The Calgary Herald (Alberta)
August 17, 2008 Sunday
Final Edition
War in Georgia demonstrates just who is in charge in Russia
THE EDITORIAL PAGE; Pg. A8
America’s George W. Bush delivered a stark warning to Russia this week
that led Russia to begin to pull back its forces in Georgia. Bush sent
his secretary of state, Condoleezza Enhanced Coverage Linkingsecretary
of state, Condoleezza Rice, to Georgia and told his defence secretary,
Robert Gates, to organize a humanitarian-aid operation. The first
American military aircraft landed at Tbilisi airport on Aug. 14.
This conflict is about more than the two separatist regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or displacing Mikheil Saakashvili,
Georgia’s hotheaded president. It is about Russia, resurgent and
nationalistic, pushing its way back into the Caucasus and chasing
others out, reversing the losses Russia feels it has suffered since
the end of the Cold War.
The fact Georgia is backed by the West made it a particularly
appealing target. In fighting Georgia, Russia fought a proxy war with
the West — and especially with America (which upgraded the Georgian
army).
All this was payback for the humiliation Russia suffered in the 1990s
and its answer to NATO’s bombing of Belgrade in 1999 and America’s
invasion of Iraq. With the smoke of battle still in the air, it is
impossible to say who actually started it. But, given the scale and
promptness of Russia’s response, the script must have been written in
Moscow. The rattling of sabres has been heard in both capitals for
months, if not years.
Russia imposed sanctions on Georgia and rounded up Georgians in
Moscow. In revenge for the recognition of Kosovo’s independence
earlier this year, Putin established legal ties with the governments
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
In the late spring, Russia and Georgia came close to a clash over
Abkhazia, but diplomats pulled the two sides apart. A war in Georgia
became a favourite topic in Moscow’s rumour mill. In early July,
Russia staged a large military exercise on the border with South
Ossetia. At the same time Russian jets flew over the region "to
establish the situation" and "cool down Georgia’s hotheads," according
to the Russians.
South Ossetia is a tiny patchwork of villages — Georgian and South
Ossetian — which was easy to drag into a war. It is headed by a
thuggish former Soviet official, Eduard Kokoity, and run by the
Russian security services. It lives off smuggling and Russian money.
In early August, Georgian and South Ossetian separatists exchanged
fire and explosive attacks. South Ossetia blew up a truck carrying
Georgian policemen and attacked Georgian villages; Georgia fired back
at the capital of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali.
What happened next is less clear. Russia claims Saakashvili
treacherously broke a unilateral ceasefire he had just announced,
ordering a massive offensive on Tskhinvali, ethnically cleansing South
Ossetian villages and killing as many as 2,000 people.
What triggered the Georgian action, Saakashvili says, was the movement
of Russian troops through the Roki tunnel connecting South Ossetia to
Russia. Georgia started to shell and invade Tskhinvali. Then the
Russian army moved in. The picture Russia presented to the world
seemed clear: Georgia was a reckless and dangerous aggressor and
Russia had an obligation, as a peacekeeper in the region, to protect
the victims.
Russia’s response was predictable. One thing almost all observers
agree on is Saakashvili made a catastrophic mistake by walking into
the Russian trap.
Russia was prepared for the war not only militarily, but
ideologically. Its campaign was crude but effective. While its forces
were dropping bombs on Georgia, the Kremlin bombarded its own
population with an astonishing propaganda campaign.
One Russian deputy reflected the mood: "Today, it is quite obvious who
the parties in the conflict are. They are the U.S., U.K., Israel —
who participated in training the Georgian army, Ukraine — who
supplied it with weapons. We are facing a situation where there is a
NATO aggression against us."
The biggest victims of this war are civilians in South Ossetia and
Georgia. Militarily, Putin has won, but all Russia has gained from its
victory so far is a ruined reputation, broken ties with Georgia,
control over separatist enclaves (which it had anyway) and fear from
other former Soviet republics.
A six-point peace plan negotiated by Nicolas Sarkozy, the French
president, recognizes Georgian sovereignty but not its integrity. In
practice, this means Russia will not allow Georgia back into Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. According to the same plan, Russia should withdraw
its troops to where they were before the war broke out.
Other former Soviet republics, including Azerbaijan, Armenia and
Ukraine, have been dealt a lesson about both Russia’s capacity to
exert its influence and the weakness of Western commitments. America’s
inability to stop or deter Russia from attacking its smaller
neighbours has been devastatingly obvious in Georgia over the past
week.
Yet, the people who are likely in the end to pay the biggest price for
the attack on Georgia are the Russians. This price will go well beyond
any sanctions America or the European Union could impose. Like any
foreign aggression, it will lead to further stifling of civil freedoms
in Russia.
The war in Georgia has demonstrated convincingly who is in charge in
Russia. Just as the war in Chechnya helped Putin’s rise to power in
1999, the war in Georgia may now keep him in power for years to come.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
