MGM sets Dec. 17 meeting for merger vote

Reuters/VNU
11/19/04 21:39 ET

LOS ANGELES (Reuters) – Film and television studio Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Inc. has set Dec. 17 as the date for a shareholder meeting to vote
on the $4.8 billion merger with an investor group led by Sony Corp
of America, MGM said in a federal filing Friday.

The meeting will be held at MGM’s headquarters in Los Angeles at 10
a.m. local time, and stockholders of record as of the end of business
on Nov. 5 are eligible to vote, according to an MGM proxy filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

MGM’s board of directors has recommended approval of the merger in
which shareholders will receive $12 per share in cash. The investment
companies controlled by billionaire Kirk Kerkorian, which own 69
percent of MGM’s common shares, have already agreed to support
the merger.

Sony’s partners are Comcast Studio Investments Inc, a unit of Cable TV
company Comcast Corp., and affiliates of Providence Equity Partners
Inc., Texas Pacific Group and DLJ Merchant Banking Partners. Sony
Corp of America is a unit of Japanese electronics company Sony Corp..

The merger agreement was announced in September and calls for the
Sony-led group to pay roughly $2.85 billion in cash for MGM and assume
about $2 billion in debt.

Harikrishna and Petrosian in joint lead :

Press Trust of India, India
Nov 21 2004

Kochi, Nov 21 : Grandmaster P Harikrishna of India and Armenian GM
Petrosian Tigran are leading the table with four points each after
the completion of four rounds in the World Junior Chess championship
here today.

In the fourth round, Harikrishna defeated Tikkanen Hans of Sweden
in the Nimzo-Indian defence in 40 moves while on the top board,
Petrosian Tigran edged out top seed and GM Berkes Ferenc of Hungary,
a former under-18 world champion in a Queens Gambit exchange variation
in 40 moves. Petrosian sacrificed his rook for a mating combination,
which was fruitful.

Third seed GM Alekseev Evgeny of Russia justified his seeding,
defeating IM Quezada Perez Yunieski of Cuba in Queens Gambit in 60
moves, while Poland’s IM Radoslaw Wojtaszek got the better of IM Jianu
Vlad-Cristian of Romania and IM Paragua Mark of Philippines defeated
India’s FM Abhijeet Gupta.

Aleekseev, Radoslaw and Paragua Mark with 3.5 points apiece are in
the second slot.

India’s IM Deepan Chakravarthy, a former Asian Junior champion,
shocked GM Timur Gareyev of Uzbekhistan in Sicilian Defence in 30
moves, while GM Koneru Humpy of India, who suffered a loss in the
third round, defeated South African (RPT South African) Johannes
Manyedi in Nimzo-Indian defence in 32 moves.

In the World Girls Under-20 championship, simultaneously being played
here, four players – Zhang Jilin of China, WGM Paehtz Elisabeth of
Germany, Majdan Joanna of Poland and WGM Ushenina Anna of Ukraine –
are leading with 3.5 points each after four rounds. PTI

Prospects grim for alleged coup plotters
Beauregard Tromp

Independent Online, South Africa
Nov 21 2004

Malabo – The fate of the alleged mercenaries involved in the attempted
coup against the Equatorial Guinea government appears to hinge on
the detailed confession of Nick du Toit, their alleged ringleader. He
claims it was extracted by torture, but local law makes no provision
for dismissing confessions extracted by torture.

Their prospects look grim as they face conviction and sentencing this
Friday. Du Toit faces the death sentence, although Equatorial Guinea
has apparently promised the SA government that he will not die. The
others face long terms in jail, so the tension among them is rising.

Late on Thursday afternoon – shortly before the state and defence
closed their cases – the 19 men accused of plotting to overthrow the
government of Equatorial Guinea were led out to an anteroom while
the court held a recess.

The room was filled with cigarette smoke as the captives, wearing leg
irons and handcuffs, discussed the court proceedings in muted tones.

The room was filled with cigarette smoke “What do you think? What
will happen to us?” asked Mark Smit, the youngest of the accused who
was brought in at the last minute to act as the group’s cook.

“Yes, what will happen?” asked Jose Domingos, a former member of
the infamous 32 Battalion and a professional soldier by vocation –
a mercenary.

International observers from the International Bar Association and
Amnesty International have been reluctant to discuss the trial until
its conclusion on November 26.

The state has asked that the men be sentenced to up to 86 years in
jail each. For Nick du Toit, the alleged coup leader, they want the
death sentence. Throughout the trial the only evidence in the state’s
case has been the signed statements made by the accused, in which
they allegedly admitted their individual roles in the coup attempt.

The state, represented by Attorney-General Jose Olo Obono, contends
that Nick du Toit was approached by Simon Mann to recruit men and
assist in preparing logistics for overthrowing the government of
Equatorial Guinea.

But time and again the judge has suppressed the torture claims Du
Toit allegedly recruited the men arrested with Mann.

Du Toit is also alleged to have led an advance party of men to
Equatorial Guinea to pave the way for the arrival of Mann’s party,
in a Boeing 727 from Harare.

The prosecution has pointed to the South Africans’ history of belonging
to the infamous 32 Battalion in the former SADF as an indication of
the kind of men they are.

“The people who stand accused are not businessmen. They are terrorists
and mercenaries. They are all members of 32 Battalion,” Obono said
on Friday at a news conference.

Du Toit, with Bone Boonzaaier as his right-hand man and logistics
operator, set up camp in Malabo, hiring first an Ilyushin transport
plane and then an Antonov 12 for use in the coup, the state says.

This is where the six Armenian accused come in. They are an air crew
alleged to have flown a number of flights carrying clandestine cargo
around Africa during their short time in operation.

Du Toit showed the eight South Africans around Malabo, indicating
the strategic places where they were to drop off Mann’s group of
mercenaries when they arrived from Harare, Obono said during the trial.

Also implicated in the plot were Manuel Javier, the minister of
co-operation, and four other locals. Since the start of the trial, the
state has dropped all charges against three of the Equatorial Guineans.

On the day of the suspected coup, Du Toit allegedly dispatched
three vehicles to the airport where they were supposed to take over
the control tower so that the Boeing could land and then drop the
mercenaries off at various strategic points around town, including
the local supermarket.

Obono further argues that while the men were waiting at the airport,
Du Toit got a call from Mann warning him that the mission had been
compromised.

Du Toit then aborted the advance plan and recalled the men, who went
about business as normal until they were arrested two days after the
botched coup attempt.

The state has built a case that has barely been contended by the
defence counsel, although claims of torture have continually arisen.

Du Toit, who admitted in his first appearance in court several weeks
ago that he had been part of a coup plot, this week retracted that
admission, saying it had been based on a confession extracted by
torture.

But time and again the judge has suppressed the torture claims,
arguing that they are not part of the trial.

One attorney said: “This is not South Africa. There is no democracy
here. Neither is there any justice.”

There was a show of bravado on Thursday as the eight defence attorneys
made an unprecedented attack on the attorney-general, the tribunal’s
judge and the judicial process in Equatorial Guinea.

“Since our arrest we have been treated like animals and tortured by
the police,” Du Toit said in his closing statement to the judge.

“Take a look at all the evidence and you will see we are innocent. We
have not done anything against this country,” he said. Accused Sergio
Cardoso has spoken out against his ill-treatment at every opportunity
he has had to address the court.

“I was tortured very badly. Gerhard Menz is one of the victims of
the torture. They say he passed away because of cerebral malaria,
but it’s not true. He passed away in front of us,” said Cardoso.

He went on to say that the German, Menz, had had a festering wound
on his right leg and died before their very eyes.

South Africans have denied any knowledge of the coup, saying that
they were in Equatorial Guinea for fishing contracts.

Du Toit admitted that Mann had approached him for help in the coup,
but argues that he refused. The statements were pieced together after
investigators spoke to the alleged mercenaries captured in Harare,
argued Du Toit.

“I came here for business and if this country can sort out its politics
then we will return to do business,” he said.

Myrtle Beach Sun News, SC
Nov 21 2004

Religious diversity in Turkey spurned

Officials’ dealings with groups slow
By Susan Sachs

ISTANBUL, Turkey – In the Panayia church, one of the few Greek Orthodox
churches active in Turkey, ceiling panels dangle precariously and
flying glass has pitted the frescos. Musty carpets are rolled up and
stored beside Byzantine iconostasis.

The building, which celebrates its 200th anniversary today, has
been scarred for a year, since terrorists bombed the nearby British
Consulate and the explosion shattered dozens of stained glass windows.

Orthodox leaders, following Turkish law, asked for government
permission to make repairs but received no response.

After a few months, they replaced the broken windows. But they hesitate
to start renovations because the Turkish authorities, as frequently
happens, have not acknowledged their request.

“That’s the usual tactic,” said Andrea Rombopoulos, a parishioner who
publishes a newspaper for Istanbul’s small Greek Orthodox community.
“They don’t give a negative answer. They don’t give any answer at all.”

Turkey has long viewed its non-Muslim minorities with a certain
ambivalence, defending freedom of worship while tightly regulating the
affairs of religious institutions. Christians of Greek and Armenian
descent, in particular, have said they are blocked from using,
selling and renovating their churches’ properties.

Now, under pressure from the European Union and local civil rights
advocates, Turkey has started to reassess the way it has treated
religious minorities since the state was founded 81 years ago.

Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan’s government has prepared
legislation that would give Christian and Jewish foundations
more freedom to manage their own assets and elect board members.
Parliament is expected to vote on the bill before Dec. 17, when EU
leaders are to decide whether to open accession talks with Turkey.

For the first time, senior Turkish officials also have broken a
long-standing taboo and broached the idea of allowing the Greek
Orthodox patriarchate to reopen a 160-year-old seminary that once
served as a leading training center for priests.

Some legal constraints on religious foundations already have been
relaxed over the last three years, although European and American human
rights monitors, citing cases like the Panayia church, have reported
that local officials have been reluctant to carry out the changes.

For many Turks, though, even a discussion of minorities raises fears
of separatism. Some have argued that lifting government controls on
religious institutions would undermine Turkey’s secular foundations.
And Turkey’s president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, recently warned that
drawing attention to Turkey’s sectarian or cultural diversity harmed
the state.

Diario Vasco, San Sebastián
Domingo, 21 de noviembre de 2004

VAHAN SARKISIAN LINGÜISTA, ARMENÓLOGO Y VASCÓLOGO

«No entiendo cómo los vascos no han terminado aún su diccionario
etimológico»
El profesor Vahan Sarkisian vuelve a Euskadi tres años después de su
última visita para renovar contactos e insistir en la importancia que
para los vascos tiene finalizar el diccionario etimológico

MIKEL AYESTARAN./DV. YEREVÁN

Hace unos años su nombre apareció en todos los medios y su teoría
sobre el origen del euskera dejó perplejo a más de uno. Vahan
Sarkisian (Yereván, 1954) regresa la próxima semana al País Vasco
para retomar los contactos con las instituciones vascas e insistir en
la importancia que tiene para Euskadi finalizar su diccionario
etimológico. Ahora es director de la Cátedra de Filología Románica en
la Universidad Estatal de Yereván y tras un período de intenso
trabajo ha encontrado de nuevo un hueco para volar hasta aquí y
dedicarse a su pasión: la relación armenio-vasca.

En su recién inaugurado despacho guarda los ejemplares que ha
traducido del castellano y el euskera al armenio. Ocupan gran parte
de su vitrina. Fumador empedernido de tabaco rubio y amante del café
a cualquier hora del día, Vahan Sarkisian piensa mucho antes de
responder a cada pregunta. A veces el silencio se hace eterno y
parece que la pregunta no le ha gustado. Pero entre calada y calada
busca el momento exacto para responder con calma y de forma reflexiva
a cada cuestión en un perfecto castellano. En diferentes momentos de
la conversación no se puede contener y, bolígrafo en mano, despieza
palabras en euskera para mostrar su extraordinaria semejanza con el
armenio.

-¿Cómo se coló el euskera entre las inquietudes de un armenólogo?

-Cuando estudiaba el sustrato pre-latino del español llegaron a mis
manos algunas comparaciones sobre la influencia en el castellano del
euskera y las lenguas pre-románicas. Ese fue mi primer contacto y ya
han pasado casi treinta años. Resultó además que todas las teorías
que consulté sobre esa nueva lengua miraban directamente a Armenia.
Andrés de Poza, Baltasar de Etxabe o Esteban de Garibai ya hablaban
del nexo entre los dos pueblos. Desde entonces el vasco pasó a formar
parte de mi vida y he trabajado muy duro para rescatar la vía
abandonada por algunos expertos actuales sobre la relación cultural
vasco-armenia.

-Usted defiende que el origen del euskera está en Armenia
contradiciendo a los que opinan que se trata de una lengua única.

-El origen del euskera está en Armenia o el del Armenio en Euskadi,
lo mismo me da. Lo que tengo claro es que los dos pueblos son
hermanos. En la cultura, tradiciones y la lengua se dan unas
coincidencias que dejan fuera de toda duda esta relación. No se trata
de casualidades, son pruebas evidentes. Además, no existe un idioma
que sea único en el mundo, un hijo siempre sale de un padre y una
madre. Lo que ocurre es que no interesa políticamente prestar
atención a esta teoría. Ni a España le conviene reconocer un hermano
vasco en el Caúcaso, ni los vascos quieren renunciar a su sentimiento
de ser únicos, ni los propios armenios desean perder este sentimiento
de exclusividad que también tienen. La ciencia es una cosa, el
orgullo nacional otra bien diferente.

-Tiene, por tanto, una complicadísima tarea por delante. ¿Cómo
pretende convencer al mundo lingüístico de sus descubrimientos?

-Aportando cada vez más pruebas. Mi intención es construir un puente
de colaboración entre expertos del País Vasco y Armenia. La primera
vez que escribí sobre el tema armenio-vasco fue en un artículo que se
publicó en la prensa argentina en el año 1988. Llegó a las manos del
difunto José María Satrústegui y me envió una carta pidiéndome nuevos
artículos para Fontes Linguae Vasconum. Desde entonces y hasta hace
tres años la relación fue estrecha, viajaba anualmente al País Vasco
y hasta me nombraron académico de honor de Euskaltzaindia (Academia
Vasca de la Lengua) como muestra de reconocimiento a mi trabajo de
promoción del euskera en el mundo.

-Y vuelve a Euskadi tras este período de reflexión para volver a
llamar a las puertas de los vascólogos.

-Quiero renovar contactos e intentar buscar un editor interesado en
publicar un trabajo que se titularía algo así como Armenios y vascos,
el reto de una identidad desconocida. Un título que enganche y que
sirva para que alguien haga en el País Vasco lo que nosotros ya
tenemos en Armenia. Hay que abandonar ese sentimiento de sentirse
únicos.

-¿Cuál es la base de su teoría de unión entre estos dos pueblos?

-Soy lingüista y me fijo sobre todo en las semejanzas que existen
entre ambos idiomas. Hay más de cien palabras de uso cotidiano que no
necesitan ni traductor. Además hay sufijos exactamente iguales que se
añaden a las palabras como por ejemplo -tegi (lugar) o -ago (más) y
con ello se hace difícilmente calculable el número exacto de
coincidencias. ¿De qué número se puede hablar si con un simple sufijo
ya se duplica el vocabulario? Entre el armenio y el vasco existen
muchísimas semejanzas, incluyendo la fonética, gramática y una parte
notoria del vocabulario. Estas coincidencias abarcan sustantivos,
adjetivos, verbos…

-¿Cómo es posible esto si hay cuatro mil kilómetros de distancia
entre ambos pueblos?

-Se puede entender de dos formas. O bien los vascos se desplazaron
desde Armenia a la Península Ibérica, o viceversa; o bien existió en
la antigüedad una gran cultura vasca-armenia que abarcaría desde los
Pirineos hasta el Caúcaso. No le veo otra explicación.

Tres años sin visitas

-¿Qué ha ocurrido en estos tres años? ¿Por qué este alto en las
relaciones con Euskadi?

-Desde el principio el trabajo ha sido unilateral, sin respuesta
desde el lado vasco. En Armenia ya contamos con una base y se puede
estudiar el euskera y la cultura vasca de forma organizada, pero en
el País Vasco no existe interés alguno por Armenia. Abrimos el camino
pero nadie ha respondido a nuestra llamada, no se dan cuenta de que
si se profundiza en esta teoría no tienen nada que perder y sí
muchísimo que ganar. Hasta 2001 me invitaban a congresos, viajaba con
asiduidad, recibíamos delegaciones vascas en Yereván, pero ¿para qué?
Sólo buenas intenciones, nadie hacía nada, sólo nosotros. Abrimos la
revista internacional armenio-vasca, Araxes, y se publicaron once
números con casi setenta artículos, fundamos en Yereván la Asociación
de Estudios Vasco Armenios, abrimos un centro que estuvo operativo
durante diez años y pusimos en marcha un programa de difusión de la
cultura vasca que culminó con la publicación en 1996 de Tradiciones
populares vascas con una tirada increíble de cinco mil ejemplares,
impreso en Armenia sin ninguna ayuda externa. También publicamos una
gramática, un diccionario mucho trabajo que abrió las puertas al
euskera a nuestros estudiantes. ¿Y cuál ha sido la respuesta vasca?
Ninguna.

-¿Se siente decepcionado con el trabajo de difusión del euskera que
realiza el Gobierno Vasco?

-En el caso vasco me decepciona sobre todo la falta de interés por
Armenia. Esta teoría exige un grado de implicación mucho mayor. Hace
tres años me planté porque pensaba que ya era hora de que los
vascólogos del País Vasco empezaran a trabajar en serio el tema
armenio y crearan condiciones para la difusión de nuestro idioma a
través de cursos en la Universidad del País Vasco, tal y como hacemos
con el mundo vasco en Yereván. A esta decepción personal hay que
sumar la decepción general en mi país con los vascos. Trabajé mucho
en defensa de la teoría y ahora los lingüistas de Armenia desconfían
porque no he recogido nada después de sembrar tanto. «¿Dónde están
los vascos?», me preguntan mis colegas de vez en cuando. Por último,
pese a ser académico de honor de Euskaltzaindia, parece que mi
técnica de trabajo no gusta demasiado a algunos vascólogos nativos.
Mientras que ellos miran al exterior para buscar el origen de las
palabras, yo propongo no salir del euskera. Es un método de
reconstrucción interna del lenguaje que ayuda a no perder el tesoro
castizo de la lengua vasca.

-¿Están de acuerdo los expertos vascos con sus planteamientos?

-Creo que algo deben reconocer para cuando me nombraron académico de
honor de su academia de la lengua. Pero mantengo discrepancias de
criterios con algunos en cuanto a la confección de una obra que yo
considero capital para cualquier pueblo, el diccionario etimológico.
No puedo entender que un pueblo que habla tanto de sus orígenes
únicos y se lamenta de tener una lengua en peligro no haya sido capaz
de culminar su propio diccionario. Hay siete tomos que llevan parados
desde 1997 y aún faltan tres por publicarse. Todos los vascólogos
esperamos que salgan algún día. En su día me comentaron la
posibilidad de terminar esta obra pero no formalizamos nada porque el
decano de la Facultad de Filología Vasca, Joseba Lakarra, asumió
personalmente la responsabilidad de acabarlo. Han pasado siete años y
no ha hecho absolutamente nada, cuando se trata de un trabajo
perfectamente realizable en tres. Me encantaría ser el autor, pero me
conformo con ser lector, sólo pido que se acabe de una vez esta obra
de importancia nacional para cualquier pueblo. A veces pienso que no
quieren que un armenio culmine esta obra que empezaron grandes
vascólogos como Agud, Michelena y Tovar.

-Conoce perfectamente la historia de los españoles y los vascos, da
clases sobre sus culturas e idiomas, ¿ve usted alguna solución al
conflicto entre ambos?

-Llevo tres años sin estar allí y han sido tres años importantes, con
muchos cambios sobre todo en España. El terrorismo también ha
cambiado de nombre, ahora el fundamentalismo preocupa más que ETA. El
PSOE ha vuelto al gobierno tras ocho años en la oposición… Todo
esto me impide hacer un análisis actual pero lo que siento es que ha
cambiado el contenido del conflicto. Me fijo en Armenia para explicar
lo que está ocurriendo en Euskadi. Aquí la opinión general es que
vivíamos mejor bajo el manto soviético, pero si lo dices en voz alta
te acusan de atentar contra la independencia nacional. Y estos mismos
que te acusan son los mismos que luego nos llenan la televisión
pública de películas en ruso o los mercados de productos del país
vecino. ¿Eso no es ir contra Armenia? Ahora podemos decir que somos
independientes, pero no tenemos libertad suficiente para comparar el
hoy con el ayer. En España ocurre lo mismo y si abres la boca ya te
colocan en un bando o en el otro. Los vascos tienen que resolver
primero su conflicto interno y luego será más sencillo el tema con
España, si logran la unidad interna en el país será más fácil llegar
más allá.

«El español gana terreno gratis en el mundo»

En las librería de Yereván se encuentra desde hace tres meses un
diccionario de Español-Armenio. Su tamaño y precio (30.000 drums, 60
dólares, una fortuna en este pequeño país en el que el sueldo medio
es de 130 dólares al mes) contrasta con los pequeños manuales de
conversación que existían hasta ahora en esta lengua. El Diccionario
Castellano-Armenio es un proyecto que Vahan Sarkisian comenzó en 1997
y ha culminado siete años después. Ahora prepara la edición inversa
que le gustaría publicar el próximo año.

– ¿Cómo se trabaja en la elaboración de un diccionario de estas
características a más de cuatro mil kilómetros de distancia de la
lengua sobre la que se trabaja?

-Actualicé el léxico armenio y lo uní con los diccionarios
castellanos más modernos, la última edición de la Real Academia,
Clave, Casares, Diccionario Básico de la Lengua de Planeta Un trabajo
cultural no puede contener elementos ideológicos como ocurría en la
etapa comunista. Ahora, por fin, los últimos datos de la lengua
española ya se encuentran también en armenio en este primer
diccionario del castellano a una lengua extranjera del siglo XXI.

-¿Cuánto tiempo le ha llevado?

-Casi mil páginas y cuarenta mil entradas, un gran avance si tenemos
en cuenta que, por ejemplo, el diccionario castellano-ruso más
completo que existe tiene quince mil menos. Empecé en 1997 pero al
enterarme de que la Real Academia preparaba un nuevo diccionario para
2001 paré, viajé a España y me lo compré para modernizar el trabajo
que ya tenía redactado. El volumen estaba ya listo el año pasado pero
por culpa de un error informático perdí veinte mil palabras y tuve
que reescribirlas. La confección del diccionario ha sido algo
personal, dedicado a mis alumnos, para lo que no he recibido apoyo
alguno, da mucho trabajo, pero poco dinero.

-¿Las autoridades españolas han respaldado este proyecto?

-No. Dejando el tema del diccionario a un lado, no estoy de acuerdo
con la política del Instituto Cervantes en mi país. No invierten una
peseta. Su labor consiste en cobrar la tasa de cuarenta euros que
cuesta el diploma de Español en la Universidad, el sueldo de algunos
padres de los chicos y chicas que tenemos aquí. Este año se han
matriculado trece jóvenes y hemos llegado a tener más de treinta en
cursos anteriores. Creo que España tenía que mimarlos un poco. En
Armenia los hispanistas estamos solos y con trabajos como el mío el
español gana terreno gratis en el mundo

DATOS PERSONALES

Vahan Sarkisian nació en Yereván en 1954. Entonces la República
estaba integrada en la URSS y Stalin era la cabeza visible del
régimen.

Entre 1973 y1978 cursó estudios de Filología Románica en la
Universidad Estatal de Yereván. Su tesis doctoral versó sobre los
contactos lingüísticos vasco-armenios.

Trabajó tres años en Cuba como intérprete y consejero de la URSS y
seis como director de una editorial juvenil. En 1993 empezó su
colaboración con la Universidad y en la actualidad es el director de
la Cátedra de Filología Románica de la Universidad Estatal de
Armenia.

Asignaturas que imparte: Introducción a la Filología Románica,
Historia de la Civilización Española, Historia de la Lengua Española,
Historia de la Literatura Española, Fonética teórica y Curso de
Civilización Vasca.

Es académico de honor de Euskaltzaindia (Academia Vasca de la Lengua)
desde 2002. También forma parte de la Asociación Internacional de
Hispanistas.

Idiomas: Domina el armenio, ruso, castellano, francés e italiano,
habla en inglés y entiende el euskera aunque no lo habla.

Traducciones: Ha traducido del castellano al armenio: El Buscón,
Lazarillo de Tormes, Tradiciones populares vascas o El rostro oculto
de la muerte. Y del euskera al armenio: Linguae Vasconum Primitiae ,
Peru Abarka y una antología sobre poetas navarros actuales. También
cuenta con una Euskal gramatika laburra y una antología sobre poemas,
Euskal esan zaharrak.

Diccionarios: Ha publicado un diccionario Castellano-Armenio (2004) y
otro Euskera-Armenio (2001).

COINCIDENCIAS

Estos son algunos de los ejemplos de las cien coincidencias
sobresalientes que el profesor Sarkisian ha encontrado entre el
euskera y el armenio:

haize viento ais

han allí hon

handiari grandeza andranik

andena grupo andeai

hara he allí ara

arasta sentencia arrats

ardi oveja arti

argi luz aregi

artza oso arch

astun pesado hast

baimen permiso paiman

bakarrik solamente batzarrik

berta cerca merdz

bits espuma bits

buru cabeza pur

elki salida elkh

erkin dolores de parto erken

gari trigo gari

gitxi poco khichi

haritx roble harrich

haztatu probar hastat

horma pared orm

murtzi puño murtz

ordo llano ord

otz frío oits

putz soplo phuch

–Boundary_(ID_ib5wlQAbUCo3J6mApvl+Bw)–

New Statesman
November 22, 2004

A nation in search of an identity; Turkey appears to be moving
eastwards and westwards at the same time. But is it really possible
to invent a pro-market Islamism? Report by Maureen Freely

by Maureen Freely

On its travel posters, Turkey is the land ‘where east meets west’. An
alluring sales pitch, but what does it mean? As they contemplate
Turkey’s bid to join the EU, nervous westerners are very keen to
know. Journalists have worked to furnish nutshell histories and
thumbnail sketches of ‘Turkey today’, but the more people read about
this strange country, the less they understand it.

The central paradox is the prime minister, who is Islamist but
fervently pro-Europe. Recep Tayyip Erdogan has introduced radical
legal, economic and political changes to bring the country into line
with European standards, but has also tried to slip in a new law that
would have criminalised adultery. Can he be trusted? In this volatile
age, how can a nation move both eastwards and westwards without
splitting in two?

More confusing still, at least to concerned Europeans, is the
consensus inside Turkey. It would be wrong to say that everyone wants
to join the EU: there are Eurosceptics there who think Turkey should
turn its back on Europe to build (and head) its own regional power
base. But, paradoxically, this is not at present an eastern dream:
the most fervent nationalists of the moment belong to the Republican
People’s Party, traditionally the voice of westward-looking
secularism.

Meanwhile, three-quarters of the Turkish electorate are in favour of
joining. No one is saying there aren’t Herculean feats to be
performed beforehand, or that there wouldn’t be large adjustment
problems afterwards. Even if it met every challenge before the
deadline, Turkey would be not just the poorest and most populous
nation in the EU, but the most unevenly developed, with the country’s
cities and western provinces far outstripping its eastern regions,
long impoverished and only just recovering from the 15-year conflict
between the army and the Kurdish paramilitary PKK. But when the
European parliament’s president, Joseph Borrell, last month met Leyla
Zana (the former parliamentarian, recently released after ten years’
imprisonment on charges of advocating Kurdish separatism) she pressed
for membership as strenuously as Erdogan had done in the same office
two weeks earlier. Certainly, her priorities were different. But the
bid to join Europe has strong support not just in Ankara and the
business sector, but also among human rights campaigners; not just in
the country’s industrialised western regions, but also in its largely
Kurdish provinces in the east.

Erdogan explained in a recent speech that joining the EU bid would
not (as nationalists have argued) be a departure from the republican
ideals set out by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 80 years ago; rather, he
said, it would be its ‘natural outcome’. This neat rhetorical
flourish indicates the distance between our view of Turkey’s EU bid
and theirs. For us it’s an east-west conundrum. For them it’s about
sovereignty, national identity, citizenship and those republican
ideals.

What exactly did Ataturk have in mind all those years ago, when he
conjured up a modern state from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire? When
he spoke of all Turkey’s peoples working together as one, did he mean
its non-Muslims as well as its Muslims? Its Alevis as well as its
Sunnis? To become true Turks, were non-Muslims expected to shed their
religions, and were Muslims compelled to give up also thinking of
themselves as Kurdish, Laz, Turkmen, Azeri, Bosnian, Circassian?

Today many would say he had no such thing in mind – that it is (or
ought to be) possible to be a fully-fledged Turkish citizen without
suppressing one’s religion or ethnic origins. But in the Turkey I
knew as a child, this was literally unsayable. The Turkey I knew in
the Sixties was a beautiful, sleepy backwater, valued by its Nato
allies mostly (some would say only) for providing a ‘bulwark against
Communism’. The news on the radio was the news as the state wished us
to view it. The state was defined less by the prime minister and the
National Assembly than by the generals in the National Security
Council. The military presented itself (and was largely accepted as)
the guarantor of the Kemalist project.

At the same time, it was forever mindful of its prime backer, the US.
The economy was closed, to protect fledgling industries; the practice
of religion permitted but kept under strict surveillance. The state
kept an almost perfect control over what children learned in school,
and what they learned in their history books was very much in keeping
with the narrow, purist nationalist project as refined by Ataturk’s
successors. To express difference was unpatriotic: to be different
could be life-threatening, as tens of thousands of Greeks and
Armenians discovered on 6 September 1955 when bands of thugs (now
acknowledged to have been government-sponsored) went on a rampage
throughout Istanbul, setting fire to Christian-owned businesses,
raping and maiming and killing as they went. When my family first
came to Istanbul five years later, it was still the multicultural
city it had been throughout the Ottoman Empire. The turning point was
1964, when the Cyprus crisis prompted the state to chase most of the
remaining Greeks away.

The state flexed its muscle frequently over the next three decades,
meeting all challenges to its authority. There was a coup in 1971 and
another in 1980; although they had various aims there was in both a
serious effort to suppress the intelligentsia, and with it the basic
freedoms we in the west take for granted. In 1974, there was the
invasion of Cyprus. Beginning in the mid-1980s, there was the
conflict with the PKK in the south-east. Running through all these
stories is the long catalogue of human rights abuses.

The EU has long made it clear that these issues had to be resolved
before Turkey could become a member. For almost just as long, its
warnings had little effect. But over the past two and a half years,
there’s been a dramatic shift. The first ‘EU laws’ were passed
several months before Erdogan’s Islamist Justice and Development
Party came into power – in a single session, the National Assembly
removed the death penalty, paved the way for teaching and
broadcasting in Kurdish, and lifted restrictions on freedom of
assembly. Since Erdogan took over, control of the National Security
Council has been switched from generals to civilians. The penal code
has been reformed and a ‘zero tolerance’ stance adopted on human
rights abuses.

The EU is dismantling the state as we used to know it and, in so
doing, challenging the way the state defines ‘the Turk’. This is ex-
plosive stuff. (Just imagine if Brussels were to march in tomorrow to
tell us how we were to define Englishness.) If three out of four
Turks are still prepared to support these radical changes, it is
because they have gone through radical changes, too. Not only has
there been mass migration to the cities: millions have gone on to
northern Europe as guest workers. Visit any village in Anatolia and
you’ll find its networks extending not just to Istanbul and Ankara
but to cities in Germany, France and the Netherlands.

In the Sixties there was only a handful of universities, which, with
few exceptions, were open only to the elite. Now there are more than
80. The expansion of higher education and the opening up of the
economy in the late 1980s have spawned a new and formidable
generation of entrepreneurs. Many have spent time studying in Europe
and the US; as comfortable in these cultures as they are at home,
they bring Turkey closer to Europe every time they pick up the phone.

Forty years ago, most Turks had no knowledge of the outside world and
their only source of information was a highly censored press. Now
millions have lived and worked and studied in Europe, and what they
want is, well, a lot more European. The borders have opened – even
the one with the old arch enemy, Greece. The rapprochement that began
with the 1999 earthquake continues still, with hundreds of small
groups (from the business world, the professions, the universities
and the arts) quietly forging ties with their colleagues across the
border. The cultural renaissance is multicultural, but at its core is
a desire to define what it is to be Turkish in a 21st-century world.

If it’s possible to be Turkish and European, is it possible to be
Turkish, European and Kurdish? If non-Muslim minorities are to enjoy
full cultural and political rights, shouldn’t Muslim minorities
receive the same consideration? In a secular state, what is the
proper place of religion? Is it possible to modernise without losing
one’s traditional values? How to prosper in a globalised economy
without becoming its slave?

These are urgent questions: no politician will get far unless he
addresses them. Erdogan’s answer, so puzzling when viewed from
abroad, makes perfect sense to the people who voted him in. Many are
(as is his family) recent urban migrants, social conservatives who
wish to prosper. So what better than pro-market Islamism? Turkey’s
established secularist bourgeoisie remains suspicious, but Erdogan
has won friends even in these quarters. ‘For the first time ever,’
one non-Muslim businessman told me recently, ‘we have a government
that actually understands business and wants to help us.’ In place of
the delaying and bribe-taking bureaucrats who once directed the
economy is a new breed of Islamist MBAs who are there to expedite and
enable and whose hands (so far) remain clean.

Where it will all lead is another matter. If George Bush invades
Iran, if Saudi Arabia slides into civil war and takes the rest of the
region with it, if the EU refuses Turkey’s bid and American GIs
continue to machine gun wounded men in mosques, we could see a Turkey
torn between east and west. But right now it’s a republic struggling
to better itself along European lines. At the same time, it wants to
remember where it comes from and what it means to bridge east and
west. Therein lies its promise – not just to itself, but to us all.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ANSA Notiziario Generale in Italiano
Novembre 21, 2004

CAUCASO: MISSIONE ITALIANA NELLA NUOVA FRONTIERA UE /ANSA ;
ON. BONIVER IN ARMENIA, GEORGIA, AZERBAIGIAN

(di Elisa Pinna)

(ANSA)- ROMA, 21 NOV – Una missione nella nuova frontiera
dell’Europa allargata, per consolidare i rapporti sempre piu
importanti e strategici tra l’Italia e i paesi del Caucaso
Meridionale. E’ questo lo scopo del viaggio che, da domani a
giovedi’ prossimo, il sottosegretario agli Esteri Margherita
Boniver intraprendera’ in Armenia, Georgia e Azeirbagian, le tre
repubbliche dell’ex Unione Sovietica che occupano la fascia
montagnosa estesa dal mar Nero ai giacimenti petroliferi del Mar
Caspio.
“L’obiettivo principale della visita – ha spiegato l’on.
Boniver all’Ansa – e’ quello di coltivare ulteriormente le gia
eccellenti relazioni politiche, economiche, culturali tra
l’Italia e le tre Nazioni”. E’ la terza missione che, nel giro
di pochi anni, il sottosegretario agli Esteri effettua in
quell’area del mondo dove l’era stalinista ha lasciato una
pesante eredita’ di conflitti territoriali, irrisolti
irredentismi etnici, milioni di profughi; una regione pero
caratterizzata allo stesso tempo da una voglia profonda di
democrazia e sviluppo economico.

Nelle tre capitali caucasiche – prima tappa Ierevan in
Armenia, seconda tappa Tbilisi in Georgia e terza Baku in
Azeirbagian- Margherita Boniver avra’ colloqui ai massimi
livelli e incontrera’ i tre capi di Stato, anche allo scopo di
preparare le loro visite in Italia previste per il 2005.
Strette tra vicini ingombranti, la Russia, l’Iran e la Turchia,
nessuna delle repubbliche caucasiche ha fatto domanda di entrare
nell’Unione Europea, ma tutte e tre sono state invitate
ufficialmente dalla Commissione di Bruxelles, nel giugno 2004, a
far parte ” della politica europea di buon vicinato”. “Sono
la nuova frontiera dell’Europa a venticinque”, ha sottolineato
Margherita Boniver. Sono tre nazioni molto diverse tra loro,
come tradizione religiosa, sviluppo e risorse economiche,
strategie e alleanze politiche; eppure le tre capitali
caucasiche guardano tutte con speranza all’Europa allargata e
considerano l’Italia un interlocutore privilegiato.

ARMENIA – La prima tappa del viaggio del sottosegretario agli
Esteri sara’ in Armenia, l’unica nazione del Caucaso meridionale
a non avere sbocchi sul mare. Il popolo armeno fu il primo a
convertirsi collettivamente al cristianesimo, nel 301 d.C., e a
quella religione e’ rimasto sempre legato per difendere la
propria identita’ etnica, in una storia di invasioni,
occupazioni, diaspore che ebbe il suo tragico apice nel
genocidio compiuto nell’impero ottomano durante la prima guerra
mondiale. L’Armenia del presente ha ritrovato la sua
indipendenza dall’ex Urss nel 1991, ma non la sua pace.
Terremoti, la guerra congelata ma non risolta del Nagorno
Karabakh (un’enclave dove una minoranza di armeni ha proclamato
la propria indipendenza dall’Azerbaigian musulmano), i rigidi
inverni e la disoccupazione hanno costretto un quarto della
popolazione (circa un milione di persone) ad emigrare in tempi
recenti. A partire dal nuovo millennio la situazione e’ pero
migliorata; la crescita economica nel 2003 e’ stata tra le piu
alte d’Europa ed ha favorito l’apertura di nuove industrie e
attivita’ commerciali. Anche se non si puo’ ancora parlare di
democrazia perfetta, il presidente della Repubblica Robert
Khorian riscuote grandi consensi per gli evidenti progressi
compiuti dal suo paese.

GEORGIA – Anche la Georgia, nazione cristiana che si affaccia
sul Mar Nero, nonostante gli indubbi passi avanti, e’ ancora
alla ricerca di una solida stabilita’, dopo oltre un decennio di
drammatici avvenimenti. Subito dopo la proclamazione
dell’indipendenza, nel 1991, scoppio’ infatti la guerra civile
interna, seguita dalla secessione dell’Abkhazia, regione
strategica per il passaggio dei gasdotti e oleodotti dal Mar
Caspio al Mar Nero, ed ancora dai conflitti nell’Ossezia
meridionale (territorio autonomo interno sotto controllo
georgiano che vuole riunificarsi all’Ossezia del Nord) e
nell’Adhzara, altra regione sul Mar Nero a maggioranza
musulmana, fino all’occupazione da parte dei ribelli ceceni
della Gola di Pankisi. Con la cosiddetta “rivoluzione delle
rose” del novembre 2003 contro il regime corrotto di Eduard
Shevrdnadze, e l’elezione plebiscitaria, nel gennaio 2004, del
nuovo presidente, Mikhail Saakashvili, avvocato di 37 anni
formatosi negli Stati Uniti, la Georgia sembra aver dimostrato
come l’avvento della democrazia nella regione possa trasformarsi
da lontana speranza in concreta realta’.

AZERBAIGIAN – L’Azerbaigian, paese a maggioranza musulmana
sciita ma, a differenza del vicino Iran, assolutamente laico, e
il piu’ ricco degli Stati della Regione. Posa letteralmente su
un mare di petrolio, e i suoi giacimenti sul Mar Caspio ne fanno
una delle aree strategiche piu’ importanti del momento. La
costruzione dell’oleodotto Baku-Ceyhan, una commessa da tre
miliardi di dollari, che portera’ a partire dal 2005 il petrolio
azero al porto di Ceyhan sul Mediterraneo in Turchia (attraverso
la Georgia), e’ vista da molti come un’alternativa interessante
alle importazioni dal Golfo e dalla Russia. Anche l’Italia, che
compra una buona parte del suo petrolio dall’Azerbaigian, e
presente nel consorzio del nuovo oleodotto. Dal punto di vista
politico, l’Azerbaigian si trova ad affrontare il problema delle
centinaia di migliaia di profughi provenienti dal Nagorno
Karabakh e un processo democratico che ancora non puo’ dirsi
compiuto. Al vecchio presidente Heydar Aliyev, e’ subentrato,
alla fine del 2003, il figlio Ilham, in elezioni contestate
dall’opposizione e dagli osservatori internazionali. Ora tocca
al giovane capo dello Stato dimostrare la sua capacita’ di
affrancarsi dall’ombra del padre, morto lo scorso anno.(ANSA).

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Some Hard-Liners in Turkey See Diversity as Divisive
By SUSAN SACHS

November 21, 2004
New York Times

ISTANBUL, Nov. 20 – In the cavernous Panayia church, one of the few
Greek Orthodox churches still active in Turkey, ceiling panels dangle
precariously over the choir loft. Flying glass has pitted the frescos
of biblical scenes. Musty carpets are rolled up and stored like logs
beside the elaborate Byzantine iconostasis.

The building, which celebrates its 200th anniversary today, has
been scarred for a year, since terrorists bombed the nearby British
Consulate and the force of the explosion shattered dozens of the
church’s stained glass windows.

Orthodox leaders, following Turkish law, asked for government
permission to make repairs but received no response. Rain seeped
in. Paint peeled. Mildew grew.

After a few months, they surreptitiously replaced the broken church
windows. But they hesitate to start renovations because the Turkish
authorities, as frequently happens in such cases, still have not
acknowledged their request.

“That’s the usual tactic,” said Andrea Rombopoulos, a parishioner
who publishes a newspaper for the small Greek Orthodox community
in Istanbul. “They don’t give a negative answer. They don’t give
any answer at all.”

Turkey has long viewed its non-Muslim minorities with a certain
ambivalence, defending individual freedom of worship while tightly
regulating the affairs of religious institutions. Christians of Greek
and Armenian descent, in particular, have said they are blocked from
using, selling and renovating properties that have been in their
churches’ hands for centuries.

Now, under pressure from the European Union and local civil rights
advocates, Turkey has started to cautiously reassess the way it has
treated religious minorities since the state was founded 81 years ago.

Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan’s government has prepared
legislation that would give Christian and Jewish foundations
more freedom to manage their own assets and elect their board
members. Parliament is expected to vote on the bill before Dec. 17,
when European Union leaders are to decide whether to open accession
talks with Turkey.

For the first time, senior Turkish officials have also broken a
long-standing taboo and broached the idea of allowing the Greek
Orthodox patriarchate to reopen a 160-year-old seminary that once
served as a leading training center for priests.

The school, perched on a hill on an island in the Sea of Marmara
off Istanbul, was closed in 1971 when the state took control of all
private universities. Mr. Erdogan’s aides have suggested that it could
be permitted to operate again, as a gesture to the European Union,
if Turkey’s membership bid advances.

Some legal constraints on religious foundations have already been
relaxed over the last three years although European and American human
rights monitors, citing cases like the Panayia church, have reported
that local officials have been reluctant to carry out the changes.

Still, Christian leaders here said they were more hopeful than ever.

“What has changed is that we don’t have that hostility anymore from the
authorities,” said Elpidoforos Lambriniadis, an aide to the Ecumenical
Patriarch Bartholomew. “As the patriarchate, we don’t doubt the good
will of the government. But we know the government is not controlling
everything in this country.”

For many Turks, even a discussion of religious or ethnic minorities
raises fears of separatism. Some have argued that lifting government
controls on religious institutions, whether Muslim or non-Muslim,
would undermine Turkey’s secular foundations. And Turkey’s president,
Ahmet Necdet Sezer, recently warned that drawing attention to Turkey’s
sectarian or cultural diversity harmed the state.

The delicacy of the issue was highlighted earlier this month when
a government-sponsored commission released a report criticizing
Turkey’s definition of itself as a “single-culture nation-state”
and urging an end to all restrictions on the expression of minority
languages and cultures.

When the report was presented at a news conference, a dissenting member
of the commission ripped a copy from the hands of the presenter and
tore it up. Later, the Erdogan government, which established the
commission, also disowned it.

Baskin Oran, the Ankara political science professor who headed the
commission, said he was undeterred by the reaction.

“They are clearly seeing that what they have been pushing under the
carpet since the 1920’s is now being questioned,” he said, “Now,
everything will be discussed. There will be no taboos in Turkey,
and they hate that.”

For some hard-line nationalists, even the term “minority” is anathema,
suggesting dual loyalties and the betrayal of the country’s cherished
ideal of an indivisible Turkish identity.

“In the end, there will be lots of small groups feeling different and
trying to identify their differences as separate identities on basis of
religion, race or language,” said Mehmet Sandir, a spokesman for the
Nationalist Movement party. “And at times of economic or political
crisis, our country will immediately turn into a ‘minority hell’
of internal strife.”

Turkey’s enemies, he added, could then exploit those differences to
split the nation, as the European allies and Russia did after World
War I when the Ottoman Empire was further divided.

“This is not paranoia,” said Mr. Sandir, whose party has organized
demonstrations against the orthodox patriarchate. “The recognition of
minorities was used as an argument in destroying empires. The Balkans
are boiling now because of this chaos of minorities.”

A distrust of minorities is drilled into Turks from childhood,
according to Hrank Dink, a magazine publisher and scholar active in
the country’s ethnic Armenian community.

“In public school, ‘minorities’ are mentioned in the textbook on
national security, under the section that talks about separatism
and about the ‘games played against Turkey’ by outside powers,”
Mr. Dink said.

That suspicion carries over to the local officials who are in charge of
regulating the non-Muslim religious foundations, including those that
administer the 17 schools and 42 churches of the Armenian community
in Turkey.

“They see the minorities in terms of national security,” Mr. Dink
said. “The fewer there are, the less they feel threatened.”

The official doctrine on minorities stems from the 1923 Lausanne
treaty in which the European powers recognized Turkey’s independence
and received guarantees concerning the status of three non-Muslim
communities – Jewish, Greek Orthodox and Armenian – in the new and
predominantly Muslim Turkish state.

The three groups mentioned in the treaty, sometimes referred to as
“indigenous foreigners” in official documents, were promised protection
but not the privileges they enjoyed under Ottoman rule.

The Greek Orthodox patriarchate, regarded with great suspicion by the
Turkish leaders because of its support for the failed Greek invasion
a few years earlier, was allowed to remain in Istanbul, where it had
been based for nearly 1,700 years.

But Turkey did not recognize its ecumenical authority, instead treating
successive Orthodox patriarchs as parish priests responsible for the
churches in their immediate neighborhood.

The treaty did not mention Turkey’s minority Alewite population,
who are Muslims but follow a different sect from Turkey’s Sunni
mainstream and now want their national identity cards to show them
as Alewite instead of Muslim.

Nor did the treaty mention ethnic minorities like Kurds. Until
recently, Turkish governments used that omission to justify their
ban on references to Kurds as a distinct subgroup in Turkey. The
government has eased its restrictions on Kurds in the past two years
but it refers to them as a group using a different language than
Turkish, not as a minority.

More changes are inevitable, said Professor Oran, who spearheaded
the government report on minorities.

“The concept of ‘minority’ has changed since the Lausanne Treaty,”
he said. “Now it’s anyone different from the majority and who wants
to maintain this difference. We have to delete the laws that prevent
them from using the same rights as the majority. If a Turk can read
and write and publish in Turkish, then any Kurd or Circassian should
have the same right.”

“The genie,” Professor Oran added, “is out of the bottle.”

Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company

Garnik Isagulyan Criticizing His Predecessor’s Report

A1+
19-11-2004

Presidential adviser for state security Garnik Isagulyan responded
Friday to the statements made recently by Levon Zurabyan, the republic
former president Levon Ter-Petrossyan adviser, in his report on
Armenian foreign policy.

Commenting on the Levon Zurabyan’s statement that Russia stopped
providing disinterested military assistance to Armenia after the
republic leadership has changed, Garnik Isagulyan said Russia has
never given Armenia disinterested assistance.

Garnik Isagulyan also said Nagorno Karabakh Republic obtained de-facto
independence as a result of vigorous people movement, not thanks to
Armenia’s former authorities.

In his words, after that, former leadership started pursuing erroneous
foreign policy and took a looser stance.

Former presidential adviser listed in his report all diplomatic
achievements reached throughout years of Ter-Petrossyan’s presidency,
among which was Karabakh issue transfer from the UNO to the OSCE
floor and official recognition of Karabakh as full-right side of
negotiations. Besides, the then leadership has managed to convince
Muslims worldwide of non-religious ground of Karabakh conflict.

Armenian Assembly of America
122 C Street, NW, Suite 350
Washington, DC 20001
Phone: 202-393-3434
Fax: 202-638-4904
Email: [email protected]
Web:
 
PRESS RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
November 20, 2004
CONTACT: David Zenian
Email: [email protected]

CONGRESS AFFIRMS MILITARY ASSISTANCE PARITY FOR ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN
Assembly hails leadership of Congressman Knollenberg

Washington, DC – The House of Representatives today approved the
Omnibus Bill for Fiscal Year 2005, providing equal levels of military
assistance to Armenia and Azerbaijan. The spending package, which
allocates $8.75 million in military financing to both countries,
thwarts the Administration’s attempt to provide Azerbaijan a $6
million increase over Armenia by placing the neighboring countries
on equal footing.

“We commend Armenian Caucus Co-Chair Joe Knollenberg (R-MI), for his
outstanding leadership on the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee
on Appropriations to reinstate U.S. balance and impartiality in
dealing with the Karabakh conflict,” said Assembly Board of Trustees
Chairman Hirair Hovnanian. “We are also very appreciative of Senator
Mitch McConnell (R-KY), the Majority Whip and the Chair of the Senate
Foreign Operations Subcommittee on Appropriations, for his efforts
to maintain security assistance parity between Armenia and Azerbaijan
in the Senate version as well.”

“The Assembly welcomes today’s vote and praises our friends in both
chambers for their steadfast support on issues of importance to
the Armenian-American community,” said Assembly Board of Directors
Chairman Anthony Barsamian. He added that had the requested disparity
in military assistance been enacted, U.S. credibility as an impartial
and leading mediator in the ongoing Karabakh peace process would
have been hampered. It would have also potentially undermined the
fragile ten-year cease-fire between the neighboring countries, which
is particularly worrisome given Baku’s recent threats against Armenia
and Nagorno Karabakh.

In September, NATO canceled its PfP exercise in Baku due to
Azerbaijan’s barring of Armenia, an active participant in the program.
Azerbaijan’s refusal to honor international commitments is part of an
escalating pattern throughout 2004 of its hostility towards all things
Armenian. By not properly condemning the murder of an Armenian officer
at a NATO event earlier this year, by periodically threatening Armenia
and Karabakh with another military offensive, and by not denouncing
the remarks of its Defense Ministry spokesperson predicting Armenia’s
conquest by Azerbaijan within 25 years, Azerbaijan’s senior leadership
has repeatedly shown their true colors to the international community.

This month, the government of Azerbaijan proposed an ill-conceived
and one-sided U.N. General Assembly resolution that could derail
the Nagoro Karabakh peace process spearheaded by the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Minsk Group
co-chaired by the United States, France and Russia. It is a hostile
declaration against the entire negotiating process, including progress
made in the recent Astana round of negotiations.

For its part, the government of Armenia has repeatedly indicated
its desire to peacefully resolve the conflict, and prior to a full
settlement being achieved, has also offered confidence-building
measures (CBM’s) to bring immediate benefit to all peoples. Azerbaijan
has chosen a different approach – blockade, rejection of CBM’s and
increasingly shrill war rhetoric.

An integral component of U.S.-Armenia relationship is the security
dimension, which has grown considerably since the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Since those seminal
events, the Armenian Government has undertaken a number of security
measures aimed at assisting the war on terrorism, measures which have
been praised by President Bush and other high-ranking U.S. officials.
Over the past few years, Armenia has also strengthened its ties to NATO
by following through on its Partnership for Peace (PfP) commitments,
sent a peacekeeping unit to Kosovo as part of KFOR, and is preparing
to send an Armenian contingent to Iraq to assist in the stabilization
and reconstruction efforts in that country.

The Omnibus spending package also approved “not less than” $75
million in assistance to Armenia, an increase of $13 million over
the Administration’s FY 2005 budget request. An additional $3 million
in humanitarian assistance for Nagorno Karabakh was also allocated.
Under the guidance of Senator McConnell, the Senate, for the first
time, provided an earmark for Karabakh. The United States remains the
only nation in the world that allocates direct humanitarian assistance
to Karabakh.

This April, Armenian Caucus Co-Chair Frank Pallone, Jr. (D-NJ) and
Caucus member John E. Sweeney (R-NY), along with over 40 of their
congressional colleagues, wrote to Chairman of the House Foreign
Operations Subcommittee on Appropriations Jim Kolbe (R-AZ) urging that
the subcommittee maintain symmetry in levels of any military/security
assistance for Armenia and Azerbaijan. In addition, they requested
“not less than” $75 million in economic assistance for Armenia and
continuing humanitarian assistance for Nagorno Karabakh in FY 2005.
The Assembly strongly supported this initiative by urging Members to
sign on to this letter during its advocacy portion of its National
Conference and via a nationwide Action Alert.

The Senate plans to vote on the spending measure later today.
Once passed by the other chamber, the bill will be sent to President
Bush for his expected signature.

The Armenian Assembly of America is the largest Washington-based
nationwide organization promoting public understanding and awareness
of Armenian issues. It is a 501 (c) (3) tax-exempt membership
organization.

NR#2004-101

–Boundary_(ID_YCsFgaKE8nBHPOcbUEoxPg)–