F18News: Turkey – Is there religious freedom in Turkey?

FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway

The right to believe, to worship and witness
The right to change one’s belief or religion
The right to join together and express one’s belief

================================================
Wednesday 12 October 2005
TURKEY: IS THERE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN TURKEY?

The European Union (EU) must make full religious freedom for all a core
demand in the EU membership negotiations with Turkey which have just
begun, argues Otmar Oehring of the German Catholic charity Missio
<; in
this personal commentary for Forum 18 News Service
<;. Dr Oehring also calls for people inside and
outside Turkey who believe in religious freedom for all to honestly and
openly raise the continuing obstructions to the religious life of Turkey’s
Muslim, Christian and other religious communities. He analyses the limited,
complex and changing state of religious freedom in the country. In
particular, he notes that Christians of all confessions, devout Muslim
women, Muslim minorities, and other minority religions face official
obstacles in practicing their faith and (in the case of non-Muslims)
strong social hostility.

TURKEY: IS THERE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN TURKEY?

By Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office of Missio
<;

Go to any mosque or church in Turkey and you will see people worshipping.
So clearly some religious freedom exists. Yet serious problems persist.
Religious communities are not allowed to organise themselves as they
choose. Individual religious freedom exists up to a point. For example,
you are entitled by law to change your religion and to have the change
recorded on your identity documents, but people who have done so have
faced hostility from fellow-citizens. As soon as a religious community
wants to organise itself, problems arise. This holds just as much for
Muslims as for communities of other faiths.

Although many Turks dislike the term “State Islam”, it has to be stated
that Islam is organised by the state. Sunnis who consider this an
unacceptable innovation are not allowed to organise. Although Sufi orders
exist, some even with a vast membership, they have been officially
forbidden banned since the 1920s.

The main problem religious communities identify is their lack of legal
status as religious communities. In the late Ottoman period some religious
minorities had legal status under the millet system, but the Islamic
community had no separate legal status as the state was considered to be
Islamic. But since the founding of the Turkish republic, any such status
has disappeared. Some Muslims are concerned about this lack of legal
status, especially minority Muslim groups within the dominant Sunni
majority, as well as the Alevis, Shias and the Sufi orders. But few
Muslims are prepared to voice their demands for legal status openly, for
fear of imprisonment, although in recent years the Alevis have become more
vocal. This has led to their gaining some recognition as associations,
though not as religious bodies.

Religious meetings and services without authorisation remain illegal,
though it remains unclear in law what constitutes legal and illegal
worship. The Ottoman millet system recognised some religious minorities
and the 1923 Lausanne Treaty spoke vaguely of religious minority rights
without naming them, but the Turkish authorities interpret this to exclude
communities such as the Roman Catholics, Syriac Orthodox and Lutherans,
even though these communities have found ways to function. Protestant
Christian churches functioning quietly in non-recognised buildings are
generally tolerated, but Muslims gathering outside an approved mosque are
viewed as a threat to the state and police will raid them.

It is not possible for most Protestant Christian churches to be recognised
as churches under current Turkish law. But in one bizarre case, a German
Christian church was recognised in Antalya, but only by calling itself a
“chapel” not a “church.” Most Evangelical Protestant churches in Turkey do
not meet in private homes, but in rented facilities such as office
buildings or other non-residential buildings. These can be fairly large.

The Law on Associations – adopted by Parliament in October 2004 – does not
allow the founding of associations with a religious purpose, so founding a
religious discussion group or even a religious freedom group is
impossible, even if some religious communities do try to register as
associations. Some Sufi orders and new Islamic movements have registered
as businesses, even with religious names.

However, the government has changed the building planning laws, replacing
the word “mosque” with “place of worship”. The government indicated to
Protestant churches that individuals cannot ask for buildings to be
designated as a place of worship, but individual congregations should try
to get recognition as a legal personality first (as a “Dernek” or society)
and then try to get their meeting place designated as a place of worship.
At least two Protestant churches are now trying this route.

There are currently two Protestant churches that are legally recognised by
the Turkish state, one of which is in Istanbul. It was recognised as a
“Vakf” (charitable foundation) several years ago, after a long court
battle, making it a legal entity. Several weeks ago, they finally had
their building officially designated as a place of worship. The second
example is the Protestant church in Diyarbakir, which has legal
recognition as a house of worship under the Ministry of Culture, as a
heritage site.

Religious education remains tightly controlled. In law such education must
be carried out by the state, although in practice Christian churches –
Armenian Apostolic, Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant – have been able to
provide catechetical training to their children on church premises. The
state turns a blind eye to this. But Koranic courses are different.
Officially they should take place only under the guidance of the state,
yet some 6,000 such courses are widely spoken of as existing
clandestinely. Many officials and police officers have good contacts with
them, while many senior officials and parliamentarians have been members
of Sufi orders which officially do not exist or are forbidden.

It is generally impossible to found higher education establishments for
Muslims, Christians and others. The Armenian Apostolic and the Greek
Orthodox seminaries were closed down in the 1970s and the government has
resisted all attempts to reopen them. Protestants cannot normally
establish Bible colleges. However, an Evangelical Bible college functions
in Selcuk; it is not government recognised and accredited, but it has been
providing theological training for several years. Christian clergy and
pastors mostly have to train abroad. Alevi Muslims do not tend to demand
religious colleges, as they are led not by imams but by elders who are
initiated by other elders.

The Law on Construction – which came into force into July 2003 – makes it
possible to “establish” places of worship. But the law – probably
deliberately – does not define if this means “build”, “rent” or “buy”.
Protestant churches face problems trying to build. Any community wishing
to build a place of worship officially can do so in an area with a minimum
number of adherents of their faith – but the state decides if the community
has enough members to get the land it needs. There is no authoritative
definition of how the law should be interpreted. The Justice Minister said
recently that religious communities intending to establish a place of
worship should apply, but how can religious communities apply if
officially they cannot exist?

Government officials do not want to acknowledge that Alevi Muslims cannot
officially establish places of worship. The government is building Sunni
mosques in many Alevi villages, but Alevis will not go to them. Instead
they meet openly for worship in cemevis (meeting houses), not only in
central Anatolia but even in Istanbul. The government stated in parliament
in 2004 that such Alevi cemevis are not to be considered as places of
worship. Although many of them still function unimpeded, some have been
closed down in recent years.

Conversion from one faith to another is possible, even from Islam, under
the law on personal status (though you cannot be listed officially as an
atheist or agnostic). If you convert from Islam you can change your faith
on your identity papers, but being Muslim on your identity card makes
day-to-day life easier. Christians, Baha’is or Jehovah’s Witnesses are
often unable to find employment, especially in rural areas. So many who
have converted from Islam to another faith prefer to leave their religious
designation on their identity papers unchanged. According to information
given by the Minister of State in charge of Religious Affairs this autumn,
during the last ten years fewer than 400 people officially converted to
Christianity and only about 10 to Judaism.

Islam is controlled by the Presidency of Religious Affairs, or Diyanet
<;, which is directed
from the Prime Minister’s office. This was deliberately established not as
a government ministry, as Turkey claims to be a secular state. Some Muslims
do object to this state control, especially those from newer groups, such
as the Nurcu movement, the Suleymanci, followers of Fethullah Gulen, and
members of Sufi orders.

Some religious communities can officially invite foreign religious
workers. The Catholics can under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty invite foreign
priests up to a certain number, though even then the government makes this
difficult, asking why the Church needs so many priests when there are so
few Catholics. It is more difficult for Protestant communities, as
officially they do not exist as religious communities. Foreign religious
workers who come to Turkey under some other guise can face problems, if
the government finds out about them. As long as the state does not have to
know about their activity they can function, but as soon as the state is
forced to take official notice of them, they can face problems. The
government knows about most, if not all, Protestant missionaries, because
these made a conscious decision to be open about what they are doing.
Occasionally they experience some problems but – with occasional
exceptions – the government merely monitors what they do, leaving them
otherwise undisturbed.

All religious communities are under state surveillance, with religious
minorities facing the closest scrutiny. Christian leaders know they are
listened in to and their telephones are tapped. The Ecumenical Patriarch
states that “walls have ears,” even when speaking within his own
Patriarchate in the Fener district of Istanbul. Police visit individual
Christian churches to ask who attends, which foreigners have visited, what
they discussed. They are particularly interested in which Turkish citizens
attend.

Are such visits a threat, or do the intelligence agencies just want to
know what is going on? When the police attend Catholic services in Ankara,
they say they are there to protect Christians. From my conversations with
church members, I’m sure this is not true.

When secularism was proclaimed as a guiding state principle in line with
French laïcité it was sincerely meant. Kemal Ataturk and his followers
aimed to crush Islam. Later on, officials understood that society was not
willing to follow this line. Slowly, Islam returned to schools and other
areas of life. Now Turkey is a Sunni Muslim state. All those whose mother
tongue is Turkish and are Sunni Muslims are considered Turks. Alevis,
Kurds, Christians and all other minorities are not considered Turks – they
are considered as foreigners.

The furore over headscarves – a genuine concern to devout Muslim women –
was exploited as a political issue by Islamist parties, eager to
demonstrate their opposition to the military authorities which had banned
Islamic dress after the 1980 coup. Had there been no headscarf ban, there
would have been no problem. This point was illustrated by the case of a
non-political devout Muslim, Leyla Sahin. She was barred from wearing a
headscarf in Istanbul University in her fifth year of medical studies and
subsequently successfully completed medical studies at Vienna University
in Austria. This disturbing ban – which de jure bars devout Muslim women
from universities – is currently under consideration by a Grand Chamber of
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). (See
<; for more on this and other ECHR
cases.)

In rural Sunni areas women have always worn headscarves – though not the
type seen in Iran or Saudi Arabia – which some women have tried to wear in
towns. In some cases, supporters of the Refah (Welfare) party and others
have paid women to wear such scarves. Even nationalist politicians say
that if women are free to choose whether to wear a headscarf or not, many
who have worn them for political reasons would no longer wish to do so.

Societal opposition to minorities of all sorts does impact on religious
freedom. Such social pressure is felt most keenly among the poor. Members
of the urban middle class who convert from Islam to other faiths can
freely practise their new faith. In Izmir a Christian church exists where
many young converts of university background attend unchallenged. But
openly converting to and practising a non-Islamic faith is often
impossible in poor neighbourhoods. In former Armenian-populated areas of
Anatolia – where there are also people of Syriac descent – many families
changed their formal identification to Muslims, but did not convert in
reality. Their attempts to practise Christianity face enormous obstacles
unless they move to Istanbul or even to Ankara. Back in these towns and
villages are no Christian churches, so anyone wanting to meet for
Christian worship could be dragged off to the police or suffer beatings.

One former Interior Minister stated that Christians should only conduct
missionary activity among such people of Christian descent. He estimated
the numbers of such people at between 800,000 and three million people.

You have to be very courageous to set up a Protestant church in remote
areas, as pastor Ahmet Guvener found in Diyarbakir. Problems can come from
neighbours and from the authorities. Even if not working hand in hand,
neighbours and officials share the same hostility. They cannot understand
why anyone would convert to Christianity. People are not upset seeing old
Christian churches – Syriac Orthodox and other Christian churches have
always existed in Anatolia – but seeing a new Protestant church, even when
housed in a shop or private flat, arouses hostility.

Officials vary in their attitudes. The Kemalist bureaucracy follows
Ataturk’s secularist line and is against anything religious. There is a
nationalist, chauvinistic wing of officialdom which believes that anything
not Turkish is a threat to be countered. The security and intelligence
services, including the powerful military, are both Kemalist and
nationalist. Anyone considered not to be Turkish and not Sunni Muslim
faces problems. Even Sunni Muslim Kurds are excluded, while Alevi Kurds
are regarded as even worse.

It is very difficult to imagine that in the next decade or so Turkish
society will change to allow full religious freedom. To take one example,
for the change to be conceivable the chauvinistic content of primary and
secondary school education – constant praise of Ataturk, Turkey and all
things Turkish – will have to change. Unless this happens, it is very hard
to imagine Turkey evolving into an open society that is truly ready to
accept European Union (EU) human rights requirements. One non-religious
illustration of the lack of openness in Turkish society is the near
impossibility of free discussion of the genocide of 1.5 million Armenians
and Assyrians in the last years of the Ottoman empire, along with
continued official denial that the genocide took place.

Christian churches have welcomed the prospect of Turkish EU accession,
often due to their own communities’ experience and hopes. If negotiations
last for more than a few years some improvements for religious minorities
– including Islamic minorities – might be possible.

Sadly, there appears to be not enough interest among diplomats in Ankara
from EU member states – or in their foreign ministries back home – in
promoting religious freedom in Turkey. The EU has forced the Turkish
government to change the Law on Foundations. This law governs inter alia
community foundations (cemaat vak&#305;flar) that act as the owners of the
real estate of Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks and Jews, who are treated by
the government as minorities within the meaning of the Treaty of Lausanne
as well as some of the properties of the Chaldean Catholic, Syrian
Catholic and Syrian Orthodox Christians, who are not treated by the
government as minorities within the meaning of the Treaty of Lausanne. But
reforms will have to go much deeper for Turkey to meet the EU’s stated
‘Copenhagen criteria’ of being “a stable democracy, respecting human
rights, the rule of law, and the protection of minorities.” The EU must
make full religious freedom for all, including for Muslims, a core demand.

Full religious freedom would bring with it an increase in the influence of
Islam, which some think would endanger the western orientation of Turkey.
Possibly this is the reason that the EU has not pushed Turkey harder on
religious freedom. However, it is unwise to see the relationship with
Turkey through such “war-against-terror spectacles.” It is vital for the
future of Turkey that full religious freedom be a core demand, so that
Turkish democracy can be strengthened to the point that it can in
democratic ways cope with the hostility of some Islamic groups.

With so little apparent interest in pushing for full religious freedom
from within the EU, local religious communities within Turkey will have to
take the lead. They are starting to challenge the denial of their rights
through the courts. Protestant Christians have been doing this for almost
10 years, usually with success. The Ecumenical Patriarchate, however, has
failed to regain a former orphanage it ran on an island near Istanbul
through the High Court in Ankara. It is now taking the case to the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg, to which Turkey is
subject as a member of the Council of Europe. I believe this is the right
way for such communities to defend their rights and others are already
following. The Alevi Muslims have told the government that, if they
continue to be denied religious education in state schools to their
children according to their own teaching, they too will go to the ECHR.
Denial of legal status to religious communities is another possible ECHR
case.

The most important thing is to put religious freedom on the agenda and
talk openly of the problems with full knowledge of the nuances and
complexities of the situation.

It is important to challenge Turkey’s restrictions on religious freedom
using Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which Turkey
signed in 1954. This article guarantees “freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship,
teaching, practice and observance.” This should be the basis for all
discussion of religious freedom, not the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, with its
highly restrictive approach to religious freedom.

Turkish religious communities will have to speak more on the importance of
religious freedom to the outside world, though they will have to be wise in
the way they do this. Religious minority leaders are in a difficult
situation: they believe that they have to argue in favour of negotiations
on EU membership, however sceptical they might be about how ready Turkish
society is to make the necessary changes.

Foreign churches and religious communities should be talking to their own
governments, to press them to promote religious freedom in Turkey. They
will have to convince them they are not simply advocating greater rights
for their co-religionists but truly advocate religious freedom for all in
Turkey, including Muslims.

The big question remains: do the Turkish government and people have the
will to allow full religious freedom for all? The Turkish media speculates
that the current government might not be in favour of EU membership, but is
merely using this as a way to introduce domestic developments to achieve
Islamist aims. The suggestion put forward in the media is that, if
democracy develops, the military will be prevented from mounting a coup
and so there will no longer be any obstacle to Islamist aims.

Whether or not this media speculation reflects reality, all those who
believe in religious freedom in Turkey – both within the country and
abroad – must keep the issue on the domestic and international agenda –
and be honest about the continuing obstructions to religious life of
Turkey’s Muslim, Christian and other religious communities.

(END)

Dr Otmar Oehring, head of the human rights office at Missio
<;, a
Catholic mission based in the German city of Aachen, contributed this
comment to Forum 18 News Service. Commentaries are personal views and do
not necessarily represent the views of F18News or Forum 18.

A printer-friendly map of Turkey is available at
<;Rootmap=turkey>

For a personal commentary on religious freedom under Islam, see
< gt;

For a personal commentary assessing western European “headscarf laws,” see
<;.
(END)

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