Situation dictates neutrality
Hayots Ashkarh, Yerevan
14 May 05
by Vardan Grigoryan
Tensions in Russian-Georgian relations observed for the past several
years have reached breaking point, when inevitable developments can
happen as a result of the withdrawal of Russian military bases from
Georgia.
Today, the main “discovery” of [US President] George Bush’s visit to
Tbilisi, i.e. the fact that having got rid of Russian troops Georgia
is unlikely to become a neutral and demilitarized country, has been
added to the reality of the talks which are about to be deadlocked.
George Bush’s statement that he will support Georgia in its effort to
join NATO has actually ruined the basis for seeking a mutual
compromise in the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia.
Russia’s earlier reservations concerning the terms of the pull-out
were more of a propaganda nature.
The real problem is that two military and political blocs cannot exist
in the South Caucasus. In other words, if Russians quickly withdraw
their bases from Batumi and Akhalkalaki, a part of their troops and
ammunition will be moved to Armenia, and if Georgia joins NATO, the
Russian military bases deployed in Armenia will not only lose a
foothold but also the opportunity to transport military cargo via
Georgia.
Therefore, if Georgia does not agree to stay militarily and
politically neutral after the Russians’ departure, it means that the
Russian base deployed in Armenia will soon find itself in a blockade
and face the risk of losing its strategic importance to Russia. A
question arises: why has the Georgian side become so unbending of
late?
We think the main “mission” of the “rose revolution” lurks just here –
it is [Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili’s desire to spread this
experience to the neighbouring countries. In other words, the USA
targets not only Georgia but also the whole region. Washington is
trying to solve this problem by means of the Georgian leadership’s
uncompromising position.
And for that to happen, it is necessary to speed up the process of
Georgia’s joining the military and political structures of the West,
which will be tantamount to neutralizing Russia’s military presence
almost in the whole region. After that, neither Armenia nor Russia
will be left with any choice. There is a situation in which Russia
itself is facing the dilemma: either to withdraw its bases not only
from Georgia but also from the whole region or to keep them.
It is obvious that at present Russia is not capable of solving such a
complex and multi-faceted problem. The opposite side does not have the
opportunity of choice either. Tbilisi threatens that if no arrangements
are made on the terms of withdrawal from Batumi and Akhalkalaki before
15 May, it will stop issuing visas to Russian servicemen. It is
obvious that no arrangements will be made before 15 May and an
unpredictable situation will take shape.
It is also clear that all this may affect certain parts of Georgia and
the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts. In this sense, we
are concerned about the situation in Javakhk [Georgia’s Armenian-
populated Javakheti region], as the local population will find itself
caught in the crossfire. For this reason, it is not ruled out that the
already noticeable tension may grow even more. Does the Armenian
leadership have an alternative view on the withdrawal of Russian
military bases from Akhalkalaki apart from the known position that
Yerevan considers it to be Georgia’s internal affair?
[Passage omitted: repetition]