The Jamestown Foundation
TERRORISM MONITOR
Volume 3 Issue 3 (February 10, 2005)
SECULAR NATIONALISM VERSUS POLITICAL ISLAM IN AZERBAIJAN
By Asbed Kotchikian
Being one of only four countries in the world with a majority of
Shiites, Azerbaijan represents an interesting case of secular Shiism
surrounded by countries and regions where theocracy and religious
movements (both Shiite and Sunni) seem to thrive. After the fall of the
Soviet Union, this South Caucasus country witnessed a civil war, several
coup d’état, war with its western neighbor Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh
and the rise to power of its former Communist era leader Heydar Aliyev.
What puts the country on the international map is that it has a
substantial amount of oil reserves – both on and off-shore – and that
Azerbaijan is a pro-Western country neighboring troubled regions of the
North Caucasus and Islamic Iran.
While the majority of Azerbaijan’s approximately eight million citizens
are followers of the Shiite branch of Islam, there are substantial Sunni
communities in the north and the west of the country. The religious
cleavage between Sunnis and Shiites is reinforced by the fact that most
of the non-Azeri minorities (such as the Lezgin) are Sunnis who live in
the north of the country, neighboring Dagestan.
Perhaps as a direct result of Azerbaijan’s Soviet legacy, Islam as a
political force has not flourished despite increasing interaction with
Iran. Moreover, historically speaking, Azerbaijan has had a nationalist
orientation rather than a religious one. The close ethnic ties between
Azeris and Turks played an important role in Azerbaijan’s adoption of
the Turkish model of strong nationalism and secularism (also known as
Kemalism). The short lived presidency of the mercurial and Turkic
irredentist Abulfazl Elchibey in 1992-93 witnessed the rise to power of
the Azerbaijani Popular Front and increasing cooperation with Ankara.
The coming to power of Heydar Aliyev in 1993 brought a more balanced
orientation in Azerbaijan’s relations with its neighbors. Having been
part of the former Soviet elite, Aliyev was able to gradually control
the political scene and in due course stabilized the country’s domestic
and foreign policies.
The absence of influential indigenous Islamic militant groups in
Azerbaijan could also be explained by severe government crackdowns on
all vestiges of dissent ` Islamic or otherwise. For instance, the Azeri
government moved quickly to neutralize the challenge from the Islamic
Party of Azerbaijan (IPA) by banning the movement and incarcerating its
leaders. The government also cracked down on other radical groups such
as Jeyshullah (Army of God), a small radical group determined to carry
out attacks against western targets (including the U.S. embassy) in
Baku. [1]
Notwithstanding the severe government crackdown on Islamic
organizations, the past several years have seen an increased amount of
Islamic activity. The local media has blamed this resurgence on the
failure of the government’s pro-Western policies. [2] Another plausible
explanation is that both the loyal opposition and the government have
done little to address the social and economic problems in the country,
particularly outside Baku. The riots that took place in Nardaran (a
village, 10 miles northwest of Baku) in June 2002 were indicative of
rural discontent with the secular Azeri regime.[3] The leader of the
movement, Alikaram Aliyev (also known as Nardaran Aliyev) was arrested
and sentenced to six years in prison. The fact that Nardaran is one of
the holy sites for Shiite Muslims (a wife of the 7th imam is buried in
the village mosque), raised more concerns about the increased opposition
to the government by religious groups.
Nevertheless, and despite the fact that the leader of the Spiritual
Board of Muslims of the Caucasus (SBMC), sheikh ul-Islam Allahsukur
Pasazada is an Azeri and the SBMC is headquartered in Baku, Azerbaijan
remains committed to secularism. In June 2001, Heydar Aliyev issued a
decree announcing the creation of the State Committee on Religious
Affairs (SCRA) which was put in charge of oversight of all the religious
activities in the country and which passed regulations limiting the
amount of money channeled to local religious groups from foreign sources
and specifically from Iran. [4]
In December 2003, a new showdown between the government and a Muslim
cleric in Baku threatened to radicalize the religious fundamentalists.
The confrontation occurred when the government tried to shut down the
Jumaa mosque and arrested the imam, Ilqar Ibrahimoglu on the grounds
that he took part in demonstrations against the irregularities reported
during the presidential elections. Ilqar Ibrahimoglu has always been
critical of the government and his Friday sermons attracted many young
Azeris, to the extent that some papers even called him the Azerbaijani
Khomeini. [5] The increasing popularity of a dissident religious leader
likely prompted the government to take drastic actions before
Ibrahimoglu was transformed into a religious icon and a national leader.
Aside from mainstream Shi’a Islamism, there are two other Islamist
tendencies in Azerbaijan. The first is the so-called Wahhabi movement
which has some adherents among Sunni Lezgin minorities in the north and
some parts of the capital Baku. The Wahhabi movement has been active in
Chechnya, Dagestan and northern Azerbaijan for over a decade. Most of
the radical Islamic groups operating in the North Caucasus are either
followers of or funded by Wahhabi movements from overseas. [6]
The presence of strong Wahhabi networks in the north of the country
overlaps with the growing nationalist and ethnic sentiments of the
Lezgins, thus making it difficult to contain. [7] In July 2004,
Azerbaijani news sources reported the arrest of over 200 people who were
believed to be followers of the Wahhabi movement in Baku and were
accused of plotting a coup d’état against the government under the
disguise of training people to fight the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. Later
in December in a television interview, the chairman of the SCRA, Rafiq
Aliyev, estimated that there are about 15,000 Wahhabis operating in Baku
alone. [8]
The third form of Islam is an amalgam of popular Islam and Turkic
nationalism. A Turkish Islamic movement called Nurcular ` the followers
of Said Nursi, a scholar who died in 1960 ` has established networks in
Azerbaijan and has been active in promoting a more Turkic nationalist
version of Islam. This movement, which is Sunni in doctrine, is banned
in Turkey and the Azerbaijani authorities have kept a close watch on the
organization’s activities. [9]
Aside from the “homegrown” and “imported” Islamic movements, Azerbaijan
also faces a huge problem in terms of being a transit point for various
Islamic movements and terrorist organizations. The wars in Chechnya and
Dagestan and the lawlessness that ensued made it possible for many
radical Islamic groups from Central Asia and the Middle East to operate
in the region and use Azerbaijan as a transit point for the transfer of
people and resources to and from the North Caucasus. However the
Azerbaijani authorities are adamant that they are combating radical
Islamic groups as part of the “War on Terror”. The fact that the country
sent troops to Iraq and is actively pursuing, arresting and deporting
alleged terrorists attests to Azerbaijan’s desire to be part of the U.S.
led coalition and to receive American support even if that means
becoming a potential target for al-Qaeda. [10]
The Azeri state apparatus is in tight control of all political and
religious activities in the country and ensures that Islamic movements
are either closely monitored or supervised by various government
agencies. As far as the transit of Islamic fighters through Azerbaijan
is concerned, officials in Baku have been in close contact with Russian
security agencies to guarantee that the border crossings between
Azerbaijan and Dagestan are not exploited by terrorists or radical
groups. Whether these promises and guarantees are being duly enforced is
anyone’s guess.
In the final analysis, while the threat from Islamic Iran is minimal and
perhaps even non-existent, the danger of transnational al-Qaeda linked
Islamic groups targeting Azerbaijan is very real. Broadly speaking,
there are two reasons to be fearful. Firstly, Azerbaijan remains an
extremely important geographic link between the Islamic groups in the
North Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Thus any serious
attempts by the Azeri authorities to constrain these links might
directly lead to a terrorist attack. Secondly, Azerbaijan’s enthusiastic
alignment with the U.S. and the west automatically makes it a potential
target for al-Qaeda. Privately Azeri authorities recognize the magnitude
of the threat and are terrified of a massive attack on their oil
infrastructure. The most troubling aspect of the situation is that they
can not do much more to protect against the looming threat.
Asbed Kotchikian is a PhD candidate in political science at Boston
University. His areas of interest include the post-Soviet South Caucasus
and the Middle East, with a focus on foreign policy, political change
and development.
Notes
1.”Jeyshullah Chief Sentenced to Life in Prison,” AssA-Irada, October 3,
2000.
2. “The Islamic Factor is Gaining More Weight,” Zerkalo, January 26,
2002.
3. “Did Islamists Organize Nardaran Events?” Azadliq, June 12, 2002.
4. “State Enforces Control Over Religious Entities,” AssA-Irada, July
23, 2001.
5. “Who Benefits from Creating Martyrs of Faith and National Heroes?”
Zerkalo, December 6, 2003.
6. “Wahhabis Based in Azerbaijan’s Northern Districts,” Zerkalo, January
4, 2002.
7. “Wahhabis Lay Down the Law in Qusar,” Ekspress, August 2, 2002.
(Qusar is a regional center in the northern district of Azerbaijan.)
8. ANS TV, December 28, 2004.
9. “The Web,” Ekho, February 9, 2002.
10. “Arab Newspapers Warn Against Terrorist Attack on Azerbaijan,” Yeni
Musavat, October 18, 2004.