From NATO Partnership for Peace crisis to European Peace Facility delays: Orbá

Anna Tamamian
New Eastern Europe
April 30 2026

The recent defeat of Viktor Orbán in Hungary has opened up new opportunities for genuine rapprochement with Armenia. Despite the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 2022 – following a decade-long suspension triggered by Hungary’s handling of an ethnically motivated murder during a NATO PfP training it hosted – Hungary’s subsequent positions have constrained and delayed EU support to Armenia.

April 30, 2026 – Sossi Tatikyan 

Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat marks a significant political development not only for Hungary, the European Union, and support for Ukraine, but also for Armenia. After all, it may have implications for EU cohesion, decision-making dynamics, and the Union’s external engagement in regions such as the South Caucasus. Armenia has been directly affected by a series of decisions taken by the government of Viktor Orbán between 2012 and 2025.

A defining episode: the 2012 extradition

The roots of this trajectory go back to August 2012, when the Hungarian government authorized the extradition to Azerbaijan of Ramil Safarov, a convicted Azerbaijani military officer who had killed the Armenian officer Gurgen Margaryan with an axe while he slept during a NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) English-language training course in Budapest in 2004. He had also intended to attack a second Armenian officer but was prevented by security personnel. The murder itself had caused a significant sense of crisis within the NATO Partnership for Peace framework, raising concerns about trust, security, and the viability of cooperative engagement between its members. This incident ultimately contributed to the eventual cancellation of a planned NATO PfP military exercise in Baku in September 2024.

Upon his return to Azerbaijan, Safarov was pardoned by President Ilham Aliyev. The officer was promoted in rank, awarded, and publicly honoured. This drew strong international criticism, including condemnation by US President Barack Obama. In response, Armenia suspended diplomatic relations with Hungary in 2012, which remained frozen for a decade.

The extradition was accompanied by allegations of financial incentives. Investigative reporting pointed to transfers exceeding seven million US dollars to a Hungarian bank account linked to an offshore company associated with Azerbaijani elites around the same period. This also coincided with Viktor Orbán’s visit to Baku and the decisions that shaped the extradition process. In addition, broader arrangements were reported, often referring to two to three billion euros in Azerbaijani investments or purchases of Hungarian government bonds.

Post-2022 normalization without policy shift

Diplomatic relations between Armenia and Hungary were restored in December 2022. However, the subsequent positions of the government led by Viktor Orbán continued to align with Azerbaijan, with practical implications for Yerevan. Within the Council of the European Union, Hungary and Italy reportedly prevented consensus on adopting a strong collective condemnation of Azerbaijan’s September 2023 military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh. As a result, a statement was issued instead by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell.

Symbolic signalling and cultural heritage

In July 2024, Viktor Orbán visited Shusha (Armenian version – Shushi) to participate in an informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States hosted by Ilham Aliyev. The town, located in the former area of Nagorno-Karabakh, had come under Azerbaijani control following the 2020 war and has since been used as a venue for international events. The choice of the town as the venue conveyed clear political signalling in the aftermath of the conflict.

Despite the Hungarian government’s self-positioning as a defender of Christian heritage, it did not publicly address the condition of Armenian religious and cultural heritage in the area. This is particularly significant given documented cases of the alteration and distortion of Armenian heritage. This includes the Surb Ghazanchetsots Cathedral in the centre of the town, as well as damage and appropriation to sites in other parts of Karabakh.

Delays in EU support to Armenia

Hungary played a sustained role in trying to prevent and delaying EU assistance to Armenia under the European Peace Facility, an instrument designed to support partners’ security and defence capacities through non-lethal means. Both the first (ten million euro) and second (20 million euro) assistance measures for Armenia were blocked by Hungary for extended periods – approximately 1.5 years each – before their eventual approval. These delays were not procedural but political, reflecting Hungary’s positioning within EU decision-making processes.

The prolonged blockage occurred at a time when Armenia was seeking to strengthen its resilience and defence capacity following repeated security challenges, including escalations along its internationally recognized borders. The delays therefore had practical implications, postponing the delivery of EU-supported capabilities and limiting the timeliness of the EU’s response.

Implications for Armenia’s upcoming elections

These dynamics also intersect with Armenia’s domestic political context ahead of the forthcoming elections on June 7th. Orbán has often been perceived as being aligned with Russia and, by extension, associated in Armenian political discourse with external influence narratives linked to Moscow. This perception is reinforced by Moscow’s support for pro-Russian opposition forces in Armenia working against Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

At the same time, Armenia’s parliament adopted an EU integration bill in spring 2025. This was cautiously framed as a long-term aspiration toward membership in the European Union – an agenda explicitly opposed by Russia. However, the opposition also claims that US Vice President J.D. Vance has expressed support for Pashinyan during his February 2026 visit to Armenia, as he previously did for Orbán. This adds further complexity to the interpretation of external signals.

Supporters of both the ruling party and the opposition interpret these signals through their respective political narratives. For the ruling side, Orbán’s defeat is framed as a setback for Russia and, by extension, Vladimir Putin, while for the opposition it is seen as a setback for J.D. Vance. In spite of these different interpretations, Orbán is widely perceived in Armenian public discourse as the leader responsible for extraditing the convicted killer of the army officer.

Outlook: opening space for Armenia–Hungary engagement

In the short term, these dynamics may influence the framing of the electoral campaign itself. Competing interpretations of external developments – whether linked to Russia, the European Union, or the United States – are likely to be mobilized by both sides to reinforce existing narratives about Armenia’s strategic orientation and external partnerships.

Taken together, these developments illustrate how Armenia–EU relations have been shaped not only by bilateral engagement but also by internal EU dynamics. The EU’s ability to act as a coherent foreign policy actor depends on consensus among its member states, and when that consensus is constrained, the effects extend directly to Armenia.

Overall, these developments reflect a set of policies that have had practical implications for Armenia. While it is too early to assess future directions, the political transition in Hungary may provide an opportunity to open a new page in Armenia–Hungary relations and explore more constructive engagement within the EU framework.

Sossi Tatikyan holds a Master of Public Administration degree from the Harvard Kennedy School, has been a NATO Defense College Partnership for Peace Research Fellow, and is currently a PhD Researcher at Sorbonne Nouvelle University. She is the co-founder and director of the Yerevan Center of Foreign and Security Policy established in 2025. Previously she has been a diplomat for Armenia and UN Security Sector Reform and Political Officer in several peace operations. Her main research topics are ethnic conflicts, cognitive and information warfare and lawfare, Euro-Atlantic integration, and the security dilemmas and policies of small states.

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Disinformation watch: false claims on Armenia village transfer to Georgia debu

Kajoyan Gevork
JAM News
April 30 2026
  • JAMnews
  • Yerevan,
  • Tbilisi

Reports by several Georgian media outlets have sparked a strong reaction in Armenia. The reports claimed that “Armenia is returning the border village of Jiliza to Georgia”. Georgian outlets cited Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, but he did not make such a statement.

Pashinyan said only that border demarcation with Georgia remains on Armenia’s agenda. His press secretary Nazeli Baghdasaryan rejected the reports.

Some Armenian opposition media also republished the claims.

On social media in Armenia, users expressed outrage. Some accused “friendly Georgia” of joining a “hybrid war against Armenia”. Others called for those spreading disinformation in local media to be punished.

JAMnews presents verified information from Georgia and Armenia. Georgian political analyst Giorgi Tumasyan comments on the situation, along with Armenian social media users.

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Information from Tbilisi

On 27–28 April, several Georgian media outlets — including news pages of Mtavari, CNews Exclusive, Dedoplistskaro TV, Itv.ge and Flashnews — as well as their Facebook pages and Georgian social media users, spread claims that Armenia would “return” the border village of Jiliza to Georgia after completing border demarcation.

Some reports tied this claim to remarks by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. He said completing border delimitation with Georgia remains on the agenda and that agreements have already been reached with Georgian partners. However, Pashinyan did not mention Jiliza or any transfer of territory.

Some posts went further and claimed Armenia and Georgia had already agreed to complete border demarcation. These claims spread widely on Facebook. Individual users and pages shared text and an information card prepared by Mtavari.

How the information appeared and was corrected

The story first appeared on Business Press News. The outlet later issued a correction and apologised to readers for the inaccuracy.

In the correction, BPN said it had originally published the story under the headline: “Armenia returns a border village to Georgia – Pashinyan: ‘We agreed to complete border demarcation with Georgia’.”

The outlet said it based the report on information from the Armenian newspaper Zhoghovurd, published in March 2024. At the time, the paper wrote that Armenia was allegedly planning to “return” Jiliza to Georgia as part of demarcation.

In April 2024, Zhoghovurd asked Pashinyan’s press secretary which sections of the border would be demarcated with Georgia and whether Jiliza, which rumours said could be transferred, was included.

In response, the press secretary said the discussion concerned only the general issue of demarcation in the context of a strategic cooperation declaration with Georgia. She said there was no additional information beyond the prime minister’s statement at the time.

On 28 April, Nazeli Baghdasaryan again said any claims about plans or agreements to transfer any part of Armenia’s sovereign territory to another country were not true.

After that, Business Press News acknowledged the error and apologised to readers.

In comments to JAMnews, Georgian political analyst Giorgi Tumasyan, who is familiar with both Georgian and Armenian politics, said the false claim was most likely the result of journalistic negligence.

The issue of a possible transfer of Jiliza to Georgia had also appeared in Armenian media in 2024. At the time, Armlur.am wrote about such a possibility but noted the information was based on unverified “rumours”. Despite this, as Myth Detector reports, other Armenian websites later republished the story, including news.am, asekose.am, mamul.am and 168.am.

So far, Georgian officials have not commented on the issue. Myth Detector has requested a comment from the Georgian Foreign Ministry.

Information from Yerevan

What triggered the disinformation

The false claims appear to have stemmed from remarks by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan at an event marking Border Guard Day of Armenia’s National Security Service. He spoke about the importance of a 12-kilometre section of the border with Azerbaijan that Armenia and Azerbaijan have already delimited and demarcated, where Armenian border guards now serve.

He described the situation as exceptional. On that stretch, Armenian and Azerbaijani forces serve without helmets or body armour, and keep their ammunition in backpacks rather than in their weapons.

He then added that border demarcation with Georgia also remains on the agenda.

“And we have already reached agreements with our Georgian partners on this issue,” he said.

Pashinyan did not say anything else on the matter and did not mention any transfer of territory.

Response from the prime minister’s press secretary

Prime Minister’s press secretary Nazeli Baghdasaryan wrote on Facebook:

“Some media outlets have circulated ‘information’ claiming that, as part of the delimitation process, an agreement has been reached under which Armenia will transfer the village of Jiliza, part of the enlarged Alaverdi community, to Georgia.

Any claim, suggestion or ‘information’ about an intention, plan or agreement to transfer any part of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia to another country cannot be true.

Therefore, as before, we have denied, deny and will continue to deny any such reports, present or future, as they are fabricated.”

Comment from the head of Jiliza administration

Journalists from Armenian outlet 5 Channel Armenia spoke with the head of Jiliza’s administration, Mher Vardanyan. He said he had seen rumours about the alleged transfer of the village on social media.

He said there were no grounds for transferring Jiliza to neighbouring Georgia.

“Our Jiliza has never been part of Georgia, so we do not fear any possible transfer,” he said.

Commenting on the prime minister’s remarks about demarcation, Vardanyan added that “such groups have not yet worked” in the area of Jiliza.

Reactions from Armenian social media users

Rumours about the possible transfer of Jiliza to Georgia angered Armenian social media users. Many expressed even greater outrage that Armenian media had republished disinformation originating in Georgia. In comments under the press secretary’s post, users called for those spreading false information to be punished.

Some of the comments included:

“A denial is not enough. When will you understand this? Punishment would be more effective. The most appropriate penalty would be a fine of 2–3 million drams [$5,000–$8,000] or more. Then they would come to their senses.”

“Refer them to law enforcement for spreading disinformation aimed at undermining the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia.”

“It is no longer funny that the authorities constantly deny disinformation spread daily by Kremlin-linked media and agents, putting pressure on our state. That is what state security bodies are for. There is a law — you can hold them accountable. Are you afraid of the Russians? Do you not understand what you are doing? Do you not grasp how serious this is? Are you mocking us or yourselves? Please tell us which it is so we can understand. Everything is becoming questionable.”

“You have driven us mad with these denials. Finally punish those spreading disinformation. People’s nerves are at breaking point.”

“We have already developed immunity to this kind of lie. In any case, you are right to respond quickly and inform the public.”

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Pashinyan says no talks with Azerbaijan on return of displaced Armenians

Mary Lazarian
Panorama, Armenia
April 30 2026

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on Thursday firmly denied that Armenia is engaged in negotiations with Azerbaijan over the return of displaced Armenians or Azerbaijanis to their former homes, including Nagorno-Karabakh and Baku.

Addressing reporters at a government briefing, Pashinyan said such discussions have “never” been part of the bilateral agenda. He warned that both issues, the return of Armenians to Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis to Armenia, are being deliberately manipulated to provoke political tensions.

“We are not discussing the return of Armenians to Karabakh, to Baku, or to other places, nor are we discussing the return of Azerbaijanis,” Pashinyan declared. “These topics have a provocative effect on the current political situation. They can escalate one another and often that is exactly what happens.”

He accused some political figures of exploiting the issue for “cheap political manipulation”, claiming they alternate between inflaming one narrative and then another when the first fails to gain traction.

“This is nothing more than low-level political exploitation,” Pashinyan added.

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Turkish Press: Erdoğan invited to European summit in Armenia

Jane Topchian
Turkish Minute
April 30 2026
Erdoğan invited to European summit in Armenia

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been invited to attend a European Political Community summit in Armenia on May 4, a meeting that comes days after Turkey and Armenia held talks on reopening a rail link between the two countries.

The summit in Yerevan will be co-chaired by European Council President António Costa and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan under the theme “Building the Future: Unity and Stability in Europe.” The European Council says leaders will discuss democratic resilience, connectivity, economic security and energy security.

Turkey has not announced whether Erdoğan will attend. The European Council says 48 heads of state and government have been invited, including those of the 27 European Union member states, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and several Balkan and non-EU European countries.

A visit by Erdoğan to Yerevan would carry weight because Turkey and Armenia have no formal diplomatic relations and their land border has been closed since the 1990s. Relations have long been strained by Turkey’s alliance with Azerbaijan and by the dispute over the 1915 mass killings of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, which many countries recognize as genocide. Turkey rejects the genocide label.

The invitation also comes during renewed steps toward normalization. On Tuesday Turkish and Armenian officials met in the eastern Turkish province of Kars as part of a joint working group on rehabilitating and operating the Kars-Gyumri railway. The Turkish Foreign Ministry said the sides emphasized the need for the railway to begin operating soon to improve regional transport links.

The railway issue is one of the most concrete steps in the slow normalization process between the neighbors. Ankara and Yerevan agreed in 2021 to appoint special envoys to work toward restoring ties and reopening the border. In December 2025 they also agreed to simplify visa procedures for holders of diplomatic, special and service passports, saying they remained committed to full normalization without preconditions.

The Yerevan meeting will be the eighth summit of the European Political Community, a forum launched in 2022 after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to bring together European Union and non-EU leaders for political coordination. The platform does not issue binding decisions, but it gives leaders space for bilateral and multilateral meetings.

Erdoğan attended the first European Political Community summit in Prague in October 2022, the Budapest summit in November 2024 and the Tirana summit in May 2025.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney is expected to attend as a guest, a move Costa described as part of a wider effort to defend peace, shared prosperity and multilateralism.

The European Political Community meeting will be followed by the first EU-Armenia summit on May 4 and 5, also in Yerevan. Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will represent the European Union, while Pashinyan will represent Armenia.

The EU has deepened ties with Armenia as Yerevan has sought closer relations with the West following its rift with Russia over security. Armenia adopted a law in 2025 launching a process aimed at closer integration with the EU, though Pashinyan has said any eventual membership would take time and require a referendum.

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Sports: Georgia and Armenia to jointly host the 2029 FIFA Under-20 World Cup

Emil Lazarian
April 30 2026

FIFA has selected Georgia and Armenia to jointly host the 2029 Under-20 World Cup. This will be the first time that these two countries from the South Caucasus region will host a FIFA tournament.

The decision was made during a FIFA Council meeting held in Vancouver, Canada, just before the 76th FIFA Congress. This tournament, held every two years, brings together 24 youth teams from around the world and is considered a platform for future stars. The Football Federation of Armenia described this as a ‘historic achievement’ and stated that it symbolizes the trust of the international football community.

The federation’s president, Armen Melikbekyan, mentioned that this tournament will provide local players and fans with a World Cup-like experience. Meanwhile, the president of the Georgian Football Federation, Levan Kobiashvili, expressed confidence that this event will give a new direction to the development of football in the region, calling it a ‘unique moment’ in Georgia’s independent football history. The competition began in 1977 in Tunisia, originally known as the FIFA World Youth Championship, and was renamed to its current form in 2007.

So far, 23 editions have been played, with Argentina Under-20 winning the most titles at six, while Brazil Under-20 follows with five titles. Recently, Morocco won the title in the tournament held in Chile in 2025.

The next edition in 2027 will be jointly hosted by Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. FIFA’s decision is seen as a significant step for regional sports development, with hopes of revitalizing youth football in the coming years.

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Verelq: What did Mher Grigoryan and Shahin Mustafaev discuss and agree on?

Khoyetsian Rose

2026 On April 29, in Aghveran, the Republic of Armenia, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Mher Grigoryan and the Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Shahin Mustafaev, the 13th meeting of the State Border Demarcation and Border Security Commission between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan and the State Commission for the Demarcation of the State Border between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia was held.


It was noted with satisfaction that the 13th meeting of the commissions is again held in the territory of one of the parties, in the Republic of Armenia, in Aghveran.


During the meeting, the parties exchanged detailed thoughts on organizational and technical issues related to demarcation measures.


The parties have agreed and exchanged the texts of the following draft guidelines on the procedure for the implementation of demarcation works:


“Guideline on the procedure of work of border demarcation expert groups during the demarcation of the state border between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan”,
“Guideline on the procedure for creating a map of the state border delimitation between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan”,
“Guideline on the procedure for formulating and publishing documents on the demarcation of the state border between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan”.
The parties agreed to approach their governments for appropriate approval of the guidelines.


The Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, Mher Grigoryan, and the Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Shahin Mustafaev, separately exchanged thoughts on issues of mutual interest.


It was noted that the transit of goods to the Republic of Armenia through the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan is successfully carried out and is currently ongoing.


It was noted with satisfaction that Azerbaijan supplies oil products to Armenia, which indicates the formation of trade and economic ties between the two countries.


There was also a discussion with the participation of representatives of the business circles of the parties on the issues related to the development of trade and economic cooperation, mutual supplies of goods and services, as well as transit transportation.


It was specially emphasized that the achieved results were made possible thanks to the political will of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan and the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev.


According to the results of the meeting, a corresponding protocol was signed.


The parties have agreed to coordinate the date of the next meeting in the Republic of Azerbaijan.

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Not border demarcation, but resettlement of 300 thousand Azerbaijanis

Torgomian Varazdat

“Hraparak” daily writes:


The CP deputies were also surprised by the visit of the Azerbaijani delegation to Armenia yesterday.


They did not know anything in advance about the visit or, even more, about the agenda, they were informed when the Azerbaijani press wrote early in the morning that the Azerbaijani plane had landed at the “Zvartnots” airport and an Azerbaijani delegation had arrived in Yerevan.


Later, the Azerbaijani media wrote that the delegation of Azerbaijan is headed by Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev, who, together with Mher Grigoryan, is the co-chairman of the state commission for the demarcation of the state border between Azerbaijan and Armenia.


However, later in the political backstage it was said that the visit was not related to border demarcation issues, but to resettling 300,000 Azerbaijanis in Armenia.


According to the information, Azerbaijani businessmen have also arrived in Armenia with Mustafaev, and a meeting will be held with Armenian colleagues at the “Abrikot” restaurant in Aghveran on bilateral economic issues. On the Armenian side, there were mainly those businessmen who recently participated in the breakfast with Pashinyan.


This is more of a test visit, they are trying to check the reaction of the Armenian people, in other words, to adapt them to the idea of ​​coexistence with Azerbaijanis in the future.


It is said that the process will start after the elections, if Pashinyan is re-elected.

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“Strong Armenia” and “HayaVote” signed a memorandum of cooperation

Hovhannisian John

On April 29, the chairman of the “Strong Armenia” party, Samvel Karapetyan, received the representatives of the “HayaVote” national civil association.  


Representatives of the leadership of the “Strong Armenia” alliance and the “Land of Living” party were also present at the meeting.


During the meeting, in the presence of the chairman of the “Strong Armenia” party Samvel Karapetyan, the coordinator-representative of the “Strong Armenia” alliance Narek Karapetyan and the coordinator of the “HayaVote” national civic association Avetik Chalabyan signed a memorandum of cooperation, by which the parties committed to unite their efforts in the 2026 election of the National Assembly. to achieve the removal of the current administration and the formation of a new national government through the June 7 elections.


For this purpose, the “Strong Armenia” alliance of parties and the “HayVote” association agreed to jointly implement the pre-election campaign, based on the maximum coordination of their political programs, as well as to jointly implement the control of the legitimacy of the electoral process.


To remind, on April 10, “HayaQuen” and Arman Tatoyan’s “Unity Wings” initiative announced that they are ending cooperation.

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10 days have passed since Onik Gasparyan’s fiery proposal. so what?

Chalian Meline

10 days have passed since Onik Gasparyan’s fiery proposal. the government rejected it, and the opposition forces and journalists considered the topic and format of its discussion at least debatable.

The former head of the State Security Service, instead of acting on the created realities, continues to position himself in the “bunker”, and has transferred the game to a notorious person, who was previously his adviser.

The latter, who is in very dubious connections inside and outside, and it is not yet clear who “parachuted” him down to the GSH and made him the bearer of military and state secrets, is an ordinary thorn whose job is to target the opposition field and the former authorities of Artsakh.

In fact, Gasparyan was not looking for contact with the public or its separate groups, journalists, but with the government, from which he continues to remain silent after receiving a rude rejection.

HG: Onik Gasparyan, I warn you that if your former adviser continues his immoral behavior, you will receive a mirror reaction, with harsher vocabulary.


Tigran Abrahamyan, secretary of the NA “I have an honor” faction




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Additions and amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure

George Mamian

In the regular session of April 29, the Standing Committee on State-Legal Issues discussed the second reading and gave a positive conclusion to the draft law “On Amendments and Amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Armenia” authored by RA NA Deputy Rustam Bakoyan.


According to the author, the draft law was not changed after the first reading.


The project concerns two important criminal justice institutes. The first is a motion not to instigate a public prosecution or to stop it, and the second is a completely new controlled supply and go undercover investigation operation.


At the suggestion of the author, the discussion of the legislative package “Bankruptcy Code of the Republic of Armenia” was postponed for up to two months.

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