FOR FIRST TIME DEPUTY FOR FIRST TIME VICAR CATHOLICOS FOR GULF
COUNTRIES

AL KUWAIT, December 30 (Noyan Tapan). In accordance with the statutes
of the Armenian Diocese of Kuwait and the Persian Gulf countries, the
Diocese consists of the Armenian flock of Kuwait, the United Arab
Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman. But till 2003 no religious and
national structures and no organized communal life existed, except for
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. The center of these structure was
in Kuwait, where the residence of the Head of Diocese is situated.

In April, Archbishop Koryun Papyan, the Vicar of Catholicos of the
Gulf countries, visited the Armenians of Qatar, whose total number
makes 170 persons and served a liturgy himself. Consulting with the
Qatar compatriots, the Archbishop established the national
administration of Qatar, which has been engaged in the spiritual needs
of the Armenians of Qatar and the religious upbringing of the youth
several months now, by holding meetings and communicating with the
Archbishop.

Recently the Armenians of Bahrain had also the honor to receive
Archbishop Koryun Papyan for the first time.

The Archbishop began the liturgy with the “Khorhurd Khorin” sharakan
at the chapel situated in the Hawalli district and used by both the
Catholic and Protestant churches. The singing party of the liturgy was
performed by Priest Aram Delirmenjian.

Then the Archbishop preached about the historic mission of the
Armenian Church, which always patronizes the children of the Armenian
people, as well as Armenia and the Diaspora. “It is that sacred
mission, which the Catholicosate of the Great Cilician House headed by
Holy Patriarch Aram I carried out jointly with the Cilician Mother See
Church under the heaviest Diasporan conditions,” said Koryun Papyan.

During the holy liturgy all the participants received the
Eucharist. At the end of the liturgy the water-consecration was also
held. And after the Archbishop’s homily the requiem was carried out,
during which the names of the late relatives of the present faithful
were mentioned by their request.

The dinner with the participation of all the Armenians of Bahrain and
Khoubar took place after the liturgy.

According to the press divan of the Residence of the Head of the
Diocese of Kuwait, 60 to 70 Armenians lived in Bahrain in the 80s, but
now their number decreased and made 15-20 persons. There are over 50
Armenians in Khoubar Saudia, near Bahrain.

p2pnet.net, Canada
Jan 3 2005

That time again!

p2pnet.net Opinion:- That time again!

Once again the year rolls over, and a whole raft of old works fall
into the public domain as their copyrights expire. Our collective
past intellectual output moves from being “property” to being
history, culture, and heritage.

Last year on this day, millions of pages of archival documents, whose
authors had died before 1949, became public domain in Canada. This
was the result of long-overdue amendments to the Copyright Act in
1998, which ended the perpetual copyright in unpublished `works.’

Unfortunately, there will not be another archival Public Domain Day
for archivists, historians, genealogists, and others, to celebrate in
Canada until January 1, 2049. This is because the 1998 amendments
also provided that the `works’, including historical documents, by
`authors’ who died between 1949 and 1998 inclusive, would have a
copyright term fixed neither to the life of the author nor the
creation of the work, but to the coming-into-force of the amendment.
Those unpublished literary works – the raw material of history –
whose authors died between 1949 and 1998, will not be public domain
for nearly another half-century. This, even though the published
material by those same people will continue to become public domain.

For example, the unpublished letters of William Lyon Mackenzie King
(d. 1950) will be `protected’ by copyright until 2049. However, his
published works became public domain four years ago today.

Similarly, a pamphlet by Agnes MacPhail (d. 1954), Convict or
citizen? : the urgent need for prison reform, is in the public domain
as of today. But her letters on this, or any subject, are not, and
won’t be for 45 years.

Isaac Pedlow’s One hundred years of Presbyterianism in Renfrew
County, published in 1930, is, as of this morning, in the public
domain. His letters to Prime Minister Meighen, on the subject of
railways, from the early 1920s, are not, and won’t be for 45 years.

Herbert Brown Ames’ The city below the hill: a sociological study of
a portion of the city of Montreal, published in 1897, is, since you
kissed your sweetie at midnight, in the public domain. But his 1902
letter to Sir Wilfrid Laurier, concerning a proposed subway for the
city of Montreal, is not, and won’t be for 45 years.

You get the picture.

But on to better news! There is, after all, still a Public Domain Day
to celebrate in respect of published works. Are you wearing your
party hats? (New Years Eve paraphernalia may be recycled.)

In the life+50 copyright universe, which comprises most of the
world’s countries, and the majority of the world’s people, including
Canada, we will see the entry into the public domain of the published
works of Soviet historian Robert Vipper; Swiss Jungian psychologist
Ernst Aeppli; British Columbia author and educator Alice Ravenhill;
historian Ferdinand Schevill; Dutch composer Henri Zagwijn; French
musician and composer Léonce de Saint-Martin; Danish novellist Martin
Andersen Nexø; American botanist Albert Francis Blakeslee; German
ethnologist, philologist and historian Wilhelm Schmidt; Canadian
economist Édouard Montpetit; American novellist and poet Elsa Barker;
Danish poet and writer Martin Anderson Nex; American evangelist Frank
Grenville Beardsley; Uruguayan poet Julio J. Casal; Bishop of Oxford
Kenneth Escott Kirk; “western” writer William MacLeod Raine; American
anthropologist Earnest Albert Hooton; Mexican artist Frida Kahlo;
German historian Otto Scheel; American poet Walter Arensberg; Flemish
artist Edgar Tytgat; British mathematician Alan Turing; physicist
Enrico Fermi; French composer Jean Roger-Ducasse; American author
(“Bobbsey Twins”) Lilian Garis; Finnish writer and diplomat Hjalmar
Johan Fredrik Procopé; Serbian philosopher Branislav Petronijevic;
French historian and philosopher Henri Berr; American literary
scholar Raymond Dexter Havens; German composer Hermann W S
Waltershausen; “crank economist” E.C. Riegel; Canadian essayist and
editor of Saturday Night B. K. Sandwell; Swedist novelist and
playwright Stig Dagerman; American writer and social reformer Vida
Dutton Scudder; Spanish poet and dramatist Jacinto Benavente;
Canadian poet, novelist and historian William Douw Lighthall; German
composer Walter Braunfels; French historian Edouard Dolléans;
American artist and alpinist Belmore Browne; Scottish-American
journalist and founder of Forbes magazine B. C. Forbes; English
novelist and poet Francis Brett Young; Austrian composer Oskar
Straus; American politician and writer Joseph P. Tumulty; American
comic artist George McManus; poet Hans Lodeizen; Canadian novellist
and historian Mabel Burkholder; English liturgical scholar and
historian Francis C. Eeles; Argentinian composer, journalist, and
director Manuel Romero; Montreal philanthropist and captain of
industry Herbert Brown Ames; American musician and writer Ernest F.
Wagner; Indian author Kalki ; Tin Pan Alley composer Arthur Brown;
Brazilian poet and playwright Oswald de Andrade; Canadian composer C.
F. Thiele; English philosopher and scholar Clement Charles Julian
Webb; Canadian politician and Premier of Prince Edward Island J.
Walter Jones; German scholar and theologian Werner Elert; American
botanist David Fairchild; British politician John Allsebrook Simon;
German historian Friedrich Meinecke; American zoologist and
entomologist Herbert Osborn; British theologian Ernest Findlay Scott;
American mathematician Julian Lowell Coolidge; American mathematician
Leonard Eugene Dickson; Swedish novelist, essayist and poet Frans
Gunnar Bengtsson; Russian writer Michail M Prishvin; British
sociologist Benjamin Seebohm Rowntree; American ornithologist Arthur
Cleveland Bent; American author Onoto Watanna; English literary
critic and Shakespearean scholar Sir Edmund Kerchever Chambers;
American urbanologist Frank Backus Williams; British legal scholar
Thomas Baty; composer Peter Van Anrooy; Italian composer and pianist
Franco Alfano; American composer Charles Ives; Soviet-era Russian
author Boris Leontevich Gorbatov; French novelist Colette ; Armenian
poet Arshag Tchobanian; Canadian composer Alfred Lamoureux; French
art historian Émile Mle; Russian ethnographer and linguist Dmitrii
Konstantinovich Zelenin; Flemish historian Floris H.L. Prims; French
photographer Claude Cahun; English clergyman and social critic
William Ralph Inge; American feminist and politician Emmeline
Pethick-Lawrence; Canadian composer Jean-Robert Talbot; American
botanist and horticulturalist Liberty Hyde Bailey; American novelist
and travel writer Alpheus Hyatt Verrill; American novelist Joseph
Hergesheimer; American songwriter J. Rosamond Johnson; art historian
John Kalf; British linguist and lexicographer Ernest Weekley; French
artist Henri Matisse; Czech musician and composer D.C. Vackar;
Australian novelist Miles Franklin; German writer, social scientist,
and women’s rights advocate Gertrud Bäumer; French scientist and
mathematician Théophile Moreux; Swedish writer Gunnar Rudberg;
American theologist Henry Sloane Coffin; German writer and editor
Franz Pfemfert; Swedish oceanographer Walfrid Ekman; British
philatelist Stanley Phillips; American author and editor Bliss Perry;
American sociologist and educator Howard Washington Odum; American
poet and critic Shaemas O’Sheel; Spanish essayist and novelist
Eugenio d’ Ors; Belgian sculptor Victor Rousseau; and Bulgarian
author Nikolai Rainov.

Just to name a few. Phew.

Of interest to Canadians, in the life+70 copyright universe the works
of J.E. Preston-Muddock will enter the public domain. (Except that,
of course, post-1922 Preston-Muddock work will still be under
copyright in the cultural lockdown that persists in the United
States.)

Whothatnow?

The novelist who sometimes wrote under the pseudonym `Dick Donovan’.

Huh?

He also wrote `The Sunless City’, first published exactly a century
ago in 1905.

The hero of which was Flintabattey Flonatin. Whence the name of Flin
Flon, Manitoba.

The dead hand of dead-letter copyright is lifted on the works of
these, and many others, and society can recreate and build on the
legacy they left us.

Short live copyright, and long live the public domain!

Happy Public Domain Day, 2005!

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

The Jamestown Foundation
Monday, December 13 — Volume 1, Issue 145
EURASIA DAILY MONITOR

IN THIS ISSUE:
*Moscow loses Georgia, Ukraine, who’s next?
*New EU members force reappraisal of Ukraine’s qualifications
*OSCE caves in to Moscow on CFE Treaty
*Saakashvili suggests personnel changes needed

————————————————————————

RUSSIAN ANALYSTS PONDER ORANGE REVOLUTION’S IMPLICATIONS FOR KREMLIN
DOMINANCE IN CIS

With democratic challenger Viktor Yushchenko all but set to win a
repeat presidential runoff in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir
Putin is facing his greatest foreign policy crisis. At stake is the
Kremlin leader’s dream of Russia’s greatness, which he perceives
primarily as Moscow’s ability to dominate the post-Soviet lands. The
Orange Revolution’s display of people power in Ukraine not only
thwarted Russia’s plans to push its favorite into the presidential
suite in Kyiv, but it will likely make it harder for the Kremlin to
influence political processes across the “near abroad,” including the
strategic regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia, Russian political
analysts contend.

Most Russian experts agree that Ukraine’s election crisis is a
watershed for Russia’s policies in post-Soviet Eurasia. The pundits
are divided, however, in their understanding of the nature of the
Orange Revolution and in suggestions as to how Moscow should respond
to the momentous events in Ukraine.

For Russian derzhavniki (champions of Russia’s great-power status), a
victory by Ukrainian democratic forces signifies a clear strategic win
for the West. In a number of articles and policy papers the statist
ideologues assert that since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991,
the presidential race in Ukraine represents “the biggest [geo-]
political war between the United States and European Union on the one
hand, and Russia on the other.” Although some of them concede that the
Ukrainian crisis does have a “democratic dimension,” the general view
is that the massive rallies in Kyiv are basically the result of
skillful manipulation from abroad. As one noted political analyst
argues, the Ukrainian “revolution, as the previous one in Georgia, has
very substantial propagandist, diplomatic, ideological, and
informational support of the Western countries.” In essence, he
continues, “it’s a great geopolitical game” aimed at tearing Ukraine
away from Russia. The alleged strategic objective of the West is to
build some sort of a cordon sanitaire around Russia (Ekspert, December
6).

But this is just one reason why “Russia cannot allow itself to lose in
Ukraine.” The Orange Revolution, the statists say, will likely cause a
dangerous chain reaction. If Moscow fails to reassert its position in
Ukraine, argues the veteran political analyst Vitaly Tretyakov,
“within the next two years velvet revolutions will take place —
according to the Kyiv scenario — in Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and, possibly, in Armenia.” As a result, Tretyakov warns,
the Kremlin might be completely deprived of “room for maneuver in the
post-Soviet space” (Rossiiskaya gazeta, December 2).

Other like-minded experts share Tretyakov’s strategic
worries. Vyacheslav Nikonov, head of the Politika Foundation think
tank, suggests that the repetition of Ukrainian events could occur in
all the post-Soviet countries, “whose regimes the West doesn’t like.”
Remarkably, “all the CIS countries, except Georgia, appear to fall
into this category,” Nikonov notes (Kreml.org, December 1).

It is no wonder, then, that some Kremlin political gurus urge the need
to elaborate an ideology of “preventive counter-revolution.” In a
wide-ranging interview with Nezavisimaya gazeta, leading spin doctor
Gleb Pavlovsky argues that the “Kyiv [events] are a very serious
signal for Russia,” adding that the political system in Russia and
other post-Soviet states is vulnerable to the “new revolutionary
technologies of the globalization era.” The government authorities in
Russia and allied countries should be prepared to protect themselves
from all sorts of revolutionary manipulations seeking a regime change,
Pavlovsky says. In his opinion, one of the antidotes against a
Western-sponsored velvet revolution is a set of measures aimed at
“developing ‘counter-revolutionary properties’ of our power structures
and our society” (Nezavisimaya gazeta, December 7).

Naturally, liberal political thinkers hold an opposite view of the
Ukrainian crisis, while agreeing with the “conservative
counter-revolutionaries” that it is of utmost importance for Russia
and its foreign policy ambitions. According to one prominent liberal
commentator, in Ukraine we are dealing with a “revolution of a new
type.” While the political conflicts in East Central Europe in the end
of the 1980s were revolutions against totalitarianism, the events in
Ukraine are a “revolution against phony democracy,” argues Lilia
Shevtsova of the Carnegie Moscow Center. It is a revolt of the
disgruntled society against a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime and
corrupt crony capitalism. Last year’s upheaval in Georgia demonstrated
the instability of such a regime, but back then Georgian events were
interpreted as a purely national phenomenon. However, Ukraine’s Orange
Revolution appears to prove that we are witnessing a certain political
trend, Shevtsova contends (Novaya gazeta, December 6).

Symptomatically, Georgia’s leadership was quick to state that events
in Kyiv are tremendously important for Tbilisi. In a recent interview
with Le Monde, Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Salome
Zourabichvili noted that until now her country was feeling quite
solitary in the post-Soviet space but with the beginning of mass
protests in Kyiv, “there emerged yet another democratic country with a
population of 50 million.” According to Tbilisi’s top diplomat, the
unfolding political process in Ukraine will likely change the entire
situation in the post-Soviet space. Two positive developments stand
out, Zourabichvili noted, “The Black Sea area will become a region of
democracy,” and “Russia will not be able to dominate the post-Soviet
space” (Politcom.ru, December 9).

Confirmation of the Kremlin’s seriously dented prestige in the “near
abroad” came also from Uzbekistan. President Islam Karimov permitted
himself to chastise his Russian counterpart for what he called a
“shortsighted policy” of open support for one candidate in the
Ukrainian election. The Kremlin’s miscalculation was “one of the
reasons that led to the events in Ukraine,” Karimov contended. In the
opinion of the regional analyst Arkady Dubnov, criticism from the wily
Uzbek strongman is yet another bad sign for Moscow’s long-term
ambitions in post-Soviet Eurasia (Vremya novostei, December 8).

–Igor Torbakov

“ORANGE REVOLUTION” EXPOSES EU’s DEFICIENT UKRAINE POLICY

One of the biggest ironies of Ukraine’s democratic “Orange Revolution”
is that it will cause difficulties in the European Union, an
organization that claims to embody “European values.” Had former Prime
Minister Viktor Yanukovych won the presidential election, it would
have resolved the EU’s dilemma: Brussels and Strasbourg could still
use the excuse given earlier to Presidential Leonid Kuchma, namely
that Ukraine has shown itself to not be part of “Europe.”

The EU’s dilemma over Ukraine may dominate the EU’s Brussels summit on
December 16-17, less than two weeks before Ukraine repeats the second
round of the disputed presidential election.

Challenger Viktor Yushchenko, who is set to win the new runoff, told
his supporters, “I am convinced that the world will recognize us as a
civilized European nation. I am deeply convinced that after the events
of the last 17 days Ukraine will never be the world’s backwater”
(Channel 5, December 8).

Yushchenko is being too optimistic, as the EU is unable and unwilling
to accept how the Orange Revolution represents a break with the Kuchma
era. Ukraine’s democratic revolution, the likely Yushchenko victory,
and constitutional reforms that will transform Ukraine into a
parliamentary republic all testify to the need for the EU to
re-formulate a clear policy toward Ukraine.

The post-communist states that joined the EU this year are not
accepting the EU’s continued complacency over Ukraine. Poland and
Lithuania encouraged the apathetic EU to host round-table negotiations
between the authorities and Yushchenko to break the political
deadlock. Former Czech President Vaclav Havel sent two statements of
support to Yushchenko and former Solidarity leader and Polish
President Lech Walesa traveled to Kyiv and addressed the orange-clad
crowds.

The crisis has caused post-communist EU members to take a harsher
attitude toward Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has confirmed
their suspicion that Russian imperialism and neo-Soviet attitudes
remain alive and well. They are also dismayed at the continued
Russophilia expressed by “old Europe,” namely France, Germany,
Belgium, and Luxembourg.

Yet it would be an over-simplification to state that the EU’s
unwillingness to treat Ukraine as a “European” state lies solely with
its “old European” members. Both British Prime Minister Tony Blair and
U.S. President George W. Bush have forged close personal relations
with Putin.

But Ukraine’s future could pose problems for the four “old European”
EU members. French and German leaders have built up personal
relationships with Putin that are now coming under strain. France, in
particular, seeks a closer alliance with Russia against the Bush
administration’s “unilateralism.”

The EU’s decision to dangle membership in front of the western Balkans
— and possibly Turkey — while denying it to Ukraine is now
untenable. Romania is set to join the EU in 2007 and yet its recent
presidential elections were also undemocratic. The difference lies in
the fact that only Ukrainians — not Romanians — launched a popular
revolution to overturn their election fraud.

Yushchenko has challenged the EU to embrace the new Ukraine that he is
set to lead. In Yushchenko’s eyes, the EU should take four concrete
steps. First, it should recognize Ukraine as a “market economy,” a
political step long over due after Russia’s status was upgraded in
2002. Second, the EU should support Ukraine’s membership in the WTO, a
step that would allow Ukraine to create a free trade zone with the
EU. Third, the EU should sign an associate member agreement with
Ukraine. Finally, Brussels should offer Ukraine EU membership sometime
in the future (Financial Times, December 10).

These four steps could be only undertaken if the EU moved towards
NATO’s “open door” position on membership, which depends on fulfilling
criteria. This would be the Copenhagen criteria for the EU and a
Membership Action Plan (MAP) for NATO.

Currently, Ukraine has only an Action Plan with NATO, not a MAP. NATO
refused to consider a MAP for Ukraine due to Kuchma’s poor reputation
after the Kolchuga radar scandal. But the grounds for this refusal
will evaporate under Yushchenko, and the post-communist members of
NATO will again be clamoring for NATO to offer Ukraine a MAP. Such a
step would strain the Bush administration’s delicate attempts to both
criticize Putin for interfering in Ukraine’s elections while
maintaining a cooperative relationship with Russia for the
international struggle against terrorism.

Washington’s attempts to not be too critical of Russia will only grow
after Condoleezza Rice replaces Colin Powell as Secretary of
State. Yet in reality, as Stanford’s Michael McFaul has pointed out,
“The Russian president is not much of an asset in fighting the global
war on terror” (The Weekly Standard, December 13).

The EU continues to only offer Ukraine a three year “Action Plan” as
part of its Neighborhood Policy, a “Plan” that does not depend on the
outcome of the Ukrainian elections. The inadequacy of these steps were
already evident when the policy was unveiled in 2003, as it placed
Ukraine on the same level as northern Africa and Israel, which are not
part of Europe and therefore have no right to join the EU, and Russia,
which has never declared its intention to seek EU membership.

Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, who takes up the EU’s
rotating presidency in January, said, “I can only warn against
offering Ukraine the prospect of full membership” (The Times, December
10). In reality, the EU has been doing its best to avoid the issue,
which will no longer be tenable if the EU allows in Turkey while
refusing to consider a Ukraine led by Yushchenko (Wall Street Journal,
December 8).

As the Polish Gazeta Wyborcza (December 9) pointed out, when Ukraine
is discussed in Paris they state, “And don’t forget about Russia’s
sensitivity.” Yet, ironically Putin is ahead of “old Europe” on this
question. Anticipating a Yushchenko victory as likely to lead to
Ukraine’s westward orientation, Putin has stated his lack of
opposition to Ukraine’s membership in the EU. For Putin the only
“nyet” is to Ukraine’s membership in NATO (Financial Times, December
10).

–Taras Kuzio

RUSSIA OFFICIALLY REPUDIATES TROOP-WITHDRAWAL OBLIGATIONS ON MOLDOVA
AND GEORGIA

At the OSCE’s year-end meeting in Sofia on December 6-7, Russia ruled
out any regional statement on Georgia or Moldova, and vetoed the
political declaration’s text that read: “Some of the commitments made
at the 1999 Istanbul Summit regarding Georgia and Moldova have not yet
been fulfilled. Their fulfillment without further delay would create
the conditions for . . . ratification of the adapted Treaty on
Conventional Forces in Europe.”

That appeasement-minded text had stopped short of mentioning Russia,
or Russian troops and bases; set no timeframe for compliance, and
failed even to recall just what those commitments were. Moreover, it
seemingly overestimates Russia’s actual (as distinct from rhetorical)
interest in Western ratification of the 1999-adapted CFE
Treaty. During the drafting process, Georgia and Moldova had insisted
that mention be made of “withdrawal of Russian forces,” “concern about
the lack of progress in this regard,” and OSCE desire to “achieve this
goal in the earliest possible timeframe.” Influential Western
delegations and the OSCE Chairmanship, however, turned down even this
mild language (itself a retreat from the 1999 Istanbul documents) for
fear of irritating Russia.

The OSCE’s timidity emboldened Russia to add, in its closing
statement: “Regarding the position taken by certain states on linking
the so-called Istanbul commitments to ratification of the adapted CFE
Treaty, the Russian Federation declares that it does not recognize
this [linkage] as legitimate.” It went on to insist that
troop-withdrawal issues are bilateral ones, between Russia and Georgia
and between Russia and Moldova, respectively, not brooking
international intercession. And it portrayed the Istanbul Commitments
as not binding: Russia may choose to fulfill them at some future time,
provided Georgia and Moldova fulfill their “conditions.”

The Istanbul Commitments had not attached any conditions to Russia’s
troop-withdrawal obligations and did set specific deadlines. The
OSCE’s 2002 Porto and 2003 Maastricht year-end conferences rephrased
the withdrawal obligations into intentions, introduced unspecified
“necessary conditions” (which Moscow can interpret at will), and
lifted the deadlines. The organization thus cooperated in the
evisceration of its own decisions.

In Sofia, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, noting that Russia’s
commitments to withdraw its forces from Moldova and Georgia remain
unfulfilled, reaffirmed the linkage between fulfillment of the
Istanbul Commitments and ratification of the CFE Treaty. Recalling, “A
core principle of that treaty is host country agreement with the
stationing of forces,” Powell confirmed the position that “The
U.S. will ratify the CFE Treaty only after all the Istanbul
commitments on Georgia and Moldova have been met.” NATO made a
collective declaration to the conference along these same lines.

For its part, the European Union’s joint statement “exhorted” (an
unusual term) Russia to withdraw its troops from Moldova and Georgia,
but failed to mention a link to CFE Treaty ratification. And, with
regard to Georgia, the EU went on to repeat the now-discredited
formula, according to which Russia and Georgia should agree among
themselves “on the duration and modalities of the functioning of the
Russian military bases.” The German and French ministers of foreign
affairs, Joschka Fischer and Michel Barnier, in their national
statements, failed to mention Russian troops, Moldova, and Georgia,
but did underscore the goal of ratifying the adapted CFE Treaty.

The OSCE’s Joint Consultative Group (JCG) is responsible for
discussing issues related to implementation and ratification of the
CFE Treaty and fulfillment of the Istanbul Commitments. The JCG’s
Chair, which rotates every two weeks among the Group’s 30-plus
members, is expected to send a letter to the OSCE’s Chairmanship at
each year-end meeting, reporting on JCG activities for that year. Last
year at Maastricht, Russia seemed set to veto the sending of that
letter, but did not need to resort to that step because Armenia
happened to chair the JCG that fortnight and it refrained from
initiating the letter.

This year, Luxemburg happened to chair the JCG just before and during
the year-end meeting. Without mentioning Moldova and Georgia, “Russian
troops,” “bases,” “withdrawal,” or lack of progress, the JCG Chair’s
one-page letter simply restated that fulfillment of the Istanbul
Commitments is a prerequisite for ratification of the adapted CFE
Treaty. It also mentioned concerns about unaccounted-for and
uncontrolled CFE Treaty-limited equipment, again without naming any
names. Russia vetoed the draft letter.

(Documents of the OSCE’s 2004 year-end ministerial conference, Vienna
and Sofia, December 1-7, 2004).

–Vladimir Socor

MEDIA SPECULATION RISES ABOUT GEORGIAN MINISTERIAL CHANGES

After two days of media speculation, there are signs that the rumored
imminent reshuffle of Georgia’s power ministries may contain a grain
of truth. On December 8 both Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili
and Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania made statements that pointed toward a
forthcoming reorganization. Symptomatically, the media leaks occurred
while Zhvania was in the United Stated and parliamentary chairwoman
Nino Burjanadze was in Germany.

Saakashvili convened a special briefing late in the evening on
December 8 to inform journalists that no immediate government
reshuffle was planned and, furthermore, he would not make any top
personnel changes without consulting with Zhvania and
Burjanadze. Saakashvili, however, clearly spoke about the need to
reorganize the power structures and “reinforce certain directions,”
which could be an oblique indication that some changes in the
government might occur in the near future.

In a telephone interview with Rustavi-2 television on December 8,
right after Saakashvili’s briefing, Prime Minister Zhvania was far
more specific. He said that during the two weeks leading up to his
departure for the United States, he had held discussions with
Saakashvili on issues related to government reorganization that, in
his words, might include some personal changes. Zhvania said that any
personnel changes would be based on many indicators, including
performance evaluations for the past year. Zhvania said he would
discuss details of the changes in the government with Saakashvili
around December 11-12 and then the general public would be informed
about it (TV Rustavi-2, December 8; Civil Georgia, December 9).

Media speculation has focused on the power ministers, although other
top officials might also be sacked. One scenario has Interior Minister
Irakli Okruashvili replacing Defense Minister Giorgi Baramidze, while
the latter becomes either Secretary of the National Security Council
or a substitute for Revaz Adamia, Georgian Ambassador to the UN. Gela
Bezhuashvili, currently Secretary of the National Security Council,
would move to the Ministry of Justice, whose current head, Giorgi
Papuashvili, would shift to the Central Electoral Commission. Finally,
Vano Merabishvili, Minister of State Security, would head the newly
merged ministries of security and internal affairs.

Speculation has Russian oligarch Kakha Bendukidze, Minister of
Economic Development, about to lose his job because of his failure to
accomplish mass privatization and bring $1.5 billion to the state
budget, as he promised to do when he took the office. Nick Gilauri,
Minister of Energy, is expected to be replaced by Irakli
Chubinishvili, head of Saakashvili’s administration.

So far, Bezhuashvili is the only official to concede the possibility
of cabinet changes, though he has denied information about his
imminent dismissal.

The first reshuffle in the power agencies took place in June. One
month later the power ministers merely rotated among themselves (see
EDM, June 10; July 1). The first media rumbling about another round
appeared in September, right after the failed military campaign in
South Ossetia this August (see EDM, September 2), and after stories
emerged about illegal arms sales and questionable recycling of used
weaponry (see EDM October 25). The whispers were particularly loud
around Defense Minister Giorgi Baramidze.

Local experts argue that the rumored personnel changes might indicate
backstage fighting between the Saakashvili and the Zhvania teams,
which have remained rivals despite their pompously announced
unification into one political party, the United National Movement, on
November 22 (TV-202, TV-Imedi, December 8).

According to parliament member Levan Berdzenishvili, Saakashvili
himself leaked the latest reshuffle story to the press. “The rumor
about changes in the government is coming from the very presidential
service and is distributed through [Security Minister] Merabishvili.”
Berdzenishvili argues that by disseminating this information,
Saakashvili has put the general public on notice that he is
dissatisfied with the performance of Baramidze, Papuashvili, and
Bezhuashvili, but fully relies on Okruashvili and
Merabishvili. Berdzenishvili sees this development as Saakashvili’s
open statement to Zhvania that he no longer trusts “his” defense
minister and other proteges (Resonance, Inter-Press, December
8-9). The personnel shuffle rumor has suspiciously coincided with a
reorganization in the Tbilisi city government, which mainly sacrificed
Zhvania’s followers.

If personnel changes indeed occur as rumored, it would only reaffirm
the belief held by many pundits that Saakashvili is acutely short of
qualified professional cadres and must grant high posts only to his
most trusted underlings.

–Zaal Anjaparidze

————————————————————————
The Eurasia Daily Monitor is a publication of the Jamestown
Foundation. The opinions expressed in it are those of the individual
authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Jamestown
Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the content of EDM, or
if you think that you have received this email in error, please
respond to [email protected].

Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of EDM is strictly
prohibited by law.

The Jamestown Foundation
4516 43rd Street, NW
Washington, DC 20016
202-483-8888 (phone)
202-483-8337 (fax)

Copyright (c) 1983-2004 The Jamestown Foundation.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

The Jamestown Foundation
Thursday, December 16 — Volume 1, Issue 148
EURASIA DAILY MONITOR

IN THIS ISSUE:
*Kyiv re-opens investigation into Yushchenko’s illness
*Decision imminent on Siberian oil pipeline
*Astana unveils new hanger at Karaganda air base
*Moscow creates political stalemate inside OSCE

————————————————————————

WAS YUSHCHENKO POISONED?

Ahead of the December 26 repeat presidential runoff, which will again
pit opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko against Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovych, debate has resumed over Yushchenko’s mysterious
illness. On December 11, the Vienna-based Rudolfinerhaus clinic
announced that Yushchenko had definitely been poisoned by dioxin, a
highly toxic substances that is difficult to neutralize. Yushchenko
turned to Rudolfinerhaus in September, complaining of severe stomach
and back pain.

His face remains distorted by ulcers and pockmarks, which prompted the
ad hoc parliamentary commission set up to investigate his illness to
claim that it was due to a viral herpes infection. The
Prosecutor-General’s Office then closed a criminal investigation
launched in October. Last weekend, the Austrian doctors who treated
Yushchenko stopped short of corroborating his claim that he had
deliberately been poisoned to derail his election campaign.

At a December 10 press conference in Kyiv, prior to visiting
Rudolfinerhaus for additional tests over the weekend, Yushchenko
characterized his poisoning as a “political reprisal.” On returning
from Vienna on December 12, Yushchenko promised to shortly supply the
Ukrainian public with proof that “the authorities did it.” “Time is
needed to complete this investigation,” he said. And a serious
investigation will take place, if Prosecutor-General Svyatoslav Piskun
is to be trusted.

On December 11 Piskun re-launched the investigation, which had been
closed by his predecessor Hennady Vasylyev, a Yanukovych crony. Piskun
was fired by President Leonid Kuchma last year, replaced with
Vasylyev, and then reinstated as Prosecutor-General on December 10,
following a December 9 court verdict saying that his dismissal was
illegal. In an interview with the opposition weekly Svoboda on
December 14, Piskun expressed sympathy with the opposition protests
over the controversial November 21 runoff, which forced the
authorities to call a repeat election. Piskun said he would be
prepared to work under a new president.

Yushchenko welcomed the re-opening of the case, while the EU expressed
its concern over the potential implications. “If there has been a case
of deliberate poisoning, those who are responsible must be brought to
justice,” declared Emma Udwin, an EU Commission spokeswoman (Reuters,
December 13). And Yanukovych, speaking on the same day, denied
complicity in Yushchenko’s poisoning and wished him a speedy recovery.

The chairman of the parliamentary commission looking into Yushchenko’s
poisoning, former KGB officer Volodymyr Sivkovych, called the Austrian
clinic’s conclusions “nonsense.” Sivkovych, whose obstinate belief in
the herpes diagnosis is shared by the Ukrainian authorities, lashed
out at Yushchenko’s Vienna-based doctor Mykola Korpan, accusing him of
“having made a lot of statements based on God knows what.” Sivkovych
said that his commission would not take the Austrian conclusions
seriously until it received “official documents.” Yet not all of
Sivkovych’s colleagues share his opinion. Oleksandr Volkov, another
member of the parliamentary commission who was once an influential
aide to Kuchma and now has become a vocal supporter of Yushchenko,
accused Sivkovych of politicizing the issue. The commission’s work has
been effectively blocked by internal disagreements, and it is expected
to reconvene only after the December 26 election.

Ukrainian First Deputy Minister of Health Oleksandr Orda, who has long
been jealous of Yushchenko’s trust in foreign doctors, tried to cast
doubt on Rudolfinerhaus’s credentials. “I would recommend the people
who tested Yushchenko’s blood to read special literature on this,” he
said. “It is impossible to determine the absence or presence of dioxin
from blood tests.” Orda also stated that if Yuschenko was really
poisoned deliberately, it could not happen overnight. “In order for
dioxin to produce the effect on Yushchenko that we are observing now,
it must have been administered in small doses for some two,
two-and-a-half months,” (Itar-Tass, December 13). Orda’s Russian
counterpart holds a similar opinion. “Dioxin does not belong to [the
group of known] fast-acting poisons,” according to Yuri Ostapenko,
head of the Russian Health Ministry’s technology center (ORT, December
13). “The effect of poisoning will be felt some time later, from
several days to several weeks.” If Orda and Ostapenko are right, the
suspicions of those observers who suggest that Yushchenko’s early
September dinner with Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) chief Ihor
Smeshko and his deputy, Volodymyr Satsyuk, and Yushchenko’s subsequent
illness were not pure coincidence, may be groundless.

One of those observers, SBU general Valery Kravchenko, has hinted that
Moscow might have assisted Ukrainian secret agents. Talking to the
opposition TV Channel 5, Kravchenko, just released from prison
following his accusations against the authorities early this year of
spying on opposition figures abroad, suggested that Yushchenko may
have survived a plot by Ukrainian and Russian secret services thanks
to secret agents’ “greediness.” “Maybe they put too little poison,” he
said. “Maybe they put only half of it to keep something for
themselves.” Be that as it may, the Austrian clinic’s conclusion that
Yushchenko was poisoned, rather than contracted a benign viral
infection, as his foes insist, is sure to gain him some points ahead
of the crucial runoff.

(Inter TV, UNIAN, December 10; Channel 5, December 9, 11, 13, 14;
Channel One (ORT), December 12; Itar-Tass, Interfax-Ukraine, Reuters,
December 13; Svoboda, December 14)

–Oleg Varfolomeyev

RUSSIA OPTS FOR PACIFIC ROUTE, BUT HELPING CHINA SAVE FACE

The Russian government is expected to make the final decision on the
destination of the Siberian oil pipeline as early as the next few
days. The pipeline would link the Russian oil fields near Taishet,
northwest of Lake Baikal, to either the Chinese city of Daqing or the
Russian Pacific port of Nakhodka (the so-called China route vs. the
Pacific route). The competition between China and Japan over the
direction of the pipeline has been well publicized. The expectation is
that the Russian government will announce its intention to build the
pipeline all the way to Nakhodka, from where it can export the
petroleum to a wide number of markets, rather than being tied to a
single Chinese market (Nikkei Shimbun, December 15).

Last May officials from Russia’s state oil-pipeline monopoly,
Transneft, revealed that the Pacific route would go through Taishet,
Kazachinskoye, Tynda, Skovorodino, and Khabarovsk to Nakhodka,
crossing Russia’s Irkutsk, Chita, Amur, Buryat, and Primor
regions. Crude would then be shipped to Japan, China, Korea,
Indonesia, and Australia (Itar-Tass, May 2). The estimated costs for
such a pipeline have swollen to $15 billion, but this figure does not
seem to be prohibitive to the Japanese, who have been actively
lobbying for the Pacific route, much to the dismay of Chinese
officials who were certain as recently as June 2002 that the pipeline
would terminate in Daqing. This was when Yukos seemed to have the
leading role in the development of the pipeline. Transneft has now
taken the leading role, and officials there have not been shy about
warning of the dangers of relying on a single Chinese market.

Many in Japan are speculating that the decision to go with the Pacific
route has already been made and that the announcement is strictly pro
forma (Nikkei Shimbun, December 15). The decision, when it does come,
will have the potential to greatly affect — and complicate —
Moscow’s relations with China and Japan.

The Russian government indicated as early as March that it favored the
Pacific route, primarily for strategic reasons. As it turns out,
domestic politics may also have a large deal to do with the ultimate
decision, as Yukos is now literally about to have its cake eaten, and
Transneft and Gazprom seem to have a firm grip on Far Eastern oil and
gas projects. Additionally, as one analyst has pointed out, economic
and financial issues have “taken a back seat in project decisions.”
President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov have
stated that the new pipelines will remain state property and that
there are no plans to allow private players — foreign or domestic —
entry into the transportation of oil or natural gas (Russia Profile,
November 29).

The fact that Russia has not made a big deal of the impending
announcement is perhaps meant to keep the Chinese from losing face and
being offended, should the decision go for the Pacific route as
expected. China and Russia are in the middle of a period of tremendous
interaction, with a border demarcation agreement having recently been
signed and with the high-profile visit by Russian Defense Minister
Sergei Ivanov to China earlier this week. During Ivanov’s visit the
two sides agreed to conduct the first joint military exercises in
decades (China People’s Daily, December 14).

In a nod to addressing China’s energy concerns, some officials from
Russia have indicated that eventually a spur will be opened running to
Daqing in northeastern China (Nikkei Shimbun, December 15). In a move
highlighting China’s desire to access Russian energy sources, the
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is expected to make a bid
for the Russian oil company Yuganskneftegaz at a public auction on
December 19. A similar bid submitted by CNPC for a part of Slavneft in
2002 failed after an intense lobbying campaign by Russian lawmakers to
exclude the Chinese company. CNPC will have to compete with
Gazpromneft for the prize (a controlling 74% share of
Yuganskneftegaz), but the Chinese have deep pockets and, they are
expected to offer up to $20 billion (Kommersant, December 10).

Although an announcement on the pipeline terminus may be expected at
any moment, if no decision is made, then it can be assumed that the
Russian government is wary of damaging its relations with China at a
time when relations with the United States are on shaky ground.

–Henry Weidel

KAZAKHSTAN SEEKS DIVERSE SECURITY PARTNERS

Kazakhstan has opened a new hanger at a military air base in
Karaganda, both commemorating Independence Day (December 15) and
highlighting its image as a regional power prepared to take its place
in constructing regional security and combating terrorism. Hailing the
development at Karaganda as the first of its kind within the CIS,
since the base will serve as a facility for repairing and restoring
air force equipment, Kazakhstani military authorities regard the
facility as further evidence that the country is ready to play an
active part in countering the threat posed by international terrorism
(Khabar Television, December 15).

The hanger itself, estimated at around 3,000 square km, took two years
to construct and includes special laboratories for testing related
electronics equipment. It is able to hold two fighters of MiG-31
capacity and perhaps carry out repairs on Boeing passenger aircraft,
given the height of the hanger. Equally possible, based on
Kazakhstan’s close relationship within the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) and its growing bilateral ties with Russia, would
be the future deployment and repair of Russian combat aircraft
carrying out strike missions within Central Asia.

In recent years the Kazakhstani military has struggled to come to
terms with the problems of Soviet-legacy forces and failed to find
adequate mechanisms to capitalize on the U.S. financing for overseas
training for its officers. Many officers return to Kazakhstan unable
to utilize their education and assist in. improving local
standards. This positive development comes at a time when efforts are
being stepped up to cement ties with both Russia and China.

Nurtay Abykayev, chairman of Kazakhstan’s Senate, believes that the
visit to Kazakhstan by a delegation from the Russian Federation
Council “crowns a major set of events carried out as part of the Year
of Russia in Kazakhstan, which is nearing completion, and the Year of
Kazakhstan in Russia that preceded it,” (Itar-Tass, December
13). Sergei Mironov, Chairman of the Russian Federation Council,
believes such multilateral institutions as the Eurasian Economic
Community, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Central
Asian Cooperation Organization, combined with the Single Economic
Space serve as “a basis for multilateral integration that enables us
to look into the future with confidence.” Mironov, no doubt also
carrying a political overture from the Kremlin, conveyed praise on the
Kazakhstani government for cooperation in the spirit of a strategic
partnership with Russia in the mutually important areas of
counter-terrorism and stemming the flow of illegal narcotics across
the porous Kazakhstan-Russia border.Simultaneously, Kazakhstan has
proceeded to strengthen its evolving security ties with China, pulled
together by mutual concerns over Uighur separatists. Kasymzhomart
Tokayev, Kazakhstan’s foreign minister, has described Kazakhstan’s
relations with China as the cornerstone of future foreign
policy. Though this principally involves oil and gas cooperation,
serving to deepen the nature of bilateral relations, security factors
are playing an increasing role in determining the specific contours of
cooperation. Tokayev observed, “We believe that military exercises
should have a specific context and purpose. At a time when the main
threat to the modern world and security is international terrorism,
such exercises should be aimed at counteracting specific threats posed
by terrorist organizations” (Interfax-Kazakhstan, December 15).

Such diplomatic moves, while understood in some Western capitals,
underscore Washington’s lack of any genuine and deep recognition of
Kazakhstan’s security needs. The Kazakhstani authorities, like many
other states both inside the region and beyond, refuse to openly admit
the presence of an indigenous terrorist threat. The mounting evidence
of the involvement of Kazakhstani citizens in the bombings in Tashkent
in spring 2004, at first vehemently denied in Astana but later
witnessing intelligence and security cooperation in the ensuing
investigation, has also been exacerbated by reports of Kazakhstani
citizens held in Guantanamo Bay. Four Kazakhstani citizens
incarcerated by the U.S. government became involved in militant
Islamic activities in an area south of Almaty and developed links with
the Taliban. The Kazakhstani Foreign Ministry has applied intense
diplomatic pressure in order to secure their return to
Kazakhstan. Sensitive negotiations relating to Kazakhstani nationals,
far from simply highlighting the vast international diversity of the
suspects involved in the war on terror, draw attention to Kazakhstan’s
unspoken security problems. Its main security threats are domestic in
nature, and although the authorities are able to reluctantly cooperate
with their Uzbek counterparts in a criminal investigation into the
terrorist attacks in Tashkent, officials realize that some elements of
its citizenry may be involved in terrorist or militant
organizations. Such rationale explains the security priority in
cooperating with China over Uighur separatists. In other words, there
is a genuine state concern with the threat posed by certain groups or
individuals and there is that which gains the government financial aid
packages from abroad — emphasizing the nature of international
terrorism and its threat to Kazakhstan. Washington may rationalize
Kazakhstan’s official “multi-vector” foreign policy, seeking to avoid
favoring any one state in its international relations, but the
emergence of China and re-emergence of Russia in the security dynamics
of the region, neither of which promote democracy or Western economic
interests, will continue to cause bewilderment until such times as
planners in the United States recognize how deftly the Kazakhstani
government is playing the game of maximizing foreign security
assistance in return for little by way of genuine reform.

–Roger N. McDermott

OSCE “REFORM” — OR A NEW LEASE ON LIFE?

With two weeks remaining from the OSCE’s 2004 budgetary authorization,
Moscow threatens to block adoption of the 2005 budget unless the
organization introduces Russian-proposed “reforms.” Those proposals
seek to: boost the OSCE’s role in the military-political and security
sphere, where Russia can and does manipulate the organization;
emasculate the OSCE in the democracy sphere, where the organization
can and does operate independently of Russia; and curtail overall
Western influence in the OSCE by restricting extra-budgetary funding
of the organization.

Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov, Deputy Minister
Vladimir Chizhov, and other officials pushed those proposals
forcefully at the OSCE’s year-end conference in Sofia on December 6-7,
and continue to do so afterwards. Moscow argues that OSCE activities
are doubly imbalanced: functionally, by focusing selectively on
democracy issues while neglecting all-European military-security
issues; and geographically, by focusing on political developments in
post-Soviet countries while ignoring what Moscow describes as flawed
elections and human-rights violations in Western countries and their
new allies.

The “reform” proposals target three OSCE institutions and processes:
the Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
(ODIHR), which specializes in monitoring elections throughout the OSCE
area; the organization’s field missions; and its budget-formation
procedures. Russian officials continually refer to reform proposals
advanced by the presidents of eight CIS countries in their July 3 and
September 15 collective statements to the OSCE. At the Sofia year-end
meeting, however, only Belarus acted as a convinced supporter of those
reform proposals.

The joint Russia-Belarus proposal calls for tasking ODIHR to: take
into account the work done in the CIS on developing election
standards; use those standards, alongside Western ones, in working out
a “common, uniform set of criteria” for OSCE-CIS appraisals of
elections; increase the proportion of CIS countries’ representatives
in ODIHR election observation missions; finance election observation
through the OSCE’s unified budget only [i.e., disallowing Western
countries’ contributions; these do not require Russian approval,
whereas the unified budget does].

Russia and Belarus gave the OSCE until June 30, 2005, to introduce
these changes, and the organization’s Permanent Council to adopt new
political guidelines for OSCE/ODIHR election monitoring in line with
those changes. In a similar vein, the statement by CIS Executive
Committee Chairman and Executive Secretary Vladimir Rushailo called
for “coordination” of OSCE/ODIHR and CIS election observation
missions, with a view to issuing “joint assessments” of elections. As
is often the case, Russia spoke on the collective behalf of the CIS
without reflecting a consensus among those 12 countries. In the
end-game negotiations on the draft final declaration, Armenia proposed
inserting a positive reference to developing a common OSCE-CIS set of
election standards. Armenia had similarly lined up behind Russia and
Belarus in accepting the fraudulent election of Viktor Yanukovych as
president of Ukraine.

Had such “reforms” been in place, OSCE/ODIHR could not have
ascertained the electoral fraud in Ukraine, would have joined the
Rushailo-led CIS monitoring mission in blessing the fraudulent
returns, and would have been prevented from deciding — as it did at
Sofia — to send and fund observers to the repeat runoff in Ukraine.

To “reform” the OSCE’s field missions, Russia proposes to: restrict
the missions’ extra-budgetary funding, which mostly consists of
above-board contributions by Western countries to local pro-democracy
activities; confine the scope of missions’ activities to socioeconomic
projects requested by host countries’ authorities; limit the missions’
mandate to one-year renewable terms, subject to the host government’s
agreement each time; and increase the proportion of representatives of
certain CIS member countries in OSCE field missions. The
organization’s German-led Minsk Office was “reformed” already in 2003
along these lines.

The proposed budgetary “reform” would entail: revising the scales of
OSCE member countries’ contributions “according to their ability to
pay” [i.e., reducing CIS countries’ contributions]; ending or curbing
the practice of extra-budgetary funding of the OSCE in general [thus
cutting the organization’s overall financial resources]; and
establishing budget formation procedures that would, in their
practical effect, severely restrict the OSCE’s ability to function
without Russia’s or its supporters’ approval.

Russia gave the OSCE until December 31 to commit itself to proceeding
down this road. “In the absence of firm obligations on this score, we
cannot vote the 2005 budget,” Lavrov and Chizhov both warned. Their
statements and those of other Russian officials before, during, and
after the Sofia meeting strongly suggested that Russia can either keep
the OSCE in business or push it toward demise (“throw it on the
sidelines of history,” in Lavrov’s unreferenced paraphrase of
Trotsky), depending on the extent to which it cooperates with Russian
policies.

Such warnings exploit the OSCE’s structural vulnerabilities, fear of
demise through irrelevance, awareness of its rapidly diminishing
raisons d’etre — save election-monitoring, which Moscow now wants to
rein in — and its disposition to give in to Russia year after year in
the military-security sphere as a price of remaining a player in that
sphere. Anxious about institutional survival, and damaged by Russia
perhaps irreparably at the 2002 Porto and 2003 Maastricht year-end
meetings over a wide range of security and democracy issues, the OSCE
hides its weaknesses and failures from public view. It prefers to
paper over the problems, instead of debating them openly and exposing
Russia’s tactics.

At the Sofia meeting, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the
United States “categorically disagreed” with Russian proposals to
shift OSCE’s focus away from democracy building in post-Soviet
countries. The European Union spoke out in a similar vein. Dutch
Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Bot, speaking for the EU’s
presidency on behalf of all member countries, as well as the External
Relations and European Neighborhood Commissioner Benita
Ferrero-Waldner, both ruled out any reduction of OSCE
democracy-building activities, or a “rebalancing” of security and
pro-democracy goals at the expense of the latter. Whether this stance,
taken in the year-end meeting’s media limelight, can hold in the
non-transparent give-and-take with Russia.

The OSCE’s incoming Slovenian Chairmanship for 2005 sounds
anxious. According to that country’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, OSCE
Chairman-in-Office-designate Dimitrji Rupel, in his closing statement
at Sofia, “Foremost among these challenges . . . is the fissure in
relations [between] East and West. As a stark reflection of this
regrettable reality . . . the more we talk of no new dividing lines in
Europe, the more we are confronted with them. I therefore read
carefully the Moscow declaration and Astana address of Presidents of
CIS states . . . a resounding expression of dissatisfaction at the
highest level, which has to be taken into account. I intend to work
relentlessly to address this situation.” Pointing to the urgent need
to adopt the 2005 budget before the end of 2004, Rupel stated,
“Without this, the very functioning of the organization would be in
jeopardy . . . . My biggest concern at the moment is to avert a
political stalemate in the organization.”

If that concern is overriding — and Russian tactics are indeed
designed to make it the overriding concern for the OSCE — then the
temptation may well persist to ensure the organization’s survival
through continuing concessions to Russia regarding the “frozen
conflicts,” CFE Treaty and Istanbul Commitment implementation, border
monitoring, and other security issues, as well as using the OSCE to
reopen ethnic issues in Estonia and Latvia at Russian insistence. That
approach would only deepen the OSCE’s crisis.

Russian duress and for the third consecutive year, the OSCE at Sofia
was unable even to cite its own earlier resolutions; let alone call,
if only symbolically, for their implementation. The organization lost
the final vestiges of its credibility in the security sphere at the
Sofia meeting.

That repeat failure, however, points the OSCE’s way out of
crisis. Election monitoring, promotion of good governance, and
democratic institution building in post-Soviet countries are
compelling raisons d’etre for the organization. It is in the democracy
sphere that the OSCE can bring its comparative advantages to
bear. This, not Russian-prescribed “reforms,” can provide the OSCE
with a new lease on life.

(Documents of the OSCE’s 2004 year-end ministerial conference, Vienna
and Sofia, December 1-8; Interfax, RIA-Novosti, December 9-12).

–Vladimir Socor

————————————————————————
The Eurasia Daily Monitor is a publication of the Jamestown
Foundation. The opinions expressed in it are those of the individual
authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Jamestown
Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the content of EDM, or
if you think that you have received this email in error, please
respond to [email protected].

Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of EDM is strictly
prohibited by law.

The Jamestown Foundation
4516 43rd Street, NW
Washington, DC 20016
202-483-8888 (phone)
202-483-8337 (fax)

Copyright (c) 1983-2004 The Jamestown Foundation.

Hamazkayin Armenian Educational and Cultural Society
Greater Washington DC Chapter
4906 Flint Drive
Bethesda, MD 20816
[email protected]

PRESS RELEASE

Contact:
Areg Abrahamian
[email protected]
[email protected]

HAMAZKAYIN PARTNERS WITH KENNEDY CENTER TO SPONSOR NEW
YEARS ARMENIAN FOLK MUSIC CONCERT IN WASHINGTON

Performance Part of Hamazkayin Evening Dedicated to Supporting Young
Armenians in the Arts

Washington, D.C. – January 2, 2005 – The Hamazkayin Armenian
Educational and Cultural Society joined forces with the John
F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts to sponsor a New Year’s
weekend performance of Armenian folk music on the Center’s Millenium
Stage. The concert was part of an evening organized by the Hamazkayin
Washington chapter dedicated to supporting young Armenians in the
performing and visual arts.

The Zulal Armenian A Capella Trio performed a range of songs
showcasing Armenia’s folk music heritage before a standing-room-only
audience of more than 600 Washingtonians gathered at the
world-renowned Kennedy Center. Using original arrangements of melodies
and harmonies, the group presented a repertoire of songs that drew on
the rich tradition of Armenia’s rural music, including songs such as
`Sari Siroon Yar’ and `Sareri Hovin Mernem.’

Following the concert, the Hamazkayin Washington chapter hosted a
photography exhibit titled `A Window to Armenia,’ featuring the works
of Arsineh Khachikian at the Soorp Khatch Armenian Apostolic Church
Hall. A Washington DC native, Ms. Khachikian shared with attendees a
photographic journey across Armenia’s mountains, villages and
people. The exhibit displayed more than 30 color and black and white
images depicting a range of subjects from panoramic landscapes to
poignant close-up portraits.

`By sponsoring such performances and exhibits, Hamazkayin is pleased
to help young Armenian artists gain increased exposure in the nation’s
capital,’ stated Maggie Simonian, chair of the Hamazkayin Washington
DC chapter. `Hamazkayin would like to thank the Kennedy Center for
opening their Millenium Stage to our organization as well as
acknowledge the Armenian Embassy for their collaboration in making
this event a success.’

Founded in 1928, the Hamazkayin Armenian Educational and Cultural
Society is dedicated to the preservation and advancement of the
history and the cultural heritage of the Armenian nation. Hamazkayin
has chapters throughout the United States, Canada, South America,
Europe, the Middle East and Australia, as well as the Republic of
Armenia.

A recording of the concert featuring Zulal is available on the Kennedy
Center Website at:

Transitions on Line, Czech Republic
Jan 3 2005

From Freeze to Deep Freeze

by Ara Tadevosyan
3 January 2005

A decade after a cease-fire was signed, the chances of peace between
Armenia and Azerbaijan are, if anything, becoming more remote.

Another year has passed and the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh remains
frozen, with no war but also no peace, and with no economic ties
between Armenia and, on the other side, Azerbaijan or Turkey.

But this was not quite an ordinary year of suspended motion. May
marked the 10th anniversary of the cease-fire that ended the conflict
between the Azeris and Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. More
importantly, for the first time, the Armenian government has not been
dealing with Heidar Aliev, but with his son, Ilham. Year nine of the
cease-fire – 2003–had been a write-off, with presidential and
parliamentary elections in Armenia and, in October, the presidential
elections in Azerbaijan that brought Ilham to power. Year 10 marked
the start of a new era.

Optimists believed that, once in the president’s seat, Ilham Aliev
might quickly push for a resolution in order to stabilize the overall
level of security in the region as, in 2005, Azerbaijan is due to
start pumping oil through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to Turkey.
Pessimists pointed instead to the domestic challenges faced by a
young leader, arguing that any compromise would weaken his public
legitimacy and his position in ruling circles. International
mediators chose to set out an optimistic schedule of high-level
meetings. But the pessimists have proved right. The peace process has
in fact gone backward even according to members of the mediation
group, a collection of U.S., Russian, and French diplomats working
under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) and known as the Minsk Group.

THE BREAKTHROUGH THAT WASN’T

In fact, the peace process has been going backward since 2001, when
the two countries appeared on the verge of a breakthrough. Heidar
Aliev, already ailing, appeared close to accepting the notion that
the de facto status of Nagorno-Karabakh – as an ethnic-Armenian region
with no ties to Azerbaijan–would become permanent. But then the
talks collapsed.

The Armenians partly blame Aliev Sr.’s ill health. He feared he might
not be well enough to implement the agreements, believes Armenian
Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian. But they have also blamed Aliev’s
son and successor, Ilham. In January, Oskanian claimed that Heidar
Aliev `believed he had the necessary moral right to settle the
conflict’ but `Ilham Aliev realizes his own weakness.’ What the talks
foundered on, in his view, was the unwillingness of Heidar Aliev’s
close entourage, including Ilham, to compromise. In other words, in
Armenian eyes Ilham is guilty not just of being unwilling to use the
Key West talks as the basis for continued negotiations, but also of
preventing a landmark treaty at Key West.

Such assertions clearly did not help create an atmosphere conducive
to a breakthrough this year. Nor did Ilham Aliev’s February
declaration, `I am not in favor of making compromises’ or that of his
then-foreign minister, Vilayat Guliev, who said that Azerbaijan had
the right to begin negotiations `from scratch.’

Baku now insists that Armenia give back seven Azeri-populated
districts of Azerbaijan seized during the war before it will discuss
the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh. For its part, Armenia insists
that any withdrawal must be agreed on at the same time as a final
status for the region. Yerevan has also put in the foreground an
issue that had seemed to be settled: the role of Nagorno-Karabakh
leaders in talks. Over the years, the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh has
become a bilateral discussion between Yerevan and Baku. That approach
dates to 1998 when Robert Kocharian moved from his post as president
of Nagorno-Karabakh to the presidency of Armenia. But this year
Kocharian has cited the absence of Nagorno-Karabakh leaders as one of
two problems preventing a resolution. (The other is Azerbaijan’s
alleged unwillingness to cooperate in reaching a settlement.)

The talks now seem to be moving in circles. Russia’s former first
deputy foreign minister, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, has said, `All
possible variants of a settlement have already been on the agenda of
the negotiating process,’ and, `Now the initial positions of the
sides in the Karabakh conflict differ much more than two to three
years ago.’

THE ATTRACTIONS OF THE STATUS QUO

Behind Aliev’s declaration against compromise seems to be a belief
that the status quo suits the Armenians. Azerbaijan pins part of the
blame on the mediators. In May, Aliev accused the OSCE of `just
observing’ talks. And in November, Azerbaijan went beyond the
framework of OSCE talks and put a motion before the United Nations to
condemn the `transfer of settlers’ from Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh
`to artificially create a new demographic situation in those
territories.’ France criticized the move as negative and Russia as
unhelpful.

Armenia had warned that a UN vote in favor of the Azeri motion would
spell the end of the latest phase of diplomatic efforts, a series of
meetings between the Armenian and Azeri foreign ministers known as
the `Prague process.’ In the end, the UN General Assembly put off a
vote until an unspecified later date.

Armenia itself has had some critical words for the OSCE Minsk Group,
claiming that it had failed to react adequately to the `killing’ of
the Key West agreement by Azerbaijan. But Kocharian has described the
Minsk Group as `the optimal format’ for discussion, adding that `the
problem lies in the parties to the conflict and not in the
mediators’ – which, judging by other comments he has made, means
Azerbaijan.

And, overall, Armenia seems satisfied both with the mediators’
efforts and the international environment. In some key relationships,
the year has been positive for Armenia. At one point, in January,
there appeared to be the possibility of a breakthrough in relations
with Turkey, when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said
his government might reopen its border with Armenia if Yerevan
reciprocated “friendly initiatives’ by Ankara. By April, the Azeris
and Turks were back to publicly declaring their unity on the Karabakh
issue. That followed a statement by Aliev in March that a settlement
would be `impossible’ if Turkey were to reopen its border with
Armenia. Still, Turkey’s initial statements cannot be wiped off the
record, and EU leaders commitment to start accession talks with
Turkey in October 2005 may put Ankara under increasing pressure to do
as the European Parliament has called for – to improve relations with
Armenia and end its blockade.

Most importantly, Armenia’s key bilateral relationship, with Russia,
remained solid. Azerbaijan, perhaps partly because of its
disillusionment with the Minsk Group, took a number of steps that
amounted to a clear bid for greater favor from Russia. It allowed
Russia to build a radar station in the country (despite enacting a
law banning military bases in the country) and, unlike Georgia, it
has been standoffish in its military relationships with NATO and the
United States. In August, Baku called on Moscow to make a greater
effort on its own to broker a deal. But within a matter of days
Russian President Vladimir Putin met Kocharian for the sixth time in
12 months, and Armenian and Russian troops had held joint military
exercises.

(Russia has a pact with Armenia promising military support for
Armenia if it is attacked, it has a military base in Armenia, and it
patrols Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran. It also controls
almost all of Armenia’s energy system.)

Azerbaijan enjoyed greater success with Iran, for the first time
winning Iran’s support for its claim to Nagorno-Karabakh. But, at the
same time, Armenia entered talks to build a pipeline to Iran.

To Armenian eyes, the international climate therefore seems
acceptable, possibly even working in its favor. Armenian negotiators
have little reason, therefore, to offer more compromises than they
did at Key West.

And it has few domestic reasons to push for change. Kocharian has
three and a half years left in his presidency, and, although the
governing coalition is in trouble, the opposition is weak, with no
leader like Ukraine’s Viktor Yushchenko or Georgia’s Mikheil
Saakashvili and no clear vision of how to resolve the question of
Nagorno-Karabakh. Kocharian also faces little pressure from the
Armenian public. Armenians are not afraid of a new war, and, by and
large, they are happy with the status quo because as least the most
important issue is practically resolved: Armenians living in
Nagorno-Karabakh are free, feel reasonably secure, and are de facto
united with Armenia.

And the risks for Kocharian of being too bold were highlighted in
late 1997, when then-President Levon Ter-Petrossian accepted a
proposal under which Armenia would cede occupied territories outside
Nagorno-Karabakh and only then discuss the political status of
Nagorno-Karabakh. The next year, he was forced out of office as a
direct consequence. Kocharian’s lack of room for maneuver was made
clear in a June poll by the Armenian Center for National and
International Studies that showed that only 2.5 percent of the
population believes the Armenian authorities can resolve the issue of
Nagorno-Karabakh. Just 1 percent believes the captured territories
should be returned to Azerbaijan. Politically, Kocharian therefore
has nothing to gain and plenty to lose by making a major concession.

Meanwhile, the apparent failure of its overtures to Moscow and
Ankara’s openness to think the previously unthinkable – to end the
blockade – show just how difficult it is for Azerbaijan to change the
status quo.

A RUBICON CROSSED?

The bottom line for Armenia is a position stated in private by
Armenian diplomats–that Key West was a Rubicon, even though no
treaty was signed. The preliminary understanding (as they put it) was
that Azerbaijan would cede sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia
would leave the occupied territories, and Azerbaijan might be granted
a secure corridor linking Azerbaijan to Nakchichevan, an exclave of
Azeri territory within Armenia. Azerbaijan denies a framework deal
was agreed to, though the U.S. negotiator has said they were
`incredibly close’ to one. But having received such an offer (as it
believes), Yerevan is now unlikely to discuss anything like `broad
autonomy’ for Karabakh inside Azerbaijan – and Armenian diplomats
believe that is well-understood by the mediators.

Judging by their comments about Aliev Sr., diplomats in Yerevan are
waiting for Ilham Aliev to become politically strong enough to be
able to reach an agreement about Karabakh. Aliev himself seems to be
waiting for Azerbaijan to become stronger but for different ends. In
February, he said, “Justice is with us, and time will work for us,’
arguing that `assessing the countries [Armenia and Azerbaijan] in
terms of economic potential, you will see that we are in a better
position.’ In July, Aliev promised that Azerbaijan “would liberate
its occupied territories at any cost”; oil may be what makes that
cost more affordable.

In the meantime, Ilham Aliev has begun to liken his policy to a cold
war with Armenia. In November, he said, `We are carrying on a cold
war successfully. Our propaganda activity in international
organizations has grown considerably. I am sure that this will allow
us to achieve what we want.’

Events of the past year, then, suggest that, after the failure of the
Key West talks, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are willing to wait a
long time for a resolution, each in the belief that time is on its
side. That is not a view shared by the U.S. co-chairman of the Minsk
Group, Steven Mann. Speaking in the autumn, he said, `We tell the two
governments: time is not on your side. It will be worse both for
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Regional development is passing Armenia by.
Pipelines, roads, railways are being built, and Armenia is missing
the advantages it could get from economic integration with the whole
region. The country is paying a high cost for the army it has to
keep.’

That prompted Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian to say,
`Armenia cannot be frightened or troubled by statements that it is
standing apart from regional oil and gas and transportation projects.
Nagorno-Karabakh is priceless and is not a subject for bargaining.
That’s why we do not accept the argument that, in defending its
interests, Armenia is missing an opportunity to take part in big
regional projects.’

For Azerbaijan, too, Nagorno-Karabakh remains priceless. So no break
in the ice of this frozen conflict seems likely soon.

Ara Tadevosyan is the director of the Armenian news agency Mediamax.

Fresno Bee, CA
Jan 3 2005

Valley churches call upon faith, compassion

By Felicia Cousart Matlosz / The Fresno Bee

After the deadly combination of an earthquake and tsunami devastated
lives overseas, many people in the Valley who turn to their faith for
comfort are reaching out to victims who need help.

Last week, Bishop John T. Steinbock of the Roman Catholic Diocese of
Fresno asked each parish to conduct a special collection Sunday to
make clear the Catholic community’s response to the disaster that
struck countries from Malaysia to East Africa the day after
Christmas.

The death toll Sunday stood at more than 137,000, but thousands more
remain missing.

Other churches also are extending a helping hand, which adds to the
many donations coming from individuals and agencies that are fueling
the relief work overseas.

St. Paul Armenian Church in east-central Fresno, for example, held a
special collection Sunday at the direction of the Western Diocese of
the Armenian Church of North America. “We had a tremendous response
and will repeat it next Sunday,” said the Rev. Arshen Aivazian.

Many churches, such as Aivazian’s, are offering heartfelt prayers for
the dead and the surviving. But it also is a natural response to send
monetary assistance.

In the case of his church, Aivazian said the Armenian people are
“very understanding and sympathetic,” especially since they have
suffered themselves. In 1988, an earthquake in northwestern Armenia
killed tens of thousands of people.

The Rev. John Coelho-Harguindeguy, pastor of St. Anthony of Padua
Catholic Church in northwest Fresno, said parishioners there Sunday
were very generous in responding to the special collection.

“They are good-hearted people,” he said. “People basically are good.
… People basically are very generous when they see a need.”

U.N. humanitarian chief Jan Egeland said this past weekend that 1.8
million people would need food and that the figure could rise.

At Cornerstone Church in downtown Fresno, the Rev. Jim Franklin said
the congregation offered a special prayer at its New Year’s Eve night
service and that his church regularly supports the great disaster
relief fund conducted by the Assemblies of God.

“Any time there’s tragedy, you always want to respond in compassion,”
Franklin said, “because we recognize tragedy happens to every
individual, whether we’re there or here. As a minister, I deal with
the heartaches and the tragedies in people’s lives every day.”

Franklin said now is not the time to try to figure out why such
calamities happen: “We’ve got people who are hurting, and we want to
reach out to help them.”

Not far away in downtown Fresno at St. John’s Cathedral, parishioners
pondered the sheer breadth of what happened.

“I can’t comprehend it. I just can’t comprehend it,” said Terry-Lyn
A. Schmidt. She said her faith helps her and that “you just pray and
help as much as you can.”

Lorenzo Santos Vega, a lay minister for the church, said his
Christian faith also helps him in times such as these. He said all of
the parishes are donating funds to the relief cause, and “I guarantee
you this parish is very generous. … We’ll do everything we can.”

But he also looked at it in a spiritual way. He believes those who
died are in heaven, and he prays for them.

“Money can do so much and the aid that we’ve given them, but what’s
the best thing is spiritually and our faith. I believe that so much,”
Vega said. “I know they’re in a better place. All of them. The ones
still surviving, I pray for them, too, because you know what? The
Lord will be there for them.”

HOW TO HELP
Among those accepting donations:
American Red Cross, Fresno chapter: (559) 455-1000
Chinese American Heritage fund at Bank of America: (559) 433-1278
International Medical Corps (Doctors Without Borders): (800) 481-4462

Sri Lanka Fund at United Security Bank: (559) 225-0101
West Coast Mennonite Central Committee: (559) 638-6911;
earthquake; 1010 G St., Reedley, CA 93654
International Mission Board, SBC: (800) 999-3113;

New York Times
Jan 3 2005

Powell and Governor of Florida Arrive in Bangkok
By SCOTT SHANE

Published: January 3, 2005

ANGKOK, Jan. 3 – On a journey designed to assure nations devastated
by the tsunami of the United States’ support, Secretary of State
Colin L. Powell arrived here tonight accompanied by Gov. Jeb Bush of
Florida as the personal representative of his brother, President
Bush.

The four-day trip through the region is intended to quash any
lingering criticism of the administration’s initial reaction to the
tragedy. Critics called the reaction sluggish and said it threatened
to bungle an opportunity to win hearts and minds in Indonesia, the
world’s largest Muslim country and the one hit hardest by the
disaster, as well as in Sri Lanka, Thailand and India.

“The president wanted both of us to come out here to demonstrate U.S.
commitment to the nations of the region and to make an assessment as
well, to see what else we might need to do,” Mr. Powell said on board
the 19-hour flight from Washington to Bangkok.

Mr. Powell said the United States’ pledges of aid – increasing an
initial $15 million offer to $35 million and then to $350 million –
was a natural “scaling up” of aid as the number of victims and the
extent of the ruin became clear.

In Washington, President Bush announced that he had asked two former
presidents, his father and Bill Clinton, to head a nationwide
fund-raising effort. “Both men, both presidents know the great
decency of our people,” Mr. Bush said. “They bring tremendous
leadership experience to this role, and they bring good hearts.”

President Bush said his father and Mr. Clinton “will ask Americans to
donate directly to reliable charities already providing help to
tsunami victims.” The president went on to say that “cash donations
are most useful, and I’ve asked the former presidents to solicit
contributions both large and small.”

The president said the United States had made “an initial commitment”
of $350 million for disaster relief. “We’re working with the United
Nations and with governments around the world to coordinate the
comprehensive response,” he said.

For Mr. Powell, 67, the trip to Thailand, Indonesia and Sri Lanka
will be one of his last tours – perhaps the very last – as secretary
of state, and it provides a shift of focus from the war in Iraq and
the strain the war has put on relations with many countries in Europe
and the Muslim world. His term will end when his successor,
Condoleezza Rice, the current national security adviser, is
confirmed.

For Jeb Bush, 51, who is a possible contender for the presidency in
2008 or later, the trip is a first major turn on the international
stage when the eyes of millions of Americans are on the disaster.

Governor Bush, who oversaw Florida’s response to four hurricanes in
August and September, defended the administration’s approach to
tsunami relief and suggested that his presence on the trip would send
a powerful message of sympathy.

“I think family matters in a lot of places, just as it does in the
United States,” the governor said. He recalled in 1988 being asked by
his father to travel to Armenia, which had just been hit by an
earthquake that cost more than 25,000 lives.

“We went, and it made a big difference that a family member would go
– this was on Christmas Eve – go to a far-off place,” Mr. Bush said.
“These hardened Soviet Communists were crying as they saw my son hand
out medicine and toys to children that looked just like him in this
hospital that needed a whole lot of help.”

Explaining the administration’s series of rising pledges of aid, Mr.
Powell said he was alerted to the Dec. 26 tsunami “Sunday after
church” at a time when the number of dead seemed possibly as low as
10,000. He quickly contacted the region’s foreign ministers and
helped start a response from the U.S. Agency for International
Development and the American military. That effort has grown steadily
with the dimensions of the disaster, he said.

As of today, Mr. Powell said that while 15 Americans have been
confirmed dead, 4,000 to 5,000 remain officially unaccounted for,
since their relatives called State Department hotlines to report that
they were in the region and had not been heard from. He suggested
that most of those reported possibly missing probably are fine,
adding that diplomats are working to reduce that total by checking
with families.

Powell and Governor of Florida Arrive in Bangkok
By SCOTT SHANE

Published: January 3, 2005

ANGKOK, Jan. 3 – On a journey designed to assure nations devastated
by the tsunami of the United States’ support, Secretary of State
Colin L. Powell arrived here tonight accompanied by Gov. Jeb Bush of
Florida as the personal representative of his brother, President
Bush.

The four-day trip through the region is intended to quash any
lingering criticism of the administration’s initial reaction to the
tragedy. Critics called the reaction sluggish and said it threatened
to bungle an opportunity to win hearts and minds in Indonesia, the
world’s largest Muslim country and the one hit hardest by the
disaster, as well as in Sri Lanka, Thailand and India.

Advertisement

“The president wanted both of us to come out here to demonstrate U.S.
commitment to the nations of the region and to make an assessment as
well, to see what else we might need to do,” Mr. Powell said on board
the 19-hour flight from Washington to Bangkok.

Mr. Powell said the United States’ pledges of aid – increasing an
initial $15 million offer to $35 million and then to $350 million –
was a natural “scaling up” of aid as the number of victims and the
extent of the ruin became clear.

In Washington, President Bush announced that he had asked two former
presidents, his father and Bill Clinton, to head a nationwide
fund-raising effort. “Both men, both presidents know the great
decency of our people,” Mr. Bush said. “They bring tremendous
leadership experience to this role, and they bring good hearts.”

President Bush said his father and Mr. Clinton “will ask Americans to
donate directly to reliable charities already providing help to
tsunami victims.” The president went on to say that “cash donations
are most useful, and I’ve asked the former presidents to solicit
contributions both large and small.”

The president said the United States had made “an initial commitment”
of $350 million for disaster relief. “We’re working with the United
Nations and with governments around the world to coordinate the
comprehensive response,” he said.

For Mr. Powell, 67, the trip to Thailand, Indonesia and Sri Lanka
will be one of his last tours – perhaps the very last – as secretary
of state, and it provides a shift of focus from the war in Iraq and
the strain the war has put on relations with many countries in Europe
and the Muslim world. His term will end when his successor,
Condoleezza Rice, the current national security adviser, is
confirmed.

For Jeb Bush, 51, who is a possible contender for the presidency in
2008 or later, the trip is a first major turn on the international
stage when the eyes of millions of Americans are on the disaster.

Governor Bush, who oversaw Florida’s response to four hurricanes in
August and September, defended the administration’s approach to
tsunami relief and suggested that his presence on the trip would send
a powerful message of sympathy.

“I think family matters in a lot of places, just as it does in the
United States,” the governor said. He recalled in 1988 being asked by
his father to travel to Armenia, which had just been hit by an
earthquake that cost more than 25,000 lives.

“We went, and it made a big difference that a family member would go
– this was on Christmas Eve – go to a far-off place,” Mr. Bush said.
“These hardened Soviet Communists were crying as they saw my son hand
out medicine and toys to children that looked just like him in this
hospital that needed a whole lot of help.”

Explaining the administration’s series of rising pledges of aid, Mr.
Powell said he was alerted to the Dec. 26 tsunami “Sunday after
church” at a time when the number of dead seemed possibly as low as
10,000. He quickly contacted the region’s foreign ministers and
helped start a response from the U.S. Agency for International
Development and the American military. That effort has grown steadily
with the dimensions of the disaster, he said.

As of today, Mr. Powell said that while 15 Americans have been
confirmed dead, 4,000 to 5,000 remain officially unaccounted for,
since their relatives called State Department hotlines to report that
they were in the region and had not been heard from. He suggested
that most of those reported possibly missing probably are fine,
adding that diplomats are working to reduce that total by checking
with families.

Azer Tag, Azerbaijan
Jan 3 2005

PRESS SERVICE OF PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN REPORTS
[January 03, 2005, 22:56:27]

Meeting of the Security Council presided by President of the Republic
of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev took place on January 3.

In the meeting, discussed were accomplishments reached in the
socio-political, economic and other fields in the country in 2004,
the tasks in 2005 and other questions.

Speaking at the meeting, President Ilham Aliyev has said: `I am very
pleased that we all have efficiently worked in 2004. Everybody in his
place has confidently managed the Republic. Mainly is that the policy
of our nationwide leader Heydar Aliyev has remained unchangeable.
This is a significant factor to provide our future successes’.

Noting that important steps have been made for social development of
the regions, the law on combat against corruption adopted, the Head
of State stated that new working places were opened and the works are
carried out in the field of dynamic development.

Touching upon the successfully going on processes of negotiations in
settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan, Nagorny Karabakh conflict,
President Ilham Aliyev has said: `It is possible to say a new phase
has began in settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan, Nagorny Karabakh
conflict. There is a process called `the Prague process’ and I have
already stated that this means the step-by-step solution of the
problem and it is not easy to reach this. Of course, I do not mean
the question has found its solution. The talks are going on and we
use all ways to carry out the talks in useful for us direction.
Attraction of large world community to this question, discussion of
the problems with other organizations, that is with the non-connected
organizations – though the Armenians protest it much more and
strongly resist – we have reached this and I hope this will have
positive influence on the process of negotiations.

Speaking of the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan MEP in 2005,
successful continuation of the regional projects, including the
transport projects in the same year, President Ilham Aliyev has said:
`We, can, possibly, look forward with optimism to the coming year. Of
course, it will depend on our activity, our work. I hope, as always,
the government, and in general, the ruling power will worthily carry
out its activities.”

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Macleans, Canada
Jan 3 2005

A tragedy beyond belief

We once could close our minds to others’ disasters — but the world
is smaller now

ANTHONY WILSON-SMITH

Phi Phi Island, off the coast of Thailand, is — or was — one of
those unbelievably lovely, restful places where you go to temporarily
abandon all cares in the world. During a week there 15 years ago, I
spent hours literally staring into space — mesmerized by the perfect
beach and the remarkable colour of the ocean, so bright it was almost
teal. The island’s tranquility contrasts with the much larger Phuket
nearby, which has a well-deserved reputation as Party Central. Both
places have provided great getaways — depending on how you take your
pleasure — which is why it is even harder to realize they are now
among the most deadly, devastated places on Earth. After the Dec. 26
tsunami that brought such phenomenal devastation to Asia and East
Africa, more than 300 bodies were found on tiny Phi Phi; the toll
around Phuket island runs into the thousands, and the final total may
not be known for months.

The nature of tragedy is that it can take months or sometimes years
before we fully comprehend how much it has changed everything. The
events of 9/11 were like that: even as we watched, with horrible
fascination, the televised replays of aircraft crashing into the
World Trade Center, it still wasn’t immediately possible to fathom
that the world really had just become a much different place. Three
years on, we feel the effects in ways both small (long lineups at
airports and vastly increased security) and large (the much more
polarized — and dangerous — nature of global politics).

The Dec. 26 tsunami is such an event. The first reports of the death
toll, though terrible, were in line with other tragedies that mankind
has endured in recent years — a 1988 earthquake in Armenia killed
25,000; a 1998 hurricane in Central America took 15,000 lives; a 2001
quake in India killed 20,000. And there was the consoling thought
that the initial estimate of 13,000 dead was probably too high — as
is often the case in the aftermath of disaster. (After the 2001
Indian earthquake, the first estimate was 100,000 dead.)

This has been the awful exception to that rule. With each day in the
immediate aftermath, the estimate of the tsunami’s toll doubled —
then doubled again and again, to beyond 100,000. In the months ahead,
disease, tainted water and spreading germs from rotting food and
outdoor toilets will drive that total far higher.

Years ago, I read a study of the print media that came to roughly
this conclusion: equivalent space is usually devoted to coverage of
hundreds of people dying in a far-off corner of the world, dozens of
people dying in North America, and a couple of people dying in the
city in which the newspaper operates. The reasons were that we care
much more about events on our doorstep (which remains true) and we
don’t feel the same empathy for faraway people from other cultures
(which, in a multicultural society, is now much less true). The sting
of loss extends everywhere, including here: as many as 85 Canadians
remain missing, and we may never know how many Canadians who were
born elsewhere lost family members. You’ll find a list of contacts on
page 27 for organizations offering aid. Be generous and remember: the
world is a smaller place in every way than it once was. And Phi Phi
Island will never again be a place where we can escape all cares.