THE RUSSIAN-TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT COULD BENEFIT ARMENIA
Eurasia Insight
EurasiaNet.org
2/01/05
By Haroutiun Khachatrian
Improving Russian-Turkish ties could benefit Armenia, as many experts
and officials believe Moscow will place additional pressure on Ankara to
lift a trade embargo and normalize relations with Yerevan. The
Russian-Turkish rapprochement comes amid a growing US presence in the
Caucasus, a region where both Russia and Turkey are considered regional
superpowers and where both are eager to maintain their diplomatic and
economic clout.
A visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to Turkey in December 2004 –
the first ever by a Russian chief-of-state – intensified the diplomatic
dialogue between the two states, which for decades had been sparring
partners. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reciprocated the
visit with an official trip to Moscow on January 10-12.
A sizeable increase in trade and business ties provided the backdrop for
these summits – Erdogan has forecast that bilateral annual trade is
expected to more than double by 2007 to $25 billion — but the Turkish
press has argued that the true significance of these meetings is
political. “Turkish-Russian ties gain a political dimension”, The
Turkish Daily News wrote recently. During Erdogan’s trip to Moscow,
Putin spoke out in favor of developing economic ties with Turkish
Cypriots, a sensitive foreign policy point for Ankara, and promised to
act as a mediator to resolve disputes between Turkey and Armenia.
“We both agree that it is necessary to strive towards establishing
friendly relations between neighbors,” the Russian news agency Interfax
quoted Putin as saying on January 11. “[Russia] will do everything
possible to settle conflicts in the post-Soviet space . . . acting
exclusively as a mediator and guarantor of future accords.”
Watching from the sidelines, analysts in Yerevan see the improved ties
with Moscow as a sign that Turkey wants to cut its own path in foreign
affairs, independent of the views of Washington, a fellow member of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and longtime military partner.
Turkey’s relations with both the United States and Israel, a key
American ally, have been strained of late. Turkish leaders are concerned
about the presence of US forces in Iraq, and, last year, expressed
dissatisfaction with Tel Aviv’s treatment of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.
“We know that our responsibilities are not just internal anymore but in
the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus and throughout the
world,’ Erdogan said in his 2005 New Year’s speech, the Turkish daily
Zaman reported. `Being conscious of this responsibility, we will carry
Turkey to a more active point.”
Ruben Safrastian, head of the Turkey department at the Armenian National
Academy of Science’s Institute of Oriental Studies, argues that this
`active point’ means regaining influence over countries that were once
part of the Ottoman Empire. That motivation parallels attempts by Russia
to maintain its sway in countries, including Armenia, that were once
part of the Soviet Union, he said. “Moscow is trying to use the
privileges gained from high oil prices not only in the economic sphere,
but also strategically. Thus, the two [regional] superpowers,
dissatisfied with their role in the world, are trying to find a new
place, a new niche,’ Safrastian said in a recent interview with the
Regnum.ru Russian news agency. Among the potential results of such an
alliance: a Turkish partnership with the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, (which includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) and joint Turkish-Russian reconstruction
projects in post-war Iraq. It is in the Caucasus that both countries
will put their partnership to the test, observers believe. An Armenian
diplomat, who asked not to be named, commented that US-Turkish relations
started to worsen after Washington began training Georgian troops in
2002. Turkey, formerly Washington’s partner for advancing Western
interests in the region, is becoming a competitor with Washington for
influence, the diplomat said. Although Turkey continues to train
Georgian military officers, and handed over $2 million worth of military
equipment in 2004, its programs pale in comparison with US training
initiatives. Washington has set aside $15 million in 2005 alone for its
ongoing Georgian military training program, and Georgia has responded in
kind with a contribution of over 800 troops to the US Iraqi
reconstruction effort.
Turkey is now looking to engage Russia diplomatically in order to check
the growing US influence in the region, the diplomat said. Safrastian
echoed this view, telling Regnum.ru that `The Caucasus is no longer a
source of discord for Russia and Turkey.’ According to this scenario,
Russia’s increased involvement in the economies of the south Caucasus
countries would be reinforced by expanded trade with Turkey.
While Armenian media and political parties have paid relatively little
attention to these events, the government has been watching closely.
Although no Russia-facilitated breakthrough is in the works for
Armenian-Turkish relations, the topic’s presence on the Putin-Erdogan
summit agendas was nevertheless considered by Armenian officials as
unprecedented.
Accordingly, optimism in Yerevan for a breakthrough is on the increase.
The Armenian diplomat said that the government sees the frequent
meetings in 2004 between Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian and
his Turkish counterpart Abdullah Gul as the basis for an
Armenian-Turkish thaw. “They had very thorough discussions and
discovered that the two countries can cooperate well in many areas,’ he
said. `We believe that Turkey may initiate some steps to overcome the
current deadlock.’
Nonetheless, Yerevan is treading carefully. In a January 25 interview
with the Turkish national daily Zaman, Oskanian said that he does not
believe Russia’s mediation will be decisive in resolving long-standing
disputes between Turkey and Armenia. In this interview, apparently meant
as a message to Turkey’s political leadership following the
Putin-Erdogan summits, Oskanian again dismissed the reasons usually
cited for Ankara’s unwillingness to normalize ties with Yerevan. The
Armenian government, he said, does not insist that Turkey recognize the
slaying of over a million Armenians in 1915 as genocide, nor is it
considering claiming any territories or financial compensation from
Turkey for lands lost after the border between the Soviet Union and
Turkey was finalized in 1921. Oskanian’s stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, the primary reason for Turkey’s decision to close its border
with Armenia in 1993, was more prickly, however.
The conflict, Oskanian said, is not a relevant problem for Turkey.
`Turkey cannot mediate because it is partial. Russia, for instance, has
no preconditions and is neutral. Turkey frequently offers its help as a
mediator, and we hold bilateral meetings. We are not against meetings,
but don’t accept [Turkey’s] mediation.’
Rather, the key to reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia, the
foreign minister said, would be a decision by Ankara to reopen Turkey’s
border with Armenia. `No one can insist that there can be normal
relations between two countries if the border between them is closed. .
. [W]e can’t wait 10-15 years or longer, for Turkey to be accepted into
the EU, for there to be some positive movement. We hope that very soon
Turkey will open the border.’
Editor’s Note: Haroutiun Khachatrian is a Yerevan-based writer
specializing in economic and political affairs.