Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
Oct 12 2007
HOUSE GENOCIDE VOTE COULD DAMAGE U.S. INTERESTS IN SOUTH CAUCASUS
By John C.k. Daly
Friday, October 12, 2007
On October 10 the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs
Committee voted 27-21 to pass a non-binding resolution that labeled
the deaths of Armenians during World War One as `genocide.’ House
Democratic leaders predicted a full House vote on the resolution
would come before Thanksgiving. The vote represents the culmination
of a decades-long campaign by the Armenian-American community to
secure government recognition of their ancestors’ sufferings, led by
the Armenian Assembly of America since its founding in 1972.
Hours before the vote President George W. Bush said, `Its passage
would do great harm to our relations with a key ally in NATO and in
the global war on terror’; afterward White House Deputy Press
Secretary Scott Stanzel pointed to more pressing issues, commenting,
`While the House is debating the Ottoman Empire, they are not moving
forward with appropriations bills. The House has not appointed
conferees, they aren’t coming to the table to discuss children’s
health care, and they haven’t permanently closed the intelligence gap
that will open up when the Protect America Act expires.’
The vote is visible proof of the influence of the Armenian lobby in
Washington. It is not the first time that Washington has seen
evidence of the lobby’s power. The collapse of Soviet power in the
Caucasus in the late 1980s led to a war between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over the disputed Karabakh enclave , which only ended with
a cease-fire signed in 1994, leaving Armenia in occupation of
approximately 20% of what was previously Soviet Azerbaijan.
In 1992 lobbying by the Armenian-American community led to a
provision in the Freedom Support Act that banned any direct U.S. aid
to the Azerbaijani government as punishment for its blockade of
Armenia. In January 2002 President George W. Bush waited Section 907
as a reward for Azeri support following the 9/11 terrorist attacks
(January 25, 2002 Presidential Determination No. 2002-06,
).
In April 2001, even before the waiver of Section 907, Secretary of
State Colin Powell’s first major foreign initiative was to try and
resolve the Karabakh dispute during a summit in Key West, Florida,
where he met with Azerbaijan President Heydar Aliyev and Armenian
President Robert Kocharian. The meetings, which were held by the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Minsk Group
co-chairs France, Russia, and United States, proved fruitless.
Despite Armenia’s sense of victory on the issue in Washington, the
fact remains that its closest political allies in the region, Russia
and Iran, are hardly viewed by the Bush administration with approval.
Russia has persistently championed Armenia as a counterweight to both
Georgia and Azerbaijan, and in 1995 Russia’s Duma recognized
Armenia’s claims of genocide. Russia also contains a significant
portion of the Armenian diaspora; authorities estimate that
approximately three million Armenians live in the Russian Federation.
The president of the World Armenian Congress and the Union of
Armenians of Russia, Ara Abramyan, commented on the close nature of
Russian-Armenian relations, stating, `The contemporary configuration
of forces in South Caucasus is such that Armenia needs close
military-political and economic relations with Russia while Russia
needs Armenia as an ally in a region which is key to Russian
interests. Therefore, the strategic union and strategic partnership
existing between our countries is not the result of wishes or
emotions of politicians. This is a harsh reality, it is politics
based on the fundamental interests of both countries’ (Azg, October
9).
In a further rebuff to Washington’s regional diplomatic clout, a
prominent Armenian intellectual has even suggested that Moscow might
broker the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations. According to
Ruben Safrastian, director of the Oriental Studies Institute at the
Armenian National Academy of Science, `Russia’s interest in Armenia,
as a regional ally, as well as the deep roots of Russian-Armenian
relations create a favorable atmosphere for Russian diplomats to more
actively mediate in the normalization and establishment of
Armenian-Turkish relations.’ Safrastian cautioned, however, `Russia
and Turkey approach each other primarily as economic partners, and
partially politically. The two countries, however, have remained
rivals from the geopolitical viewpoint’ (Interfax-AVN, October 11).
Washington might still yet have a role to play in the final
settlement of Karabakh, as it is currently holding discussions with
its OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs Russia and France (Trend, October 11).
What remains unclear at the moment is that, having delighted the
Armenian lobby with the congressional resolution, what will the
fallout be with Washington’s close NATO ally — Turkey — and what
impact this may have on the Pentagon’s potential further use of the
Turkish Incirlik airbase and Ankara’s intentions toward Kurdish
guerrillas operating from bases in northern Iraq. Whatever its
policies in the short term, it seems most unlikely that Washington
will be able to mollify both Yerevan and Ankara and whether in the
long run such resolutions will grow quiet or further inflame an
already volatile region.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
