Chess: Anand wins as World team takes lead

New Kerala, India
June 11 2004

Anand wins as World team takes lead

Moscow, June 11 (IANS) :

Viswanathan Anand registered a fine win and carried his World team to
a encouraging one-point lead on the opening day of the Petrosyan
Memorial chess match against an Armenian team.

The match is being played to mark the 75th birth anniversary of late
Armenian world chess champion Tigran Petrosian.

Petrosian, who was born in 1929, died in 1984.

The win Thursday did not come easily, as Armenian Smbat Lputian
stretched him to 61 moves in the first round.

“It is always nice to start with a win. The competition is bound to
get more intense as the match progresses,” said Anand, who last year
had led the World team to a fine win over a Russian team which also
had Garry Kasparov.

While Anand and Peter Svidler scored wins for the World team,
Kasparov was the lone winner for Armenia.

Svidler beat Boris Gelfand, an Israeli, who is turning out for the
Armenian team because he is the master’s most famous pupil.

The match continues till July 15. With six members on either side,
the match is a six-round Scheveningen event.

Anand (2774) had white pieces in his clash against Lputian (2634),
who is rated well below the Indian star. The game was a French
Winawer, in which at one stage, the Armenian seemed to have a chance
to escape with a draw. But Anand did not allow that and managed to
find a winning route as the game stretched to 61 moves.

Kasparov opened the match with a win over Dutchman, Loek Van Wely in
33 moves of an English Symmetrical game. The remaining three games
ended in draws.

Svidler beat Gelfand in a 52-move Sicilian Najdorf Variation game.

Besides Anand, the other members of the World team are Michael Adams,
Peter Svidler, Loek Van Wely, Etienne Bacrot and Francisco Vallejo
Pons. The Armenian team comprises Vladimir Akopian, Smbat Lputian and
Rafael Vaganian plus Kasparov whose mother is Armenian, Peter Leko
whose wife is Armenian and Boris Gelfand.

Results of Round 1:

Kasparov (ARM) beat Van Wely (ROW); Anand (ROW) beat Lputian (Arm);
Leko (ARM) drew Adams (ROW); Svidler (ROW) beat Gelfand (Arm);
Akopian (ARM) drew with Vallejo Pons (ROW); Bacrot (ROW) drew with
Vaganian (Arm).

Moves of Anand’s game:

1. e4 e6 2. d4 d5 3. Nc3 Bb4 4. e5 c5 5. a3 Bxc3+ 6. bxc3 Ne7 7. Qg4
O-O 8. Bd3 Nbc6 9. Qh5 Ng6 10. Nf3 Qc7 11. Be3 Nce7 12. h4 Nf5 13. g4
Nxe3 14. fxe3 cxd4 15. cxd4 Qc3+ 16. Ke2 Bd7 17. Rab1 Be8 18. Ng5 h6
19. Rxb7 Qc8 20. Rhb1 Nxe5 21. dxe5 f5 22. exf6 Rxf6 23. Nf7 Rxf7 24.
Rxf7 Bxf7 25. Qe5 Qd8 26. Rb7 Qf8 27. g5 hxg5 28. hxg5 g6 29. e4 a5
30. Qf6 Rb8 31. Ra7 Ra8 32. Rd7 Be8 33. Qxe6+ Bf7 34. Qe7 Re8 35.
Qxf8+ Kxf8 36. Kf3 dxe4+ 37. Bxe4 Re5 38. Kf4 Rc5 39. Ra7 Be8 40. Ra6
Ke7 41. Bxg6 Bxg6 42. Rxg6 Rxc2 43. Ra6 Rc4+ 44. Kf5 Ra4 45. Ra7+ Kf8
46. Kf6 Rf4+ 47. Kg6 Ra4 48. Rf7+ Kg8 49. Rf3 Rc4 50. Rb3 Rc6+ 51.
Kh5 Ra6 52. a4 Ra7 53. Rb5 Kg7 54. Kg4 Kg6 55. Kf4 Ra6 56. Ke4 Ra8
57. Kd4 Rd8+ 58. Kc4 Rd1 59. Rxa5 Ra1 60. Kb3 Rb1+ 61. Ka3 1-0

A reluctant Turkey begins Kurdish-language broadcasts

A reluctant Turkey begins Kurdish-language broadcasts 11.06.2004

ISN, Switzerland
June 11 2004

The long-awaited implementation of Kurdish-language state
broadcasting in Turkey has earned Ankara reserved praise from the EU,
which has hailed the move as a good first start in meeting human
rights criteria for accession negotiations. In light the several
decades of bloody civil war between Turkish forces and Kurdish
separatists, the symbolism of the once taboo idea should indeed not
be downplayed, but at the same time, the lacklustre programming is
sadly insufficient.

By Burak Bekdil for ISN Security Watch

Two long years after Ankara approved the broadcasting of
Kurdish-language programs, the first such programs were aired on
Wednesday – a delay that illustrates there is still some serious
resistance to EU-inspired political reforms in Turkey. But the final
implementation of the broadcasting reforms is still a positive
indication from Ankara that its desire to join the EU – which
requires meeting the bloc’s basic human rights criteria – is growing
stronger than its desire to maintain the status quo. While the new
weekly 30-minute Kurdish-language programs are far from winning any
broadcasting awards, they are at least a positive prelude of what is
to come. The project represents the slow metamorphosis of the
official and public Turkish mindset. Only a few years ago the mere
advocacy of Kurdish-language broadcasting would have been a criminal
offence. “Either Turkish, or Nothing!” is one ultra-nationalist
slogan that still decorates the various corners of Ankara.

A slow and silent revolution through music

Speaking Kurdish was outlawed in Turkey until 1991, and until a few
years ago, the issue of the Kurdish language was taboo for the state
establishment. It had taken the guardians of Turkey’s territorial
integrity quite some time to digest Kurdish music and concerts, which
were likely the precursors to wider recognition of the language. In
many ways, the dozens of Kurdish singers who released CDs in their
own language broke the vicious circle, showing that language was not
synonymous with terrorism. Their songs worked as a catalyst,
demonstrating that the use of language, per se, was not a threat to
Turkey’s territorial integrity. Those artists sparked a slow and
silent revolution. What was unthinkable in Turkey only half a decade
ago is now becoming a reality, but it will still take several years
for the minority-language broadcasting reforms to please everyone. To
praise the reforms without reservations is premature, but it would
also be unfair to play them down altogether.

A reservedly historic move

Most analysts have contributed Ankara’s historic move was largely
designed to persuade the EU to open accession talks. Though the first
Kurdish-language program was broadcast on Wednesday, the project had
begun earlier in the week with broadcasts in other minority
languages, Bosnian and Arabic. Numerically and politically, though,
Wednesday’s Kurdish program was of much greater significance. The
Wednesday program, aired by TRT-3 state television, offered 30
minutes of news highlights, sports, folk music, and a nature
documentary in Kurmandji – one of the two main Kurdish dialects, of
which there are around 40, spoken in Turkey. Kurdish is an
Indo-European tongue unrelated to Turkish, though it has many Turkish
words. On Friday, the TRT-3 was scheduled to broadcast a second
program in the Kurdish dialect of Zaza. The programs also broadcast
Turkish subtitles. State radio also broadcast a program in Kurmandji
earlier in the week. Various estimates put the number of Turkish
Kurds anywhere between eight million and 25 million, as Turkish
population censuses do not produce statistics on ethnic origin. There
is, however, empirical evidence that the Kurds are the largest ethnic
minority in the country, with nearly 100 different races.

The Turkish legislative malady

The legislation approving minority-language broadcasting was passed
in 2002, but the typical gap between passing legislation and
implementing it, the Turkish malady, delayed the project for two
years. Though the legislation paved the way for lifting the ban on
minority-language broadcasting, there was still no legal basis to
regulate such broadcasting. For over a year, various state agencies
passed the buck down the line, none wanting to spearhead the
controversial program – not, at least, until Brussels stepped up the
pressure, waving the EU carrot before them. Despite pressure from the
government to implement the reforms, the administration of TNT
remained reluctant. The day before the first Kurdish program was to
be aired, police in Istanbul detained 25 journalists from pro-Kurdish
media outlets in a security sweep ahead of the NATO summit on 28
June. In a series of raids in Istanbul, a journalist from the small
Dicle News Agency said police had seized computers and other records.
He said the charges against his agency included belonging to an
illegal organization and publishing in Kurdish. Strange timing,
indeed.

Mixed reactions

The minority-language programs have sparked a wide range of reactions
in Turkey. Most Turks remain indifferent to the broadcasts. According
to Reha Tartici, director for the Istanbul-based Consensus research
house, the early results of a survey show that a majority of Turks
“do not see broadcasting in ethnic languages as a threat against the
country’s territorial integrity”. After all, if Kurdish music has not
posed a threat to territorial integrity, why should state-sponsored
programs? However, the Turkish nationalists are divided over the
issue. Ulku Ocaklari, an ultra-nationalist youth organization dating
back to the street fights in the 1970s that claimed half a dozen
lives a day, staged a protest against broadcasting in non-Turkish
languages – though no more than a handful of people turned out for
the demonstration. In a conspicuously soft tone, Mehmet Agar, a
right-wing opposition leader and a former police chief with quite a
notorious pan-Turkic past, labeled the programs a “democratic
overture.”

Minority indifference and opposition

Like the rest of the population, Kurds also seem to be indifferent to
the programs. “Most Kurds in the countryside have different
priorities and problems, mostly economic ones,” a local journalist
based in Van, eastern Anatolia, told Security Watch. “State
broadcasting in their own language will not add much to their lives.
Besides, there are many Kurds who do not understand the two main
dialects.” Other minorities have had reacted differently. Bosnians
and Arabs had raised objections to the program, saying they could not
understand the Kurdish dialects. Circassians, too, have objected, but
for a different reason. A spokesman for the Circassian community in
Turkey said that the country’s ethnic Caucasians did not their own
language programs. “Although we come from Circassian descendants, our
country is Turkey and our language is Turkish,” he said. Apparently,
the Circassians, who have remained extremely loyal to Turkey, do not
want to be labelled as separatists. Another group, the Laz, or Black
Sea people of Georgian/Caucasian-origins, have also objected, saying
that they have been left out of the program.

Down-playing the program’s Kurdish aspect

Ali Bayramoglu, a commentator writing in the liberal, pro-Islamic
Yeni Safak, takes a fairly negative view of the programs. He accuses
the Turkish authorities of trying to down play broadcasts in Kurdish
by introducing other, less relevant minority languages, such as
Bosnian and Arabic. “In order not to prioritize the broadcasts in
Kurdish they had added such languages as Arabic, Circassian, and
Bosnian,” he told Security Watch. At the same time, the Ankara has
could argue that the reforms could not justify prioritizing any
particular language, which would be unconstitutional. As part of the
Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey gives equal status to its non-Muslim
minorities in terms of religion and education. A few thousand Greeks
have the same rights as the 25’000 Jews and 65’000 Armenians living
in Turkey. The Supreme Court could have annulled the
minority-language broadcasting legislation if it had proposed only
Kurdish dialects.

The reward for reform

Most importantly, the proposed “recipient” of the move, the EU, is
content, but also has many reservations. “This is a good start, but
not the finished product yet,” said an EU ambassador in Ankara.
“Thinking about the bureaucratic resistance, it is a big step for the
state establishment. But it may not be sufficient.” Another EU
diplomat in the Turkish capital warned that Brussels might soon start
to pressure Ankara to broaden the scope of minority-language
broadcasting. “This is only a first move for informative,
professional broadcasting. You cannot please an audience with
week-old news or hastily picked programs. We reckon that the Turkish
government should be quite keen for upgrades.” According to George
Coats, a London-based Turkey specialist, the EU will inevitably be
looking for further steps. “You need something more substantial,
topical,” he told Security Watch. For now, the program is not
receiving praise for its content merits, but only for the symbolic
value seen in diminishing Turkish paranoia. State broadcasting is
limited and its content still reflects a hostile mindset. The
government would do best to encourage private stations to get in on
the program, but Ankara has made it clear it wants complete control
over sensitive Kurdish-language broadcasting – a message taken to
heart with the arrest, the day before the first scheduled state
Kurdish broadcast – of 25 “pro-Kurdish” journalists.

Burak Bekdil is a columnist for the Ankara-based Turkish Daily News
and the Athens-based Kathimerini. He is a correspondent for Defense
News weekly, Virginia, United States.

Is President Ilham Aliyev’s Power Base Wobbling?

Azerbaijan: Is President Ilham Aliyev’s Power Base Wobbling?
By Jean-Christophe Peuch

Radio Free Europe, Czech Republic
June 11 2004

Members of the Azerbaijani government and other state officials have
been trading accusations of corruption and other misdeeds through the
media for the past few weeks. Indications that political jockeying
among the ruling elite may be intensifying have, in turn, fueled
speculation about President Ilham Aliyev’s ability to control his team.

Prague, 11 June 2004 (RFE/RL) — In Baku, a power struggle among the
country’s top leadership is the talk of the town.

The political jockeying kicked off a few months ago with a media
campaign directed at Baku Mayor Hacibala Abutalibov.

The “Azerbaycan” official newspaper published an article criticizing
Abutalibov for failing to regulate the city’s expansion and improve
communal services. Other attacks soon followed, blaming the Baku mayor
for building fountains during a water shortage and demolishing the
city’s commercial kiosks, a move that left many unemployed.”Everyone
was expecting that after the October elections Ilham Aliyev would
launch a few purges and that all of those officials who were tainted
with corruption and bribe-taking…would be progressively replaced
with younger reformist cadres. Unfortunately, [Ilham Aliyev’s]
cadre policy is the same as that of the previous president.”

A former deputy prime minister, Abutalibov was appointed Baku mayor
in January 2001 by then President Heydar Aliyev.

Like the late head of state, Abutalibov was born in Nahcivan, an
Azerbaijani exclave in Armenia that has been virtually cut off from
the rest of the country since the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict broke
out in the late 1980s.

Abutalibov reportedly belongs to the so-called Nahcivani clan, an
informal grouping of political leaders that dominated Azerbaijan’s
political life for most of Heydar Aliyev’s rule.

For many years, a power struggle positioned representatives of the
Nahcivani clan against government officials originating from Armenia,
known in Azerbaijan as Yeraz.

Fragmentation along regional lines has also affected the ruling Yeni
Azerbaycan (New Azerbaijan) party.

Yet, Heydar Aliyev never allowed infighting to become public, let alone
to make headlines. But his son, Ilham, who took over the presidency
after last October’s disputed polls, has failed to prevent the feuding
from coming into the open.

Eldar Namazov, who served as a close aide to Heydar Aliyev in the
1990s, tells our correspondent the political succession brought a
major change in domestic politics.

“That at the top of the executive different groups are vying for
influence has long been an open secret. These groups do exist,
and in this respect Azerbaijan is no exception. The problem is that
Heydar Aliyev, who was a shrewd politician, was able to arbiter these
conflicting interests. Never before had this infighting become so
obvious. In any case, it had never made the headlines of newspapers
or was discussed on television. But the situation has changed since
the last elections. These groups are now openly trading accusations,
and the problem has become much more acute than it used to be under
Heydar Aliyev,” Namazov said.

Since the first attacks targeting the mayor appeared in the media,
Baku residents have witnessed a string of campaigns aimed at vilifying
a number of government officials, including Education Minister Misir
Mardanov, Transport Minister Ziya Mammadov, Health Minister Ali
Insanov, and Customs State Committee Chairman Kamaletdin Heydarov.

Media reports indicate the current dispute once again pits members of
the Nahcivani clan against their traditional Yeraz rivals. However,
“blood connection” is no longer a deciding factor.

Sahin Abbasov is deputy editor in chief of the Baku-based independent
“Ekho” newspaper. He says political clans are no longer solely
organized along regional relationships.

“The situation is much more intricate today. Regional belonging is no
longer the driving force behind these groups. Different sub-groups
with different interests have formed within these regional groups,
and today it is more financial interests that link people together,”
Abbasov said.

Analysts believed that, after the election, Aliyev would bring in a
new team that would progressively evict the presidential “old guard.”

Yet, with the exception of Foreign Minister Vilayat Quliyev and a
few middle-ranking officials, the 42-year-old Azerbaijani leader has
kept most of his father’s ministers and advisers. He even reappointed
former Prime Minister Artur Rasuzade — whom he had replaced a few
months earlier at that position — to head the government.

Former presidential aide Namazov, who heads a nongovernmental
organization known as Civic Forum, says Aliyev is now paying the
price for failing to bring in new blood.

“Everyone was expecting that after the October elections Ilham Aliyev
would launch a few purges and that all of those officials who were
tainted with corruption and bribe-taking, or those who were holding
very conservative political views and opposing democratic values,
would be progressively replaced with younger reformist cadres.
Unfortunately, [Ilham Aliyev’s] cadre policy is the same as that of
the previous president. These groups are now fighting each other
to preserve their corporatist interests, and this poses a serious
problem to Azerbaijan,” Namazov said.

Among the factors that have contributed to the present situation,
political analysts cite Ilham Aliyev’s lack of experience in pulling
the strings of shadow politics. They also point to the vacuum left
by Heydar Aliyev’s death, which brought an end to the apparent
cohesiveness of the ruling team needed to ensure a smooth political
transition.

But these are not the only reasons.

Before the ballot, most experts predicted the opposition would pay
a high political price for failing to unite behind a single candidate.

The crushing defeat suffered by Musavat Party leader Isa Qambar and the
police crackdown that followed the disputed polls profoundly modified
Azerbaijan’s political landscape. Today, the opposition is a mere
shadow of its former self and, despite Aliyev’s offers of dialogue,
remains under constant threat of renewed harassment.

“Ekho” deputy editor in chief Abbasov believes Aliyev has fallen
victim to his own success against the opposition.

“Before the elections, there was an opposition. One can argue whether
this opposition was strong or weak, but it had a certain influence.
After the elections, the opposition has been wiped out and the
political struggle that before pitted the party in power against
the opposition has moved and is now limited to the ruling elite,”
Abbasov says.

Political infighting has reached such a scale as to become a potential
embarrassment to the Azerbaijani leader. Aliyev recently entered the
fray, warning he would not let himself be influenced by “politically
motivated” newspaper articles.

Whether he will be able to stop the political infighting and restore
control over his father’s team remains uncertain, however.

“One thing is clear,” Abbasov says. “The system that was elaborated
by Heydar Aliyev is starting to misfire. Will this have serious
consequences? It is too early to say. In any case, this ‘war of
compromising materials’ that is splashing across the front pages of
newspapers shows that the system is misfiring and that something needs
to be done. Everyone expects the president to do something about it
and try to reassert his control, either by structurally changing the
system, or by appointing new people.”

In a report released last month, the International Crisis Group said,
“Azerbaijan’s ruling elite is increasingly divided, with several
clans competing for control of a pyramidal distribution structure
that allows substantial funds to be skimmed from the oil business.”

“Ilham Aliyev needs to embrace the democratic process and dismantle
autocratic rule,” the Brussels-based think tank added, saying that
his “best chance” to achieve this objective is “to nurture a new
generation of technocratic professionals while steadily dismantling
the corrupt patronage network that strangles politics and keeps the
economy overly dependent on oil.”

Yet, critics doubt Aliyev is willing to change the system. They point
to the president’s failure to deliver on pre-election pledges and
the conflicting signals he has been sending since the ballot on his
commitment to reforms.

Former presidential aide Namazov fears Aliyev’s attempts to reassert
his authority over the ruling elite may not be sufficient.

“The exasperation of these clannish wars is, of course, a problem on
the tactical level for the country’s leadership because it undermines
its prestige in the eyes of society and contributes to blackening the
image of the government. This is why I think there will certainly
be attempts to put out these wars. But this does not mean that
the problem will be solved. Should these clans strike a deal to
redistribute economic resources among themselves, that would neither
meet the interests of society nor those of the country. This is not
what our society is expecting,” Namazov says.

“What is needed is the political will to reform the country,” Namazov
adds. “If there is political will, I believe the rest will follow, and
the conservative part of the top leadership will be doomed to failure.”

International Forum On Dialogue Of Cultures In Eurasia Ends

Kyrgyzstan: International Forum On Dialogue Of Cultures In Eurasia Ends
By Antoine Blua

Radio Free Europe, Czech Republic
June 11 2004

A two-day high-level international conference to promote dialogue in
Eurasia ended on 11 June in Kyrgyzstan with the adoption of a draft
document on future European-Asian cultural relations. Participants
underscored the need to accept the diverse cultural values of the
region’s various populations — and to work together to resolve any
security issues that might arise from future culture clashes.

Prague 11 June 2004 (RFE/RL) — A two-day forum on enhancing
international stability and intercultural dialogue concluded today
in the Kyrgyz resort town of Cholpon-Ata.

The forum — titled Eurasia in the 21st Century: Dialogue of Cultures
or Conflict of Civilizations? — was held under the aegis of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

The international gathering ended with the adoption of a draft document
stating that Central Asia has the prerequisites needed to become a
model for the development of dialogue on European and Asian cultures
and civilizations.

The document says that the region is suited to such a role because
it is situated in the heart of Eurasia, has many languages, and is
multiethnic and multireligious.

Participants included the Kyrgyz and Tajik presidents as well as
high-ranking officials and scholars from around Eurasia, including
Russia, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Iran,
Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Pakistan.

At the opening ceremony, UNESCO Director-General Koichiro Matsuura
noted that globalization — and the sometimes aggressive reaction to
it — is the reality of the world today. But Matsuura said he remains
optimistic.”My conclusion from the lessons of history is that people
learn little from it.” — Tajik President Imomali Rakhmonov

“Conflict between civilizations is not our collective destiny,”
Matsuura said. “After all, we live in an era of globalization,
integration and mutual exchange. Also, there is new ignorance
being generated by increased globalization. [But] we are capable of
addressing that.”

Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev, who initiated the gathering, also denied
the threat of a “clash of civilizations,” and expressed hope the
forum would pave the way for improved dialogue and practical action.

“It is very important under present conditions to preserve
the diversity of cultures and encourage the harmonious
multi-civilizationism [coexistence of civilizations] as an essential
condition for stability in the world,” Akaev said.

Tajik President Imomali Rakhmonov noted that globalization may be
having a negative effect on Eurasia’s national cultures. He warned
that only dialogue based on the principle of equality between European
and Asian countries can prevent this.

At the same time, Rakhmonov urged the countries of Central Asia to
pursue greater ties between themselves in order to prevent conflicts.

“My conclusion from the lessons of history is that people learn little
from [it],” Rakhmonov said. “This is one of the reasons why sad events
sometimes repeat.”

Azerbaijan’s Deputy Prime Minister Elchin Efendiev, referring to the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which has led to the occupation of Azeri
territory by Armenian troops, described what he called the “tragic”
consequences of military occupation on a native culture.

“The occupation of a territory has, among other things, humanitarian
consequences that are tragic for the preservation of the cultural
heritage and the development of culture,” Efendiev said.

Not all examples were so bleak. Seyyed Makhdoom Raheen, Afghanistan’s
minister of culture and information, said his country’s reconstruction
process is a good example of cooperation between cultures.

“Afghanistan has suffered for several years under the shadow of
terrorism and the Taliban rule, which resembled a nightmare in our
national life,” Raheen said. “Now the country, with the thoughts of its
people and the assistance of the international community, is moving
ahead towards its moral and material reconstruction. According to
President [Hamid] Karzai, Afghanistan is a good example for cooperation
of civilizations.”

Violence in Afghanistan and Iraq was a strong theme throughout the
gathering. Iranian Vice President for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs
Mohammad Ali Abtahi criticized the use of Islam by terrorists as a
justification for their actions. He, too, pressed for better dialogue
as the first step toward resolving international conflicts, but with
a condition.

“No doubt a real dialogue is possible only when we see that the other
part is also seeking the truth and the ideal and their words are part
of this truth and this ideal,” Abtahi said.

Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Eleonora Mitrofanova stated that
attempts to bring in Western models of civilization have failed in
Iraq. She said she believes it is impossible to use force to propagate
Western-style democracy in a non-Western civilization.

Azerbaijan, Armenia Work On New Peace Plan

Azerbaijan, Armenia Work On New Peace Plan

Radio Free Europe, Czech Republic
June 11 2004

Baku/Prague, 11 June 2004 (RFE/RL) — Azerbaijani Foreign Minister
Elmar Mammadyarov says Azerbaijani and Armenian negotiators are
taking a new approach to settling their dispute over the territory
of Nagorno-Karabakh.

In an interview today with RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani service, Mammadyarov
said Baku and Yerevan are working on a plan that will include elements
from each side’s previous proposals.

“Azerbaijan stands for a step-by-step approach, and the Armenian side
stands for a package approach. What we are right now working on is
to try to pick up from each approach ideas that would be acceptable
to both sides and put them into one basket,” Mammadyarov said.

Mammadyarov was referring to Baku’s insistence that ethnic Armenian
troops withdraw from all Azerbaijani lands they have been occupying
since the 1994 cease-fire agreement before negotiating the status of
Karabakh. Yerevan wants both issues to be resolved simultaneously.

Mammadyarov did not elaborate on the negotiations, saying
confidentiality is needed to ensure the good continuation of peace
talks.

The Azerbaijani envoy is due to meet his Armenian counterpart Vardan
Oskanian later this month in the Czech capital Prague.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Rumsfeld’s Monster Pictures And The Fallout From Abu Ghraib

>>From the Wilderness
June 11 2004

1104_rumsfeld_monster.html

Theatrical Militarism Gets More Bad Reviews:

Rumsfeld’s Monster Pictures And The Fallout From Abu Ghraib (Part II)

by
Stan Goff

[In the first installment of this multi-part report, Stan Goff found
the neocons squirting a few apologies at the media. Their
embarrassment was somebody else’s psychic and/or physical maiming. In
this sequel, Goff looks at a few other public relations disasters (PR
is what diplomacy amounts to these days) leading up to the second War
on Iraq. Less than delighted with American looting of the post-Soviet
economy, Russia surely gave Iraq clandestine help; and when the Bush
administration administered Turkey the arrogant assumption of total
compliance with U.S. warplans, Turkey administered them a robustly
democratic flourishing of the middle finger. Coupled with the
undeniable monstrosity of Abu Ghraib – which we now know was sent
straight from the Defense Department’s highest echelons – all this
suggests that the next stop on the endless warpath will not be a
cakewalk. – JAH]

JUNE 11, 2004: 1100 PDT (FTW) — What goes around, comes around.

The Russians didn’t say it in 2002, but the hauteur of the Bush
administration toward Russian aspirations, their own lingering,
resentful inferiority complex at having begun their forced march into
modernism only in the 1930’s, the humiliation of having collapsed
under the strain of the Cold War, and the very tangible new reality
that the U.S. was about to kick the Russians into the global
periphery, all coalesced into icy retribution.

Russia began advising Iraq. Their political advice and maneuvering
was intended to delay, delay, delay… in particular, to incrementally
make concessions to the United Nations as a means of raising the bar
for the Americans to legitimize their sought-after invasion.

By March 2002, London’s Telegraph reported, this link was firmly
established. The Telegraph hinted hint that military advice and
assistance might also have been provided.

I had said the same thing in Full Spectrum Disorder (Soft Skull
Press, 2004).

Accusations by the United States that the Russians were providing
material assistance were likely true. The Russians had now thrown in
their lot with “old Europe” and China, and they were aiming to
undermine U.S. power at every opportunity. I suspected they had not
only provided equipment and training on that equipment, but advisory
assistance on the reorganization of the Iraqi military.

Someone surely had.

The Iraqi military had abandoned its former Soviet-style doctrine,
predicated on armor, mass, and centralized command. It had now
seemingly adopted tactics more suited to Special Operations: agile
and decentralized. Such a switch requires a very intentional and
systematic reorientation from top to bottom. This is an
“asymmetrical” response to the high-tech doctrine the U.S. developed
to overcome the doctrine of its own predecessor. This Iraqi doctrinal
reorientation proved stunningly effective, even though it was often
tragically amateurish in its execution, with Iraqis simply stepping
into the street to fire RPG’s and being cut down by a tsunami of fire
and lead.

In December 2003, the United States retaliated openly with a Pentagon
announcement that barred Russia from any post-invasion contracts in
Iraq.

Dmitry Rogozin of the Duma said this action “shows the very primitive
vindictiveness of the current U.S. administration.”

Asia Times reported this year (Sergei Blagov, “Putin to expand
strategic partnership with China,” Asia Times, March 12 2004) that it
would expand its agreements with China. Part of that agreement was a
strategic energy pact. Another part was an increase in the Chinese
importation of Russian weapons.

Like balsamic vinegar and extra virgin olive oil… petroleum and guns.

But back to our account of how these circumstances built into a
political storm, catalyzed by some photographs that could very well
destroy the Bush administration.

While the bully boys advising the White House were rampaging around
with the pre-capsized Ahmed Chalabi, NATO ally Turkey was in the
throes of an election.

It is important to note that Turkey is a “democracy” that serves at
the pleasure of its own military, a military that itself has a
historical power base that is deeply involved in the drug trade. Note
also that the U.S. has traditionally relied on the Turkish military
to secure policy outcomes favorable to Washington. The majority of
Turkish citizens are ethnic Turks (which is itself a historical
composite of many groups) and religiously Muslim.

Istanbul, the capital, is on the Bosphorus, a strait that divides
Europe from Asia, and, as Louis Proyect pointed out after a visit
there to see his in-laws in January 2003, it points to a geographic
fault that could rival San Andreas.

The geological fault line obviously has a counterpart in the city and
country’s precarious location on the political-tectonic plates that
divide the Christian West from the Islamic East. If these plates
clash with each other at full force, the impact can be as devastating
as any earthquake. Istanbul is geographically unique. It is the only
city in the world, as far as I know, that straddles two continents.
Imagine getting in your car each morning in Asia and driving across a
bridge to get to your workplace in Europe. Not only is the city
divided spatially, it is also divided culturally and politically.

This division that the Turkish economic, military, and political
elites have so carefully negotiated over the years was brought into
bold relief after September 11.

It needs to be noted that the Bosporus is a huge trans-shipment point
for oil. In 2003, Russia complained bitterly that passage through
Turkey was far too slow for Urals crude. The establishment of a
permanent U.S./NATO base, Camp Bondsteel, in Kosovo after the
NATO-engineered breakup of Yugoslavia (with the assistance of the
heroin-funded “Kosovo Liberation Army”) paved the way for U.S. oil
companies operating in the Caspian region (which has since turned
into the biggest oil bust in recent history) to bypass the Bosporus.
This was a huge political betrayal for Turkey – a NATO member state –
which deepened Turkish suspicions about their European allies.

Bondsteel was built (it should be no surprise) by Halliburton, Dick
Cheney’s company.

Without belaboring Turkey’s history overmuch, it is important to
understand that Kemalism, the prevailing political current in Turkey
– often mistakenly seen by the west as a rejection of Islam – is a
system where the state exists over and above religion. It was built
up within the complexities of the 20th Century and in the wake of
Turkey’s disastrous alliance with the Germans in World War I. The
official ideology was initially pan-Islamic, but evolved into a
pan-Turk racial identity, which was an effective method of social
control of the majority Turk while the state systematically massacred
the Albanians and subjected the Kurds as an internal colony.

Over time, the economic and political stability of Turkey came to
depend absolutely on the suppression of the Kurds (Turkey’s largest
“minority”), and this suppression forged a revitalized movement for
Kurdish autonomy. This ability to divert the general public’s
discontents into racially coded nationalism becomes increasingly
important in times of economic instability – which for Turkey began
in earnest in 1991 and has only gotten worse under the direction of
the International Monetary Fund.

But the fact remains that contiguous Kurdish living space – referred
to by some as Kurdistan – extends beyond Turkey into Iraq, Iran, and
less so into Syria. The “Kurdish question” for Turkey, then, is
necessarily internationalized.

Not coincidentally, Iraqi Kurdistan is sitting atop the richest oil
fields in the nation, with its political center in Kirkuk.

Kurds once ruled a significant portion of the region, after the
Kurdish military leader, Saladin, threw the Europeans out of
Jerusalem in 1187. They prospered because the region – not yet
dragged into the age of hydrocarbons – was a trade crossroads between
Europe, Africa, and Asia. But with the so-called discovery of the
Americas, the region went into a permanent economic slump, and the
Kurds largely reorganized as criminal syndicates led by warlords.

In his February Swans piece, “The Kurdish Pawn,” Louis Proyect says:

In addition to being economically marginalized, the Kurds were
isolated geographically as well. Preferring to dwell in the mountains
or rocky hills, they subsisted on sheep-herding and small-scale
farming…

After the Ottomans created a new regional economic system based on
trade between North Africa and Central Asia, they were not sure how
the Kurds fit into the big picture. They finally decided to co-opt
them into the Hamidiye, a warrior caste functioning more or less like
the Janissaries — slaves of Christian origin enjoying privilege and
political power in spite of their subject status. Despite the high
ideals of their nationalist leaders, Kurdish soldiers joined with the
Turks in slaughtering other subject peoples like the Armenians…

For decades their leaderships have subordinated the needs of the
Kurdish nation as a whole for their own narrowly self-defined
political goals within each state. Backstabbing, backroom deals and
suppression of more radical trends within the Kurdish struggle have
been the norm rather than the exception.1

Proyect goes on to quote scholar Amir Hassanpour:

The Kurdish movement for self-determination has thus been
factionalized. In a supreme irony, Iraqi Kurdish leaders unleashed
their own peshmergas (militias) in the early 1990s against the
Turkey-based Kurdish separatists of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK),
in part to please their U.S. benefactors in the struggle against
Iraqi Arabs. The U.S. had declared, on behalf of its NATO ally
Turkey, that the PKK was a “terrorist” organization. 2

The PUK and KDP are two Kurdish factions in Iraq, each supported by
the U.S. to weaken the Iraqi Ba’athists. Their rivalry exploded into
a fratricidal mini-war in 1992 that claimed 3,000 lives, almost as
many as were killed in the chemical attacks during the Iran-Iraq War
which gained so much propaganda currency in the run-up to the latest
U.S. invasion.

In “Reckless Disregard,” a 1999 article by Vera Saeedpour quoted by
Proyect in his superlative Swans piece, she noted:

The Iraqi Kurds, long accustomed to suffering in wars between
guerrillas and governments, found themselves again beleaguered, this
time not by Baghdad but by Kurds. Their new lament came to be, “Even
Saddam Hussein didn’t do this.” But no one wants to hear, much less
publicize, their plight. Only Amnesty International would produce a
belated report in 1995 on human rights abuses of Kurds under Kurdish
administration. Human Rights Watch has yet to bring out a word on the
topic. In their zeal to provide documentation in support of the State
Department’s case against Saddam Hussein for his abuses of Kurds in
the 1980s — for which they have received considerable funding —
they deliberately ignored abuses of Kurds by Kurds in the 1990s. 3

The Kurdish peshmergas of northern Iraq were maintained courtesy of
the U.S.A throughout the low-intensity war between the two U.S.
invasions of Iraq, and they actually fought alongside American
Special Forces in the last ground campaign. They are now a huge and
unpredictable political factor in a zone where a decade of
U.S.-protected political autonomy has only fed into the popular
desire for an independent Kurdistan – which is anathema to Turkey’s
elites.

There are still new military and political storms waiting to form out
of these turbulent winds.

This contextualizes the Turkish elections of 2003, where the U.S.
suffered its first political defeat. That translated into a military
setback which advanced the development of a credible Iraqi guerrilla
resistance by several years.

By 2002, the widespread Turkish sense of humiliation at the hands of
the Americans – national humiliation and economic humiliation –
peaked in a political upheaval.

In a bit of political irony, the Turkish “proportional
representation” system that requires at least 10% of the vote to
qualify a party for any seat in parliament, a system designed to
protect the domination of the incumbents, became a surprise landslide
victory for the Islamic Party of Justice and Development (AKP), who
got only 35% of the vote (far more than any other formation) and
ended up with two thirds of the parliamentary seats.

At this point, Turkey was preparing to authorize the use of Turkish
soil for the U.S. military to launch its north-to-south ground
offensive into Iraq, even though more than 90% of the Turkish public
passionately opposed this plan. That authorization required passage
of a law by the Turkish parliament.

Even the newly empowered AKP had to take into account the Turkish
military, which supported assistance of the American invasion. The
Turkish military had already demonstrated that they would stand back
from politics only so far.

When the vote was taken on March 1, after the invasion plans were
already laid out and preparations were in the 11th hour, in a
stunning defeat the parliament narrowly voted to deny the U.S., even
in the face of massive bribery and intimidation by both Washington
and factions within Ankara. The decisive pressure on the Turkish
parliament, elected as an Islamic Party, was the mass movement in
Turkey opposing the war, and the weight of the international mass
movement against the war that stood behind it.

>>From Full Spectrum Disorder:
How had the antiwar movement become a material force on the
Iraqi battleground?

A snapshot of the tactical situation, as least what could be
gleaned from different accounts, revealed that the original battle
plan was scrapped. The complexity of planning a military operation of
that scope is simply indescribable, and it takes months to do it
right. But the unexpected loss of ground fronts, in Turkey in the
north and Saudi Arabia in the south, forced a complete reconstruction
of plans in a matter of days. The operation could be put off no
longer. The aggressor’s back was against the weather wall. The
pre-summer sandstorms had already begun, and by late April the heat
index inside a soldier’s chemical protective gear could be 140
degrees Fahrenheit.

The international antiwar movement had firmed up political
opposition around the world and forced the delays that culminated in
the UN Security Council becoming a key arena of struggle. For the
ossified left who couldn’t see beyond their own simplistic
shibboleths and who dismissed the UN on ideological – and therefore
idealist – grounds, there was an example of how politics translates
dialectically into military reality.

We had stalled the Bush administration to push the war back, and
there was an effect. There is an effect to this day. Never doubt it.

The entire 4th Infantry Division was still sitting in the
barracks waiting for their equipment to steam around the Arabian
Peninsula in cargo ships because the Turkish parliament denied them
their battlefront. Medium- and short-range tactical aircraft that
could have struck dozens of key targets were sidelined because they
were forbidden to take off from Saudi Arabia to deliver their
payloads.

Inside the Department of Defense there was another war raging
between the Generals of the Army and Marine Corps and the clique of
doctrinal “revolutionaries” pushing Rumsfeld’s crackpot theory,
cyberwar combined with commandos.

The new “doctrine” was creating a military debacle in Iraq.
Rumsfeld was refusing to learn what was in front of him, that in war,
which is an extreme form of politics, success is not measured on a
point system like a golf tournament. It is not measured in body
counts or inventories of destroyed war materiel. In fact, it is not
perfectly measurable at all. Success has to be gauged against the
expectations of the military operation and its final objectives –
which are always political. The U.S. inflicted a terrible empirical
toll on Southeast Asia and ultimately lost the Vietnam War. The U.S.
never grasped the political character of that war…

Fragile Turkey was beset by a severe economic crisis. Its
majority-Muslim population had just elected a moderate Islamic Party
and the popular opposition to the war was overwhelming.

The Turkish ruling class could not afford another insurrection
from Kurdish nationalists, and the Turkish military had no intention
of watching a Kurdish state take form to their south. As a result of
the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Turkey was becoming a powder keg behind
its stable exterior, and Kurdistan was a furnace.

The political implications reach deep into Europe, where less
than two years ago the U.S. pushed behind the scenes for Turkey into
the EU as a U.S. stalking horse. Germany has a substantial population
of Turks and Kurds, and the German government still has a real and
justifiable fear that open warfare in Iraqi Kurdistan will spill over
into the streets of Germany.

To mollify the Kurds, the U.S. had to menace back the Turkish
military, and the Kurds softened their language about an independent
Kurdistan.

Oh, the tangled web we weave… One could almost hear Ian Malcolm
saying, “I’m really getting tired of being right all the time.”

Then there is Saudi Arabia.

1 Louis Proyect, “Resistance: In The Eye Of The American Hegemon: The
Kurdish Pawn,” Swans, Special Issue on Iraq – February 2, 2004.

2 “The Kurdish Experience,” Middle East Report, July-August 1994.

3 Reckless Disregard, Peacework, November 1999,
9/119914.htm

http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/06
http://www.swans.com/library/art10/iraq/proyect.html
http://www.afsc.org/pwork/119

BEIRUT: AUB to award honorary doctorates

Daily Star, Lebanon
June 12 2004

AUB to award honorary doctorates
4 men to receive doctor of human letters

By Daily Star Staff

BEIRUT: For only the second time since 1969, the American University
of Beirut will be awarding honorary doctorates in a special midday
ceremony in Assembly Hall on commencement day, June 26.

This year the university will award the degree of doctor of humane
letters to four outstanding individuals: mathematician Michael Atiyah,
Carnegie Corporation president Vartan Gregorian, ABC TV anchor Peter
Jennings and world-renowned cellist Yo-Yo Ma, an AUB statement said.

Michael Atiyah, whose father was Lebanese, has carved a name for
himself throughout the 20th and 21st centuries in the world of
mathematics.

He was referred to as one of the greatest living mathematicians. In
March of this year, Atiyah received, in collaboration with professor
Isadore Singer of MIT, the Abel Prize for mathematics, which is almost
the equivalent of the Nobel Prize for this field.

Their Atiyah-Singer index theorem, linking pure mathematics and
theoretical physics, has been described by the Norwegian Academy of
Science, as one of the great landmarks of 20th century mathematics.

Vartan Gregorian, born and raised until the age of 15 in Tabriz,
Iran, was then educated in Beirut at the Armenian College.

He then went on to Stanford University, where he received both his
Bachelors degree and doctorate in history.

He taught at San Francisco State College, University of California, Los
Angeles, the University of Texas and the University of Pennsylvania,
where he became the first dean of Arts and Science.

Peter Jennings, the popular and suave anchor of ABC Evening News
since 1983, established the first American television news bureau in
the Arab world in Beirut in 1972. He conveyed breaking news stories
throughout the Arab world and broadcasts in hotspots in Europe,
the Middle East and Asia.

Yo-Yo Ma, born of Chinese parents in Paris, was playing the cello
when he was four years old.

Moving to New York with his musician parents, he studied at the
Juilliard School and debuted at Carnegie Hall at the age of 9.

PACE monitoring commission representatives assess political situatio

PACE MONITORING COMMISSION REPRESENTATIVES ASSESS POLITICAL SITUATION IN ARMENIA

RIA Novosti, Russia
June 11 2004

EREVAN, June 11 (RIA Novosti) – Co-reporter of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe monitoring commission Ezhi Yaskernya
and the commission’s secretary David Chupina began to assess Armenia’s
political situation.

The Armenian parliament public relations department told RIA Novosti
that on Friday the monitoring commission members met chairman of
Armenia’s Constitutional Court Gagik Arutyunyan, head of Erevan-based
OSCE office Vladimir Pryakhin, ambassadors of the European Council
member-states, representatives of international organizations,
national minorities and mass media.

Scheduled for Saturday in the National Assembly are the meetings with
speaker Arthur Bagdasaryan, vice-speaker Tigran Torosyan, members of
the Armenian PACE delegation, heads of the standing parliamentary
committees for external relations, state and legal issues, defense
and national security, leaders of the parliamentary factions.

On Monday the commission members will meet Armenian President Robert
Kocharyan, Prime Minister Andranik Markaryan, Minister of Justice
David Arutyunyan, Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan, Defense Minister
Serge Sarkisyan, Attorney General Agvan Ovsepyan, Police Chief Aik
Arutyunyan, Central Election Committee Chairman Gevorg Azaryan,
members of the central broadcasting commission.

Mr. Yaskernya said earlier that “the PACE would be informed of the
internal political situation in Armenia and of the steps taken by
the Armenian government towards implementation of the PACE resolution”.

On April 28, the PACE adopted a resolution prescribing Armenia to
settle the internal political situation prior to September this year,
otherwise the Assembly reserved the right to review the Armenian
parliamentary delegation credentials.
From: Baghdasarian

In 10 years Russia’s population to be less by another 10million

IN TEN YEARS RUSSIA’S POPULATION TO BE LESS BY ANOTHER 10 MILLION

RIA Novosti, Russia
June 11 2004

MOSCOW, JUNE 11 (RIA Novosti) – By 2015 Russia’s population will be
reduced by another ten million. Olga Antonova, deputy head of the
Population Statistics Board of the Federal State Statistics Service,
made this forecast at the RIA Novosti round table Priorities of the
State Ethnic Policy of the Russian Federation and Outlook for the
Ethnic-Cultural Autonomies in Light of the 2002 National Census.

The 2002 population census showed that over the twelve preceding years
the population of Russia became less by 10 million; the average annual
population loss is 800,000.

Since the last census, Russians have become one million less.

“As of January 1, 2004, Russia had 144.2 million people”, Antonova
said.

Immigrants are the salvation for the Russian demographic situation.
“They replenish the natural population loss by two thirds”, she said.
“Migration is and will be a source replenishing the population of
our country”, she added.

The main “providers” of manpower in Russia are countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan
and Moldova. Since the 1989 census, the number of Turks, Koreans,
Vietnamese, Pashtuns residing in Russia has also increased.

“However, the inflow of registered migration has been ebbing in recent
years”, Antonova noted. In expert estimate, the aggregate potential
of future migration from countries in the Transcaucasia and Central
Asia does not exceed three to four million.

“All those willing to leave Armenia and Georgia have already left
them”, she said.

On a longer perspective, manpower resources may arrive from East
and South-East Asia, above all China, and, “to a lesser degree,
from India and Afghanistan”.

The number of Russia’s native small ethnic groups has increased by a
fourth over twelve years and, according to the last census, is 306,000,
said Galina Sheverdova, head of the Methods and Census Analysis Sector
of the Federal State Statistics Service, told the Friday round table.

According to the state statistics, native small ethnic groups
constitute from 19 to 40 percent of Russia’s autonomous entities –
Evenk, Chukchee, Koryak (Siberia) etc.

“Noteworthily, less than a half of the native small ethnic groups
speak their national tongues. Less than 20 percent of the 19 mostly
Northern ethnic groups do”, Sheverdova noted.

Azerbaijan, Armenia accuse each other of violating ceasefire

AZERBAIJAN, ARMENIA ACCUSE EACH OTHER OF VIOLATING CEASEFIRE

RIA Novosti, Russia
June 11 2004

BAKU/YEREVAN, June 11 (RIA Novosti) – Azerbaijan and Armenia have
accused each other of violating the ceasefire.

The press service of the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry reported that
on Wednesday night Armenian military units, deployed in the Berd
district of Armenia, fired small arms at the Azerbaijani army in Koha
Nabi, a village in the Tovuz district.

Also, Azerbaijani positions were shelled from the Armenian positions,
1 kilometer northeast of the village of Kuropatkino in the
Khodzhavend district of Azerbaijan in lower Karabakh.

The press service asserted that the fire from the Armenian positions
was neutralized through return fire and that no Azerbaijanis died.

On June 6 and 7, Armenian soldiers fired sub-machineguns and
machineguns twice at the Azerbaijani army’s positions in the Gazakh
district of Azerbaijan (western Azerbaijan), 200 kilometers away from
Karabakh and the border with Armenia.

The press secretary of Armenian Defense Minister, Seiran
Shahsuvaryan, said that on Thursday at 7:50 p.m., Moscow time,
Azerbaijani military units shelled the village of Movses in the
Tavush region of Armenia.

“The Armenian side did not return fire,” Mr. Shahsuvaryan said.

No Armenians were killed.

According to Mr. Shahsuvaryan, on Wednesday night, Azerbaijani
soldiers shelled the positions of the Nagorny Karabakh defense army
near the village of Kuropatkino.

“The Karabakh soldiers were forced to return fire and neutralize the
fire from the Azerbaijani side,” Mr. Shahsuvaryan said. No one was
killed on the Karabakh side.

Mr. Shahsuvaryan also said that on June 7, Azerbaijani troops fired
large-caliber weapons at the village of Berkaber in the Tavush region
of Armenia.

The OSCE representatives on Thursday monitored the observance of the
ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the village of
Garakhanbeili in the Fizuli district of Azerbaijan. According to the
EU, there were no violations in that area.