CIS defence system disintegrating, CIS “slowly dying”, says Russian paper
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow
14 Feb 05
The collective defence system of the Commonwealth of Independent States
has begun to rapidly disintegrate, according to a Moscow daily. The
Commonwealth, as a transitional entity between USSR republics and
post-Soviet sovereign countries, is slowly dying, it said, and
collective military relations are no exception. The countries form
their military relations not in accordance with the model established
in the 1990s, but in accordance with their national interests, the
paper said. The following is text of report by Vladimir Mukhin:
“Farewell To Arms! Collective Arms…. Russia’s CIS partners are
rapidly dismantling the common defence space” published by Russian
newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta on 14 February:
The CIS collective defence system has begun to rapidly
disintegrate. The first evidence of this is the imminent
abolition of the CIS Staff for Coordinating Military Cooperation
[ShKVS]. Nezavisimaya Gazeta has learned from informed sources at the
Russian Defence Ministry that after long and intensive consultations
Moscow finally accepted Astana’s proposal to abolish this supranational
body. The structure, which has tried throughout post-Soviet history
to do at least something to regulate military relations between the
CIS state, is breathing its last.
That this decision may be made at the CIS summit to be held in Kazan
in August 2005 was confirmed for Nezavisimaya Gazeta by Col-Gen Leonid
Ivashov, vice president of the Academy of Geopolitical Issues, who
was behind the creation of the ShKVS and for a long time headed the
CIS Council of Defence Ministers secretariat and the Russian Defence
Ministry main international military cooperation directorate. The
general himself sees this step as “extremely erroneous and damaging;
one that significantly weakens Russia’s positions in the post-Soviet
space”. As you know, Russia has hitherto opposed the abolition of the
ShKVS and even at last November’s Council of Ministers it initiated
support for the body on the part of other CIS republic – first and
foremost, the Central Asian republics and Armenia. Now we have a
U-turn, as they say. Why?
The answer to this question is provided to some extent by the
heads of various CIS structures and post-Soviet republics’ military
ministers. “No single Eurasian security space currently exists,” CIS
General Secretary Nikolay Bordyuzha believes. “It remains fragmentary
and diffuse and to some extent internally contradictory, since some
of its elements not only fail to harmonize, but compete with one
another.” In order to avoid this, in his opinion, “it is necessary
to delimit spheres of influence in matters of safeguarding collective
security between existing integration structures in the region – CIS,
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Community,
the Collective Security Treaty Organization [CSTO] and others”. That
is, Bordyuzha diplomatically avoids mentioning the abolition of
military structures within the CIS (ShKVS and Council of Defence
Ministers), but clearly singles out his own structure, the Collective
Security Treaty Organization, which could be the “engine-room for
integration processes in the CIS space”. Kazakh Defence Minister
Mukhtar Altynbayev is even more emphatic. Like President Nursultan
Nazarbayev, he believes that “instead of an ineffective ShKVS and
ineffective Council of Defence Ministers a CIS states’ Security
Council should be set up, operating within the framework of the
CIS”. This idea has already been partially supported by Belarusian
Defence Minister Leanid Maltsaw: His proposal is to disband the ShKVS,
but keep the Council of Defence Ministers secretariat.
But only six of the 12 post-Soviet countries (we can rule the Baltic
countries out right away) are members of the CSTO. They, let us say,
will be “engine-rooms of integration”, but what are the others to
do? The CIS Security Council, if set up, cannot be an “engine-room”
either, since there are still no integration processes in the
post-Soviet space.
It has to be said that the Commonwealth, as a transitional entity
between USSR republics and post-Soviet sovereign countries, is
slowly dying. And collective military relations are no exception. The
countries form their military relations not in accordance with the
model established in the nineties, but in accordance with their
national interests. And this is evidently an objective process. That
the CSTO military staff is more effective than the ShKVS is an
illusion. For instance, within the CSTO there is already a nucleus of
countries united by their own coalition forces in Central Asia. There
is a single grouping of Russian and Belarusian forces in the western
CIS and Russian and Armenian forces in the south. All these groupings
have their own command and control staffs and only at a pinch could
they be united under the CSTO flag. At the same time, the recent
10th anniversary of the formation of the CIS combined air defence
system showed that many post-Soviet countries have common interests
in defending their air borders. Of course, the CSTO states are
the backbone of the countries. But there is rivalry and there are
problems even among them. For instance, Kyrgyzstan, a CSTO member,
is clearly lagging behind integration processes within the framework
of the formation of the combined air defence system. Its air defence
chief, Col Vladimir Valyayev, was not even at the celebratory session
of the combined air defence system countries’ coordinating commission,
which discussed plans for 2005. But Ukraine and Uzbekistan, which, as
you know, are not CSTO members, have shown an interest in these events.
Kazakhstan is active, as ever, having proposed CIS air defence forces
exercises not only at the Russian firing range, as has happened in
the past, but at its sole Sary-Shagan military firing range. Ukraine
has already taken the bait by severing the contracts with Moscow for
firing exercises in Ashuluk (Astrakhan Region) and is now preparing
an intergovernmental agreement on firing exercises at the Kazakhstani
range. So we find military-technical competition between CSTO allies
– Astana and Moscow. And Astana is clearly winning in this case,
since its firing range is both considerably bigger and obviously
more attractive financially. But this demonstrates once again the
fact that military relations are being built not in accordance with
the CSTO and ShKVS organizations’ models, but in accordance with the
interests of the CIS states’ military structures.
Moscow traditionally provides military equipment and services for
CIS combined air defence system states at their own domestic prices,
largely taking it upon itself to provide the military infrastructure
(airfields, test sites, headquarters), train personnel, and so
on. All it gets in return is unhealthy competition between military
firing ranges, “semihostile” blocs (remember GUUAM [Georgia, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova]), and purchase of armaments and
military hardware from and training of CIS armed forces’ officers in
NATO countries (as Ukraine will now be doing and Georgia is already
doing).
“Collective staffs and collective defence bodies have run their course
in their present form also because Russia has not finally decided on
it own principles, and its own ideology in mutual relations with the
CIS countries,” Academician Vladimir Popov of the Academy of Military
Sciences believes.
According to the analyst, the ShKVS has run its course. It had already
been halved in 2004 and the 55 officers that remain are not calling
the shots – they are clearly ineffective. But this does not mean
that the staff should be destroyed. Its staffers might well take
up theoretical work, developing blueprints, identifying threats,
and planning joint measures in Moscow’s interests. Indeed it was the
ShKVS that devised documents defining the content of such concepts
as CIS collective defence and security.
Moreover, the ShKVS is in Moscow. The Russian capital provides a
base for work and tackles the everyday problems of offices from CIS
countries. And it pays extra for communication, for lighting, and so
on. And he who pays the piper should call the tune.