Azer Tag, Azerbaijan State Info Agency
July 30 2004
MEETING AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
[July 30, 2004, 22:48:41]
Head of the OSCE mission to Slovenia Yanez Lenartziz on 30 July met
the foreign minister of Azerbaijan Republic Mr. Elmar Mammadyarov,
AzerTAj correspondent reported.
Reminding that Slovenia will preside at OSCE in 2005, noted that
Azerbaijan’s position is very important for him. The guest also took
interest in contacts of the Ministry with the OSCE Baku Office.
Minister Elmar Mammadyarov spoke of the links between Azerbaijan and
OSCE, updated on the mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group in settlement
of the Armenia-Azerbaijan, Nagorny Karabakh conflict. Expressing with
deep regret that the Minsk Group’s activity has not yielded any
conclusion the Minister stated that he hopes for Slovenia’s efforts
in this direction as future OSCE chair. Minister Elmar Mammadyarov
reminded the UN Security Council’s four Resolutions on the question
and principles of the Lisbon Summit, underlining that the aggressive
and ethnic cleaning policy of Armenia should not be justified.
As far as the links with the OSCE Baku Office, the Minister said that
they are acting jointly in this direction. He also expressed
confidence that the OSCE and world community would protest against
the so-called `elections to the municipalities in the Nagorny
Karabakh region’ on 8 August.
Noting that he attaches great significance to the links between
Azerbaijan and his country, Mr. Yanez Lenatrziz said that he would
not spare his efforts for fair settlement of the Nagorny Karabakh
conflict.
The sides discussed a number of other issues of mutual interest.

PRESS OFFICE
Armenian Holy Apostolic Church Canadian Diocese
Contact; Deacon Hagop Arslanian, Assistant to the Primate
615 Stuart Avenue, Outremont Quebec H2V 3H2
Tel; 514-276-9479, Fax; 514-276-9960
Email; [email protected] Website;
Ararat Summer Youth Camp Committee Meeting with Participants, Families
and Friends
On Wednesday July 28, 2004 the organizing committee of the Diocesan
Ararat Summer Camp met with the participants, families and friends of
2004 Ararat Camp at Holy Trinity Armenian Apostolic Church of Toronto.
His Eminence Bishop Bagrat Galstanian presided over the
meeting. Present were the pastor of St Vartan Armenian Church of
Mississauga Rev Fr Komitas Mirzakhanyan, Director of Ararat Summer
Camp, as well as participants, parents and friends.
The meeting opened with prayer conducted by Rev Fr Komitas
Mirzakhanyan, who then presented the schedule and the programs for
this year. Fr Komitas thanked His Eminence Bishop Bagrat Galstanian
for the care and attention he has shown towards the Ararat Summer Camp
project. New requests were submitted to the Director to be considered
during the organization of 2005 Ararat Summer Camp.
Upon the directive and instruction of His Eminence Bishop Bagrat
Galstanian, Primate, the Diocesan Summer Camp committee has organized
the 2004 Ararat Summer Youth Camp from August 9-14 at Woodland Trails
Conservation Area.
His Eminence Bishop Bagrat Galstanian back in Montreal
His Eminence Bishop Bagrat Galstanian, Primate of the Armenian Church
Canadian Diocese arrived in Montreal, Canada, on Monday July 26 at
Trudeau International Airport.
During his ten days visit to the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin His
Eminence met with His Holiness Karekin II Catholicos and Supreme
Patriarch of All Armenians. His Eminence then joined the St Sahag-St
Mesrob Saturday school participants who visited Armenia. Bishop
Galstanian also visited the premises where the Canadian Youth Mission
to Armenia are implementing their mission currently. Upon his arrival
Bishop Galstanian revised the schedule for the month of August during
which he will be presiding over many meetings.
We wish and pray that God grant him good health to continue the
pursuit of his objectives with a great enthusiasm.
A Princely Donation to the Armenian Church Canadian Diocese
In response to an appeal by His Eminence Bishop Bagrat Galstanian,
Primate of the Canadian Diocese, an anonymous benefactor, a devout
believer and supporter of the spiritual mission of the Mother See of
Holy Etchmiadzin and of the Armenian Holy Apostolic Church, has
graciously donated the princely sum of 200.000 US dollars. The
donation is intended to promote the spiritual and national missions of
the Diocese and to foster the realization of many new projects.
This generous donation will permit to rekindle youth programs, as well
as educational and more specifically, spiritual projects.
For the past twenty years, under the auspices of the Mother See of
Holy Etchmiadzin, the Diocese of the Armenian Church of Canada has
been serving the faithful of the Armenian Church by advancing
spiritual, cultural and educational enrichment.
On behalf of the Primate of the Diocese of the Armenian Church of
Canada, the Diocesan Council, the clergy and the faithful, we extend
our heartfelt gratitude and pray that Almighty God protect and grant
good health and longlife to the noble benefactor.
St Sahag-St Mesrob Saturday School Students are back from Motherland
Armenia
It is with deep spiritual joy and prayers of gratitude to Almighty God
that we announce to the faithful of the Armenian Church Canadian
Diocese that the St Sahag-St Mesrob Saturday school students are back
in Toronto, Canada. They arrived to Toronto at Pearson International
Airport on July 29, 2004 where they were greeted by His Eminence
Bishop Bagrat Galstanian, Primate of Canada and Arch Rev Father Zareh
Zargarian, Pastor of the Holy Trinity Armenian Church, Toronto and
parents/friends. The Group was thrilled to see His Eminence andRev
Father Zareh receive them at the airport.
Serpazan has already joined the group in Armenia to many of the trips
and outings with the students. While in Armenia His Eminence Bagrat
Serpazan arranged for the group to be at the Mother See of Holy
Etchmiadzin and had a formal meeting with His Holiness Karekin II on
July 18, 2004.. On behalf of the Students and the Teachers the
Chairperson of the HTAC St Sahag and St Mesrob Saturday School Board
of Trustees, Ashkhen Shishmanian, presented His Holiness with a
ceramic plate specially designed and handcrafted for this
occasion. His Holiness blessed the group and presented each one with a
cross.
After the meeting they attended the Holy Badarak and received Holy
Communion and also visited the museum in the Veharan with His Eminence
Bagrat Serpazan. Serpazan also guided the students to the museum at
the Holy Etchmiadzin to see the Pagan relics on which the Main Alter
stands.
The students were so impressed that they paid another visit another
day just to see the Holy Etchmiadzin Church and have spiritual time
privately. Serpazan also met with the students and CYMA at
Saghmosavank where they stayed for three hours and special lunch was
served. Also the group and Cyma with the arrangement of the Serpazan
visited the Nork Hayortyatz Doun where a special cultural program was
presented by one hundred young professionals.
All the students and the teachers thank His Eminence Bishop Bagrat
Galstanian, Primate for his pastoral guidance, attention and special
care that he had shown for each and everyone during their stay in the
Motherland.
First Annual Armenian Youth Pilgrimage to St Catharine’s
The oldest and the first Armenian Apostolic Church in Canada,
St. Gregory the Illuminator Armenian Apostolic Church of
St. Catharine’s, On. will be hosting the first Annual Armenian Youth
Pilgrimage.
His Eminence Bishop Bagrat Galstanian will join the pilgrims from
Montreal, Laval, Toronto and Ottawa at this historic event that will
take place starting Saturday, August 14th in the evening and continue
on Sunday, August 15th with the 74th Annual “Blessing of the Grapes”
Holy Badarak and traditional Picnic.
St. Vartan Summer Day Camp 2004
On the morning of July 12, 2004 a group of 25 Armenian children (aged
3- 8 years) gathered at Fogolar’s Country Club in Oakville. They were
there to participate in the week long St. Vartan Summer Day Camp under
the leadership of Reverend Father Komitas Mirzakhanyan, Pastor of
St. Vartan Armenian Church of Mississauga. During the week the campers
participated in a variety of activities, each day having its own theme
(e.g. Armenian Alphabet, Holy Badarak, Armenia, and “I am special”). A
variety of hand-crafts were worked out by the children, including a
mosaic of Etchmiadzin, a Pourvar and Armenian flag magnets, among
others. The children also participated in games like Armenian Bingo,
learned Armenian traditional shoorch-bar and singing Armenian
songs. The children were also given the chance to play soccer and to
swim.
The camp wrapped up on Friday with an exhibition of crafts, a slide
show from the camp and a performance for the parents. The campers sang
the beautiful Hye Menank and Ayp ou Pen songs which they had learned
over the past week. The campers also recited the Lord’s Prayer, Hayr
Mer to open the show.
Such a camp was a major undertaking for the St. Vartan Mississauga
parish and could not have been possible without the contribution of
time and money of various individuals.
Thank you to the team of eight counselors who assisted Der Komitas
during the week. The counselors were Steve Beler, Armen Dumanian,
Garen Hamblin, Nairi Kazazian, Arlaine MacClennan, Caroline
MacClennan, Christine Sevadjian, Peter Sevadjian, and Tanya
Sevadjian. A thank you also goes out to the parent volunteers who
helped during the camp: Taline Paroyan, Ani Badiani, Alessia Aivazian,
Ani Altounian, Christine Sakarya, Christine Ermarkaryan as well as the
organizing committee of the camp who included Ani Altounian, Taline
Paroyan, Houri Houldsworth, and Christine Ermar-karyan.
We would like to thank the following members of our community for
their donations towards the operating expenses of the camp: Ian & Seta
MacLennan,Loris & Julia Dumanian, Arlette Boghosian, Mardig & Lilian
Sevadjian, Vic & Aida Sevadjian, John & Houri Houldsworth, Vazken &
Ani Altounian, Edouard & Taline Paroyan, Arno & Christine Ermarkaryan,
First Choice Haircutters, Kraft Canada, and Voortman Cookies.
Special thanks to the parents who supported the camp with the presence
of their children and made the 2nd annual St. Vartan Summer Day Camp a
great success!!
Last but not least, a special thanks to Der Komitas for his leadership
and efforts to continue to make this camp a reality.
Some thoughts and sentiments on the Pilgrimage to St Anne de Baupre
Gregory Kalaydjian
On July 9, 10, and 11, around 140 of us went on a three-day journey
from Toronto to Montreal and Quebec City. Our journey began on Friday
with a small tour of Montreal, where we visited Notre Dame and St
Joseph cathedrals. The architecture of these two cathedrals was
magnificent, as I stood there marveled by their beauty. Although we
did not get a chance to enter the Notre Dame Cathedral, we could still
appreciate its awe-inspiring stature from the outside. From the moment
I caught sight of the Notre Dame Cathedral, I knew our journey had
just begunâ=80¦
Our next stop was the St Joseph Cathedral/oratory, located atop Mount
Royal. This cathedral was a sight to behold. The altar is situated on
the topmost level of the cathedral, where one can either take the
escalators from the inside or climb the stairs on the outside to reach
it. The bottom level of the cathedral features a hallway adorned with
small candles. The candles can belit as a sign of respect for the
Saints, followed by a prayer. Our group of pilgrims headed for the
altar. Slowly but surely we all made our way to the top, as we were
able to observe the splendor and beauty that is St. Joseph.
As we gathered in front of the altar, I felt a sense of peace and
tranquility I had not felt in a long time. Suddenly, as if guided by
the Holy Spirit, the choir began to sing Armenian hymns. Anybody who
knew the words to the hymns joined the choir. It was a very spiritual
experience. I left the cathedral feeling blessed and spiritually
fulfilled.
The next day, along with around a hundred of our fellow pilgrims from
Montreal, we made our way to Ste. Anne de Beaupre located outside of
QuebecCity. This was to be the apex of our journey. This majestic
cathedral stood alone, isolated from everything else. It was a
spiritual oasis located in the middle of a desolate wasteland. Badarak
was held within the cathedral, whose walls are decorated with various
images of Jesus Christ and the Saints. I am gratefulto the council of
Ste. Anne de Beaupre for allowing us Armenians to perform our ceremony
in the cathedral. In return, we had the opportunity to share our
wonderful and enlightening ceremony we call ‘badarak’ with the
non-Armenians of Ste Anne de Beaupre.
I would like to thank Mr. And Mrs. Mario and Taline Gumushdjian for
being the driving force behind this trip; the Very Rev. Arch Father
Zareh Zargarian for his guidance and wisdom as he led us pilgrims on
this wonderful journey; Deacon Vrej Berberian, Mrs. Diana Bogosyan,
Mrs. Sonia Kokorian and all theothers who helped out with the
organization of the trip; my fellow members of the Christian Church
Mission for their patience and their ideas brought forth to the table;
Ms. Talar Chichmanian who helped co-ordinate the trip in Montreal; His
Eminence Bishop Bagrat Galstanyan along with all the priests and
deacons in Montreal who organized and co-ordinated badarak at Ste Anne
de Beaupre. I would also like to thank everyone who participated in
this pilgrimage for their patience, their enthusiasm, and their
determination. I hope your journey was as spiritually fulfilling as
mine.
Divan of the Diocese

Associated Press
July 30 2004
Judge approves landmark insurance settlement to benefit Armenians
TIM MOLLOY
Associated Press
LOS ANGELES – A judge approved a landmark $20 million settlement in a
lawsuit seeking unpaid life insurance benefits for descendants of
Armenians killed nearly 90 years ago in the Turkish Ottoman Empire.
Attorneys for the plaintiffs said they filed the class-action suit to
raise awareness of the deaths as well as to win money from New York
Life Insurance Co.
They contend that 1.5 million Armenians were killed in an act of
genocide by the Turkish Ottoman Empire. Turkey rejects the genocide
claim and maintains that Armenians were killed in civil unrest during
the collapse of the empire.
The legal agreement approved by U.S. District Court Judge Christina
A. Snyder is believed to be the first ever in connection with the
disputed event.
“As lawyers and descendants of victims of the genocide, we were able
to bring to court a lawsuit that brings some recognition of the
genocide,” said attorney Brian S. Kabateck, who, like co-counsel Mark
Geragos, is Armenian-American.
New York Life sold about 8,000 policies in the Ottoman Empire
beginning in the 1880s, with less than half of those bought by
Armenians. It stopped selling insurance there in 1915.
The company said it located about one-third of the policyholders’
descendants to pay benefits. The rest of the policies languished
because the remaining heirs could not be found, the firm said.
Under the agreement, $11 million will be set aside to pay claims by
heirs of some 2,400 policyholders. About $3 million will go to
Armenian charitable organizations.
Another $2 million will be used for administrative costs, with
anything not spent on expenses going to the charities. The remaining
$4 million will cover attorneys’ fees.
One of the plaintiffs, 89-year-old Martin Marootian, will receive
$250,000 because of his work for decades to bring about the lawsuit.
His attorneys said he has also suffered because of criticism from
others in the Armenian-American community who opposed the settlement
as insufficient.
Geragos said some of the critics wrongly believe the case involves
reparations for the killings rather than insurance payments.
Marootian was born in New York in 1915 – the year that Armenians
contend the Turks began the executions to punish Armenians for
allegedly helping the invading Russian army during World War I.
France and Russia are among 15 countries, along with a United Nations
human rights panel, that have recognized the genocide. The United
States has not made such a declaration.

The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom
Policy Review (Published by the Hoover Institution)
June/July 2004
No. 125
By Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson
A series of historically unprecedented events have brought the
attention of the West to the wider Black Sea region – that region
including the littoral states of the Black Sea, Moldova, and the
Southern Caucasus countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The
successful completion of the anchoring and integration of Central and
Eastern European countries stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea
in the Euro-Atlantic community marks the end of the grand historical
project of the 1990s initiated in the wake of the end of the Cold
War. Moreover, the terrorist attacks of 9-11 and 3-11 have underscored
the dangers of a new century and the fact that the greatest threats to
both North America and Europe are now likely to emanate from further
afield and beyond the continent, in particular from the Greater Middle
East.
These events have begun to push the Black Sea from the periphery to
the center of Western attention. At the same time, they have
underscored the fact that the West today lacks a coherent and
meaningful strategy vis-à-vis this region. Neither the United
States nor the major European powers have made this region a priority
nor have they identified strategic objectives in the region. Absent a
compelling rationale attractive and comprehensible to elites and
publics on both sides of the Atlantic, this is unlikely to
change. Absent such a rationale, Europe and the United States are not
going to be willing or able to generate the attention and resources
necessary to engage and anchor the countries of the wider Black Sea
region to the West – let alone to help them transform themselves into
full partners and perhaps, over time, full members of the major
Euro-Atlantic institutions. We mean to explain in this essay why the
Black Sea region needs to be at the forefront of the Euro-Atlantic
agenda.
Years of neglect
Why has the West lacked such a strategy in the past and what has
changed to make one so critical now? Four main factors explain the
past lack of interest. First, in many ways the wider Black Sea region
has been the Bermuda Triangle of Western strategic studies. Lying at
the crossroads of European, Eurasian, and Middle Eastern security
spaces, it has been largely ignored by mainstream experts on all three
regions. Geographically located at the edge of each, the region has
not been at the center of any. When it came to Europe, our priority
was with the arc of countries extending from the Baltic states to the
Eastern Balkan states. When it came to the former Soviet Union, we
were focused on building a new cooperative relationship with
Moscow. And apart from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the interests
and attention of our Middle Eastern policy usually ceased at Turkey’s
southern border.
Second, given the crowded agenda of the Euro-Atlantic community since
the collapse of communism 15 years ago, there was little time or
political energy left to address the wider Black Sea region. The task
of anchoring and integrating Central and Eastern Europe, stopping the
Balkan wars, and putting those countries back on a path towards
European integration – and, finally, trying to establish a new and
cooperative post-Cold War relationship with Moscow – became full-time
preoccupations. If one looked at the list of priorities of an American
secretary of state or European foreign minister in the 1990s, rightly
or wrongly, the Black Sea rarely broke through into the top tier of
concerns. The exception was, of course, Turkey, which fought a lonely
political battle to get the West to pay more attention to the
region. Almost by default, our considerable interest in the safe and
stable flow of energy through the region ended up driving our policy –
as opposed to some overarching vision of how we saw the place of these
countries in the Euro-Atlantic community.
Third, there was also little push from the region for a closer
relationship with the West. No Lech Walesa or Vaclav Havel emerged to
capture our attention or pound at our door. The countries of the
region, different and with widely varying aspirations, were
preoccupied with their own problems and at times engaged in civil war
and their own armed conflicts. Any thought of joining the West in the
foreseeable future seemed unrealistic or even utopian – in their eyes
as well as ours. In the West, there is always a tendency to ignore or
neglect problems for which one has no immediate answer or prospect for
success: the `too hard to handle’ category. Henry Kissinger is
reported to have said that a secretary of state should not tackle an
issue without at least a 90 percent likelihood of success. The
problems of the wider Black Sea region were seen as failing to meet
that standard.
Fourth, the Black Sea has been a civilizational black hole in the
Western historical consciousness. We suffer not only from a lack of
familiarity with the region, its people, its problems, its rich
culture, and its contribution to the spread of Western civilization,
but also from a kind of historical amnesia. For some, `Europe’ meant
Western Europe; for others, it extended to the Baltic Sea and the
Black Sea – but in the case of the latter, only to its western and
southern edges. For many in the West, Ukraine and the Southern
Caucasus seemed far-away lands of which we knew little and, rightly or
wrongly, cared less. Others were too afraid even to think about
venturing into what Moscow claimed to be its `near abroad’ and natural
sphere of domination.
Many of these hurdles and constraints are starting to soften or
change. As the West succeeded in implementing its agenda of the 1990s,
it now can afford to lift its geopolitical horizon and think about
challenges that lie farther afield. The successful example of the `Big
Bang’ of nato and eu enlargements has helped awaken aspirations in the
wider Black Sea region. Today, a new generation of democratic leaders
in the region openly proclaims the desire to bring their countries
closer to and eventually to join the Euro-Atlantic community. Having
succeeded in joining nato, countries like Bulgaria and Romania are
joining Turkey in trying to impress upon the West the need to make the
Black Sea a higher strategic priority. Having largely ignored the
region for the past decade, the West is starting to wake up to the
need to determine just exactly what our objectives and strategy should
be.
What is the wider Black Sea region?
Historically, the black sea has stood at the confluence of the
Russian, Persian, and Ottoman Empires. During the Cold War, it was
further divided between East and West. Public images of the region
were shaped as much by spy thrillers and James Bond movies as anything
else. The twin revolutions of 1989 and 1991, leading to the collapse
of communism in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the ussr itself,
in turn opened the door for a new chapter in the region’s history and
called attention to it for the first time since parts of the `Great
Game’ were played out along its shores in the nineteenth century. With
nato members Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey dominating the western and
southern shores and newly minted cis states Moldova, Ukraine, Russia,
and Georgia along the north and east, the region begins to take shape.
The wider Black Sea region must also include all three Southern
Caucasus states – Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In referring to
the region, we implicitly refer to the Euro-Asian energy corridor
linking the Euro-Atlantic system with Caspian energy supplies and the
states of Central Asia. Moreover, we are also making some claim to the
projection of a Black Sea system northward from Transnistria, Odessa,
and Sokhumi because a stable system would require both the resolution
of `frozen conflicts’ along a northeast arc and access to the great
commercial rivers that flow into the Black Sea: the Danube, Dniester,
and Dnieper. Conceptually, then, the wider Black Sea region is as
broad and variegated a region as the North German Plain or the
Baltic/Nordic zone.
Significantly, the concept of a unitary Black Sea region was
envisioned in several 1990s efforts to build regional cooperation,
first in ad hoc structures and since 1999 in the engagement of major
Euro-Atlantic and European institutions. Limited systems of
cooperation such as the Black Sea Economic Council and the so-called
guuam (a coordination mechanism among former Soviet republics Georgia,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) reflected a growing
sense of common economic and political interest. The articulation of
the so-called Southern Dimension of European security and in 2001 the
accession of Romania and Bulgaria to nato in April 2004 confirmed that
three major states of the Black Sea region agreed that they shared a
single security system fully integrated into the larger Euro-Atlantic
system. As we approach the nato summit in Istanbul, both Ukraine and
Georgia are pursuing nato membership, suggesting that these states
also see their futures in terms of shared Black Sea security and
cooperation.
A similar convergence of regional interests can be seen in the
development of relations with the European Union. The countries on the
south and western shores of the Black Sea – Turkey, Bulgaria, and
Romania – constitute the entire class of formal applicants to the
European Union and, therefore, potentially an integrated political and
economic system. After the anticipated decision on June 12, 2004 to
extend Europe’s Neighborhood Policy to Georgia, Azerbaijan, and
Armenia, all the countries on the northern and eastern shores of the
Black Sea – including Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova – will be engaged
in developing closer relations with the European Union.
The engagement of other multilateral institutions – the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Minsk Group approach to
the `frozen conflicts’ of the Black Sea, the negotiations surrounding
the southern flank of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe –
all follow the formula of `Common Regional Problems, Cooperative
Regional Solutions.’ Common economic and security interests and the
gravitational pull of a rapidly integrating Europe are driving the
Black Sea states toward some manner of regional convergence. While the
persistence of conflict and the fragility of national institutions
suggest that the emergence of a fully functional Black Sea
geopolitical system is still some years in the future, there is strong
evidence that the Black Sea is indeed an inchoate Euro-Atlantic
region. It follows that the Euro-Atlantic states have an interest in
and should have a strategy towards such an important and potentially
positive development.
The strategic case
Why do we need a new Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Black Sea region
today? Let’s begin with the strategic case, which has two major
reinforcing components. The first element has to do with completing
the job of consolidating peace and stability within Europe. The other
has to do with addressing the most dangerous threat to future
Euro-Atlantic security, which emanates from beyond the continent in
the Greater Middle East. A subsidiary but still important strategic
consideration pertains to European access to energy supplies.
Over the past decade nato and the eu successfully projected stability
and helped consolidate democracy throughout much of the eastern half
of the European continent, from the three Baltic states in the north
to Romania and Bulgaria in the south. As a result, Europe today is
probably more democratic, prosperous, and secure than at any time in
history. At the same time, there are parts of the continent where
peace and stability are not yet fully assured. They are centered in
the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Belarus, and the Black Sea. Whereas
the eu and nato are heavily engaged in the Balkans and are developing
new approaches toward Ukraine and Belarus, the same cannot be said
with regard to the Black Sea, a region just as important strategically
and arguably more so.
The inclusion of the wider Black Sea region in the Euro-Atlantic
system would both consolidate the foundation of this system and
buttress it against many of the future threats to its peace and
stability which concern us most. The case for strategic buttress is
easiest to illustrate in the negative. If one thinks about many of the
major new problems and threats Europeans today are concerned about –
be they in the form of illegal immigrants, narcotics, proliferation,
or even trafficking in women – the wider Black Sea region is the new
front line in combating them. This region constitutes one of the key
routes for such illegal contraband. The traditional trade routes of
the Silk Road are now used to bring heroin to European markets and
dangerous technologies to al Qaeda terrorists. For the first time in
more than a century, trade routes under the control of European states
are being used for a sex-slave trade in women and children. Moreover,
the four `frozen conflicts’ monitored by the osce (Transnistria,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh) run through the region.
It is widely and correctly believed that these unresolved fragments of
Soviet Empire now serve as shipment points for weapons, narcotics, and
victims of trafficking and as breeding grounds for transnational
organized crime – and, last but not least, for terrorism.
Another equally important strategic reason has to do with the Greater
Middle East. During the twentieth century, Europe – and Central Europe
in particular – was the locus of the greatest potential conflict
confronting the West. The Fulda Gap in a divided Germany was the place
many feared the next major war would erupt. Today the only Gap left in
Fulda sells blue jeans, and we worry about terrorists armed with
weapons of mass destruction launching attacks on either side of the
Atlantic. Now the Greater Middle East is the place from which the most
dangerous threats to the Euro-Atlantic community are likely to emanate
and where Americans and Europeans are most likely to risk and lose
their lives.
The Black Sea region is at the epicenter in the grand strategic
challenge of trying to project stability into a wider European space
and beyond into the Greater Middle East. As nato expands its role in
Afghanistan and prepares for a long-term mission there and
contemplates assuming added responsibilities in Iraq, the wider Black
Sea region starts to be seen through a different lens: Instead of
appearing as a point on the periphery of the European landmass, it
begins to look like a core component of the West’s strategic
hinterland.
Put simply, the interface between the Euro-Atlantic community and the
Greater Middle East runs across the Black Sea, the new Fulda Gap. The
generational challenge of projecting stability into the Greater Middle
East will be much aided by a stable and successfully anchored wider
Black Sea region. This is not just a matter of geography, territory,
or Western access to military bases that might better enable us to
prosecute the war on terrorism. We have a key interest in seeing the
countries of this region successfully transform themselves into the
kind of democratic and stable societies that can, in turn, serve as a
platform for the spread of Western values further east and
south. Azerbaijan’s ability to transform itself into a successful
Muslim democracy may be as important to our ability to win the war on
terrorism as access to military bases on Azeri soil. What these
countries become may be as important as where they are.
The mechanisms and alliances Europe and the United States develop in
cooperative efforts in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Black Sea region
will also likely be immeasurably valuable in tackling the long-term
challenge of bringing democracy to the Greater Middle East. In the
wider Black Sea region, ethnic conflicts, post-conflict societies, and
economic devastation confront us with the same conditions we will find
in the Greater Middle East. We may look back on a successful Black Sea
strategy and see a proving ground on which effective multilateralism
and nation-building were first developed.
A final consideration in the strategic case pertains to the role of
Euro-Asian energy supplies in providing for the energy security of
Europe as well as the environmental quality of the Euro-Atlantic. At
present, Europe imports approximately 50 percent of its energy over
complicated and often dangerous routes through the Bosphorus and
English Channel. By 2020, Europe will be importing 70 percent of its
energy from sources beyond Europe. To the extent that we might have
political concerns about Russian or Saudi influence in European
capitals or harbor an environmental bias against nuclear power or
unrestricted shipping off our beaches, we might look seriously at what
a stable and secure Black Sea system offers as an alternative.
The wider Black Sea region straddles and indeed dominates the entire
Euro-Asian energy corridor from trans-Ukrainian oil and gas pipelines
running to the markets in Europe’s north to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline running to the Mediterranean. A new Euro-Atlantic strategy
geared towards anchoring and stabilizing the region can potentially
bring the vast energy reserves of the Caspian Basin and Central Asia
to European markets on multiple, secure, and environmentally safe
routes. Not only will these energy supplies secure the prosperity of a
politically independent Europe for decades to come, but the
construction and maintenance of these routes will provide an important
economic stimulus to the economies that were left behind in the
revolution of 1989.
The moral case
As important as the strategic argument for Euro-Atlantic engagement in
the wider Black Sea region is the moral case. After all, it was
precisely the combination of moral and strategic factors that made the
case for enlarging nato and the European Union to Central and Eastern
Europe so compelling and which eventually carried both elite and
public opinion. In a nutshell, that argument was based on the premise
that the West had a moral obligation to undo the damage of a
half-century of partition and communism and to make Europe’s eastern
half as safe, democratic, and secure as the continent’s western
half. Today that same argument must be extended to the wider Black Sea
region.
Reaching out to the Black Sea countries is the natural next step in
completing our vision of a Europe whole and free. Today there are
growing numbers of voices in the region articulating their aspiration
to anchor themselves to, and eventually become full members of, the
Euro-Atlantic community through membership in nato and the European
Union. Ukraine publicly claims to have made a strategic choice along
these lines (although some of President Leonid Kuchma’s actions as
well as Ukraine’s limited progress on reform have undercut that
case). More recently, Georgia has clearly moved in the same
direction. Azerbaijan has harbored nato aspirations for some
time. Armenia, with its close relationship to and dependence on
Russia, thus far continues to be the odd man out.
These aspirations have evoked an ambivalent Western response – just
as, for many, the aspirations of Central and Eastern Europe initially
did a decade ago. Overwhelmed with the challenges of completing the
integration of Central and Eastern Europe, many Europeans don’t want
to consider any options of further enlargement down the road. In
addition, many in the West have forgotten the key role that this
region once played in the evolution of Western civilization. Along
with the Mediterranean, it was the cradle and meeting place of many of
the cultures and peoples that have built the heritage of what we now
call the West. Reclaiming those cultures and helping these nations
reform and transform themselves into societies like ours represents
the next step in completing the unification of Europe.
Once again, the West is struggling to define what constitutes `Europe’
and the `Euro-Atlantic community.’ At several points in the 1990s
debate over nato and eu enlargement, we faced the issue of how far
membership in these institutions could or should extend. At each and
every step there were Western voices calling for a pause or a cap on
the process. The proponents of an open-ended approach prevailed with
the moral argument that countries which had suffered longer under
communism or were simply less developed should not be discriminated
against or punished, but should instead have the prospect of one day
walking through the open doors of our institutions once they have
embraced our values and met the criteria for membership. We must press
that case again today.
The moral case hinges on the extent of the Euro-Atlantic’s collective
responsibility to those people beyond the immediate scope of our
defining institutions but who share some or all of the cultural and
historical characteristics that define our civilization – as, for
example, Armenians undoubtedly do. The European Union’s new
Neighborhood Policy comes as close as Brussels could be expected to
get to asking, `Am I my brother’s keeper?’ As Genesis informs us,
opinion on this question varies. At one end of the spectrum are those
who would narrowly define a `core Europe’ whose highly integrated
markets would be restricted to existing eu members and remain a de
facto `Christian club.’ At the other are those who see a politically
completed community encompassing a wide range of ethnicities and
faiths within a more modestly integrated Europe. At a minimum, we can
say with certainty that the answer to this moral question has
existential consequences for the 250 million people, most of whom live
in the wider Black Sea region, who await our judgment.
The second moral reason underlying the need for a new Euro-Atlantic
strategy for the wider Black Sea region revolves, paradoxically,
around Russia. Today, all too many people see Russia as a reason for
the West not to engage in the wider Black Sea region – for fear that
engagement will generate new tensions with Moscow. The opposite may
actually be the case. The long-term goals of the West are to support
the democratization of the Russian state and to encourage Moscow to
shed its age-old zero-sum approach to geopolitics. A policy that
essentially cedes the Black Sea to Russian influence is likely to
retard both. The anchoring and integration of the countries of the
Black Sea to the West is likely to enhance both. While a full account
of how to craft a Western policy toward Russia is beyond the scope of
this paper, one thing is readily apparent: Once again, the West faces
the dilemma that a strategy aimed at further extending stability will
in all likelihood be seen by many Russians as hostile. And once
again, the West will have to reject such thinking and instead be
prepared to defend its own integrationist logic.
The reality is that nato and eu enlargement to Central and Eastern
Europe has not created a new threat on Russia’s western border. On the
contrary, enlargement has probably created a more enduring peace and a
greater degree of security in the region than at any time in recent
history. An enlarged nato and eu have eliminated a worry that has
haunted Russian leaders since Napoleon, namely, the rise of an
aggressive and hostile power to its west. Moreover, since September
11, the United States and its allies have done much to reduce the
threat to Russia on its southern border through the successful war
against the Taliban and the deployment of a nato-led peacekeeping
mission in Afghanistan.
Where to start?
Developing a new Euro-Atlantic strategy for the wider Black Sea region
must start with the major democracies of North America and Europe
recognizing our own moral and strategic stake in the region. In this
regard, the European Union has already taken a key step by including
the Southern Caucasus in Europe’s Neighborhood Policy, informally
known as `wider Europe.’ This allows these new democracies to begin
discussing the `Four Freedoms’ of wider Europe – freedom of market
access, direct investment, movement of labor, and travel. While the
European Union will begin discussions of its Neighborhood Policy on a
bilateral basis and will attach a high degree of conditionality, the
liberalization of trade and labor and capital flows with the Black Sea
countries will swiftly have beneficial regional and subregional
effects.
It is time for nato to take a parallel step at its upcoming summit in
Istanbul by recognizing the strategic stake the alliance has in the
region. Such a recognition should be matched by a stepped-up program
of outreach and both bilateral and regional cooperation. As proved
effective in Central and Eastern Europe, various Western countries can
organize themselves to take the lead in working with each of the Black
Sea countries on a bilateral or multilateral basis. The tools for
expanded military cooperation already exist under nato’s `Partnership’
programs. What is lacking is the political will and the guidance to
tailor such programs to the specific interests and needs of the
region. Much as nato responded to the changed geopolitical
circumstances of the Visegrad and Vilnius states, it must develop a
comprehensive Black Sea strategy that complements the political
objectives of the European Union.
Finally, North America and Europe, working through the osce and the
United Nations, must step up and make a concerted effort to resolve
the frozen conflicts that continue to plague the region, thereby
setting the stage for the withdrawal of Russian troops who have
remained since the end of the Cold War. Persistent conflict and
occupying forces are childhood cancers in relation to the development
of peaceful and prosperous regions. In place of economic development,
a frozen conflict will substitute criminal enterprise and
trafficking. In place of a shared regional approach to security
cooperation, Russian military bases have only fostered the
proliferation of arms, a climate of intimidation, and protection
rackets. Fifteen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time
to make the resolution of the frozen conflicts from Transnistria to
Nagorno-Karabakh a top priority of our diplomacy with Moscow.
Such steps can help contribute to a new dynamic of reform in the
region. To be sure, the impetus for reform and change must come from
within these countries, but the West can both assist in that process
and help create a foreign policy environment that reinforces such
trends.
In doing so, we would be laying the foundation for the completion of
the third phase of a wider Europe. The first phase focused on the
anchoring of Poland and the Visegrad countries. The second phase
broadened our vision of an enlarged Europe by encompassing the new
democracies from the Baltics to the western edge of the Black
Sea. Today we face the challenge of extending our strategy to embrace
a Europe that runs from Belarus in the north to the eastern edge of
the Black Sea region in the south. The completion of this vision of a
Europe whole and free would be a tremendous advance for the cause of
democracy, integration, and security in the Euro-Atlantic region. It
would also better position the United States and Europe to deal with
the challenges of the Greater Middle East. The key question is not
whether it is desirable but whether it is achievable. What we have
learned from the enlargements of nato and the European Union and since
1994 from coordinating the efforts of our multilateral institutions in
the Balkans argues that a common and compassionate strategy toward the
Black Sea is well within our grasp.
Ronald D. Asmus is senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall
Fund of the United States.
Bruce P. Jackson is president of the Project on Transitional
Democracies.
Email: [email protected]

Report to the Armenian Government
on the visit to Armenia
carried out by the European Committee
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT)
from 6 to 17 October 2002
The Armenian Government has requested the publication of this report and of
its interim and follow-up responses. The Government’s responses are set out
in documents CPT/Inf (2004) 26 and 27.
Strasbourg, 28 July 2004
CONTENTS
Copy of the letter transmitting the CPT’s report6
Preface.. 7
I. INTRODUCTION.. 9
A. Dates of the visit and composition of the delegation. 9
B. Establishments visited. 10
C.. Consultations held by the delegation and co-operation encountered.
11
D. Context of the visit12
E. Immediate observations under Article 8, paragraph 5, of the
Convention. 13
II. FACTS FOUND DURING THE VISIT AND ACTION PROPOSED.. 14
A. Establishments under the authority of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs. 14
1. Preliminary remarks. 14
2. Torture and other forms of physical ill-treatment15
3. Safeguards against the ill-treatment of persons deprived of their
liberty. 19
a. introduction 19
b. notification of deprivation of liberty 19
c. access to a lawyer20
d. access to a doctor22
e. information on rights 23
f. conduct of police interviews 24
g. custody records 24
h. independent inspections 25
4. Conditions of detention. 26
a. introduction 26
b. temporary detention centres 27
c. holding cells/cubicles for administrative detention 29
B. Establishments under the authority of the Ministry of National
Security. 30
C. Prison establishments. 33
1. Preliminary remarks. 33
2. Ill-treatment34
3. Conditions of detention. 35
a. pre-trial facilities – Nubarashen and Gyumri Prisons 35
i. material conditions 35
ii. activities 38
b. strict-regime colonies – Erebuni and Sevan Prisons 39
i. material conditions 39
ii. activities 41
c. prisoners sentenced to death 41
4. Health-care services. 43
a. introduction 43
b. health care services in the prisons visited 43
i. staff and facilities 43
ii. medical screening on admission 46
iii. medical records and confidentiality 46
iv. tuberculosis 47
v. HIV 49
vi. hunger strikes 49
c. Hospital for Prisoners, Yerevan 50
5. Other issues of relevance to the CPT’s mandate. 55
a. staff55
b. contact with the outside world 55
c. discipline and segregation 57
d. complaints and inspection procedures 59
D. Psychiatric establishments (Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric
Hospital)61
1. Preliminary remarks. 61
2. Ill-treatment61
3. Staff62
4. Patients’ living conditions. 64
5. Treatment and regime. 65
6. Ward 6 for persons undergoing forensic psychiatric assessment67
7. Means of restraint69
8. Safeguards in the context of involuntary hospitalisation. 70
E. Military detention facilities. 73
III. RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSIONS 77
APPENDIX I – LIST OF THE CPT’S RECOMMENDATIONS, COMMENTS
AND REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION.. 84
APPENDIX II – LIST OF THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND
NON-GOVERNMENTAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
WITH WHICH THE DELEGATION HELD CONSULTATIONS. 101
Copy of the letter transmitting the CPT’s report
Strasbourg, 28 April 2003
Dear Ambassador,
In pursuance of Article 10, paragraph 1, of the European
Convention for the prevention of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment, I enclose herewith the report to the Government of Armenia
drawn up by the European Committee for the prevention of torture and inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment (CPT) after its visit to Armenia from 6
to 17 October 2002. The report was adopted by the CPT at its 50th meeting,
held from 4 to 7 March 2003.
I would like to draw your attention in particular to paragraph
232 of the report, in which the CPT requests the Armenian authorities to
provide an interim and a follow-up response on the action taken upon its
report. The Committee would be grateful if it were possible, in the event of
the responses forwarded being in Armenian, for them to be accompanied by an
English or French translation. It would also be most helpful if the Armenian
authorities could provide a copy of the responses in a computer-readable
form.
I am at your entire disposal if you have any questions
concerning either the CPT’s report or the future procedure.
Finally, I would be grateful if you could acknowledge receipt of
this letter.
Yours faithfully,
Silvia CASALE
President of the European Committee for
the prevention of torture and inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment
Mr Christian TER STEPANIAN
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Armenia
to the Council of Europe
40, allée de la Robertsau
67000 Strasbourg
Preface
The European Committee for the prevention of torture and inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment has deemed it appropriate to begin the
first of its reports to each State by setting out some of the Committee’s
salient features. This should prove particularly helpful in differentiating
the basis and aims of the CPT from those of another Council of Europe
supervisory body within the field of human rights, the European Court of
Human Rights.
Unlike the Court, the CPT is not a judicial body empowered to
settle legal disputes concerning alleged violations of treaty obligations
(i.e., to determine claims ex post facto).
The CPT is first and foremost a mechanism designed to prevent
ill-treatment from occurring, although it may also in special cases
intervene after the event.
Consequently, whereas the Court’s activities aim at “conflict
solution” on the legal level, the CPT’s activities aim at “conflict
avoidance” on the practical level.
This being so, the guiding maxim for the CPT when performing its
obligations must be to “extend the widest possible protection against
abuses, whether physical or mental” (quotation from the 1979 UN Code of
conduct for law enforcement officials as well as from the 1988 Body of
Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, both adopted by the General Assembly).
The CPT’s activities are based on the concept of co-operation
(Article 3 of the European Convention for the prevention of torture and
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment). The CPT’s task is not to
publicly criticise States, but rather to assist them in finding ways to
strengthen the “cordon sanitaire” that separates acceptable and unacceptable
treatment or behaviour. In fulfilling this task the CPT is guided by the
following three principles:
i) that the prohibition of ill-treatment of persons deprived of
their liberty is absolute,
ii) that ill-treatment is repugnant to the principles of civilised
conduct, even if used in milder forms, and
iii) that ill-treatment is not only harmful to the victim but also
degrading for the official who inflicts or authorises it and ultimately
prejudicial to the national authorities in general.
The CPT first of all explores the prevailing factual situation
in the countries it visits. In particular it:
i) examines the general conditions in establishments visited;
ii) observes the attitude of law enforcement officials and other
staff towards persons deprived of their liberty;
iii) interviews persons deprived of their liberty in order to
understand how they perceive (i) and (ii) and hear any specific grievances
they may have;
iv) examines the legal and administrative framework on which the
deprivation of liberty is based.
Subsequently, the CPT reports to the State concerned, giving its
assessment of all the information gathered and providing its observations.
In this regard, it should be recalled that the CPT does not have the power
to confront persons expressing opposing views or to take evidence under
oath. If necessary, it recommends measures designed to prevent the possible
occurrence of treatment that is contrary to what reasonably could be
considered as acceptable standards for dealing with persons deprived of
their liberty.
In carrying out its functions, the CPT has the right to avail
itself of legal standards contained in not only the European Convention on
Human Rights but also in a number of other relevant human rights instruments
(and the interpretation of them by the human rights organs concerned). At
the same time, it is not bound by the case law of judicial or quasi-judicial
bodies acting in the same field, but may use it as a point of departure or
reference when assessing the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty
in individual countries.
To sum up, the principal differences between the CPT and the
European Court of Human Rights are:
i) the Court has its primary goal ascertaining whether breaches of
the European Convention on Human Rights have occurred. By contrast, the
CPT’s task is to prevent abuses, whether physical or mental, of persons
deprived of their liberty from occurring; it has its eyes on the future
rather than the past;
ii) the Court has substantive treaty provisions to apply and
interpret. The CPT is not bound by substantive treaty provisions, although
it may refer to a number of treaties, other international instruments and
the case law formulated thereunder;
iii) given the nature of its functions, the Court consists of lawyers
specialising in the field of human rights. The CPT consists not only of
such lawyers but also of medical doctors, experts in penitentiary questions,
criminologists, etc;
iv) the Court only intervenes after having been petitioned through
applications from individuals or States. The CPT intervenes ex officio
through periodic or ad hoc visits;
v) the activities of the Court culminate in a legally binding
finding as to whether a State has breached its obligations under a treaty.
The CPT’s findings result in a report, and, if necessary, recommendations
and other advice, on the basis of which a dialogue can develop; in the event
of a State failing to comply with the CPT’s recommendations, the Committee
may issue a public statement on the matter.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Dates of the visit and composition of the delegation
1. In pursuance of Article 7 of the European Convention for the
prevention of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
(hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”), a delegation of the CPT
visited Armenia from 6 to 17 October 2002. This visit was the first to be
carried out by the CPT to Armenia and formed part of the Committee’s
programme of periodic visits for 2002.
2. The visit was carried out by the following members of the CPT:
– Petros MICHAELIDES, Head of the delegation
– Emilia DRUMEVA
– Zdenek HÁJEK
– Andres LEHTMETS
– Florin STANESCU.
They were assisted by:
– Andrew COYLE (Director of the International Centre for Prison
Studies, London, United Kingdom), expert
– Marianne KASTRUP (Psychiatrist, Centre for Transcultural
Psychiatry, Copenhagen, Denmark), expert
– Khachatur ADUMYAN (interpreter)
– Sergei ASATRYAN (interpreter)
– Artashes DARBINYAN (interpreter)
– Artashes EMIN (interpreter)
– Astrig KATCHIKIAN (interpreter)
– Levon SHAHZADEYAN (interpreter)
and were accompanied by the following members of the CPT’s Secretariat:
– Wolfgang RAU, Head of Unit
– Borys WÓDZ.
B. Establishments visited
3. The delegation visited the following places of detention:
Establishments under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
– Akhurian Department of Internal Affairs, Temporary detention
centre and police station
– Fourth District Division of Internal Affairs, Gyumri
– Hrazdan Department of Internal Affairs, Temporary detention
centre and police station
– Maralik Department of Internal Affairs, Temporary detention
centre and police station
– Sevan Department of Internal Affairs, Temporary detention centre
and police station
Yerevan
– Temporary detention centre of the City Department of Internal
Affairs
– Arabkir District Division of Internal Affairs
– Kentron District Division of Internal Affairs
– Shengavit District Division of Internal Affairs
– Zeitun-Kanaker District Division of Internal Affairs
Establishments under the authority of the Ministry of National Security
– Isolator of the Ministry of National Security,
Yerevan
Establishments under the authority of the Ministry of Justice
– Gyumri Prison
– Sevan Prison
Yerevan
– Erebuni Prison
– Nubarashen Prison
– Hospital for Prisoners
Establishments under the authority of the Ministry for Public Health
– Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital, Yerevan
Establishments under the authority of the Ministry of Defence
– Shirak Military Police Division, Gyumri
Yerevan
– Central Detention Centre of the Military Police
– Garrison Detention House
– Military Police Division.
C. Consultations held by the delegation and co-operation
encountered
4. In addition to meeting local officials at the establishments
visited, the delegation held talks with the competent national authorities
and with representatives of several non-governmental organisations active in
areas of concern to the CPT. A list of the national authorities and
organisations consulted during the visit is set out in Appendix II to this
report.
5. The delegation’s meetings with the national authorities – both at
the start and the end of the visit – took place in a spirit of close
co-operation. The CPT is grateful for the time devoted to its delegation by
Davit HARUTYUNYAN, Minister of Justice, Ararat MKRTCHYAN, Minister for
Public Health, Ararat MAHTESYAN, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs,
and Vladimir SARGSYAN, Head of Investigation Department at the Ministry of
National Security, as well as by other senior officials from these
Ministries. Discussions were also held with Haykaram STEPANYAN, First Deputy
Director of Military Police, Vahgarshak VARDANYAN, Head of the Department
for Supervision of Implementation of Criminal Punishments of the General
Prosecutor’s Office, and Hovhannes ASRYAN, President of the Presidential
Committee for Human Rights.
The delegation appreciated the efficient assistance provided to
it before, during and after the visit by Samvel HOVHANNISYAN, Head of the
Criminal Executive Department at the Ministry of Justice, as well as by the
liaison officers designated by the national authorities: Nikolay ARUSTAMYAN,
Head of the Department of Structural Reforms, and Hayk KHEMCHYAN, Head of
the Division for Legal and International Relations of the Criminal Executive
Department, both of the Ministry of Justice.
6. The co-operation provided to the delegation by staff at the
places of detention visited was – with two exceptions – of a high standard.
The delegation was generally given ready access to the places it wished to
visit and could move inside them without restriction and speak in private
with persons deprived of their liberty.
7. The two exceptions to the overall favourable situation described
above concerned delays in gaining access to the Temporary Detention Centre
in Akhurian and to the Isolator of the Ministry of National Security. In
both cases, the delegation had to wait for some 30 minutes until the
officers on duty received clearance from their superiors.
The CPT trusts that such situations will not be encountered during future
visits.
D. Context of the visit
8. Since its independence in 1991, Armenia has been confronted with
a series of grave political, economic and social problems, many of which
were related to the conflict concerning Nagorno-Karabakh. At the outset of
the visit, the Armenian authorities made it clear to the CPT’s delegation
that, although the overall situation had been improving over the last few
years, the problems referred to above inevitably had negative repercussions
in areas covered by the Committee’s mandate. This has been borne in mind by
the CPT, especially when considering material conditions of detention and
activities offered to detained persons. However, as was stressed at the
final talks with the Armenian authorities, armed conflict and economic and
social problems can never justify deliberate ill-treatment.
9. The CPT’s first visit to Armenia took place at a time of
structural and legal change. Responsibility for the country’s prison system
had been transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry
of Justice only about a year before, and the implications of that change had
not yet been fully absorbed. Several legal texts of direct relevance to
issues falling within the CPT’s mandate had recently been adopted (e.g. Law
on the Police, Law on the Treatment of Arrestees and Detainees), while
others (such as the new Criminal Code, the Law on the Enforcement of
Sentences and the Mental Health Law) were still at various stages of the
drafting process. Further, the Armenian authorities and representatives of
several NGOs met by the CPT’s delegation expressed the hope that the setting
up of the office of an Ombudsman – expected to occur during 2003 – would
help reinforce existing mechanisms for the protection of human rights of
persons deprived of their liberty, and in particular strengthen the
effectiveness of the Presidential Committee for Human Rights.
10. In the light of the facts found during the visit, the CPT makes a
number of recommendations in this report. Some of them will not have
important financial implications and could be implemented without delay.
However, the implementation of others may require considerable budgetary
expenditure which is most probably beyond the current financial capacity of
the Armenian authorities. The CPT is aware that certain initiatives have
already been undertaken by various States on a bilateral basis, as well as
within the framework of international organisations, with a view to
assisting Armenia; ittrusts that these efforts will be continued and
intensified.The CPT hopes that the recommendations and other remarks set out
in this report will make it possible to distinguish priorities in the areas
falling within the Committee’s competence.
E. Immediate observations under Article 8, paragraph 5, of the
Convention
11. At the end of its visit, the CPT’s delegation held talks at the
Criminal Executive Department of the Ministry of Justice with
representatives of the various Ministries and agencies concerned, in order
to acquaint them with the main facts found during the visit. On this
occasion, the delegation made immediate observations, in pursuance of
Article 8, paragraph 5, of the Convention, on two particularly urgent
matters.
The first immediate observation concerned the disciplinary sections
(referred to as “Kartzer” or “ShIZO”) in the prisons visited i.e. Erebuni
and Nubarashen Prisons in Yerevan, as well as Gyumri and Sevan Prisons.
Prisoners placed in these sections had no access to outdoor exercise. The
delegation made it clear that this was not acceptable. Daily outdoor
exercise of at least one hour per day is a fundamental requirement for all
prisoners, including those undergoing disciplinary confinement. The
delegation urged the Armenian authorities to take steps rapidly to ensure
that this requirement is met.
The second immediate observation related to the unit for forensic
psychiatric assessment at Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital in
Yerevan. Living conditions in that unit were totally unacceptable; the
delegation requested the Armenian authorities to take immediate measures to
remedy this situation.
12. The above-mentioned immediate observations were subsequently
confirmed in a letter of 14 November 2002 from the President of the CPT. The
Committee requested the Armenian authorities to submit, within three months,
a report on the action taken in response to those observations.
The delegation also asked to receive confirmation, within three months,
that:
– measures had been taken to improve the sanitary conditions in
the communal toilet facilities at Erebuni and Sevan Prisons;
– the vacant doctor’s post at Gyumri Prison had been filled;
– all persons undergoing assessment and patients under compulsory
treatment at Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital whose medical
condition so permitted were offered at least one hour of outdoor exercise
every day.
13. By letter of 28 February 2003, the Armenian authorities informed
the CPTof the measures taken. Those measures will be considered later in the
report.
II. FACTS FOUND DURING THE VISIT AND ACTION PROPOSED
A. Establishments under the authority of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs
1. Preliminary remarks
14. The detention of persons suspected of criminal offences is
governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), in force since January
1999 (with a number of subsequent amendments).
A criminal suspect may be detained by the police on their own
authority for a maximum of 72 hours.[1] Within this time limit, the “body of
inquiry” (i.e. an operational police officer) and/or an investigator must
interrogate the suspect, perform any other necessary investigative acts and
decide whether or not to bring criminal charges. If charges are brought, it
is up to a judge to decide whether the person concerned is to be subjected
to a procedural preventive measure (e.g. remand in custody, house arrest,
bail, etc.) or released.[2] In principle, persons remanded in custody are
transferred to pre-trial establishments under the Ministry of Justice.
15. However, the above-mentioned 72-hour time limit applies only
as from the moment when the “body of inquiry” initiates criminal proceedings
and draws up a resolution formally declaring the person concerned a suspect
(as well as a protocol of detention); some considerable time may elapse
before this stage is reached. The delegation heard numerous allegations from
persons who were – or had recently been – in police custody that they had
spent prolonged periods (up to a few days) in police establishments prior to
the drawing up of a protocol of detention. During that period the persons
concerned were apparently interrogated by operative officers and/or
investigators, and were not free to leave the police establishment. In the
course of the visit, several senior prosecutors, investigators and police
officers confirmed that it could occur that persons summoned or brought to
police establishments as witnesses[3] were declared suspects, after the
“body of inquiry” or investigator reached such a conclusion in the course of
interrogation. There was apparently no specific time limit for such
interrogations. This clearly leaves the door wide open to abuse.
Furthermore, on a number of occasions, senior police officers
made statements to the effect that the period of 72 hours of police custody
could be prolonged in certain circumstances. For example, at the Temporary
detention centre of the City Department of Internal Affairs in Yerevan, the
delegation was informed that, if the court took a decision to remand a
person in custody during a weekend, such a person would only be transferred
to a remand establishment on the following Monday. At the Maralik Department
of Internal Affairs, the delegation learned that a transfer of a person
remanded in custody to a pre-trial establishment could be delayed by up to
48 hours. At the Hrazdan Department of Internal Affairs and Temporary
Detention Centre, the delegation was informed that, pursuant to a decree of
the Ministry of Justice, police custody could be extended by up to 3 days by
the prosecutor, in order to organise the transfer of a suspect to a remand
facility.
At the latter establishment, the delegation also saw copies of
several court decisions extending the period of custody on police premises
“until the end of the investigation” (i.e. without mentioning any deadline)
or “until the judge has decided on pre-trial detention”. As a consequence,
criminal suspects had been held at the establishment, on occasion, for up to
16 days. Moreover, the examination of custody records in some of the other
temporary detention centres visited revealed that persons had frequently
been held there for periods of 7 to 8 days. Throughout the visit, the
delegation received numerous allegations from persons who had recently been
detained by the police that they had been held on police premises for
extended periods of time (as long as a few weeks).
At least certain of the practices described above would appear
to be at variance with the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, and all of them entail a heightened risk of ill-treatment. The
CPT would like to receive the comments of the Armenian authorities on this
matter.
16. Persons suspected of having committed administrative violations
can be held by the police for up to 3 hours, or, in case of certain
infringements of public order (e.g. insulting a public official,
hooliganism, minor traffic violations, etc.), until the person concerned is
taken to court. If found guilty, such persons can be placed under
administrative arrest for up to 15 days, a period which is served in
temporary detention centres.
In the course of the visit, the delegation gathered information suggesting
that the three-hour period was often used in order to detain and question
persons who were in fact suspected of criminal offences. The delegation also
heard allegations that, on occasion, administrative arrest was exploited by
the police in order to hold and question for days persons who in reality
were suspected of crimes.
The CPT recommends that appropriate steps be taken to stamp out
the above-mentioned practices.
2. Torture and other forms of physical ill-treatment
17. The CPT’s delegation received numerous and consistent allegations
of physical ill-treatment of persons detained by the police in Armenia.
Almost all of these allegations were made during individual interviews with
remand prisoners at the two pre-trial establishments visited[4].
The ill-treatment alleged consisted essentially of punches and
kicks, and of striking the persons concerned with truncheons and/or other
hard objects, such as chair legs, thick metal cables or gun butts. In
virtually all cases, it was said to have been inflicted in the context of
police interrogation (mostly by operative police officers) and with a view
to extracting confessions or information. In some cases, the ill-treatment
alleged – very severe beating by several police officers, including on the
soles of the feet, or the squeezing of fingers with pliers – could be
considered as amounting to torture.
Some of the persons interviewed gave accounts of psychological
pressure put on them, in the form of threats to use physical force,
including sexual violence, in order to make them confess to a crime.
Allegations such as those described above were also received
from other sources, including members of the Presidential Human Rights
Committee of Armenia[5]. In contrast, hardly any allegations were received
of physical ill-treatment by staff working in temporary detention centres.
18. Most of the allegations related to periods some time before the
CPT’s visit; consequently, any injuries which might have been caused by the
ill-treatment alleged would almost certainly have healed in the meantime.
However, in a few cases, the delegation’s doctors found, in the records of
the medical examination of the persons concerned upon their arrival at
pre-trial establishments, entries which mentioned injuries consistent with
allegations made. By way of illustration, reference might be made to the
following examples:
A person interviewed at one of the remand prisons stated that,
six weeks previously, while in the custody of the police, he had been kicked
repeatedly by police officers in the back and legs, and received punches and
truncheon blows on various parts of his body. Upon admission to prison, he
was found to display in the region of the left kidney a red-green bruise of
5 x 20 cm and several smaller bruises on the left arm and both legs. Many of
the bruises found on the legs were covered with excoriations.
Another person met at the same establishment alleged that, five
months previously, he had been punched in his face and hit with a baton on
his head and back while in police custody. The records of the medical
examination upon his arrival in prison showed that he bore multiple bruises
on his face, head and on the upper left part of the back.
19. In the light of all the information gathered during the visit, the
CPT can only conclude that persons deprived of their liberty by the police
in Armenia run a significant risk of being ill-treated. Vigorous action is
required to combat ill-treatment by the police.
20. The best possible guarantee against ill-treatment is for its use
to be unequivocally rejected by police officers. This implies strict
selection criteria at the time of recruitment of such staff and the
provision of adequate professional training. As regards the latter, the
Armenian authorities should seek to integrate human rights concepts into
practical professional training for handling high-risk situations, such as
the interrogation of criminal suspects. This will prove more effective than
separate courses on human rights. Training should be pursued at all levels
of the police force, and should be ongoing. It should seek to put across and
develop two points: firstly, that all forms of ill-treatment are an affront
to the human dignity of both the victim and the perpetrator and, as such,
are incompatible with the values enshrined in the Armenian Constitution as
well as in international instruments ratified by and binding upon Armenia;
secondly, that resort to ill-treatment is a fundamentally-flawed method of
obtaining reliable evidence for combating crime. More advanced interrogation
and investigation techniques will lead to better results from a security
standpoint.
Particular attention should be given to training in the art of
handling, and more especially of speaking to, persons in police custody,
i.e. interpersonal communication skills. The possession of such skills will
often enable police officers to defuse situations which might otherwise
become violent.
Consequently, the CPT recommends:
-that a very high priority be given to professional training for police
officers of all ranks and categories, including in modern investigation
techniques. Experts not belonging to the police force should be involved in
this training;
-that an aptitude for interpersonal communication be a major factor in the
process of recruiting police officers and that, during the training of such
officers, considerable emphasis be placed on acquiring and developing
interpersonal communication skills.
The CPT also recommends that the relevant national authorities
as well as senior police officers make it clear to police officers that the
ill-treatment of persons in their custody is not acceptable and will be
dealt with severely.
21. Another effective means of preventing ill-treatment by police
officers lies in the diligent examination by the competent authorities of
all complaints of such treatment brought before them and, where appropriate,
the imposition of a suitable penalty. This will have a very strong
dissuasive effect.
In this connection, the Ministry of Internal Affairs informed
the CPT that, during the nine months preceding the 2002 visit, it had not
received any complaints concerning “torture or violence inflicted on
citizens” by its personnel. Further, a mere 8 complaints about “a crude and
disrespectful attitude” of such personnel or other “infringements of
professional ethical norms” (including in respect of persons detained by the
police) were recorded. In the CPT’s opinion, no comfort is to be taken from
the above figures; they are undoubtedly a reflection of the inadequacy of
(and lack of trust in) the existing complaints procedures, not of the
absence of ill-treatment.
In this context, it should be noted that persons in Armenia can
spend lengthy periods of time with the police, without access to an
authority which is independent from the police (e.g. a judge). More
particularly, the information gathered during the visit indicated that
criminal suspects were frequently not physically brought before the judge
who decided on the preventive measure of remand in custody. Such a situation
deprives persons, who have been ill-treated by the police, of a timely
opportunity to lodge a complaint with an independent authority. In the
interests of the prevention of ill-treatment, the CPT therefore recommends
that all criminal suspects taken into police custody be physically brought
before the judge who must decide on the application of a preventive measure.
The CPT also recommends that whenever a judge receives an
allegation of ill-treatment by the police, he should immediately request a
medical examination of the person concerned and take the necessary steps to
ensure that the allegation is properly investigated. Such an approach should
be followed whether or not the person concerned bears visible external
injuries.
Further, even in the absence of an express complaint, the judge
should request a medical examination whenever there are other grounds (e.g.
visible injuries, a person’s general appearance or demeanour) to believe
that ill-treatment may have occurred.
22. Prison health-care services can also make a significant
contribution to the prevention of ill-treatment by the police, through the
systematic recording of injuries borne by newly-arrived prisoners and, when
appropriate, the provision of information to the relevant authorities.
The observations made by the CPT’s delegation suggest that the
procedure as regards the recording of injuries observed upon arrival in
prison could be improved considerably. The records seen by the delegation
usually contained only succinct descriptions of injuries as well as an
occasional summary account by the prisoner concerned as to how the injuries
had been sustained. In this regard, at the two remand facilities visited,
the medical examination took place in the presence of the police officer(s)
who delivered the person to prison as well as non-medical prison staff; such
a practice is a flagrant violation of the principle of medical
confidentiality and could clearly inhibit the persons concerned from making
a truthful statement about what had happened to them.
The CPT recommends that the record drawn up by prison doctors
following a medical examination of a newly-arrived prisoner contain: (i) a
full account of statements made by the person concerned which are relevant
to the medical examination (including his description of his state of health
and any allegations of ill-treatment), (ii) a full account of objective
medical findings based on a thorough examination, and (iii) the doctor’s
conclusions in the light of (i) and (ii), indicating the degree of
consistency between any allegations made and the objective medical findings.
Whenever injuries are recorded which are consistent with allegations of
ill-treatment made, the record should be systematically brought to the
attention of the relevant authority. Further, the results of every
examination, including the above-mentioned statements and the doctor’s
conclusions, should be made available to the detained person and his lawyer.
In addition, the CPT recommends that all medical examinations be
conducted out of the hearing and – unless the doctor concerned expressly
requests otherwise in a particular case – out of the sight of law
enforcement officials and other non-medical staff.
3. Safeguards against the ill-treatment of persons deprived of their
liberty
a. introduction
23. The CPT attaches particular importance to three rights for persons
deprived of their liberty by the police:
– the right of those concerned to have the fact of
their detention notified to a close relative or third party of their choice,
– the right of access to a lawyer,
– the right of access to a doctor.
The CPT considers that these three rights are fundamental
safeguards against the ill-treatment of persons deprived of their liberty,
which should apply from the very outset of their deprivation of liberty
(i.e. from the moment when the persons concerned are obliged to remain with
the police). These rights should be enjoyed not only by criminal suspects,
but also by all other categories of persons deprived of their liberty (e.g.
persons placed in administrative detention, persons detained under Aliens’
legislation, etc.).
Furthermore, persons detained by the police should be expressly
informed, without delay and in a language they understand, of all their
rights, including those referred to above.
24. From the outset, the CPT wishes to highlight two important
deficiencies that emerged from the delegation’s conversations with senior
officials, prosecutors, investigators and police officers, and from perusal
of the relevant legal provisions. First, it appears that the above-mentioned
rights are applicable only after a person has been formally declared a
“suspect”, a status which may well be acquired some time after a person’s
deprivation of liberty. Second, persons in administrative detention do not
enjoy these rights at all and, in particular, have no access to a lawyer.
This state of affairs is all the more of concern in the light of
the information referred to in paragraphs 15 to 17.
b. notification of deprivation of liberty
25. Under section 63 (2) (9) of the CCP[6], a person detained on
suspicion of having committed a criminal offence has the right to notify his
close relatives of the place of his detention, through the body conducting
the criminal proceedings. However, the notification of deprivation of
liberty may be delayed by up to 12 hours.
Most persons interviewed by the delegation indicated that they
had been able to inform their family of their situation shortly after having
been taken into police custody. However, in a few cases, the delegation
heard allegations that notification had been delayed by several days or even
refused altogether by operative police officers and/or investigators.
26. The majority of prosecutors, investigators and police officers
with whom the delegation spoke stated that only persons who had the official
status of a “suspect” could benefit from this right. It was not extended to
persons brought to a police station to verify an initial suspicion of a
criminal offence or in order to be interrogated as “witnesses”.
The CPT recommends that all persons deprived of their liberty by the police
in Armenia – for whatever reason – be granted the right to inform a close
relative or a third party of their choice of their situation, as from the
very outset of their deprivation of liberty (i.e. from the moment when they
are obliged to remain with the police).
Of course, the CPT fully accepts that the exercise by a person
in police custody of the right to have the fact of his custody notified to a
relative or other third party may have to be made subject to certain
exceptions designed to protect the legitimate interests of the
investigation. However, any such exceptions should be clearly defined and
applied for as short a time as possible.
The CPT recommends that any possibility exceptionally to delay the exercise
of the right to have the fact of one’s custody notified to a relative or a
third party be clearly circumscribed in law, be made subject to appropriate
safeguards (e.g. any delay to be recorded in writing with the reasons
therefor and to require the approval of a senior police officer unconnected
with the case at hand or of a prosecutor) and be applied for as short a time
as possible.
c. access to a lawyer
27. Section 63 (2) (4) of the CCP stipulates that a “suspect” has the
right to have a lawyer as from the moment of the drawing up of a detention
protocol. The bodies conducting the criminal proceedings (including the
police) have the obligation to provide the suspect with a possibility to
effectively implement this right[7].
As regards the actual content of the right of access to a
lawyer, it includes the right to have the lawyer present during
interrogations; to meet with him in private, out of the hearing of police
officers and without restrictions; and to have the lawyer consult the
investigation file. It should also be noted that under section 69 of the
CCP, the participation of a lawyer is obligatory in the case of certain
categories of detained persons: minors, mentally disturbed or disabled
persons, persons unable to speak Armenian, persons who have been drafted for
military service, etc.
28. The majority of the persons interviewed by the delegation stated
that they had been informed of their right of access to a lawyer – albeit
only at the time when the detention protocol was drawn up – and confirmed
that operational police officers and/or investigators had told them that
they would arrange for a lawyer to come if they so wished. However, several
persons who had recently been in police custody claimed that operative
officers or investigators had persuaded them to waive their right to a
lawyer, apparently by using the argument that calling for one would
unnecessarily complicate or prolong the proceedings. In fact, the findings
made by the delegation in the course of the visit suggest that the presence
of lawyers at the stage of police custody is very rare in practice.
It should also be noted that, under current legislation, persons
summoned to appear in a police establishment as witnesses and persons in
administrative detention do not enjoy the right of access to a lawyer.
29. The CPT wishes to stress that, in its experience, it is during the
period immediately following deprivation of liberty that the risk of
intimidation and ill-treatment is greatest. This is amply borne out by the
information gathered during the visit to Armenia. Consequently, the
possibility for persons to have effective access to a lawyer from the very
outset of their custody by the police (i.e. from the moment they are obliged
to remain with the police) is a fundamental safeguard against ill-treatment.
The existence of this possibility will have a dissuasive effect on those
minded to ill treat detained persons; moreover, a lawyer is well placed to
take appropriate action if ill-treatment actually occurs.
The person concerned should also be entitled to have a lawyer
present during any questioning, whether it takes place before he is
officially deemed a suspect or after, and whether it is conducted by bodies
of the inquiry, investigating officers or prosecutors. Naturally, the fact
that a detained person has stated that he wishes to have access to a lawyer
should not prevent the police from beginning to question him on urgent
matters before the lawyer arrives.
In the light of these considerations, the CPT recommends that
the Armenian authorities take steps to ensure that the right of access to a
lawyer for persons in police custody applies as from the very outset of
their deprivation of liberty (and not only when the person is formally
declared a suspect). The right of access to a lawyer must also be enjoyed by
anyone who is under a legal obligation to attend – and stay at – a police
establishment (e.g. as a “witness”) as well as by persons in administrative
detention.
30. Finally, if the right of access to a lawyer is to be fully
effective in practice, there must be a system of legal assistance for
detained persons. Section 10 (5) of the CCP stipulates that “the body
conducting the criminal proceedings is entitled to provide the suspect or
the accused with free legal counselling based on the financial situation of
the latter”.
The delegation met a number of detained persons who had been
assisted by ex officio lawyers in the course of their detention by the
police. However, many of these persons expressed dissatisfaction with the
manner in which these lawyers had performed their functions, it being
advanced that they tended to take the side of the police.
The CPT would like to receive the comments of the Armenian
authorities on this subject. Further, the CPT would like to receive details
of the system of legal assistance for detained persons, in particular the
procedure for appointment of ex officio lawyers, their remuneration, etc.
d. access to a doctor
31. Armenian legislation contains a number of provisions on
health care for persons detained by the police. For example, pursuant to
section 5 (3) of the Law on the Police, the latter “shall take measures to
render medical or other assistance to [persons detained] as well as to
eliminate any danger threatening the life [and] health […] of a person
[…] associated with the detention or arrest”. Section 13 of the Law on the
Treatment of Arrestees and Detainees stipulates that persons in police
custody have the right to protect their health, including to receive urgent
medical aid. Further, section 21 of the same law sets out a series of
requirements that have to be met in police establishments as regards health
care (e.g. respect of sanitary and anti-epidemic norms; availability of
specialised medical aid; recording and follow-up of bodily injuries;
procedure in case of serious illness, etc.). However, as matters stand,
detained persons do not appear to have a formal right to request an
examination by a doctor. It is left very much at the discretion of police
staff in charge of a place of detention to determine whether the
intervention of a doctor is necessary.
Police officers indicated that, in practice, they would not
hesitate to summon a doctor if the person detained so requested. However, a
number of persons interviewed by the delegation claimed that they had asked
to see a doctor, but their request had not been granted.
32. The CPT recommends that the right of persons detained by the
police to be examined by a doctor be expressly guaranteed. This right should
exist as from the very outset of deprivation of liberty (i.e. not only after
the person has been formally declared a suspect) and should include the
right to be examined, if the person concerned so wishes, by a doctor of his
own choice, in addition to any medical examination carried out by a doctor
called by the police (it being understood that an examination by a doctor of
the detained person’s own choice may be carried out at his own expense).
The relevant provisions should also stipulate that:
-all medical examinations should be conducted out of the hearing and –
unless the doctor concerned expressly requests otherwise in a given case –
out of the sight of police officers;
-the results of every examination, as well as any relevant statements by the
detained person and the doctor’s conclusions, should be formally recorded by
the doctor and made available to the detainee and his lawyer.
e. information on rights
33. Section 19 (2) of the CCP stipulates that “the body conducting the
criminal proceedings is obliged to explain to the suspect and to the accused
their rights”. According to section 63 (2) (2) of the CCP, the information
on rights has to be provided in writing “immediately upon detention”[8].
This was generally understood by most of the police officers and
investigators interviewed by the delegation as applying only from the moment
a person had officially been declared a suspect. In this regard, many
detained persons met by the delegation complained that they had been
informed of their rights only after a certain period – up to several days –
spent in police custody. In some cases, it had apparently happened following
the person’s confession to the offence of which he/she was suspected.
Further, a few complaints were heard about the completeness of the
information provided (e.g. some of the persons concerned had not been told
about the possibility of having an ex officio lawyer).
34. At some of the police establishments visited, the delegation noted
the presence of a form setting out the rights of persons suspected of having
committed criminal offences as well as their obligations[9]. The form makes
reference inter alia to the rights to have a lawyer, to meet with him/her in
private without limitation of the number and length of the conversations, to
be interrogated in the presence of the lawyer, and to notify one’s family of
the place of detention within 12 hours. The form does not provide
information on the issue of access to a doctor. According to operative
police officers and investigators, the form in question would normally be
handed to the suspect at the moment of drafting the detention protocol; he
would be asked to sign it in two copies, of which one would be given to him
and the other filed in the case record.
The CPT welcomes the introduction of such a form. However, not
all the police establishments visited appeared to have copies of it.
Further, only a small number of detained persons met by the delegation
stated that they had received the form.
35. In order to ensure that persons in police custody are duly
informed of all their rights, the CPT recommends that the form setting out
those rights be given systematically to such persons as from the very outset
of their deprivation of liberty (and not only when they are formally
declared suspects). The contents of this form should reflect the
recommendations made in paragraphs 26, 29 and 32. The form should be
available in an appropriate range of languages. Further, the persons
concerned should be systematically asked to sign a statement attesting that
they have been informed of their rights.
f. conduct of police interviews
36. Article 19 of the Armenian Constitution stipulates that “no one
may be subjected to torture and to treatment and punishment that are cruel
or degrading to the individual’s dignity”. This provision is repeated and
developed in section 11 (7) of the CCP, which states that “it shall be
prohibited to use force, threats, fraud, violation of rights and other
unlawful methods when trying to obtain testimony from the suspect, the
accused, […] the witness and other persons participating in criminal
proceedings”. Chapter 28 of the CCP contains a number of procedural
provisions concerning the interrogation of suspects, accused persons and
witnesses (e.g. the rule that interrogations should take place during day
time, except in urgent cases; conduct of interrogations of minors, of
disabled and sick persons; keeping a protocol of the interrogation, etc.).
37. The art of questioning criminal suspects will always be based in
large measure on experience. However, the CPT considers that formal
guidelines should exist on a number of specific points; the existence of
such guidelines will, inter alia, help to underpin the lessons taught during
police training.
Consequently, the CPT recommends that the Armenian authorities supplement
the provisions already existing in the Code of Criminal Procedure by drawing
up a comprehensive code of conduct for police interviews. In addition to
reiterating the total prohibition of ill-treatment, the code should deal,
inter alia, with the following: the systematic informing of the detained
person of the identity (name and/or number) of those present at the
interview; the permissible length of an interview; rest periods between
interviews and breaks during an interview; places in which interviews may
take place; whether the person detained may be required to remain standing
while being questioned; the questioning of persons who are under the
influence of drugs, alcohol or medicine, or who are in a state of shock. It
should also be stipulated that a systematic record be kept of the times at
which interviews start and end, the persons present during each interview
and any request made by the detained person during the interview. Further,
the position of specially vulnerable persons (for example, the young, those
who are mentally disabled or mentally ill) should be the subject of specific
safeguards.
g. custody records
38. No legal safeguard against ill-treatment is more fundamental than
the requirement that the fact of a person’s deprivation of liberty be
recorded without delay. The delegation’s examination of police custody
records revealed that there is clearly room for improvement in this area. At
several police establishments – especially the divisions of Internal
Affairs – custody records contained errors (e.g. the same date and time
being recorded for both the arrival and release of a given person),
omissions (including missing dates and times of arrival and
release/transfer) and corrections (often related to times of arrival).
The CPT recommends that steps be taken immediately to ensure
that police custody records are properly maintained.
The CPT also considers that the fundamental safeguards offered
to persons in police custody would be reinforced if a standard, single and
comprehensive custody record were to be kept for all persons brought to a
police station. This register should record all aspects of the custody and
all the action taken in connection with it (including time of and reason(s)
for the arrival at the police station; time of issuing the order of
detention; when informed of rights; signs of injury, mental disorder, etc.;
contact with and/or visits by a relative, lawyer, doctor or consular
officer; when offered food; when questioned; when released, etc.).
The CPT invites the Armenian authorities to explore the
possibility of introducing such a custody record.
39. During visits to the divisions of Internal Affairs, it appeared
that the trigger for making an entry in the custody record is the fact of
placing someone in a cell. However, a person may be deprived of his liberty
for several hours in a police establishment before being placed in a cell.
This initial period of detention – during which a person would usually be
interviewed by an operative police officer or an investigator – would often
appear to go unrecorded; and if the person is subsequently released without
being placed in a cell, no record whatsoever might have been made of the
fact that he has been deprived of his liberty by the police. Further, the
custody records examined by the delegation did not contain references to
periods during which persons detained had been removed from their cells (and
the purpose of such removals).
The CPT recommends that steps be taken immediately to ensure that whenever a
person is deprived of his liberty by the police, for whatever reason, this
fact is formally recorded without delay. Further, once a person detained has
been placed in a cell, all instances when he is subsequently removed from
the cell should be recorded in the custody record; that record should state
the date and time when the detained person is removed from the cell, the
location to which he is taken and the officers responsible for taking him,
the purpose for which he has been taken, and the time and date of his
return.
h. independent inspections
40. Systems for the inspection of police detention facilities by
an independent authority are capable of making an important contribution
towards the prevention of ill-treatment and, more generally, of ensuring
satisfactory conditions of detention.
Pursuant to section 42 of the Law on the Police and Section 46 of the Law on
the Treatment of Arrestees and Detainees, the oversight of police activity,
and in particular of the observance of laws in places of police detention,
is exercised by the Prosecutor General and his subordinate prosecutors. They
are under an obligation to visit all police detention facilities on a
regular basis and to verify the legality of detention of persons in custody.
Furthermore, they are entitled to consider any complaints lodged by detained
persons.
The existence of this system of visits is to be welcomed.
However, the delegation was informed during the meeting with senior
prosecutors at the General Prosecutor’s Office that the above-mentioned
system does not extend to persons under administrative arrest. The CPT
recommends that measures be taken to remedy this lacuna.
41. Inspections of police detention facilities are also performed
by the Presidential Committee for Human Rights. The CPT would like to
receive copies of reports drawn up by this body following visits to police
establishments in 2001 and 2002.
Further, the delegation learned about plans to set up (under the
auspices of the Ministry of Justice) a monitoring group of representatives
of civil society, pursuant to Section 47 of the Law on the Treatment of
Arrestees and Detainees. The group’s main task would involve visits to
places of detention, including police facilities and penitentiary
establishments. The CPT would like to receive further information about this
group (composition, powers, working methods, etc.), as well as a copy of the
relevant rules and regulations pertaining to it, once they have been issued.
42. The CPT wishes to emphasise that authorities with powers of
inspection must examine all issues related to the treatment of persons in
custody; those issues concern not only material conditions of detention but
also questions such as the recording of detention, information on rights and
the actual exercise of those rights (in particular the rights of access to a
lawyer and to notify a relative of one’s custody), and compliance with the
rules governing the medical examination of persons in police custody. To
explore these different issues in an effective manner will involve inter
alia interviewing in private persons detained and/or summoned to appear at a
police facility for questioning. Further, the above-mentioned authorities
should exercise their powers of inspection frequently and without prior
notification.
The CPT recommends that the Armenian authorities bring these
considerations to the attention of all prosecutors and other bodies
responsible for carrying out visits to places of detention. Naturally, these
considerations should also be taken into account when defining the remit and
the powers of the monitoring group referred to in paragraph 41.
4. Conditions of detention
a. introduction
43. At the outset, the CPT wishes to highlight the criteria which it
applies when assessing police detention facilities.
All police cells should be clean, of a reasonable size for the
number of persons they are used to accommodate, and have adequate lighting
(i.e. sufficient to read by, sleeping periods excluded) and ventilation;
preferably, cells should enjoy natural light. Further, cells should be
equipped with a means of rest (for example, a chair or bench) and persons
obliged to stay overnight in custody should be provided with a clean
mattress and clean blankets.
Persons in custody should be able to satisfy the needs of nature
when necessary, in clean and decent conditions, and be offered adequate
washing facilities. They should have ready access to drinking water and be
given food at appropriate times, including at least one full meal (that is,
something more substantial than a sandwich) every day. Persons held in
custody for 24 hours or more should, as far as possible, be offered one hour
of outdoor exercise every day.
b. temporary detention centres
44. During the visit, the CPT’s delegation visited temporary detention
centres in Yerevan, Akhurian, Hrazdan, Maralik and Sevan. Establishments of
this type are used to hold two categories of detainees: criminal suspects
and persons under administrative arrest.
Conditions of detention in the temporary detention centres
visited varied from acceptable (at the Hrazdan Department of Internal
Affairs) to poor (e.g. at the Akhurian and Sevan Departments of Internal
Affairs).
45. As regards occupancy levels, a consultation of registers and the
number of sleeping places per cell suggested that the minimum standard of
2.5 m² of living space per person, as stipulated by the Law on the Treatment
of Arrestees and Detainees, was respected as concerns criminal suspects.
However, the CPT must add that this minimum standard is too low. As concerns
the cells for administrative detainees, the information gathered during the
visit indicated that conditions could become extremely cramped, e.g. up to 6
detainees in a cell of 9 m² in Hrazdan and Sevan.
All the centres visited presented deficiencies concerning the in-cell
lighting and ventilation. With the exception of the Hrazdan centre, access
to natural light was poor (small windows, sometimes – as in Yerevan –
covered by metal shutters) or inexistent (e.g. in Akhurian). Artificial
lighting was invariably dim, with some cells (e.g. in Yerevan, Akhurian and
Maralik) submerged in near darkness. As to ventilation, it left something to
be desired at Yerevan and Sevan.
As to the state of repair and hygiene of the detention areas, it ranged from
quite acceptable at the Hrazdan Department of Internal Affairs to poor at
the Sevan establishment. Cells at the Temporary detention centre in Yerevan
were in a reasonably good state of repair; however, their level of
cleanliness left something to be desired. Detention areas in Akhurian and
Maralik were dilapidated but clean.
46. Cells were furnished with beds or wooden sleeping platforms. The
delegation noted that mattresses, sheets, pillows and blankets were
available for criminal suspects at all the temporary detention centres
visited; however, this was not the case for administrative detainees.
The delegation did not hear any complaints from persons who
were – or had recently been – detained at the centres visited as regards
access to a toilet. However, with the notable exception of the Hrazdan
Department of Internal Affairs, the communal toilet and washing facilities
were dilapidated and dirty.
The centres in Yerevan and Hrazdan possessed shower facilities,
which could apparently be used by newly-arrived detainees (upon
recommendation of a feldsher/doctor) and by those administrative detainees
who stayed in the respective establishments for longer than a week. In both
centres, the shower facilities were in an acceptable state of repair and
cleanliness, and hot water was available. However, the only personal hygiene
item that was distributed to detainees was a small piece of soap.
47. According to information provided by police officers in the
majority of the temporary detention centres visited, detainees were offered
food three times per day, including one hot meal. However, this was not the
case at the Sevan Department of Internal Affairs, where food was only
delivered once per day, reportedly due to the limited budget set aside for
this purpose (320 AMD – i.e. some 50 euro cents – per detainee per day). In
this situation, the provision of food was to a large extent ensured by
detainees’ families. Detained persons without family contacts had to rely on
the generosity of other detainees or individual police officers for food.
48. All the temporary detention centres visited possessed outdoor
exercise areas, where detainees were apparently allowed to take exercise for
one hour per day (in the case of women and juveniles – for two hours per
day). However, at the Temporary Detention Centre of the City Department of
Internal Affairs in Yerevan, the delegation was informed that detainees
could be deprived of outdoor exercise as a form of punishment for violation
of the centre’s internal regulations.
49. The CPT recommends that the Armenian authorities take steps at
temporary detention centres to:
– ensure that all detainees are offered adequate living
space; the objective should be at least 4 m² per person;
– provide adequate in-cell lighting (including access to
natural light) and ventilation;
– maintain the cells and common sanitary facilities in a
satisfactory state of repair and hygiene;
– ensure that all detainees (including those held for
administrative violations) are offered a mattress and blankets at night;
– ensure that administrative detainees are able to take
a hot shower at least once a week during their period of detention;
– ensure that all detainees are offered food –
sufficient in quantity and quality – at normal meal times;
– put an end to deprivation of outdoor exercise as a
disciplinary punishment.
c. holding cells/cubicles for administrative detention
50. In addition to temporary detention centres, the Departments of
Internal Affairs visited in Akhurian, Hrazdan, Maralik and Sevan each
possessed from two to four holding cells/cubicles (usually referred to as
“aquarium”) intended, in principle, to accommodate persons suspected of
having committed administrative violations (cf. paragraph 16) for short
periods of time. Such cells/cubicles were also found in the District
Divisions of Internal Affairs in Yerevan and Gyumri.
With a few exceptions, the facilities in question consisted of
small cubicles which were devoid of any furniture other than, at best, a
bench. By virtue of their size alone, which could be as little as 0.65 m²,
most of them were not suitable for custody purposes, no matter how short the
duration.
Furthermore, the vast majority of the holding cells/cubicles in
question – with the notable exception of those at the Hrazdan Division of
Internal Affairs – were dark, poorly ventilated and dirty; in this respect,
the worst conditions were observed at the Kentron District Division of
Internal Affairs (Yerevan) and at the 4th District Division of Internal
Affairs in Gyumri.
51. Among all the holding cells/cubicles for persons suspected of
administrative violations inspected by the delegation, only those measuring
between 2 and 3 m² – seen at the Arabkir, Shengavit and Zeitun-Kanaker
District Divisions of Internal Affairs in Yerevan, as well as at the Hrazdan
Department of Internal Affairs – could be considered as acceptable for
detention periods not exceeding a few hours. Clearly, none of them was
suitable for overnight stays. Nevertheless, in the course of its visit, the
delegation met many persons who alleged that they had spent lengthy periods
of time – even several days – in such facilities. In some cases, the
delegation found evidence in custody registers that persons were
occasionally held overnight in holding cells/cubicles, i.e. considerably
longer than the period of 3 hours envisaged in the Administrative Violations
Code. Further, it was clear that persons who spent the night in these
facilities were not provided with mattresses or blankets. Moreover, there
was no provision for supplying such detainees with food, and no possibility
for outdoor exercise.
52. In the light of the above remarks and the general criteria set out
in paragraph 43, the CPT recommends that the Armenian Ministry of Internal
Affairs remind all establishments falling under its responsibility that
holding cells/cubicles for persons suspected of administrative violations
should not be used for accommodating detainees for longer than 3 hours.
Further, the Committee recommends that all holding
cells/cubicles measuring less than 2 m² be withdrawn from service.
Finally, the CPT recommends that measures be taken to ensure
that all holding cells/cubicles which remain in service have adequate
lighting and ventilation, and are maintained in a good state of repair and
cleanliness.
B. Establishments under the authority of the Ministry of National
Security
53. The CPT’s delegation visited the Isolator of the Ministry of
National Security in Yerevan[10]. The facility accommodates persons
suspected – or accused of – offences subjected to investigation by the
Ministry’s competent services (e.g. crimes against the State, terrorism,
serious organised and economic crime, violations of border regime, etc.). It
holds persons in the custody of the investigation bodies of the Ministry
(for up to 72 hours), persons under administrative arrest, essentially
“violators of border regime” (for up to 15 days), and persons in pre-trial
detention (for periods of months, if not years).
Located in the building of the Ministry, the Isolator had an
official capacity of 50 places[11]. At the time of the visit, 25 persons
were held in the Isolator, of whom 21 were in pre-trial detention and the
remainder were violators of border regime. Two of the detainees were women.
The average length of stay was between 1 and 1.5 years; however, one of the
detainees had been held there for more than 3 years.
54. The delegation did not hear any allegations of ill-treatment of
persons detained at the Isolator of the Ministry of National Security by sta
ff working at the establishment, and did not find any other evidence of such
treatment.
55. In general, the conditions of detention at the Isolator could be
considered as acceptable for the custody of criminal suspects and
administrative detainees. However, conditions were not suitable for lengthy
periods of detention, such as those endured by pre-trial detainees.
As regards material conditions, detained persons were
accommodated in two kinds of cells. The larger cells measured between 15 and
20 m² and contained four to five beds each. As to the smaller cells,
intended for double occupancy, they measured 6 m²; as such, they provided
only cramped accommodation. All cells were adequately lit and ventilated.
However, the state of repair and cleanliness of most of the cells left
something to be desired.
The cell furnishings consisted of beds with full bedding, tables
with benches (in larger cells), lockers and shelves. Cells were also
equipped with a partially screened toilet and a washbasin.
Detainees could take a hot shower once per week, in a
dilapidated facility located in the basement of the establishment; for a
number of them, this was also an opportunity to wash their clothes and bed
sheets. Detainees without financial resources were provided with basic
hygiene items: soap, towels and toilet paper.
The delegation did not hear any complaints from inmates about
food, which was served three times per day (including one hot meal at noon).
Detainees were also allowed to receive up to 10 kg of additional food per
week from their families.
56. All detainees had the possibility to take one hour of daily
outdoor exercise. The exercise yards, which were situated on the roof of the
building, measured between 40 and 90 m² and were equipped with a bench.
However, they were of an oppressive design (high walls topped with wire
netting, with a view only of the sky) and offered no protection from
inclement weather.
57. As regards activities, the situation observed at the Isolator was
totally unacceptable for lengthy periods of detention. Except for daily
outdoor exercise and periods of interrogation, detainees spent the entire
day locked up in their cells with virtually nothing to occupy themselves.
Radio and television sets were not authorised; the only distractions
consisted of playing board games or reading books and newspapers.
58. The delegation did not hear any complaints from detainees about
the provision of health care. The health-care service was staffed by a
full-time feldsher (present in the establishment every working day from 9.00
am to 6.00 pm, and on call at night and during weekends). The post of
general practitioner had been vacant for 2 years; thus, it was the feldsher
who decided on the need to call a general practitioner, a specialist or a
dentist from the nearby polyclinic of the Ministry of National Security. It
also appeared that the feldsher enjoyed a high level of discretion as
regards the prescription and administration of medication.
The health-care service premises were modestly equipped but very
clean. There was also a small pharmacy, although most of the medication
apparently came directly from the pharmacy of the Ministry or – in the case
of more expensive medicines – from inmates’ families. There was no register
or daily scheme of administered medication.
The feldsher informed the delegation that consultations would
normally take place in the presence of a custodial officer, except in the
case of female detainees.
All inmates underwent a medical screening, performed by the
feldsher at the latest on the day following their arrival. However, the
register of medical examinations on arrival contained only succinct notes
about injuries or health complaints of newly arrived inmates, and no mention
was made of any relevant statements of the inmate and of the feldsher’s
conclusions.
59. The CPT has serious concerns as regards the possibilities for
detainees held in the Isolator to maintain contacts with the outside world.
According to the information provided by the Head of the establishment,
family visits had to be expressly authorised by the investigator, prosecutor
or court, and detainees had no access to a telephone. With respect to
correspondence, the delegation received conflicting information from
management and inmates. While the former stated that, in principle, there
were no restrictions on sending and receiving letters, the vast majority of
the inmates claimed that correspondence was prohibited.
60. The delegation was not in a position to obtain a clear picture of
the situation as concerns the possibilities for persons detained at the
Isolator to send confidential complaints to outside bodies. According to the
information provided by the Head of the establishment, all complaints would
first have to be passed on to him. He would summarise them in a special
register and send them on to the addressee, with prior approval of the
investigator. However, detainees would in principle be allowed to send
complaints to the competent prosecutor, which would be forwarded without
censorship, in a sealed envelope. In addition, inmates would have the
opportunity to complain to the supervising prosecutor during his inspection
visits. It is noteworthy, nevertheless, that the inmates interviewed by the
delegation appeared unaware of these possibilities.
61. The CPT recommends that measures be taken as a matter of priority
at the Isolator of the Ministry of National Security in Yerevan in order to:
– substantially improve activities for persons in pre-trial
detention held at the establishment. They should be allowed to have radio
and television sets in their cells. Further, an appropriate range of
out-of-cell activities should be offered to them; the basement area might
usefully be exploited for this purpose;
– ensure that persons detained in the establishment have the
possibility to maintain adequate contact with the outside world. The
relevant provisions of the Law on the Treatment of Arrestees and Detainees
should be applied fully.
Further, in the light of the remarks made in paragraphs 55, 56
and 58,measures should be taken in order to ensure that:
– all the cells, as well as the shower facility, are maintained in
a satisfactory state of repair and cleanliness;
– improvements are made to the establishment’s exercise yards;
– the vacant doctor’s post is filled;
– the health-care service is adequately equipped and provided with
necessary materials;
– medical confidentiality is respected;
– the procedure of medical screening on arrival meets the
requirements set out in the recommendation made in paragraph 22.
The CPT would also like to receive confirmation that persons
detained in this establishment have the possibility to send confidential
complaints to an appropriate outside authority, and that steps are now being
taken to inform them of that possibility.
C. Prison establishments
1. Preliminary remarks
62. The CPT’s delegation carried out visits to five penitentiary
establishments in Armenia: two pre-trial facilities, Nubarashen and Gyumri
Prisons, two colony-type establishments for the serving of sentences,
Erebuni and Sevan Prisons, and the Hospital for Prisoners in Yerevan, the
principal penitentiary health-care institution in Armenia. The latter will
be dealt with separately under the section “Health-care services”.
63. In the course of the visit, the delegation heard much praise from
both inmates and prison staff about positive changes which had reportedly
occurred after the transfer (in October 2001) of responsibility for the
prison system from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of
Justice. Among the changes referred to in particular by inmates, were
improvements in prison officers’ attitudes towards them and overall enhanced
possibilities for maintaining contact with the outside world. Some of the
staff interviewed by the delegation emphasised that the transfer had
provided more stability to prisons’ internal operations and had led to an
overall reduction of incidents. Notwithstanding this, there was widespread
recognition of the need for further urgent action to improve conditions of
detention.
At the time of the visit, the perimeter of 4 penitentiary
establishments in Armenia (including the Hospital for Prisoners and Erebuni
and Sevan Prisons) was still guarded by staff of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs. The delegation was informed that this function would be assumed by
Ministry of Justice personnel in due course (as was already the case in the
remaining Armenian prisons). The CPT would like to receive the timetable for
the implementation of this measure.
64. The Committee welcomes the openness with which the Armenian
Minister of Justice, during the talks held with the delegation at the outset
of the visit, addressed some of the key problems currently facing the
Armenian prison system. In particular, he mentioned the absence of
systematic and ongoing renovation of the prison estate (despite some
positive initiatives in this regard), the lack of work opportunities for
prisoners and the “lamentable” situation as regards health care for inmates.
This overall assessment was subsequently confirmed by the delegation’s own
observations.
65. Since the transfer of responsibility for the prison system,
noticeable efforts have been made (and continue to be made) to bring the
relevant regulatory framework up to international standards. These efforts
have led inter alia to a new Law on the Treatment of Arrestees and Detainees
(March 2002) and, more recently, to detailed draft internal regulations for
pre-trial detention facilities and draft standards for the medical treatment
of prisoners. However, only limited progress appears to have been achieved
in respect of the draft Law on the Enforcement of Sentences (cf. paragraph
9) and, as a consequence, the Corrective Labour Code and related
instructions continue to be applied.
The CPT invites the Armenian authorities to vigorously pursue
the legislative programme pertaining to the prison system. It would like to
be kept abreast of ongoing developments.
In this context, the CPT also recommends that the standard of
living space per prisoner be increased to at least 4 m².
66. The CPT is aware of the serious economic difficulties experienced
by Armenia and the ensuing budgetary constraints under which the Armenian
prison service operates. The Committee also recognises that it will not be
possible to transform the current situation radically overnight.
Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that the decision to deprive someone
of their liberty entails a correlative duty upon the State to provide decent
conditions of detention.
2. Ill-treatment
67. The delegation did not receive any allegations – and did not find
any other evidence – of ill-treatment of inmates by staff in the prison
establishments visited. A number of inmates met by the CPT’s delegation
stressed that relations between staff and prisoners had improved in recent
years (cf. paragraph 63 above). It is also noteworthy in this regard that
prisoners sentenced to death[12] (who were held at Nubarashen Prison) spoke
favourably of the manner in which they were now treated by prison officers.
Nevertheless, in order to obtain a nationwide view, the CPT
would like to receive the following information in respect of 2001 and 2002:
-the number of complaints lodged concerning ill-treatment by prison officers
and the number of disciplinary and/or criminal proceedings initiated as a
result of those complaints;
-an account of the outcome of the above-mentioned proceedings (verdict,
sentence/sanction imposed).
68. Despite the positive finding referred to above, it should be said
that, at Erebuni and Gyumri Prisons, staff-inmate relations appeared to be
of a rather formal and distant nature, with staff adopting a regimented
attitude towards prisoners and limiting their interaction with them to the
strict minimum.
In this connection, the CPT wishes to stress that constructive
staff-prisoner relations and – more specifically – a proactive approach of
staff towards prisoners will not only reduce the risk of ill-treatment but
also enhance control and security. In turn, it will render the work of
prison staff far more rewarding and lead to a raising of the quality of life
in the institution, to the benefit of all concerned.
Consequently, the Committee recommends that the requisite
aptitude for interpersonal communication be a major factor in the process of
recruiting prison officers and that, during their induction and in-service
training, considerable emphasis be placed on acquiring and developing
interpersonal communication skills. Building constructive relations with
prisoners should be recognised as a fundamental requirement for effective
performance of the prison officer’s role.
3. Conditions of detention
a. pre-trial facilities – Nubarashen and Gyumri Prisons
i. material conditions
69. Nubarashen Prison, the largest pre-trial facility in Armenia,
was brought into service in 1980. It is located on the outskirts of Yerevan.
The establishment, designated as having a maximum capacity of 1250[13], had
665 adult male inmates at the time of the visit. Of those present, 424 were
on remand; the prison was also holding 149 inmates awaiting confirmation of
their sentence or allocation/transfer to other establishments, 42 prisoners
sentenced to death, and 52 sentenced inmates assigned to work in the
prison’s general services.
Approximately 85 % of the inmate population were housed in a
circular six-storey block. The remainder, including the sentenced working
prisoners, were accommodated in a two-storey adjacent building.
70. Most of the establishment’s premises were in a poor state of
repair and decoration, and some areas had been left to deteriorate to such
an extent that they were in urgent need of refurbishment. On the positive
side, there were discernible efforts to keep the establishment in a
reasonable state of cleanliness.
71. The prison was operating well below its official capacity and the
available living space per inmate was generally just about adequate. A
standard cell in the main accommodation block measured some 28 m², and
usually held up to 7 inmates. Nevertheless, the number of beds present in
most of the cells (up to 12) indicated that conditions would be very cramped
if they were used at their maximum designated capacity.
72. In most parts of the establishment, access to natural light and
ventilation were quite satisfactory, a consequence of the recent removal of
the majority of metal blinds previously fixed to cell-windows – a
commendable positive development. However, the windows were frequently
devoid of panes. In addition to bunk-beds, cell furniture usually comprised
a large table with benches, some storage space (small lockers/shelves) and,
in a number of cases, a (privately owned) TV set.
Cells were fitted with a well-partitioned sanitary annexe (Asian
toilet and wash basin with cold water); however, these facilities were
frequently in a poor state of cleanliness.
73. The best conditions of detention were observed in the building
housing the sentenced working prisoners (as well as some 50 remand
prisoners). Most of the cells offered good living space (e.g., 2 prisoners
in a cell of 18 m²; 4 in a cell of 36 m²) and were relatively light and
airy; several of them had apparently been redecorated recently.
74. The poorest conditions of detention were found on the ground-floor
of the main accommodation block, which contained the disciplinary unit (cf.
paragraph 156), the “quarantine” section (for newly-arrived prisoners), two
cells for homosexuals, a cell occupied by a hunger-striker (cf. paragraph
129) and the accommodation for prisoners “under psychiatric observation”
(cf. paragraph 111). Most of the cells were in an extremely poor state of
repair, had inadequate access to natural light and fresh air, and were
generally dirty.
In this regard, the CPT wishes to stress that prisoners who are
in a situation of vulnerability (as was the case for several of the
prisoners mentioned above) should never be accommodated under material
conditions which are inferior to those prevailing on normal location.
75. Prisoners were allowed one shower per week and the central
shower facility was, overall, of an acceptable standard. In contrast, the
establishment’s laundry facilities were clearly inadequate for the needs of
the inmate population. As a consequence, prisoners had to rely on improvised
arrangements to clean – and dry – their clothes and bed linen in their
cells.
76. Gyumri Prison was brought into service in 1944. It is situated in
the centre of town and has a maximum capacity of 220. At the time of the
visit, the establishment was holding 81 inmates (49 on remand, 24 prisoners
awaiting confirmation of their sentence or allocation/transfer to an
establishment for serving sentences, and 8 sentenced workers).
77. Prisoner accommodation was provided in three single-storey
detention blocks of various ages (two of them dating back to the beginning
of the century). After the 1988 earthquake, which severely damaged the
prison, some refurbishment had been carried out, and at the time of the
visit, renovation work was in progress. A considerable amount of work will
be necessary to restore the establishment’s premises to an acceptable
condition
78. The prison had 24 cells of differing sizes, mostly designed for 4
to 14 inmates. Cell occupancy was generally below the official capacity,
thus allowing for a living space of 4 to 6 m² per person; that said, in some
of the cells, prisoners were being held under rather cramped conditions
(e.g. 3 inmates in a cell of 10 m²).
In most of the refurbished cells, access to natural light and
ventilation was quite acceptable. By contrast, the state of cleanliness of a
number of cells left a lot to be desired. The cells were furnished with bunk
beds, tables and benches; most of them also had some individual storage
space (shelves; small lockers), and a few were equipped with a TV.
Cells had a sanitary annexe (floor toilet and sink) which was partially
partitioned by a wall of 1.5 m. In general, these facilities were in a
rather unhygienic state, and some of them were very dirty.
It should also be noted that the delegation was told by both
staff and prisoners that the central heating system was insufficient in
winter.
79. Several cells in the unrenovated parts of the establishment were
in such a state of dilapidation (in addition to being poorly lit and
ventilated) that they were totally unfit for holding prisoners for any
length of time. The cells concerned were unoccupied at the time of the
visit, and the delegation was told that they were only rarely used.
80. As was the case at Nubarashen Prison, newly-arrived prisoners were
held in totally unacceptable conditions. They spent one or two days in a
very dilapidated, dirty and humid “quarantine” cell. Further, it would
appear that inmates admitted in the late afternoon were not provided with
mattresses for the night.
81. Prisoners could use the central bathroom once a week, which
was also an occasion for them to wash their clothes and bed linen (the
establishment’s laundry was not working). However, the bathroom was in a
poor state of repair and filthy.
82. At both prisons, the delegation heard few complaints from
prisoners about the quality and quantity of food provided by the
establishments. That said, it was clear that prisoners counted greatly on
food parcels from their families.
83. The CPT recommends that the Armenian authorities take steps
at Nubarashen and Gyumri Prisons:
– to ensure a living space of at least 4 m² per
prisoner;
-to gradually improve the state of repair and decoration of the premises,
having regard to the remarks made in paragraphs 70 to 81; in this context, a
high priority should be given to the upgrading of prisoner accommodation on
the ground level of the main building of Nubarashen Prison and, as regards
Gyumri Prison, of the cells referred to in paragraphs 79 and 80 as well as
the establishment’s central bathroom;
-to ensure that the in-cell toilets are kept reasonably clean;
at Nubarashen Prison:
-to remove the remaining devices blocking windows of prisoner accommodation;
at Gyumri Prison:
– to improve the central heating system;
-to review the partitioning of the in-cell toilets, in order to ensure
adequate privacy;
-to ensure that prisoners accommodated in the establishment’s “quarantine”
cell are always provided with a mattress at night.
ii. activities
84. As already indicated, at Nubarashen and Gyumri Prisons, a small
number of sentenced inmates were assigned to work on the establishments’
premises. None of the remaining inmates were offered any form of organised
activities. The only regular out-of-cell activity was outdoor exercise of
one to two hours per day. Further, at Nubarashen Prison, such exercise was
not guaranteed during weekends.
At both establishments, the outdoor exercise facilities
consisted of high-walled, bare areas, which were topped with grills/wire
netting. By virtue of their configuration and limited size, these facilities
did not facilitate proper physical exertion.
85. The CPT recognises that the provision of organised activities in
pre-trial establishments such as Nubarashen and Gyumri Prisons, where there
is a high turnover of inmates, poses particular challenges. However, it is
not acceptable to leave prisoners to their own devices for months at a time.
The aim should be to ensure that all prisoners (including those on remand)
spend a reasonable part of the day outside their cells/dormitories engaged
in purposeful activities of a varied nature: work, preferably with
vocational value; education; sport; recreation/association. As a first step,
remand prisoners, who are currently confined to their cells for most of the
day, should be allowed to participate in association periods outside their
cells (naturally, subject to an assessment of the security risk individual
inmates may represent and to the interests of the investigation).
The CPT recommends that the Armenian authorities make determined
efforts to develop activities for prisoners at Nubarashen and Gyumri
Prisons, in the light of the above remarks.
Further, steps should be taken to:
-ensure that inmates at Nubarashen Prison are offered the possibility to
take at least one hour of outdoor exercise every day (including during
weekends);
-upgrade the outdoor exercise facilities at Gyumri and Nubarashen Prisons,
in order to allow prisoners to physically exert themselves.
b. strict-regime colonies – Erebuni and Sevan Prisons
i. material conditions
86. Erebuni Prison is located in a large compound in the vicinity of
Nubarashen Prison. The establishment was brought into service some 20 years
ago and has been subject to major repair work after the 1988 earthquake.
With a maximum capacity of 750 inmates, at the time of the visit, the
establishment was holding 582 sentenced male prisoners, three quarters of
whom had two or more convictions. The prison also accommodated 15 prisoners
considered as being especially dangerous recidivists; they were dispersed
throughout the establishment.
Previously, the official capacity stood at 1000 prisoners;
however, according to the Director, the establishment was not suitable for
holding more than 300 to 400 inmates. This assessment was confirmed by the
delegation’s own observations.
87. Prisoners were accommodated in three buildings, divided into
7 units, each of which comprised one or more dormitories. The vast majority
of the dormitories were very overcrowded (e.g., 16 prisoners in a dormitory
of 33 m²; 53 prisoners in a dormitory of 94 m²) and in a poor state of
repair (peeling paint, crumbling plaster, windows without panes). At the
time of the visit, some of the dormitories were undergoing refurbishment; as
a consequence, a number of prisoners had been moved temporarily into the
“club” rooms, were conditions were even more cramped than on normal location
(e.g. 20 prisoners in a room of 30 m²).
With the exception of the aforementioned temporary
accommodation, dormitories generally enjoyed good access to natural light
and ventilation. As for the state of cleanliness, it varied from acceptable
(and sometimes even good) to mediocre. The equipment consisted of double
bunk beds, small lockers, and occasionally tables and chairs. The presence
in many of the dormitories of small sitting areas, carpets, curtains, TV
sets, bed covers and plants contributed to a personalised environment and
thus somewhat counterbalanced the limited living space. In this context, it
is noteworthy that in a few dormitories, the furnishings and decoration were
of a standard which was distinctly better than elsewhere in the
establishment.
88. Sevan Prison, built in 1962, is located close to the towns of
Sevan and Hrazdan, some 60 km from Yerevan. The establishment, designated as
having a maximum capacity of 950, was holding 764 sentenced adult male
inmates on the first day of the visit. Of these, some 85 % had two or more
convictions. The delegation was told that, over the last 5 years, the
establishment’s inmate population had decreased by roughly 50%; however,
this was still insufficient to ensure acceptable living space for the vast
majority of the inmates.
89. Prisoner accommodation was provided in three two-level blocks
and a smaller one-level building. A large separate building housed the
kitchen, the establishment’s health care unit, and an extensive “club” room.
Further, one of the two-level blocks had three dormitories for prisoners
suffering from tuberculosis (cf. paragraph 124).
90. Conditions in most of the dormitories were cramped (e.g. 40
prisoners in a dormitory of some 80 m²; 82 prisoners in a dormitory of 190
m²). Several dormitories had been refurbished to an acceptable standard or
were subject to on-going renovation work. However, many of them were in a
rather poor state of repair (displaying the same pattern of deficiencies
already observed at Erebuni Prison), and the level of cleanliness in some of
them was unsatisfactory. On a more positive note, all dormitories enjoyed
good access to natural light and fresh air.
The equipment of the dormitories was very similar to that seen
at Erebuni Prison, and in a number of cases, prisoners had created an almost
homely environment with some greenery, curtains, pictures on the walls etc.
Again, the CPT’s delegation came across accommodation which was of an
exceptionally high standard.
91. At Erebuni Prison, newly-arrived prisoners were held in a bleak
room, containing little else than beds, the entrance to which was located in
the ShIZO/PKT unit (cf. paragraph 156). At Sevan Prison, such inmates were
accommodated in ShIZO/PKT cells (cf. paragraph 156). In the CPT’s opinion,
newly-arrived prisoners should not be located alongside inmates subject to
segregation for infringements of discipline. Alternative, better facilities
should be found.
92. Inmates at Erebuni Prison were allowed a shower once every 5 to 6
days, at Sevan every 8-10 days, which they took in dilapidated central
bathrooms. The state of repair and, even more, the cleanliness of the
collective toilet facilities (to which prisoners had access around the
clock) left an enormous amount to be desired. Admittedly, an irregular water
supply (which also concerned the community at large) made it difficult to
keep these facilities clean at all times; however, this does not justify the
appalling conditions observed. At the end of the visit, the delegation
requested confirmation, within three months, that measures had been taken to
improve the sanitary facilities at Erebuni and Sevan Prisons. In their
letter of 28 February 2003, the Armenian authorities informed the CPT that
the facilities concerned would be subject to “reconstruction works”, which
would start in the spring of 2003. The CPT wishes to receive confirmation
that these works have been completed.
93. At both establishments, the situation as regards food was
comparable to that in the two pre-trial facilities (cf. paragraph 82).
94. The CPT recommends that steps be taken at Erebuni and Sevan
Prisons:
-to reduce occupancy levels in the dormitories; the aim should be to provide
in due course a minimum living space of 4 m² per prisoner;
-to complete the refurbishment of prisoner accommodation areas;
-to ensure an appropriate level of cleanliness in all dormitories.
The CPT also recommends that ways be found to allow inmates at
Sevan Prison at least one hot shower per week.
ii. activities
95. As regards activities, the situation of the vast majority of
inmates at Erebuni and Sevan Prisons hardly differed from that of inmates in
the pre-trial facilities visited.
Barely 10 % of the inmates were employed (the jobs concerned
were in the domestic workforce, handicrafts and, at Sevan Prison,
agricultural work). Both establishments had large, obsolete production sites
outside their perimeter, which formerly provided employment for considerable
numbers of inmates. As regards the existing communal facilities, such as
“club” rooms or outdoor areas, they also appeared to be underused.
At Sevan Prison, the delegation was informed of plans to set up
a woodwork shop which would, in due course, provide employment for some 100
prisoners. The CPT would like to receive information on the timetable for
implementation of these plans.
96. Admittedly, inmates were allowed throughout the day to move
freely within the establishments’ perimeter; however, this is not a
substitute for a proper programme of activities. Sentenced prisoners are
entitled to expect a full program of work, educational and sports activities
and, as far as possible, individual custody plans should be drawn up. In
this respect, the CPT wishes to stress that the provision of appropriate
work for sentenced prisoners is a fundamental part of the rehabilitation
process.
97. In the light of the above remarks, the CPT recommends that the
Armenian authorities undertake a thorough examination of the means of
providing appropriate activity programmes at Erebuni and Sevan Prisons, for
example by making better use of the available facilities (production sites,
“club rooms”; outdoor areas etc.).
98. Finally, the delegation was shown draft regulations aimed at
redefining and strengthening the role of the “social rehabilitation
sections” in Armenian prisons. According to these regulations, the
aforementioned sections were to be complemented by external consulting
groups (consisting of social workers, psychologists and lawyers) and thus to
form “social-psychological rehabilitation services”. The services remit
includes the delivery of induction courses for newly-arrived prisoners, the
provision of organised programmes of activities as well as individual
pre-release preparation. The CPT would like to receive a copy of the above
regulations once they have been issued.
c. prisoners sentenced to death
99. As mentioned above (cf. paragraph 69), at the time of the visit,
Nubarashen Prison held 42 inmates sentenced to death (i.e. the totality of
such prisoners in Armenia). The inmates concerned were accommodated in 15
standard-sized cells (i.e. 28 m²) on the top floor of the establishment’s
main building. Given the relatively low occupancy level (2 to 4 inmates per
cell), the prisoners concerned enjoyed more generous living space than the
bulk of the inmate population. Most of the cells were in a rather poor state
of repair, decoration and – on occasion – cleanliness; others had recently
been refurbished to a good standard and were very clean. In all cells,
ventilation and access to natural light were acceptable, and in a number of
them, personal belongings such as TV sets, books, electric fans, fridges,
hot plates etc. were in evidence.
100. Inmates generally stressed that conditions of detention and the
regime had considerably improved over the last two years. They referred in
particular to the absence of physical ill-treatment, a significant reduction
in cell occupancy rates, an increased range of items allowed in cells, and
enhanced possibilities for contact with the outside world (e.g. one family
visit of 50 minutes every 4 months; access to the phone – 20 minutes every 3
months or 5 minutes every month).
The CPT welcomes these positive developments. Nevertheless, it
remains the case that the possibilities for contacts with the outside world
for prisoners sentenced to death are distinctly inferior to those enjoyed by
other sentenced prisoners (cf. paragraph 148). The CPT invites the Armenian
authorities to improve further the possibilities for prisoners sentenced to
death to receive visits from relatives. The visiting entitlement for the
prisoners concerned should be aligned with that of other sentenced inmates.
101. As was the case for the vast majority of the establishment’s inmate
population, death-sentenced prisoners were not offered any form of organised
activities apart from outdoor exercise, which itself was inadequate (50
minutes per day, excluding weekends). On this latter point, the
recommendation made in paragraph 85 applies equally here.
102. The CPT has already highlighted the importance of sentenced
prisoners being offered appropriate activities (cf. paragraph 96). This is
all the more important for those who can expect to remain in prison for many
years, which was clearly the case for prisoners sentenced to death held at
Nubarashen Prison.
Long-term imprisonment can have a number of desocialising
effects upon inmates. In addition to becoming institutionalised, long-term
prisoners may experience a range of psychological problems (including loss
of self-esteem and impairment of social skills) and have a tendency to
become increasingly detached from society, to which almost all of them will
eventually return. In the view of the CPT, the regimes which are offered to
prisoners serving long sentences should seek to compensate for these effects
in a positive and proactive way.
The prisoners concerned should have access to a wide range of
purposeful activities of a varied nature (work, preferably with vocational
value; education; sport; recreation/association). Moreover, they should be
able to exercise a degree of choice over the manner in which their time is
spent, thus fostering a sense of autonomy and personal responsibility.
Additional steps should be taken to lend meaning to their period of
imprisonment; in particular, the provision of individualised custody plans
and appropriate psycho-social support are important elements in assisting
such prisoners to come to terms with their period of incarceration and, when
the time comes, to prepare for release. Moreover, the provision of such a
regime to prisoners serving long sentences enhances the development of
constructive staff/inmate relations and hence reinforces the security within
the prison.
It is clear that the regime applied to prisoners sentenced to
death at Nubarashen Prison falls far short of the above criteria. The CPT
calls upon the Armenian authorities to fundamentally revise the regime
applicable to the prisoners concerned, in the light of the above remarks.
103. Prisoners sentenced to death were handcuffed during all
periods spent outside their cells, including during outdoor exercise and
apparently even when receiving visits. The application of such security
measures may exceptionally be necessary, for a certain period of time,
vis-à-vis a given prisoner. However, there can be no justification for
routinely handcuffing all prisoners sentenced to death when they are outside
their cells, all the more so when the measure is applied in an already
secure environment. Further, to be handcuffed when receiving a visit could
certainly be considered as degrading for both the prisoner concerned and his
visitor. The present arrangements in this regard can only be seen as
disproportionate and punitive.
The CPT recommends that the Armenian authorities review the
current practice of routine handcuffing of prisoners sentenced to death when
taken out of their cells, in the light of the above remarks.
4. Health-care services
a. introduction
104. At the time of the visit, prison health care services were placed
under the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice. Talks held by the
delegation with the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Public Health
indicated that there were tangible efforts to step up cooperation between
the two Ministries. This cooperation had apparently led to the provision of
in-service training to prison health care staff by the Ministry of Public
Health, and the drawing up of detailed draft standards for the medical
treatment of prisoners and, more specifically, of a new programme of
psychiatric care in prison. This is a welcome development. The CPT would
like to receive copies of the aforementioned standards, once they have been
finalised, and of the programme of psychiatric care.
105. The CPT considers that a greater involvement of the Ministry of
Public Health in this area, in particular as regards the organisation and
assessment of prison health care services, would be highly beneficial. This
approach is clearly reflected in Recommendation No. R (98) 7 of the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe concerning the ethical and
organisational aspects of health care in prison. Such involvement would help
to ensure optimum health care for prisoners, as well as observance of the
general principle of the equivalence of care in prison with that in the
outside community.
The CPT would like to receive the comments of the Armenian
authorities on this issue.
b. health care services in the prisons visited
i. staff and facilities
106. At Nubarashen Prison, the full-time health care team consisted of 7
doctors (head doctor, internist, surgeon, stomatologist,
dermato-venerologist, radiologist, psychiatrist), 5 feldshers, a laboratory
assistant, an X-ray technician and a dental technician. Assistance was
provided by several prisoner orderlies.
The provision of health care at Gyumri Prison relied almost
exclusively on a feldsher, who performed the same range of duties as a
doctor (the doctor’s post had been vacant for some 7-8 years). There was
also a dentist who attended the establishment once per week.
The health-care service at Erebuni Prison was staffed by a head
doctor, an internist, and a dentist, all working full-time; they were
assisted by an orderly.
At the time of the visit, three of the four doctors’ posts at
Sevan Prison were vacant. Consequently, the establishment’s health-care
service had only one full-time doctor (the head doctor, a general
practitioner). He was assisted by a feldsher and two prisoner orderlies, and
a dental technician visited the establishment 3 times per week (mainly to
perform extractions).
At Nubarashen Prison, the presence of a feldsher was ensured on
a 24-hour basis. However, in none of the other prisons was someone with a
health care qualification present during much of the afternoon, at night and
during weekends.
107. As regards the complement in terms of doctors, the situation at
Nubarashen and Erebuni Prisons can be considered satisfactory. By contrast,
the number of doctors actually working at Sevan Prison was clearly
insufficient, having regard to the size of the inmate population, and the
absence of a doctor at Gyumri Prison is totally unacceptable.
The CPT recommends that, at Sevan Prison, at least one of the
vacant doctors’ posts be filled as a matter of urgency.
Concerning Gyumri Prison, at the end of the visit, the CPT’s
delegation requested the Armenian authorities to confirm, within three
months, that the vacant doctor’s post had been filled. In their letter of 28
February 2003, the Armenian authorities informed the Committee that this has
now been done. The CPT welcomes this positive development.
108. The CPT is particularly concerned about the low number of qualified
feldshers and the total lack of qualified nurses at the four establishments.
Given the size and structure of the respective inmate populations (with
rapid inmate turnover at the two pre-trial facilities and noticeable
proportions of older prisoners at the two colonies), the CPT recommends that
the nursing staff resources (i.e. feldshers and nurses) at the four
establishments be increased.
The CPT also wishes to stress that a person competent to provide
first aid, preferably with a recognised nursing qualification, should always
be present on prison premises, including at night and weekends.
109. In the CPT’s view, the employment of inmates as orderlies should be
seen as a last resort, and prisoners should under no circumstances be
involved in the distribution of medicines. Further, such persons should not
be given access to medical files, nor should they be present during medical
examinations. The Committee recommends that the position of the prisoners
working as orderlies at Nubarashen and Sevan Prisons (as well as other penal
establishments in Armenia) be reviewed, in the light of these
considerations.
110. The delegation heard very few complaints about access to the doctor
(or, as in Gyumri, to the feldsher). However, at the four prisons, inmates
complained about the standard of treatment and care, in particular as
regards the range of medication prescribed and the quality of dental care
(which appeared to be limited to extractions). At each of the
establishments, the transfer of inmates to the Hospital for Prisoners in
Yerevan, when required by their state of health, was said to be
unproblematic. By contrast, ensuring external specialist consultations at
Gyumri and Sevan Prisons was very much dependent on improvised arrangements
with local doctors and local hospitals/dispensaries, and was not always
satisfactory. The CPT would like to receive the comments of the Armenian
authorities on this latter issue.
111. The CPT is concerned about the provision of psychiatric and
psychological care at the prisons visited. In addition to the lack of
psychiatric medication, only Nubarashen Prison employed a psychiatrist, and
none of the establishments had a psychologist. Each of the prisons
accommodated a certain number of inmates who, while not requiring admission
to a psychiatric facility, could benefit from ambulatory psychiatric care;
consequently, the CPT recommends a strengthening of
psychiatric/psychological care resources at the four establishments.
In this connection, the CPT has serious misgivings about the
deleterious conditions under which 19 so-called “prisoners under psychiatric
observation” were held at Nubarashen Prison; in virtually all respects,
these conditions were inferior to those observed elsewhere in the
establishment (cf. paragraph 74). The fact that half of the prisoners
concerned had spent between 4 and 15 months in these premises renders this
state of affairs all the more objectionable. The CPT recommends that the
situation of the prisoners under psychiatric observation at Nubarashen
Prison be reviewed as a matter of urgency.
112. The health-care facilities of the establishments visited generally
displayed similar material shortcomings to those observed elsewhere in other
sections of the prisons concerned. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the
health-care unit of Sevan Prison (one of the most dilapidated areas of the
establishment) was undergoing refurbishment at the time of the visit. At the
four prisons, most of the medical equipment seen (e.g. X-ray machines;
dental instruments) was obsolete and often badly maintained; it was highly
unlikely that reliable diagnoses and treatment could be performed with it.
The CPT recommends that efforts be made to remedy the
aforementioned shortcomings.
113. The supply of basic medication and related materials was grossly
insufficient at each of the establishments. This was hardly surprising,
given the very limited budget for acquiring such items. In this regard, the
health-care services concerned depended to a considerable extent on
donations and inmates’ own resources.
Reference has already been made to the State’s duty of care
vis-à-vis persons deprived of their liberty, even in periods of serious
economic difficulties (cf. paragraph 66). The CPT recommends that the
Armenian authorities take measures without delay to ensure the supply of
appropriate medicines and related materials to the prisons visited and, if
necessary, to other penitentiary establishments in Armenia.
ii. medical screening on admission
114. The importance of medical screening of newly arrived prisoners,
especially at establishments which represent points of entry into the prison
system, cannot be over-emphasised. Such screening is indispensable, in
particular in the interests of preventing the spread of transmissible
diseases, suicide prevention and the timely recording of injuries.
Every newly-arrived prisoner should be properly interviewed and
physically examined by a medical doctor, or by another member of the health
care service reporting to the doctor, as soon as possible after his/her
arrival. Save for in exceptional circumstances that interview/examination
should be carried out on the day of admission, especially in so far as
pre-trial establishments are concerned.
115. With the exception of Gyumri Prison (where the initial examination
was performed by the officer on duty, backed up – if necessary – by the
feldsher), in each of the other establishments, newly-admitted inmates were
examined by a member of the prison’s health care service. No significant
delays in that procedure were observed; however, the thoroughness of the
examination, including the recording of injuries borne by newly-arrived
prisoners, left much to be desired.
As regards this latter point, the CPT wishes to recall the
recommendation made in paragraph 22 concerning the record to be drawn up
following the medical examination of a newly-arrived prisoner. The same
approach should be followed whenever a prisoner is medically examined
following a violent episode in prison.
iii. medical records and confidentiality
116. At the four prison establishments visited, each prisoner had a
personal medical file. This is a most welcome situation. Nevertheless, the
thoroughness with which the files were maintained and updated was not fully
satisfactory. Further, the CPT has misgivings about certain practices
observed, such as entrusting prisoner orderlies with handling medical files
(Sevan Prison), or – in the case of prisoner transfers – forwarding such
files unsealed to the receiving establishment, as appeared to be the case at
the four prisons.
Personal medical files should contain diagnostic information as
well as an ongoing record of the prisoner’s state of health and of his
treatment, including special examinations he has undergone. The prisoner
should be able to consult his medical file, unless this is unadvisable from
a medical standpoint, and to request that the information it contains be
made available to his family or lawyer. Further, all medical data concerning
prisoners should be handled in such a way as to ensure the strict
confidentiality of that data.
The CPT recommends that the manner in which personal medical
files are handled in Armenian penitentiary establishments be reviewed, in
the light of the above remarks.
iv. tuberculosis
117. Tuberculosis represents a major problem in the Armenian
prison system. According to estimates of the Ministry of Justice, some 400
prisoners (i.e. about 10 % of the Armenian prison population) were suffering
from TB as of 1 October 2002. Further, the number of new cases per year was
said to be in the range of 100. Given the overall lack of diagnostic means,
the aforementioned figures might understate the gravity of the situation.
118. Tuberculosis control in penal establishments in Armenia is
seriously hampered by poor material conditions and budgetary difficulties.
For several years, the ICRC has played an important role in assisting the
Armenian authorities to combat tuberculosis, through a variety of measures,
including the setting up of a referral laboratory (which is reportedly being
used by the prison system and the community) and the construction of a new
TB-ward within the premises of the Hospital for prisoners in Yerevan (cf.
paragraph 140).
119. The CPT was pleased to learn that, in principle, the DOTS strategy
(“Directly observed treatment – Short Course”) was acknowledged by the
Armenian authorities as the key tool for tuberculosis control. However, the
effective implementation of DOTS in the prison context was rendered
difficult by the above deficiencies and the lack of appropriate training of
prison doctors.
120. Each of the four prisons visited, as well as the Hospital for
Prisoners (cf. paragraph 131), accommodated prisoners suffering from
tuberculosis. The approach followed as regards the procedure for TB
screening and treatment left a lot to be desired.
121. As regards the procedure for medical screening for tuberculosis,
the delegation was told at Nubarashen Prison that newly-admitted inmates
underwent an X-ray examination of the thorax, which was subsequently
repeated twice per year. However, at Gyumri Prison, only group examinations
were available (taking place in April and October of each year);
consequently, newly-arrived prisoners were, on occasion, screened for TB
with a delay of several months. This is a totally unacceptable state of
affairs, given that Gyumri Prison is an entry-point into the prison system.
The procedure followed at the two establishments for sentenced prisoners
corresponded, overall, to that applied at Gyumri.
It is currently widely acknowledged in international medical
circles (cf. guidelines for the control of tuberculosis in prisons drawn up
by the WHO and the ICRC) that in populations with a high tuberculosis
prevalence, an X-ray examination cannot constitute in itself a satisfactory
initial method for detecting infectious pulmonary tuberculosis cases. In
such situations, it is first of all essential to assess the clinical
symptoms of the disease during the initial medical screening – for example,
persistent cough, sputum production and weight loss – and then to proceed to
sputum smear microscopy for pulmonary tuberculosis suspects (regardless of
whether they have undergone an X-ray examination) in order to detect
infectious cases.
The information gathered by the CPT’s delegation clearly
indicated that the screening procedure for TB at the four prisons did not
meet the above requirements. More particularly, there appeared to be no
institutionalised arrangements for the collection and subsequent examination
of sputum samples (which also precluded adequate monitoring of patients’
response to treatment).
122. Turning to treatment, anti-tuberculosis medication and vitamins
were in short supply at each of the establishments, which cannot but favour
the spread of the disease and the emergence of resistance to
anti-tuberculosis medication. In this latter respect, the CPT was concerned
to learn that second-line anti-tuberculosis drugs were virtually unavailable
throughout the Armenian prison system, despite a not insignificant number of
confirmed cases of multi-resistant TB.
123. The above situation was compounded by the fact that proper
monitoring of the taking of tuberculosis medicines by prisoners was not
guaranteed. This was unsurprising, given the low levels of nursing staff
resources at the four establishments (which, at Gyumri Prison, led to
medication being administered by custodial staff), and the periods during
which no (or hardly any) health care staff were present (cf. paragraph 106).
Moreover, doctors had received little training in DOTS.
124. Overall, the material conditions under which prisoners with TB were
held at Nubarashen, Gyumri and Erebuni Prisons reflected the shortcomings
observed elsewhere in the establishments. By contrast, at Sevan Prison,
inmates suffering from TB were accommodated in dormitories where conditions
were slightly better than in other parts of the establishment: for example,
the living space per prisoner was in the range of 3.5 to 5 m², and the
dormitories contained almost exclusively single beds, which created a
somewhat more welcoming environment than in other locations. At each of the
establishments, inmates with TB encountered difficulties in maintaining an
adequate level of personal hygiene; moreover, their specific dietary needs
were not being catered for in a satisfactory manner.
125. In the light of the above remarks, the CPT recommends that the
Armenian authorities strengthen tuberculosis control in all prison
establishments, especially through adequate screening of the inmate
population, regular supply of anti-tuberculosis medication and related
materials in sufficient quantities, and appropriate monitoring of the
distribution and taking of such medication. In this latter respect, the
number of paramedical staff responsible for this task should be increased in
the four prisons visited.
The CPT also recommends that steps be taken to ensure that, in
all prisons in Armenia, material conditions for inmates with tuberculosis
are conducive to the improvement of their health. In this connection, the
Committee wishes to stress in particular that, in addition to natural light
and good ventilation, there must be an absence of overcrowding. Care should
also be taken to ensure that the inmates concerned are able to maintain a
standard of personal hygiene consistent with the requirements of their state
of health. Further, prisoners with tuberculosis should be provided with an
adequate diet.
More generally, the CPT recommends that tuberculosis control be
effected in a consistent manner across the prison system, and in accordance
with international standards as defined by the WHO and ICRC. In this
connection, prison doctors should receive appropriate training and be
provided with written instructions concerning new approaches to tuberculosis
control.
126. Finally, the Committee wishes to stress that tackling effectively
the problem of tuberculosis will require a combined effort by all relevant
Ministries. Tuberculosis in prisons represents an important threat to public
health in society at large. It is therefore imperative to introduce adequate
methods of detection and prevention, to provide appropriate treatment, and
to ensure that treatment begun in prison continues after release.
v. HIV
127. At the time of the visit, an HIV+ inmate was held in the
health-care unit of Nubarashen Prison. He was accommodated in one of the
worst cells of the unit, which was among other things entirely deprived of
natural light (due to metal blinds fixed to the window). The inmate
concerned was strictly separated from other prisoners and had to take
outdoor exercise on his own.
The delegation was informed that a similar approach would be
followed at the other three prisons (at the time of the visit, they did not
hold any HIV+ inmates). For example, at Erebuni and Sevan Prisons, such
inmates would be accommodated in the ShIZO/PKT unit.
128. The CPT recognises the problems of integration of HIV+ prisoners
with the rest of the prison population, arising from lack of experience,
insufficient information and fear on the part of other prisoners and staff.
However, the Committee must emphasise that there is no medical justification
for the segregation of a prisoner solely on the grounds that he/she is HIV+.
The CPT recommends that the Armenian authorities devise a policy aimed at
putting an end to the practice of ostracising HIV+ prisoners. That policy
should provide inter alia for a programme of education and information for
both prison staff and prisoners about methods of transmission, means of
protection, etc.
When, exceptionally, temporary segregation of HIV+ prisoners is
necessary (e.g. for their own protection or pending transfer to a hospital
facility), the inmates concerned should always be held under appropriate
conditions.
vi. hunger strikes
129. At each of the prisons visited, the delegation was informed that
hunger-strikes of inmates did occasionally occur, mainly in protest against
the processing of their cases, applications and complaints by the competent
investigative/judicial authorities. The CPT’s delegation met two persons on
hunger-strike (at Nubarashen and Erebuni Prisons). They were kept
respectively on the ground-floor of the main accommodation block of
Nubarashen Prison (cf. paragraph 74) and in the ShIZO/PKT unit of Erebuni
Prison (cf. paragraph 156); naturally, the CPT’s remark concerning the
accommodation of vulnerable prisoners (cf. paragraph 74) applies equally in
this context. Consequently, the CPT recommends that the situation of
prisoners on hunger-strike be reviewed at Nubarashen and Erebuni Prisons (as
well as at other prison establishments in Armenia).
130. The delegation was told that – in the event of prolonged hunger
strikes – the option of forced feeding was provided for by law. The CPT
would like to receive a copy of all rules and regulations dealing with the
subject of the management of inmates on hunger-strike.
c. Hospital for Prisoners, Yerevan
131. The Hospital for Prisoners is located close to the centre of
Yerevan. It is the only such establishment in the prison system, receiving
male sentenced prisoners (and, in exceptionally complex cases, remand
prisoners) from all over Armenia[14]. The two main hospital buildings in
operation at the time of the visit dated back to 1888 and 1960,
respectively. These premises had originally been used as a pre-trial
establishment and were transformed into a prison hospital in 1980. The
hospital had an official capacity of 250 beds, distributed between six
wards: therapeutic (internal diseases), surgery, psychiatry, tuberculosis,
narcology and infectious diseases (located in a small separate building). At
the time of the visit, it was accommodating 255 prisoners, of whom some 200
were patients[15]. The average length of hospitalisation was 55 days, with
average stays of some three months in the tuberculosis and narcology wards,
and of approximately two months in the psychiatric ward; the longest stay in
the hospital was 15 months. The youngest patient was 18 years old, the
oldest, 75.
132. At the outset of the visit, the hospital’s Head Doctor drew the
delegation’s attention to the difficult situation which his establishment
was facing due to the very low level of financing[16], the annual budget
apparently only being sufficient to cover the necessary expenses during one
quarter of the year. Consequently, the hospital had to rely on humanitarian
assistance and patients’ families to satisfy a large part of its
requirements in medication and food.
133. In these circumstances, it was hardly surprising that the material
environment at the establishment was grossly deficient. The main hospital
buildings, as well as the premises of the infectious diseases ward, were in
a state of advanced dilapidation.
In most of the patients’ rooms, living space per person was
adequate (2 to 15 beds in rooms from 10 to 60 m²). However, conditions were
cramped in some rooms (e.g. seven patients in a room measuring 20 m², four
patients in a room of 14 m²). The worst overcrowding was observed in the
psychiatric ward, where several rooms of 10 to 12 m², intended in principle
for double occupancy, accommodated up to five patients each.
The majority of the rooms benefited from a good access to
natural light and were well ventilated; however, this was not the case in a
small number of rooms where windows were obstructed by metal shutters. As to
the artificial lighting, it was poor in all rooms.
The establishment did not possess a central heating system. The
delegation observed that, despite efforts to heat the rooms with small
electric heaters, most of the patient accommodation was cold. This was
particularly the case in a few rooms seen in the psychiatric ward, in which
window panes were missing.
The standard equipment of patients’ rooms consisted of beds or
bunk beds with bedding (generally clean), a few lockers and, occasionally, a
table and stools. This was supplemented by some personal items. Although on
the whole in a good state of cleanliness, the vast majority of the rooms
were dilapidated, some of them (e.g. room 21 in the psychiatric ward) to an
advanced degree (mildew, peeling paint, etc). At the same time, a small
number of rooms offered strikingly better material conditions: fresh paint,
attractive furnishings (e.g. own furniture, fridge, TV set) and decoration.
The delegation did not hear any complaints from patients about access to the
toilet. However, the toilets located in the psychiatric, narcology, TB and –
in particular – infectious diseases wards were dilapidated and dirty.
Furthermore, patients from the above-mentioned wards told the delegation –
and staff confirmed – that their access to the hospital’s recently
refurbished bath and washing facility was subject to restrictions. The CPT
is very concerned about this situation, further aggravated by the fact that
washing facilities in the psychiatric, narcology, TB and infectious diseases
wards were totally inadequate. Taking additionally into account that the
hospital’s laundry was not operational and that patients had to wash their
clothes and bed sheets themselves, sanitary conditions in the wards
concerned could only be described as unacceptable.
134. Despite the very low food budget (cf. paragraph 132), the
delegation was told that the relevant dietary norms (3100 – 3300 kcal per
patient per day) were respected. However, the hospital was not in a position
to provide special diets required for certain medical conditions. Patients
generally did not complain about the food, although many of them stated that
the diet was monotonous. In practice, they relied to a great extent on food
parcels brought by their families.
135. The hospital’s medical equipment was generally outdated and some of
it, e.g. the operating table, was in a poor state of repair. The X-ray
apparatus used at the time of the visit was approximately 30 years’ old, as
was the ECG machine. Further, the dental surgery’s equipment was obsolete.
On a more positive note, the equipment for anaesthesia and sterilisation had
apparently been replaced recently, and the establishment also possessed a
clinical and a bacteriological laboratory, which could carry out basic blood
and urine tests.
As regards medication, the supplies were sufficient to cover the absolute
minimum needs of the hospital. Cases of interruption of supply apparently
did not occur, largely thanks to the humanitarian aid, arrangements with
some suppliers (allowing the purchase of medication on credit) and help from
patients’ families. The situation was analogous concerning other materials,
such as sterile gloves, bandages, syringes, etc.
136. As regards health-care staff, at the time of the visit, there were
24 full-time and 6 part-time doctors, representing a wide variety of
specialisations; further, each ward was regularly attended on a contract
basis by an outside consultant specialist. An additional 7 doctors’ posts
(including 4 for TB specialists, as well as those for a dentist and an X-ray
specialist) were vacant. The hospital’s medical staff complement can
therefore be considered as adequate, although obviously it would be
desirable to fill the vacant posts as soon as possible.
The situation was less favourable as regards other health-care
staff. 23 feldshers or nurses and 6 junior health-care personnel (“sanitar”)
worked in the establishment, and 4 other health-care staff posts were
vacant. Such a nursing staff complement is not sufficient for a 250-bed
hospital.
After 4.00 pm on weekdays, as well as during weekends, there was
one duty doctor for the whole hospital. As regards the feldshers, nurses and
junior health-care staff, they worked on the basis of a 24-hour shift. In
principle, at least one feldsher or nurse was present in each ward at any
given time.
137. The establishment’s outside secure perimeter was guarded by some 65
staff employed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. According to the Head
Doctor, the staff concerned were not authorised to enter the premises of the
hospital. He also informed the delegation that it was planned to replace the
above-mentioned staff by personnel employed by the Ministry of Justice.
As regards the maintenance of order and security within the
patients’ living areas, it was the task of 31 custodial officers (for 40
available posts), employed by the Ministry of Justice. The Head Doctor
stated that custodial staff acted exclusively upon instructions given by
members of the health-care staff. It is noteworthy that the delegation did
not find any evidence to the contrary and that no complaints were heard from
patients about the manner in which they were being treated by custodial
officers.
138. Despite the severe lack of funds to purchase new medical equipment
and medication, the treatment offered to patients appeared to be on the
whole adequate. The delegation heard hardly any complaints from patients
about the attitude of health-care staff, who seemed to be striving to make
the best possible use of the few available resources. Further, in cases
requiring specialist treatments unavailable at the hospital, there was a
possibility to invite outside specialists or to transfer a patient to a
civil hospital; it appeared that these arrangements functioned well in
practice
Patients’ individual medical files and other medical
documentation contained frequent entries and were generally well kept.
However, the confidentiality of medical data did not seem to be fully
guaranteed; as the delegation was told, investigators, prosecutors and
authorised staff of the Criminal Executive Department could have access to
this data under certain circumstances.
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned generally positive
evaluation, the CPT has concerns about the treatment provided to two
categories of patients.
139. The treatment of psychiatric patients consisted almost exclusively
of pharmacotherapy; other forms of therapy were limited to occasional
individual psychotherapy. Basic psycho-pharmacological drugs were apparently
available without interruption, and the delegation did not find signs of
overmedication of patients. However, the combined effect of poor material
conditions and underdeveloped activities (cf. also paragraph 142) could be
described as anti-therapeutic.
The delegation was told that physical restraints (which
consisted of attaching the patient to a bed frame with the help of bed
sheets) were rarely used in the ward. As for seclusion, a specific room was
set aside for this purpose. Although of a reasonable size and appropriately
furnished (a bed, with bedding, and a small table fixed to the floor;
in-cell floor toilet), it was dark – due to the presence of shutters fixed
to the window – and very cold.
According to staff, restraints and/or seclusion were ordered by or subject
to the approval of the treating psychiatrist (or, in his absence, of another
doctor), and were normally only applied for short periods of time, usually
15 to 20 minutes. However, cases of application of up to 2 -3 days could
also occur; in the Committee’s opinion, the application of physical
restraints for a period of days cannot have any therapeutic justification. A
reference to the use of physical restraints and/or seclusion was made in the
patient’s file; however, there was no register for the systematic recording
of such events.
140. With regard to the patients suffering from tuberculosis, the
treatment being provided at the time of the visit was clearly substandard.
The supply of anti-tuberculosis medicines was extremely modest, second-line
antibiotics were not available and the DOTS method for tuberculosis control
was not in operation.
However, there were prospects for radical improvement of this
situation in the near future. The delegation visited a building, constructed
and equipped with the support of the ICRC, which was to accommodate the new
tuberculosis ward with a capacity of up to 250 beds[17]. The new building
had the potential to offer good living conditions for patients. As regards
treatment, it was planned to follow the DOTS method. In cooperation with the
ICRC, doctors from the hospital had undergone appropriate training and were
in the process of screening inmates in all prison establishments in Armenia
for transfer to the new TB ward.
It is noteworthy that, in addition to the fundamental importance
for the patients suffering from tuberculosis, the opening of the new ward
was to have positive repercussions for the hospital as a whole; in fact, it
was anticipated that its opening would provide the opportunity to begin a
gradual refurbishment of all other wards.
141. At the time of the visit, there were four HIV+ patients,
accommodated in the infectious diseases ward. According to staff, prisoners
with a detected HIV+ status could be transferred to the Hospital for
Prisoners, irrespective of whether they had developed AIDS or not. The
Committee has already emphasised (cf. paragraph 128) that there is no
medical justification for the segregation of a prisoner solely on the
grounds that he is HIV+; similarly, there is no medical justification for
placing a prisoner in an infectious diseases ward solely on the grounds that
he is HIV+.
142. As regards the regime at the hospital, all patients benefited from
unrestricted access to the outdoor exercise areas, which were decorated with
plants and equipped with a means of protection against inclement weather.
However, other than watching TV, listening to the radio, playing board games
and reading books from the establishment’s modest library, patients had few
means of distraction at their disposal: there were no purposeful activities,
a state of affairs which was particularly detrimental for the psychiatric
patients.
143. The CPT recommends that serious efforts be made at the Hospital for
Prisoners in Yerevan in order to:
– improve material conditions for patients, taking due
account of the remarks made in paragraph 133; in particular, urgent steps
must be taken to ensure that all rooms enjoy adequate access to natural
light (by removing the shutters obstructing windows), are protected from the
cold (through the fitting of window panes and the installation of an
efficient heating system) and are maintained in a good state of repair;
– ensure that all patients have ready access to adequate
and clean toilet and washing facilities; measures should also be taken to
provide all patients with the possibility to take a hot shower – in decent
and hygienic conditions – at least once per week;
– upgrade the hospital’s medical equipment and ensure a
regular supply of appropriate medication and materials;
– reinforce the hospital’s nursing staff resources;
-improve the treatment of patients in the psychiatric ward; the aim should
be to offer a range of therapeutic and rehabilitative activities, including
access to occupational therapy, group and individual psychotherapy. It is
also desirable to offer these patients some educational activities and
suitable work;
– remedy the shortcomings observed in the seclusion room
for psychiatric patients;
– ensure that every instance of physical restraint
and/or seclusion of a patient is recorded in a specific register established
for that purpose (in addition to the patient’s file). The entry should
include the times at which the measure began and ended, the circumstances of
the case, the reasons for resorting to the measure, the name of the doctor
who ordered or approved it, and an account of any injuries sustained by
patients or staff;
– ensure full confidentiality of medical data.
Further, the CPT invites the Armenian authorities to:
– provide more varied food to patients, including
special medical diets;
– make efforts to fill the vacant doctors’ posts;
– explore the possibility of developing the range of
activities available to patients in general.
Finally, the CPT would like to receive confirmation that,
following the entry into service of the new TB ward, the DOTS strategy for
tuberculosis control has been introduced at the hospital.
5. Other issues of relevance to the CPT’s mandate
a. staff
144. The cornerstone of a humane prison system will always be properly
recruited and trained prison officers, who know how to adopt the appropriate
attitude in their relations with prisoners. As already indicated (cf.
paragraph 68), developed inter-personal communication skills are an
essential part of the makeup of such staff.
The information gathered by the delegation suggests that, since
the transfer of responsibility for the prison system to the Ministry of
Justice, efforts have been made to improve in-service staff training. The
teaching of international human rights standards and the updating of staff
on new domestic rules and regulations appear to be given particular
attention in this context. These are welcome initiatives. The CPT encourages
the Armenian authorities to vigorously pursue their efforts in the area of
prison staff training, including at the induction stage.
The CPT also understands that a draft law on the selection and
training of prison staff is currently being prepared; it would like to
receive more information on this subject (content, expected date of entry
into force, etc.).
b. contact with the outside world
145. It is very important for prisoners to be able to maintain
reasonably good contact with the outside world. Above all, prisoners must be
given the means of safeguarding their relationships with their families and
close friends. The continuation of such relationships is of crucial
importance for all those concerned, particularly in the context of
prisoners’ social rehabilitation. The guiding principle should be to promote
contact with the outside world; any restrictions on such contacts should be
based exclusively on security concerns of an appreciable nature or
considerations linked to available resources. That is the spirit underlying
several recommendations in the 1987 European Prison Rules, especially Rule
43 (paragraph 1) and Rule 65 (point c).
146. The CPT welcomes recent changes in the Armenian legislation
intended to enhance remand prisoners’ contacts with their families through
visits, correspondence and access to the phone
According to Section 15 of the 2002 Law on the Treatment of
Arrestees and Detainees, remand prisoners are entitled to at least two
supervised visits from relatives per month (lasting up to 3 hours each).
Visits can only exceptionally be prohibited by decision of the “body
conducting the criminal proceedings”.
However, in practice, the situation remained unsatisfactory;
hardly any remand prisoners at Nubarashen and Gyumri received visits from
their relatives, despite the fact that only a very small number of them was
subject to restrictions on visits[18]. Inmates were apparently still under
the impression that they were only allowed visits after completion of the
investigation, and staff were apparently doing very little to dispel this
misconception.
The CPT recommends that the Armenian authorities take immediate
steps to ensure that the right of remand prisoners to visits by relatives is
rendered fully effective in practice. These steps must include duly
informing inmates about their right to visits.
147. The visiting facilities at Nubarashen and Gyumri Prisons comprised
small booth-type rooms, where inmates and visitors were separated by a
plexy-glas partition; in addition, at Nubarashen, there was a room with
tables and chairs for open visits (for use by sentenced prisoners and their
visitors). The capacity of the visiting facilities was clearly insufficient
for the number of inmates likely to benefit from the new visit entitlement,
an assessment shared by senior staff at the two establishments.
Consequently, the CPT recommends that steps be taken to increase
the capacity of the visiting facilities at Nubarashen and Gyumri Prisons,
and that the possibility be explored of moving to more open visiting
arrangements for remand prisoners. As regards the latter point, booth-type
facilities, such as those presently used at Nubarashen and Gyumri Prisons,
do not facilitate the maintenance of positive relations between prisoners
and members of their families. The CPT fully understands that closed
visiting arrangements may be necessary in some cases; however, this approach
should constitute the exception, not the rule.
148. Sentenced inmates at Erebuni and Sevan Prisons had good
possibilities for maintaining contact with the outside world. In particular,
they could receive one short (2 hours) and one long visit (72 hours) from
their relatives per month.
The CPT would like to put on record its appreciation of the efforts
undertaken at both establishments to create a welcoming environment on the
premises for long visits; most of these premises had been refurbished to a
high standard.
149. At Nubarashen and Erebuni Prisons, inmates had access to a
telephone. At Gyumri Prison a payphone had been installed a few days before
the CPT’s visit, and the delegation was told that such a facility would also
be made available at Sevan Prison in the near future.
The CPT welcomes this situation and would like to receive
information on the precise regulations governing access to a telephone for
prisoners.
150. Prisoners (including those on remand) may receive and send
an unlimited amount of correspondence. At each of the establishments, the
delegation was told that such correspondence was not subject to censorship
(unless the competent court decided otherwise in a given case[19]). However,
the information gathered by the delegation suggests that, in practice, many
inmates submitted their correspondence unsealed to the management for
despatch to the final addressee. In this connection, some of the prisoners
interviewed by the delegation asserted that no envelopes were available or
that their correspondence (whether incoming or outgoing) would be read by
staff anyway. In addition, at Sevan Prison, several inmates claimed that
incoming letters were often received several weeks after they had arrived at
the establishment. The CPT would like to receive the comments of the
Armenian authorities on these matters.
c. discipline and segregation
151. Punishments for infractions of prison discipline include
simple warnings, written reprimands, withdrawal of privileges and, in more
serious cases, placement in a disciplinary (ShIZO) cell for up to 10 days
for remand prisoners and up to 15 days for sentenced prisoners.
152. Disciplinary sanctions are imposed by the prison director on
the basis of a case file prepared by his staff (including a written
statement by the inmate concerned). The directors of the prisons visited
indicated that it was standing practice to interview the inmates concerned
on the subject of the offence they are alleged to have committed.
However, the CPT noted that a formal right of prisoners facing
disciplinary charges to be heard in person did not appear to be laid down in
the existing rules and regulations (nor in the specific draft internal
regulations for pre-trial facilities). The CPT recommends that steps be
taken to formally guarantee such a right. The Committee would also like to
receive confirmation that prisoners have the right to appeal to a higher
authority against any sanctions imposed.
153. The delegation was concerned to learn at Sevan Prison that
proposals for disciplinary punishments could be discussed with duty
prisoners, who were apparently involved in the maintenance of good order and
control. Such a partial abrogation of the responsibility for order and
security – which properly falls within the ambit of custodial staff – is
unacceptable. It exposes weaker prisoners to the risk of being exploited by
their fellow inmates. It is also contrary to the European Prison Rules,
according to which no prisoner should be employed, in the service of the
institution, in any disciplinary capacity. The CPT recommends that the
Armenian authorities take steps to ensure that no prisoner is put in a
position to exercise power over other prisoners.
154. Sentenced prisoners can also be segregated for up to six
months in accommodation (PKT) which resembles a ShIZO cell (mostly for
serious and repetitive infringements of prison discipline). The delegation
was told at Sevan Prison that – in anticipation of forthcoming new
legislation – segregation for more than 2 months must be confirmed by the
supervising prosecutor, following a hearing in which the prisoner concerned
can be legally assisted. The CPT would like to receive more information on
the procedure by which placement in a PKT cell is decided.
155. At the four prisons visited, the delegation gathered no evidence of
excessive resort to disciplinary punishments or segregation. Where recourse
was had to disciplinary confinement, its duration rarely exceeded 3 to 5
days. As to placement in a PKT cell (which was only applied at Erebuni and
Sevan Prisons), the imposition of the authorised maximum of 6 months was a
very exceptional measure.
156. Overall, material conditions in the ShIZO and PKT cells in the four
prisons mirrored those found elsewhere in the establishments.
Nubarashen Prison had 10 disciplinary cells of some 10 m²,
intended for single occupancy. The cells were in a very poor state of repair
and poorly ventilated. The small windows were covered by metal devices, and
only a meagre amount of artificial light came from the corridor through a
small aperture in the door.
The 3 disciplinary cells at Gyumri Prison had recently been
repainted and had quite acceptable access to natural light and fresh air.
However, they were very small (some 4.5 m² for up to two persons) and damp.
The ShIZO/PKT unit at Erebuni Prison comprised 8 cells of
various sizes (e.g. a cell of 10 m² for 4 prisoners; cells of 5.6 m² and 7.4
m² for 2 prisoners each). Lighting and ventilation were generally poor, due
to metal devices obstructing the windows. However, some of the PKT cells had
been upgraded to a rather good – in one case even very good – standard.
At Sevan Prison, the ShIZO/PKT unit was located in a separate
building. The 8 cells of the unit varied in area between 5.7 m² and 18 m²
(for 2 to 8 prisoners). Most of them had good lighting and ventilation.
However, some of the cells (nos. 3, 4, 5) were in a very bad state of repair
and unfit for holding prisoners for any length of time.
The CPT recommends that the situation in the
disciplinary/segregation units in the four prisons be reviewed, in the light
of the above remarks. In particular, a minimum living space of 4 m² per
prisoner should always be ensured, as well as access to natural light and
adequate artificial lighting and ventilation.
157. The regime applied varied, depending on the nature of the
placement. Unlike inmates placed in a PKT cell, those undergoing
disciplinary confinement could not lie down during the day, and were not
allowed to smoke, read or walk in the open air. In this latter respect, the
CPT must stress that daily outdoor exercise is a fundamental requirement for
all prisoners, including those undergoing disciplinary confinement. As
already noted (cf. paragraph 11), at the end of the visit, the delegation
made an immediate observation, requesting the Armenian authorities to take
steps rapidly to ensure that the entitlement of one hour of outdoor exercise
every day is respected. In their letter of 28 February 2003, the Armenian
authorities stated that the directors of penitentiary establishments had
been instructed by the Minister of Justice to provide all prisoners
undergoing disciplinary confinement with an opportunity to benefit from at
least one hour of daily outdoor exercise. The CPT welcomes this.
d. complaints and inspection procedures
158. Effective complaints and inspection procedures are basic
safeguards against ill-treatment in prisons. Prisoners should have avenues
of complaint open to them, both within and outside the prison system, and be
entitled to confidential access to an appropriate authority.
The CPT attaches particular importance to regular visits to all
prison establishments by an independent body (for example, a visiting
committee or a judge/prosecutor with responsibility for carrying out
inspections) with authority to receive – and, if necessary, take action on –
prisoners’ complaints and to visit the premises.
159. The prisoners interviewed by the CPT’s delegation were generally
aware of the avenues of complaint open to them. In addition to their lawyers
and authorities or officials within the national criminal justice system
(prison directors, “bodies supervising places of detention” etc.), prisoners
could address communications to the Presidential Human Rights Committee and
“international human rights organisations”.
Inmates usually handed their communications (i.e. proposals,
applications or complaints) over to staff, who then passed them on to the
prison director; the latter was responsible for transmitting them to the
relevant external addressee. Prior to transmission, the main content of such
communications was recorded in a special register and/or prisoners’
individual files. In the CPT’s opinion, such a practice is almost certainly
not conducive to prisoners developing a sense of trust in complaints
procedures.
In the light of the above, the Committee recommends that the
Armenian authorities review the complaints procedures, with a view to
ensuring that prisoners can make complaints to appropriate authorities
within and outside the prison system on a truly confidential basis. If
necessary, the relevant rules and regulations should be changed.
160. As regards inspection procedures, the delegation was informed that
penitentiary establishments in Armenia were visited by a variety of bodies;
these included representatives of the Department for the Supervision of
Implementation of Criminal Punishments of the General Prosecutor’s Office,
the Presidential Human Rights Committee, various non-governmental bodies,
and international organisations such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE.
There were also plans to set up a monitoring group of
representatives of civil society. The CPT considers that this is a
particularly interesting initiative, and looks forward to receiving the
information already requested on this subject (cf. paragraph 41).
D. Psychiatric establishments (Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric
Hospital)
1. Preliminary remarks
161. The CPT’s delegation visited a psychiatric establishment under the
authority of the Ministry of Public Health: the Nubarashen Republican
Psychiatric Hospital in Yerevan. It is one of the largest in-patient
psychiatric facilities in Armenia. Built in 1979, it occupies extensive
grounds in the suburbs of the capital and has an official capacity of 350
beds (reduced a few years ago from the initial capacity of 500 beds),
including 80 for women, 140 for men in ordinary “civil” wards, 40 for
conscripts (undergoing psychiatric assessment to determine whether they are
fit for military service), 80 for male patients who have been declared
criminally irresponsible and are undergoing compulsory treatment by court
order[20], and 10 for persons undergoing in-patient forensic psychiatric
assessment.
At the time of the visit, the hospital was accommodating 287 patients: 51
women (including four admitted for compulsory treatment), 127 men
hospitalised in “civil” wards, 25 conscripts, 75 men admitted for compulsory
treatment, and 18 persons undergoing forensic psychiatric assessment[21].
According to the management, the main diagnosis was schizophrenia, followed
by oligophrenia, organic disorders, epilepsy and reactive psychosis. The
length of hospitalisation of “civil” patients depended on whether a patient
was in an acute condition (the stay of such patients could not exceed 24
days, as the hospital would not receive necessary financing from the
Ministry of Public Health for longer hospitalisation periods) or in a
chronic stage of the disease – those patients could remain at the
establishment for several years. As regards patients undergoing compulsory
treatment, their average stay was of approximately two years, but one of
them had been in the hospital for over 6 years.
162. Accommodation was provided in 9 wards: six ordinary
(“civil”) and three “forensic” wards (Ward 5 for men undergoing compulsory
treatment under intensive supervision; Ward 7 for men on compulsory
treatment under strict supervision; and Ward 6 for persons undergoing
forensic psychiatric assessment). The ordinary wards were located in five
large blocks; as to the three “forensic” wards, they were situated in a
separate building surrounded by a secure perimeter wall and guarded by
Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel. During the visit, the delegation
focused its attention on the conditions in the latter wards.
2. Ill-treatment
163. The delegation did not hear any allegations, and found no other
evidence, of ill-treatment of patients by staff at the Nubarashen Republican
Psychiatric Hospital. On the contrary, most of the patients interviewed by
the delegation spoke highly of the doctors and other health-care staff. The
CPT wishes to place on record the dedication to patient care demonstrated by
health-care staff, which is all the more commendable given the paucity of
resources at the staff’s disposal and the difficulties arising from the low
nursing and orderly staff complement (cf. also paragraph 165).
164. Nor were any allegations heard about deliberate ill-treatment by
the Ministry of Internal Affairs staff responsible for the security of the
“forensic” wards. However, the presence – within the perimeter of the
building housing the “forensic” wards – of uniformed and armed security
guards, accompanied by a guard dog, clearly had an intimidating effect on
patients and could hardly contribute to diminishing tensions and mistrust
among them. In this context, several members of health-care personnel
confirmed that occasional verbal conflicts did occur between patients and
security staff. Further, the hospital’s Head Doctor expressed concern about
the potential negative impact which this situation could have on the medical
condition of the patients concerned.
In their letter of 28 February 2003, the Armenian authorities
informed the CPT that a camera surveillance system was currently being
installed in the “forensic” wards; this measure would replace recourse to
guard dogs. The CPT welcomes this development; nevertheless, the Committee
invites the Armenian authorities to explore ways of ensuring perimeter
security of the building housing the “forensic” wards, without exposing
patients from those wards to the view of armed guards.
3. Staff
165. The hospital’s medical team at the time of the visit comprised the
following full-time doctors: the Head Doctor (a psychiatrist, who was
occasionally involved in patients’ treatment), the Deputy Head Doctor in
charge of treatment, 16 psychiatrists, a general practitioner and a doctor
in charge of the clinical laboratory. There were also several part-time
specialists: a surgeon, an anatomo-pathologist, a neurologist, a radiologist
and a dentist (present in the establishment 2-3 times per week). Further, in
case of need, other specialists could be invited from Yerevan hospitals. In
addition, the establishment employed a pharmacist and a few technicians
(laboratory, X-ray, etc).
The nursing staff comprised 11 full-time senior nurses, 39
full-time nurses, one nurse-dietetician and two part-time nurses, in charge
respectively of physiotherapy and of social assistance matters. None of the
nurses had received specialised training in psychiatry (a fact deplored by
the Head Doctor, who stressed that the nurses were not in a position to
contribute actively to the treatment process), and very little in-service
training was apparently provided to them. Further, the nurses were assisted
by 77 orderlies who had only received some basic initial on-the-job
training.
Wards 5 and 7 (each with a capacity of 40 beds) were each
staffed by two psychiatrists, a senior nurse, four nurses and eight
orderlies. As to Ward 6 (capacity: 10), the staffing was identical except
that there was only one psychiatrist.
The doctors and senior nurses worked from 9 am to 4 pm during
the week; after this hour and on weekends, one doctor was on duty for the
whole hospital. As regards the other nurses and orderlies, they worked on
24-hour shifts i.e., at any given time, there was one nurse and two
orderlies in each ward.
166. At the time of the visit, the hospital employed a part-time
psychologist and an occupational therapist. However, with the exception of
the above-mentioned nurse responsible for social assistance matters, there
was no other staff qualified to provide therapeutic activities e.g.
psychotherapists and social workers.
167. The psychiatrist/patient ratio at the time of the visit was 1:17
(1:19 on Wards 5 and 7), which can be considered as adequate. However, the
very limited staff resources as regards psychologists and occupational
therapists, as well as the lack of psychotherapists and social workers,
clearly precluded the emergence of a therapeutic milieu based on a
multidisciplinary approach. As regards the nurses and orderlies, the current
resources – both in terms of numbers and level of training – are
insufficient for meeting the needs of the hospital.
In the light of the above, the CPT recommends that the Armenian
authorities take steps at the Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital to:
– reinforce substantially the team of specialists qualified to
provide therapeutic and rehabilitation activities, by increasing the number
of psychologists and occupational therapists, and employing psychotherapists
and social workers;
– increase the number of nurses and orderlies employed
at the hospital;
– provide nursing staff with specialised (initial and ongoing)
training in psychiatry;
– ensure that orderlies receive adequate training before being
assigned to ward duties.
168. As already mentioned (cf. paragraph 164), the “forensic” wards of
the hospital (i.e. Wards 5, 6 and 7) were guarded by seven security officers
employed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Their primary task was to
ensure perimeter security. However, according to the medical staff, they
could occasionally be asked by the doctors to come inside the wards in order
to be present during a medical consultation or help the health-care staff
restrain an agitated and/or aggressive patient (cf. paragraph 187). Further,
some of the health-care personnel with whom the delegation spoke stated that
security guards would enter patient accommodation areas every day, when
escorting patients to the outdoor exercise yard and in order to search the
patients’ rooms. Apparently, whenever inside the ward, security staff would
be unarmed and act exclusively upon instructions given by health-care
personnel.
Bearing in mind the challenging nature of their work, it is of
crucial importance that security staff in a psychiatric hospital be
carefully selected and that they receive appropriate training before taking
up their duties, as well as in-service courses. In this context, the
delegation was informed by the hospital’s management that security guards
working in Wards 5 to 7 were in fact police officers who had not received
any special training before or while being assigned to this work.
In the light of the above, as well as of the remarks made in
paragraph 164, the CPT recommends that steps be taken to review the
procedures for the selection of security staff employed at the Nubarashen
Republican Psychiatric Hospital and their initial and ongoing training.
Detailed regulations concerning the duties of security staff working in
psychiatric hospitals should be adopted. In this connection, the Armenian
authorities should consider the possibility of security staff working inside
psychiatric establishments being recruited and trained by the Ministry of
Public Health.
4. Patients’ living conditions
169. At the outset of the visit, the Head Doctor informed the delegation
that the hospital was entitled to receive from the Ministry of Public Health
3500 AMD per day (i.e. approximately 5.5 EUR) for every “acute” patient,
3000 AMD per day (i.e. some 4.75 EUR) for every patient on compulsory
treatment, and 2200 AMD per day (i.e. approximately 3.5 EUR) for each
“chronic” patient. These amounts were meant to cover expenses for staff
salaries, medication and food. Although the establishment was slightly
under-funded as compared with these norms, the Head Doctor stressed that the
financial resources available were sufficient to ensure an adequate supply
of basic medication and food, as well as some of the necessary repair
work[22]. Unfortunately, there was no possibility of carrying out any major
refurbishment, and even the replacement of broken window panes apparently
posed a problem.
In fact, the hospital wards were all in a more or less
dilapidated condition. The compulsory treatment Wards 5 and 7 – and even
more so Ward 6 – were in urgent need of repair. The following remarks apply
essentially to Wards 5 and 7, Ward 6 being dealt with separately (cf.
paragraphs 180 to 185).
170. The compulsory treatment wards were not overcrowded at the time of
the visit. Most of the patients were accommodated in rooms measuring 30 – 40
m² and containing up to 6 beds; there were also a few larger dormitories (60
m², for ten patients each) and a number of smaller rooms (15 – 20 m², for
one to three patients). Further, all rooms benefited from good access to
natural light and ventilation; artificial lighting and central heating also
appeared to be adequate.
However, both wards gave a prison-like, austere and
depersonalised impression, reinforced by the fact that patients’ rooms were
fitted with barred doors. Most of the rooms and equipment were in a state of
advanced dilapidation (crumbling and peeling walls, exposed electrical
wiring, broken glass in windows and broken furniture, threadbare blankets
and sheets). In addition, the level of cleanliness in many of the rooms left
a great deal to be desired.
171. The delegation heard no complaints from patients about access to
the communal toilets and showers. Patients could shower once a week (and
more often on request), which was also an opportunity for some of them to
wash their clothes. Hot water was apparently available without interruption;
however, both the toilet and shower facilities were in a poor state of
repair.
The hospital provided patients with only a limited range of
personal hygiene products, i.e. a small quantity of soap and towels. As
regards bedding, the delegation was informed that it was washed once a week.
However, the bedding in many patients’ rooms appeared to be in a poor state
of cleanliness.
172. The Head Doctor informed the delegation that the supply of food was
secured thanks to arrangements with some of the staff members (i.e. those
living in rural areas), who could provide various food items at attractive
prices and with deferred payment. Most of the patients stated that they were
satisfied with the food offered at the establishment, although a few
complained that it was insufficient in quantity.
The hospital’s central kitchen, the small kitchens in the wards
and the areas where patients took their meals were very basic and
dilapidated, but clean.
173. In the light of the remarks made in paragraphs 169 to 172 above,
the CPT recommends that steps be taken to refurbish thoroughly all patient
accommodation areas – including the toilets, showers, kitchens and
canteens – at the Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital, and especially
in Wards 5 and 7. The overriding objective should be to provide a positive,
therapeutic environment. This involves, inter alia, offering the patients
more congenial and personalised surroundings.
More particularly, the CPT recommends that steps be taken at the
Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital in order to:
– maintain all accommodation areas in a clean and
hygienic condition;
– provide patients with lockable space for their personal
belongings;
– provide patients with an adequate range of basic
personal hygiene items;
– ensure that patients’ bedding and clothes are cleaned
at regular intervals.
5. Treatment and regime
174. Psychiatric treatment in the hospital as a whole – and in
particular in the compulsory treatment wards – relied almost exclusively on
pharmacotherapy. At the time of the visit, the supply of basic psychiatric
medication appeared to be adequate.
175. Every morning, the psychiatrists made rounds in the wards and asked
the patients how they felt; this was also an occasion for patients to
request individual consultations. In addition, during the first 10 days
following admission to the wards, all patients were seen by the
psychiatrists individually on a daily basis; subsequently, such meetings
were more rare (every 15 -20 days), unless a change occurred in the
patient’s condition. In this context, the delegation was told by both the
doctors and patients that individual consultations usually took place in the
presence of orderlies and, if the doctor so requested, security guards.
The observations made by the psychiatrists during consultations
were recorded in patients’ medical files, which were well kept.
176. The offer of psycho-social rehabilitative activities at the
hospital was generally extremely limited, which is hardly surprising given
the shortage of qualified staff capable of conducting such activities (cf.
paragraph 166). Apparently, the psychologist organised group psychotherapy
sessions for a few patients from the “civil” wards; further, the
psychiatrists occasionally provided individual psychotherapy, and a small
number of patients participated in art therapy (painting and sculpture). The
delegation was informed by the Head Doctor that, following the decision of
the Ministry of Public Health to remove the adjacent former workshop complex
from the hospital’s remit – and to close it down – the establishment had
ceased offering organised work therapy.
The situation of patients in the compulsory treatment wards was
clearly even worse than that of the rest of the hospital population. With
the exception of a few patients involved in simple cleaning and maintenance
tasks, patients from Wards 5 and 7 usually only left their rooms for the
purpose of going to the toilet, taking outdoor exercise and having their
meals. Admittedly, at certain times of the day, patients were also allowed
to watch television in the wards’ corridors; however, the TV set in Ward 7
had been out of order for over a month. As regards in-room activities, they
consisted of board games, reading books from the hospital’s library and
newspapers brought by families, and – for the patients who could afford
one – listening to the radio.
177. In contrast with the “civil” wards, where most patients could walk
freely around the hospital grounds during the day, patients from Wards 5 and
7 were only allowed to take outdoor exercise for 45 – 50 minutes per day;
however, the vast majority of the patients with whom the delegation spoke
claimed that outdoor exercise periods were in fact even shorter (some 30
minutes). Further, outdoor exercise was not available during weekends. At
the end of the visit, the delegation requested the Armenian authorities to
confirm within 3 months that all patients whose medical condition so permits
are offered at least one hour of outdoor exercise every day. In their letter
of 28 February 2003, the Armenian authorities informed the CPT that patients
undergoing compulsory treatment are now allowed to have at least one hour of
outdoor exercise per day. The CPT welcomes this.
The conditions in which outdoor exercise took place were hardly
acceptable: up to 20 patients at a time in a small yard (some 30 m²)
surrounded by a fence and equipped with a bench. Clearly, such a facility
does not allow patients to exert themselves physically.
178. In the Committee’s view, in addition to pharmacotherapy,
psychiatric treatment should involve a wide range of therapeutic and
rehabilitative activities, including access to occupational therapy, group
and individual psychotherapy, relapse prevention, art, music and sports. It
is also desirable to offer patients education and suitable work. The CPT is
aware that a significant improvement in the range of therapeutic and other
activities offered at the hospital will have to await more favourable
economic circumstances. Nevertheless, the CPT recommends that the Armenian
authorities strive to develop the possibilities for therapeutic and
psycho-social rehabilitation activities at the Nubarashen Republican
Psychiatric Hospital, in particular as regards patients from Wards 5 and 7.
The CPT also recommends that the conditions under which patients from these
wards take outdoor exercise be improved.
179. The delegation also examined the somatic treatment provided to
patients at the hospital. All patients underwent a medical examination on
admission, which included an X-ray examination and blood and urine tests.
However, the delegation was concerned to learn that there was no systematic
and ongoing screening for tuberculosis; this was all the more of concern as
the last TB screening, carried out in 2001, apparently resulted in several
cases of tuberculosis being detected among patients.
The CPT recommends that a systematic screening for tuberculosis
of all newly-arrived patients be introduced at the Nubarashen Republican
Psychiatric Hospital.
Specialist somatic care was provided either by doctors employed
in the hospital (cf. paragraph 165) or by visiting consultants; if
necessary, consultations and treatments could be arranged in hospitals in
Yerevan. As regards dental care, the delegation was told that it included
conservative treatment, and not only extractions.
6. Ward 6 for persons undergoing forensic psychiatric assessment
180. Ward 6 of the Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital is located
in the same building as Wards 5 and 7 (cf. paragraph 162). Its function is
to carry out forensic psychiatric assessment of detained persons referred to
it by an investigator, prosecutor or court with a view to establishing their
criminal responsibility[23]. Such persons are committed to the ward for a
period of up to 24 days. The ward’s capacity is 10 beds; on the day of the
visit, 9 men undergoing assessment were present.
181. The accommodation area consisted of three rooms with barred doors:
two larger ones (some 60 m²) and one smaller (some 20 m²). The rooms had
hardly any access to natural light (their windows being covered with metal
shutters and additionally made much smaller with extra bricks), and
artificial lighting and ventilation were very poor. The equipment in the
larger rooms consisted of nothing but four beds with bedding. The smaller
room had somewhat better furnishings (two beds with bedding, a table with
chairs and a small cupboard); however, just as was the case with the two
other rooms, it was very dilapidated – with severely deteriorated walls and
ceiling – and dirty.
Persons undergoing forensic psychiatric assessment were allowed to use the
communal toilet and washing facility three times per day, and more often on
request. They could also take a shower at least once a week. No complaints
were heard from the persons concerned about access to these facilities,
which were in an acceptable state of repair and cleanliness. However, it is
noteworthy that the only hygiene items provided to the persons held in Ward
6 were small pieces of soap and towels.
At the end of the visit (cf. paragraph 11), the delegation
stated that living conditions at the ward for forensic psychiatric
assessment of the Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital were totally
unacceptable; the delegation invoked Article 8, paragraph 5, of the
Convention and requested the Armenian authorities to submit, within 3
months, a report on the action taken to remedy this situation. The letter of
the Armenian authorities of 28 February 2003 contains no specific reply to
this point. The CPT would like to be informed without further delay of the
steps taken in response to the immediate observation concerning the living
conditions at the ward for forensic psychiatric assessment of the Nubarashen
Republican Psychiatric Hospital.
182. The forensic psychiatric assessment of persons admitted to the ward
was performed by a panel of three psychiatrists (appointed by the Minister
of Public Health), each of whom examined the person concerned. The joint
opinion of the panel was submitted to the investigator, the prosecutor or
the court who had requested the assessment.
Persons undergoing assessment received psycho-pharmacological
medication only in case of emergency and were not offered any therapeutic
activities. Apart from 15 minutes of outdoor exercise (on working days
only), the time spent on various medical examinations and interviews, and
the meals taken together in the corridor, persons referred to the ward
remained locked in their rooms with hardly anything to occupy themselves.
The only available activities consisted of watching TV from behind the
barred doors (the TV set being placed in the corridor) and reading books
from the hospital’s library.
At the end of the visit, the delegation requested the Armenian
authorities to confirm, within 3 months, that all persons undergoing
psychiatric forensic assessment at the Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric
Hospital whose medical condition so permits are offered at least one hour of
outdoor exercise every day. The Armenian authorities did not address this
point in their letter of 28 February 2003. The CPT would like to be informed
without further delay of the steps taken in response to this immediate
observation.
183. As regards contact with the outside world, visits by relatives, as
well as any correspondence and food parcels, were subject to the
authorisation of the relevant investigator. Furthermore, it was prohibited
for persons placed in Ward 6 to make telephone calls.
184. The situation described above is of considerable concern to the
CPT. Persons referred to Ward 6 for forensic psychiatric assessment were
being denied certain of the basic safeguards which should be guaranteed to
all persons deprived of their liberty (in particular, daily outdoor exercise
of at least one hour and contact with the outside world). It should be added
that the environment in the ward is not conducive to the accurate
psychiatric assessment of persons referred to the facility. Such an
assessment can only be properly conducted if there is a good level of
interaction between skilled staff and the patients, and the latter are
relatively stress-free; the existing living conditions and regime in the
ward do not enable these requirements to be met. In this connection, it
should be stressed that the provision of therapeutic activities to persons
undergoing observation and the possibility for them to receive visits would
not interfere with the assessment process; on the contrary, they could
facilitate the gathering of valuable information for that purpose.
185. The CPT recommends that steps be taken at Ward 6 of the Nubarashen
Republican Psychiatric Hospital to:
– improve living conditions in the rooms, in the first place by
removing the shutters and bricks obstructing the windows;
– provide a more congenial and personalised environment for
persons held on the ward, in particular by allowing them a reasonable number
of personal belongings;
– ensure a regular supply of an appropriate range of personal
hygiene products (soap, toothbrush, toothpaste, toilet paper, etc.);
– develop psycho-social activities for persons held on the ward;
– ensure that the possibilities for persons held on the ward to
maintain contact with the outside world are not unduly restricted.
7. Means of restraint
186. In any psychiatric facility, the restraint of agitated and/or
violent patients may on occasion be necessary. This is a subject of
particular concern to the CPT, given the potential for abuse and
ill-treatment.
187. The delegation was informed that seclusion was not practised at the
Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital. As regards physical restraint
(which involved the tying of the patient to a bed frame with the help of
strips of linen cloth), it was apparently rarely used. The restraint was
ordered by or subject to the approval of the treating psychiatrist (or, in
his absence, of the duty doctor), and was normally only applied for as long
as it took for chemical restraint (i.e. sedating medication) to start
producing its effect. A reference to the use of physical restraint was made
in the patient’s file and the nurses’ journal; however, there was no
register for the systematic recording of such events.
The delegation was told that in the case of particularly violent
patients, security staff might be asked to help restrain the patient (cf.
paragraph 168). Health-care staff assured the delegation that in such cases,
security staff always acted upon their instructions.
188. The CPT recommends that detailed instructions on the use of means
of restraint be drawn up. Such instructions should make clear that initial
attempts to restrain aggressive behaviour should, as far as possible, be
non-physical (e.g. verbal instruction) and that where physical restraint is
necessary, it should in principle be limited to manual control. Instruments
of restraint should only be used as a last resort, and removed at the
earliest opportunity; they should never be applied, or their application
prolonged, as a punishment.
The CPT also wishes to stress that health-care staff must have
the main responsibility for the restraint of agitated and/or violent
patients. Any assistance by security staff in such cases should only be
provided at the request of health-care staff and must conform to the
instructions given by such staff.
Further, the CPT recommends that every instance of the physical
restraint of a patient be recorded in a specific register established for
that purpose (in addition to the patient’s file). The entry should include
the times at which the measure began and ended, the circumstances of the
case, the reasons for resorting to the measure, the name of the doctor who
ordered or approved it, and an account of any injuries sustained by patients
or staff. This will greatly facilitate both the management of such
incidents and oversight into the extent of their occurrence.
8. Safeguards in the context of involuntary hospitalisation
189. Mentally ill and mentally handicapped persons are
particularly vulnerable, and hence should benefit from safeguards in order
to prevent any form of conduct – or avoid any omission – contrary to their
well-being. It follows that involuntary admission/placement in a psychiatric
facility should always be surrounded by appropriate safeguards, and that the
need for such a placement should be reviewed at regular intervals. Other
safeguards should deal with such matters as effective complaints procedures,
the maintenance of contact with the outside world, and external supervision
of psychiatric establishments.
As already mentioned (cf. paragraph 162), during its visit to
the Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital, the delegation focused its
attention on the situation of persons undergoing forensic psychiatric
assessment and patients placed for compulsory treatment.
190. The Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) contains the legal grounds and
procedure for compulsory medical measures in respect of persons found to be
criminally irresponsible for their acts or who develop a mental illness
after committing a punishable act. Sections 464 (1) and 471 of the CCP
provide that the placement of such persons in a psychiatric establishment is
decided by a court on the basis of a forensic psychiatric assessment[24].
Regular court reviews (i.e. within 6 months following the
placement and, subsequently, not more than once every 3 months and not less
than every 6 months) of such decisions are performed in the light of
unanimous recommendations by a medical commission. The review concerns the
necessity to continue the placement of a patient for compulsory treatment in
general, as well as his continued placement in a ward of a given security
regime (i.e. strict supervision; intensive supervision; general regime).
Members of the medical commission may be invited to attend the court
hearing, and the presence in court of the patient’s lawyer and legal
representatives (i.e. his close relatives or a representative of the
psychiatric establishment in which he is placed) is obligatory[25]. Further,
the patient has the right to participate in the hearing, and the court’s
decision can be appealed by the patient, his lawyer or legal
representative[26].
191. At the Nubarashen Hospital, the delegation gained the impression
that the above-mentioned procedure for compulsory treatment was generally
respected. The medical commission, composed of the Deputy Head Doctor in
charge of treatment, the Heads of compulsory treatment wards and the
patient’s treating doctor, met at least every 6 months. Patients were
familiar with the procedure and confirmed that they were invited to attend
the commission’s meetings and had the opportunity to express themselves
before it; they also confirmed that they had been informed of the outcome of
the commission’s deliberations. As regards the regular court reviews, they
were carried out by the local Nubarashen district court, and there seemed to
be no significant delays in this stage of the procedure.
However, it appeared that – in practice – most of the patients
concerned did not have access to legal advice and therefore it is hardly
surprising that challenges to the court decisions as regards compulsory
treatment were extremely rare. The CPT recommends that the Armenian
authorities take steps to guarantee that, in the course of compulsory
admission and treatment, patients are effectively in a position to have
access to legal advice.
192. Specific arrangements enabling patients to lodge formal complaints
with a clearly-designated body and to communicate on a confidential basis
with an appropriate authority outside the establishment are essential
safeguards.
The delegation was informed that patients at the Nubarashen
Hospital could complain to the supervising prosecutor. However, it appeared
that the confidentiality of patients’ complaints was not always fully
guaranteed. The CPT is very concerned about the occasional filtering by
doctors of patients’ complaints to the prosecutor. The CPT recommends that
the Armenian authorities take the necessary measures to guarantee that all
patients at the Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital have unrestricted
possibilities to lodge confidential complaints with the supervising
prosecutor and other appropriate outside bodies. Further, patients should be
systematically informed about the possibility of making a confidential
complaint.
More generally, the CPT recommends that an introductory brochure
setting forth the hospital routine and patients’ rights be devised and
issued to each patient on admission, as well as to their families. Patients
unable to understand this brochure should receive appropriate assistance.
193. The maintenance of patients’ contact with the outside world is
essential, not only for the prevention of ill-treatment but also from a
therapeutic standpoint. Patients should be able to send and receive
correspondence, to have access to the telephone, and to receive visits from
their family and friends. Confidential access to a lawyer should also be
guaranteed.
Patients from Wards 5 and 7 of the Nubarashen Hospital could
receive visits until 4.00 pm on every working day; however, despite the
management’s efforts to encourage families to come to the hospital, few
patients received visits. Patients were also allowed to receive parcels from
their families, in principle without restrictions (unless the treating
doctor decided otherwise for medical reasons). As regards correspondence,
the delegation was told by staff that it was not subjected to any
limitations, although letters could be controlled (but not read) by security
staff. However, some of the patients with whom the delegation spoke claimed
that they were not allowed to send and receive letters. Finally, patients
did not have free access to a telephone; in exceptional cases, doctors could
authorise patients to use a telephone installed in one of the
administration’s offices.
The CPT invites the Armenian authorities to examine the possibilities for
improving patients’ contact with the outside world, including correspondence
and access to a telephone.
194. Finally, the CPT attaches considerable importance to psychiatric
establishments being visited on a regular basis by an independent outside
body, responsible for the inspection of patients’ care.
The delegation was told that Wards 5 and 7 of the Nubarashen
Hospital received a monthly visit by the supervising prosecutor, who would
verify the respect of legal safeguards, examine the treatment and living
conditions of patients, and consider any complaints from patients. The CPT
would like to receive copies of the supervising prosecutor’s inspection
reports drawn up in 2001 and 2002 in respect of the Nubarashen Republican
Psychiatric Hospital.
Psychiatric establishments in Armenia may also be visited by
members of the Presidential Human Rights Committee. The CPT would like to
receive copies of any reports concerning visits carried out by the
above-mentioned Committee to the Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital.
E. Military detention facilities
195. The CPT’s delegation visited four Ministry of Defence detention
facilities: the Central Detention Centre of the Military Police in Yerevan,
the Detention House of Yerevan Garrison, and two Divisions of the Military
Police, in Yerevan and Gyumri (Shirak region).
196. The delegation received a few allegations of ill-treatment of
persons who had recently been held in military detention facilities. These
allegations concerned, in the main, random blows, humiliation and verbal
abuse. No such complaints were heard from servicemen actually being held in
the military facilities visited[27].
The CPT recommends that the relevant authorities deliver to
military personnel in charge of detained persons the clear message that all
forms of ill-treatment, including humiliation and verbal abuse, are not
acceptable.
197. The Central Detention Centre in Yerevan operated primarily as
temporary detention facility of the Military Police (where servicemen
suspected of having committed a criminal offence could be held for up to 72
hours) and as a remand establishment. Servicemen remanded in custody could
spend, in principle, up to four months (including extensions) at the centre,
pursuant to a court order.
The Detention House of Yerevan Garrison was used exclusively for
the disciplinary confinement of military personnel (including officers). The
maximum term of confinement varied, depending on the rank of the serviceman
concerned: between 5 days for officers and 10 days for ordinary soldiers.
Nevertheless, in case of serious violations of internal regulations, an
additional term of up to 10 days could be imposed by the establishment’s
commander.
Yerevan Military Police Division was reserved for servicemen
arrested for having committed disciplinary violations (e.g. unauthorised
absence from the garrison), prior to being returned to their units (or to a
disciplinary facility), or suspected of criminal offences, pending their
release or transfer to the Central Detention Centre. The maximum duration of
stay in this facility was said to be only a few hours.
The Military Police Division in Gyumri performed a dual
function: it was used for the temporary detention of army personnel
suspected of having committed criminal offences (prior to release or
transfer to the Central Detention Centre or a civil pre-trial establishment)
and as a disciplinary unit (the remarks made above as regards the maximum
term of confinement apply equally here). In principle, criminal suspects
could be held for 72 hours at the facility. However, if detained pursuant to
an arrest warrant, longer periods (up to 5 weeks) could occasionally occur,
reportedly due to problems of transport to civil pre-trial establishments.
198. As regards material conditions, the cells seen in the four
establishments were generally in an adequate state of repair and
cleanliness, and no evidence of overcrowding at any time was found in the
custody records. However, the cells did display a number of other important
shortcomings.
The Central Detention Centre had 8 cells of sizes varying
between 6 m² (for up to two persons) and 19 m² (for up to four persons);
there was also a large holding room of some 60 m², which was reportedly used
very rarely. Cells had no or very little access to natural light (due to
metal shutters fixed to the windows), poor artificial lighting and
inefficient ventilation. The cell equipment was extremely spartan,
consisting only of beds (with bedding), and occasional tables. The rest of
the premises included a small room for visits by family members and
investigators/lawyers, an area for taking meals and a relatively
well-furnished and impeccably clean medical unit.
The Detention House of Yerevan Garrison comprised 14 cells of
some 8 to 21 m² for an intended maximum capacity of 2 to 6 detainees each.
The majority of cells were dimly lit and poorly ventilated; their small
windows were covered with metal devices, and the artificial lighting was
very weak. The in-cell equipment of soldiers’ and sergeants’ cells comprised
tables and stools as well as retractable wooden sleeping benches, which
where folded during the day. Unlike officers and ensigns (whose cells had
beds with full bedding), ordinary soldiers and sergeants were not provided
with mattresses and blankets at night and had to sleep in their uniforms.
The Division of the Military Police in Gyumri had 17 cells for a
designated capacity of some 25 detainees. Military personnel suspected of
having committed a criminal offence were usually accommodated in single
cells of 6.3 m². The cells used for disciplinary confinement generally
offered a living space of 13 m² for a maximum of 3 detainees. Again, light
(both natural and artificial) and ventilation generally left a lot to be
desired. Cell furnishings corresponded to those seen at the Central
Detention Centre (for criminal suspects) and Yerevan Detention House (for
servicemen undergoing disciplinary confinement). The establishment also had
two rooms for visits by investigators/lawyers, a dining room, a small
library, and a sparsely equipped medical unit.
Yerevan Military Police Division had one windowless and
unventilated cell of some 16 m², which was furnished with two benches; as
mentioned above, it was only used for stays not exceeding a few hours.
199. The common toilet facilities seen in the four establishments were,
overall, in an acceptable state of repair and cleanliness, and access to
these facilities did not appear to be problematic. However, the toilets at
the Military Police Division in Gyumri were devoid of any partitioning.
Of the four establishments, only the Central Detention Centre
had communal showers (which detainees could use once per week). At the
Detention House of Yerevan Garrison and the Military Police Division in
Gyumri, the delegation was told that one of the conditions for admitting a
soldier for disciplinary confinement was a confirmation that he had had a
shower shortly before his arrival at the facility, as it was not possible
for him to shower throughout the period of detention.
200. The regime of detention depended on the nature of the placement.
Military personnel undergoing disciplinary confinement spent
some 8 to 10 hours per day outside their cells involved in drills and/or
other activities (e.g. lessons, physical education, cleaning duties).
Servicemen held on 72-hour detention or remanded in custody were
offered some 50 minutes of daily outdoor exercise. However, it would appear
that no other forms of organised out-of-cell activities were provided for
servicemen remanded in custody (save for some cleaning duties on the
facilities’ premises). On the positive side, detainees on remand had access
to the phone and were allowed visits from their family, pursuant to the Law
on Holding Arrestees and Detainees (i.e. two 3-hour visits per month).
The CPT recommends to:
– review access to natural light, artificial lighting and
ventilation in the cells of the four establishments;
– restrict the 6 m² cells at the Central Detention Centre in
Yerevan to single occupancy;
– provide all detainees undergoing disciplinary confinement with
mattresses and blankets at night; if necessary, the relevant statutory rules
should be amended;
– equip the common toilet facilities at the Military Police
Division in Gyumri with suitable partitioning/screening in order to ensure
adequate privacy;
– enable detained servicemen to have a hot shower at
least once a week;
– extend the daily outdoor exercise period for servicemen held on
72-hour detention or remanded in custody to at least one hour. More
generally, the CPT would like to stress that anyone held for a prolonged
period of time should be offered appropriate activities (work, sport, etc.).
201. The records kept at the Detention House of Yerevan Garrison and the
Military Police Division in Gyumri do not call for particular comments.
However, at the Central Detention Centre and the Yerevan Division of the
Military Police, periods spent in custody were not always properly
documented (e.g. missing entries concerning the date and/or time of
release/transfer). The CPT recommends that the keeping of custody records at
the latter two establishments be reviewed.
202. Military personnel placed at the Central Detention Centre, the
Detention House of Yerevan Garrison and the Military Police Division in
Gyumri were examined by a feldsher upon admission. Further, in case of need,
the persons concerned could have access to the feldsher or – upon referral
from the feldsher – to a doctor during detention.
203. The information provided to the delegation did not allow it to gain
a clear picture of the safeguards concerning disciplinary proceedings. The
CPT would like to receive details about the procedural safeguards applicable
(for example, are the persons concerned informed of the charges brought? Are
they allowed to question the evidence against them and to present their
case? Can they contest the disciplinary sanction before another authority,
including of a judicial nature?).
204. The delegation was informed that military detention facilities in
Armenia are regularly visited by a military prosecutor. Further, the CPT was
pleased to learn there were also visits by representatives of civil society,
such as the Presidential Human Rights Commission and the Soldiers’ Mothers’
Committee.
III. RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSIONS
205. Since its independence, Armenia has been confronted with a series
of grave political, economic and social problems. The Armenian authorities
made clear that, although the overall situation had been improving over the
last few years, these problems inevitably had negative repercussions in
areas covered by the CPT’s mandate. This has been borne in mind by the
Committee, especially when considering material conditions of detention and
activities offered to detained persons. However, political, economic and
social problems can never justify deliberate ill-treatment.
A. Establishments under the authority of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs
206. In the course of individual interviews with prisoners, the CPT’s
delegation received numerous and consistent allegations of physical
ill-treatment of persons detained by the police in Armenia. The
ill-treatment alleged consisted essentially of punches and kicks, and of
striking the persons concerned with truncheons and/or other hard objects. In
virtually all cases, it was said to have been inflicted in the context of
police interrogation (mostly by operative police officers) and with a view
to extracting confessions or information. In some cases, the ill-treatment
alleged was of such a severity that it could be considered as amounting to
torture. In a few cases, the records of the medical examination of the
persons concerned upon their arrival at pre-trial establishments contained
entries which mentioned injuries consistent with allegations made. In
contrast, hardly any allegations were received of physical ill-treatment by
staff working in temporary detention centres.
Similar allegations of ill-treatment by the police were also
received from other sources, including members of the Presidential Human
Rights Commission.
In the light of all the information gathered during the visit,
the CPT has been led to conclude that persons deprived of their liberty by
the police in Armenia run a significant risk of being ill-treated. Vigorous
action is required to combat this problem.
207. The best possible guarantee against ill-treatment is for its use to
be unequivocally rejected by police officers. This implies strict selection
criteria at the time of recruitment of such staff and the provision of
adequate professional training. As regards the latter, the Armenian
authorities should seek to integrate human rights concepts into practical
professional training for handling high-risk situations, such as the
interrogation of criminal suspects. Further, the CPT has recommended that
the relevant national authorities as well as senior police officers make it
clear to police officers that the ill-treatment of persons in their custody
is not acceptable and will be dealt with severely.
208. Another effective means of preventing ill-treatment by
police officers lies in the diligent examination by the competent
authorities of all complaints of such treatment brought before them and,
where appropriate, the imposition of a suitable penalty. This will have a
very strong dissuasive effect.
In this connection, the CPT has recommended that all criminal
suspects taken into police custody be physically brought before the judge
who must decide on the application of a preventive measure. This will
provide a timely opportunity for a person who has been ill-treated to lodge
a complaint. Further, even in the absence of an express complaint, the fact
of having the person concerned brought before the judge will enable the
latter to take action in good time whenever there are other grounds (e.g.
visible injuries, a person’s general appearance or demeanour) to believe
that ill-treatment may have occurred.
209. The CPT has stressed the need to strengthen safeguards against
ill-treatment of persons deprived of their liberty by the police. The
Committee has recommended among other things that the rights to notify a
relative of one’s custody and to have access to a lawyer be applicable as
from the very outset of deprivation of liberty by the police (and not only,
as at present, when a person has been formally declared a “suspect”). As
regards more particularly the right of access to a lawyer, it must be
enjoyed by anyone who is under a legal obligation to attend – and stay at –
a police establishment (e.g. as a “witness”).
Other recommendations made concern access to a doctor, the drawing up of a
code of conduct for police interviews, the keeping of custody records and
the carrying out of independent inspections of police detention facilities.
210. Conditions of detention in the temporary detention centres
visited varied from acceptable (at the Hrazdan Department of Internal
Affairs) to poor. All the centres presented deficiencies concerning in-cell
lighting and ventilation. Moreover, persons under administrative arrest (who
could be held for up to 15 days) were not provided with bedding at night,
and the communal toilet and washing facilities were generally dilapidated
and dirty. Recommendations aimed at remedying these shortcomings have been
made. The CPT has also stressed that the living space per detained person
should be at least 4 m².
Regarding the holding cells/cubicles of the Departments of
Internal Affairs visited, most of them were too small for even short periods
of custody. The Committee has recommended that facilities measuring less
than 2 m² be withdrawn from service. As for those cells/cubicles which
remain in service, measures must be taken to ensure that they have adequate
lighting and ventilation and are maintained in a good state of repair and
cleanliness.
B. Establishments under the authority of the Ministry of National
Security
211. The delegation did not hear any allegations of ill-treatment of
persons detained at the Isolator of the Ministry of National Security by
staff working at the establishment, and did not find any other evidence of
such treatment.
212. In general, conditions of detentioncould be considered as
acceptable for criminal suspects and administrative detainees. However, the
Isolator also accommodated persons in pre-trial detention, who were held
there for periods of months, if not years. Conditions in the establishment
were not suitable for such lengthy periods of detention. In particular, the
situation as regards activities was totally unacceptable; except for daily
outdoor exercise and periods of interrogation, the persons concerned spent
the entire day locked up in their cells. The CPT has made specific
recommendations designed to remedy this problem.
Measures are also required to ensure that persons detained in
the establishment have the possibility to maintain adequate contact with the
outside world.
C. Prison establishments
213. The CPT’s delegation heard much praise from both inmates and prison
staff about positive changes which had reportedly occurred after the
transfer (in October 2001) of responsibility for the prison system from the
Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice. Among the changes
referred to in particular by inmates were improvements in prison officers’
attitudes towards them. The delegation did not receive any allegations – and
did not find any other evidence – of ill-treatment of inmates by staff in
the penitentiary establishments visited.
Nevertheless, there was widespread recognition among prison staff of the
need for further urgent action to improve conditions of detention.
214. Material conditions of detention at the two pre-trial
facilities visited – Nubarashen and Gyumri Prisons – were deficient in many
respects. At Nubarashen, most of the premises were in a poor state of repair
and decoration, and some areas had been left to deteriorate to such an
extent that they were in urgent need of refurbishment. On the positive side,
the CPT has noted the recent removal of the majority of metal blinds
previously fixed to cell-windows, which has considerably improved access to
natural light and ventilation. Further, there were discernible efforts to
keep the establishment in a reasonable state of cleanliness.
At Gyumri Prison, some refurbishment had been carried out after
the 1988 earthquake and, at the time of the visit, renovation work was in
progress. However, a considerable amount of work will be necessary to
restore the establishment’s premises to an acceptable condition. Several
cells in the unrenovated parts of the prison were in such a state of
dilapidation (in addition to being poorly lit and ventilated) that they were
totally unfit for holding inmates for any length of time; they were
unoccupied at the time of the visit.
At both Nubarashen and Gyumri, conditions in the “quarantine” cells for
newly-arrived prisoners were totally unacceptable.
In the context of its recommendations designed to improve
material conditions of detention at Nubarashen and Gyumri Prisons, the CPT
has stressed that there should be living space of at least 4 m² per
prisoner.
215. As regards activities, the only regular out-of-cell activity for
the vast majority of prisoners at both pre-trial establishments was outdoor
exercise (and at Nubarashen Prison, even that was not guaranteed during
weekends). No form of organised activities was available. The CPT recognises
that the provision of organised activities in pre-trial establishments such
as Nubarashen and Gyumri Prisons, where there is a high turnover of inmates,
poses particular challenges. However, it is not acceptable to leave
prisoners to their own devices for months at a time.
The aim should be to ensure that all prisoners (including those
on remand) spend a reasonable part of the day outside their
cells/dormitories engaged in purposeful activities of a varied nature: work,
preferably with vocational value; education; sport; recreation/association.
Determined efforts in this direction are required.
216. Material conditions of detention in the strict-regime
colonies visited – Erebuni and Sevan Prisons – left a lot to be desired in
terms of occupancy rates, state of repair and, on occasion, cleanliness.
Nevertheless, prisoner accommodation generally enjoyed good access to
natural light and ventilation, and at both establishments some renovation
work was in progress. Various recommendations addressing the deficiencies
observed have been made.
The CPT has once again expressed concern about the conditions of
detention of newly-arrived prisoners; they should not be located alongside
inmates subject to segregation for infringements of discipline.
217. Turning to the activities available at Erebuni and Sevan Prisons,
the situation of the vast majority of inmates hardly differed from that of
inmates in the pre-trial facilities visited; in particular, barely 10% of
them were employed. Inmates were allowed throughout the day to move freely
within the establishments’ perimeter; however, this is not a substitute for
a proper programme of activities. The CPT has stressed that sentenced
prisoners are entitled to expect a full program of work, educational and
sports activities and that, as far as possible, individual custody plans
should be drawn up.
218. Nubarashen Prison held 42 inmates sentenced to death and
subject to the 1991 moratorium on executions. The prisoners concerned
generally stressed that conditions of detention and the regime had
considerably improved over the last two years. Nevertheless, the CPT found
that possibilities for contacts with the outside world for such prisoners
remained distinctly inferior to those enjoyed by other sentenced prisoners.
Further, the inmates concerned were not offered any form of organised
activities apart from outdoor exercise, which itself was inadequate (50
minutes per day, excluding weekends). The CPT has emphasised that the
provision of appropriate activities is all the more important for inmates
who can expect to remain in prison for many years. The regime applicable to
the above-mentioned prisoners must be fundamentally revised.
219. The CPT has addressed a number of specific issues relating to
prison health care services (staff and facilities; medical screening on
admission; medical records and confidentiality; HIV; hunger strikes). In
this context, the Committee has stressed that a greater involvement of the
Ministry of Public Health in prison health care services would help to
ensure optimum health care for prisoners, as well as observance of the
general principle of the equivalence of care in prison with that in the
outside community.
220. Tuberculosis represents a major problem in the Armenian
prison system. Unfortunately, control of the disease is seriously hampered
by poor material conditions and budgetary difficulties. The CPT has made
various recommendations aimed at strengthening tuberculosis control. In
particular, the Committee has recommended that it be effected in a
consistent manner across the prison system and in accordance with
international standards, as defined by the WHO and ICRC. The Committee has
also stressed that tackling effectively the problem of tuberculosis will
require a combined effort by all relevant Ministries.
There were prospects for radical improvement of the situation
via a new 250-bed tuberculosis ward at the Hospital for Prisoners in
Yerevan, which reportedly entered into service in November 2002. The CPT has
sought further and better particulars concerning the operation of this
facility.
221. The Hospital for Prisoners in Yerevan was facing a difficult
situation due to the very low level of financing. In these circumstances, it
was hardly surprising that the material environment at the establishment was
grossly deficient. Similarly, the hospital’s medical equipment was generally
outdated and some of it was in a poor state of repair. As regards
medication, the supplies were sufficient to cover the absolute minimum needs
of the hospital. The complement of doctors could be considered as adequate;
the situation was less favourable as regards nursing staff resources.
Despite the severe lack of funds, the treatment offered to
patients appeared to be on the whole adequate. However, the treatment of
psychiatric patients consisted almost exclusively of pharmacotherapy, and
the combined effect of poor material conditions and underdeveloped
activities could be described as anti-therapeutic. Further, the treatment
provided to tuberculosis patients was clearly sub-standard; hopefully the
entry into service of the new TB ward will remedy this state of affairs.
The CPT has made detailed recommendations in the light of its
delegation’s findings at the Hospital.
222. The CPT has also made a number of recommendations and comments
about a variety of other issues of relevance to its mandate (staff; contact
with the outside world; discipline and segregation; complaints and
inspection procedures). In particular, the Committee has welcomed steps
recently taken to ensure that prisoners undergoing disciplinary confinement
are offered daily outdoor exercise.
D. Psychiatric establishments (Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric
Hospital)
223. The delegation did not hear any allegations, and found no other
evidence, of ill-treatment of patients by staff at the Nubarashen Republican
Psychiatric Hospital in Yerevan. On the contrary, most of the patients
interviewed by the delegation spoke highly of the doctors and other
health-care staff. Nor were any allegations heard about deliberate
ill-treatment by the Ministry of Internal Affairs staff responsible for the
security of the “forensic” wards of the hospital, on which the CPT’s
delegation focused its attention. However, the CPT has stressed that the
presence – within the perimeter of the building housing these wards – of
uniformed and armed security guards clearly had an intimidating effect on
patients and could hardly contribute to diminishing tensions and mistrust
among them.
224. Staffing levels could be considered as adequate as regards
psychiatrists. However, there was a clear need to reinforce substantially
the team of specialists qualified to provide therapeutic and rehabilitative
activities (i.e. psychologists, occupational therapists, psychotherapists
and social workers), and to increase the number of nurses and orderlies. The
Committee has also invited the Armenian authorities to consider the
possibility of security staff working inside psychiatric establishments
being recruited and trained by the Ministry of Public Health.
225. Patients’ living conditions reflected the fact that the
financial resources available to the hospital did not permit the carrying
out of any major refurbishment. The wards were all in a more or less
dilapidated condition, with the “forensic” wards being in urgent need of
repair. Recommendations aimed at remedying the shortcomings observed have
been made; the overriding objective should be to provide a positive,
therapeutic environment for patients.
226. Living conditions in the ward for forensic psychiatric assessment
were totally unacceptable, and were the subject of an immediate observation
under Article 8, paragraph 5 of the Convention. The persons concerned were
being denied certain of the basic safeguards which should be guaranteed to
all persons deprived of their liberty (in particular, daily outdoor exercise
of at least one hour and contact with the outside world). Further, the
environment in the ward was not conducive to accurate psychiatric
assessment. The CPT has made several recommendations on these matters.
227. Psychiatric treatment in the hospital as a whole – and in
particular in the compulsory treatment wards – relied almost exclusively on
pharmacotherapy. The supply of basic psychiatric medication appeared to be
adequate. In this context, the CPT has recommended that the Armenian
authorities strive to develop the possibilities for therapeutic and
psycho-social activities.
228. As regards formal safeguards in the context of involuntary
hospitalisation, in the light of the information gathered the Committee has
recommended the taking of steps to guarantee that, in the course of
compulsory admission and treatment, patients are effectively in a position
to have access to legal advice. Further, all patients should have
unrestricted possibilities to lodge confidential complaints to appropriate
outside bodies.
E. Military detention facilities
229. The delegation received a few allegations of ill-treatment of
persons who had recently been held in military detention facilities. These
allegations concerned, in the main, random blows, humiliation and verbal
abuse. The CPT has recommended that the relevant authorities deliver to
military personnel in charge of detained persons the clear message that all
forms of ill-treatment, including humiliation and verbal abuse, are not
acceptable.
230. As regards conditions of detention, cells in the four
establishments visited were generally in an adequate state of repair and
cleanliness, and no evidence of overcrowding at any time was found. However,
they displayed a number of other important shortcomings, which have been the
subject of specific recommendations by the Committee. In particular,
lighting and ventilation in the cells must be improved. Further, all
detainees undergoing disciplinary confinement should be provided with
mattresses and blankets at night.
F. Action on the CPT’s recommendations, comments and requests for
information
231. The various recommendations, comments and requests for information
formulated by the CPT are listed in Appendix I.
232. As regards more particularly the CPT’s recommendations, having
regard to Article 10 of the Convention, the CPT requests the Armenian
authorities:
i. to provide within six months an interim response
giving details of how it is intended to implement the CPT’s recommendations
and, as the case may be, containing an account of action already taken (N.B.
the Committee has indicated the urgency of certain of its recommendations);
ii. to provide within twelve months a follow-up
response providing a full account of action taken to implement the CPT’s
recommendations.
The CPT trusts that it will also be possible for the Armenian
authorities to provide, in the above-mentioned interim responses, reactions
to the comments formulated in this report which are listed in Appendix I as
well as replies to the requests for information made.
APPENDIX I
LIST OF THE CPT’S RECOMMENDATIONS, COMMENTS
AND REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION
A. Establishments under the authority of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs
Preliminary remarks
recommendations
– appropriate steps to be taken to stamp out the practices
referred to in paragraph 16.
requests for information
– comments of the Armenian authorities on the fact that at least
certain of the practices described in paragraph 15 of the report, appear to
be at variance with the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure and all of which entail a heightened risk of ill-treatment
(paragraph 15).
Torture and other forms of physical ill-treatment
recommendations
– a very high priority to be given to professional training for
police officers of all ranks and categories, including in modern
investigation techniques. Experts not belonging to the police force should
be involved in this training (paragraph 20);
– an aptitude for interpersonal communication to be a major factor
in the process of recruiting police officers and, during the training of
such officers, considerable emphasis to be placed on acquiring and
developing interpersonal communication skills (paragraph 20);
– the relevant national authorities as well as senior police
officers to make it clear to police officers that the
ill-treatment of persons in their custody is not acceptable and will be
dealt with severely (paragraph 20);
– all criminal suspects taken into police custody to be physically
brought before the judge who must decide on the application of a preventive
measure (paragraph 21);
– whenever a judge receives an allegation of ill-treatment by the
police, he should immediately request a medical examination of the person
concerned and take the necessary steps to ensure that the allegation is
properly investigated. Such an approach should be followed whether or not
the person concerned bears visible external injuries. Further, even in the
absence of an express complaint, the judge should request a medical
examination whenever there are other grounds (e.g. visible injuries, a
person’s general appearance or demeanour) to believe that ill-treatment may
have occurred (paragraph 21);
– the record drawn up by prison doctors following a medical
examination of a newly-arrived prisoner to contain: (i) a full account of
statements made by the person concerned which are relevant to the medical
examination (including his description of his state of health and any
allegations of ill-treatment), (ii) a full account of objective medical
findings based on a thorough examination, and (iii) the doctor’s conclusions
in the light of (i) and (ii), indicating the degree of consistency between
any allegations made and the objective medical findings. Whenever injuries
are recorded which are consistent with allegations of ill-treatment made,
the record should be systematically brought to the attention of the relevant
authority. Further, the results of every examination, including the
above-mentioned statements and the doctor’s conclusions, should be made
available to the detained person and his lawyer (paragraphs 22 and 115);
– all medical examinations to be conducted out of the hearing
and – unless the doctor concerned expressly requests otherwise in a
particular case – out of the sight of law enforcement officials and other
non-medical staff (paragraph 22).
Safeguards against the ill-treatment of persons deprived of their
liberty
recommendations
– all persons deprived of their liberty by the police in Armenia –
for whatever reason – to be granted the right to inform a close relative or
a third party of their choice of their situation, as from the
very outset of their deprivation of liberty (i.e. from the moment when they
are obliged to remain with the police) (paragraph 26);
– any possibility exceptionally to delay the exercise of the right
to have the fact of one’s custody notified to a relative or a third party to
be clearly circumscribed in law, made subject to appropriate safeguards
(e.g. any delay to be recorded in writing with the reasons therefor and to
require the approval of a senior police officer unconnected with the case at
hand or of a prosecutor) and applied for as short a time as possible
(paragraph 26);
– the Armenian authorities to take steps to ensure that the right
of access to a lawyer for persons in police custody applies as from the very
outset of their deprivation of liberty (and not only when the person is
formally declared a suspect). The right of access to a lawyer must also be
enjoyed by anyone who is under a legal obligation to attend – and stay at –
a police establishment (e.g. as a “witness”), as well as by persons in
administrative detention (paragraph 29);
– the right of persons detained by the police to be examined by a
doctor to be expressly guaranteed. This right should exist as from the very
outset of deprivation of liberty (i.e. not only after the person has been
formally declared a suspect) and should include the right to be examined, if
the person concerned so wishes, by a doctor of his own choice, in addition
to any medical examination carried out by a doctor called by the police
(paragraph 32).
– the provisions on access to a doctor should also stipulate that:
? all medical examinations should be conducted out of the hearing
and – unless the doctor concerned expressly requests otherwise in a given
case – out of the sight of police officers;
? the results of every examination, as well as any relevant
statements by the detained person and the doctor’s conclusions, should be
formally recorded by the doctor and made available to the detainee and his
lawyer
(paragraph 32);
– the form setting out the rights of persons in police custody to
be given systematically to such persons as from the very outset of their
deprivation of liberty (and not only when they are formally declared
suspects). The contents of this form should reflect the recommendations made
in paragraphs 26, 29 and 32 of the report. The form should be available in
an appropriate range of languages. Further, the persons concerned should be
systematically asked to sign a statement attesting that they have been
informed of their rights (paragraph 35);
– the Armenian authorities to supplement the provisions already
existing in the Code of Criminal Procedure by drawing up a comprehensive
code of conduct for police interviews (paragraph 37);
– steps to be taken immediately to ensure that police custody
records are properly maintained (paragraph 38);
– steps to be taken immediately to ensure that whenever a person
is deprived of his liberty by the police, for whatever reason, this fact is
formally recorded without delay. Further, once a person detained has been
placed in a cell, all instances when he is subsequently removed from the
cell should be recorded in the custody record; that record should state the
date and time when the detained person is removed from the cell, the
location to which he is taken and the officers responsible for taking him,
the purpose for which he has been taken, and the time and date of his return
(paragraph 39);
– measures to be taken to extend the system of visits by the
Prosecutor General and his subordinate prosecutors so as to cover persons
under administrative arrest (paragraph 40);
– the Armenian authorities to bring the considerations set out in
paragraph 42 of the report to the attention of all prosecutors and other
bodies responsible for carrying out visits to places of detention. These
considerations should also be taken into account when defining the remit and
the powers of the monitoring group referred to in paragraph 41 of the report
(paragraph 42).
comments
– the Armenian authorities are invited to explore the possibility
of introducing a standard, single and comprehensive custody record
(paragraph 38).
requests for information
– comments of the Armenian authorities on the fact that many
detained persons met by the delegation expressed dissatisfaction with the
manner in which ex officio lawyers had performed their functions (paragraph
30);
– details of the system of legal assistance for detained persons,
in particular the procedure for appointment of ex officio lawyers, their
remuneration, etc. (paragraph 30);
– copies of reports drawn up by the Presidential Committee for
Human Rights following visits to police establishments in 2001 and 2002
(paragraph 41);
– further information about the monitoring group of
representatives of civil society, to be set up pursuant to Section 47 of the
Law on the Treatment of Arrestees and Detainees (composition, powers,
working methods, etc.), as well as a copy of the relevant rules and
regulations pertaining to it, once they have been issued (paragraph 41).
Conditions of detention
recommendations
– the Armenian authorities to take steps at temporary detention
centres to:
? ensure that all detainees are offered adequate living space; the
objective should be at least 4 m² per person;
? provide adequate in-cell lighting (including access to natural
light) and ventilation;
? maintain the cells and common sanitary facilities in a
satisfactory state of repair and hygiene;
? ensure that all detainees (including those held for
administrative violations) are offered a mattress and blankets at night;
? ensure that administrative detainees are able to take a hot
shower on arrival and at least once a week during their period of detention;
? ensure that all detainees are offered food – sufficient in
quantity and quality – at normal meal times;
? put an end to deprivation of outdoor exercise as a disciplinary
punishment.
(paragraph 49);
– the Armenian Ministry of Internal Affairs to remind all
establishments falling under its responsibility that holding cells/cubicles
for persons suspected of administrative violations should not be used for
accommodating detainees for longer than 3 hours (paragraph 52);
– all holding cells/cubicles measuring less than 2 m² to be
withdrawn from service (paragraph 52);
– measures to be taken to ensure that all holding cells/cubicles
which may remain in service have adequate lighting and ventilation, and are
maintained in a good state of repair and cleanliness (paragraph 52).
B. Establishments under the authority of the Ministry of National
Security
recommendations
– measures to be taken as a matter of priority at the Isolator of
the Ministry of National Security in Yerevan in order to:
? substantially improve activities for persons in pre-trial
detention held at the establishment. They should be allowed to have radio
and television sets in their cells. Further, an appropriate range of
out-of-cell activities should be offered to them; the basement area might
usefully be exploited for this purpose;
? ensure that persons detained in the establishment have the
possibility to maintain adequate contact with the outside world. The
relevant provisions of the Law on the Treatment of Arrestees and Detainees
should be applied fully (paragraph 61);
– in the light of the remarks made in paragraphs 55, 56 and 58 of
the report, measures to be taken in order to ensure that:
? all the cells, as well as the shower facility, are maintained in
a satisfactory state of repair and cleanliness;
? improvements are made to the establishment’s exercise yards;
? the vacant doctor’s post is filled;
? the health-care service is adequately equipped and provided with
necessary materials;
? medical confidentiality is respected;
? the procedure of medical screening on arrival meets the
requirements set out in the recommendation made in paragraph 22 of the
report.
(paragraph 61).
requests for information
– confirmation that persons detained at the Isolator of the
Ministry of National Security in Yerevan have the possibility to send
confidential complaints to an appropriate outside authority, and that steps
are now being taken to inform them of that possibility (paragraph 61).
C. Prison establishments
Preliminary remarks
recommendations
– the standard of living space per prisoner to be increased to at
least 4 m² (paragraph 65).
comments
– the Armenian authorities are invited to vigorously pursue the
legislative programme pertaining to the prison system (paragraph 65).
requests for information
– the timetable for the replacement of perimeter staff of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs with Ministry of Justice personnel in the
remaining 4 penitentiary establishments in Armenia (including the Hospital
for Prisoners and Erebuni and Sevan Prisons) (paragraph 63);
– the CPT would like to be kept abreast of ongoing developments as
regards the legislative programme pertaining to the prison system (paragraph
65).
Ill-treatment
recommendations
– the requisite aptitude for interpersonal communication to be a
major factor in the process of recruiting prison officers and, during their
induction and in-service training, considerable emphasis to be placed on
acquiring and developing interpersonal communication skills. Building
constructive relations with prisoners should be recognised as a fundamental
requirement for effective performance of the prison officer’s role
(paragraph 68).
requests for information
– the following information in respect of 2001 and 2002:
? the number of complaints lodged concerning ill-treatment by prison
officers and the number of disciplinary and/or criminal proceedings
initiated as a result of those complaints;
? an account of the outcome of the above-mentioned proceedings (verdict,
sentence/sanction imposed).
(paragraph 67).
Conditions of detention
recommendations
– the Armenian authorities to take steps
at Nubarashen and Gyumri Prisons:
? to ensure a living space of at least 4 m² per prisoner;
? to gradually improve the state of repair and decoration of the
premises, having regard to the remarks made in paragraphs 70 to 81 of the
report; in this context, a high priority should be given to the upgrading of
prisoner accommodation on the ground level of the main building of
Nubarashen Prison and, as regards Gyumri Prison, of the cells referred to in
paragraphs 79 and 80 of the report as well as the establishment’s central
bathroom;
? to ensure that the in-cell toilets are kept reasonably clean;
at Nubarashen Prison:
? to remove the remaining devices blocking windows of prisoner
accommodation;
at Gyumri Prison:
? to improve the central heating system;
? to review the partitioning of the in-cell toilets, in order
to ensure adequate privacy;
? to ensure that prisoners accommodated in the
establishment’s “quarantine” cell are always provided with a mattress at
night
(paragraph 83);
– the Armenian authorities to make determined efforts to develop
activities for prisoners at Nubarashen and Gyumri Prisons, in the light of
the remarks set out in paragraph 85 of the report (paragraph 85);
– steps to be taken to:
? ensure that inmates at Nubarashen Prison are offered the
possibility to take at least one hour of outdoor exercise every day
(including during weekends);
? upgrade the outdoor exercise facilities at Gyumri and
Nubarashen Prisons, in order to allow prisoners to physically exert
themselves
(paragraphs 85 and 101);
– steps to be taken at Erebuni and Sevan Prisons:
? to reduce occupancy levels in the dormitories; the aim should
be to provide in due course a minimum living space of 4 m² per prisoner;
? to complete the refurbishment of prisoner accommodation areas;
? to ensure an appropriate level of cleanliness in all
dormitories
(paragraph 94);
– ways to be found to allow inmates at Sevan Prison at least one
hot shower per week (paragraph 94);
– the Armenian authorities to undertake a thorough examination of
the means of providing appropriate activity programmes at Erebuni and Sevan
Prisons, for example by making better use of the available facilities
(production sites, “club rooms”; outdoor areas etc.)
(paragraph 97);
– the Armenian authorities to fundamentally revise the regime
applicable to prisoners sentenced to death, in the light of the remarks set
out in paragraph 102 of the report
(paragraph 102);
– the Armenian authorities to review the current practice of
routine handcuffing of prisoners sentenced to death when taken out of their
cells, in the light of the remarks set out in paragraph 103 of the report
(paragraph 103).
comments
– prisoners who are in a situation of vulnerability should never
be accommodated under material conditions which are inferior to those
prevailing on normal location (paragraph 74);
– newly-arrived prisoners should not be located alongside inmates
subject to segregation for infringements of discipline. Alternative, better
facilities should be found (paragraph 91);
– the Armenian authorities are invited to improve further the
possibilities for prisoners sentenced to death to receive visits from
relatives. The visiting entitlement for the prisoners concerned should be
aligned with that of other sentenced inmates (paragraph 100);
requests for information
– confirmation that the “reconstruction works” concerning the
sanitary facilities at Erebuni and Sevan Prisons have been completed
(paragraph 92);
– timetable for implementation of the plans to set up a woodwork
shop at Sevan Prison (paragraph 95);
– a copy of the regulations redefining and strengthening the role
of the “social rehabilitation sections” in Armenian prisons, once they have
been issued (paragraph 98).
Health-care services
recommendations
– at Sevan Prison, at least one of the vacant doctors’ posts to be
filled as a matter of urgency (paragraph 107);
– the nursing staff resources (i.e. feldshers and nurses) at the
four prison establishments visited to be increased (paragraph 108);
– the position of the prisoners working as orderlies at Nubarashen
and Sevan Prisons (as well as other penal establishments in Armenia) to be
reviewed, in the light of the considerations set out in paragraph 109 of the
report (paragraph 109);
– the psychiatric/psychological care resources at the four prison
establishments visited to be strengthened (paragraph 111);
– the situation of prisoners under psychiatric observation at
Nubarashen Prison to be reviewed as a matter of urgency (paragraph 111);
– efforts to be made to remedy the material shortcomings observed
in the health-care facilities of the establishments visited (paragraph 112);
– the Armenian authorities to take measures without delay to
ensure the supply of appropriate medicines and related materials to the
prisons visited and, if necessary, to other penitentiary establishments in
Armenia (paragraph 113);
– the procedure recommended in paragraph 22 also to be followed
whenever a prisoner is medically examined following a violent episode in
prison (paragraph 115);
– the manner in which personal medical files are handled in
Armenian penitentiary establishments to be reviewed, in the light of the
remarks set out in paragraph 116 of the report (paragraph 116);
– the Armenian authorities to strengthen tuberculosis control in
all prison establishments, especially through adequate screening of the
inmate population, regular supply of anti-tuberculosis medication and
related materials in sufficient quantities, and appropriate monitoring of
the distribution and taking of such medication. In this latter respect, the
number of paramedical staff responsible for this task should be increased in
the four prisons visited (paragraph 125);
– steps to be taken to ensure that in all penal establishments
throughout Armenia, material conditions for inmates with tuberculosis are
conducive to the improvement of their health. In particular, in addition to
natural light and good ventilation, there must be an absence of
overcrowding. Care should also be taken to ensure that the inmates concerned
are able to maintain a standard of personal hygiene consistent with the
requirements of their state of health. Further, prisoners with tuberculosis
should be provided with an adequate diet (paragraph 125);
– tuberculosis control to be effected in a consistent manner
across the prison system, and in accordance with international standards, as
defined by the WHO and ICRC. In this connection, prison doctors should
receive appropriate training and be provided with written instructions
concerning new approaches to tuberculosis control (paragraph 125);
– the Armenian authorities to devise a policy aimed at putting an
end to the practice of ostracising HIV+ prisoners. That policy should
provide inter alia for a programme of education and information for both
prison staff and prisoners about methods of transmission, means of
protection, etc. When, exceptionally, temporary segregation of HIV+
prisoners is necessary (e.g. for their own protection or pending transfer to
a hospital facility), the inmates concerned should always be held under
appropriate conditions (paragraph 128);
– the situation of prisoners on hunger-strike to be reviewed at
Nubarashen and Erebuni Prisons (as well as at other prison establishments in
Armenia) (paragraph 129);
– serious efforts to be made at the Hospital for Prisoners in
Yerevan in order to:
? improve material conditions for patients, taking due account of
the remarks made in paragraph 133 of the report; in particular, urgent steps
must be taken to ensure that all rooms enjoy adequate access to natural
light (by removing the shutters obstructing windows), are protected from the
cold (through the fitting of window panes and the installation of an
efficient heating system) and are maintained in a good state of repair;
? ensure that all patients have ready access to adequate and clean
toilet and washing facilities; measures should also be taken to provide all
patients with the possibility to take a hot shower – in decent and hygienic
conditions – at least once per week;
? upgrade the hospital’s medical equipment and ensure a regular
supply of appropriate medication and materials;
? reinforce the hospital’s nursing staff resources;
? improve the treatment of patients in the psychiatric ward; the
aim should be to offer a range of therapeutic and rehabilitative activities,
including access to occupational therapy, group and individual
psychotherapy. It is also desirable to offer these patients some educational
activities and suitable work;
? remedy the shortcomings observed in the seclusion room for
psychiatric patients;
? ensure that every instance of physical restraint and/or seclusion
of a patient is recorded in a specific register established for that purpose
(in addition to the patient’s file). The entry should include the times at
which the measure began and ended, the circumstances of the case, the
reasons for resorting to the measure, the name of the doctor who ordered or
approved it, and an account of any injuries sustained by patients or staff;
? ensure full confidentiality of medical data
(paragraph 143).
comments
– a person competent to provide first aid, preferably with a
recognised nursing qualification, should always be present on prison
premises, including at night and weekends
(paragraph 108);
– tackling effectively the problem of tuberculosis will require a
combined effort by all relevant Ministries (paragraph 126);
– the application of physical restraints for a period of days
cannot have any therapeutic justification (paragraph 139);
– there is no medical justification for placing a prisoner in an
infectious diseases ward solely on the grounds that he is HIV+ (paragraph
141);
– with respect to the Hospital for Prisoners in Yerevan, the
Armenian authorities are invited to:
? provide more varied food to patients, including special medical
diets;
? make efforts to fill the vacant doctors’ posts;
? explore the possibility of developing the range of activities
available to patients in general
(paragraph 143).
requests for information
– copies of the draft standards for the medical treatment of
prisoners, once they have been finalised, and of the new programme of
psychiatric care in prison (paragraph 104);
– comments of the Armenian authorities on a greater involvement
of the Ministry of Public Health in the area of prison health care services,
in particular as regards their organisation and assessment (paragraph 105);
– comments of the Armenian authorities on existing arrangements
for ensuring external specialist consultations at Gyumri and Sevan Prisons
(paragraph 110);
– a copy of all rules and regulations dealing with the subject of
the management of inmates on hunger-strike (paragraph 130);
– confirmation that, following the entry into service of the new
TB ward at the Hospital for Prisoners in Yerevan, the DOTS strategy for
tuberculosis control has been introduced at the hospital (paragraph 143).
Other issues of relevance to the CPT’s mandate
recommendations
– the Armenian authorities to take immediate steps to ensure that
the right of remand prisoners to visits by relatives is rendered fully
effective in practice. These steps must include duly informing inmates about
their right to visits (paragraph 146);
– steps to be taken to increase the capacity of the visiting
facilities at Nubarashen and Gyumri Prisons, and the possibility of moving
to more open visiting arrangements for remand prisoners to be explored
(paragraph 147);
– steps to be taken to formally guarantee the right of prisoners
facing disciplinary charges to be heard in person (paragraph 152);
– the Armenian authorities to take steps to ensure that no
prisoner is put in a position to exercise power over other prisoners
(paragraph 153);
– the situation in the disciplinary/segregation units in the four
prisons visited to be reviewed, in the light of the remarks set out in
paragraph 156 of the report. In particular, a minimum living space of 4 m²
per prisoner should always be ensured, as well as access to natural light
and adequate artificial lighting and ventilation (paragraph 156);
– the Armenian authorities to review the complaints procedures,
with a view to ensuring that prisoners can make complaints to appropriate
authorities within and outside the prison system on a truly confidential
basis. If necessary, the relevant rules and regulations should be changed
(paragraph 159).
comments
– the Armenian authorities are encouraged to vigorously pursue
their efforts in the area of prison staff training, including at the
induction stage (paragraph 144).
requests for information
– more information on the draft law on the selection and training
of prison staff (content, expected date of entry into force, etc.)
(paragraph 144);
– the precise regulations governing access to a telephone for
prisoners (paragraph 149);
– comments of the Armenian authorities on the matters raised in
paragraph 150 of the report concerning prisoners’ correspondence (paragraph
150);
– confirmation that prisoners have the right to appeal to a
higher authority against any disciplinary sanctions imposed (paragraph 152);
– more information on the procedure by which placement in a PKT
cell is decided
(paragraph 154).
D. Psychiatric establishments (Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric
Hospital)
Ill-treatment
comments
– the Armenian authorities are invited to explore ways of ensuring
perimeter security of the building housing the “forensic” wards at the
Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital, without exposing patients from
those wards to the view of armed guards (paragraph 164).
Staff
recommendations
– the Armenian authorities to take steps at the Nubarashen
Republican Psychiatric Hospital to:
? reinforce substantially the team of specialists qualified to
provide therapeutic and rehabilitation activities, by increasing the number
of psychologists and occupational therapists, and employing psychotherapists
and social workers;
? increase the number of nurses and orderlies employed at the
hospital;
? provide nursing staff with specialised (initial and ongoing)
training in psychiatry;
? ensure that orderlies receive adequate training before being
assigned to ward duties
(paragraph 167);
– steps to be taken to review the procedures for the selection of
security staff employed at the Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital
and their initial and ongoing training. Detailed regulations concerning the
duties of security staff working in psychiatric hospitals should be adopted
(paragraph 168).
comments
– the Armenian authorities should consider the possibility of
security staff working inside psychiatric establishments being recruited and
trained by the Ministry of Public Health (paragraph 168).
Patients’ living conditions
recommendations
– steps to be taken to refurbish thoroughly all patient
accommodation areas – including the toilets, showers, kitchens and
canteens – at the Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital, and especially
in Wards 5 and 7. The overriding objective should be to provide a positive,
therapeutic environment. This involves, inter alia, offering the patients
more congenial and personalised surroundings (paragraph 173);
– steps to be taken at the Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric
Hospital in order to:
? maintain all accommodation areas in a clean and hygienic
condition;
? provide patients with lockable space for their personal
belongings;
? provide patients with an adequate range of basic personal
hygiene items;
? ensure that patients’ bedding and clothes are cleaned at regular
intervals.
(paragraph 173).
Treatment and regime
recommendations
– the Armenian authorities to strive to develop the possibilities
for therapeutic and psycho-social rehabilitation activities at the
Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital, in particular as regards
patients from Wards 5 and 7 (paragraph 178);
– the conditions under which patients from Wards 5 and 7 of the
Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital take outdoor exercise to be
improved (paragraph 178);
– systematic screening for tuberculosis of all newly-arrived
patients to be introduced at the Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital
(paragraph 179).
Ward 6 for persons undergoing forensic psychiatric assessment
recommendations
– steps to be taken at Ward 6 of the Nubarashen Republican
Psychiatric Hospital to:
? improve living conditions in the rooms, in the first place by
removing the shutters and bricks obstructing the windows;
? provide a more congenial and personalised environment for
persons held on the ward, in particular by allowing them a reasonable number
of personal belongings;
? ensure a regular supply of an appropriate range of personal
hygiene products (soap, toothbrush, toothpaste, toilet paper, etc.);
? develop psycho-social activities for persons held on the ward;
? ensure that the possibilities for persons held on the ward to
maintain contact with the outside world are not being unduly restricted
(paragraph 185).
requests for information
– without further delay, information on the steps taken in
response to the immediate observation made by the CPT’s delegation
concerning the living conditions at the ward for forensic psychiatric
assessment of the Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital (paragraph
181);
– without further delay, information about the steps taken in
response to the immediate observation concerning daily outdoor exercise of
at least one hour for all persons undergoing psychiatric forensic assessment
at the Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric Hospital whose medical condition so
permits (paragraph 182).
Means of restraint
recommendations
– detailed instructions on the use of means of restraint to be
drawn up. Such instructions should make clear that initial attempts to
restrain aggressive behaviour should, as far as possible, be non-physical
(e.g. verbal instruction) and that where physical restraint is necessary, it
should in principle be limited to manual control. Instruments of restraint
should only be used as a last resort, and removed at the earliest
opportunity; they should never be applied, or their application prolonged,
as a punishment (paragraph 188);
– every instance of the physical restraint of a patient to be
recorded in a specific register established for that purpose (in addition to
the patient’s file). The entry should include the times at which the measure
began and ended, the circumstances of the case, the reasons for resorting to
the measure, the name of the doctor who ordered or approved it, and an
account of any injuries sustained by patients or staff (paragraph 188).
comments
– health-care staff must have the main responsibility for the
restraint of agitated and/or violent patients. Any assistance by security
staff in such cases should only be provided at the request of health-care
staff and must conform to the instructions given by such staff (paragraph
188).
Safeguards in the context of involuntary hospitalisation
recommendations
– the Armenian authorities to take steps to guarantee that, in the
course of compulsory admission and treatment, patients are effectively in a
position to have access to legal advice
(paragraph 191);
– the Armenian authorities to take the necessary measures to
guarantee that all patients at the Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric
Hospital have unrestricted possibilities to lodge confidential complaints
with the supervising prosecutor and other appropriate outside bodies.
Further, patients should be systematically informed about the possibility of
making a confidential complaint (paragraph 192);
– an introductory brochure setting forth the hospital routine and
patients’ rights to be devised and issued to each patient on admission, as
well as to their families. Patients unable to understand this brochure
should receive appropriate assistance (paragraph 192).
comments
– the Armenian authorities are invited to examine the
possibilities for improving patients’ contact with the outside world,
including correspondence and access to a telephone
(paragraph 193).
requests for information
– copies of the supervising prosecutor’s inspection reports drawn
up in 2001 and 2002 in respect of the Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric
Hospital (paragraph 194);
– copies of any reports concerning visits carried out by the
Presidential Human Rights Committee to the Nubarashen Republican Psychiatric
Hospital (paragraph 194).
E. Military detention facilities
recommendations
– the relevant authorities to deliver to military personnel in
charge of detained persons the clear message that all forms of
ill-treatment, including humiliation and verbal abuse, are not acceptable
(paragraph 196);
– the Armenian authorities to:
? review access to natural light, artificial lighting and
ventilation in the cells of the four military detention establishments
visited;
? restrict the 6 m² cells at the Central Detention Centre in
Yerevan to single occupancy;
? provide all detainees undergoing disciplinary confinement with
mattresses and blankets at night; if necessary, the relevant statutory rules
should be amended;
? equip the common toilet facilities at the Military Police
Division in Gyumri with suitable partitioning/screening in order to ensure
adequate privacy;
? enable detained servicemen to have a hot shower at least once a
week;
? extend the daily outdoor exercise period for servicemen held on
72-hour detention or remanded in custody to at least one hour
(paragraph 200);
– the keeping of custody records at the Central Detention Centre
and at the Yerevan Division of Military Police to be reviewed (paragraph
201).
requests for information
– details about the procedural safeguards applicable to
disciplinary proceedings in a military context (for example, are the persons
concerned informed of the charges brought? Are they allowed to question the
evidence against them and to present their case? Can they contest the
disciplinary sanction before another authority, including of a judicial
nature?) (paragraph 203).
comments
– anyone held for a prolonged period of time should be offered
appropriate activities (work, sport, etc.) (paragraph 200).
APPENDIX II
LIST OF THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND
NON-GOVERNMENTAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATONS
WITH WHICH THE DELEGATION HELD CONSULTATIONS
A. National authorities
Ministry of Justice
Mr Davit HARUTYUNYAN Minister
Mr Ashot ABOVYAN Deputy Minister
Mr Nikolay ARUSTAMYAN Head of Directorate for
Judicial Reforms
Mr Samvel HOVHANNISYAN Head of Criminal Executive
Department
Mr Varujhan MELKONYAN Deputy Head of Criminal
Executive Department
Mr Hovhannes HOVHANNISYAN Deputy Head of Division for Medical
Services of Criminal Executive Department
Mr Hayk KHEMCHYAN Head of Division for
Penitentiary Reforms of Directorate for Judicial Reforms
Ministry of Public Health
Mr Ararat MKRTCHYAN Minister
Mr Hayk DARBINYAN First Deputy Minister
Mr Tatul HAKOBYAN Deputy Minister
Mr Vahan POGHOSYAN Head of Department for
Organisation of Medical Aid
Mr Hayk GRIGORYAN Head of Division for
International Relations
Ministry of Internal Affairs
Mr Ararat MAHTESYAN First Deputy Director of
Police
Mr Armen YERITSYAN Deputy Director of Police
Mr Eduard GHAZARYAN Chief of Staff
Mr Hovhannes VARYAN Deputy Director of Police
Mr Gagik HAMBARDZUMYAN Head of General Investigation
Department
Mr Valeri KHUBLARYAN Head of Public Order
Department
Mr Artak VARDAZARYAN Head of Information Department
Ministry of National Security
Mr Vladimir SARGSYAN Head of Investigation
Department
Mr Armen ALOYAN Director of Service for
Foreign Relations
Mr Vahagn VARDUMYAN Officer of Service for Foreign
Relations
Ministry of Defence
Mr Haykaram STEPANYAN First Deputy Director of
Military Police
Mr Samvel GHUKASYAN Deputy Director of Military
Police
Prosecutor General’s Office
Mr Vahgarshak VARDANYAN Head of Department for
Supervision of Implementation of Criminal Punishments and Other Measures of
Compulsion
Mr Tatul KHANJYAN Deputy Head of Department
for Supervision of Implementation of Criminal Punishments and Other Measures
of Compulsion
Mr Albert MKRTCHYAN Senior Prosecutor of
Department for Supervision of Implementation of Criminal Punishments and
Other Measures of Compulsion
Presidential Committee for Human Rights
Mr Hovhannes ASRYAN President of the Committee
Mrs Silva MARKOSYAN Coordinator of Current
Works
Mr Hayk ALUMYAN Deputy President of the
Committee. Lawyer
Mr Varujhan ANTONYAN Expert
Mr Sergey HAYRIYAN Expert
B. Non-governmental organisations
Armenian Helsinki Association
Civil Society Development Union
Soldiers’ Mothers’ Committee
“Word and Right”
C. International organisations
Delegation of the ICRC in Yerevan
OSCE Office in Yerevan
[1] Cf. sections 11 (3), 62 (3) as well as 129 (2), 130 (2) and
131 (2) of the CCP.
[2] Cf. sections 134 (2), 135 (2) and 136 (2) of the CCP.
[3] Cf. sections 205 – 209, as well as section 153, of the CCP.
[4] Throughout the whole visit, the delegation met only one
criminal suspect who was actually in police custody.
[5] In this context, it should be noted that the Annual Report
of the Presidential Human Rights Committee of Armenia for 2000 (issued in
2001) states: “Already in its 1998 report, the Committee drew attention to
cases of torture occurring in law enforcement agencies, and to the absence
of appropriate measures to stop them. In this area, the situation remains of
the highest concern (emphasis added).” (ibid., p.1).
[6] Cf. also section 5 (3) of the Law on the Police.
[7] Cf. sections 10 (2), 19 (3) and 63 (1) of the CCP, as well
as section 5 (3) of the Law on the Police.
[8] Cf. also section 5 (2) of the Law on the Police, according
to which “in each case of restriction of the rights and freedoms of a
citizen, the Police employees shall be obliged to present immediately the
grounds for restriction to him/her and explain to him/her his/her rights and
duties”. Section 13 (1) of the Law on the Treatment of Arrestees and
Detainees mentions as one of the rights of persons in police custody the
right “to receive information in his/her mother tongue or other language
he/she is fluent in about his/her rights, freedoms and responsibilities”.
[9] The form in question contained a quotation of section 63 of
the CCP.
[10] The establishment was transferred under the responsibility
of the Ministry of Justice as from 1 January 2003.
[11] In the basement of the establishment the delegation saw
another detention zone with 15 cells (i.e. the same number as in the
operational part of the Isolator). The Head of the establishment told the
delegation that these cells had been withdrawn from service several years
ago; indeed, the cells in question did not appear to have been used in the
recent past. However, most of them were in a quite good state of repair and
were equipped for use.
[12] A moratorium on executions was put in place in 1991. At the
time of the visit, the death penalty was still officially provided for under
the Criminal Code.
[13] As regards the capacity of the five penitentiary
establishments visited, reference is made in this report to the figures
contained in the “List of the criminal-executive institutions” provided by
the Armenian authorities. The information received at local level frequently
deviated from these figures.
[14] Sick female and juvenile prisoners are treated in their
respective establishments or – if it is necessary to hospitalise them – in
general hospitals.
[15] Some 50 sentenced prisoners, employed on various maintenance
duties on the establishment’s premises, were also held in the hospital.
[16] For example, in 2001, the hospital spent approximately 845
AMD (i.e. some 1.34 EUR) per patient per day. This amount included expenses
for medication and food.
[17] The new ward was also expected to accommodate patients from
the existing infectious diseases ward. On 28 February 2003, the Armenian
authorities confirmed that the ward had entered into service in the course
of November 2002.
[18] E.g. some 4 to 5 at Nubarashen Prison.
[19] Cf. Section 17 of the Law on the Treatment of Arrestees and
Detainees.
[20] Female patients declared criminally irresponsible are placed
in ordinary “civil” wards for women.
[21] Among those undergoing psychiatric assessment, nine
persons – who had committed a punishable act of minor gravity – were
accommodated in an ordinary “civil” ward for male patients.
[22] For example, at the time of the visit, urgent repairs of the
roof of the building accommodating the “forensic” wards had just been
completed, and work was beginning on the plumbing and electricity systems.
[23] The ward also occasionally accommodates sentenced prisoners
who develop a mental disorder while in prison and have been referred by a
court for evaluation whether they are fit to continue serving their
sentence.
[24] In addition, pursuant to sections 459 and 469 of the CCP,
the court (and, with respect to a remand prisoner, the investigator, with
subsequent approval by the court) may apply the preventive measure of
placing a person in a psychiatric establishment prior to the definitive
decision as to his/her criminal irresponsibility.
[25] Cf. sections 454, 455, 466 (2) and 467 of the CCP.
[26] Cf. sections 456, 465, 466 and 472 of the CCP.
[27]Throughout the whole visit, the delegation met only a small number of
detainees held by the military (i.e. a total of 10 persons). As regards the
Central Detention Centre of the Military Police in Yerevan, the custody
records indicated that a drop in the number of persons held had occurred
immediately before the CPT’s visit. On 12 October 2002 (i.e. the day of the
delegation’s visit to the facility) only 4 detainees were present (in
contrast to the 12 to 25 persons usually present on any given day).

Maltamedia Daily News, Malta
July 30 2004
Women’s team to fight for bronze medal in Promotion Cup
By MM Sports

Malta will be playing for the bronze medal in the FIBA European
Promotion Cup for Women which is being held in Andorra.
On Thursday, Malta managed to beat Scotland 57-39. The Maltese won
the four sessions 16-15, 13-8, 12-9 and 16-7.
This win gave Malta the right to play in the qualifying phase for the
2006 Commonwealth Games to be held in Melbourne. The qualifying phase
will be held next year in the form of a triangular tournament between
Malta, England and the best placed team between Cyprus and Scotland
in this year’s Promotion Cup. The two best placed teams in the
qualifying phase will earn the right to play in the final phase to be
held in Melbourne in March 2006.
On Friday, the Maltese team was again in action but this time, Malta
was on the losing end as Iceland won 84-58. The top scorers for Malta
were Josephine Grima 18, Sandra Schembri Wismayer 16 and Dorianne
Galea 10.
This was the first loss during the Santino Coppa reign as coach, the
first one in two years. The Icelandic players found the Maltese on a
very bad day collectively especially in the first two sessions. The
Maltese performance improved in the second half but the contest
proved to be more than over.
Malta will now meet Armenia on Saturday in the match for the bronze
medal. But no matter the result, Malta is surely to obtain its best
ever placing in the Promotion Cup.

US State Department “officially registers” Karabakh mission – Azeri paper
Ekspress, Baku
30 Jul 04
Excerpt from report by Hasan Agacan in Azerbaijani newspaper Ekspress
on 30 July headlined “Separatists’ embassy’ is granting visas” and
subheaded ” The diplomatic mission’ of Nagornyy Karabakh’s separatist
regime in Washington has been officially registered at the US State
Department”
The “embassy” of Nagornyy Karabakh’s separatist regime in the USA
yesterday 29 July announced the beginning of “a normal working
regime”. The new “embassy”, which has been located in two rooms of the
Armenian embassy in the USA until recently, has acquired a new
building for itself in Washington.
Passage omitted: details of report from the Armenian press
We obtained another report yesterday that “the embassy of Nagornyy
Karabakh” had been officially registered at the US State Department as
a “diplomatic representative office”. Vardan Barsegyan is the head of
this “embassy-representative office”, Sarkis Kotanchyan and Armen
Kanayan are its main employees.
The separatists’ representative office in Washington also started
granting “visas” to the US citizens who want to visit Nagornyy
Karabakh. For example, the Americans can get a visa for seven or 21
days. The seven-day visa costs 25 dollars, while the 21-day visa costs
35-45 dollars “depending on terms”. In addition, there is a two-dollar
“consular fee”.
US citizens, who want to get “a Nagornyy Karabakh visa”, are advised
to bring a photograph and a foreign passport to Xankandi’s Stepanakert
“embassy” in Washington.
Nagornyy Karabakh’s “Foreign Ministry” has issued a statement on rules
for giving the “visas”. Citizens of Armenia, Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,
representatives of the international organizations operating in
Xankandi, individuals “who have received invitations from Nagornyy
Karabakh’s president, Speaker, prime minister or foreign minister” as
well as teenagers can get “the Nagornyy Karabakh visa” free of charge.

Azeri authorities ban party’s pickets over Armenian officers’ visit
Turan news agency, Baku
30 Jul 04
Baku, 30 July: The Baku mayor’s office has refused to authorize a
series of pickets and protest actions that members of the United
People’s Front of Azerbaijan Party UPFAP were planning to stage in
early August.
A press release issued by the party describes the actions of the
mayor’s office as a “gross violation” of the law “On freedom of
assembly”.
We should remind you that UPFAP activists were going to picket the
Foreign Ministry on 2 August and the Defence Ministry on 3 August.
Protest actions were to be staged outside the US, French, German,
Italian, Greek, Polish and British embassies on 4-13 August.
The UPFAP was going to express its dissatisfaction with the
forthcoming visit to Baku by Armenian officers to participate in NATO
exercises in September.

Azeri minister, Slovenian delegation discuss Karabakh settlement
MPA news agency, Baku
30 Jul 04
Baku, 30 July: Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov today
received a delegation from the Slovenian Foreign Ministry led by
Slovenia’s permanent representative to the OSCE, Janez Lenarcic.
The ministry’s press service told MPA that the meeting discussed a
number of issues of mutual interest. The sides examined Slovenia’s
election as chairman of the OSCE in 2005. In this connection,
Mammadyarov pointed out that the OSCE has taken the role of a mediator
in settling the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, however, it has not
managed this task yet. The foreign minister expressed the hope that
during its chairmanship, Slovenia will make efforts to solve the
problem.

Armenians fire on Azeri village, cause material damage – Azeri TV
Space TV, Baku
30 Jul 04
Presenter in studio The Armenians have fired on the village of Mazam
in Qazax District northwestern Azerbaijan . Our regional correspondent
Elcin Ismayil has the report.
Correspondent by telephone The Armenians have violated the cease-fire
again in the village of Mazam in Qazax District which borders on
Armenia. The Armenian armed forces fired on the village yesterday, 29
July, at about 1400 0900 gmt . Firing at houses, villagers, cattle and
haystacks, the Armenians tried to cause panic in the village. During
the shellfire, the villagers suffered moral and material damage. The
Armenians, who fired incendiary bullets, set fire to haystacks in the
courtyards of villagers Mohubbat Qasimov and Afiq Suleymanov. As a
result, five haystacks were burnt. The shellfire which lasted for
about two hours was silenced by retaliatory fire opened by the
Azerbaijani armed forces.
Elcin Ismayil, Space, Qazax.