Associated Press Worldstream
October 20, 2004 Wednesday 11:23 AM Eastern Time
Europe hopes to carve new role in world affairs through “ring of
friends”
ROBERT WIELAARD; Associated Press Writer
BRUSSELS, Belgium
The 25-member European Union – now comprising eight ex-communist
nations and considering membership for Muslim-dominated Turkey – is
busily crafting a “Wider Europe” as well. It would stretch far beyond
the EU’s formal borders and aim to lock a diversity of nearby lands
into democracy and good neighborly relations through tailor-made
programs of trade and assistance.
But the blueprint for a “ring of friends” making Europe’s
neighborhood safe, secure and prosperous comes with complications:
There is Israel and its nuclear ambiguity and security morass.
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus show creeping authoritarianism. Libya may
be emerging from the cold, but it is still a dictatorship. The
Balkans remain a scary doorstep.
In many ways, however, this may be the very point.
The EU’s outreach program to sometimes dangerous places beyond its
borders marks a dramatic shift in Europe’s perception of how it can
play a key – perhaps central – role in world affairs: The strategy is
one of exploiting economic clout to both achieve influence on the
world stage and shape the rim of Europe. Perhaps Europe might even
school America – and its many Euro-cynics – in the merits of
persuasion rather than force.
“We want to strengthen the instruments available to us to become a
dynamic protagonist in the world. The EU has a leading role to play
in securing human rights and democracy,” said Austrian Foreign
Minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner, who is set to take over as the EU
external relations commissioner on Nov. 1.
If the United States has in the post 9/11 era become ever more
willing to use its overwhelming military might as a stick to bring
nations into line, the EU appears to be awakening to the possibility
that the lure of “Old World” good life can be a comparably persuasive
carrot in provoking change in areas of chaos and repression.
To see that go-softly approach in action, consider Turkey.
A decade ago, the notion that outside interference might succeed in
convincing Turkey to implement meaningful democratic reforms,
dismantle a system of judicial repression based largely on torture,
curb the power of a military that had dominated society for decades,
and loosen state control over the economy would have seemed remote.
But those objectives have largely become a reality. And the reason,
of course, is the strict conditions – based on human rights as well
as fiscal soundness – that Europe imposed on Turkey to win even a
prospect of EU membership.
In economic terms at least, Europe is a genuine superpower.
The EU’s enlargement last May added 75 million consumers, creating a
single market of 450 million people, compared to 420 million for
NAFTA – the countries of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Its
total GDP – [euro]8,800 billion (US$11,017 billion) in 2003 –
outstrips, by today’s exchange rate, that of the United States –
[euro]8,787 billion (US$11,000 billion).
It is already the world’s biggest trader, home to one of the world’s
most sought-after currencies and – defined as a single unit – is the
world’s biggest donor, spending more than [euro]500 million a month
in assistance projects on all five continents.
In the decades following World War II, Europe clamored for the need
for multilateralism in world affairs as a balance to U.S. might,
while relying heavily on the U.S. nuclear umbrella to nurture
standards of living that would eventually become the envy of the
world.
Now, however, there are signs it’s hoping to offer a serious
alternative to American influence in world affairs.
One prominent scholar, Robert Kagan – author of “Of Paradise and
Power,” a widely acclaimed analysis of trans-Atlantic alienation –
believes the divergences are deep, and threaten to be lasting.
“On major strategic and international questions today, Americans are
from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and
understand one another less and less,” Kagan writes in the opening of
his book.
By Nov. 2, the EU hopes to have deals with Ukraine, Moldova, Morocco,
Tunisia, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority under its “New
Neighborhood Policy.” Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia,
Lebanon, Libya, Syria and Tunisia are next.
In some cases the relationship is new; in others, like that of
Israel, it amounts to an expansion of existing association
agreements.
The aim is, where needed, to steer neighbors toward more democracy,
sounder economic policies, sensible defense spending, respect for
minorities, sustainable development and peaceful settlement of ethnic
disputes.
Their reward: More aid, trade, regular political consultations and –
importantly – easy access to the EU market of 455 million consumers.
“We must never forget European integration is not about milk quotas
and customs duties,” says Guenter Verheugen, the EU commissioner for
expansion matters. “It is about peace, stability and prosperity…”
Negotiations with the first seven candidates have gone fairly well,
except for Israel, which complains the EU uses the bonanza of trade
and aid to simply grab a more prominent role in the Mideast peace
process. Long wary of what it considers pro-Arab views in Europe,
Israel wants the EU to continue to play second fiddle to the United
States in Middle Eastern diplomacy.
Russia, meanwhile, has brushed aside any suggestion of being part of
multi-nation deal, insisting on special treatment that would reflect
its image of itself as a global power.
The EU has proposed an alternative “strategic partnership” with
Russia that focuses on four areas: Trade and investments, cooperation
in law enforcement and nonproliferation issues, settling border
disputes with EU members Estonia and Latvia and visa-free travel for
Russians in Western Europe. The EU and President Vladimir Putin hope
to sign the accord Nov. 11, though prospects are uncertain.