AMERICAN RADAR SYSTEMS, RUSSIAN BASES AND NATIONAL ARMED FORCES: THE STATE OF MILITARY AFFAIRS IN THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS
By Celia Chauffour
Today, Azerbaijan
Oct 9 2006
143%. That is the number held by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) in a report made public on June 12th to
evaluate the increase in Georgia’s military expenditures in 2005. In
this military roster, the neighboring Southern Caucasian republics of
Azerbaijan and Armenia show increases in their armament expenditures
of 51% and 23% respectively.
What must one see behind this dizzying rise in military expenditures
by the Georgians? The Georgian authorities claim that it is linked to
the reforms the country is undertaking to integrate into NATO. Some
international capitals, particularly Moscow, object that Tbilisi’s
intention is to launch an armed reconquest of the secessionist regions
of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia. One day after the publication
of SIPRI’s report, the Russian minister of defense, Sergei Ivanov,
in no way failed to highlight that the significant augmentation of
Georgian military expenditures elicited an "incontestable worry."
Today, the Georgian defense budget totals 397.4 million laris (178
million euros), approximately 3% of the GDP. Georgia’s defense budget
also receives important aid from the United States and NATO.
Reforming Georgian Defense
In terms of defense, it is with a loud voice that the Georgian
government formulates itsthree main objectives. The first is to
facilitate the process of integration with NATO. "Our ultimate goal is
to equip the country with permanent armed forces and forces which are
interoperable with the Alliance’s other units in order to contribute
to international peace-keeping operations," said Mamuka Kudava,
the Georgian vice-minister of defense, recalling immediately that 8%
of the Georgian armed forces are currently mobilized in peacekeeping
operations.
A second target in the Georgian ministry of defense’s line of sight
is the reformation of its system of management. For Mr. Kudava,
this means "using our logistical, financial and human resources
efficiently, and rendering the decision making and implementation
process more effective." One example of the reforms underway is that
the Georgian defense ministry is giving its officer corps a face
lift. The actual command structure, inherited from the Soviet era,
will be progressively remodeled in order to equip the country with
an officer corps interarmed to NATO standards.
Trained and Equipped
The third and final declared objective of the ministry is to improve
the combat capacities of its armed forces. Any question of equipment
and training cannot fail to remind one that from May 2002 to April
2004, Georgia benefited from the Georgia Train and Equip Program
(GTEP), a program financed by the United States and led by American
instructors, which sought to form battalions of Georgian soldiers
for the ‘War on Terror.’
"Contrary to what some people were able to write, the goal of the
program was not simply to form a small group of Georgian soldiers
capable of assuring the protection of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum (BTE) pipelines and their maritime
approaches. The arrangement undertaken by the United States goes
well beyond that. It is very much a heavy rearrangement of all of
the components of the Georgian army including transforming infantry
troops into special forces, made up by armored units as well as
police, customs and security services," explains Cyrille Gloaguen,
a specialist in military issues and Russian security at l’Institut
Fransais de Geopolitique and a former collaborator with the United
Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) from 1998 to 2000.
A New Military Base in Senaki
As the crowning event of 2006 and the ultimate pride of the Georgian
defense, the inauguration of the military base at Senaki in western
Georgia will have made some noise. Begun in 2005, the construction
of this new base conforming to NATO standards will not be completed
until the end of 2006. The total cost? According to the figures given
by the Georgian authorities, the cost will reach 35 million laris
(15.6 million euros).
Following its launch, the Saakashvili administration plans to open
a similar building site in the coming months at Gori in central
Georgia. "The construction of this base will be launched in 2006,"
confirms Mr. Kudava.
In the eyes of numerous international observers, the location of
these bases is not insignificant. At a minimum, it raises questions
and doubts because the Senaki base is situated only 40 kilometers
from the border with separatist Abkhazia. The base in Gori will be
separated from Tskhinvali, the capital of the secessionist republic
of Southern Ossetia, by only some thirty kilometers.
Even if Tbilisi pleads for a peaceful resolution to these separatist
conflicts, it is an undeniable fact that these two bases are as many
negative signals for the two unrecognized republics of Abkhazia and
Southern Ossetia. Although the construction of these bases does not
fit into a military project of restoring the integrity of Georgian
territory, Abkhazians and Southern Ossetians give little credit to
the declared intentions of the Georgian government.
Abkhazian and Southern Ossetian Defense
Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia are equipped with de facto ministers
of defense, armed forces and police forces. These structures are
not recognized by the international community and are consequently
categorized as paramilitaries. In addition, in these two separatist
regions actual armed paramilitary groups are evolving which are not,
or practically are not, under the control of the local authorities.
Finally, both Tskhinvali and Sukhumi have the ability to mobilize
a large portion of the male population in case of a threat or for
exercises.
But it is difficult to evaluate the latter group with precision. For
Southern Ossetia, estimates range between 2,000 and 6,000 men.
Concerning Abkhazia, one can retain that the last two military
exercises conducted in March and April 2006 mobilized 4,000 and 5,000
men respectively, including reservists.
The Russian peacekeeping forces deployed in Abkhazia are comprised of
1,300 men. In Southern Ossetia, the battalions of joint peacekeeping
forces are made up by 500 Russian soldiers to which 500 Northern
Ossetians and 300 Georgians are adjoined.
The Departure of Russian Soldiers from Georgia
Back to Georgia. Although it was largely publicized, the two building
sites at Senaki and Gori, one nearly completed and the other in the
planning stage, will not have stolen the thunder from the national
military agenda’s major push: the retreat of Russian troops from
Georgia.
In Moscow in 2005, the then Georgian minister of foreign affairs,
Salome Zurabishvili, demanded the closure of the two Russian bases on
Georgian territory (in Batumi and Akhalkalaki) and the process is under
way today. The Russian base at Akhalkalaki which will definitively
close its doors at the end of 2007 will be completely emptied of its
heavy equipment and weapons between now and the end of 2006.
In mid-June, ten infantry combat vehicles (BMP), a reconnaissance
vehicle (BRDM) as well as a light armored troop transport vehicle
(MT-LB) left the Akhalkalaki base in order to be put into use in
Russia via Azerbaijani territory. Five Kamaz armed with 100mm canons
also left the base in the direction of Armenia where the arms will be
stocked on the Russian military base at Gioumri (in western Armenia).
>>From Conscripts to Professionals
Another thread to follow is the professionalization of the Georgian
army. Today 60% of the country’s armed forces, which totaled
17,500 men in 2005, are comprised of volunteers. According to the
Georgian minister of defense, Irakli Okruashvili, conscripts will
be completely replaced with professionals by 2009. This will be a
heavy and expensive reform and it will see the light of day only if
the ministry in question undertakes the difficult task of rapidly
and completely introducing reforms which will improve the management
of the armed forces. This includes, notably, playing the budgetary
transparency card.
For now, Georgian observers maintain that projects like the opening
of the base at Senaki are necessary to follow the road which leads
to NATO membership. But a strong army starts with well nourished
soldiers. As expected, the ministry categorically rejects this type
of accusation, arguing mainly that salaries have been "augmented in
a significant way since 2004", brandishing even "an average raise
of 250%." Critics of the living conditions of Georgian conscripts in
barracks regularly dismiss this argument.
Russian Bases in Armenia
In the neighboring republic of Armenia which the frozen Nagorno
Karabakh conflict has pitted against Azerbaijan for more than ten
years, Pavel Safarian, the vice-minister of the economy and finances,
recently announced a sensible increase in the defense budget for
2007. 34% of the state budget will be earmarked for defense, totaling
approximately 90 billion drams (172 million euros). In 2004, the
defense budget in Armenia was 78 million euros, as opposed to 108
million euros in 2005 and 131 million euros in 2006.
Members of the Armenian armed forces totaled 45,000 men in 2005,
of which 41,500 were ground troops. On the other hand, nobody can
ignore the presence of Russian troops from the Southern division of
the Group of Russian forces in the Transcaucasus (GRVZ; approximately
4,500 men) which assures the protection of the country’s borders
under the auspices of the CIS’s collective security agreement.
American Radar Systems
On the Azerbaijani side, the authorities shy away from communicating
about the sensible subject of defense. Figures vary and Baku cultivates
the imprecision. The country’s armed forces will mobilize 67,000
people, of which 57,000 are for the sole ground army.
According to figures from the International Institute for Strategic
Studies in London, the defense budget will reach 470 million euros
this year, as opposed to 247 million euros in 2005 and 195 million
euros in 2004. And oil revenues could allow for a considerable
augmentation of the military portfolio for 2007. But once again,
it is hazardous to give exact figures about Azerbaijan. According to
the numbers published by the Institut de Relations Internationales
et Strategiques (IRIS) in its Annee Strategique 2006, the military
budget of Azerbaijan reached 124 million Euros in 2005.
Outside of these military expenditures, Azerbaijan has attracted
international attention for the agreement which links it to the
United States. The agreement concerns the installation of American
radar systems on its soil, one 20 kilometers north of the Iranian
border in southern Azerbaijan and the other north of Baku, near the
Russian border.
For Oksana Antonenko, director of the Russia-Eurasia program at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, these radar systems
"have the official objective of controlling contraband, including
the likely traffic of weapons of mass destruction via the Caspian sea."
"However, it is clear that the technical characteristics and the
location of these radar systems near the Iranian and Russian borders
could allow them to assemble information and monitor northern Iran and
the eastern portion of the Russian North Caucasus – two particularly
unstable regions," insists Ms. Antonenko. "These radar systems could
also control other activities in the Caspian sea, such as activities
of a military type, which have increased considerably with the steady
militarization of the Caspian."
A Reinforced Cooperation Between Baku and Washington
It seems that in this affair, the American interests are evident. But
why has the Ilham Aliev regime accepted this military agreement? "I
believe that the agreement must be considered in the larger context
of Baku’s projects which aim to reinforce military relations with
Washington~Z- which partially explains the need to counterbalance the
developing Russian military presence in Armenia~Z- and in terms of the
more pressing need of the Azerbaijanis to pull a profit from their
partnership with the Americans," maintains the expert. "The policy
of balance which Azerbaijan is judiciously playing in developing good
relations with the United States, Russia and Iran guarantee that its
military cooperation with Washington will not undermine its relations
with its two important neighbors. One must note however that Russia
is less preoccupied by military links, potential and real alike,
tying Baku to Washington than by the military cooperation displayed
between Georgia and the United States."
Although it is less visible, the military cooperation between
Washington and Baku is developing. A revealing sign was in Baku where,
at Washington’s initiative, a conference of non-proliferation in
the Black and Caspian seas was held in the autumn of 2005. For the
occasion, marine officers from the coastal countries of the two seas
were reunited under the auspices of a fictional exercise to oppose a
fictional state baptized "The Purple Republic", suspected of terrorist
activities and of detonating a nuclear weapon. No particular state
was targeted. The only certainty is the callous one following: Of the
coastal states convened to participate in the exercise, only Russia
and Iran were absent.