Site says police, army may remain mainly neutral in Ukrainian election

Glavred, Kiev
16 Nov 04

It is by no means certain that the army, security service and police
force, (referred to collectively as the “armed services”) will actually
carry out the orders reportedly given to them to do everything
possible to secure the victory of the establishment candidate in
Sunday’s presidential election, a Ukrainian web site has said. It
said some senior officers want Yanukovych to win, while others are
not very concerned as they will be dismissed anyway. This indifference
extends downwards, resulting at best in a patchy response to partisan
orders, it said. The net result may be that the armed services will
prove to be largely neutral, it concluded. The following is the text
of the article by Viktor Shlynchak posted on the opposition-leaning
Ukrainian web site Glavred on 16 November under the title “Powerless?”;
subheadings have been inserted editorially:

The situation in the Ukrainian armed forces, the SBU Security
Service of Ukraine and the Interior Ministry shows that today the
lower subdivisions of the armed-service departments are minded to
“wait and see which way the wind blows” and to refrain from taking
radical action against the opposition – until the terrain has been
finally reconnoitred. In other words, until the winner has been
declared. Armed services’ loyalties are uncertain

We have reported on more than one occasion that something akin
to an internal revolt is simmering deep inside the armed-service
departments. We have also reported that each of the teams of the
presidential candidates has tried all means of gaining the support
of the armed services – both public means and those that are behind
the scenes. Opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko has read out appeals
to law-enforcement officers.

Prime Minister and establishment candidate Viktor Yanukovych has
promised district police inspectors a pay rise and a “topping up” of
their length of service. Yushchenko has had meetings with the heads
of the armed-service departments and appealed to their consciences.

Yanukovych has brought pressure to bear through administrative
methods, strengthening Kiev with military units. Neither Yushchenko
nor Yanukovych is convinced that, in a state of emergency, he will
have the support of the armed services, just as neither is convinced
that he will not be betrayed at the very last moment. Yushchenko has
nothing in particular to hope for, whereas for Yanukovych it may mean
unconditional surrender.

Defence minister’s indifference prompts army neutrality

At the moment, Yanukovych can only rely on the Defence
Ministry. Oleksandr Kuzmuk, a member of the establishment candidate’s
team who has just taken over the ministry after heading it previously,
has a pretty good idea of what is what in the institution entrusted to
him. However, sources inside the ministry say that Kuzmuk, appointed
two months ago, spends most of his time on preserving his influence
in the ministry after the election, whatever the final outcome
is. This process includes the gradual placing of “his own people”,
the formation of a balance among the generals and also the commonplace
accumulation of money in the accounts of commercial bodies that work
with the Defence Ministry.

We shall not represent this claim as being the truth, but rumours to
the effect that Kuzmuk is least of all concerned about the election
have long and persistently been in circulation. Kuzmuk’s closest
associates are not certain that, even if Yanukovych comes to power,
Gen Kuzmuk will remain in his post, since the post has reportedly
been promised to a USDPU United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine
protege. Hence his attitude towards his area of responsibility.
Kuzmuk’s mood inevitably affects not only the calculations
being made by the generals, but also the views of lower-ranking
officers. Campaigning for Yanukovych in the army boils down to a
reminder that Yushchenko “took benefits away”, while Yanukovych has
promised to restore them. However, even those for whom this argument
seemed previously to be the most convincing are not very sure that
the income part of family budgets in the army will increase. That
is why they still retain a relatively neutral attitude towards the
two candidates. Commanders of units are, of course, able to bypass
the law on elections and to control the course of the voting at the
polling stations within military units, yet the degree of loyalty
to the current authorities in the armed forces does not allow one to
say that it is very high.

Quite interesting processes are also taking place in the army itself,
and they are setting the other armed services against Kuzmuk. The
present defence minister’s attempts to attach to the Defence
Ministry the SBU’s department of military counterintelligence (the
DVKR), which has been resurrected, in the full sense of the term,
would seem to be prompted by dissatisfaction with the keenness of
the counterintelligence officers and by reluctance to contemplate
an independent body that has every opportunity to monitor the
army. Incidentally, so far, this body has already “dug up” a mass of
material on the abuses, intrigues and unscrupulousness of top officers
in the Defence Ministry. The “bargaining” over such matters is not
only becoming a stumbling block between the armed services, but is
also generating tension between individual subunits, including those
that are to ensure order on polling day, 21 November, and possibly
after the result has been announced.

SBU also standing on the sidelines

The SBU is also avoiding active participation in the elections in the
run-up to the second round. The available data suggest that the secret
service has withdrawn from playing an active role in the election,
and extensive reports from the “electoral fields” have stopped
thudding on to the desks of senior state officials. Operational
information from the regions, particularly those in the west, has
also dried up. Can these developments be logged as achievements by
the opposition candidate’s team? That is dubious. It is more likely
that SBU chief Ihor Smeshko stood up to the president and defended his
right to take no part in electoral games, regardless of the dismissal
looming over him, for which forces close to the Party of Regions led by
Yanukovych are pressing. After the election, Smeshko will, in any case,
have to collect his belongings and go. If Yanukovych comes to power,
Smeshko will probably be replaced by his former first deputy in the
SBU, Yuriy Zemlyanskyy, whom Smeshko himself fired not so long ago
on 20 August , incidentally. Zemlyanskyy not only hails from Donetsk
Region like Yanukovych , but he is also one of the people through whom
Yanukovych resolved the lion’s share of his affairs in Kiev while he
was still governor of Donetsk Region .

The fact, however, that Zemlyanskyy spent a lengthy period inside
the building in Volodymyrska Street, Kiev – SBU headquarters does
not mean that his authority is very strong and firm. He has far more
enemies than friends in the head office. Members of the secret service
themselves say that people in the building remember Volodymyr Radchenko
(now secretary of the National Security and Defence Council) more than
Gen Zemlyanskyy, even though Radchenko moved to other work before he
did. Volodymyr Satsyuk, the man in the SBU with responsibility for the
elections, has recently lost any special interest in these measures,
evidently because he has not found anything in a Yanukovych victory
that would be at all beneficial to himself.

Police also wobble

The only question now unanswered is how the police will behave if the
crunch comes. The obsessive determination of Interior Minister Mykola
Bilokon during the presidential campaign would be surprising if one
did not know what specifically Yanukovych had promised the general in
his office. He is said to have promised a great deal. Much depends,
however, not so much on Bilokon himself as on how he is perceived
by the actual Interior Ministry staff. There are constant whispers
in the central directorate about the blackmail and threats that are
levelled against the relatives of internal affairs officers who,
in the opinion of the minister’s associates, are lukewarm in helping
“Yanukovych’s headquarters carry out election work”. It is also known
that some of the ministry’s orders are given verbally, so as to avoid
liability if Yushchenko wins. A resolution to that effect was adopted
the week before last. Most orders are now conveyed using the secure
communications systems.

The fact that information leaks about the actions of senior police
officers surface in the media proves that there is a certain number
of staff in the law-enforcement agencies who are willing to engage in
dialogue with the opposition candidate’s headquarters. It is rumoured
that among such people is former Interior Minister Yuriy Kravchenko,
who occasionally meets representatives of Yushchenko’s headquarters
and offers them help. It is hard to judge how honest that desire is. It
should also be recalled that the text of an appeal to speaker Volodymyr
Lytvyn from law-enforcement officers in the Kharkiv area was published
not so long ago by Vecherniye Vesti on 10 November . The letter
referred to falsification of the election and how Interior Ministry
staff were involved in this. Admittedly, Deputy Interior Minister
Mykhaylo Korniyenko said later, in a Glavred interview, that “the
letter is an election stunt” and does not actually exist. According
to our information, the police “whistleblowers” immediately decided
to hold a news conference, but cancelled it at the last moment.
Another report appeared on Internet sites later, saying that Deputy
Minister Mykola Lyubar had instructed his subordinates in the office
of the governor of Cherkasy Region: “if Yanukovych doesn’t get 50 per
cent of votes, it is essential to put into effect the plan to disrupt
the election so that they are deemed to be invalid”. Can this statement
be regarded as a verbal order? In view of the minister’s directive,
it probably can.

Twilight of Kuchma era recalls Ceausescu scenario

However, the main question remains open: how are such initiatives seen
locally? Our information suggests that responses vary quite a lot. Even
the actual posing of the question means that the authorities, who
wanted to look “as strong as never before” and whose administrative
resources relied primarily on the armed services, are starting to
lose their power as the end of the election draws near.

The present situation in Ukraine reminds one of Romania in the
final hours of Ceausescu, when all the armed services turned against
him towards the end of the uprising. It reminds one of Russia, when
Yeltsin’s words were stronger than the tanks. It reminds one of Armenia
and the Georgia of recent times. And, even if, in some unexpected
circumstances, Kuzmuk, Smeshko and Bilokon repeat the words of the
Romanian general Vasile Milea the defence minister, who refused to
carry out Ceausescu’s orders: “I looked in all the service regulations
and could not find anywhere a paragraph that said that the people’s
army should fire on the people… ellipsis as published “, events
will not, we hope, lead to shooting in Ukraine. We very much hope not.

AsiaNews.it, Italy
Nov 19 2004

Call to Christians: Pilgrims, come to the Holy Land

Representatives of all Churches: “The West, driven by secularism, is
forgetting Christians”.

Jerusalem (AsiaNews) — “A call to all people of faith: Visit the
Holy Land”. This is the title of a document signed by
representatives of different Christian denominations in Jerusalem
this week, to encourage Christians around the world to resume visits
to the Holy Sites.

On Monday, November 13, the Custodian of the Holy Land, Father
Pierbattista Pizzaballa, papal representative Archbishop Pietro
Sambi, and representatives of the Greek and Russian Orthodox,
Armenian and Protestant Churches signed a joint statement urging
Christians of the world to visit the Holy Land and, thus, contribute
to preventing the exodus of Christians from these areas. It is the
first time that Christians jointly sign a document of this kind.

“There are many things that divide Christians, but there are many
more that unite us. The Holy Land is one of these,” Fr. Pizzaballa
said, echoing Pope John XXIII’s famous phrase.

Archbishop Sambi referred to pilgrimages to the Holy Sites as times
of “joy and spiritual enrichment”, saying that they offer both
spiritual and material encouragement to the small Christian
communities there. Many Christian Palestinians in fact make a living
thanks to religious tourism to the Holy Sites. Furthermore, pilgrims
can create “an atmosphere of peace” that can contribute to “defusing
the ever-tense political situation between Israelis and
Palestinians.”

The document bemoans the flight of Christians from the Holy Land.
Today they make up only 1.6% of the population. “Along with the
Christian exodus the Christian vision of man regarding the respect
for the human person and human life is also disappearing, in a region
in which these values are in open decline”, the document states. It
also laments the inaction of “governments of the Christian West”,
which, “driven by a false vision of religious freedom and perhaps by
an exacerbated secularism,” forget to help Christians and come to the
aid of Palestinians for merely ideological and political motives.

Speaking in support of the document, Israel’s Minister of Tourism,
Gideon Ezra, provided figures on the decline of Christian pilgrimages
to the Holy Land. This decline has been the result of security
problems related to the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis.
In 2000, Christians made up 60% of the 2.6 million tourists in
Israel. In 2004, the percentage fell to 29. (LF)

Glasgow Evening Times, UK
Nov 19 2004

Armenia seeks help of Scots

SCOTLAND’S prized reputation for financial prudence is helping the
former Soviet state of Armenia to rebuild its economy.
The Caucasus republic expects to have its accountancy profession
rubber-stamped by international governing bodies in the next two
years, after seeking the help of the world’s oldest accountancy body.

The 150-year-old Institute of Chartered Accountants Scotland is
helping hundreds of young Armenian students through professional
exams.

It is part of an international effort to encourage investment in the
country and secure its membership of the respected International
Federation of Accountants.

Armenia’s best known exports are its cognac, a favourite tipple of
Stalin and Sir Winston Churchill, and cut diamonds.

But the economy has depended heavily on foreign aid since
independence from Russia in 1991 forced it to rebuild its formerly
Soviet-funded power industry.

Neil Wallace, head of international services for ICAS, has been
leading the project from Armenian capital Yerevan and is now seeing
Japanese, Korean, German and French investors looking for business.
He said: “It sounds a bit pie-in-the-sky to say you can help people
become rich, but it does happen.”

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

The Messenger, Georgia
Nov 19 2004

Minister in electric seat
Former minister downplays attacks as wintertime pressure
By Christina Tashkevich

This Wednesday turned out to be a very hard day for the Minister of
Energy Nika Gilauri. First he listened to sharp criticism from the
Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania at the government session and then he
was grilled in debates with majoritarian MPs at Parliament.

The majoritarians, representing almost all of Georgia’s regions,
gathered at a meeting of the sectoral economy committee of Parliament
on Wednesday to listen to Gilauri’s speech.

The majority of MPs criticized the minister and even threatened him
with dismissal. “We can seriously influence this sphere,” claimed
leader of Conservatives Zviad Dzidziguri during discussion.

“For example, if there is no [electricity] in a week, let’s raise the
issue of Gilauri’s dismissal,” said Dzidziguri. At the end of the
meeting majoritarian MPs gave Gilauri a 10-day deadline to schedule
regular electric supplies in the regions.

In Gilauri’s defense, the former minister of energy Mamuka
Nikolaishvili told reporters that the Minister of Energy and the
Ministry always is under attack in winter, “because it is hard to
satisfy everybody when you have a deficit in the energy system.”

He pointed out there should be “certain fairness in distributing the
existing, small electricity resources that Georgia has.” He added
further support for the ministry, saying, “I know that the ministry
seriously works on this task.”

Meanwhile Tbilisi may have fewer or even no problems with electricity
this winter. Wednesday evening Telasi started importing 100 megawatts
of electricity from Russia through the Kavkasioni high transmission
line.

In addition Georgia will be getting 100 megawatts of imports from
Armenia. “With imports of 200 megawatts, I think the winter should go
by without problems,” said the General Director of Telasi Dangiras
Mikalajunas on Wednesday.

Meanwhile Gilauri himself commented to journalists after the meeting
with MPs that he “never promised there will be a 24-hour electricity
supply.” The minister says the problems in the sector are very
difficult but added they “can be resolved.”

Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania, who a week ago also threatened Gilauri
with the axe if electricity supplies were not well managed, again
expressed his dissatisfaction with the electricity supply problems at
the Wednesday government session. He demanded from Gilauri a complete
countrywide energy schedule within one week, saying that he wanted to
know exactly which regions would receive electricity at what time.

“Not only Minister Gilauri but every government member must be
involved in the process of regulating this system,” Zhvania said.

“There are many problems connected with electricity in all regions of
Georgia, and only in some big cities can it be said that the
situation has improved, although I must admit that in Kutaisi the
situation is much better, and the same can be said about Zugdidi. But
in Mtskheta and Mtskheta-Tianeti as a whole nothing has changed.
Nothing has changed besides the demonstrations and my effort to
regulate the schedule there,’ stated the prime minister.

The Messenger, Georgia
Nov 19 2004

Kosovo will not help separatists
According to the Azeri newspaper Ekho.Baku, Nagorno-Karabakh,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdnestr are rooting for the independence
of Kosovar Albanians. Karabakh separatists together with “friends in
misfortune” Prednestrovie, Abkhazia and South Ossetia continue to
consolidate their efforts to achieve recognition by the international
community.
The Azeri paper comments on a recent report by the newspaper
Moskovski Komsomolets that these separatist states are close to the
creation of a union of unrecognized states. According to Ekho.Baku,
these four ‘countries’ have held joint trainings where they agreed to
render mutual military assistance in case of a security threat to any
of the regimes.
But Moskovski Komsomolets reports their chief expectation is
connected to the fate of Kosovo. Many leaders from the four
separatist states think that soon this Serbian autonomy will receive
complete independence and recognition by the international community.
Such an event would give them a precedent and a chance, the paper
writes, “to draw themselves up to their full height.”
But commentators in Ekho caution that all the regions should be put
in the same basket. “First of all, we have to distinguish the
situation in Kosovo from the Armenian-Azeri conflict,” said Director
of the Peace and Conflict Resolution Center Elkhan Mekhtiev, adding
that the final decisions of the UN recognized Kosovo as an integral
part of Serbia.
He said that despite the fact that there is international decision
over that territory, there is no talk regarding the giving Kosovo
sovereign status. Moreover, according to Ekho.Baku, Mekhtiev said
that Serbia is adhering to the path of the European democratic
development and this is a further guarantee that the country will
retain its territorial integrity.
But in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, he noted that
international organizations have decreed that they will not recognize
the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh or Abkhazia. “On the contrary,
OSCE and UN as well as other organizations confirm the territorial
integrity of Georgia and Azerbaijan. So, in this case, the issue of
status is the prerogative of Azerbaijan, because the Minsk Group of
OSCE says that it can recognize everything if Azerbaijan will agree
with that,” Mekhtiev said.
Conflict specialists in Azerbaijan think that the article in
Moskovski Komsomolets has a propagandistic character. A member of the
delegation of Azerbaijan in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe Asim Mollazade thinks that Moskovski Komsomolets write “the
things they want to happen in reality but does not.”
“The depicted situation will never occur, because the world will
never recognize these formations created by Russia so that it could
create problems for independent Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldava.
These separatist structures will always be recognized by the world as
parts of those countries. Any efforts of separatists to aggravate the
situation will not lead to the good either for them or for those
forces who are behind them,” he said. Mollazade also is sure that
Kosovo will never be recognized as an independent state.

PRESS RELEASE
Parliamentary Assembly Communication Unit
Ref: 582a04
Tel: +33 3 88 41 31 93
Fax :+33 3 90 21 41 34
[email protected]
internet:

PACE committee spells out steps to peaceful settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict

Strasbourg, 19.11.2004 – A report of the Council of Europe Parliamentary
Assembly (PACE) made public today spells out a series of steps Armenia and
Azerbaijan could take to fulfill their commitment to settle the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict peacefully.

In a draft resolution adopted at a meeting in Paris on Wednesday, PACE’s
Political Affairs Committee expressed concern at the creation of
“mono-ethnic areas which resemble the terrible concept of ethnic cleansing”,
and reaffirmed the right of displaced persons from the area of conflict to
return to their homes safely and with dignity.

The committee called on Armenia and Azerbaijan to submit constructive
proposals for the peaceful settlement of the conflict via the OSCE Minsk
Group, which should conduct speedy negotiations. If these fail, the parties
should consider using the UN’s International Court of Justice, the
parliamentarians said.

Meanwhile, the Council of Europe should offer experts to help Armenia and
Azerbaijan draw up a political status for Nagorno-Karabakh. Both countries
pledged to use only peaceful means to settle the conflict when they joined
the organisation in January 2001.

The committee also condemned any expression of hatred portrayed in the media
of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and called for a Council of Europe action plan
for mutual reconciliation involving the media, schools and universities as
well as contacts between locally elected representatives.

It is proposed that the report be debated by the Assembly at its next
plenary session in Strasbourg (24-28 January 2005).

Link to provisional versions of the draft resolution and recommendation

—
The Parliamentary Assembly brings together 630 members from the national
parliaments of the 46 member states.
President: Peter Schieder (Austria, SOC); Secretary General of the Assembly:
Bruno Haller.
Political Groups: SOC (Socialist Group); EPP/CD (Group of the European
People’s Party); LDR (Liberal, Democratic and Reformers’ Group);
EDG (European Democratic Group); UEL (Group of the Unified European Left).

Sydney Morning Herald , Australia
Nov 20 2004

Sorry for all the apologies
By Ruth Wajnryb

It might bemuse a visiting anthropologist from Mars to discover
within Earth culture a speech event loosely called “saying sorry”. If
s/he stays around long enough, s/he may discover that the sorry
speech event is an umbrella term for a diverse collection of
utterances (or sorry noises) that leaders of democratic nations emit
– or feel compelled to emit – usually at some symbolic occasion.
Anniversaries of genocides are good.

I say “democratic nations” because for the life of me I can’t
remember one such verbal engagement with the issue of sorriness
coming out of the mouths of tyrants. It’s not the Idi Amin Club
members who wrestle with apologetics. At the bookends of the 20th
century, descendants of the dispersed survivors of the Armenian
genocide and those of Saddam’s gassed Kurds are still waiting.

I’d like to propose “apologetics” (note the small “a”) as a
superordinate to cover all the verbal noises that accrue with the
issue of sorriness. The word refers both to the verbal act and the
rumblings that surround it.

A recent example comes from Tony Blair. Jeered on by anti-war
protesters outside the annual conference of the British Labour Party,
and with considerable visible angst (most angst, of course, being an
interior experience), Blair wrestled with his apologetics, struggling
to find a way between the simplicity of straight-talking and the
complex pressures of public opinion mixed with party constraints.

He refused to apologise for the Iraq war. “The world is a better
place with Saddam in prison, not in power.” When it came to
allegations about the “sexing up” of prewar intelligence reports,
Blair’s ice got thinner: he “admitted”, “acknowledged” and “accepted”
that evidence about the weapons of mass destruction “has turned out
to be wrong”. It was a tenuous path to walk – between the cajoling of
anti-war protesters (they who, strangely, only surface in
democracies) and the sensitive fact that, as he speaks, he has boys
in the field. Even amid the party faithful, “guarded” and “gingerly”
are the ways to go.

An apology means saying you’re sorry. This seems straightforward
enough until you poke at the scar tissue of history. Sometimes,
etymology offers insights. It was not until the 18th century that
“apologise” seriously took on the meaning of “a frank expression of
regret for wrong done”. Before that, its meaning was closer to the
Latin and the original Greek, apologia, where apo (from, off) and
logos (speech) combine to produce an account mounted in defence or
justification. In modern terms, think of the closing argument of the
defence lawyer.

English retains this original sense in its “apologist”, though this
too has been tainted by negativity. Alleged apologists usually deny
that they are. The pseudo-historian David Irving denies being an
apologist for Hitler even while uttering his absurd claims that
openly seek to exonerate or explain away or diminish the monstrosity
of Nazism.

If you key “apologetics” into case-non-sensitive Google, you get
almost a million hits. These are mostly (big-A) Apologetics – a
Christian term for the practice of defending the Christian faith
against those who raise objections to its validity. This usage more
closely resembles the original Greek sense.

Contrast is a great mechanism for discerning the less-than-obvious.
To grasp the navigational complexity of apologetics, consider the
sheer simplicity of an uncomplicated act of sorry. At
, Democrat-voting Americans apologise
for Bush’s re-election.

One is reminded that English allows both forthrightness and
obfuscation, each achieved through words.

Reuters AlertNet, UK
Nov 19 2004

CRISIS PROFILE-Why is tension resurfacing in Georgia?

By Theresa Freese

People enjoy the view of old Tbilisi under the moon.
Photo by DAVID MDZINARISHVILI

What’s the problem?

Stability in the South Caucasus republic of Georgia is looking shaky
in the semi-autonomous regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Where exactly is the South Caucasus?

The South Caucasus consists of three states – Georgia, Armenia, and
Azerbaijan. All are former Soviet republics pinned between the
Russian Federation and the Middle East from north to south and the
Black Sea and Caspian Sea from east to west.

The Caucasus Mountains range divides and, Georgians claim, protects
the country from its northern neighbour.

Lying just beyond these mountains are the North Caucasus republics of
Russia: Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia,
Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Adygheia.

Why are there so many disputes in this region?

It’s a familiar story of Soviet nationalities policies and
ethnopolitical tensions tearing apart states. Most of the disputes go
back to when the Soviet Union broke apart in 1991, when autonomous
republics and regions clamoured for independence.

Ossetia was integrated into the Russian Empire in the late 18th
century, but divided between 1922 and 1924, when the South became an
autonomous region of Georgia and the North an autonomous republic of
Russia.

About 60,000 people live in South Ossetia. The population of North
Ossetia is more than 700,000.

When Georgia became a sovereign state after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, South Ossetia’s leadership seceded from Georgian rule
and went to war.

Thousands of people were killed and displaced between 1989 and 1992,
but South Ossetia’s population won de facto independence – but with
amorphous borders.

Abkhazia’s 1992-1993 war was much bloodier, claiming some 10,000
lives and uprooting tens of thousands of people – but the republic
achieved a solid boundary with Georgia.

Why do people in South Ossetia and Abkhazia reject Georgia?

They have grown accustomed to independence and fear Georgia will
attempt to retake their territories by force. They worry about
becoming a marginalised ethnic minority within Georgia.

Russia’s economic and political involvement complicates the
situation.

What is Russia’s involvement?

Both South Ossetia and Abkhazia owe their autonomy largely to Russian
backing.

Russia provides their inhabitants with Russian passports and
residency documents, allowing free movement into Russia.

Through them, the Abkhaz and Ossetians receive Russian pensions,
which are much higher than pensions from the Georgian state.

Georgians allege they receive military training and equipment.

In addition to its peacekeeping bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
Russia maintains military bases in Georgia proper.

Some government officials are direct imports from Russia. The
currency is the Russian ruble, and there are Russian flags and
posters of Russian President Vladimir Putin everywhere.

Why is Russia doing this?

Mostly for geopolitical reasons. Many regional experts claim they
provide Russia with a foothold south of the Caucasus mountains.

At the same time, Russia is concerned about separatist movements in
its federation. If Abkhazia or South Ossetia successfully became
breakaway states, Chechnya’s calls for independence could be
validated.

However, Russia apparently does not want to see Abkhazia and South
Ossetia fall back under Georgian sovereignty. Instead, it avoids
officially recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent
republics but provides other types of support.

Why is the tension rising now?

President Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in the `rose revolution’
of November 2003, after mass demonstrations prompted by flawed
parliamentary elections resulted in the bloodless removal of his
predecessor, Eduard Shevardnadze

Whereas Shevardnadze is widely seen as having let the conflicts
freeze — and even allowing his government to profit from them —
Saakashvili promised to re-establish Georgia’s territorial integrity
by bringing three breakaway regions under control.

Georgia needs to settle these conflicts and get foreign troops off
its soil in order to achieve its long-term aim of joining NATO and
the European Union. It stands to reduce corruption, crime and the
trade in contraband, narcotics and weapons that results from porous
borders. Both the Abkhaz and Ossetians, as well as many Georgians,
survive on smuggling numerous products between Russia and Georgia.

How did the president start his campaign?

President Saakashvili’s first target was the autonomous republic of
Ajaria.

He succeeded in regaining control in May 2004, when the region’s
leader — Aslan Abashidze — fled to Russia.

Unlike Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Ajaria had had no history of
conflict with Georgia proper, and the majority of residents are
ethnic Georgians.

When did things begin heating up in South Ossetia?

The tension started rising in June 2004, and the conflict heated up
in August. The mid-October shooting of peacekeepers in South Ossetia
signaled a return to violence after a summer of fighting had given
way to tenuous peace.

The September massacre of more than 330 hostages after armed men
seized a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, was another blow to
stability.

Arguably overconfident after its success in Ajaria, Georgia moved
quickly without a well-planned strategy.

The Georgian crackdown on smuggling from Russia was designed to cut
off income to Ossetian authorities in Tskhinvali, South Ossetia’s
capital.

However, it also damaged the livelihoods of Ossetian and Georgian
communities and severed the only real interaction between them.

The Georgian government launched humanitarian aid and cultural
initiatives to garner popular support among Ossetians, but since
authorities were always accompanied by journalists, their activities
were perceived as show.

Armed Ossetians responded by closing roads linking disputed
territories. They detained Georgians on or near Ossetian lands, and
prevented Georgian media from operating freely.

Many Ossetians ceased communication with their Georgian neighbors,
reportedly under threat of being detained or losing their jobs or
pensions.

So is it just a question of coming to some agreement?

Ossetians and the Abkhaz firmly reject Georgian rule, while Georgian
residents in South Ossetia are adamant that they will never live
under Ossetian authority.

Georgian authorities say they never intended for events to degenerate
into a conflict. But the conflict incited fears in both Abkhazia and
South Ossetia that Georgia’s new leadership could be aggressive.

They are offering South Ossetia and Abkhazia wide autonomy within
Georgia, but cannot define this.

The population of Abkhazia halved after the 1992-1993 war, when
ethnic Georgians left or were driven out. Only a small group of
Georgians remains in the disputed Gali district – under Abkhazian
authority.

The republic has less than 250,000 inhabitants, compared with 536,000
before the war. The population of the Abkhaz capita, Sukhumi, was
also cut in half.

South Ossetia remains ethnically mixed, but Georgian-controlled
villages remain in its centre.

What are the humanitarian consequences of the tension?

People living on both the Georgian and South Ossetian sides of the
conflict zone are suffering.

Many buildings have been heavily hit by shelling.

People in the region — particularly those with damaged homes —
worry about surviving the winter for lack of firewood. Venturing into
the woods is dangerous. Villagers have disappeared, been killed by
landmines, beaten, detained or bribed.

Georgians are worried about Ossetian forces targeting their schools,
since some were heavily hit over the summer, and some families are
moving or sending their children elsewhere to study.

Georgia’s crackdown on contraband has left many people without
incomes. Some are unable to buy staple food items such as flour,
cooking oil and sugar.

Information on the situation in South Ossetia is difficult to obtain
or verify but Ossetians are reportedly experiencing similar problems.

At least eight civilians and peacekeepers have been killed or wounded
since the ceasefire began in South Ossetia on August 19.

What is going on in Abkhazia?

Abkhazia has been on the brink of civil unrest since disputed
presidential elections in early October 2004.

Abkhazia may pose a more difficult challenge to Saakashvili’s
government than South Ossetia. Given its Black Sea coast, it has
greater strategic, economic, and historical importance for Russia.

Peace in Abkhazia has been shaky since its 1993 cease-fire agreement.
A May 1998 special operation in Gali almost threw the republic back
into a full-scale war.

Worsening matters, the Abkhaz defense ministry reports that Georgia
is building up its forces along its border with Abkhazia.

What are the effects on regional stability?

Neighbouring North Caucasus republics could get involved, either to
call for independence from Russia or to support the Abkhaz or
Ossetians.

Former fighters from Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia, and
Adygheia are already politically involved in Abkhazia’s election
dispute.

Chechens supported the Abkhaz in their war against Georgia. Some say
they might now support Georgia against Russia in South Ossetia.

North Ossetia, meanwhile, has territorial disagreements with
Ingushetia and could get stuck in a two-front war if the South
Ossetia conflict escalates.

Who’s keeping the peace?

In South Ossetia, a Joint Control Commission representing Georgia,
South Ossetia, North Ossetia and Russia, as well as Joint
Peacekeeping Forces representing Georgia, Russia, and North Ossetia
are meant to prevent the escalation of the South Ossetia conflict.

Because Russia backs the Ossetians, Georgia claims it stands alone in
these institutions.

Georgia has signed an agreement with South Ossetia’s leader, Eduard
Kokoeti, that would prevent all armed formations except peacekeepers
and police inside the South Ossetia conflict zone.

But this will be difficult, many say impossible, to achieve.
Moreover, definition of the conflict zone is currently being
contested by Georgia.

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is
seen by many analysts as the only objective body operating in South
Ossetia.

However, since Russia is an OSCE member state, it is difficult for
the organisation to expand its mandate to increase its observation
capabilities.

With only five military observers on the ground, the OSCE has little
chance of covering the region effectively.

The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) performs a
similar function in Abkhazia and faces analagous obstacles.

It gave the peacekeeping mandate to the Commonwealth of Independent
States, and the contingent is entirely made up of Russians.
Negotiations between Georgia and Abkhazia on this point have come to
a halt since Saakashvili became president.

Reporter, Greece
Nov 19 2004

Greece: OTE Secures settlement agreement regarding Armentel

19 November 2004 – The major shareholders of Armentel, OTE and the
Armenian state, have reached a settlement agreement following a year
of litigation, which is expected to be sealed by next week.

Armentel will retain exclusive rights for the provision of basic
telecommunication services and international data exchange channels
by 2009, but will not be a monopolist on GSM market. In addition,
parties have agreed on the gradual adjustment of tariffs. OTE has
disclosed no official announcement on the issue yet.
Note that call tariffs, the monopoly status and competition from IP
telecom providers were the main disputing issues between the
government and Armentel with both parties filing claims during the
previous year. Meanwhile, Armenia has also reportedly granted a 2nd
GSM license to Karabakh Telecom.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Daily News , South Africa
Nov 19 2004

Suspected mercenaries ‘chained like animals’

By Beauregard Tromp

Malabo: A South African arms dealer who could face death for plotting
to overthrow the president of Equatorial Guinea told a court
yesterday he and his comrades had been chained like animals and
tortured into confessing.

Equatorial Guinea’s state prosecutor demanded the death penalty for
Nick du Toit and decades in jail for 13 other suspected foreign
mercenaries.

But in a dramatic final day of submissions in a trial that began in
August, the defendants stood up in chains and handcuffs to plead
their innocence.

“No weapons, no arms, no explosives were found on us,” Du Toit said.

“We have done nothing wrong. Since our arrest, we have been chained
like wild animals. We have been tortured by the police.There hasn’t
been any coup attempt.”

State Prosecutor Jose Olo Obono rejected any allegations of
mistreatment, saying all prisoners’ rights had been respected.

“Any statement to the contrary is not admissible in this trial,” he
told the court.

After closing arguments yesterday the fate of the eight alleged South
African mercenaries and their co-accused is now in the balance with
the very real threat of every man spending the rest of his life in
prison.

Yesterday the men shuffled to the front of the courtroom in Atepa
International Convention Centre constrained by their leg-irons, and
one by one pleaded to the judge for their lives. Judgment is set to
be delivered next Friday.

First to enter the courtroom was Jose Domingos, one of the
naturalised South African Angolans, followed by Mark Smit, the
youngest of the group, who was brought in at the last minute to work
as a cook.

Some have visibly lost weight since a month ago. Most were wearing
shorts, T-shirts and sandals with the eight South Africans and six
Armenians still in handcuffs and leg irons.

After the judge and his two magistrates were seated, the alleged
ringleader of the mercenaries, Nic du Toit, was brought in, escorted
by six soldiers.

When the men were taken away later Du Toit was driven away alone in a
police van. He was kept away from the rest of the group who are all
seated behind eight defence attorneys.

The Equatorial Guinea authorities say there has been at least one
attempt to free the prisoners. It also emerged that while the
attention was focused on the trial of Mark Thatcher in Cape Town,
there had been another coup attempt.

The latest plot, EG authorities said, apparently was a local attempt
that was quickly quashed before it came to fruition.

Inside the courtroom a photographer and video cameraman moved around
the floor, photographing everybody present at the trial.

Even young Mark, who seemed teary-eyed and bewildered a few months
ago, has changed, now sporting a beard and a steely look was visible
from under his furrowed brow.

During the half-hour recess the men were glad for the opportunity to
speak to the South African officials attending the trial.

For Du Toit and Bones Boonzaaier it was another rare opportunity to
see their wives.

As they sit in an adjoining room, staring into their partners’ eyes
like young, starry-eyed lovers, they seem to relish every tidbit of
information they receive.

There was no talk of the trial, the horrendous prison conditions or
their health but rather of family, children and home. – Foreign
Service and Reuters