Armenian paper says country bowed to Russians over Iran gas pipeline project
Haykakan Zhamanak, Yerevan
8 Jul 04
An Armenian paper has said that Armenian has bowed to Russian pressure
and refused to take part in the “game” of Iranian gas exports to
Europe. An agreement on the construction of an Iran-Armenia gas
pipeline had been signed as Iran was interested in exporting its gas
to the West and Georgia via Armenia. However 1,200mm diameter pipes
were needed for this and at the last minute Armenia “succumbed to
Russia’s pressure” and changed the planned diameter to 700mm. This
meant that it would not be possible to export Iranian gas from Armenia
by this pipeline and Armenia would therefore not benefit from the
transit. Russia, the paper said, did not want any new rivals in the
gas market. However Iran would now want to seek new partners, and
Azerbaijan and Georgia were both possibilities. The following is the
text of Arman Karapetyan’s report by Armenian newspaper Haykakan
Zhamanak on 8 July headlined “Rapprochement at the expense of Armenia”
During hearings in the National Assembly, Armenia’s Foreign Minister
Vardan Oskanyan said that after the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline
is put into operation, Azerbaijan’s income will be incomparable with
Armenia’s. And even the Dashnaks admit that the Baku-Ceyhan oil
pipeline was a lost chance for Armenia. But you are wrong if you
think that such regrets can make certain changes to Armenia’s foreign
policy, because the countries of the region give us new reasons to
worry.
A delegation led by Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili is in Iran
at the moment. A member of the delegation, Fuel and Energy Minister
Nikolay Gilauri, told journalists yesterday that one of the issues
discussed in Tehran was the possibility of exporting Iranian gas to
Georgia. He added that they have already made an arrangement and
Iranian gas will go to Georgia via the territory of Azerbaijan. There
is a gas pipeline which connects Georgia with Azerbaijan, as for the
connection between Iranian and Azerbaijani gas systems, it requires
serious expenses, and gas supplies from Iran to Georgia may start in
2005.
Undoubtedly, the reader has guessed what Armenia’s interest is in this
context? It is certainly the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline, the contract
on the construction of which was signed on 13 May in Yerevan. Iran was
interested in the construction of this gas pipeline because it was
hoping to export its gas to the West, Georgia, etc. via Armenia. It
would be possible to fulfil this programme if the Iran-Armenia gas
pipeline was constructed using 1,200mm diameter pipes. But Armenia
succumbed to Russia’s pressure and changed the diameter to 700mm at
the last minute. This means that it will not be possible to export
Iranian gas from Armenia by this pipeline. That is, Armenia will not
benefit from the transit of Iranian gas. It was clear from the very
beginning that Russia would be an obstacle to the construction of the
promising Iran-Armenia gas pipeline. If we do not take into account a
little exception, today Russia has a monopoly on the European gas
market and the appearance of new rivals on this market is not
advantageous to it.
On the contrary, Iran is in dire need of this market because although
it has great gas reserves this country, in fact, cannot make
productive use of them. Iran regarded the construction of the 1,200mm
diameter gas pipeline to Armenia as the first step towards the
European market, in the sense that the gas pipeline will extend to the
West later. While making arrangements on the construction of the gas
pipeline, our political elite, which loves to talk about a
Russia-Armenia-Iran “geopolitical axis”, was caught in the crossfire
between Iran and Russia for the first time and succumbed to Russia’s
pressure in these disagreements. That is, it has de-facto established
a bloc with Russia in order not to let Iran into the European market.
Today it does not matter any more how many millions of dollars Armenia
has lost because of this. But it is important that, by its behaviour,
Armenia lost the opportunity to Azerbaijan, which has the privilege of
the Baku-Ceyhan and other oil pipelines, and has allowed it to have
common interests with our partner Iran. It is natural that as a result
of Armenia’s behaviour, Iran will not refuse the strategic goal of
exporting gas to the European market and will start looking for
another transit territory after Armenia’s failure. Apart from Armenia,
Azerbaijan is the only country that can serve as such a territory,
especially as Georgia, in turn, might make Russia understand that it
will support Iran in the matter of directing its gas to
Europe. Certainly, all these are projects, but sometimes projects have
much more value than their implementation. To understand this simple
reality, let us enumerate once again what happened: succumbing to
Russia’s pressures, Armenia refused to take part in the game of
Iranian gas exports to Europe. Iran could not but refuse that game,
but needed a partner. Since Armenia’s departure, the role of partner
was vacant and Azerbaijan and Georgia occupied it.
In general, Azerbaijan and Georgia do not really need the programme of
Iranian gas exports to Europe. But they are taking part in this game
to bring Russia to its knees. Undoubtedly, Russia will try to persuade
Azerbaijan and Georgia to give up the idea of letting Iranian gas into
post-Soviet territory. At any moment, Azerbaijan will be ready to
discuss this suggestion and demand that Russia, say, help return the
territories controlled by the Armenian troops. It is clear that Russia
cannot return these territories to Azerbaijan, but it can reduce arms
supplies to the Armenian armed forces.
In turn, for giving up the idea of importing Iranian gas, Georgia will
demand that Russia make compromises on the Abkhaz and South Ossetian
problems. It does not matter how this geopolitical “argument” ends. It
is important that Armenia cannot pursue its own interests any more,
and it gives Armenia’s rivals a wide opportunity and new blank
cheques, some of which will be used against us. It seems there is no
point in explaining that all this is the consequence of the simple
fact that an illegitimate president cannot pursue the interest of a
country. It is evident that our president cannot talk to Putin as one
equal to another and cannot tell him that the Iran-Armenia gas
pipeline should be constructed using not 700, but 1,200mm diameter
pipes because this meets Armenia’s interests. Maybe it is possible to
see Robert Kocharyan as a friend of Vladimir Putin, but it is
obviously impossible to see him as Armenia’s president.