OSCE MG co-chairmen to visit Baku after Yerevan

RIA Novosti
July 14, 2004

OSCE MINSK GROUP CO-CHAIRMEN TO VISIT BAKU AFTER YEREVAN

BAKU, July 14 (RIA Novosti) – The co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group
for Nagorny Karabakh settlement, Yury Merzlyakov (Russia), Steven
Mann (USA) and Henri Jacolin (France), will pay a two day visit to
Azerbaijan.

As the Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry reported, the aim of the visit by
the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group is to conduct consultations
with the Baku officials concerning the settlement of the Nagorny
Karabakh conflict. They plan to meet with a number of the Azerbaijan
leaders.

The co-chairmen will arrive in Baku from Armenia where they stay now
in the context of their Trans-Caucasian tour.

As Azerbaijan Foreign Minister Elmar Mamedyarov said, “I would not
say that the co-chairmen will arrive with some new proposals. Since
they did not visit the region in the course of the last six months,
the sides will only exchange opinions.’
Before the visit of the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group to the
region, special representative of the European Union for the South
Caucasus Heikki Talvitie said at the news conference in the
Azerbaijan capital that there were “new moments” with regard to the
settlement of the conflict which the co-chairmen will discuss with
the sides to the conflict. This visit will be very important,” he
added. “I am glad that both Yerevan and Baku support the activity of
the Minsk Group co-chairmen who have done a great work,” he said. But
the EU spokesman did not specify these “new moments.” However, the
official position of Baku, Yerevan and Stepanakert (the capital of
the self-proclaimed republic of Nagorny Karabakh in the territory of
Azerbaijan which is inhabited mainly by Armenian speaking population)
has not changed today, at the tenth anniversary of the armistice.
Baku is ready to give Nagorny Karabakh the broadest autonomy, but it
is flatly against the independence of the territory. Yerevan and
Stepanakert are prepared to conduct negotiations about normalising
relations with Baku and the return of some earlier captured
Azerbaijan territories but only with the preservation of the present
status of Nagorny Karabakh.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Govt. slams Armenian territory elections

IPR Strategic Business Information Database
July 14, 2004

GOVT. SLAMS ARMENIAN TERRITORY ELECTIONS

According to IINA, Azerbaijan government has said elections proposed
by Armenia in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan are illegitimate
since such a move is in complete contradiction of the international
law as well as the national legislation of the Republic of
Azerbaijan. A statement by the ministry of foreign affairs the
elections, scheduled for August 8 are illegal because they are being
held in conditions of continued aggression, occupation and forceful
expulsion of one third of the indigenous population of Nagorno
-Karabach region of Azerbaijan currently occupied by Armenia. It said
such action will negatively impact the current process of peaceful
settlement of the conflict and that fait accompli may not serve as a
basis for the settlement.

Fradkov: Prospects for Russian natural gas exports via Armenia

RIA OREANDA
Economic News
July 14, 2004 Wednesday

Premier Fradkov: There are prospects for Russian natural gas exports
via Armenia to third countries.

Moscow. Russias Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov met with his Armenian
counterpart A. Markarian as part of the latter’s visit to Moscow.
During their meeting they reiterated that Russia and Armenia intend
to develop their cooperation in all spheres of business, the
presidential press service said today.

Fradkov stated that Russia and Armenia cooperate successfully in the
economic sphere, as their trade turnover increased by 30% y/o/y.
According to Fradkov, toward the end of this year the
intergovernmental commission on trade and economic cooperation will
meet in its regular session to discuss economic and humanitarian
issues, as well as issues relating to payment of debts resulting from
Russias property acquisitions in Armenia.

According to Premier Fradkov, the near future will see solutions to
problems relating to Russias obligations to invest in companies on
Armenian territory, which have been transferred to Russia to offset
Armenias debts to Russia.

The discussants also addressed issues of military and technical
cooperation. According to Fradkov, bilateral military and technical
cooperation will be oriented toward upgrading hardware that had been
formerly supplied and adopted by the Armenian army and extending its
service life. In addition, Russia is ready to provide Armenias armed
forces with the necessary spare parts and equipment.

In the coming days Russia and Armenia will also complete the
agreement on cooperation in the natural gas sphere. Fradkov stated
that issues of cooperation on construction of new gas mains are
currently under discussion. There are prospects for Russian natural
gas exports via Armenia to third countries.

Fradkov Reports to Pres. Putin on Advances of Russian Economy

RIA OREANDA
Economic News
July 14, 2004 Wednesday

Prime Minister Fradkov Reports to Pres. Putin on Advances of Russian
Economy

Moscow. Russias President Vladimir Putin has met with Prime Minister
Mikhail Fradkov, who informed the head of state about the progress of
the Russian economy, emphasizing that in the first half of 2004
industrial output grew by 7.4% y/o/y. Fradkov also related to the
Presidents the results of his talks with his Armenian counterpart,
according to the presidential press service.

Leading Expert Traces Rise of Skinhead Movement

Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press
July 14, 2004

Leading Expert Traces Rise of Skinhead Movement

TARASOV ATTRIBUTES INCREASE IN EXTREMIST VIOLENCE TO POST-SOVIET
COLLAPSE OF SOCIAL SERVICES, SCHOOLS; LOSS OF RECREATIONAL
OPPORTUNITIES LEFT YOUTH VULNERABLE TO ‘POLITICALLY CRIMINAL’
IDEOLOGIES, WESTERN NEOFASCISTS; TOTAL MEMBERSHIP IS AROUND 50,000
AND RISING

SOURCE: THE SKINHEADS ARE COMING. By Aleksandr Tarasov. Russky
kuryer, June 18, 2004, pp. 1, 12-13. Condensed text:

About the Author. (By Georgy Tselms). — For 10 years now, Aleksandr
Tarasov has been researching a phenomenon that is new to Russia:
skinheads, or “skins.” Our country very likely has no greater expert
on that topic. Tarasov’s interest in youth movements that are not
officially sponsored is no accident. In 1975, as a 17-year-old
freshman in the philosophy department at Leningrad State University,
he started an underground youth organization of the “new left” type.
Its members dreamed of social justice; their idols were Camus, Sartre
and Marcuse. The KGB saw the young fighters for justice as a danger
to the Soviet system. They were all arrested. Then everything
followed the usual course: jail, the Serbsky Institute [for
psychiatric evaluation — Trans.], then a special psychiatric
hospital. After that, Tarasov worked as a watchman and continued his
interest in the underground. He eventually managed to complete his
university studies. And with the onset of the new era, Tarasov took a
job at the independent Panorama Center, where he specialized in
problems relating to political extremism. He has studied skinheads
not just from the literature, but also through “direct observation”:
He has been in contact with them, attended their gatherings, etc.
Today Tarasov is in possession of unique material that is absolutely
indispensable to our law-enforcement agencies if they intend to
combat the brownshirt plague in Russia. If they intend to.

* * *

. . . The catastrophic economic slump beginning in 1991 left
millions of people in Russia unemployed. In addition, the educational
system broke down. In recent years, 400 to 450 schools closed
annually for financial reasons, and a correspondingly large
percentage of students at those schools were denied the possibility
of continuing their education. As early as 1997 in Siberia, for
example, between 7% and 11% of draftees were illiterate, according to
official data from military registration and enlistment offices, and
in the spring of 1999, every third lawbreaker of school age had not
completed even an elementary education! Young people were reverting
to a wild state en masse. Crime, alcoholism and drug abuse swept
across the country, especially among the young.

Kids simply had no place to go. “Houses of culture” and the like
had been bought up by “new Russians” and converted to night clubs,
casinos and restaurants. Children’s clubs had perished. Schoolkids
were left to their own devices after school, and by and large, they
became prey for criminal elements and drug traffickers. . . .

The younger generation became an ideal target for the absorption of
all sorts of primitive ideologies based on violence and individualism
— both just plain criminal and politically criminal (xenophobic,
racist and anti-Semitic). Initially, Russian skinheads had no
systematic ideology. They were gut-level racists, xenophobes, machos,
militarists and anti-intellectuals. But the constant propaganda
conducted in the skinhead community by extreme right-wing parties has
caused the skins to become increasingly conscious fascists,
anticommunists, Russian Orthodox fundamentalists and anti-Semites. .
. .

Russism — a rather exotic radical-right ideology — has become
widespread among skinheads. Despite its constantly underscored
devotion to Russian Orthodoxy, Russism takes a rather indulgent view
of Aryan paganism (in the spirit of national socialism), since “race
comes before faith” and “blood unites, while religion separates.”
Russism builds a bridge from prerevolutionary Russian Orthodox
monarchism to national socialism: According to the canons of Russism,
there were two great Aryan heroes in the 20th century — Nicholas II
and Adolf Hitler. . . .

It is a noteworthy fact that in Russia, of the three main currents
in the world skinhead movement — Nazi skins, “Red skins” and “trads”
— only the first is widespread in Russia, whereas in many countries
the majority of skinheads are in fact “trads” (i.e., “traditional
skinheads,” apolitical young people who adopt the skinhead subculture
strictly because it’s cool). . . .

In clothing, the skins copy their kindred spirits in the West. . .
.

Our first skinheads were predominantly adolescents between the ages
of 13 and 19 who were in public schools, vocational-technical schools
or technical colleges, or were unemployed. But over time, the
situation has changed. A skin’s paraphernalia alone (the “right”
boots, trousers, bomber jacket, insignia patches, “Celtic” tattoos,
etc.) costs quite a lot of money — roughly 15,000 rubles. Poor kids
simply don’t have that kind of money. Today’s skinhead frequently
owns both a handheld computer and a cell phone. The skinheads are
united in small groups (three to 10 people) that are basically
mini-gangs. Their average term of existence is a few years. But there
are also larger and more structured groups. The first to appear in
Moscow were Skinlegion and Blood & Honor (B & H) — Russian
Affiliate. B & H is an international organization of Nazi skins that
has been officially banned in some countries as extremist or fascist.
B & H — Russian Affiliate and Skinlegion each had 200 to 250 members
and were characterized by a certain level of discipline, a hierarchy,
and a division of labor. In 1998 they were joined by a third large
organization — United Brigades 88. . . . Later on came the
Hammerskin Nation group (Hammerskins), which considers itself a
division of the international skinhead organization of the same name.

Skinhead gangs first arose in our major and most highly developed
cities, where the social stratification that has developed in Russia
in recent years is especially visible. Today, however, a “second
wave” of skins has swept through small provincial towns as well.

No one did anything to fight the skins. While the OMON special
police were “dealing with” people from the Caucasus, the skins, being
weaker and more cowardly, chose as their victims people from Central
Asia or the third world — particularly “blacks” and “slant-eyes.” A
certain amount of variety could be seen from city to city.
Historically, Moscow, St. Petersburg and Nizhny Novgorod were the
centers of the skinhead movement in Russia. In Moscow, the skins
attacked mainly Africans and Indians; in St. Petersburg — Africans,
Nepalese and Chinese; and in Nizhny Novgorod — people from Central
Asia (primarily refugees from Tajikistan).

The police took a tolerant attitude toward the skins. . . . In that
atmosphere of tolerance, the skinhead movement grew to its present,
quite impressive size. The number of skinheads in Russia is now close
to 50,000. There are currently somewhere between 5,000 and 5,500
skinheads, according to various estimates, in Moscow and the nearby
parts of Moscow Province; about 3,000 in St. Petersburg and vicinity;
more than 2,500 in Nizhny Novgorod; more than 1,500 in Rostov-on-Don;
over 1,000 each in Pskov, Kaliningrad, Yekaterinburg and Krasnodar;
and several hundred each in Voronezh, Samara, Saratov, Krasnoyarsk,
Irkutsk, Omsk, Tomsk, Vladivostok, Ryazan and Petrozavodsk. It should
be recalled that in 1992, there were about a dozen skins in Moscow
and maybe five in St. Petersburg. All told, skinhead communities now
exist in approximately 85 cities.

Many radical right-wing, nationalist parties and organizations
regard skinheads as their ready reserve and “social base.” In Moscow,
the Russian National Socialist Party (RNSP; until 1998 the Russian
National Union, or RNU) is considered to have pioneered work with
skins.

In St. Petersburg, it’s the Freedom Party (until 2000 the National
Republican Party of Russia, NRPR) that works with skins. In the
cities of the Volga region and in Krasnodar, it’s Russian National
Unity (RNU) and Russian Guards (a splinter group of RNU).

It’s interesting that the majority of our ultrarightists began
working with skins only after receiving instructions from their
Western “colleagues.” Beginning in 1997, representatives of
neofascist groups visited Russia repeatedly from the US, Germany, the
Czech Republic and Austria and “shared their experience” in working
with skinhead youth. . . . There are no visa restrictions to bar
fascist emissaries.

In most cities in Russia, skinheads feel self-assured and
unthreatened. The police and the authorities are clearly sympathetic
toward them. Choi Yun Shik, president of the South Korean Student
Association, who is studying in Moscow, and Gabriel Kotchofa,
president of the Moscow Foreign Students Association, both assert
that the Moscow police have refused hundreds of times to allow
foreign students who have been victimized by skins to file criminal
charges. Col. Mikhail Kirilin of the Federal Security Service’s [FSB]
public relations center and Vladimir Vershkov of the Chief Internal
Affairs Administration’s press service both told to a reporter from
the Moscow Times that their agencies do not regard skins as
constituting a danger. . . .

A certain amount of information has now accumulated to the effect
that Nazi skins are being encouraged, organized and used by Russia’s
ruling circles for their own purposes. There was considerable
evidence earlier that Nazi skins enjoyed the protection of regional
authorities (Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories, Pskov Province) and
especially of law-enforcement structures (Saratov, Voronezh, Nizhny
Novgorod, Volgograd, Samara). But in 2002 it was determined that Nazi
skins were training at a facility belonging to the Moscow OMON
special police, and that OMON trainers were doing the teaching. Such
training could not have taken place without the sanction of top
officials at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. . . .

In late 2000, amid demonstrative inaction on the part of the
authorities and silence on the part of the press, the skinheads
progressed to more serious, mass organized actions — to pogroms. The
first such attack took place on Oct. 21, 2000, in Moscow, at a
Vietnamese hostel near the Sokol subway station. Since the
authorities and the media did their best to suppress all mention of
the event, impunity inspired the skinheads to make their next move —
an attack on an Armenian school in Moscow (March 15, 2001). The
police did not detain a single troublemaker, confining themselves to
dispersing the skinheads. Despite protests from Moscow’s Armenian
community and from officials of the Republic of Armenia, the
authorities did their utmost to hush up the incident.

The next stage was the organization of a pogrom at the Yasenevo
market [see Current Digest, Vol. 53, No. 17, pp. 4-5.]. Since that
attack was unprecedented in scale, it proved impossible to keep it
quiet, and the incident was widely covered on TV and in the press. .
. . The next such attack, which began at a market near the Tsaritsyno
subway station [see Current Digest, Vol. 53, No. 45, pp. 1-6],
subsequently continued at several subway stations and in subway
trains and ended at the Sevastopol Hotel, which houses a large number
of refugees from Afghanistan. At least 300 skinheads took part in
that pogrom, more than 80 people were injured, 22 were hospitalized,
and four people (a Moscow Armenian, an Indian citizen, a citizen of
Tajikistan and an Afghan refugee) were killed. The events touched off
a major public outcry and were covered by all the media. The Moscow
authorities were forced to create a special department within the
Chief Internal Affairs Administration to combat extremism among young
people. The FSB refused to provide the new department with data on
skinheads, claiming that it had no information on that subject.

Despite the fact that 300 people had participated in the pogrom,
only five ended up in court. Three rank-and-file participants
(Rusakov, Polyakov and Trubin) were sentenced to three-year prison
terms. Klimanov, who had purchased the rebar [used as weapons], got
off with a suspended sentence. And finally, Mikhail Volkov, the
middleman between those who ordered the violence and those who
carried it out, got nine years. The trial did not determine who had
done the ordering. Volkov was declared to have been the organizer. In
January 2004, the Supreme Court reduced Volkov’s sentence from nine
years to five, concurring with the defense’s claim that Volkov’s
guilt as organizer of the pogrom had not been proven.

The Yasenevo and Tsaritsyno pogroms set an example to be emulated.
A whole string of others followed: on Prosveshcheniye Prospect in St.
Petersburg, in [Moscow’s] Old Arbat and in Kapotnya [also in Moscow]
(at a Vietnamese hostel). All those arrested were released, and the
police took to denying that ethnically motivated attacks were even
occurring. I have listed only those that caused the greatest stir.
Actually, a wave of ethnic violence swept across the entire country.

If at the beginning of the “second wave” (April 2002), the total
number of skinheads in Russia was approximately 35,000 to 40,000, by
the time it ends that number will probably be around 75,000 to 80,000
(after which the growth will stop). And since in Russia, unlike in
the West, no youth subculture ever disappears (including those that
have already faded out in the West, such as hippies and punks), one
can predict with confidence that the skinhead movement has taken root
among Russia’s young people for a long time to come.

Armenian NPP to be halted for 65 days of repairs

ITAR-TASS News Agency
TASS
July 16, 2004 Friday 2:31 PM Eastern Time

Armenian NPP to be halted for 65 days of repairs

By Tigran Liloyan

YEREVAN

The Armenian nuclear power plant will be stopped for planned repairs
and fuel loading in the small hours of July 31. The repairs will take
65 days, Armenian NPP General Director Gagik Markosyan told Itar-Tass
on Friday. The power plant will be connected to the Armenian
electricity network on October 4.

That will be the largest repair in the entire history of the Armenian
nuclear power plant, Markosyan said. The power plant’s main computer
will be replaced with $1 million from the U.S. Department of Energy.
Eur550,000 from the TACIS program will help to replace 37 switches,
six kilovolt each. The power plant’s safety will thereby be upgraded.
The fourth turbo-generator will be repaired, and blades of two
turbo-generators will be replaced.

The Armenian nuclear power plant was commissioned in 1979 and halted
after the devastating earthquake of 1989. The mothballed power plant
was restarted in 1996 with the assistance of Russian specialists. The
second unit of the power plant provides for about 40% of all
electricity in Armenia. A Russian-Armenian intergovernmental
agreement put the Armenian NPP under control of Inter UES, a
subsidiary of the Russian Unified Energy System grid.

Meanwhile, the European Union insists on closure of the Armenian
nuclear power plant that is located 40 kilometers west of Yerevan.
The Armenian authorities say that the power plant can be closed only
if the country obtains other sources of energy.

Baku, Yerevan must provide for Karabakh talks progress-OSCE

ITAR-TASS News Agency
TASS
July 16, 2004 Friday 2:31 PM Eastern Time

Baku, Yerevan must provide for Karabakh talks progress-OSCE

By Sevindzh Abdullayeva, Viktor Shulman

BAKU

The leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia, not the OSCE Minsk Group, are
responsible for the development of negotiations on the Karabakh
settlement, the Minsk Group co-chairmen said at a Friday press
conference in Baku.

The co-chairmen will continue supporting direct dialog between the
Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents and negotiations of the two
foreign ministers, U.S. Co-Chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group Steven
Mann said. He said that he believed in peace settlement. Lasting
peace can be achieved only through political negotiations, and
attempts to settle the conflict with other methods can have tragic
consequences, he said.

The co-chairmen said they would not thrust any solutions on the
conflicting sides. They noted that the negotiations could be
successful only in case of compromises, whose degree was up to the
sides.

Russian Co-Chairman Yuri Merzlyakov said the three member countries
of the OSCE Minsk Group (Russia, the United States and France)
supported the principle of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

Georgia unleashed an express war

Agency WPS
What the Papers Say. Part B (Russia)
July 16, 2004, Friday

GEORGIA UNLEASHED AN EXPRESS WAR
SOURCE: Kommersant, July 16, 2004, p. 10

Vladimir Novikov, Alexander Gabuyev

The latest round of talks within the framework of the Joint Control
Commission in Moscow yesterday ended with nothing to show for it.
Georgia has finally released the Russian relief aid it sezied. CIS
Executive Secretary Vladimir Rushailo and Stephen Mann, the US
president’s travelling trouble-shooter, have visited Tbilisi.

The envoys of Moscow and Washington envoy never expected to meet each
other in Tbilisi. Both tried hard to make out that their visits were
planned diplomatic events. Rushailo pointed out repeatedly that he
regularly tours CIS capitals and “has just visited some Central Asian
countries.” Mann repeated over and over that he is not visiting
Georgia alone, but “also Armenia and Azerbaijan to discuss
Nagorno-Karabakh settlement there.” Needless to say, the
representatives of Moscow and Washington claimed in practically
identical terms that their visits to Tbilisi had nothing to do with
the situation in South Ossetia. Mann only said on the subject of
South Ossetia that he had exhaustive information on the state of
affairs and reiterated that “the United States supports a peaceful
solution to the problem.”

Rushailo was more communicative. After meetings with President
Mikhail Saakashvili and Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania he said that he
had come to meet new leaders of Georgia and specify the date of the
next CIS summit in Kazakhstan. Rushailo left the positive news for
the end of the news conference. Rushailo said, “Emphasis in the talks
with the president of Georgia was made on facilitation of integration
with neighbors, first and foremost with Russia.”

A day before Rushailo’s visit, however, Saakashvili was in London and
made quite different statements there. “The West should continue
putting pressure on Russia,” he said. “We have to show Russia that
Georgia will not be pushed around.” Should the West follow the
advice, according to Saakashvili, “several thousand people in South
Ossetia will join Georgia within six months.” Saakashvili even
boasted that “the Georgian special forces trained by NATO instructors
are better than any Russian unit.”

Georgia Express 2004 exercise, an element of the British program of
military assistance to the Tbilisi regime and of the NATO’s
Partnership for Peace Program, began on July 3 as though to confirm
Saakashvili’s words. The exercise is taking place at the Vaziani base
near Tbilisi, where almost 170 British and 230 Georgian servicemen,
supported by two helicopters, have until July 18 to capture a village
overrun by hypothetical guerrillas and protect journalists from
terrorist attacks. Iraqi Shiites were chosen for the hypothetical
enemy. This demonstration of strength must have had its effect. The
South Ossetian government Tskhinvali is seriously afraid of an
invasion.

Meanwhile, the confrontation in Ergneti between Russian troops
escorting relief aid to Ossetian villages and the Georgian financial
police continued. Tbilisi went on claiming that the shipment must
clear customs. Saakashvili eventually said that by way of exception
he himself would pay the Finance Ministry. The convoy was about to
continue on its way when the Ossetian side kicked up a scandal. The
Ossetians demanded peacekeeping contingent commander Svyatoslav
Nabzdorov to prevent the Georgian police from escorting the convoy.
Leaving Ergneti, the trucks were supposed to cross the territory of
Georgia before making a turn into South Ossetia, and Nabzdorov could
not very well forbid the Georgian police from escorting the shipment
on the territory of Georgia. It was a dead-end, and the sides got
down to thoroughly unproductive negotiations again.

Translated by A. Ignatkin

Saakashvili’s scenarios

Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
July 16, 2004, Friday

SAAKASHVILI’S SCENARIOS

SOURCE: Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier, No 26, July 14 – 20, 2004, p. 2

by Colonel Anatoly Tsyganok, Candidate of Military Sciences,
Professor of the Academy of Military Sciences

THE GEORGIAN-OSSETIAN CONFLICT: SAAKASHVILI’S SCENARIOS, RUSSIA’S
POSITION, PROBABLE OUTCOME

Escalation of tension in South Ossetia may reach the boiling point
any moment and a shooting war will follow. Meantime, Georgian
newspapers are full of articles on how much Moscow needs a Georgia
without stability and on how Moscow’s tactic is being executed by
Tskhinvali.

Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania said, “Promises of the Russian
leaders to take measures have remained promises so far.” Koba
Davitashvili of the parliament of Georgia agrees with the premier.
“Russian peacekeepers are occupiers. They must immediately leave,” he
said. Interior Minister Irakly Okruashvili doubts the necessity of
the Russian contingent’s presence in the region. “Unless Russian
peacekeepers provide peace in South Ossetia, expediency of their
presence in the conflict area may be questioned,” he said.

In fact, Tbilisi has never lifted a finger to gather the lands around
it. It has Russia to thank for the process. It was Russia that
unified Georgia into an integral formation and saved it from
disintegration in the space of almost two centuries. Moscow finances
the republic all through the history of the Soviet Union. Should
Russia stops exerting political, economic, financial, and military
effort to preserve Georgia, nothing – not even the United States,
NATO, or the European Union – will save it from disintegration into
several states.

According to Western sources, Georgia is the poorest country in the
Commonwealth. Annual per capita income there amounts to only about
$400. Tbilisi’s foreign debts exceed $1.5 billion, and $150 million
of them are owed to Russia for gas and electricity. Economic
dependence of most Georgian families on Russia is colossal. Their
relatives working in Russia send over $1 billion to Georgia. All of
that makes one wonder about statements of Georgian state officials
undermining the system of existence itself of the population of
Georgia and provoking disintegration of the security framework in the
South Ossetian area.

“Peace” option by Saakashvili

Here are some facts enabling observers to judge the option (or plan).
Demonstrating his determination to unify Georgia, its president used
peace-loving rhetoric and propagandistic methods to appeal to the
residents of South Ossetia. Saakashvili spoke of the payment of
pensions as of July 1, free fertilizers and medical services (just
like in Adjaria), broadcasts in the Ossetian language. Along with
that, Georgia began reconstruction of the railroad between Gori and
Tskhinvali and of the detour road bypassing the capital of South
Ossetia and leading to the Georgian villages of Tamarisheni,
Achibeti, Kurta, Kekhvi to the north. This is where the Military
Ossetian Road (30 kilometers of it, at any rate) runs. It is possible
to isolate Tskhinvali from the rest of the world only by cutting the
road there. Three officers of the State Security Ministry of Georgia
were sent to Tskhinvali supposedly to “oversee the construction”.

Defense Ministry of Georgia disbanded its peacekeeping battalion on
January 3, 2004. It was formed again soon, and (according to South
Ossetian sources) its numerical strength increased to 1,500 men by
late May and to between 2,000 and 3,000 by the middle of June.
Battalion of the Internal Troops trained by American instructors was
included in the formation. Internal Troops backed by artillery pieces
and multiple rocket launchers were sent into the conflict area
allegedly for the purpose of a special operation against smugglers.
Additional roadblocks and checkpoints were established in the
villages and along the border with South Ossetia. Tbilisi proclaimed
the move of tank units to Gori. The town is known as the location
where repaired and chalked-off tanks are stored. On July 11, Russian
and OSCE observers noticed two attack and three transport helicopters
(MI-24 and MI-8) in the Georgian army group.

The population of Georgia is brainwashed into believing in existence
of an enemy. The implication is that Russia is the enemy. Society is
constantly updated on what Saakashvili is doing to repel the
potential aggression. TV channels regularly show the motorized
infantry battalion of the Georgian Internal Troops in brand-new NATO
uniforms. The battalion is commanded by Internal Troops Commander
General Georgy Tavtukhashvili.

Resolute and no-nonsense statements made by state officials are
broadcast again and again.

In short, no effort is spared to make the population believe that the
government of Georgia has its own opinion on how the South Ossetian
problem should be tackled, that the government has determination and
a powerful (by standards of the Caucasus) army that would not balk at
anything for the sake of territorial integrity of the country.

The impression is that Georgia is trying to test the level of
Russia’s support (first), gauge the level of Russian peacekeepers’
tolerance (second), and change single-handed the format of the 1992
Dagomys Accords (third). In accordance with them, the
Georgian-Ossetian conflict area should be manned by international
peacekeeping forces comprising Russian, Georgian, and South Ossetian
battalions 500 men each. The Russian battalion should include two
MI-8 helicopters.

Along with everything else, Tskhinvali is irritated by neglect of the
accord to dismantle additional police and customs roadblocks and
checkpoints by Georgia. And that Georgia still retains South Ossetian
vehicles that ferried goods to Georgia.

Nocturnal marches of 200 Georgian servicemen commanded by interior
and state security ministers in South Ossetia may be regarded as a
provocation. These servicemen forced the Russian convoy to pull over
under the threat of weapons. This particular episode persuades some
observers that official Tbilisi deliberately aggravates the situation
in the hope to settle the old conflict to its satisfaction as soon as
possible.

Moscow’s point of view

As far as Russia is concerned, a peaceful solution to the South
Ossetian problem is only possible on the basis of the previous
accords. First and foremost, the matter concerns the 1992 (July 24)
Dagomys Accords on settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.
Within their framework, the involved parties should discuss the terms
of gradual reduction of the numerical strength of peacekeeping
contingents. Restoration of trust between the warring sides will play
a significant role in the peace process. In March, the European Union
initiated the program of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict area
rehabilitation. The program realization protocol was signed by
Georgia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia – Alania, OSCE, and European
Union. The European Union allotted 2.5 million euro for the program
and Georgia began receiving the few installments.

The situation being what it is, pugnacious statements of Georgian
leaders perplex observers. Particularly since the new foreign
minister of Georgia is called by her former colleagues a seasoned
negotiator.

Over 10,000 people left South Ossetia for North and almost 30,000
Ossetians left Georgia in the war of the early 1990’s. The new
shooting war will probably bring about some similar results. As far
as Russia is concerned, a calm border in the Ossetian direction is a
priority in development of relations with countries of the Caucasus.
If Georgia proceeds in the direction of a forceful annexation of
South Ossetia, state interests of Russia and Georgia will certainly
part company because the war will both deteriorate the situation in
the border regions and echo all over the Caucasus. It is also
important for Moscow that most residents of South Ossetia are
citizens of the Russian Federation.

For the time being, the situation is only beginning to deteriorate
into an armed confrontation. As before, 12 years ago, cars carrying
women and children leave South Ossetia for Russia.

The worst outcome

Does Tbilisi really count on victory in the hostilities? If it thinks
so, it had better think again.

Firstly, the rugged terrain typical of South Ossetia will certainly
cut down combat capacities of the offensive and particularly
efficiency of armored vehicles. Relatively small units – properly
trained, knowing the terrain, camouflaged, and wielding modern
weapons – can hold narrow roads in the foothills for a long time.

Secondly, Tskhinvali is bare kilometers from the southern border of
the republic that is denied recognition by the international
community and its location is not favorable for defense. All the
same, drawing on the experience of the previous war, South Ossetians
will probably emplace their artillery pieces on the tops of the
nearby mountains currently controlled by them. It follows that the
capture of the capital of South Ossetia will take a lot of effort and
losses. Moreover, nobody can give any guarantees that the city will
be held afterwards.

Moreover, even despite Russia’s official statement on non-involvement
in the armed conflict, Ossetians will not abandon their brothers in
the south. They will help offering shelter, providing weaponry,
treating the wounded, and helping families of combatants with
finances.

In any case, the use of force will inevitably split Georgian society
– even despite the brainwashing campaign. Not all Georgians will
support the escapade. It stands to reason to assume that instead of
rallying all of Georgia, the war will accelerate processes of
decentralization in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and even the
Armenian-populated Samtskhe-Dvavakhetia, and Azerbaijani-populated
areas. It will generate instability not even Saakashvili or his
predecessors will manage to do away with in decades.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Iraqi Christian, Shiite Muslim stand firm in face of extremists

Agence France Presse — English
July 16, 2004 Friday 3:21 AM Eastern Time

Iraqi Christian, Shiite Muslim stand firm in face of extremists

by SEBASTIEN BLANC

BAGHDAD

Attackers wreck five liquor stores along the same Baghdad street but
amid the rubble a Christian and a Shiite Muslim say their friendship
is stronger than the Islamist extremists’ hatred of alcohol.

Vartan Sarkissian, 51, an Iraqi Armenian whose family fled to Baghdad
to escape the 1915 genocide under the Ottoman Empire, lives in a
Christian neighbourhood around Al-Thariba avenue.

The busy shopping street is also home to his Shiite friend, Salah
Abdallah, despite being outnumbered nine-to-one by Christians.

The 38-year-old car salesman has an apartment in a building near
Vartan’s shop, which sells mobile telephones.

The pair, both sporting moustaches, are good friends. Their children
play together. Every now and then they even share a small glass of
something alcoholic.

And Salah, a moderate Muslim, is on occasion invited to the local
church to attend family events.

He has a figure of Jesus at the front of his car as “a present from
my Christian friends”, Salah explained, adding that he really enjoyed
Mel Gibson’s blockbuster, “The Passion of Christ”.

The two friends were, naturally, shocked by the bomb attacks which
took place overnight Wednesday against five liquor stores along their
street. It reduced the shop fronts to rubble and also wrecked several
neighbouring stores.

Vartan’s mobile phone outlet was partially damaged.

“We do not want an extremist in a turban ruling Iraq. It is not
possible to set up an Islamist regime here,” said Salah, who blamed
militiamen loyal to radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr for the
attack.

Such men adhere to a strict line of Islam and frown on any
association with alcohol.

“Moqtada has divided the Shiites,” who represent around 60 percent of
the Iraqi population, said Salah.

“But these attacks are not going to affect our relationship with the
Christians. They are our brothers and are always welcome here,” he
said.

Despite the strong sentiment, the violence does have an adverse
effect.

Vartan can name five or six families who have recently left the
country for Syria or fled to Iraqi Kurdistan in the north.

“It is sad because they are people we have welcomed for 20 years,”
agreed Salah.

His Christian friend appeared set to weather the storm, however. “I
will repair my shop and pray for those people who have lost their
sense of social responsibility,” Vartan said.

Vartan does not blame Iraqi Muslims for the violence that has raged
in the country for the past 15 months.

“It is simply a case of establishing what their goals are to find who
is pushing from behind: it is Iran,” he said.

Salah and Vartan said they were prepared to begin communal patrols,
armed with Kalashnikov riffles, to help secure the neighbourhood.

“I will protect him and he will protect me. We are not just
neighbours we are friends and brothers,” said Vartan.

“He is like an uncle to my son. There are people who want to break
the bonds in Iraq between Christians and Muslims. They will not
succeed,” said the Armenian.