Heritage.org, DC
25 Oct. 2004
U.S.-Russian Security Cooperation After Beslan
by Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.
On September 1, 2004, the first day of school, a multiethnic group of
over 30 radical Islamist terrorists, including two female suicide
bombers and some Chechens, took more than 1,000 children, teachers, and
parents hostage in Beslan, North Ossetia. The terrorists deployed
explosives around the school, hanging them from basketball hoops in
the gym, where most of the children were held. This was the fifth
massive hostage-taking event in Russia since 1995, and it ended in
tragedy. Shamil Basaev, leader of the radical Islamist wing of the
Chechen separatist movement, has taken responsibility for the
massacre.1
In the aftermath of Beslan, the U.S. should emphasize to the Russian
people, President Vladimir Putin, and the Russian government that the
two countries are facing the same enemy. The U.S. should increase
outreach in the battle for Russia’s hearts and minds, paying particular
attention to the younger generations of Russian citizens.
In addition to these public diplomacy efforts, Presidents Putin and
George W. Bush should hold an anti-terrorism summit in the near future
to hammer out a joint anti-terrorism action plan. The two countries
should expand security cooperation in anti-terrorist force structure;
command, control, and communications; and on techniques for dealing
with hostage situations. The U.S. and Russia should expand the range of
joint programs designed to prevent the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) to terrorist organizations, going beyond the
current Nunn-Lugar funding.
However, even though the two countries face a common threat, the U.S.
does not have to agree to Russia’s policies toward its neighbors. The
U.S. should support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all
post-Soviet states, and it should not remain silent if democracy in
Russia is rolled back. Instead, Washington should develop programs that
support growth of the nonprofit/nongovernment sector, promote the rule
of law, and help to advance transparent, participatory, and democratic
governance in Russia. The U.S. should also expand support of the
independent media in all forms, including print, broadcasting, and
Internet.[1]
Beslan: Russia’s 9/11
The Beslan tragedy shook Russia on a scale comparable to how September
11 affected the United States. Terrorists subjected the children and
other hostages to unspeakable abuses, denying them water and food,
killing some at random, and forcing many children to drink urine.[2]
Europe has not seen such cruelty since the Nazi atrocities during World
War II and Stalin’s genocidal exile of nations to Siberia and Central
Asia.
After two days, the terrorists triggered an explosion in the gym, and
many children ran from the building. The terrorists opened fire,
shooting and killing hostages. Russian special forces and the armed
local population attempted a rescue, but the death and destruction of
that day speaks clearly of a monumental security failure.
Heart-wrenching scenes of small bodies in tiny coffins and parents
breaking down in grief at their children’s graves shocked the world.
Many Russians watched the crisis on television, tears pouring down
their cheeks.
Security Failures
The systemic failures of the policy and security apparatus that failed
to stop the atrocities in Beslan were immediately obvious to Russian
and Western observers. The Russian intelligence networks–run by the
military, internal security forces, and the Ministry of Interior police
in the North Caucasus– failed to identify preparations for the attack
or provide timely intelligence that would have allowed the terrorists
to be intercepted en route to the school.
Nor was Beslan an isolated incident: A few days prior to Beslan, two
female suicide bombers destroyed two Russian airliners in flight, and a
Moscow metro station and a bus stop were bombed.
The failure of the rescue operation was also obvious. The top military
commander indicated that “there was no planning to rescue hostages” and
disclosed that 48 hours after the school was seized, the main special
forces were training 30 kilometers away.[3] Even if negotiations were
underway, a rescue force should have been on location and ready to
respond at any moment. Furthermore, the rescuers had only two or three
armored personnel carriers to use as shields in approaching the
building. As a result, the special forces were pinned down by the
terrorists’ heavy fire.
The terrorists were permitted to dictate the operational tempo. They
imposed the rescue timing by setting off the explosives and put up a
stiff resistance that lasted for 10 hours, from 1 p.m. to 11 p.m.,
when most of them were finally killed. Sporadic fire continued until 4
a.m. of the next day.[4]
Because the building was rigged with explosives, the only chance to
save the children if negotiations failed would have been to overwhelm
the terrorists in a massive, precise surprise attack, which would take
out most of the perpetrators in the first few minutes. Such an
operation could have used advanced technology, such as night vision
goggles, stun grenades, body armor, and incapacitating gas. Nothing of
the kind happened.
Roaming Locals. Appallingly, the security forces failed to remove
hundreds of armed locals from the scene. This failure to establish and
enforce a police perimeter allowed civilians to interfere with the
rescue attempt. It placed both the hostages and rescuers in their
crossfire and exposed civilians to terrorists’ weapons fire, leading
to entirely avoidable civilian casualties. Furthermore, some
terrorists were allowed to break out of the building, and they engaged
in firefights until the next morning.
The Russian anti-terrorist forces were woefully unprepared. Beslan was
Russia’s fifth massive hostage situation, with over 1,000 hostages;
yet Russian security forces demonstrated that they had learned little
from the debacles of Budennovsk, Pervomaysk, and Kizlyar in the 1990s
and from Dubrovka in 2002. They did not wear modern Kevlar helmets or
even bulletproof vests in some cases, and the elite Alfa and Vityaz
units lost 10 men–their largest losses in post-Soviet history.
Failures of Policy and Leadership
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, both the Yeltsin and Putin
administrations have failed to reform the Soviet-era security services
and the Ministry of Interior police forces, which in turn failed to
prevent or adequately respond to the Beslan hostage situation. These
are still quasi-totalitarian political control and crime fighting
organizations, rife with corruption, as has been acknowledged by
President Putin as well as other senior Russian officials.[5] They are
simply inadequate to the task of confronting modern local and global
terrorism.
Despite the recent terrorist attacks on Russia, President Putin is
ambiguous about Russian cooperation with the West in fighting
terrorism. After the tragedy, Putin repeatedly bemoaned the passing of
the Soviet “great power,” but he also recognized that Soviet ideology
suppressed numerous real ethnic conflicts.
Putin accuses Western intelligence services of maintaining contact with
the Chechen rebels. Clearly, he believes that the U.S. and other
Western powers support anti-Russian Chechen forces in an effort to
keep Russia pinned down and “involved in its own problems.”[6] After
all, Great Britain and the U.S. have granted political asylum to some
Chechen leaders.
Putin could have also mentioned the fundraising activities conducted
in the West by radical Muslim groups to aid the “jihad” in
“Chechnistan.”[7] Such activities have been going on in Great Britain
and the U.S. for years but now seem to be coming to an end (although
fundraising for Chechnya is continuing in the Middle East and
throughout the Muslim world without interference). In this regard,
Putin’s criticism may be legitimate in view of the Beslan atrocities
and Basaev’s own admission that he received money from abroad and, if
offered, would have taken money from Osama bin Laden.[8]
As an intelligence professional, Putin should appreciate the difference
between information gathering and operational support. Instead, he is
apparently convinced that the West is preoccupied with creating an
irritant for Russia. In an earlier speech to the nation, Putin went
even further, saying that foreign powers are interested in
dismembering Russia and neutralizing it as a nuclear power;[9] he
ignored, however, the much greater issue of the global Islamist
networks supporting the Chechen extremists.
Still, Putin left enough common ground to infer that continuing
cooperation with the West in the war on terrorism is possible. He sent
a clear message that entrenched bureaucracies on both sides of the
Atlantic hamper U.S.-Russian security cooperation. He also said that
President Bush is a “good, decent man,” “a reliable and predictable
partner,” and someone he can “feel as a human being.”[10] He also
stated that terrorist attacks in Iraq are aimed at achieving President
Bush’s electoral defeat.[11]
Thus, despite his vocal reservations concerning the West, Putin sent a
message to the Western leadership. Putin presented himself as open to
anti-terrorism cooperation, indicating that security “professionals” on
both sides are in contact and recognizing that Cold War sentiments
still excessively influence the bureaucracies on both sides of the
Atlantic.[12] Putin is no doubt aware of shared risks of terrorists
gaining access to weapons of mass destruction.[13]
New Challenges
While President Putin appears to understand the threat of global
terrorism, Russia’s security apparatus does not seem to grasp
sufficiently the challenge of the jihadi menace. This is an enemy
different from the Cold War threats of “Western imperialism” and
internal political opposition. Externally, Soviet foreign intelligence
fought the Cold War against the U.S. and its European allies while,
domestically, the secret police were positioned to ruthlessly suppress
any political dissent among the unarmed population through
intimidation and incarceration.
Ethnic and religious unrest, however, is endemic to the territory of
the Russian empire and the Soviet Union, as prolonged guerrilla warfare
during the 18th-20th centuries in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Western
Ukraine, and Baltic states demonstrates. In particular, ethnic-based
warfare and insurgency have hardly been new to the Caucasus–north and
south–for the past two centuries.
A Missed Chance. President Putin has admitted that the first Chechen
war, unleashed by the Yeltsin administration in the fall of 1994, in
which 80,000-100,000 people were killed and over 100,000 became
internally displaced, was an error.[14] After the Russian army’s defeat
in Chechnya, Moscow granted the rebel region quasi-independence in
1996.
Sadly, however, “independent” Chechnya turned into a disaster for its
own people. Armed gangs and clans ran wild. Radical Sunni (called
Wahhabi or Salafi) clerics imported from Saudi Arabia have established
Islamic religious courts in the society, which had previously practiced
a rather lax version of Sufi Islam.[15] Public hangings have become
commonplace. Thousands have been kidnapped for ransom. Slave markets
have appeared. Oil has been stolen from pipelines, pipelines sabotaged,
transit trains from Russia shot at, and passengers robbed. Trafficking
in drugs, arms, and other contraband is rampant.
The Wahhabi presence, including ties with al-Qaeda terrorists, has
increased, strengthening the leadership of radical Islamists such as
Shamil Basaev. Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s second in
command, spent six months in Chechnya setting up training camps and
preparing for jihad. The Russian security services even arrested
al-Zawahiri, but unaware of his identity eventually let him go.
The Second Chechen War. The second Chechen war began in 1999 when a
radical Chechen faction commanded by Shamil Basaev invaded the
neighboring republic of Daghestan. Bombings of apartment buildings in
Moscow and Volgodonsk, in which over 300 people died, greatly escalated
matters. Basaev and the radical faction he leads do not hide their
geopolitical ambitions of establishing a caliphate from the Black Sea
to the Caspian. Russia responded with a World War II- style invasion of
Chechnya, which resulted in massive destruction and heavy civilian
casualties.
The second Chechen war bolstered Putin’s popularity and facilitated
his election to his first term in office in March 2000, but it also
left lingering problems. Tens of thousands of Chechen civilians were
displaced, killed, or wounded. After Beslan, however, Putin refused to
discuss the problems. Further, he asserted that the Chechen war had
nothing to do with the hostage taking in Beslan. The Russian president
offered no criticism of command, control, and leadership failures or
of doctrinal and organizational lapses in fighting the terrorist war
in the Caucasus and Russia.
Today, political, economic, social, cultural, religious, and
“hearts-and-minds” issues desperately need attention throughout the
Northern Caucasus. President Putin understands this, at least to some
degree. However, it remains to be seen whether the newly installed
nationalities minister Vladimir Yakovlev, former mayor of St.
Petersburg and a political enemy of Putin,[16] and the newly appointed
Governor-General of the Northern Caucasus Dmitry Kozak, a Putin can-do
confidante and former Cabinet secretary, are up to the demanding tasks
involved.[17]
To address today’s threats, Russia needs to rethink and revamp its
anti-terrorism approach, learn lessons from other countries and
conflicts, and establish new security structures that are capable of
dealing with 21st century terrorism. In such a predicament, one would
think that Russia would not look for adventures in the “near abroad”
(the other former Soviet republics) and would leave recent democratic
achievements intact.
Prisoner of the Caucasus
However, in the days before and after Beslan, Putin and his inner
circle overtly questioned the sovereignty of Georgia and her
post-Soviet borders. Putin said, “When the Soviet Union collapsed, no
one asked the Ossetians and the Abkhaz whether they want to stay in
Georgia.”[18] Russia is also staunchly opposing the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe’s plan for a peaceful settlement of
the crisis in Transdniester, a secessionist region in Moldova.
The message is loud and clear: Post-Soviet borders are no longer
sacrosanct. Furthermore, in 2001, the Duma quietly adopted a
constitutional mechanism for incorporating foreign lands and countries
into the Russian Federation.
In Georgia, Russian arms, Transdniester and Cossack volunteers, and
Russian peacekeepers under the umbrella of the Commonwealth of
Independent States have been deployed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Russian gunboats have entered Georgian territorial waters without
authorization. One even had ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky on
board. Zhirinovsky was delivering the gunboat as a gift to the Abkhaz
separatist leadership.[19] Such events do not happen without the
permission of Putin’s administration.
Russian citizenship and passports, freely distributed to the
secessionist populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, undermine the
national identity of the Abkhaz and Ossetians as citizens of Georgia,
while these separatist elites benefit from contraband trafficking and
are supported with secret Moscow-based funds.[20] Plans have even been
laid to reopen a railroad line from Sochi to Abkhazia without Tbilisi’s
agreement.[21]
The Russian leadership seems to have a blind spot. By trying to pull
South Ossetia and Abkhazia into Moscow’s orbit, the Kremlin may be
inadvertently strengthening the case of Chechen separatism.
Border Revisions? Since 1992, Moscow has supported sundry
separatists–from Transdniester to Abkhazia and South Ossetia to
Nagorno-Karabakh–for a reason. These moves open the door to revising
other borders, especially in areas heavily populated with Russian
speakers, such as northern Kazakhstan, Transdniester, and eastern
Ukraine.
Russia may also support border revisions in such areas as
Nagorno-Karabakh, which could have unpredictable consequences for the
10-year- old Armenian-Azerbaijani cease-fire. Border revisions can be
held over the heads of uncooperative neighbors like the sword of
Damocles. Internationally, this can become a powder keg. Undermining
the territorial integrity of Russia’s neighbors is unacceptable to the
U.S. and the European Union, and it is dangerous to Russia itself.
The Kremlin Response After Beslan
Crying over the phantom pains of empire will not protect Russia from
terrorism. Instead of revamping, retraining, and reorganizing Russia’s
anti-terrorist and security services, Putin has opted for a massive
re-centralization of power–despite an outcry from the Russian liberal
elites.[22] In doing so, he is taking the country on a path
reminiscent of the Soviet and czarist eras.
Specifically, on September 13, 2004, Putin announced the following
measures ostensibly to ensure that Russia is effectively governed:
Regional leaders will no longer be elected by a popular vote. Instead,
regional legislatures will approve nominees submitted by the president.
All Duma deputies will be elected through party lists in single-seat
constituencies.
A “public chamber” will be established to provide public oversight of
the government, particularly of law enforcement and security agencies.
Voluntary people’s patrols, ubiquitous in the Soviet era, will be
established and will work in tandem with police to ensure that public
order is re-established.
A special federal commission will be set up to oversee the North
Caucasus issues.
The government will re-establish a new Ministry for Regional Policy
and Nationalities.
The government will elaborate a system of responses to thwart terrorist
threats.[23]
Putin is essentially rebuilding the Soviet state security apparatus and
applying the 19th century Russian imperial model to a 21st century
state that is riddled with terrorism and corruption. For example, there
are also plans to the reintroduce police-issued residence permits,
similar to the Soviet-era propiska, to control internal movement of the
population.[24]
These measures are unlikely to provide an effective antidote to
expanding terrorism in the North Caucasus and Russia, and they reverse
democratic achievements of the 1990s. Nostalgia for the Soviet past may
beget new authoritarianism, as former Presidents Boris Yeltsin and
Mikhail Gorbachev warned in interviews on September 16, 2004.[25]
Reverting to the Past? Putin’s decision to nominate governors, doing
away with their election, will not only dilute Russia’s developing
democracy. It will effectively end administrative ethnic autonomy,
which was adopted by the Bolsheviks after the 1917 coup.
The number of regions–“federation subjects” as they are called in
Russia–is likely to be reduced through constitutional changes from 89
to about 30. However, in the 21st century, it is extremely difficult
to govern a country that spans 11 time zones from one political center.
The information overload and corruption may become severe enough to
slow the pace of economic growth. Putin may have to abandon his
proclaimed goal of doubling Russia’s gross domestic product by
2012.[26]
It is also counterproductive to undermine the connection of voters and
their elected representatives by abandoning the single-district system
and shifting to elections by party lists.
Establishing an unelected and disempowered “public chamber” to
supervise the security services will not solve Russia’s flagging
anti-terrorism conundrum. There is no substitute for effective civilian
control by the legislative and civilian executive branches. Nor are
additional bureaucratic offices, such as the new Ministry for Regional
Policy and Nationalities, likely to resolve the systemic problems of
the Northern Caucasus.
What Should Be Done
In pursuing the global war on terrorism, the U.S. should attempt to
accomplish a number of policy objectives with regard to Russia:
Keeping Russia as a friendly partner in the anti-terrorism coalition;
Cooperating with Moscow to prevent the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, especially preventing terrorists from acquiring such
weapons;
Shoring up Russia as a reliable supplier of oil and gas to the world
market, in addition to the Persian Gulf states, and keeping the
Russian energy sector open to U.S. and Western investment;
Supporting the territorial integrity and independence of the
post-Soviet states of Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, and Central Asia;
and
Developing the forces of democracy in Russia, especially supporting
civil society and free media.
To advance these policy objectives, the Bush Administration should:
Emphasize to the Russian people, President Putin, and the Russian
government that Russia and the U.S. are facing the same enemy, which
threatens their national survival, their peoples, and their most
cherished values. Presidents Bush and Putin should hold an
anti-terrorism summit in the near future to hammer out a joint
anti-terrorism action plan. In view of Beslan, President Bush should
order a review of U.S. policies on asylum for Chechen leaders, Chechen
fundraising in the U.S., and the U.S. intelligence community’s contacts
with Chechen rebels.
Increase U.S. outreach in the battle for Russia’s hearts and minds,
paying particular attention to the younger generations of Russian
citizens. Cold War paranoia still permeates the Russian elites. The
U.S. Embassy in Moscow is already busy reaching out to Russia’s media,
think tanks, and government offices, but more needs to be done on the
public diplomacy front.
Expand security cooperation in anti-terrorist force structure, command,
control, and communications and on techniques for dealing with hostage
situations. The Trubinkov-Armitage Group run by the U.S. Department of
State and the Russian Foreign Ministry could coordinate cooperation. A
joint project, such as neutralizing Shamil Basaev and his
organization, could be undertaken cooperatively. On the U.S. side,
participants might include the Departments of State, Defense, and
Homeland Security and the CIA. On the Russian side, participating
offices might include the Foreign Intelligence Service, Federal
Security Service, Emergency Situations Ministry (Russian FEMA), and
Alfa and Vityaz units.
Cooperate with Russia, if it so desires, in strengthening transparency
and civilian control of the Russian security services. This can be
accomplished through expanded contacts between the Duma, the Council of
the Federation, and the U.S. Congress. Congress and the Pentagon, as
well as think tanks, could conduct a series of seminars discussing the
U.S. experience in this field in Moscow.
Develop a range of joint programs that reduce WMD and terrorist threats
to both countries, going beyond the current Nunn-Lugar funding which
focuses on storage, safety, and security. Such programs should
actively prevent WMD proliferation to non-state actors. As both
countries have an interest in strategic arms reduction and ballistic
missile defense, such cooperation can help to transcend Cold War fears.
The U.S. and Russia should intensify cooperation on joint ballistic
missile defense and aggressive non-proliferation to help further reduce
Cold War sentiments.[27]
Support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all post-Soviet
states. Expand cooperation with these countries via NATO’s Partnership
for Peace and bilateral military-to-military ties, exchanges,
train-and-equip programs, and (where necessary) limited troop
deployment. Maintain and expand dialogue with Moscow over contentious
issues, such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as the U.S.
presence in Central Asia.
Develop programs that support freedoms of the press and of political
organizations, federalism and local self-governance, growth of the
nonprofit/nongovernment sector, and the rule of law and promote
transparent, participatory, and democratic governance in Russia. This
can be accomplished through joint activities involving political
parties, their institutions, and other nongovernmental organizations,
such as the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic
Institute, and the National Endowment for Democracy in the U.S. and the
Moscow Helsinki Group, International Memorial Society, and Glasnost
Defense Foundation in Russia. The U.S. should also expanding support of
the independent media in Russia in all forms, including print,
broadcasting, and Internet.
Conclusion
The U.S. faces a delicate and difficult policy challenge after Beslan.
President Putin is taking Russia in the direction of greater
centralization, which he believes will make Russia more secure and make
it into a greater power. An authoritarian Russia, lacking democratic
checks and balances, is likely to pursue a regional and even global
foreign policy that increases friction with the United States, its
vital interests, and its allies.
The U.S. should do its best to encourage democracy, political
pluralism, and media freedoms and dissuade Moscow from becoming
increasingly authoritarian or expansionist. It should support Russia’s
weaker neighbors, their independence, and their territorial integrity.
At the same time, the U.S. should avoid an unnecessary confrontation
with Russia while shoring up and expanding U.S.-Russian cooperation in
the global war on terrorism.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies
in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
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