Pashinyan Visits Russia To Strengthen Armenian-Russian Relations

Eurasia Review
July 8, 2026

By Eurasianet

Takeaways

  • Russia Seeks Reconciliation — After failing to undermine Nikol Pashinyan’s reelection, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin urged Armenia to reset bilateral relations on a positive footing during Pashinyan’s visit to Yekaterinburg on July 6.
  • Russian Conditions — Moscow called for protection of Russian investors’ interests and warned that Armenia’s EAEU membership is incompatible with its EU aspirations, demanding clarity on Yerevan’s geopolitical direction.
  • Pashinyan’s Cautious Stance — The Armenian prime minister expressed interest in keeping EAEU mechanisms functional and resolving issues constructively, while keeping options open and avoiding major concessions.

(Eurasianet) — After mounting an unsuccessful campaign to sink Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s reelection chances, Russia is now telling him that it is time to bury the hatchet.

Pashinyan traveled to the Siberian city of Yekaterinburg, where on July 6 he met his Russian counterpart, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. After the meeting, Mishustin voiced hope that bilateral relations, which have taken a nosedive in recent years amid Armenia’s geopolitical pivot westwards, can get back on an even keel. 

In effect, Mishustin asked Pashinyan to forget about all the dirty tricks and disinformation that Russia deployed against him during the recent parliamentary election campaign, which nonetheless ended with a decisive victory for the Armenian prime minister’s Civil Contract party. 

“We hope that the new government… will ensure the progressive development of Russian-Armenian relations in the spirit of friendship, good neighborliness, mutual respect and consideration of mutual interests,” the Gazeta.ru news outlet quoted Mishustin as saying.

If Mishustin’s comments were intended as an olive branch, they contained some thorns.

The Armenpress news agency indicated that the Russian prime minister issued a tacit warning to Pashinyan, calling on Yerevan to “maintain a favorable environment for Russian investors” and protect their “legitimate interests.” 

Pashinyan’s response was muted, with the clear intent of keeping his options open.

“We are interested in our participation in the Eurasian Economic Union [EAEU], and we are interested in ensuring that the mechanisms envisaged by the EAEU Treaty function as intended,” Armenpress quoted Pashinyan as saying. 

“We are committed to a constructive approach to discussing and clarifying all issues and nuances. I hope that following today’s talks we will be able to resolve specific issues,” he added.

A major source of bilateral friction revolves around Armenia’s EAEU membership, which Russian officials contend is incompatible with Yerevan’s recent efforts to gain European Union membership. Moscow insists that Armenia can’t be a member of both and has called on the Armenian leadership to choose. With EU membership a distant prospect, Pashinyan has said there’s no need to make an immediate choice.

As part of its campaign to undermine Pashinyan’s government during the run-up to the parliamentary election campaign, Russia imposed import bans on a variety of Armenian food products. 

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Russia’s Losing Hand in the South Caucasus


July 7, 2026

The Kremlin is struggling to reassert its dominance in the South Caucasus as Azerbaijan and Armenia bury the hatchet.
a:hover]:text-red” st1yle=”box-sizing:border-box;border-width:0px;border-style:solid;border-color:currentcolor;font-size:1.125rem;line-height:2rem”>By Fuad Shahbazov
July 7, 2026

Amid pronouncements about the war in Ukraine and confrontation with the West, Vladimir Putin devoted time at June’s St Petersburg Economic Forum to discussing the state of relations with the former Soviet republics sandwiched between Russia and Iran.

His comments came three days before Armenia’s parliamentary elections and the failure of Moscow’s campaign to derail Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s re-election.

Russia’s drive to reassert influence over Yerevan stems from two strategic imperatives: regaining its leverage in the post-2020 peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and preserving its leading role in regional energy and infrastructure projects in an area it likes to call the near abroad. While Moscow has adopted a bellicose tone toward Armenia and has pushed its proxies to resist Pashinyan’s pro-European government, it has stepped up its efforts for reconciliation with Azerbaijan after years of strained relations. Putin even asserted that Russia has “good relations with Azerbaijan. They have always been good and remain so, both in the economy and in the political sphere,” he said.

The truth is that Moscow–Baku ties deteriorated sharply after an AZAL jet was hit by a Russian missile in December 2024, killing 38 people. Azerbaijan demanded an apology and compensation, maintaining a firm and uncompromising position, and has since accused Moscow of intentionally attacking its embassy in Kyiv three times. Russia has also been frustrated by both Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s ties with President Donald Trump’s administration, particularly over critically important transport infrastructure. The Armenian election and the defeat of pro-Putin candidates pushed the Kremlin to work harder to rekindle its relationship with Azerbaijan as it seeks to reassert itself in the region.

The recalibration comes in the face of increasingly complex regional dynamics, intensifying competition over transport corridors, and the ongoing transformation of Eurasia’s economies.

Closer ties with the West will have a “negative impact” on Armenia’s finances, Moscow warned, and it has threatened to switch to imports from its rivals. “If Armenia cuts off trade relations with Russia, we will turn toward Azerbaijan,” Putin’s special representative Boris Titov said.

As well as trade, Russia’s goals in Azerbaijan have focused on logistics and transportation due to its geographical proximity to Iran, Turkey, and Central Asia. Closer ties with Baku would allow Moscow to retain influence over regional transit routes, including the International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC), an objective it has pursued for more than two decades.

The corridor offers Russia a gateway to southern markets through Iran and the Persian Gulf, and a diplomatic thaw would enable Moscow to seek completion of the missing section of the Rasht-Astara railway, via Azerbaijani territory, to make the route through Iran fully operational. Russia has largely been a bystander to the resurgence of the east-west Middle Corridor, a major alternative trade route linking China and Europe via the Caspian basin, and to plans for the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) across Armenia’s Syunik province. It is eager to shoehorn itself into the latter project and is pressuring Armenia to accommodate its interests.

The Kremlin’s renewed emphasis on energy, trade, and logistics in its overtures to Azerbaijan, reinforced by Putin’s claims in St Petersburg, signals that Moscow sees Baku wielding significant influence over the region’s energy and transportation dynamics. For its part, Azerbaijan will seek to pragmatically leverage Moscow’s more positive rhetoric to maintain a balanced relationship.

But it is unlikely to show much enthusiasm for deepening ties with Russia, given the regional volatility and rising security risks. Instead, it will seek to preserve its existing high-level partnerships with Europe, Turkey, China, and Central Asia, which offer it greater strategic diversification and stability.

Fuad Shahbazov is a policy analyst covering regional security issues in the Eurasian region. He regularly provides his short geopolitical insights at @fuadshahbazov. 

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

https://cepa.org/article/russias-losing-hand-in-the-south-caucasus/







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EU accused of ignoring attacks on Armenian Church

Christian News
July 7, 2026

EU accused of ignoring attacks on Armenian Church

Tue Jul 07 2026

by Rachel Huston

The European Union has been accused of ignoring alleged persecution of the Armenian Apostolic Church.

The claim has been made by opposition figure Samvel Karapetyan, a businessman and Russian national who was detained before being placed under house arrest.

He has begun legal action against the EU through the law firm Amsterdam & Partners LLP.

Since Nikol Pashinyan became Armenia’s prime minister in 2018, his government has clashed with the Armenian Apostolic Church, with tensions worsening after Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, a decades-long territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Since then, four bishops have reportedly been imprisoned in pre-trial detention: Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, leader of the “Sacred Struggle” opposition movement, who was arrested on coup-plotting charges; Archbishop Mikael Ajapahyan, who was sentenced to two years in prison for allegedly calling for the government’s overthrow; and Archbishop Arshak Khachatryan and Bishop Mkrtich Proshyan.

In addition, the Church’s leader, Karekin II, Catholicos of All Armenians, was barred from leaving the country in February 2026 as part of a criminal investigation. However, an Armenian court overturned the travel ban on 13 April this year.

Prime Minister Pashinyan has said he is protecting the Church from what he describes as “anti-Christian” and “anti-state” elements.

Karapetyan has accused Brussels of portraying Pashinyan’s government as a “democratic success story” while ignoring what he describes as a crackdown on the Church and opposition figures.

Quoted by Christian Today, Robert Amsterdam, managing partner of Amsterdam & Partners LLP, said: “The European Union has not acted as a neutral observer. It has chosen to align itself with a government that has overseen widespread arrests, targeted its critics, attacked the Church and weakened democratic safeguards.

“Brussels cannot claim to be a defender of democracy while ignoring these abuses and refusing to engage seriously with opposition voices. The EU’s actions have helped shield this government from accountability.”

The EU has rejected the claims. In response to the legal action, a spokesperson pointed to the findings of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which observed Armenia’s elections.

The spokesperson said the election observation mission concluded that the elections “offered voters a genuine choice among political alternatives in a well-run process” and that the legal framework provided a “sound basis for democratic elections”.

The Armenian Apostolic Church is one of the world’s oldest Christian institutions, tracing its roots back nearly 1,700 years, and remains deeply woven into Armenia’s national identity.


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“If the president of the European Commission has this experience in mind, it is a bad experience.” expert

July 7, 2026

On July 2, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, visited Armenia. During the meeting with Nikol Pashinyan in the government building, addressing the question of how the EU supports Armenia in the energy sector, had said.

“Armenia needs a strategic, multi-layered and comprehensive approach to the issue of energy carriers.

That is why a group of experts from the EU will arrive in Armenia next week, we have rich experience with such a situation in Ukraine, Moldova, we have gone through it, we have accumulated a lot of experience, we ourselves have faced problems in the EU. At the same time, we are investing in regional energy security, opening new energy interconnection routes and supporting the formation of stronger regional energy networks. 25 million is included in that program.

International and energy issues expert Armen Manvelyan in other words, if the president of the European Commission is talking about the experience of Ukraine and Moldova, it may be the same experience of the EU, then the result of that experience is as follows: they completely cut off energy supplies from Russia and brought them from other sources.

Read also

  • I’m sorry, dear Tsarukyan, I have to tell you… the Turk is opening champagne… Dear Morkur, go home, why are you dragging us into the war? Arman Abovyan
  • I am not sure if Pashinyan’s visit should be considered as a “breakthrough” or a return to the previous situation. Markedon
  • I heard and was horrified. Is Armenia a testing ground? God forbid they apply the experience of Ukraine and Moldova. It’s a lie, what a 450 million market… Bulgaria’s agriculture was destroyed in 1-2 years. Sergey Manasaryan

“It was mainly the import of liquefied gas from the United States, the import increased from Qatar, they tried to develop solar and wind energy as an alternative to Russian gas and oil. This, in turn, led to the fact that electricity prices increased 3 times. In other words, this can be an alternative to what von der Leyen is offering to Armenia today.” 168.am–Armen Manvelyan said in a conversation with

According to the expert, taking into account the geographical position of Armenia, supplies from other countries to Armenia, in the case of gas, are not possible at all. It is possible to develop electricity in Armenia in connection with solar energy. However, the expert is sure that even in this case, if Armenia becomes completely dependent on solar energy, this means that electricity prices will have to be raised at least 3 times.

“If the president of the European Commission means this experiment, then this is a very bad experiment, the countries he mentioned did not gain a single gram from it, but on the contrary, they suffered, the population suffered, companies, the economy, etc. In particular, they do not have a positive experience to point to and say that they have done something positive.

If, for example, they stop the gas supply from Russia, this will only lead to the deterioration of the general situation of Armenia, the EU has no possibility to offer an alternative to this. The EU does not have gas, on the contrary, it is a gas importer, because the same von der Leyen went to Baku to buy new gas reserves, because they need gas. That’s why when they announce that they offer an alternative to Armenia, it’s more of a political gimmick than a serious energy solution proposal,” emphasized Armen Manvelyan.

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Israel recognizing Armenian Genocide doesn’t go far enough – they must protect

Jerusalem Post
July 7 2026

States do not recognize genocides because they have suddenly discovered a moral conscience. They do so when it aligns with their political, strategic, diplomatic, or domestic interests.

ByBEDROSS DER MATOSSIANJULY 7, 2026 14:00

The Israeli government’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide has generated mixed reactions in the public sphere around the world and in Armenia itself.

Some have welcomed the decision, while others have argued that a government itself widely accused of committing crimes against humanity in Gaza lacks the moral authority to recognize another people’s genocide, suggesting that Israel is even exploiting the issue for gain. 

While I understand the criticism, it rests on a fundamentally flawed understanding of geopolitics.

States do not recognize genocides because they have suddenly discovered a moral conscience. They do so when it aligns with their political, strategic, diplomatic, or domestic interests.

International relations have never been governed by moral idealism but by realpolitik. If morality were the driving force behind statecraft, genocides would not have occurred in the first place, nor would governments have ignored or enabled them whenever it suited their interests.

The notion that recognition of the Armenian Genocide is – or has ever been – a purely moral act is a comforting illusion.

Most states that have recognized the Armenian Genocide have not done so solely out of moral conviction, without domestic lobbying, geopolitical calculations, electoral considerations, or strategic interests.

Every recognition has taken place within a political context. Israel is no exception, and that does not detract from finally doing the right thing.

It is also important to note that while successive Israeli governments refused to recognize the genocide for decades, it was the Armenian National Committee of Jerusalem (ANCJ), together with several Israeli scholars and public figures and academic organizations such as the Zoryan Institute, that sustained the campaign for recognition. 

They devoted a huge effort to educating Israeli society, lobbying decision-makers, and ensuring that the Armenian Genocide did not disappear from the Israeli national conversation.

Considering that, the Israeli government should, as part of the recognition, also have taken concrete steps to address the terrible conditions faced by the Armenian community in east Jerusalem.

Its several thousand members continue to experience discrimination and harassment from ultra-nationalist Jewish groups. Incidents such as spitting on clergy, verbal abuse, and the desecration of sacred sites have become part of the daily reality for many Armenians.

The climate of impunity surrounding these acts has turned such groups into an existential threat to the Armenian community of Jerusalem.

This raises an important question: recognition without meaningful measures to protect a vulnerable minority is little more than ink on paper. This pattern has been evident in many cases of genocide recognition.

Genocide acknowledgment without a genuine commitment to prevention is ultimately of limited value.

Recognition must go hand-in-hand with action

Israel was directly or indirectly complicit in the ethnic cleansing of the Armenians of Artsakh (known in Israel and elsewhere as Nagorno-Karabakh) through its extensive military cooperation with Azerbaijan. 

Some estimates suggest that Israel supplied approximately 70% of Azerbaijan’s arms imports between 2016 and 2020. Haaretz, for example, reported that 92 Azerbaijani military cargo flights landed at Israel’s Ovda Air Base between 2016 and 2020. 

During this period, Azerbaijan acquired a wide range of Israeli military equipment, including intelligence-gathering drones, Hermes UAVs, Harop loitering munitions (“kamikaze drones”), Spike anti-tank missiles, ATMOS self-propelled artillery systems, Cardom mortars, Barak air defense missiles, Searcher and Heron drones, naval patrol vessels, and Typhoon weapon stations.

Equally troubling is the fact that many states that formally recognized the Armenian Genocide failed to take meaningful measures to prevent the ethnic cleansing of Artsakh.

Despite their official recognition of the genocide of 1915, they did not impose significant sanctions on Azerbaijan or take other effective steps to deter the forced displacement of the Armenian population.

As a result, Armenians were uprooted from their historical homeland in Artsakh and continued to witness the destruction of their cultural heritage in territories they inhabited for centuries, all in full view of states that had previously acknowledged the Armenian Genocide. 

This raises a fundamental question: What is the value of genocide recognition if it is not accompanied by a commitment to prevent similar crimes against vulnerable communities?

Since the 19th century, the Armenian question has too often become a pawn in international politics, with the so-called “civilized world” invoking it selectively to advance geopolitical interests rather than consistently defending the rights and security of the Armenian people.

Recognition, if it is to have genuine moral significance, must be accompanied by concrete action to prevent persecution, protect vulnerable populations, and uphold international law.

The writer was born and raised in the Old City of Jerusalem. A Guggenheim Fellow, he is professor of Modern Middle East history and Hymen Rosenberg Professor in Judaic Studies at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln.

https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-901437

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Beirut: Raggi meets Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister

MTV Lebanon
July 7, 2026
Raggi meets Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants Youssef Raggi received Vahan Kostanyan, Armenia’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is visiting Beirut to deliver humanitarian aid from the Armenian government valued at US$150,000.

During the meeting, Kostanyan said that “this assistance, though modest, reflects Armenia’s appreciation for Lebanon and its people.” He also emphasized “Armenia’s steadfast support for Lebanon’s sovereignty and its aspiration to strengthening cooperation and coordination between the two countries across various fields.”

For his part, Minister Raggi thanked Armenia for its initiative and praised “the positive and constructive role that Lebanese Armenians have long played in Lebanon, as well as their contributions across various fields.”

Raggi also affirmed “Lebanon’s steadfast support for Armenia in its struggle to achieve its sovereignty, and for the resilience of the Armenian people and their pursuit of independence and freedom.”

The meeting also addressed developments in Lebanon in light of the framework agreement reached under U.S. mediation. Raggi reiterated that “this agreement is not final but rather serves as a basis for continuing negotiations on the standing disputed issues.” Raggi stressed the need to consolidate the ceasefire, secure a full withdrawal, obtain the release of detainees, and negotiate the demarcation of the land border.

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EU bolsters Armenia against Russia

EURACTIV
July 7, 2026

Visits by Western leaders to Armenia, once rare, have become commonplace in recent months

Politics

Neil Hauer


YEREVAN –  Last Thursday, Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, became the latest high flier to visit Yerevan, Armenia’s capital.

Joined by EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, she  met with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to announce major new support for Armenia

The announced package centred around two themes.

The first, and most acute, related to Armenia’s export sector, currently struggling under a wide-ranging import ban from Russia, Armenia’s primary trading partner.

Dubbed ‘autonomous trade measures,’ these will temporarily liberalise roughly 80% of Armenian exports to the EU, including 99% of Armenian fruits, vegetables and plants once bound for Russia and 91% of alcoholic beverages.

An additional €80 million in financial support was also provided to help diversify Armenia’s trade. 

The second track of initiatives are focused upon Armenia’s ongoing peace process with its neighbour and longtime foe, Azerbaijan.

Von der Leyen announced an additional €20 million in support of projects including skills development, healthcare and de-mining, in conflict zones while promising further support under the auspices of the EU’s ‘Connectivity for Peace Package’. 

The mood on the ground in Yerevan is cautiously optimistic.

Many Armenians are in favour of greater alignment with the West, but most see a balanced foreign policy that includes continued ties with Russia – still the country’s most important economic partner – as preferable.

Recent polling by the International Republican Institute showed that a plurality of Armenians desire close ties with both the EU and Russia as the ideal foreign policy for the country. 

Maintaining cordial relations with Russia, however, may only be getting more difficult.

Moscow began acting with open hostility towards Pashinyan and his government in the weeks leading up to Armenia’s 7 June election, which saw the prime minister reelected with nearly 50% of the vote.

His main two challengers – former president Robert Kocharyan, and Russian Armenian oligarch Samvel Karapetyan – are both closely linked to the Kremlin.

Russia’s imposition of import bans on Armenian goods, allegedly for failing sanitary checks but widely understood as a political measure, began prior to the vote and expanded in scope following its conclusion. 

One more hopeful avenue, actively supported by the EU and US, is the ongoing peace process between Armenia on the one side and Turkey and Azerbaijan on the other.

Work continues on the opening of the Turkey-Armenia border, closed since 1993, while Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, during a meeting with von der Leyen in Baku on Wednesday, stated that Azerbaijan was increasingly supplying Armenia with gas.

(bw)

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Pashinyan travels to Russia, searches for solid ground for Armenian-Russian re

EurasiaNet
July 7, 2026

Russia still displeased while grappling with reality.

Jul 7, 2026

After mounting an unsuccessful campaign to sink Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s reelection chances, Russia is now telling him that it is time to bury the hatchet.

Pashinyan traveled to the Siberian city of Yekaterinburg, where on July 6 he met his Russian counterpart, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. After the meeting, Mishustin voiced hope that bilateral relations, which have taken a nosedive in recent years amid Armenia’s geopolitical pivot westwards, can get back on an even keel. 

In effect, Mishustin asked Pashinyan to forget about all the dirty tricks and disinformation that Russia deployed against him during the recent parliamentary election campaign, which nonetheless ended with a decisive victory for the Armenian prime minister’s Civil Contract party. 

“We hope that the new government… will ensure the progressive development of Russian-Armenian relations in the spirit of friendship, good neighborliness, mutual respect and consideration of mutual interests,” the Gazeta.ru news outlet quoted Mishustin as saying.

If Mishustin’s comments were intended as an olive branch, they contained some thorns.

The Armenpress news agency indicated that the Russian prime minister issued a tacit warning to Pashinyan, calling on Yerevan to “maintain a favorable environment for Russian investors” and protect their “legitimate interests.” 

Pashinyan’s response was muted, with the clear intent of keeping his options open.

“We are interested in our participation in the Eurasian Economic Union [EAEU], and we are interested in ensuring that the mechanisms envisaged by the EAEU Treaty function as intended,” Armenpress quoted Pashinyan as saying. 

“We are committed to a constructive approach to discussing and clarifying all issues and nuances. I hope that following today’s talks we will be able to resolve specific issues,” he added.

A major source of bilateral friction revolves around Armenia’s EAEU membership, which Russian officials contend is incompatible with Yerevan’s recent efforts to gain European Union membership. Moscow insists that Armenia can’t be a member of both and has called on the Armenian leadership to choose. With EU membership a distant prospect, Pashinyan has said there’s no need to make an immediate choice.

As part of its campaign to undermine Pashinyan’s government during the run-up to the parliamentary election campaign, Russia imposed import bans on a variety of Armenian food products. 

https://eurasianet.org/pashinyan-travels-to-russia-searches-for-solid-ground-for-armenian-russian-relations

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A Constitutional Change Needs To Be Armenia’s Next Evolution

FORBES
July 7, 2026

ByIlan Berman,

Contributor.

Last month, a critical geopolitical contest took place in the South Caucasus, when voters in Armenia went to the polls to appoint a new government. The June 7th parliamentary election was about far more than the composition of that country’s legislature. Rather, it constituted a referendum of sorts on its economic and political future.

For most of the post-Cold War era, Armenia had stayed deeply dependent on Russia, both politically and strategically. But over the past several years, under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s leadership, it has undertaken a more independent, sovereign course. This has included a long-overdue mending of fences with regional rival Azerbaijan, involvement in critical connectivity projects like the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) and the Middle Corridor, and deepening ties with both Europe and the United States.

These shifts have drawn Yerevan closer to the West. They have also challenged the influence of Russia and China, both of which have sought in recent years to dominate and direct Eurasian connectivity and trade.

All that helps explain the extraordinary scale of Russia’s efforts to undermine the June vote. Investigations and leaked documents have exposed a broad, coordinated attempt by Moscow to manipulate the Armenian election via information warfare and propaganda. It also weaponized a network of Russian-Armenian oligarchs – whose fortunes are tied to the Russian-dominated regional system – to try and reshape the country’s political landscape. (Most prominently, this has included Samvel Karapetyan, a construction and real estate magnate with close ties to Russian business and politics, who positioned himself as a leader of the anti-Pashinyan opposition despite lacking the constitutional standing to do so on account of his dual Armenian-Russian citizenship.)

The objective was clear: not simply to oust Prime Minister Pashinyan, but to reverse the broader reorientation that the country has pursued in recent years under his guidance. To no avail, however. Pashinyan’s “Civil Contract” Party persevered in the polls, securing a renewed mandate to continue its political course. The question now becomes how best to do so.

Here, Armenia’s constitution should naturally take center stage. In its present form, the country’s foundational document still rests on language that incorporates territorial claims to Azerbaijani land – specifically, a Declaration of independence that references the priority of Armenia’s reunification with the enclave of Karabakh, which is internationally recognized as territory belonging to Baku.

Notably, Pashinyan himself doesn’t seem to hold to this formulation, and the August 2025 framework deal he signed in Washington with Azerbaijan’s President, Ilham Aliyev, codifies an end to the broader conflict between the two countries. But that document alone can’t obviate constitutional provisions a future government might invoke to return to an earlier status quo that’s more favorable to Moscow (and by extension Beijing), and adversarial to everyone else.

Logically, then, the next phase to lock in Armenia’s evolution is a constitutional referendum that resets the terms of its foreign policy, including abandoning claims to territory that have already been settled. One is now being considered for the 2027 timeframe, and the stakes promise to be high. Moreover, passage of such a new compact is far from assured, particularly if the country’s nationalist opposition manages to mobilize effectively.

As long as Armenia’s constitution is still based on territorial claims that conflict with its neighbors, Yerevan’s recent strategic gains can still be reversed. Without that change, the current peace in the South Caucasus might last only as long as the current government remains in power in Yerevan. The United States and Armenia’s allies in the West have a stake in it lasting much longer.

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The Armenian-Russian agenda under the “either-or” principle. What did Pashinyan-Mishus solve?

July 7, 2026

During the last two months, the deep and systemic crisis in Armenian-Russian relations, which is accompanied by harsh rhetoric, serious economic restrictions, and interruption of normal political dialogue, has reached an unprecedented tension point.

Against this background, the day before Nikol Pashinyan’s visit to Yekaterinburg and the meeting with the Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin was an attempt not only to participate in the bilateral economic agenda, but also to restore the dialogue and prevent the further deepening of the crisis of relations by focusing on the issue of solving the economic problems that have arisen.

Pashinyan spoke about the “problematic issues” that have arisen in relations, stating that he expects to “discuss and resolve” them, and Mikhail Mishustin stated that Russia expects the development of Armenian-Russian relations “in the spirit of friendship, neighborliness, mutual respect and consideration of each other’s interests.”

Pashinyan also assured that Armenia is committed to the further development of relations with Russia both before and after the elections. “And, of course, we are interested in our participation in the EAEU and ensuring that the mechanisms provided for in the EAEU agreement work as intended,” he said.

Read also

  • I’m sorry, dear Tsarukyan, I have to tell you… the Turk is opening champagne… Dear Morkur, go home, why are you dragging us into the war? Arman Abovyan
  • Nothing can suffocate Pashinyan. he is not legitimate. Samvel Karapetyan
  • Parliamentary Mandate, Boycott and Voter’s Will

Mishustin also emphasized that it is important for the Armenian government to continue creating a comfortable environment for Russian investors. According to him, Moscow expects that their rights and legal interests will be respected.

The closed part of the meeting, the negotiations lasted one and a half hours. However, the main question remains open. Did this meeting in Yekaterinburg become the beginning of the restoration of relations, normalization, or was it just a diplomatic pause without a political solution to the deep Armenian-Russian contradictions?

168.amin a conversation with Russian analyst Alexander Khramchikhin said that he does not think that the visit actually led to a serious unloading of bilateral relations, because the existing contradictions between Moscow and Yerevan remain fundamental and unchanged.

According to him, Russia does not separate politics and economy, it considers them in one system, whereas the Armenian side currently wants to maintain economic cooperation with the Russian Federation, that is, privileges, benefits without a political component, as it declares its desire for European integration.

“For Moscow, the issue is the “either-or” principle, requiring Armenia to specify its political vector, because it is not possible to simply combine the EAEU and the European Union. Therefore, if the political orientation is towards the EU, then the economy too, it is assumed that one day it will turn to the other side, so today the EAEU membership of RA is a temporary circumstance that solves the current economic problem.

On the other hand, Russia perceives the EU as a security and integration threat,” he said.

Khramchikhin recalled the recent high-level European visit to Armenia.

“The recent visit of Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, to Yerevan proved that everything is very serious in the relations between Armenia and the EU. Therefore, in case of such systemic, deep-seated political disagreement, I do not think that the visit and meeting with Mishustin solves a serious political problem. It is more likely to think that it solves the issue of the continuation of the dialogue, but the deep contradictions and the political problem remain,” he said.

As a result, according to Khramchikhin, this visit should be considered not as a resolution of the crisis, but as a tactical step to postpone the escalation and alleviate the economic problems.

“However, in the political sphere, Armenia’s activity towards Europe and Russia’s demand to Armenia create a field of contradictions, where diplomatic rhetoric can no longer mask the difficult situation. One of the future milestones of Armenian-Russian relations may be the final rupture, if one of the parties does not make concessions. However, it seems unlikely at the moment,” said Russian analyst Alexander Khramchikhin.

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