The Messenger, Georgia
Feb 4 2005
Lavrov’s forthcoming Georgia visit
Many hope that Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov
scheduled visit to Tbilisi on February 18 will witness an improvement
in the much strained relations between Russia and Georgia, though
others are more skeptical and do not expect any breakthrough. Georgia
is the minister’s last stop on a South Caucasian tour and only after
he returns to Moscow will it be possible to speak about any possible
changes in Russia’s policy towards the Caucasus.
Lavrov’s tour in the Caucasus begins in Azerbaijan, where he will
discuss the prospects of bilateral relations, reformation of CIS
structures, the conflicts that exist in the Caucasus, particularly
Karabakh, and fighting against international terrorism and
transnational organized crime. In addition, a visit of Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliev to Moscow is being planned for the end of
February.
Having good relations with Azerbaijan is very important for Russia.
Likewise, Ilham Aliev also tries to improve relations with Moscow.
Analysts are particularly interested to see what comes of the two
sides discussion regarding the Karabakh conflict. Russian support for
its traditional ally Armenia in this conflict helped to ensure its
victory, but it is speculated that Russia may demonstrate greater
support for Baku’s cause, perhaps as a result of alleged cooler
relations with Armenia.
Perhaps Moscow is trying to regulate the issue of Karabakh so that
both Armenia and Azerbaijan will be satisfied. But if this does
happen, analysts question what Moscow might benefit from brokering a
deal which would leave Armenia less dependent on Russia and more
flexible in terms of foreign policy.
Karabakh will not be the only topic on the agenda when Lavrov moves
on to Yerevan. There, as in Tbilisi, discussion of reopening the rail
route between Russia and Armenia, particularly after Azerbaijan
recently strengthened its blockade of Armenia so that cargo from
Azerbaijan cannot enter Georgia if it is ultimately destined for
Armenia, will dominate the agenda. The new Kavkaz-Poti ferry route is
unlikely to ease Armenia’s transportation problems much, and so
reopening the route remains of great importance.
But although Georgia has expressed readiness to consider the
rehabilitation of the Tbilisi-Sokhumi leg of the railway, there seems
little likelihood of this happening in the near future. The most
serious stumbling block is the Georgian government’s continuing
demands that Georgian refugees be allowed to return to Abkhazia
before any repairs can take place on the railway.
Resolving Georgia’s conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia will
top the agenda of discussions in Tbilisi. The Georgian government
continues to complain of Russian hypocrisy with regard to the
conflicts – recognizing the territorial integrity of Georgia in word
but doing all it can to annex parts of the country in deed – and it
will hope that it can persuade to act on its statements and show
active support for the restoration of its territorial integrity.
However, despite Saakashvili’s Strasbourg proposals regarding the
peaceful resolution of the South Ossetian conflict, little is
expected to change in the situation, although some experts continue
to hope that behind-the-scenes negotiations may lead Moscow to change
its attitude towards Georgia. Lately, a large amount of Russian
capital has entered Georgia and in Strasbourg, during discussions
about Georgia, Russian representative displayed a surprisingly
constructive position with regard to Georgia.
In addition to the unregulated conflicts, a number of other problems
have also accumulated in Georgian-Russian relations. The issue of
Russian military base withdrawal has yet to move forward after years
of negotiations. Moscow demands 13 years for the process, but the
Georgian side regards that it will need less time. Without the
support of the West, however, this issue is unlikely to be resolved.
Some experts regard that the visa regime in place between the two
countries is more important than the issue of base withdrawal. This
regime makes it difficult for Georgian citizens to enter Russia and
as of this year, the price of a Russian visa has increased. At the
same time the Russian market is extremely important for Georgia.
Caspian oil will be one of the main issues of Lavrov’s tour in the
Caucasus. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline is set to begin
operation this year and the issue of transporting Azerbaijani gas to
Turkey and Iranian gas to Europe is also slated for discussion.
Georgia is vitally important in all of these issues.
The issue of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Tbilisi is
likely to be agreed upon during Lavrov’s visit. Putin was to visit
Georgia last year, but his trip was postponed. However, Putin may
visit Georgia in the near future to sign important documents; but
although the Russian-Georgian frame agreement is named among them, it
is difficult to imagine that such an agreement could be signed in the
current climate of hostility.

Pilot sent SOS minutes before crash
Region / Sudan
Gulfnews.com
04/02/2005
By Bassam Za’za’, Bassma Al Jandaly and Jay Hilotin,
Staff Reporters
SHARJAH: The captain of a Sudanese cargo plane that crashed near
Khartoum yesterday reported an emergency a few minutes before it went
off the radar screens, an official said.
“He (the pilot) said there was something wrong with the fuel system
… A few minutes later it disappeared from the screens,” Sudanese
Civil Aviation Authority director Abu Bakr Jaafar said.
“Of course, it is too early to tell what the cause is,” he said.
Nine people died when the cargo plane carrying goods from Sharjah
crashed.
The pilot appeared to have guided his aircraft away from a residential
district and crashed in an uninhabited area near the airport, Al Obaid
Ahmad Murawih, the media attaché at the Sudanese Consulate in Dubai,
told Gulf News.
“It crashed in a vacant lot where authorities are planning to build
the new Khartoum International Airport, east of the Nile River at
about 9am UAE time (8am in Sudan). The plane took off from Sharjah at
about 4.37am on Thursday.”
The aircraft, a Russian-made Ilyushin 76, was carrying a cargo
consignment from Sharjah to the Sudan-ese city of Nyala, near Darfur,
and was scheduled to land in Khartoum for refuelling, he said.
Murawih said a Sudanese businessman chartered the plane and that nine
people five Russians, three Sudanese and an Armenian, died in the
crash.
“There were seven crew members and we have no further information
about the other two,” he said.
Dr Ganem Al Hajiri, director general of Sharjah Civil Aviation
Authority, told Gulf News the aircraft was a chartered plane of Air
West (Al Ghareb), a private Sudanese company with offices in Sharjah.
“The plane is not registered in the UAE and neither are the crew
members,” he said.
Air West’s office in Sharjah declined to comment.
With inputs from agencies

NTV MSNBC, Turkey
Feb 4 2005
We will sign Ankara Protocol: Erdogan

The Cyprus question topped the agenda of the meeting between the
Turkish Prime Minister and the speaker of the French parliament.

February 4 – Turkey will sign an official protocol that would signify
the recognition of the Greek Cypriot administration before October 3,
the date Ankara is due to open accession negotiations with the
European Union, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said
Thursday.
Signing of the expanded version of the Ankara Protocol between
Turkey and the EU is a step on Turkey’s path towards joining the
bloc. The document declares that Turkey recognises all EU members,
including those newly joined in May of last year. Among the new
members was the Greek Cypriot administration.
Speaking in a meeting with Jean Luis Debre, the speaker of the
French parliament, Erdogan said that Turkey would sign the protocol
before accession talks began.
Erdogan said that they are taking the views of legal experts
on the protocol, adding, `we are not in a rush. The signing of the
protocol bring not just political but commercial results.’
One of the issues that marked the meeting was the referendum
that France is to hold to vote on Turkey’s membership, which Debre
described was a tradition of France. Debre also asked Erdogan for his
views of secularism. The Turkish Prime Minister responded by saying
that Turkey had learned secularism from France but had made more
progress than France on the issue.
On the issue of the so-called Armenian genocide, Erdogan said
that Turkey had opened its archives but the Armenians had not.
`As new archives are opened you will see that the situation is
not like it is alleged,’ Erdogan said.
The Turkish premier asked for Debre’s help in Ankara’s efforts
to change the prejudices about Turkey in France.
Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said that there was
still time for the signing of the Ankara protocol. However, Gul,
speaking on his second day of his official visit to China, stressed
that in the protocol would not signify the official recognition of
the Greek Cypriot administration.

Rocky Mountain News, CO
Feb 4 2005
2nd college yanks Churchill invitation
President of school in Massachusetts cites security fears
By Berny Morson, Rocky Mountain News
February 4, 2005
A Massachusetts college withdrew a speaking invitation Thursday to
University of Colorado professor Ward Churchill.
Wheaton College, in Norton, Mass., had invited Churchill to
participate in a March 29 panel on genocide.

President Michael Crutcher withdrew the invitation amid concerns
about public safety, college spokesman Michael Graca said.
“Freedom of speech is an important principle both for the country,
but certainly as well for educational institutions,” Graca said. “And
it needs to take place in a secure and safe environment, and that’s
the fundamental issue.”
Eastern Washington University will decide today whether to rescind an
invitation to Churchill to speak April 5.
The ethnic-studies professor is under fire nationally for a 2001
essay in which he referred to victims in the World Trade Center on
9/11 as “little Eichmanns,” a reference to Adolf Eichmann, the Nazi
Gestapo officer who headed Adolf Hitler’s effort to wipe out Jews in
Europe.
On Tuesday, Hamilton College in upstate New York canceled an address
by Churchill because of security concerns. Churchill’s remarks on the
Sept. 11 attack were brought to light by a student journalist at
Hamilton.
Graca said Wheaton College has not received any threats, but acted in
light of the threats at Hamilton.
“Given the experience of Hamilton this past week, we felt it was
prudent to take some action to maintain a secure campus,” Graca said.
Churchill was to speak about the American Indian experience with an
expert on the Turkish genocide of Armenians in 1915, and survivors of
the Holocaust and mass killings in Rwanda. That discussion will take
place now without Churchill.
Wheaton College is a 1,500-student liberal-arts college in southeast
Massachusetts.
At Eastern Washington, Churchill is scheduled to take part in Native
American Awareness Week. The school in Cheney, Wash., is 6 percent
American Indian – considered a large proportion for a college, said
spokesman David Rey.
Rey said faculty members who invited Churchill knew his views about
Americans Indians were controversial. They didn’t know about his
essay on Sept. 11.
“I don’t think this is what they expected,” Rey said.
President Stephen Jordan spent Thursday discussing the matter with
trustees and faculty, Rey said. Jordan will issue a statement during
a trustees meeting this morning.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

zawya
Redistricting of Beirut threatens divisions
04 February 2005
Interview
BEIRUT: Tripoli MP and Democratic Renewal Movement member Mosbah Ahdab, an
outspoken member of the opposition, said that the loyalists’ attempt to
correct Christian representation in the government by dividing Beirut’s
districts in such a way to hurt Sunni representation goes against national
unity and coexistence principles.
“I think it is a good thing we went back to the 1960 (electoral) law, but
the trick with this gerrymandering in Beirut concerning the first and third
district was very absurd,” Ahdab said in an interview last Monday.
Beirut’s first district, a Sunni enclave and a stronghold for former Premier
Rafik Hariri, consists of some 210,000 voters but will be represented by
only six MPs, while Beirut’s second district, comprising mostly of Shiites
and Armenians and numbering some 150,000 voters, will be home to nine MPs.
Ahdab said that Interior Minister Suleiman Franjieh’s threats raised the
demographic issue from a sectarian point of view.
“This type of gerrymandering was not only meant to give loyalists four extra
MPs, but also to create disagreements between different factions in Lebanon,
including Sunnis, Shiites, Maronites and Orthodox,” he added.
Ahdab said that, as a Muslim, he always thought that Christians were
misrepresented in Lebanon, citing the alienation of former army General
Michel Aoun and the undermining of the Lebanese Forces in the North, a
reference to when Bsharri and Akkar were joined for electoral purposes
although the two areas are not geographically connected.
“However, I do not think the proper way to fix Christian misrepresentation
is by creating a problem in Beirut,” Ahdab said. “Although it is true they
are targeting Hariri’s leadership, they are in fact hurting an entire sect,
and that’s repeating the mistakes of the past.”
Ahdab further said that the loyalists’ attempts to create a gap between
Hariri and the opposition are bringing the two sides closer together.
“Hariri should, however, declare a clear position on this, which as of yet
he hasn’t,” he added.
Ahdab questioned Franjieh’s position saying that his comments were not
compatible with his ambitions of becoming president because they tend to
disregard the country’s institutions.
“Franjieh cannot threaten to change the law depending on how the opposition
acts on its alliances with Hariri,” he said. “We have a Cabinet and
Parliament that decide on these issues, and while some believe that Lebanon
has not been able to build institutions until now, why don’t they move and
let others try?”
Ahdab was responding to comments made last week by Information Minister Elie
Ferzli in agreement with Syrian President Bashar Assad’s recent claims that
Lebanon needs Syrian help to establish proper institutions.
Ahdab went on to say that the last minute meetings on electoral reforms at
Parliament House follow a long-standing tradition by loyalists to deprive
the opposition of an equal opportunity for representation.
“Parliamentary elections will take place between April and May, so if you
now want to start a process of discussing the perfect electoral law, when
will it finish?” Ahdab asked.
He agreed that talks on a new law are long overdue, but questioned the
timing. Ahdab believes that the qada draft electoral law will be passed in
Parliament “unless loyalists change their mind.”
As for lowering the voting age and introducing a quota for female
representatives, Ahdab said these proposals were but another “smokescreen.”
“Eighteen year olds should vote and it would not create an imbalance in
favor of Muslims, because someone who is 18 now, will be 21 and of the same
religion three years later,” Ahdab argued.
He added that as 18 is the age of responsibility in the eyes of the law,
they should have the right to decide whom they should be ruled by.
Ahdab denied claims that Christians are the ones opposed to the voting age
constitutional amendment.
“I think the real opposition is amongst loyalists. They have been managing
the elections for a long time by controlling the different groups, by mixing
and matching lists with known numbers of followings,” Ahdab said. “Sure
people are free to vote for whomever, but when you start to have more than
30 percent participation, loyalists start to lose the advantage.”
He said the 18-21 age bracket cannot be controlled and when asked to vote
they would be instantly interested and would start to read and watch the
news, and decide which candidates have the best solutions.
As for quotas, Ahdab supported the practise, “However, I have heard comments
that putting a quota is against democracy, and in a way it is discrimination
again male candidates, and there is some truth in that.”
Ahdab also said that Lebanon wants excellent terms with Syria, with whom it
shares a history, culture and heritage.
“But the existing situation is not ideal,” Ahdab said. He said many
agreements need to be implemented, and day to day interferences in domestic
affairs is no longer acceptable.
“It is a small country and there are no secrets to hide.”
Article originally published by The Daily Star 04-Feb-05

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
_________________________________________ ____________________
RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly
Vol. 5, No. 5, 4 February 2005
A Weekly Review of News and Analysis of Russian Domestic Politics
************************************************************
HEADLINES:
* RUSSIA ON THE VERGE OF A BREAKDOWN?
* DMITRII ROGOZIN: THE HUNGER ARTIST
* HOLDING PUTIN ACCOUNTABLE
* STRANGE DAYS FOR THE AUDIT CHAMBER
* POLITICAL CALENDAR
************************************************************
POLITICS
RUSSIA ON THE VERGE OF A BREAKDOWN?
By Victor Yasmann
Hard on the heels of a humiliating political defeat in the
presidential election in Ukraine, the Kremlin is now facing another
serious crisis, this one even closer to home. For weeks now, the
country has been wracked by growing social unrest in opposition to
the government’s reform to convert most in-kind social benefits
to cash payments, which has been widely criticized as ill considered
and poorly implemented.
According to media reports, more than two-thirds of the
subjects of the federation have seen protests and demonstrations by
pensioners, the disabled, public-sector workers, and other benefits
recipients. In some cases, protestors blocked highways and rail lines
or took over regional-administration buildings. In many cases, the
protests were apparently spontaneous, but the Communist Party has
claimed to be organizing the demonstrations.
In addition, speaking to journalists in Moscow on 27 January,
Communist Party leader Gennadii Zyuganov said that his party has
collected the 90 Duma deputy signatures required to force the
chamber’s leadership to include a motion of no confidence in the
government in the Duma’s agenda, gazeta.ru and other Russian
media reported. Zyuganov said that in addition to Communist deputies,
the Motherland faction is backing the initiative, as well as 15-18
independent deputies.
Although a no-confidence measure has no chance of passing
without the support of the pro-Kremlin Unified Russia party, which
controls a majority of the seats in the chamber, holding such a vote
would put Unified Russia in the awkward position of having openly to
support the unpopular benefits reform, gazeta.ru commented on 27
January.
At a recent meeting of the government’s Council on
Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship, participants concluded that the
main reason for the unrest and for the slowdown in economic growth
generally is a crisis of confidence, a loss of public trust in the
government, “Vremya novostei” reported on 28 January. A similar view
was expressed by Higher Economics School head and former Economy
Minister Yevgenii Yasin, who was quoted by the daily as saying, “We
are seeing a textbook example of how economic growth that seemed to
be working so well can be destroyed.”
Economist and Institute of Globalization Director Mikhail
Delyagin said he thinks the present situation, including the
widespread unrest, is the result of infighting between the so-called
siloviki, or people connected to the security apparatus, and such
liberal ministers as Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin and Economic
Development and Trade Minister German Gref. Delyagin called the
latter “liberal fundamentalists” in a 14 January interview with
RosBalt. Delyagin added that the dismantling of the social safety net
“is not only the result of liberal reforms, but also of the blind
aggression of the silovik oligarchy, an aggression that is spreading
from the business community to society as a whole.” “It is an open
secret that a considerable portion of those agencies that we more and
more often call ‘siloviki’ and less and less often call
‘law enforcement organs’ perceive the citizenry of Russia as
a legitimate target for looting,” Delyagin said.
Delyagin said that the Putin regime has declared war not only
on business and society, but also on the regional elites, which it
has stripped of political influence without giving them anything in
return. “I think the protests which are continuing all over the
country are partly generated by regional administrations, which feel
that they have been robbed by the benefits-reform process,” Delyagin
said. “Since they are afraid to confront Moscow openly, they pretend
that the protests are only the voice of the people and are in no
hurry to silence it.”
National Strategy Institute Director Stanislav Belkovskii
told APN on 27 January that the unrest is evidence of a systemic
crisis confronting the Putin regime. He said the protests demonstrate
how illusory and ephemeral the Russian system of power is, and prove
that the authorities can neither govern the people nor communicate
with them. He added that the regime has already demonstrated this
inability in the cases of the August 2000 sinking of the “Kursk”
nuclear submarine, the October 2003 hostage taking at a Moscow
theater, and the September 2004 hostage drama at a school in Beslan,
North Ossetia. However, he added, the current unrest even more
graphically demonstrates that the Putin regime is not unshakable.
Belkovskii added that the response to the protests proves
that the regime fears only direct actions of this sort. It is not
possible to outmaneuver the country’s oligarchic-bureaucratic
machine, but only to pressure it, Belkovskii said.
Belkovskii said that in October, a member of the Communist
Party of the Russian Federation told him that if Ukrainian
presidential hopeful Viktor Yushchenko could bring at least 100,000
people out onto the streets of Kyiv, the issue of power in Ukraine
would be settled regardless of other factors. Time has shown that he
was right, Belkovskii said, adding that anyone who can bring 300,000
people out onto the streets of Moscow can similarly take power in
Russia. Therefore, he concluded, the street will remain the main tool
of the political struggle in Russia for the next two years.
The government was unprepared for the protests and chose to
treat its own citizens like “cattle,” Belkovskii said. He quoted a
Unified Russia Duma deputy as saying that “the tougher the laws are
that the government adopts, the less people protest against them.”
Belkovskii said the regime placed its stake on public apathy and was
convinced that there would be no massive protests. For this reason,
the government is responsible for the crisis and should be dismissed.
Belkovskii added, though, that President Putin does not
consider the benefits reform itself a mistake. Therefore, Kudrin,
Gref, and Health and Social Development Minister Mikhail Zurabov will
remain in government in one capacity or another. However, the
president will most likely have to make some sort of gesture to quell
the unrest, and the most likely victim will be the cabinet of Prime
Minister Mikhail Fradkov.
Demonstrators have already been seen carrying signs calling
for Putin to resign and even bearing slogans such as “Putin Is Worse
Than Hitler.” Although Putin often tries to avoid tough personnel
decisions, Belkovskii said, he will need to do something to appease
the public. The most likely scapegoat will be Fradkov, Belkovskii
said, not because of the reform fiasco itself, but because he has
avoided taking public responsibility for the crisis and has thereby
exposed Putin to criticism.
PROFILE
DMITRII ROGOZIN: THE HUNGER ARTIST
By Julie A. Corwin
The hunger strike of five State Duma deputies from the
Motherland faction, which began on 21 January, came to end this week.
The five legislators, including Motherland leader Dmitrii Rogozin,
who were demanding a moratorium on implementation of the law on
converting in-kind benefits to cash payments and the dismissal of
Health and Social Development Minister Mikhail Zurabov, Finance
Minister Aleksei Kudrin, and Economic Development and Trade Minister
German Gref, decided to transform their struggle from “the passive to
the active stage,” “Izvestiya” reported on 2 February. Lawmaker
Andrei Savelev was hospitalized on 29 January with low blood sugar,
and the party’s presidium was expected to issue an order to the
strikers to give up their protest for the sake of their health at a
presidium session on 3 February.
Typically, hunger strikes attract sympathy for the
participants and their cause, but in the case of the Motherland party
action, a more common reaction – at least among the Russian political
elite — has been derision. State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov labeled
the action “self-promotion.” And Lyudmila Alekseeva, chairwoman of
the Moscow Helsinki Group, found herself agreeing with Gryzlov. She
told politcom.ru on 24 January that public relations was likely at
least one of the motivations for the deputies’ action.
In an interview with Ekho Moskvy on 22 January, Garri
Kasparov, chess champion and Committee-2008 chairman, concluded that
“quite obviously” Rogozin got news from his patrons in the Kremlin —
that is, first deputy head of the presidential administration Igor
Sechin or deputy head of the administration Viktor Ivanov — that
resignations are forthcoming in the government. “One should not doubt
that Rogozin’s strike is a harbinger of changes in the Russian
government,” Kasparov said. “We’ll wait and we can thank Dmitrii
Olegovich [Rogozin] for imparting this information in such a bizarre
way to all those able to compare and contrast his action with the
information he usually receives from his Kremlin patrons.”
Kasparov added that he believes that Kremlin control over
Rogozin is “quite high,” but Rogozin “no doubt has his own game plan.
Sechin’s game is to bet on Rogozin and help him in every way, and
it’s Rogozin’s game, at this stage, to pretend and dream that
one day he will do to his patrons what Putin did to his.”
In an interview with politcom.ru on 24 January, Marat Gelman,
the art gallery owner and campaign consultant who worked on
Motherland’s surprisingly successful campaign during the December
2003 State Duma elections, agreed with Kasparov: “Rogozin has
information that he won’t be on a hunger strike long. But in my
opinion he or his informant is wrong,” Gelman said. Gelman also
commented that since Duma deputies are now devoid of real power, they
are reduced to making symbolic gestures such as hunger strikes. But
as gestures go, Gelman figures that Rogozin’s gambit is a
stronger one than the competition’s: Unified Russia is just
discussing the benefits reform among themselves, he says, while the
Communist party is trying to head spontaneous protests.
Part of the harsh reaction to Motherland’s hunger strike
could reflect the Russian political elite’s attitude toward
Motherland’s leader, Rogozin himself. Like many federal
politicians, Rogozin changes party and coalition membership on an
almost seasonal basis. Rogozin is only 41 years old, but he has
already either been a member of or aligned with a half a dozen
political organizations, including the Union of Revival, the Congress
of Russian Communities (KRO), the Fatherland party, the Yurii
Boldyrev Movement, the Inter-Ethnic Union, the People’s Deputy
Duma faction, and the Motherland-Patriotic Union bloc. And his
break-ups have often been publicly acrimonious.
Rogozin’s first big public fight was with former
presidential candidate Aleksandr Lebed. Lebed was No. 1, and Rogozin
No. 5 on the KRO’s party list for the December 1995 State Duma
election. But relations soured quickly after Lebed became Security
Council secretary in summer 1996, and especially after he negotiated
the Khasavyurt accords that ended the first military conflict in
Chechnya.
By the spring of 1998, Rogozin and the KRO were actively
campaigning against Lebed in the Krasnoyarsk Krai gubernatorial
election. In 1999, Rogozin’s KRO was initially aligned with
Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov’s Fatherland party, but when Luzhkov
chose to join forces with the All-Russia movement, headed by
Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev and Bashkortostan President
Murtaza Rakhimov, Rogozin dropped out of the alliance. Rogozin made a
number of unflattering remarks to Luzhkov at the time, and Luzhkov
has been unable to forgive him, according to “Profile” on 7 April
2003.
In 2003, Rogozin’s name was proposed during a Unified
Russia party congress, but Luzhkov blocked his membership of the
party, because he “could not forget old offenses,” according to
“Yezhenedelnyi zhurnal” on 15 December 2003. In December 2003,
Rogozin was No. 2 on the party list for the unexpectedly successful
Motherland bloc. However, that alliance began to unravel unusually
quickly. By January 2004, Rogozin and candidate No. 1 on the party
list, Sergei Glazev, were exchanging brick bats in the press, and by
March, Glazev was removed as the bloc’s faction leader.
Rogozin, a native Muscovite, is the son of Oleg
Konstantinovich Rogozin, a military general. Rogozin resisted
following in his father’s footsteps. According to “Profil” and
“Yezhnedelnyi zhurnal,” Rogozin almost entered the acting faculty of
the All-Russia State Institute of Cinematography, having successfully
completely all stages of the application and competition process.
However, at the last minute, he rethought his career plans and
instead joined the international department of the journalism faculty
at Moscow State University (MGU). At MGU, Rogozin participated in
student theater.
Now as a mid-career professional, he finds himself
participating in a theatre of a more modern variety, reality
television. The Motherland deputies’ hunger strike was webcast on
the party’s website (). Computer hackers shut
the site down temporarily, but as of evening of 31 January Moscow
time, the show was back on the air. Rogozin was shown conversing with
his colleagues, hands tucked in his jean pockets, his once-splendid
paunch noticeably less visible underneath his black sweatshirt.
According to “Izvestiya” on 2 February, Rogozin lost 8 kilos. But he
may have gained much more than a slimmer figure: In a monthly ranking
of influential politicians published by “Nezavisimaya gazeta,”
Rogozin jumped from 57th place to 30th.
RFE/RL RUSSIAN SERVICE
HOLDING PUTIN ACCOUNTABLE On 28 January, RFE/RL’s Russian Service
broadcast an exclusive interview with Motherland leader Dmitrii
Rogozin, who spoke by telephone from his office in the State Duma
building where he is participating in a hunger strike against the
government’s benefits-reform plan. The complete interview in
Russian can be seen at
During the interview, Rogozin defended the decision to stage
a hunger strike and said that the current Duma has become “a sort of
farce, in which simply by the command of some director from the
majority faction, plus the well-known Russian hooligan [Liberal
Democratic Party of Russia leader Vladimir] Zhirinovskii who has
stuck himself on to them, [deputies] come and pass whatever decisions
are deemed necessary without any discussion and with the most blatant
violations of the Duma’s regulations.” He specifically criticized
deputies’ rejection of a Motherland-sponsored proposal to give
the floor to human rights ombudsman Vladimir Lukin to discuss the
benefits crisis.
Rogozin also criticized the “officious” state media, “even
the formerly independent NTV television,” for waging a conspiracy of
silence about the Motherland hunger strike. He said that false
statements purportedly from the hunger strikers have been circulated
in the Duma and posted on the Internet, and he accused Unified Russia
of complicity in this campaign.
Rogozin also categorically denounced a letter that was
recently sent by 20 Duma deputies, including several from the
Motherland faction, that urged the Prosecutor-General’s Office to
investigate Jewish organizations on suspicion that they foment ethnic
and religious strife.
Although Motherland has always marketed itself as a
pro-presidential, nationalist-leaning party, Rogozin called on
President Vladimir Putin to take responsibility for the benefits
crisis. “We demand that the president make his deeds match his words
and, finally, become a governmental leader,” Rogozin said, “instead
of just appearing on television and saying what people expect.” “We
believe that [the president] bears total responsibility for
everything that is happening in the country,” he added. (Robert
Coalson)
POLITICS
STRANGE DAYS FOR THE AUDIT CHAMBER
By Robert Coalson
Although President Vladimir Putin re-nominated Sergei
Stepashin to his post as Audit Chamber chairman on 27 January, the
political elites in Russia were caught off-guard when Stepashin told
a meeting of the Duma’s Motherland faction on 18 January that he
had submitted his resignation.
Stepashin, whose term was scheduled to end in April 2006,
said that he considered it his duty to tender his resignation in
keeping with the spirit of a new law on the formation of the Audit
Chamber, which stipulates that the president nominates that
body’s chairman and that the Duma confirm the nomination.
Until Putin reaffirmed his support for Stepashin, there was a
frenzy of discussion about what Stepashin’s move might mean. Most
analysts saw it as a clear appeal for a vote of confidence from
Putin, although some doubted whether that nod would come. Dmitrii
Oreshkin of the Merkator analytical group told “Novye izvestiya” on
19 January that some within the administration might try to take
advantage of Stepashin’s move because the chief auditor “is a man
with unsatisfied political ambitions who is not caught up in any
compromising games.”
The announcement of Stepashin’s resignation was given
additional political gravitas by the fact that the Duma has now three
times postponed hearing his potentially scandalous report on his
chamber’s review of 1990s-era privatizations. On 12 January, Duma
Speaker Boris Gryzlov announced that the report would not be put on
the Duma’s agenda because changes in the legislature’s rules
had made it unclear what “format” was appropriate for Stepashin’s
appearance. “Tribuna” noted on 12 January that Stepashin had already
appeared in the Duma chamber on 8 December 2004 to present the report
but deputies refused to give him the floor. A few analysts, including
Lydia Andrusenko, writing in “Politicheskii zhurnal,” No. 2,
speculated that Stepashin’s resignation was a protest to the
Kremlin against possible moves to quash the report.
However, at the 18 January Motherland faction meeting,
Stepashin told deputies that the Duma’s leadership had scheduled
his report for sometime “in March or April in the context of a report
on the work of the Audit Chamber.” He added that he has already
submitted the report to both legislative chambers, Putin, and the
Prosecutor-General’s Office.
“Kommersant-Daily” on 17 January reported that it had
obtained a copy of Stepashin’s report and that it was
characterized mostly by ambiguous conclusions and statements that
could be variously interpreted. However, the daily, which is owned by
avowed Kremlin foe and former oligarch Boris Berezovskii, wrote that
the document could serve “as the basis for the mass reexamination of
privatization results” and that “the authorities don’t seem to be
in any hurry to play this card.” Some analysts have raised the
concern that the report could signal a qualitative change in the
state’s assault of private enterprise, inasmuch as the Yukos
affair and other high-profile cases to date have centered on the
issue of minimizing tax obligations rather than on the core issue of
property ownership.
The daily reported that the report repeats longstanding
general criticisms of privatization, including that it was conducted
without a complete legal foundation; that the State Property
Committee frequently failed to register its instructions with the
Justice Ministry, making them technically void; and that most tenders
were insufficiently competitive and transparent. The report also
reportedly includes general conclusions such as that privatization
failed to achieve such stated goals as boosting industrial production
and economic growth. The report concludes vaguely but menacingly that
“it is essential to establish through the courts the violated rights
of the legal property owner, that is, the state,” the daily reported.
The “Kommersant-Daily” article reports that the main
ambiguity in the possible repercussions of the report lies in the
fact that it does not really examine specific privatization cases in
detail. It surveys the oil and energy sectors, according to the
daily, and lingers on Chukotka Autonomous Okrug Governor Roman
Abramovich’s Sibneft. It also covers the tobacco industry and
other sectors, but mostly in order to demonstrate various
privatization-related schemes that allegedly harmed the state’s
interests rather than to point fingers at particular companies or
individuals.
KM.ru speculated on 21 January that the Kremlin is benefiting
from the uncertainty over Stepashin’s report, which the news
agency described as “a bomb hanging over” the oligarchs. On the other
hand, National Strategy Council General Director Valerii Khomyakov
told “Nezavisimaya gazeta” on 20 January that “clearly, some points
in the report may not have pleased the Kremlin-linked oligarchs very
much.” Despite Stepashin’s renomination, the fate of the
privatization report remains unclear.
Putin met with Stepashin on 24 January and listened to his
report on the Audit Chamber’s plans for 2005. At that meeting,
Stepashin announced that the chamber would “move away from petty
topics” and instead study larger matters such as the overall
effectiveness of government spending. On 21 January, Federation
Council Chairman Sergei Mironov told ABN that Stepashin deserves to
keep his post, noting that Stepashin is a “gosudarstvennik,” or a
person who believes in a strong state, and “that is very important.”
Stepashin told reporters on 27 January, the day of his renomination,
that the government will not pursue a policy of “deprivatization,”
and he shifted the focus of his criticisms from privatization issues
to concerns about the management of state property.
Former Duma Deputy Yurii Boldyrev, who helped write the
original law on the Audit Chamber, told derrick.ru, the official
website of the Union of Oil and Gas Equipment Producers, on 25
January that the most important thing is neither Stepashin nor even
the privatization report, but the fate of the Audit Chamber itself,
which has gone largely unremarked. He said that the new law that
allows the president to nominate the Audit Chamber’s chairman
spells the end of its independence and turns it into “a fifth wheel”
in the structure of the government. “The Audit Chamber made sense
when it operated independently of the president and made public
things he wanted to cover up,” Boldyrev said.
POLITICAL CALENDAR
2-3 February: Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to visit Azerbaijan
to discuss visit to Moscow of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev
later the same month
4-11 February: 60th anniversary of the Yalta Conference, at which
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, U.S. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, and Soviet dictator Josef Stalin discussed plans for post-
war Europe
6 February: Second round of voting in the gubernatorial election
in Nenets Autonomous Okrug
12 February: Communist Party to organize a day of national protest
against the government’s benefits reform
16 February: Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement intended
to curb the emissions of gases widely believed to contribute
to global warming, comes into effect following its ratification by
the Russian Federation
18 February: Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to travel to Tbilisi
20 February: New patriotic television channel organized by the
Russian Defense Ministry to begin broadcasting
24 February: President Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush to
hold a summit in Bratislava, Slovakia
March: Terms of Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug Governor Yurii
Neelov, Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug Governor Aleksandr
Filipenko, Jewish Autonomous Okrug Governor Nikolai Volkov, and
Primorskii Krai Governor Sergei Darkin to expire
March: Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to visit Japan to discuss
Russian-Japanese summit scheduled to be held in Tokyo in April,
according to many media reports
March: EU external relations commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner to
visit Moscow
6 March: Parliamentary elections in Moldova
20 March: Legislative elections in Voronezh Oblast
April: Terms of Tula Oblast Governor Vasilii Starodubtsev, Saratov
Oblast Governor Dmitrii Ayatskov, and Amur Oblast Governor Leonid
Korotkov to expire
April: Russian Soyuz spacecraft to bring new crew to the
International Space Station
17 April: Krasnoyarsk Krai to hold a referendum on the question of
merging the krai with the Taimyr and Evenk autonomous okrugs
9 May: Commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the end of World
War II
2006: Russia to host a G-8 summit
1 January 2006: Date by which all political parties must conform to
law on political parties, which requires at least 50,000 members and
branches in one-half of all federation subjects, or either reregister
as public organizations or be dissolved.
*********************************************************
Copyright (c) 2005. RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.
The “RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly” is prepared by Robert Coalson
on the basis of a variety of sources. It is distributed every
Wednesday.
Direct comments to Robert Coalson at [email protected].
For information on reprints, see:
Back issues are online at

FACTBOX-Georgia PM death: five facts on the country
TBILISI, Feb 3 (Reuters) – Here are five basic facts on ex-Soviet
Georgia, whose Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania was found dead on
Thursday, apparently from accidental gas poisoning:
– Georgia toppled long standing leader Eduard Shevardnadze in a
bloodless “Rose Revolution” in November 2003 and replaced him with
West-leaning president Mikhail Saakashvili. Saakashvili wants to pilot
his poor country into the Europe mainstream.
– Zhvania, 41, was one of the fathers of the revolution and as prime
minister was seen as a moderating influence on Saakashvili, a volatile
37-year-old U.S.-trained lawyer.
– The Georgian model of mass street protests over rigged elections was
emulated by another ex-Soviet state, Ukraine, a year later in an
“Orange Revolution” that brought Viktor Yushchenko to power.
– A mountainous republic of about 5 million in the Caucasus, Georgia
is one of the poorest ex-Soviet states. It has a ramshackle economy
with a small industrial base and limited natural resources. The new
government has pledged to implement liberal reforms to attract
investment.
– Though small, Georgia is riven by separatist tensions. The
Saakashvili leadership has pledged to re-assert control by peaceful
means over two breakaway regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which
say they want to join Russia.
02/03/05 12:41 ET

GEORGIA’S PM GETS POISONED BY GAS WHILE PLAYING BACKGAMMON
TBILISI, FEBRUARY 3. ARMINFO. Georgia’s Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania
got poisoned by gas while playing backgammon in his friend Raul
Yusupov’s house.
Georgia’s Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili says that it was an
accident caused by gas escape from an Iranian gas heater.
Zhvania’s bodyguards found him in the drawing room while Yusupov was
in the kitchen. “They must have been playing backgammon,” says
Merabishvili.
The bodyguards immediately reported of the accident to their chief,
vice PM Georgy Baramidze, President Mikhail Saakashvili and the
prosecutor general. Investigation is underway.
ITAR-TASS reports that gas heater failure is a usual thing for Tbilisi
– dozens of people died of them there in the last months.
Interfax reports that Pres.Saakashvili has called an extraordinary
government meeting.
President of Abkhazia Sergey Bagapsh says that Zhvania’s death will
not aggravate the situation in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict
zone. “This is Georgia’s internal affair and it is the task of their
police to investigate into the accident,” he says to Interfax.
NOTE: Zurab Zhvania was 42. He was biologist. In 1989 he led a party
of greens and co-chaired the party of greens of Europe. In 1993 he led
the Union of Georgian Citizens party supporting President Eduard
Shevardnadze. In 1992-1995 and 1995-1999 he got into the parliament
and was elected speaker. In 1999 he was reelected speaker but left the
post in 2001.
Before the Rose Revolution Zhvania was believed to be the key official
successor of Shevardnadze as president of Georgia. He was known for
his pro-western views and for regarding Georgian-Russian relations as
“close to cold war.” In 2002 he led the United Democrats party. In Nov
2003 he was appointed Georgia’s Prime Minister.

THE KURDISH STATE WILL EMERGE – IF USA IS WILLING
Azg/arm
4 Feb 05
The Iraqi parliamentary elections were launched to set a national
assembly of 275 lawmakers that would choose a president and two
vice-presidents of the country from among its members and the latter
would chose a prime minister.The primary task of the would-be national
assembly is to prepare a draft constitution that will be voted on
October 15.
In case the constitution passes new parliamentary elections will be
held in Iraq on December 15 that will form the executive and the
legislature on the constitutional basis.
In other words the elections are important as regards the Iraqi
constitution and the constitution is vital for Iraq’s political
future. If the Iraqi constitution turns Iraqi state into federation
that will put the country onthe edge of falling apart.
A referendum held along with the elections on January 30 in 4 Kurdish
cities of Northern Iraq showed that 99.5 percent of population demands
independence. Masut Barzani, president of Democratic Party of
Kurdistan, made an interesting statement regarding Kurdish
population’s orientation. Turkish Yeni Shafaq newspaper informed on
January 31 that Barzani met journalists in Salahaddinwhere he stated
that there is no such question if a Kurdish state will be created but
when will it be created. `Kirkuk’s identity is Kurdish.Neither Turkey
nor any other state has the right to draw conclusions about Kirkuk or
any other Iraqi state’.
Barzani’s words caused Turkey’s active confrontation. Chairman of
Turkish parliament, Byulent Arnc, called Barzani arrogant noting that
the American has petted him. Apparently Arnc’s words missed the point
as Barzani made his second statement on February 3: `Independence is
inevitable; demand for independence is the most natural right of
Kurdish people’. A Kurdish politician and foreign minister of Iraqi
temporary government, Khoshyar Zebar, added to Barzani’s words:
`Hopefully the Iraqi Kurdistan will become Europe’s neighbor in near
future’.
Regardless of Barzani’s and Zebar’s views, America’s position and
plans for Iraq’s reconstruction will be decisive. Turkish foreign
minister Abdullah Gul who is paying an official visit to China
declared in Beijing on February 2:` The US has to take tough measures
to neutralize insurgency in Northern Iraq’. Meanwhile he reminded
that Turkey stands for Iraq’s territorial integrity.
Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State, who is going to visit Ankara
on February 5, will possibly discuss the issue of Kurdish state as
well as issues concerning Iraq’s reconstruction with Abdullah Gul.
By Hakob Chakrian
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

The New York Times
February 3, 2005
Inquiry Severely Criticizes U.N.’s Oil-for-Aid Program
By JUDITH MILLER

An interim report by a United Nations-appointed panel investigating
the oil-for-food program in Iraq severely criticizes its director and
depicts the program as “tainted” for failing to follow the
organization’s own procedures.
In an essay appearing today in The Wall Street Journal, Paul
A. Volcker, the former Federal Reserve chairman who heads the
three-member commission investigating the oil-for-food program, said
its procurement system had failed to follow “the established rules of
the organization designed to assure fairness and accountability.”
He said the report, which is scheduled to be made public today, also
accuses Benon Sevan, the Cypriot who had headed what was once the
world body’s largest humanitarian effort, of “irreconcilable conflict
of interest.”
Citing what he called “conclusive” evidence, Mr. Volcker wrote that by
“effectively participating in the selection of purchasers of oil under
the program,” Mr. Sevan had violated both “specific United Nations
rules and of the broad responsibility of an international civil
servant to adhere to the highest standards of trust and integrity.”
One official who has seen parts of the report said that it also
criticized another senior United Nations official, Joseph Stephanides,
a senior official on the Security Council staff, for failing to ensure
that the organization’s own rules for buying oil, selling goods and
selecting contractors were followed.
Telephone calls were made last night to the offices of both Mr. Sevan
and Mr. Stephanides, but neither man could be reached for comment.
In his essay, Mr. Volcker said the report explored in “excruciating
detail” three “potentially vulnerable” parts of the $64 billion
program, which was aimed at easing the debilitating effects of
economic sanctions on the Iraqi people between 1996 and 2003 by
ensuring that Iraq’s oil revenues were used to buy food, medicine and
other necessities for its people.
Specifically, he said the interim report discussed the initial
selection of major contractors hired to inspect Iraqi oil exports,
imports of ostensibly humanitarian goods, and how the program’s funds
were spent and managed. The report also discusses internal program
audits, many of which have already been disclosed, and how the program
spent its own administrative funds, he wrote.
“The findings do not make for pleasant reading,” Mr. Volcker
concluded.
His interim report, which has been eagerly and skeptically awaited by
United Nations critics, is months overdue. Hampered by what
investigators and diplomats called a reluctance among some member
countries to cooperate and a lack of subpoena power, Mr. Volcker’s
panel has had difficulty obtaining evidence. Conservatives and other
critics have accused him of being insufficiently impartial and
independent, a charge he has denied. And John Danforth, who recently
left his position as American ambassador to the United Nations, said
Mr. Volcker, with a staff of over 60 people and a budget of some $30
million, lacked some tools needed to conduct a thorough inquiry.
Mr. Volcker was particularly critical of the oil-for-food program’s
procurement system. “We have found in each case that the procurement
process was tainted,” he wrote, by a failure to follow established
rules.
“Perhaps not surprisingly,” he added, “political considerations
intruded, but in a manner that was neither transparent nor
accountable.”
Repeating criticisms the commission, officially known as the
Independent Inquiry Committee, made in an earlier report, Mr. Volcker
said the interim report concluded that the auditing system was
“underfunded and undermanned” and hence, “unable to meet effectively
the challenge posed by a really unique, massive and complex program of
humanitarian assistance.”
Despite the “skill and dedication of auditing professionals,” he
wrote, the auditing system lacked “clear reporting lines and the
management responsiveness critical to achieving a fully effective
auditing process.”
Even though no evidence of “systematic or widespread abuse” was found
in how the program’s administrative funds were spent, Mr. Volcker
wrote, the commission still found what he called “a clear lapse from
disciplined judgment.”
Mr. Volcker called his panel’s initial findings about Mr. Sevan “more
disheartening.” He indicated that the investigation of Mr. Sevan, an
aide to Kofi Annan, was continuing, as was his investigation of how
and why Cotecna Inspection, a Swiss-based company that was hired to
inspect humanitarian goods bought by Iraq and that employed
Mr. Annan’s son, got its own contract.
Mr. Annan has denied charges of nepotism within his organization and
said he had not known that his son, Kojo, had continued being paid by
Cotecna after leaving the company. Mr. Sevan have also previously
denied charges of wrongdoing, but he has declined for many months to
meet with or talk to reporters.
Under the rules of the oil-for-food program created by the United
States and other members of the Security Council, Iraq could chose to
whom it would sell its oil and buy humanitarian goods. Congressional
investigators have said that because of the program’s structure,
secrecy and poor oversight, billions were diverted from the program.
Mr. Annan told reporters yesterday that the United Nations would adopt
reforms in response to Mr. Volcker’s criticisms and recommendations,
and that he was already doing so.