Iran and US holding talks behind closed doors: Pakistani ambassador to Russia

Emma Jilavian
Iran17:51, 13 August 2026
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Iran and the United States are continuing to hold talks behind closed doors, Pakistan’s Ambassador to Moscow Faisal Niaz Tirmizi told TASS.

Asked whether there had been progress in contacts between Tehran and Washington, the diplomat responded positively, saying that consultations were “under way right now”.

The ambassador declined to comment on whether the talks were taking place in Islamabad.

“This is not public information, but we are working on it,” he said.

Earlier, Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokesperson Tahir Hussain Andrabi said the country was making efforts to bring the United States and Iran back to the negotiating table in order to ease tensions in the Middle East.

Pakistan has played an important mediating role in efforts to resolve the US-Iran conflict that began in late February.

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Supporting Palestine is shared responsibility of all humanity: Turkish preside

Talar Tumanian
Türkiye11:28, 13 August 2026
Read the article in: Armenian:

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said that supporting Palestine is a shared responsibility of all humanity, particularly the Muslim world.

“I want to once again emphasize that supporting Palestine is a shared responsibility of all humanity, particularly the Muslim world,” Erdogan said at a joint news conference with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas at the presidential palace in Ankara, according to Anadolu news agency.

“We, as Türkiye, will continue to strongly defend the Palestinian cause on every platform,” he added.

Erdogan also said the “genocidal Netanyahu government” continues its illegal actions in the occupied West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem “before the eyes of the entire world.”

“The existence of a sovereign Palestinian state is being undermined. It is impossible to ignore this or remain indifferent to it,” he said.

Erdogan said Türkiye continues to advance the Palestinian cause on the basis of a two-state solution, in consultation with its Palestinian counterparts.

He said policies of occupation, forced displacement and seizure of land continue to intensify across the region.

Citing UN data, Erdogan said around 3,800 Palestinians have been displaced in 2026 alone due to occupier violence, demolitions and evictions, while nearly 100 Palestinians have been killed.

He described the situation as the result of a “systematic occupation” and a strategy of attrition aimed at making it increasingly difficult for the Palestinian administration to function on its own territory.

The Netanyahu government seeks to remove Palestine from the global agenda by exploiting chaos and new conflicts, but it will not succeed, he added.

Erdogan called for the necessary conditions to be established as soon as possible to launch the reconstruction and rebuilding process in Gaza and ensure security in the enclave.

Erdogan added that despite Palestinians’ constructive stance, Israel’s current government continues its uncompromising and aggressive approach.

“We are particularly strongly opposed to provocations aimed at changing the status quo at Al-Aqsa Mosque, our first qibla, and other holy sites,” Erdogan said.

Reiterating Ankara’s support for Palestinian statehood, Erdogan said that Türkiye would resolutely work for the establishment of an independent, geographically contiguous Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, with occupied East Jerusalem as its capital.

He welcomed the decision to hold legislative and presidential elections in Palestine, expressing hope they will advance reconciliation and strengthen Palestinian unity.

“I thank the president and his esteemed delegation for their visit and extend my heartfelt greetings and affection to the entire Palestinian people,” the president added.

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U.S. forces on track to complete Iraq pullout by Sept. 30

Ani Basmajian
Near East11:42, 13 August 2026
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The U.S. military is on track to pull all of its forces out of Iraq by the end of September, marking the end of a presence that started with the 2003 invasion against Saddam Hussein, Associated Press reported.

Washington and Baghdad agreed in 2024 to wind down the much smaller U.S.-led operations against the Islamic State group.

U.S. troops pulled out of bases in most areas of Iraq last year but maintained a presence in the semi-autonomous northern Kurdish region. Bases there have regularly come under attack since the U.S. and Israel launched the war on Iran on Feb. 28.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi met with Adm. Brad Cooper, who leads the U.S. Central Command, on Wednesday. Al-Zaidi said in a statement afterward that he had affirmed Sept. 30 as the “fixed and final date for ending the military mission of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in Iraq and completing the departure of its forces.”

A U.S. official confirmed to AP that the U.S. expects to complete its pullout by Sept. 30, but declined to say how many troops remain in Iraq or where they would be redeployed.

“The United States, Iraq and coalition partners have achieved tremendous success in defeating ISIS and now the Iraqi security forces, including the Peshmerga and other Iraqi Kurdistan Region security forces, will lead the fight against terrorists in Iraq,” AP quoted the official as saying.

Two Iraqi Kurdish officials said a drawdown of U.S. troops and military equipment from Erbil began about three weeks ago.

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Tested and Ghosted: A Job Seeker’s Guide to Armenia’s Hiring Culture

Emil Lazarian
Aug 13, 2026
Sona Gevorgyan

Two years ago, while job hunting in Yerevan, I came across an opening for a content writer. Nothing about it raised any concerns. The position was advertised through the company’s page, the organization had a professional-looking website, and everything suggested it was a genuine opportunity. As a recent graduate eager to gain experience, I applied without hesitation.

The initial communication seemed routine. I exchanged messages with a company representative and was invited for an interview. As the process continued, however, the lines began to blur. It was never quite clear whether I was speaking with an HR specialist, a manager, or the company’s owner. When I arrived, the person I had been communicating with introduced himself as the CEO. While that is not unusual for very small businesses, it was the first sign the company lacked a formal hiring process.

The address listed on the company’s website turned out to be a private residence. Because many startups operate from coworking spaces or unconventional offices, I didn’t find this suspicious at first. However, when I arrived, it was clear this was not a typical workplace environment.

Inside were several people, but no desks, computers or signs of a functioning office. The setting felt unprofessional and far removed from what I expected from a company that presented itself as established and credible online.

A few hours later, the same person asked to meet again, on a Sunday, to discuss salary. I couldn’t understand why compensation hadn’t been discussed during the interview, or why the conversation was taking place over WhatsApp outside working hours rather than through official company channels.

Nothing illegal happened, and I left safely. Still, I couldn’t shake the feeling that something about the experience wasn’t right.

Later, as I spoke with other job seekers, I realized my story wasn’t unusual: vague communication, unclear expectations and interview processes that left them wondering whether the job itself was genuine. That raised a larger question: what should a professional hiring process actually look like?

“Endless Test Tasks”

Among the complaints I heard most often was the growing use of unpaid recruitment assignments.

Many companies ask candidates to complete writing samples, marketing strategies, design projects, or coding tasks before an interview. Skills assessments can be a legitimate hiring tool. The problem arises when they become so extensive that they resemble unpaid work.

Candidates often spend hours, sometimes days, completing assignments with no guarantee of feedback, compensation, or further communication. In some cases, applicants are ghosted after submitting the assigned work.

The Communication Problem

One frustration came up again and again in conversations with other job seekers: silence.

You send off an application and hear nothing. Days turn into weeks. You begin to wonder whether the position has been filled, whether anyone has read your CV, or whether the vacancy was ever real to begin with. After a while, you stop checking your inbox with anticipation and start checking it out of habit.

Large organizations often use applicant-tracking systems that automatically acknowledge applications, but many employers in Armenia still rely on informal hiring practices that can leave candidates in the dark. You invest time tailoring your CV and cover letter, yet receive no indication that your application was even reviewed.

The silence doesn’t always end after an interview. Candidates are told to expect a decision within a week or two, only for that deadline to come and go without a word. Some travel to Yerevan for interviews, take time off work or university, and spend hours preparing, only to be left wondering what happened. Even a brief rejection email would acknowledge the time and effort every applicant invests in the process.

When Salary Becomes a Mystery

Salary transparency is another challenge. Many vacancies do not disclose compensation ranges, requiring applicants to spend significant time in interviews before learning whether a position meets their financial needs.

Negotiations can be particularly difficult for young professionals and recent graduates who lack market information or bargaining power. The absence of clear salary ranges may also lead to unequal outcomes for candidates applying for the same role.

Although salary transparency tools have emerged globally, many vacancies in Armenia still do not disclose compensation ranges. As a result, candidates may go through multiple interview stages before learning whether a position aligns with their expectations. 

Armenia’s Job Market Today 

Armenia’s recruitment landscape has become increasingly digital. Platforms such as staff.am and Worknet.am now serve as the primary bridge between employers and those seek employment. Yet despite the growth of these platforms, there are clear issues with communication and transparency: unanswered applications, unclear job descriptions, and vacancies that require significantly more responsibilities than originally advertised. 

The legal situation surrounding recruitment tasks is less straightforward than many applicants assume. Armenia’s labor legislation primarily regulates employment relationships after a labor contract has been established. However, employers should not use recruitment exercises to obtain substantial productive work without compensation. This concern arises when assignments become extensive enough to generate tangible value for the employer. For example, asking a marketing candidate to develop a complete campaign strategy, a writer to produce publishable content, or a designer to create finished branding materials may raise ethical, and potentially legal, questions if the work is ultimately used by the company without payment. 

A Matter of Professional Standards

Many of the hiring complaints are not necessarily violations of labor law. Being ghosted after an interview, waiting weeks for a response, or encountering vague salary discussions may be legal. However, they raise questions about professional standards and workplace culture.

As Armenia competes for skilled workers and seeks to reduce talent migration, recruitment itself has become part of an employer’s reputation. The hiring process is often a candidate’s first interaction with an organization. When that experience is marked by poor communication, or excessive unpaid tasks, companies may lose talented applicants before employment even begins.

That said, the challenges facing job seekers are not unique to Armenia. According to the International Labor Organization, young people worldwide continue to face significant obstacles when entering the labor market, including unstable employment, temporary contracts, and difficulties transitioning from education to work.

What Fair Hiring Should Look Like

A professional recruitment process doesn’t require perfection, but it does require respect.

At a minimum, employers should:

  • Acknowledge receipt of applications.
  • Communicate realistic hiring timelines.
  • Limit unpaid assessments to reasonable demonstrations of skill.
  • Provide feedback when possible.
  • Be transparent about salary expectations and job responsibilities.
  • Maintain professional boundaries throughout the hiring process.

Armenia’s labor market has evolved rapidly over the past decade, particularly in technology, communications, and service industries. Yet many hiring practices haven’t kept pace. For people entering the workforce, finding a job is already stressful. The hiring process should evaluate candidates’ abilities, not their willingness to tolerate uncertainty, unpaid labor, or unprofessional behavior.

As Armenia seeks to retain talent and build a competitive workforce, improving recruitment practices is not simply an HR issue. It is a question of workplace culture, trust and respect.



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How is it that no one needs Armenia? Pashinyan stated that in addition to the

Jagharian Tania
Eurasia Daily
Aug 13, 2026
August 13th, 2026
14:04

The Armenian authorities will organize a referendum on EU membership only after carrying out preparatory work and submitting an official application for joining the association. This was stated by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, noting that in addition to choosing between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the EU, Armenians “may have a third option.”

“We will definitely hold a referendum in the future, but this will happen after, firstly, the preparatory work is carried out institutionally, and secondly, we will officially apply to the EU with the issue of membership,” Pashinyan said at a briefing.

As the head of government noted, Armenian citizens can choose a third development path that is not related to either the EAEU or the EU.

“We indicate these two [associations], but there may be another initiative: neither the EAEU nor the EU. There may be a third option <"We want to create alternatives for the citizens of Armenia, so that the people can choose for themselves, but today we do not stop thinking about the fourth alternative, the fifth alternative, because there should not be a situation when someone declares that no one needs Armenia, it has nowhere to go."

As EADaily reported, according to the newspaper “Grapark”, Moscow gave Nikol Pashinyan a month to decide on the choice between The EU and the Eurasian Economic Union. Otherwise, the second, tougher stage of sanctions will begin. Russia insists on Yerevan’s political certainty and on the final choice between maintaining membership in the EAEU and continuing the course towards European integration. On August 11, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin said that the issue of Armenia’s future status would be discussed at a meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in December. As the Deputy Minister noted, if the call to hold a referendum is not heeded, the EAEU leaders will take this into account when determining further joint steps.

Подробнее: https://eadaily.com/en/news/2026/08/13/how-is-it-that-no-one-needs-armenia-pashinyan-stated-that-in-addition-to-the-eaeu-and-the-eu-has-a-3rd-option

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Armenia 2026 Parliamentary Election: At the Dawn of a New Geopolitical Era

Emil Lazarian
Aug 14, 2026
By Bálint L. Tóth | Backgrounders – August 14, 2026

The 2026 Armenian parliamentary election represented a pivotal moment in the country’s post-war political progression. Held against the backdrop of profound geopolitical transformation following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Azerbaijan’s 2023 military takeover of the region, the election reflected the intersection of domestic political realignment, security challenges, and shifting foreign policy priorities.

This analysis examines how the legacy of the armed conflict, the evolving peace process with Azerbaijan, and Armenia’s changing geopolitical orientation shaped the electoral campaign, voting behavior, and political outcomes. It further explores the institutional and social dimensions of the voting, as well as the broader implications for democratic consolidation, political legitimacy, and Armenia’s future strategic trajectory.

The Long Shadow of Nagorno-Karabakh

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) war essentially reshaped Armenia’s domestic politics, foreign policy, and regional position. The armed conflict triggered a profound political crisis while simultaneously increasing the country’s dependence on Russia and complicating its efforts to normalize relations with Türkiye. The November 2020 ceasefire agreement severely undermined the legitimacy of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government. The unexpected territorial concessions generated widespread public outrage, mass protests, and accusations of national betrayal. Although Pashinyan ultimately retained power through the 2021 early legislative elections, the war deepened political polarization and left many key issues unresolved.

The conflict changed fundamentally after Azerbaijan’s September 2023 military offensive, which ended the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and forced more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians to flee to Armenia. In March 2025, the two countries agreed on the text of a draft peace treaty, although disputes remained over ratification, Armenian detainees, the rights of displaced Karabakh Armenians, constitutional changes requested by Azerbaijan, and other unresolved humanitarian and political issues.

The peace process nevertheless marked the strongest opportunity in over 30 years to normalize relations. Expected benefits include mutual recognition of territorial integrity, reopening borders and transport links, expanding trade and investment, and improving regional cooperation. At the same time, Russia’s regional influence declined sharply after its failure to prevent Azerbaijan’s takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, undermining its credibility as Armenia’s traditional security guarantor.

Defining Issues in the 2026 Election

Accordingly, the 2026 election campaign was highly polarized between the governing party and openly pro-Russian opposition forces (Strong Armenia, Armenia Alliance). The messages were dominated by national security, which the government successfully reframed as a question of sovereignty and reducing dependence on Russia. Alongside this message, the ruling party (Civil Contract) benefited from public approval of infrastructure improvements, regional development, and a perception that corruption had declined compared with previous governments.

PM Pashinyan’s party campaigned on strengthening Armenia’s sovereignty, reducing dependence on Russia, and prioritizing normalization with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, arguing that difficult concessions were necessary to end the conflict. In contrast, the opposition accused the government of recognizing Azerbaijan’s territorial sovereignty over Artsakh without securing stronger protections for the local Armenians, while the government blamed Russian peacekeepers for failing to prevent the displacement of the Armenian population. Thus, growing public disappointment with Russia, reinforced by its perceived inaction during Azerbaijani border incursions, became a central election issue.

Further, Pashinyan’s political formation used leaked information about alleged Russian connections and campaign financing to strengthen its Kremlin-skeptic message. The government also reported thwarting four alleged coup attempts between 2023 and 2025 involving militias, Russian-backed groups, members of the Armenian Apostolic Church, and prominent public figures, such as businessman Samvel Karapetyan, who entered politics just before the election and whose newly formed party (Strong Armenia) finished second.

To better understand the situation, it is important to consider that political polarization has become the defining feature of Armenia’s post-2018 political system, undermining democratic consolidation, weakening political competition, and reducing public trust in institutions. The phenomenon is rooted not only in ideological disagreement but in an identity-based struggle between the ruling Civil Contract party and the opposition representing the pre-2018 political elite (“the Formers”), with each side portraying the other as politically illegitimate. Political actors increasingly rely on antagonistic rhetoric that frames politics as a struggle between mutually exclusive camps, making compromise politically costly for all players involved. The 2020 war reinforced these divisions by turning questions of national security and regime legitimacy into existential issues, further entrenching polarization.

Institutional arrangements also reinforce polarization. Armenia’s fully proportional electoral system and the constitutional requirement for a stable legislative majority encourage dominant-party rule while weakening incentives for cross-party cooperation. Because MP candidates depend primarily on party leadership rather than parliamentary constituencies, they are rewarded for demonstrating loyalty through increasingly confrontational rhetoric. These institutional dynamics have enabled the ruling party to legislate and make appointments with minimal need to negotiate with the opposition. Additionally, strong partisan identities make voters less likely to punish undemocratic behavior by their preferred political camp, thereby weakening democratic accountability and reinforcing dominant-party politics.

Moreover, post-war Armenia experienced democratic backsliding since 2020, despite some institutional reforms. This includes restrictions on media freedom imposed during the pandemic and martial law, growing disinformation and hate speech, government efforts to shape political narratives, and continuing weaknesses in anti-corruption reforms. Although Armenia improved its international democratic ratings after the 2021 elections, these gains coexist with persistent shortcomings in freedom of _expression_, judicial independence, and governance. Civil society remains active and resilient but has become less influential in policymaking.

Takeaways from the Election Results

Three parties entered parliament after the 2026 ballot. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract (K’aghpaymanagir) won 50% of the vote (64 seats), losing its two-thirds majority but retaining a comfortable governing position. The party lost support in the capital city, yet it secured strong backing in the provinces, including the strategically important Syunik region, where fears of territorial concessions to Azerbaijan had fueled opposition campaigning. Despite years of claims that the government would surrender sovereignty, most provincial voters backed the prime minister.

Strong Armenia (Uzhegh Hayastan), led by Karapetyan, secured 23% (29 seats), while the Armenia Alliance (Hayastan dashink), led by Robert Kocharyan – who previously served as president and prime minister of both Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic – received under 10% (12 seats), suffering major losses. Although the ruling party can no longer unilaterally amend the constitution or initiate a constitutional referendum, it still holds enough seats to govern, appoint senior officials, and pass legislation requiring a qualified majority. Therefore, the election outcome is expected to ensure continuity in Armenia’s domestic and foreign policies.

Voting patterns reflected a notable generational divide. Older voters generally supported the government’s pro-sovereignty and Western-oriented policies, while many younger voters favored the opposition. This trend may be attributed partly to the growing influence of TikTok, Telegram, and other social media, where emotionally driven content promoted nostalgia for Armenia’s past control of Nagorno-Karabakh and portrayed previous governments more positively. Younger voters, lacking personal memories of Soviet rule, the economic hardship of the 1990s, or electoral abuses under former governments, were seen as more susceptible to these narratives. Older generations remained skeptical of the opposition because of their direct experience with corruption and political repression.

At the same time, a huge portion of pro-democracy and pro-EU voters principally viewed the election as a difficult choice, supporting the ruling party despite reservations because smaller democratic parties were unlikely to pass the electoral threshold and the main opposition was perceived as a threat to democratic institutions and more closely aligned with Russia.

Memory and Politics in Armenia

It is worth mentioning that memory/remembrance politics has always been a central instrument of nation-building in post-Soviet Armenia, shaping public identity through state-directed commemorations, education, monuments, holidays, and symbolic landscapes. Since independence in 1991, the Armenian Genocide became the foundational “master narrative” of the new state, reinforced through institutions such as the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute and the integration of genocide memory into public discourse and education.

Under Robert Kocharyan’s presidential term (1998–2008), remembrance politics shifted toward stronger emphasis on the Karabakh war, the Armenian military, and the Armenian Apostolic Church. Official holidays increasingly celebrated military achievements, churches became more prominent in public space, and school curricula reinforced nationalist historical narratives. The Church was presented less as a purely religious institution than as a pillar of Armenian nationhood and identity. During the Serzh Sargsyan era (2008–2018), these trends intensified. The 2015 centenary of the Armenian Genocide was a defining commemorative event, characterized by the nationwide campaign built around the slogan “Remember and Demand.” Genocide remembrance expanded through monuments, schools, and local initiatives, encouraging broad public participation.

The 2018 Velvet Revolution initially introduced more civic-oriented and inclusive forms of remembrance, including new commemorative practices and debates over educational reform. However, the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war reversed much of this shift. The defeat prompted renewed emphasis on military sacrifice, heroism, and national survival.

Pashinyan: Pragmatic Survivor

Armenian political culture shapes the process of political legitimation. The electorate is normally characterized by short political expectations, emotional decision-making, and a preference for leaders who appear capable of overcoming national crises. The survival of Pashinyan’s ethos therefore depends on continually responding to shifting public moods and presenting himself as a leader closely connected to society rather than the political establishment. Pashinyan’s legitimacy rests on a combination of personal, cultural, economic, and geopolitical factors rather than electoral success alone.

The prime minister has successfully maintained societal acceptance by combining personal charisma, responsiveness to public sentiment, economic pragmatism, and flexible foreign policy. Nevertheless, this legitimacy remains fragile because it depends on unresolved domestic and external challenges, including economic weaknesses, deteriorating relations with Russia, tensions with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, and the risks associated with prolonged incumbency and corruption.

Economic performance is identified as an additional pillar of legitimacy. Post-2022 economic growth—driven by increased remittances, Russian relocants, expanding construction and services, and growing trade—has reinforced public confidence. However, persistent corruption, insufficient foreign investment, logistical constraints caused by Armenia’s regional isolation, and limited financial resources continue to threaten long-term political stability.

The Civil Contract leader’s ability to remain in power despite Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war reflects his political adaptability, symbolic appeal, and capacity to present himself as the indispensable defender of Armenia’s national interests. Pashinyan’s long career as an opposition journalist, activist, parliamentarian, and participant in the 2018 Velvet Revolution cultivated an image of an anti-establishment leader committed to democratic change. His imprisonment following the 2008 protests, sustained criticism of previous governments, and populist leadership style strengthened his credibility among many Armenians. The PM’s charisma, effective use of political symbolism, and control of the public narrative have been essential sources of public support.

Geopolitical Fallout

Foreign policy has become a key source of legitimacy in the South Caucasus country. Pashinyan is more pro-European than his predecessors, emphasizes governance reforms, anti-corruption measures, and the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA). Pashinyan is pursuing a flexible and often contradictory strategy, balancing relations with Russia while simultaneously strengthening ties with the United States, France, China, and, more recently, Türkiye. His evolving rhetoric toward the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Russia is interpreted as pragmatic political maneuvering intended to preserve domestic support while adapting to changing geopolitical realities after the Karabakh conflict. Armenia’s foreign policy is therefore best understood as the product of domestic elite preferences operating within significant external security constraints, rather than as a purely pro-European or pro-Russian orientation.

In contrast, during the Sargsyan era (2008-2018), the country was more strongly oriented toward Russia, particularly regarding security. Although not portrayed as anti-European, Sargsyan considered Russia Armenia’s indispensable strategic partner and prioritized economic and security considerations over closer integration with the EU. The 2013 decision not to sign the EU Association Agreement, following Russian pressure to join the Customs Union of the Eurasian Economic Union, was evidence of how external constraints and domestic elite preferences interacted to shape Armenia’s foreign policy.

As for the foreign policy guidelines of the new Pashinyan cabinet, although negotiations resumed under a “no preconditions” framework, there remains a widespread skepticism about their prospects, due to previous failed normalization attempts and the absence of a concrete roadmap. Domestic political divisions and unresolved disputes continue to constrain progress. Armenia’s post-war trajectory is characterized by an increased dependence on EU and US aid, as well as uncertain prospects for regional reconciliation. Lasting stability will require resolving the unresolved status issues surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh, rebuilding public trust, strengthening democratic institutions, and reducing Armenia’s strategic vulnerability. Progress on the peace agreement with Azerbaijan, improved relations with the Republic of Türkiye, and regional development projects could strengthen Armenia’s long-term stability despite the loss of the constitutional supermajority needed for major constitutional reforms.

Outlook

In summary, the 2026 parliamentary election confirmed that Armenia’s democratic trajectory is threatened by the interaction of entrenched political polarization and institutional incentives that favor dominant-party rule. Polarization is unlikely to diminish unless party institutionalization is strengthened, links between elected representatives and citizens are reinforced, new democratic parties gain broader electoral support, cross-party cooperation on nonpartisan policy issues is encouraged, and accountability through constituency engagement and policymaking is enhanced. Nevertheless, even these measures are likely to produce only gradual and limited improvements as long as identity-based political conflict continues to dominate the political landscape.

The country’s democratic future will depend not only on the successful implementation of the peace process and continued economic development but also on strengthening political institutions capable of fostering pluralism, accountability, and public trust. As Armenia navigates in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment, the interaction between domestic political competition and external security pressures will remain the defining challenge for both democratic consolidation and long-term regional stability.

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Turkish Press: Education Ministry audits Armenian schools over enrollment of n

Christine Harutyunian
Aug 14, 2026
Schools serving Turkey’s Armenian community have admitted students from Armenia as “guest students” for the past 14 years. The ministry is now reportedly considering ending this practice.

The National Education Ministry has begun inspections of Armenian schools, with inspectors  telling administrators they can no longer enroll Armenian citizens as “guest students,” according to Agos, an İstanbul-based Armenian community newspaper.

Inspectors also requested information about Armenian citizens who previously attended the schools, the newspaper reported. Authorities are considering the transfer of currently enrolled students to public schools.

The inspections are not expected to be limited to Armenian schools as Greek and Jewish schools are also reportedly within the scope of the audits, Agos said.

Armenians, Greeks and Jews are Turkey’s recognized minority groups under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Minority schools established under the treaty serve citizens of Turkey belonging to those communities.

A regulation issued by the National Education Ministry on Mar 20, 2012 allowed foreign nationals to attend private schools as “guest students.” These students are not eligible for diplomas but receive documents listing the courses they completed when they leave school.

Armenian schools have admitted children who are Armenian citizens under this arrangement for about 14 years.

If the practice ends following the inspections, students who are already ineligible for diplomas could also lose the ability to continue their education at Armenian schools.

Armenian Patriarch of Turkey Sahak Maşalyan is also aware of the developments, according to Agos.

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More than 32,000 applications for Armenian citizenship in a year: who is apply

Chakhmakhchian Vatche
JAM News
Aug 14, 2026
  • JAMnews
  • Yerevan

“There has been a sharp increase in the number of applications for Armenian citizenship. In 2025, the number exceeded 32,000, a historic high for the entire history of the Republic of Armenia,” said Armen Kazaryan, acting deputy interior minister.

According to him, the number of citizenship applications exceeded 20,000 in each of the previous two years, compared with 7,000-8,000 in earlier years.

Kazaryan believes the main goal of applicants is to obtain a document that allows them to travel:

“We have seen certain developments, in particular the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine and restrictions on travel for Russian citizens. After that, we saw an increase in applications for Armenian citizenship. By the way, most Russian citizens applying for Armenian citizenship are ethnic Armenians.”

He rejected claims that obtaining Armenian citizenship is a complicated process:

“The requirements for ethnic Armenians are ‘zero’. People may face administrative difficulties. For example, some may lack the necessary documents proving their ethnicity, or their records may contain errors. In such cases, we need to compare the information with other records and verify it. Essentially, Armenia imposes no requirements on ethnic Armenians.”

Kazaryan himself considers the lack of requirements for ethnic Armenians problematic. In his view, this devalues the institution of citizenship itself.

“We will soon present a draft of the relevant legislative amendments addressing these issues,” he said, without specifying what changes the amendments would introduce.

  • Armenia begins shift from Russia towards EU – but finish line remains distant
  • New EU mission in Armenia to help address post-election risks
  • ‘Main obstacle to Armenia’s EU integration is frozen EU-Georgia dialogue’ – Pashinyan

Border crossings: more people entered than left

Nelli Davtyan, acting head of the Migration and Citizenship Service, also spoke to journalists. She recalled that last year Armenia recorded a “significant positive figure” in the difference between the number of citizens entering and leaving the country. The figure stood at 8,660.

In the first half of this year, the difference between entries and exits stood at 1,347.

“There were 871,409 entries and 870,062 exits. If we compare this with figures for the first half of previous years, last year’s figure was -20,065, while in 2024 it was -22,893,” Davtyan noted.

She stressed that the figure usually rises in the second half of the year. This happens because seasonal migrant workers return home after leaving the country for temporary work. They usually leave in early spring and return in autumn. Davtyan therefore described a positive figure already in the first half of the year as “exceptional”.

More than 6,000 people granted temporary residence permits

Armen Kazaryan said Armenia had transformed from a country that “sends” migrants abroad into a country that receives migrants. “The second major trend is the growing interest in Armenia among foreign nationals,” he noted.

Nelli Davtyan said the Migration and Citizenship Service had received 9,534 applications for one-year temporary residence permits: “Of these, 6,059 were approved. Compared with previous years, the number of applications has almost tripled. The proportion of approved applications has also nearly tripled.”

According to Davtyan, the number of applications for three-year residence permits has also increased, although more modestly: “In previous years, the figure stood at 1,500-1,700, while in the first half of this year it had already reached 2,085.”

Armenia implementing 53 EU recommendations on visa liberalisation

Armen Kazaryan said Armenia was actively cooperating with the European Union on visa liberalisation. He recalled that Armenia received its first report on the implementation of the action plan in May 2026. The report gave a fairly positive assessment of the steps taken by the Armenian government.

“The EU presented us with 53 recommendations. To complete our work, we divided them into specific actions. We broke down the recommendations so that we could clearly identify the steps we need to take to implement them,” Kazaryan explained.

Based on the 53 recommendations, an Armenian working group drew up a list of 117 actions. More than half of them have already been completed.

The recommendations form part of the first stage of the visa liberalisation action plan. This stage covers legislation and policy development only. The authorities expect to assess how effectively Armenia has implemented the first stage by early 2027 or during the first half of the year. If the results prove positive, work on the second stage will begin.

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Can the ‘Trump Route’ in the South Caucasus succeed without Iran’s buy-in?

Hagop Kamalian
Amwaj
Aug 14, 2026
Iran/Politics

Rovshan Mammadli

“TRIPP will also create opportunities for Iran…in effect, TRIPP creates a new rail connection linking the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea,” Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan insisted to journalists in late May, referring to the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity.” His remarks were not merely descriptive but strategic, implicitly tying the US-backed transit project to Armenia’s own “Crossroads of Peace” initiative. The latter vision seeks to transform the South Caucasus from a landlocked zone of frozen conflicts into a vibrant logistical hub, integrating the railway systems of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and crucially, Iran.

The diplomatic choreography surrounding Mirzoyan’s comments was highly significant. They followed immediately after his meeting in Yerevan with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, where the two chief diplomats signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement. This pact was accompanied by a framework agreement on critical minerals and the operationalization of TRIPP.

As proposed, TRIPP involves a 43 km (26.7 miles) transit corridor slicing across Armenia’s southernmost Syunik province. For Azerbaijan, the corridor is a crown jewel of the settlement following its 2020 war with Armenia, providing a direct, sovereign-lite land link to its Nakhchivan exclave and establishing a contiguous bridge to Turkey. For the United States, it represents a bold attempt to diminish Russian influence over regional transit while anchoring Armenia more firmly in the western orbit.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has reinforced this narrative, arguing that the “Crossroads of Peace” would foster regional stability by distributing the dividends of trade among all neighbors. By framing TRIPP as a component of this broader network, Yerevan is attempting to sell a western-led project to a skeptical Tehran by promising that it will eventually facilitate Iran’s own north-south and east-west trade ambitions.

The shift in Armenian rhetoric has been palpable. Since the tripartite agreement between Armenia, Azerbaijan and the United States was signed in Washington in Aug. 2025, Yerevan has noticeably de-emphasized its “Crossroads of Peace” branding in international fora, pivoting instead to TRIPP as the primary vehicle for regional connectivity. This shift has not gone unnoticed in Tehran, where the replacement of a multilateral regional initiative with a US-brokered corridor is viewed with profound apprehension.

Iran’s concerns Over TRIPP

For the Iranian leadership, TRIPP represents a complex strategic dilemma. On the one hand, the formalization of the corridor via international agreement—rather than military conquest—lowers the immediate risk of a full-scale Azerbaijani invasion of southern Armenia, an outcome Tehran has vowed to prevent. On the other hand, TRIPP threatens to bypass Iran’s own transit infrastructure, depriving it of lucrative transit fees and geopolitical leverage. More critically, the project envisions a significant US technical and security presence on Iran’s sensitive northwestern border. Following the Mirzoyan-Rubio summit in late May, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baqaei reiterated “serious suspicions” regarding Washington’s ultimate goals, signaling that while Tehran may tolerate the corridor’s existence, it remains fundamentally opposed to an expanded US footprint in the South Caucasus.

The shadow of the Israeli-US war on Iran looms large over these developments. The fighting between late February and April demonstrated that Iran possesses both the resilience to absorb high-tech strikes and the asymmetrical capability to hit back at western interests across the zones where the ‘Axis of Resistance’ has a presence. The drone strike on Nakhchivan’s international airport in the week following the Feb. 28 launch of the war on Iran was a watershed moment. Although Iran denied any involvement, the incident proved that the South Caucasus is no longer a sanctuary from broader escalations in West Asia. Investors in TRIPP must now calculate the risk of their infrastructure becoming a collateral target in any future Iran-US flare-up. Even in the absence of direct kinetic strikes, a volatile security environment could deter the private capital necessary for the corridor’s construction and long-term viability. The current fragile understanding between Tehran and Washington, which remains on life support, is the only thing keeping the project on life support; should it fail, TRIPP could become the first casualty of a resumed US “maximum pressure” campaign against the Islamic Republic.

 

Reconciling TRIPP with Iran’s interests

Sustainable success for TRIPP likely depends on integrating Iran into the regional architecture rather than isolating it. Tehran has harbored a multi-decade ambition to establish a “Persian Gulf–Black Sea” multimodal corridor. This vision was historically blocked by the collapse of Soviet rail links during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War between 1988 and 1994. Since the 2020 Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation over the disputed territory, Iran has shifted its strategy: rather than building a prohibitively expensive direct rail line through Armenia’s rugged mountains, it is looking to rehabilitate the existing Iran–Nakhchivan–Armenia–Georgia route. If TRIPP is structured to allow for Iranian usage and connection points, it could transform from a point of friction into a shared economic interest.

Armenia’s renewed diplomatic outreach suggests it is trying to carve out this middle ground. By reviving the “Crossroads of Peace” language alongside TRIPP, Yerevan is attempting to leverage any Iran-US détente to ensure that western-backed connectivity does not trigger an Iranian security response. This requires a delicate balancing act—convincing Washington that the corridor is a tool for western integration while convincing Tehran that it is a platform for regional inclusion.

The economic dimensions of this recalibration are already visible. Yerevan has reportedly awarded roughly 215M USD for infrastructure contracts to Iranian firms for work on the North–South Highway in Syunik. These projects are strategically placed in the very province where TRIPP will operate. In June, Iranian Vice President Seyed Hamid Pourmohammadi attended the inauguration of the Kajaran tunnel, a move that underscored Iran’s determination to remain a physical stakeholder in Armenian transit, regardless of who facilitates the east-west corridors.

Politically, Pashinyan has gone to great lengths to signal that Armenia’s westward tilt has its limits. His recent attendance at the funeral of former supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran was a potent symbolic gesture. It was intended to reassure the Iranian establishment that while Armenia seeks American investment through TRIPP, it will not allow its territory to be used as a platform for hostile intelligence or military activity against its southern neighbor. Neither will this affect Yerevan’s relations with Tehran. This strategy of “strategic balancing” is Armenia’s only path to survival in a region where geography is often destiny.

Ultimately, the fate of TRIPP—and the broader peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan—is inextricably tied to the future of Iran-US relations. If the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding survives the current turmoil and eventually matures into a durable settlement, Tehran may find it easier to ignore the US presence in Syunik in exchange for trade benefits. However, if the Trump administration returns to a policy of regional confrontation, the South Caucasus will likely be the first place where Tehran attempts to impose costs on Washington. In such a scenario, TRIPP would cease to be a “Route for Peace” and instead become a new fault line in an old conflict. Its success depends not on the quality of its asphalt or the efficiency of its customs, but on the high-stakes diplomacy between two capitals many miles away.

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Pashinyan signals openness to compromise with Russia over Armenia’s railways

Ani Basmajian
OC Media
Aug 14, 2026
by Ani Ghulinyan

14 August 2026•4 min read

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has told reporters that Armenia is seeking to negotiate a compromise with Russia over the Russian-run national railway, rather than unilaterally cancelling Russian Railways’ (RZhD) management contract.

Armenia’s railway system is owned by Russian Railways (RZhD) under a 30-year concession signed in 2008. Pashinyan first called for ending the RZhD’s presence in February, arguing that Russian control discourages investment from international partners. In July, he threatened arbitration and a $2 billion annual bill for RZhD’s management rights, triggering warnings from Russia.

When talking about the compromise solution on Thursday, marking a departure from previous statements where he called for an end to the 30-year agreement. Instead, Pashinyan suggested that Russia could sell its concession rights, but only partially and remain on as a shareholder in Armenia’s railways.

While he noted it would not be a quick fix, Pashinyan said the move would help Armenia to eventually join the wider international railway network — something that would not be possible with greater Russian shares in the network.

‘I suggested this as one of the possible development scenarios without having anything specific in mind’, he added.

Prior to this recent suggestion, Pashinyan in July threatened to sue RZhD for $2 billion annually for its management rights. This triggered warnings from both the Kremlin and RZhD itself. At the time, he stated that there was ‘no alternative’ to ending Russia’s control of the railway network and raised the idea of international arbitration. In response, RZhD chair Oleg Belozerov demanded that Yerevan compensate the company for around $400 million of investments made since 2009, while Russia’s economic development minister Maxim Reshetnikov called Armenia’s demand for additional payment ‘groundless’.

Pashinyan covers relations with CSTO and EAEU, Azerbaijani energy, and Simonyan’s new position

Pashinyan linked the railway issue to Armenia’s wider relationship with the EAEU and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). The EAEU had recently called on Armenia to hold a referendum to decide whether it wants to remain in the bloc or join the EU. The CSTO, a Russia-led security bloc, said it might discuss revoking Armenia’s voting rights in its upcoming November session.

‘There is an expectation, which Armenia has not agreed to, that it should maintain an exclusive relationship [with the bloc]’, Pashinyan said.

He argued that Armenia’s import and export trade being tied to a single direction is problematic in itself, and that the country needs to diversify its markets rather than remaining dependent on a single partner regardless of the situation with Russia.

Pashinyan also talked about Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s comments on recent visits by Azerbaijani specialists to Armenian power stations, addressing public concerns about these visits and mentioning that there have been two visits, both previously announced ahead of time.

Although there was an announcement about Azerbaijani delegations visiting Armenia in September 2025, the statement did not outline plans for Azerbaijani specialists to survey possible sites for power-line pylons. The press release about the second visit Pashinyan mentioned, dated 15 January 2026, is not available on the government’s website.

He also commented on a recent statement by Aliyev, in which he suggested that his country could supply Armenia with electricity.

In an interview, Aliyev said Azerbaijani specialists have conducted preliminary surveys in Armenia and identified possible sites for power-line pylons.

‘I hope the Armenian side will not delay a decision on this matter. After all, they themselves may need it most of all, given that their primary energy source today is a nuclear power plant — one that is not under their own control’, Aliyev said.

Pashinyan said that Armenia used to have an electricity surplus, but now the country might develop new demands due to growing AI facilities in Armenia that require a lot of energy.

‘Overall, however, our strategy is to achieve 100% energy independence’, he added.

The next talking point of the briefing covered non-combat deaths in the army. Pashinyan announced his intention to make personnel changes in the Military Police and the bodies directly responsible, following a recent death.

Although there have been no combat deaths in the army in the past year, an opposition MP from Armenia Alliance, Anna Grigoryan, announced in parliament on Tuesday that there have already been eight non-combat deaths in the first seven months of 2026. According to the Military Prosecutor’s Office, 30 soldiers died in non-combat conditions in 2025, 27 in 2024, and 54 in 2023.

Pashinyan also said that Yerevan’s real estate market is growing, driven by increasing interest from foreign nationals and the Armenian diaspora in purchasing apartments in the capital. He described this as a trendy development, adding that reforms are needed to facilitate transactions while boosting trust in the market.

Finally, he touched upon the appointment of former Parliamentary Speaker Alen Simonyan to the position of Secretary of the Security Council, replacing Armen Grigoryan. Asked about the appointment, Pashinyan stated that this type of political reshuffle is normal and that Grigoryan, who had served in the position for eight years, had been offered a position on his staff but had declined, choosing to step back and rest instead.

Strained economic ties with Russia

Separately, on Thursday, Armenian Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan and Russian Agriculture Minister Oksana Lut met in Almaty, Kazakhstan, on the sidelines of the EAEU’s Council for Agro-Industrial Policy. The two ministers agreed to strengthen their cooperation on food safety, appearing to mark another step toward defusing the tension between the two countries since the parliamentary elections in Armenia.

The ministers discussed developing cooperation within the agro-industrial complex, as well as lifting the import restrictions on Armenia. The Food Safety Inspection Body of Armenia and Russia’s Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision (Rosselkhoznadzor) are set to work more closely together to lift current restrictions on shipments of Armenian products to Russia, as well as on their transit to third countries.

Since May, Russia has restricted imports of certain agricultural products, alcoholic beverages, and soft drinks from Armenia as part of Moscow’s economic pressure on Armenia ahead and after the Armenian parliamentary elections of June.

Lut emphasised that resuming shipments hinges on Armenia ensuring compliance through measures such as verifying the use of local raw materials, controlling pesticides and making the supply chain traceable.

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