IF RUSSIA YIELDS ARMENIA, IT WILL LOSE ALL OF ITS POSITIONS IN THE CAUCASUS: INTERVIEW WITH VIKTOR NADEIN-RAYEVSKY
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15:04 06/05/2006
Senior researcher of the Institute of World Economy and International
Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences Viktor Nadein-Rayevsky
answers REGNUM’ s questions:
REGNUM: Mr. Nadein-Rayevsky, presently Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov is paying a visit to Turkey and Turkish President Ahmed Necet
Sezer is going to shortly visit Russia. The sides are speaking about
strategic cooperation – basically, in energy. What do you think about
Russian-Turkish relations and the prospects of their development?
The strategy term is hardly applicable to Russian-Turkish
relations. Russia and Turkey have never had any strategy in the
past, do not have it in the present and will hardly have it in the
future. Turkey was the first who tried to bring in some strategy in
bilateral relations: in 1990 Ankara attempted to make a strategic
alliance with the Soviet Union, but decided to take time when it
collapsed. The Turks hoped that now they would be able to enlarge
relations already with the post-Soviet republics and with some of
them to use the factor of common Turkic origin and language. They
planned this almost the way Ataturk planned, but they failed: the newly
independent nations turned out to be quite different in mentality and
culture. Historically, Turkey itself is responsible for the gradual
distancing between the Turkic nations: they first regarded themselves
as Ottomans, then, under Abdul Hamid II, they proclaimed pan-Islamism,
then, they still preferred pan-Turkism and brought into power Young
Turks, who joined Germany during the WWI – so much eager they were
to expand.
Everything what happened after 1991 was, to a certain extent,
the consequence of this pan-Turkic policy. Pan-Turkism proved
impracticable – it was like Communism. Not that the national elites
of the Turkic republics were just unready to give up power, they
were simply unwilling to do that: to give power, money and economy
for some idea – nobody will agree to this. Ankara saw that there is
absolutely no basis for pan-Turkism. Roughly speaking, they faced
the same we faced with our Slavonic brothers in XIX.
As regards Russia, as I have already said, it was mainly Turkey who
tried to bring up bilateral relations to the level of strategic
cooperation. The first Ankara’s proposal in 1990 was rejected by
the Soviet authorities as they took it as an attempt to interfere in
the Soviet influence zone, which was right. Turkey raised this issue
again in 1995, when its pan-Turkic policy ran across some impassable
barriers – but our position was the same. It was then that Turkey began
realizing that 90% of its ties in the Soviet area were with Russia
and no Uzbekistan could replace the millions of dollars it got from
shuttle trade. It turned out that language is not the main thing. The
main thing is economic interests – the lives of people and the life of
a nation. This is the very principle the present Russian-Turkish ties
are based on. The key link between Russia and Turkey has been and is
economy. Already before the big energy projects, like the Blue Flow,
Turkey got $6 bln-$15 bln from shuttle trade alone, and it was the
key source of income for its economy for quite a long time.
REGNUM: The first thing that comes in mind when one speaks of Turkey’s
trade policy is Turkish “fast moving consumer goods.” Is this problem
still topical for the Russian consumers, if yes, how serious is it?
In 1995 we warned the Turks that they should not trade with us the
way they did, that they should raise the quality of their goods to the
European standards, that our consumers were buying Turkish goods only
because of hard social conditions, that they would no longer buy them
as soon as they got better-off, that Turkey could lose our market. In
the following years Turkey faced default but still preserved its
shuttle trade. Later, suitcase sellers were replaced by firms trading
in big lots and paying taxes. It was already an improvement. The
quality control was also improved. Now Turkey is trying to make quality
the basis of its trade as it clearly understands that it can get in
the situation the Georgian and Moldavian wines got in.
One should always care for the quality of his exports rather than
just allege that Russia does something for political motives. Our
relations With Georgia have been tensed for many years already —
but what we actually want is to, finally, taste a normal Georgian
wide. Russia is fighting with all low quality producers and with home
producers it is even tougher than with foreigners.
I think we are right as it is high time to stop high mortality caused
by faked alcohol – to stop the death of tens of thousands of people
every year. The same was the situation with the American chicken
legs – the row was big but they solved the problem. The US raised
the quality control standards. Why could they do this and Georgia
and Moldova can’t? This is a national issue, and when the Russian
president spoke about demography he meant there will be no indulgence –
for Turkey either.
REGNUM: They in Armenia are worried with any closer contacts between
Russia and Turkey? Can Russian-Turkish relations be bad for Armenia?
Russia will never cede Armenia for improving its relations with
Turkey. This is a matter of principle. There are things one can
sacrifice, but there are things one cannot. The point is not so
much that two million Armenians live in Russia and many of them
are Russian citizens. For Armenia Russia’s steps must never be
bad. The point is that even the Yeltsin Russia perfectly realized
that it must not waive Armenia’s interests, not mentioning Putin,
who clearly sees the national interests, at least, the clear ones. He
is trying to extrapolate them for the future. I simply can’t imagine
that Russia may yield Armenia – if Russia does this it will lose all
of its positions in the Caucasus.
Russia should understand one most important thing – there are partners
and allied countries with whom one should keep up the sense of alliance
and duty.
REGNUM: How could you explain the outburst of activity of the
Iranian Azeris? Large-scale destabilization – is it possible and what
consequences it may have?
There are several versions. Northern Iran has two provinces with
some 12 mln-18 mln Azeri residents. Iranian Azeris are not outcasts
in Iran. Iran is a multi-national and multi-religious country and
Azeris have their serious place there. Even the religious leader
of Iran Ayatollah Khamenei is Azeri. The basic principle in Iran is
religion rather than nationality.
Iran’s official version is that the protest actions are an American
project.
They probably have proofs, but I don’t believe this. My personal
opinion is that this is an Iranian project, or the result of local
nationalism, or a preventive action to neutralize a potentially
unreliable element. In any case, many complex processes are taking
place in Iran – many people are displeased with the tyranny of
mullahs who dictate a lifestyle nobody accepts any longer outside
Iran. Obviously, there is tension and there is need for reforms. At
best, this situation may end in reforms and, if the Iranian authorities
prove wise enough to carry them out, everything will be OK. Of course,
the Americans can capitalize on this tension. They can use any social
tension to plot a revolution, which is all but good for Iran.
REGNUM: How much probable is the US’ active invasion of Iran or its
preventive strikes on its nuclear facilities?
Though I don’t believe this will happen, I prefer to call
this hypothetical action “a possible American stupidity.” The
strikes by Israel or US groups will spark off numerous mostly
unpredictable scenarios. One thing is clear – there will be no
internal explosion. The Iranian authorities will be able to unite
their people against the foreign enemy, to stop all reforms, which
will mean an end to the hopes of the democratic part of the Iranian
society. It seems that the Americans do not realize this, they are
like an elephant in a china-shop. For them the invasion of Iran is
an initially counterproductive action. They will immediately lose
the confidence of the Shiahs — 55%-60% of the Iraqis. As a result,
they will get a collapsing coalition and anti-American southern Iraq.
REGNUM: What are the chances that Turkey may join the anti-Iranian
coalition?
I very much doubt that it will. Turkey is wise enough not to get
there as this would be a suicide. This would mean to blow up the
10-12 mln Kurds, to blow up Shiahs – a total of 1/3 of the Turkish
population. This would be a fatal trick. The Turks are wise politicians
and they will not get into this bog exactly now that their economy is
coming out of crisis. The Iraqi example has shown that it is very hard
to insure oneself from the American stupidity. They got into a mess in
Iraq though they could get what they wanted – oil – in a more civilized
manner. Relying on force, they could not imagine that cities can also
be a serious arena for guerrilla war, they were not ready for that.
As regards the South Caucasus, here the major risk is the flow of
refugees who may simply overwhelm the region in case of bad scenario.