G8 COUNTRIES HIGHLIGHT UNSOLVED CONFLICTS
PanARMENIAN.Net
03.07.2006 13:19 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ G8 countries do pay much attention to unsettled
conflicts, including that in Karabakh, Armenian President’s
Spokesperson Victor Soghomonyan told a PanARMENIAN.Net reporter. In
his words, the statement of FMs reaffirms G8 importance in solving
the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.
We remind that the other day the FMs reaffirmed the G8 supports
mediation efforts of the OSCE MG over peaceful settlement of the
Nagorno Karabakh conflict.
“We underscored the need for soonest agreement over peace settlement
basic principles to be attained in 2006. We urge Azerbaijan and Armenia
to display political will and prepare their peoples to peace,” says
a statement of G8 chair made at a meeting of G8 FMs in Moscow.

JULY 5 ARMENIAN PRESIDENT TO LEAVE FOR IRAN ON WORKING VISIT
PanARMENIAN.Net
03.07.2006 13:24 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ July 5-6 Armenian leader Robert Kocharian will pay
a working visit to Iran, Armenian President’s Spokesperson Victor
Soghomonyan told PanARMENIAN.Net. In his words, the schedule of
meetings, the final format of Kocharian’s visit and the composition
of the delegation are being specified still.

SUSPECT OF ARMED ATTACKED AGAINST ARMENIANS AT MOSCOW METRO ARRESTED
PanARMENIAN.Net
03.07.2006 13:42 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Law-enforcement bodies of Moscow have arrested a
resident of Lipetsk, 24, who is suspected in armed attack against two
natives of Armenia. At the same time the Moscow Office of the Public
Prosecutor has re-qualified the criminal case, filed on the fact of
the fight, into the article “Provoking national hatred.” The fight,
in which two Armenians got knife injuries, took place at Kuznetsky
Most metro station last Saturday. The capital’s Office of the Public
Prosecutor first considered the incident as “hooliganism,” instituting
proceedings in compliance with the respective article of the Criminal
Code, reports Lenta.ru.

WORLD SUMMIT OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS TO DISCUSS KARABAKH CONFLICT
PanARMENIAN.Net
03.07.2006 14:04 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ The issue of settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict will be touched at the World Summit of Religious Leaders,
which opened in Moscow July 3, reported the Department of Muslims
of the Caucasus (DMC). Chair of the DMC sheik-ul-Islam Allahshukur
Pashazade, who take part in the summit “will urge world religious
leaders to solidarity in supporting Azerbaijan’s fair cause.” The
Nagorno Karabakh conflict may be also discussed at the meeting of
Allahshukur Pashazade with Catholicos of All Armenians Garegin II,
Trend reports.

NEWLY-APPOINTED US AMBASSADOR TO AZERBAIJAN ARRIVED IN BAKU
PanARMENIAN.Net
03.07.2006 14:15 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ US newly-appointed Ambassador to Azerbaijan Anne
Derse arrived in Baku. “Azerbaijan is one of US best friends and
allies. I looked forward to living here and working with Azeri people,”
the diplomat told journalists in the airport. The Ambassador reported
that before her arrival she met with Americans, who had visited
Azerbaijan and she got to know from them that the Azeri people are
very hospitable. “I will try to promote development of relations
between the US and Azerbaijan,” A. Derse said, reports Day.az.

EU LIKELY TO GRANT ARMENIA STATUS OF STATE WITH MARKET ECONOMY
PanARMENIAN.Net
03.07.2006 15:05 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ The European Union is likely to grant Armenia the
status of a state with market economy, head of the department for
cooperation with the WTO and EU at the Ministry of Trade and Economic
Development Vahagn Ghazaryan informed. “Our part of work is finished
and the essential papers have been already submitted to the European
Commission,” he said adding that in the near future the assumption
of the status is expected according to the norms established by the EU.

HIS HOLINESS KAREKIN II DEPARTS FOR WORLD SUMMIT OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS
Panorama.am
11:42 03/07/06
On the morning of July 3, His Holiness Karekin II, Supreme Patriarch
and Catholicos of All Armenians, departed for Moscow to participate in
the World Summit of Religious Leaders. From July 3 to 5, more than 100
leaders of religions and denominations will gather in the capital of
Russia for the first world summit to discuss urgent problems of modern
times. The summit precedes the G8 summit of industrial leaders in
St. Petersburg.
The delegation, led by the Catholicos of All Armenians, consists of
His Eminence Archbishop Voskan Kalpakian, Primate of the Armenian
Diocese of Greece; His Eminence Arcbishop Pargev Martirosian, Primate
of the Diocese of Artsakh; His Eminence Archbishop Yeznik Petrosian,
Director of the Department of Inter-Church Relations for the Mother
See of Holy Etchmiadzin; and Mr. Rafael Papayan, lay member of the
Supreme Spiritual Council.
Also accompanying the Pontiff of All Armenians to Russia is His Grace
Bishop Vicken Aykazian, who will be participating in the Summit as
the President of the National Council of Churches (USA).

Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Wednesday, May 17, 2006 — Volume 3, Issue 96
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Kocharian banishes Orinats Yerkir party from government
*Yanukovych party moves to upgrade status of Russian language in Ukraine
*OSCE to review CFE treaty in late May
ARMENIAN SPEAKER OUSTED FROM RULING COALITION
Armenia’s President Robert Kocharian has banished one of the three
political parties represented in his government after it appeared to
threaten his reported plans to hand over power to a staunch loyalist in
2008. The Orinats Yerkir (Country of Law) party officially announced its
withdrawal from the ruling coalition on May 12. Its ambitious leader,
Artur Baghdasarian, also resigned as speaker of the Armenian parliament.
The move followed mass defections of lawmakers affiliated with Orinats
Yerkir, an exodus widely believed to have been engineered by the
presidential administration. Baghdasarian’s party boasted the
second-largest faction in the National Assembly as recently as last
month, controlling 20 of its 131 seats. It shrank by almost half in a
matter of one week.
The official reasons for the party’s ouster are its socioeconomic and
foreign policy differences with Kocharian and the two other coalition
partners. Both sides have been reluctant to elaborate on those
differences. The coalition has been beset by internal squabbles ever
since its formation in June 2003. Much of the bickering has been caused
by Orinats Yerkir’s periodic public criticism of the government, a
tactic that has been particularly galling for Prime Minister Andranik
Markarian and his Republican Party of Armenia (HHK). The latter has also
had an uneasy rapport with the third governing party, the Armenian
Revolutionary Federation (HHD).
Kocharian has repeatedly intervened to salvage the three-party marriage
of convenience that has enabled him to deflect popular disaffection with
the government and somehow mitigate his lack of legitimacy. As recently
as February 6, the HHK, the HHD, and Orinats Yerkir vowed (apparently
under pressure from Kocharian) to continue to stick together “at least”
until next year’s parliamentary election. In a joint statement, they
also agreed to show “mutual respect for each other and each other’s
positions.”
However, the truce did not prove long lasting, with Orinats Yerkir
lashing out at the Armenian government (in which it was represented with
three ministers) on April 11 over its shady privatization policies (see
EDM, April 19). The attack drew an angry rebuttal from Markarian and his
loyalists. Baghdasarian further raised eyebrows in Yerevan with an April
19 interview with a leading German newspaper, Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, in which he contradicted the official line by calling for
Armenia’s eventual accession to NATO. More importantly, he also implied
that Kocharian’s hotly disputed reelection in 2003 was fraudulent.
The extraordinary confession (or a slip of the tongue) seems to have
been the final straw for Kocharian, who was reportedly behind the
devastating defections from the Orinats Yerkir faction in parliament
that began on May 5. The defectors, all of them wealthy businessmen
dependent on government connections, offered no clear explanation for
their actions. But newspaper reports citing coalition leaders said the
exodus was masterminded by Kocharian with the aim of forcing Orinats
Yerkir out of the government.
Hayots Ashkhar, a pro-Kocharian daily, indicated on May 15 that the
Armenian president has lost patience with Orinats Yerkir’s notorious
populism, widely attributed to its strong showing in the last
parliamentary polls. “It is more than weird to be part of the
government; have a number of government members, a myriad of
various-caliber officials, protected and reliable businesses; and play
the old tune,” the paper wrote. “This is a violation of the rules of the
game. One deserves to be severely punished for that.”
Interestingly, it was Kocharian who went to great lengths in June 2003
to get parliament to elect Baghdasarian as its speaker, fuelling
speculation that the then 34-year-old politician was being groomed to
become Armenia’s next president. However, it has since become evident
that Kocharian’s preferred successor is his most trusted and powerful
lieutenant, Defense Minister Serge Sarkisian. Some local commentators
suggest that the two men were incensed not so much by Baghdasarian’s
enduring populism as his far-reaching political ambitions that could
interfere with their anticipated handover of power in 2008. The outgoing
Armenian speaker has already attracted Western interest in his
personality with his pro-democracy statements and stated strong
commitment to Armenia’s “integration into Europe and the Euro-Atlantic
family.”
“Artur Baghdasarian has felt like Robert Kocharian’s successor and begun
his pre-election campaign of late,” the independent newspaper 168 Zham
wrote on May 11. “In the process, he was doing everything to distance
himself from the current authorities thanks to whom he had become the
number two official in the Republic of Armenia in 2003.”
Announcing his resignation on May 12, the Orinats Yerkir leader was
anxious not to blame Kocharian for the dramatic collapse of his
parliamentary faction, saying vaguely that the Orinats Yerkir defectors
faced pressure “from all sides.” His claims that Orinats Yerkir is
“becoming an opposition force” are therefore unlikely to be taken at
face value by leaders of Armenia’s main opposition parties. Some of them
have made it clear that Baghdasarian cannot join the opposition camp
unless he publicly “repents” his association with Kocharian.
Baghdasarian has owed his strong electoral performances to a canny
combination of opposition-style rhetoric with covert cooperation from
the ruling regime and wealthy businessmen hungry for political power.
Their defections and his subsequent ouster from the government mean that
Orinats Yerkir will have to operate in a more hostile environment and
with far fewer financial resources.
(Aravot, May 13; Hayots Ashkhar, May 12; 168 Zham, May 11; RFE/RL
Armenia Report, February 6)
–Emil Danielyan
REGIONS OF UKRAINE COMES BACK, TAKES UP LANGUAGE ISSUE

Though defeated in the Orange Revolution, regional elites scored a
strong performance in Ukraine’s March 26 general election, strengthening
the position of their main party — the Party of Regions (PRU) of former
presidential contender Viktor Yanukovych. President Viktor Yushchenko’s
Our Ukraine bloc emerged very weak in the east and south of Ukraine,
where PRU people dominate the local councils. Yushchenko is grudgingly
accepting the status quo and starting to withdraw his appointees from
those regions. The opposition, in the meantime, is displaying its
strength in its strongholds, challenging Yushchenko on a highly
sensitive issue — language. Several regional councils have decided to
officially equate Russian to Ukrainian, and Yushchenko seems to be
helpless to stop them.

Yushchenko-appointed governors in the eastern-most regions, including
Henady Moskal of Luhansk and Vadym Chuprun of Donetsk, resigned in
April. Yushchenko dismissed Kirovohrad governor Eduard Zeynalov of Our
Ukraine and Odessa governor Vasyl Tsushko of the Socialist Party on May
3, and on May 12 he dismissed another Socialist governor, Stepan Bulba,
in Poltava region. More dismissals apparently loom.

So far the government has found a replacement only for Chuprun —
Volodymyr Lohvynenko. Unlike Chuprun, essentially an outsider who had
spent many years abroad as a diplomat before coming home in 2005,
Lohvynenko is firmly entrenched in Donetsk. He was deputy governor in
2002-2005, and prior to that that he had managed Energo — one of the
major local business conglomerates controlling companies in the metals
and mining sector and several banks. The PRU has no objections to
Lohvynenko, who “is a person with extensive life experience,” according
to one of the PRU’s leaders, Volodymyr Rybak. The business daily Delo,
which published the comment by Rybak, led its article on Lohvynenko with
a telling headline: “The end of Orange experiments in Donbas.”

Following the March elections, Yanukovych’s people became the dominant
force in the Crimean parliament. The “For Yanukovych” bloc —
essentially the local PRU branch — secured 44 of the legislature’s 100
seats. Allied locally with the radical anti-West Progressive Socialists
and several smaller pro-Russian groups, the PRU secured the election of
its own Anatoly Hrytsenko as local parliament speaker to replace the
politically neutral Borys Deych. Hrytsenko was elected on May 12 with 71
votes. He is hardly a political novice — Hrytsenko occupied the same
position in 1997-98.

In the regions where it dominates, the PRU began to challenge Yushchenko
almost immediately after the election on a matter of principle for him
— language. Giving Russian an official status equal to Ukrainian was
one of the PRU’s main election promises. Russian de facto dominates in
Kyiv and other major cities except Lviv, and public opinion polls over
the past several years have shown that most Ukrainians are in favor of
raising the status of Russian. De jure, however, Russian is just another
minority language, on par with Hungarian or Greek. It will be hard to
raise the language issue at the national level, as the PRU has no
dedicated allies on this issue in the national parliament in Kyiv. In
the east and south, however, the PRU quickly got down to business.

Even before the election, on March 6, northeastern Kharkiv’s regional
council voted, 53-22, to give Russian “regional language” status. This
should mean that official correspondence and bookkeeping may be
conducted in Russian. Yushchenko’s secretariat reacted on the same day,
saying the decision was outside the legal field, as the constitution
does not provide for such a status. The PRU-dominated regional councils
in Luhansk and Sevastopol, however, followed Kharkiv’s suit on April
25-26. Yushchenko on April 28 asked the Justice Ministry and the
Prosecutor-General’s Office to look into the legal side of the three
councils’ decisions.

The councils argued that they were inspired by the European Charter for
Regional and Minority Languages, adopted by Ukraine. But Justice
Minister Serhy Holovaty argues that the charter referred to languages on
the verge of extinction — a threat Russian definitely is not facing.
Yushchenko has laid the blame for the language dispute on parliament,
which has failed to swear in Constitutional Court judges. Language is a
constitutional matter, so a decision on the Russian language status by
the Constitutional Court should have — in theory — settled the
dispute. But the court cannot resume it work, as it does not have a
quorum. The outgoing parliament blocked the appointment of new judges to
replace those whose tenure expired.

The language dispute has revealed how difficult it will be for
Yushchenko to steer the country after the election in the absence of an
Orange coalition, and with an opposition that dominates half of the
country. The language discussion has been a convenient occasion for the
PRU to demonstrate its strengths and probe Yushchenko’s weaknesses.

(UT1, March 6; Korrespondent.net, April 14; Interfax-Ukraine, April 21,
May 3, 12; Channel 5, April 28, May 10; Delo, May 12; Delovaya stolitsa,
May 15)
–Oleg Varfolomeyev
MOSCOW PRESSING FOR CFE TREATY RATIFICATION DESPITE ITS OWN
NON-COMPLIANCE
Amid a deep secrecy that belies its democratic professions, the OSCE is
preparing to hold a Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty on
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) in Vienna at the end of this month.
Some West European chancelleries are seeking ways to give in to Moscow’s
main goal at this conference: ratification of the 1999 treaty at the
expense of a few small countries in Europe’s East. Thus far, Moscow has
only managed to persuade Belarus, Ukraine (during Leonid Kuchma’s
presidency), and Kazakhstan to ratify that treaty.
Originally signed in 1990, the CFE Treaty underwent adaptation at the
1999 OSCE Istanbul summit, in one package with the Final Act that
includes what came to be known as Russia’s “Istanbul Commitments”;
namely, to withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova. While the
original 1990 treaty remains in force, the 1999-adapted treaty never
entered into force because Russia has not fulfilled those commitments.
Moreover, Armenian forces deploy Russian-supplied heavy weaponry
exceeding CFE treaty limits in areas seized from Azerbaijan, out of
bounds to international inspection.
Meanwhile, Russia seeks to extend the CFE Treaty’s area of applicability
so as to include the three Baltic states, which were not parties to the
1990 treaty (they were still occupied by Moscow at that time). Since the
Baltic states joined NATO, Russia seeks to bring them under the purview
of the 1999-adapted CFE treaty and start negotiations with them about
limiting allied forces that might hypothetically be deployed to the
Baltic states’ territories, for example in crisis contingencies.
Legally, however, the Baltic states cannot join an unratified treaty.
Thus, Russia is now pressing for the treaty’s speedy ratification by all
state-parties, so as to make possible the Baltic states’ accession to
the ratified treaty, while still keeping Russian troops on Georgia’s and
Moldova’s territories in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria.
Moscow calculates that Western consent to ratification of the 1999
treaty in such circumstances would legitimize, prolong, and even
legalize the stationing of Russian troops in Georgia and Moldova as
“peacekeepers.”
To pave the way for such an outcome, Moscow has agreed with Georgia to
close Russian bases and military installations situated deep inside the
country by 2008 (nine years after its pledge to do so); but it insists
on maintaining its “peacekeeping” forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
while heavily arming its proxy forces there. Russia had liquidated most
of its treaty-limited weaponry in Transnistria already in 2001; but
retains a part of it to this day, has transferred another part as well
as personnel to Transnistria-flagged forces, and openly repudiates the
obligation to withdraw Russia’s own troops, styled as “peacekeepers.”
The United States as well as NATO collectively take the position that
ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty is inseparably linked to
fulfillment of Russia’s commitments to withdraw its forces from Georgia
and Moldova; and that the Baltic states would accede to the treaty, once
it enters into force.
Russia has drafted its version of a decision for the CFE Treaty Review
conference and wants negotiations on its basis in the OSCE’s Joint
Consultative Group (JCG), the Vienna forum of the 30 state-parties to
the treaty. Moscow’s draft claims, “Most commitments and arrangements
mentioned in the [1999] Final Act are either already fulfilled or are in
the process of fulfillment, [while] the implementation of the remaining
ones has no direct relevance to the CFE Treaty and depends on the
progress of conflict settlement on the territories of some State
Parties.” It proposes that all state parties should deem the 1999 treaty
as valid from October 2006, start the national ratification procedures,
bring the treaty into force in 2007, and “discuss the possibility of
accession of new participants.”
The translation: Although Russia has far from completely honored its
force-withdrawal commitments, the state-parties (mostly NATO and
European Union member countries) should agree that is has. Thus, they
should: proceed with the Moscow-desired ratification of the treaty;
de-link ratification from the fulfillment of Russia’s withdrawal
commitments, using the conflicts for an excuse; lean on Georgia,
Moldova, and Azerbaijan to accept the situation and ratify the treaty;
and start the procedure of the Baltic states’ accession to the
force-limiting treaty.
Some German, French, Belgian, and other diplomats are now exploring a
solution that could allow Russia to claim that it has fulfilled its
troop-withdrawal commitments. Such a solution would:
1) exempt Russia’s “peacekeeping” troops from the obligation to
withdraw, recognizing their hitherto unrecognized role as “peacekeepers”
and allowing them to stay on;
2) silently tolerate the arsenals of CFE treaty-limited weaponry that
Russia has transferred to proxy forces in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and
South Ossetia, as well as the deployments inside Azerbaijan; and
3) elicit consent from Tbilisi, Chisinau, and Baku with such a solution.
It would seem that the secrecy surrounding the JCG debates in Vienna and
the ironing out of common positions at the EU in Brussels is a
propitious atmosphere for a compromise with Moscow at the expense of
small countries. Lack of transparency in Vienna also tends to facilitate
undercutting or diluting the U.S. and collective NATO position on these
issues through initiatives from a few important European capitals.
(JCG documents, May 2006)
–Vladimir Socor
The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation, is
edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those of
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Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Wednesday, May 10, 2006 — Volume 3, Issue 91
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Moscow presses for better Caspian oil deal
*Abkhazia formulates own solution to conflict with Tbilisi
*Analysts suggest “Camp David” approach to Karabakh resolution
AGREEMENT AT HAND ON OIL TRANSPORT FROM KAZAKHSTAN TO AZERBAIJAN
Following Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s late April visit to
Washington and U.S. Vice President Richard Cheney’s early May visit to
Kazakhstan, a breakthrough seems imminent on the project to connect
Kazakhstan with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. Officials in
Kazakhstan now anticipate that Presidents Nursultan Nazarbayev and
Aliyev will sign a framework agreement on that project by late June.
Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Daniyal Akhmetov and KazMunayGaz Managing
Director for Transport and Infrastructure Karygeldi Kabyldin have just
discussed this issue in Baku with Aliyev and Azerbaijan’s State Oil
Company management. According to officials on both sides, no political
or commercial differences arise between them regarding this project.
Remaining technical issues, such as the mode and schedules of
transportation, can be ironed out in time for the agreement’s signing.
According to these Kazakh officials, oil deliveries into the BTC
pipeline are to originate in the super-giant Kashagan offshore field.
Oil transportation to Baku is to start in late 2008-early 2009 by
tankers. Commercial production at Kashagan is expected to start in 2008
at an annual rate of 7 million tons (“early oil”), rising to 13 million
tons annually by 2010 and reaching 50 million to 60 million tons per
year by 2015. Developed by a consortium of Western companies with
Italy’s Agip as project operator, the field holds estimated recoverable
commercial reserves of at least 1.2 billion tons of oil.
Following his Baku visit, Akhmetov expressed confident hope that the
agreement to be signed by the two presidents would include a pipeline on
the Caspian seabed from Aktau in Kazakhstan to Baku. Thus far, Russia’s
opposition (in tandem with Iran) has intimidated Astana into withholding
its signature on the pipeline project. Cheney’s visit to Kazakhstan
seems to have encouraged Astana that it is Kazakhstan’s national
interests to join the project.
Transport to Baku by tankers, as has been proposed, is only viable as a
short-term option. Once Kashagan comes fully on stream with its massive
volumes, the existing fleet of small-capacity tankers would be neither
sufficient nor cost-effective. On-site construction of medium-capacity
tankers would involve prohibitively high investments, as well as
expensive operations. Moreover, westbound transport solutions other than
by pipeline would only ensure that the lion’s share of Kashagan oil is
ultimately routed toward Russia, as is the bulk of Kazakhstan’s overall
output at present.
According to estimates made in 2004, a trans-Caspian pipeline should
become commercially profitable above an annual volume of 20 million tons
of oil transported. However, oil price dynamics since then and into the
foreseeable future suggest that the profitability threshold has
descended below 20 million tons for a seabed pipeline.
During the Economic Cooperation Organization’s presidential-level summit
just held in Baku, Kazakhstan’s delegation felt that Iran is softening
its opposition to the proposed trans-Caspian pipelines. Astana intends
to explore that issue further with Tehran. In addition, Kazakh officials
are willing to discuss Iranian proposals to expand the existing swap
operations. By this method, Kazakhstan delivers small volumes of oil to
northern Iran by Caspian tankers, while Iran exports oil of equivalent
value from the Persian Gulf on Kazakhstan’s behalf. The oil volumes
swapped by Kazakhstan with Iran have been very small in recent years,
despite Iran’s oft-expressed wish to increase them.
At this juncture, Astana seems to be considering an increase in those
modest volumes as a means to induce Iran to lift its objections to a
trans-Caspian pipeline. With Kazakhstan’s oil output due to grow
spectacularly in the next few years, volumes swapped with Iran would in
any case remain only a small fraction of Kazakhstan’s overall exports.
Meanwhile, Moscow is pressuring Western companies in the Caspian
Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which owns and operates the Tengiz
(Kazakhstan) — Novorossiysk (Russia) pipeline. Those companies depend
on Russia’s consent to expand the pipeline’s capacity of 28 million tons
annually in the first stage to the planned second-stage capacity of 67
million tons annually by the next decade, plus an additional mooring
system for tankers at the port of Novorossiysk.
The Russian government, however, demands “corrections” in its favor to
the 1996 contract, higher transit tariffs, and a high share of
management posts for Russia in CPC, including the Director General’s
post for a nominee of the Russian government. The Western companies
involved are urgently in need of an export outlet for their rapidly
growing output at Tengiz and elsewhere, and therefore are vulnerable to
Moscow’s pressure on the CPC. They seem prepared to accept most of those
conditions because they do not have a trans-Caspian option immediately
available.
(Interfax, Trend, May 5-8)
–Vladimir Socor
ABKHAZIA SLIDES TOWARD RUSSIA, BUT GEORGIA HOLDS ONTO ITS CLAIMS
May 6 marked the second anniversary of the restoration of Georgia’s full
jurisdiction over the Ajarian Autonomous Republic. Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili, attending the celebration in Batumi, Ajaria’s main
city, stated that this process “should surely be completed” in breakaway
Abkhazia (TV-Imedi, Regnum, May 6).
Tbilisi likely is encouraged by hopeful messages on separatist movements
from its Western allies. U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney evidently
alluded to Russia during the May 3-4 Vilnius conference on “Common
Vision for a Common Neighborhood” when he said, “No one can justify
actions that undermine the territorial integrity of a neighbor” (see
EDM, May 5). Whether this statement becomes a prelude to more proactive
policies by Georgia’s Western allies regarding Abkhazia and South
Ossetia will likely be clarified at the July G-8 summit, where the
frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space are likely to be discussed.
Although the Georgian parliament passed a resolution in October 2005
that instructed the government to submit a peace plan on Abkhazia by May
1, 2006, no formal document has been made public. But as early as March
it was apparent that the structure of the Abkhaz plan would be largely
similar to the one designed for South Ossetia — demilitarization and
economic rehabilitation followed by wide autonomy within the Georgian
state.
However, the South Ossetian framework is not reproducible in the more
independence-oriented Abkhazia, which even dared to anger Moscow in
October 2004 by electing a president of its own choice. Predictably,
Abkhaz leaders flatly rejected the peace plan. Sergei Shamba, the
purported Abkhaz foreign minister, said that Abkhazia would not disarm
while Georgia strengthens its military potential and plans to join NATO
(Interfax, March 7).
The Abkhaz establishment has long raised the specter of an imminent
Georgian military invasion to keep the Abkhaz establishment on a
constant state of alert. The separatist government steadfastly claims to
be able to rebuff any aggression from Georgia. “Almost each Abkhaz
household can arm a platoon,” boasted Abkhaz “prime minister” Alexander
Ankvab (Vremya novostei, March 6). In an interview with the Abkhaz
newspaper Forum, Anatoly Zaitsev, a Russian lieutenant general serving
as Abkhazia’s chief of the general staff, stated that the Abkhaz army
has the capacity to successfully retaliate against a Georgian military
invasion (Forum, February 17). Abkhaz forces held their third round of
military exercises this year on April 24-27; 5,000 servicemen
participated (Apsnypress, April 25).
With no Georgian peace plan on the table, the Abkhaz separatists have
submitted their own. On May 7, the Abkhaz parliament approved a
“Comprehensive Resolution of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict,” submitted
three days earlier by Abkhaz “president” Sergei Bagapsh. The parliament
particularly emphasized that the Abkhaz side was the first to propose a
peace plan. The Abkhaz document, “Key to the Future,” seeks to the
“development of fundamentally new, neighborly relations” between Georgia
and Abkhazia as two independent states. According to Abkhaz news agency
Apsnypress, the plan proposes confidence-building measures, mutual good
will, ending military rhetoric, and practical implementation of peace
measures. The plan particularly underlines the possibility of conflict
settlement in the framework of regional economic cooperation among the
Black Sea countries (Apsnypress, May 5; Regnum May 6).
Undoubtedly, Abkhazia’s peace plan seeks international recognition, as
Tbilisi will not recognize Abkhazia as an independent state.
The Abkhaz peace initiative resembles the peace plan proposed by South
Ossetia last December, which asked Georgia to consider South Ossetia as
an independent state (EDM, December 15, 2005). Symptomatically, before
proposing the peace plan, Bagapsh had held closed-door talks with Sergei
Baburin, deputy chair of the Russian State Duma, in Sukhumi on May 2. It
appears that both the Abkhazian and Ossetian “peace plans” have been
written in Moscow, which fully controls both separatist regimes.
The Abkhaz separatists reaffirmed their secessionist agenda during a
meeting with a delegation from the NATO parliamentary assembly in
Sukhumi on May 6. Bagapsh noted, “The conversation started smoothly, but
continued in a tense atmosphere.” The Abkhaz party leaves “little
opportunities for talks with Georgia,” Pier Lelush, head of the
assembly, stated after the talks with the separatists leaders.
Commenting on this statement Shamba said that the Abkhaz leadership has
ruled out both federative and confederative forms of coexistence with
Georgia. Bagapsh stressed that “Abkhazia will develop relations with
Russia whether the international community likes it or not” (rian.ru,
May 7; Apsnypress, Regnum, Interfax, May 6).
Although Bagapsh brushed away allegations of Russia’s annexation of
Abkhazia at the meeting with the NATO delegation, this process
nevertheless is progressing at full speed. About 50 Russian banks now
operate in Abkhazia despite numerous protests by Tbilisi. On May 5,
Bagapsh stated that Abkhazia wants to join Commonwealth of Independent
States, which Georgia plans to leave. He reaffirmed that Abkhazia still
seeks associated membership in the Russian Federation. “The main thing
is to bring Abkhazia closer to Russia politically and economically,”
Bagapsh stressed (Interfax, May 5).
As tensions increase between Georgia and Russia, Georgia’s former
President Eduard Shevardnadze, interviewed by Imedi-TV on May 8, advised
Saakashvili to restrain his anti-Moscow ardor and arrange a meeting with
Russian President Vladimir Putin. Georgia’s territorial integrity will
not be resolved if Russia stays away from this process, he said.
“Improving relations with Russia will facilitate a peaceful solution of
the conflicts in Georgia,” he stressed (TV-Imedi, May 8).
–Zaal Anjaparidze
WILL WASHINGTON LEAD THE KARABAKH PEACE PROCESS?
After a failed February attempt to break the deadlock in negotiations
between Armenian President Robert Kocharian and Azerbaijani President
Ilham Aliyev, observers thought the Karabakh peace process was dead. But
following a few quick fixes in the current proposal, international
mediators have come to believe that the peace process is not “dead” but
rather “comatose,” and could be revived if only given the “right
medicine.”
In the wake of President Aliyev’s successful April 25-28 visit to the
United States, the Azerbaijani press, analysts, and scholars have began
guessing whether Washington could provide the proper prescription for
Karabakh, as it did to negotiate a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel
at Camp David in 1978.
In his speech at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington on April
26, President Aliyev remarked, “We hope that the current framework of
negotiations will create opportunities for a just [and] long-lasting
peace based on the principles of international law. And of course we
hope that the United States, as a superpower, as a country [which is] a
co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, will contribute to the resolution of
[this] conflict” (, April 26).
Commenting on the outcome of President Aliyev’s visit, Novruz Mammadov,
head of the Foreign Relations Department at the Executive Office of the
President, declared that there will be “certain changes in the U.S.
position on the peace talks” and that Washington will make some
“positive steps to resolve the conflict.” According to Mammadov, from
now on, the U.S. will “provide Azerbaijan with strategic support in all
areas” (BakuToday.Net, May 2).
While in Washington, President Aliyev also reiterated his previous
statements that the Karabakh conflict could only be resolved within the
framework of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, implying that Baku will
reject calls for holding a referendum inside Karabakh.
Baku and Yerevan have already agreed on most of the outstanding issues,
but two remain. One is the timetable to remove Armenian troops from two
occupied regions of Azerbaijan (Kalbajar and Lachin). Second, how will
the parties determine the final status of the Karabakh enclave, which is
by law part of Azerbaijan, but has been controlled by Armenian forces
since 1994?
For more than a decade, Armenia has adeptly managed to defy
international criticism over its occupation of Azerbaijani lands thanks
to existing geopolitical arrangements in the South Caucasus. Neither
Europe, which has been absent in the region until recently, nor the
United States, which has strong Armenian lobbying groups, were seriously
interested in resolving a remote territorial dispute.
But the troublesome situation around the Iranian nuclear program, the
growing importance of Caspian oil and gas for Europe, and the rising
potential that another war will erupt in the region have contributed to
the need for speedy resolution of the Karabakh conflict.
Even Moscow, which as a status quo mediator has kept all three South
Caucasus conflicts in limbo for years, may be willing to be accommodate
the U.S.-supported initiative to resolve the conflict this year.
Russia’s security dilemma in the region has been the major impediment in
its ability to propel Baku and Yerevan forward in the peace process.
Moscow remains concerned that the resolution of this conflict will
diminish Russian influence in the South Caucasus while increasing U.S.
influence. Moreover, Moscow’s unwillingness to pressure its closest ally
in the region (Armenia), while at the same time trying to keep
Azerbaijan on board have raised questions on how far Russia is willing
to push the envelope. Many in Azerbaijan believe that Moscow is
determined to push the resolution process only to a certain level — a
level that is a step short from resolving the Karabakh conflict
permanently.
Nonetheless, Russia came to realize that its desire to maintain the
status quo is backfiring. In fact, during all these years the regional
processes in the South Caucasus have developed in a direction that
Moscow had hoped they would not. Thus, the Kremlin can no longer rely on
its traditional strategy that so long as the Karabakh conflict is
unresolved, Armenia and Azerbaijan will be dependent on Moscow’s active
involvement in regional affairs.
It is clear, however, that without U.S. assurances and international
pressure, Armenia will be reluctant to consider proposals that call for
the resolution of the conflict while preserving Azerbaijan’s territorial
integrity. Baku hopes that Washington could convince Yerevan that the
resolution of the conflict within the framework of territorial integrity
will benefit not only Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also the entire South
Caucasus region. It will allow the parties to open communication links,
engage in regional cooperation, and more importantly begin the
reconciliation process.
Sabine Freizer, Caucasus Project director for the International Crisis
Group, recently indicated, “If the U.S. wants to ensure Azerbaijan’s
long-term support [for U.S.] policies towards Iran, and overall regional
security, [Washington’s] best bet is to first focus on securing a
peaceful resolution of the existing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”
(Crisisgroup.org). “While the [Karabakh] conflict remains unresolved,
Azerbaijan can ill afford to undermine its improving relations with
Tehran,” she added.
Unlike the Key West summit in 2001, where the late Azerbaijani President
Heydar Aliyev and President Kocharian tried to negotiate a peace deal
without a clear framework, today the situation is diffident. The parties
have already agreed on major issues and need one final push. Washington
seems willing to take the lead in facilitating the negotiations and
aiding the parties to reach a historical breakthrough in 2006. Hence, it
could sponsor a new “Camp David Accord” for President Aliyev and
President Kocharian and offer some carrots to both leaders. This would
demonstrate a serious U.S. commitment to stability and security in the
region and help to prevent another war in the South Caucasus.
–Taleh Ziyadov
The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation, is
edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those of
the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
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– BLACK SEA FORUM SEEKING ITS RATIONALE
– MOSCOW, ANKARA RELUCTANT TO WELCOME NEW BLACK SEA FORUM
– VILNIUS CONFERENCE ON EUROPE’S COMPLETION IN THE EAST
******************************************** *******************************
Thursday, June 8, 2006 — Volume 3, Issue 111
BLACK SEA FORUM SEEKING ITS RATIONALE
by Vladimir Socor
Presidents Traian Basescu of Romania, Vladimir Voronin of Moldova, Viktor
Yushchenko of Ukraine, Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia, Robert Kocharian of
Armenia, and Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan were joined by senior officials from
the United States, Turkey, Bulgaria, and international organizations at the
inaugural session of the Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue on
June 4-6 in Bucharest.
A Romanian initiative, the Forum is tentatively meant to hold annual
presidential-level summits — the venues rotating among participant
countries — and thematic or sectoral-cooperation meeting during those
annual intervals. The Forum is not meant to create new regional
institutions, but rather to turn into a regular consultative process among
countries of the extended Black Sea region (defined as including the South
Caucasus to the Caspian Sea) and between this group of countries and
international organizations such as the European Union.
Russia refused to send a delegation to the Forum; instead, it merely
authorized the ambassador to Romania, Nikolai Tolkach, to sit in as an
observer, without taking part in discussions or signing a concluding
document. Tolkach had to be practically corralled to pose for the “family
photo” by the irresistibly jovial Romanian president. Moscow had turned down
the Forum initiative as soon as Bucharest announced it last December:
Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly deprecated the proposed Forum
as redundant, duplicative of existing cooperation frameworks, and apt to
siphon off limited resources from those frameworks (Interfax, December 13,
2005). From that point on and practically until the Bucharest session’s eve,
Russia turned down entreaties to join the Forum as a participant and to send
an official delegation: if not one led by President Vladimir Putin, then a
ministerial one under Sergei Lavrov, or at least on some decent level.
Moscow maintains that existing cooperation frameworks such as the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and the joint naval activity Black Sea Force
(Blackseafor) are adequate in themselves as well as the only possible basis
for deepening regional cooperation. Tolkach reiterated this position to
local media during the summit, thus sniping at the Forum from the sidelines.
Apparently, Moscow would not want the Forum to become a means for Western
countries and organizations to voice their positions on Black Sea region
issues.
Moscow finds BSEC and Blackseafor to its liking because it can dominate them
jointly with Turkey and can also use them to promote Russian objectives in
the region. For its part, Turkey regards itself as Russia’s peer in the
Black Sea and is keen to share a leadership role with Russia. There is,
however, a broader political message in Russia’s dismissive attitude toward
the Forum: It suggests, first, that it is not for “lesser” countries to take
major regional initiatives on their own that are not worked out from the
beginning with Moscow; and, second, that no regional project can be
successful without Russia’s participation in a key role. This is an
oft-heard proposition in Black Sea diplomacy, and Moscow tries to reinforce
by distancing itself demonstratively from projects not its own or perceived
as Western-oriented, such as this Forum.
Nevertheless, Forum organizers hoped until the last moment to secure a
decent-level Russian representation at the founding session as well as
participant status for Russia in the Forum down the road. This consideration
loomed large in shaping the summit’s agenda in a way that would not risk
irritating Moscow. In this regard, the Forum summit duplicated (instead of
learning from and avoiding) the experience of the December 2005 summit of
the Community of Democratic Choice (CDC) in Kyiv. There, President Viktor
Yushchenko’s forlorn hope (tied to the electoral campaign) to induce Putin
to visit Ukraine trumped the CDC’s own democracy-promoting goals and made
for a bland, irrelevant agenda at that summit. Similarly in Bucharest, the
shadow of absentee Russia weakened the Forum’s agenda and raised unnecessary
question marks about the rationale of this initiative.
Energy transit and the secessionist conflicts — those uppermost policy
issues in the extended Black Sea region — seemed almost lost among a wide
variety of issues on a kaleidoscopic agenda. Several participating heads of
state did not avoid addressing the conflicts. Thus, Saakashvili described
the latest claims by Russia-sponsored secessionist movements to legitimacy
through a “democratic referendum” as a “cannibal-style democracy”: It
involves the violent seizure of a territory, ethnic cleansing, despotic
rule, and criminality, all of which is then to be crowned by a referendum
and claims for international recognition on such a basis, Saakashvili noted.
For his part, Voronin criticized the draft of the Forum’s concluding
declaration for failing to identify the external source and sponsor of the
secessionist conflicts: Resolving the conflicts will not be possible if the
external factor is not identified with the necessary clarity, Voronin
observed. Aliyev declared that Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity would not
be subject to negotiations; while Kocharian characterized Karabakh as a
“classic case of secession through self-determination” — a formulation
seemingly in line with Moscow-led recent attempts to provide a “model” for
post-Soviet conflict resolution. Aliyev and Kocharian held five hours of
inconclusive talks, including a working dinner with Basescu, during the two
days of the Bucharest summit.
Yushchenko harked back in his speech to the 2005 CDC, although that
initiative does not seem to have survived its birth. He also urged, as he
had then, Black Sea countries to co-invest in a project to build a massive
industrial center and transport hub at Donuzlav on Ukraine’s Black Sea
coast, without providing specifics or rationales; and in the same vague
manner he called for coordination among Black Sea, Caspian, and Baltic
countries in addressing energy problems. Yushchenko held a news conference
for Ukrainian journalists, presumably dealing with the deepening instability
back home, and prompting the local press to complain of being excluded.
Aliyev’s speech, delivered extemporaneously, stood out for reflecting the
political stability and bright economic prospects of Azerbaijan, possibly
the most successful among the region’s countries at this stage. His speech
exuded quiet confidence in the strategy of evolutionary political and
economic reforms on parallel tracks and the advance of Azerbaijan from a
regional to a global role in energy projects.
(Rompres, Moldpres, Interfax-Ukraine, AzerTaj, June 5, 6)
–Vladimir Socor
******************************************* ********************************
Friday, June 9, 2006 — Volume 3, Issue 112
MOSCOW, ANKARA RELUCTANT TO WELCOME NEW BLACK SEA FORUM
by Vladimir Socor
When the presidents of Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and
Azerbaijan gathered in Bucharest on June 4-5 for the first session of the
Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue, Russia’s minimal presence was
notable.
Russia refused to send a delegation to the Forum and instead, it merely
authorized the resident ambassador in Romania, Nikolai Tolkach, to sit in as
an observer, without taking part in discussions or signing a concluding
document. Romanian President Traian Basescu practically had to corral
Tolkach to pose for the summit’s “family photo.” Moscow apparently is
concerned that the Forum will become a means for Western countries and
organizations to voice their positions on issues related to the Black Sea
region.
Attending the inaugural session of the Forum were Presidents Traian Basescu
of Romania, Vladimir Voronin of Moldova, Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine,
Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia, Robert Kocharian of Armenia, and Ilham
Aliyev of Azerbaijan. They were joined by senior officials from the United
States, Turkey, Bulgaria, and several international organizations.
A Romanian initiative, the Forum is tentatively meant to hold annual
presidential-level summits — the venues rotating among participant
countries — and thematic or sectoral-cooperation meeting during those
annual intervals. The Forum is not meant to create new regional
institutions, but rather to turn into a regular consultative process among
countries of the extended Black Sea region (defined as including the South
Caucasus to the Caspian Sea) and between this group of countries and
international organizations such as the European Union.
However, Russia maintains that the existing cooperation frameworks, such as
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and the joint naval activity Black
Sea Force (Blackseafor), are adequate in their present composition, which is
limited to “regional” countries. Russia insists that such bodies form the
only possible basis for regional cooperation and it calls for deepening
cooperation in these frameworks without bringing in Western members. Tolkach
reiterated this position to local media during the summit, thus sniping at
the Forum from his observer’s perch.
Moscow finds BSEC and Blackseafor to its liking because their limited
membership maximizes Russia’s weight within these bodies. Turkey, guided by
parallel calculations of its own, regards itself as Russia’s peer in the
Black Sea and is keen to share the leadership role with Russia. Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reasserted that position while visiting
Ankara on May 31 and released his statement in Moscow on June 4, timed to
the Bucharest Forum’s opening: “Concentrating the regional countries’
cooperation efforts around Blackseafor and BSEC, which exist and are
functional, is the optimal way to resolve issues in the region” (Interfax,
June 4). Furthermore, Lavrov sent an elaborate congratulatory message to a
totally irrelevant parliamentary assembly of BSEC member countries that
opened in Yerevan the day after the Bucharest Forum, but he did not deign to
send a cable to the Black Sea summit among six heads of state.
Moscow and Ankara jointly resist NATO’s proposal to extend the alliance’s
maritime security operation, Active Endeavor, from the Mediterranean into
the Black Sea. Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, and Ukraine — NATO member and
aspirant countries in the Black Sea — support the alliance’s proposal.
Russia, however, calls for institutionalizing Blackseafor and turning it
into a “regional” naval security grouping with a wide range of missions,
including anti-terrorism operations. The proposal is designed to create a
seeming alternative to NATO in the Black Sea and support the argument that
NATO’s presence is not necessary there, as the “regional countries” can cope
thanks to Russia and Turkey. For an initial step toward institutionalizing
Blackseafor, Moscow launched during the days of the Bucharest Forum a
proposal to endow Blackseafor with civil defense missions and a
corresponding headquarters.
Beyond those specific calculations, there is also a more general political
message in Russia’s dismissive attitude toward the Forum: It suggests,
first, that it is not for “lesser” countries to take major regional
initiatives on their own that are not worked out from the beginning with
Moscow; and, second, that no regional project can be successful without
Russia as a major participant. This is a proposition that Russia seeks to
turn into a general axiom in the Black Sea region and it tries to enforce it
by distancing itself demonstratively from projects not its own, or perceived
as Western-oriented, such as this Forum.
The creation of a Black Sea Trust for Democracy is the only palpable, major
result of the Bucharest summit thus far. The German Marshall Fund of the
United States is the main donor and will also staff the Trust. Other U.S.
foundations as well as the Romanian government are expected to contribute
as well to the Trust’s $20 million initial endowment. Announcing this
initiative at the Forum, Jack D. Crouch, deputy national security adviser to
the U.S. President, underscored the abiding U.S. interest of in the region’s
security and seeing it advance toward prosperity.
(Rompres, Moldpres, Interfax-Ukraine, AzerTaj, June 5-7)
–Vladimir Socor
****************************************** *********************************
Friday, May 5, 2006 — Volume 3, Issue 85
VILNIUS CONFERENCE ON EUROPE’S COMPLETION IN THE EAST
by Vladimir Socor
U.S. Vice President Richard Cheney joined the presidents of the three Baltic
states, Poland, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia, as well as
other high-level European officials, for a conference on “Common Vision for
a Common Neighborhood” on May 3-4 in Vilnius. The common neighborhood is
that between the Baltic and the Black Sea-South Caucasus.
The Vilnius Conference `06 carries forward a process initiated by Lithuania
in 1997 that led to the creation of the Vilnius Ten group of countries in
2000 for common pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration. Crowned with success
through the 2002-2004 “Big Bang” enlargement of NATO, that Vilnius Process
continues in a modified form to promote the completion of Europe through
integration of countries in Europe’s East — Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and
Azerbaijan — and work through Euro-Atlantic institutions toward that goal.
Lithuania’s initiatives in the Vilnius Process have turned a small country
into a significant international actor, as did recently Lithuania’s active
role alongside far larger countries in the coalition in Afghanistan.
Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus urged the Vilnius Conference ’06 to
initiate a strategic discussion about policies in Europe’s East on two
levels: commitment to reforms on the part of these countries and Western
commitment to completion of Europe in the East. However, the context of this
effort at present differs markedly from that of the first two rounds of
Euro-Atlantic enlargement. Many in Western Europe are no longer aboard such
efforts — indeed in some cases tend to obstruct them — while Russia has
embarked on a political and economic counteroffensive not only in Europe’s
East but within core Europe itself.
Cheney’s address in Vilnius introduced a long-awaited new tone in the
Administration’s discourse on Russia: “The [Russian] government has unfairly
and improperly restricted the rights of its people. [And] no legitimate
interest is served when oil and gas become tools of intimidation and
blackmail, either by supply manipulation or attempts to monopolize
transportation. And no one can justify actions that undermine the
territorial integrity of a neighbor, or interfere with democratic
movements.”
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s speech to the conference focused on
Russia’s challenge: “Freedom is under threat, the changes that we once
thought were irreversible and universal are now confronted by very serious
forces, intent on promoting very different outcomes. Increasingly
well-organized and financed, and tolerated in the discourse of today’s
European debates … [those] forces in Moscow actively work to undermine our
economies, our sovereignty, using such tools as energy dependence, state
censorship, and the power of monopolies … The fate of Georgia or Ukraine is
not the only one held in the balance. If Europe fails to respond, it puts at
risk its very system of governance and European security. Let this be a
wake-up call for all European leaders: Without real action and a genuine
recognition of what is at stake, we risk a reversal of the wave of
liberation that strengthened and unified Europe during the past fifteen
years.”
Alongside Georgia, Moldova is being directly targeted by Russia for economic
devastation through embargoes on these two countries’ main export
commodities — agricultural produce and wine — on the Russian market and
manipulation of energy supplies, as well as exploitation of conflicts.
President Vladimir Voronin’s speech to the conference reflected the
intimidating effect of these Russian pressures on Moldova, Western support
for which amounts to only a fraction of the support earned by Georgia.
Compared to his speech, however, Voronin’s message in private conversations
to the heads of state present in Vilnius was far more straightforward,
reflecting his resolve to maintain the country’s European orientation in the
face of Russian pressure. However, recurrent suggestions by some
medium-level American diplomats (apparently bucking the White House line)
and in Brussels to negotiate on Transnistria on Russia-defined terms pose a
problem of a different order.
European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana’s address in Vilnius could
for the most part have fitted any place, moment, or forum. Its only novel
element was a far-reaching deference to Moscow regarding the “frozen
conflicts”: “It is up to the parties to settle these conflicts. But we are
willing to help. We do so together with our international partners,
including Russia, whose role is crucial. … Such an offer is there for
Transnistria and the conflicts in Georgia. But it is up to the parties to
take responsibility and bring about a settlement.” In this terminology, “the
parties” means Moldova and Transnistria, Georgia and Abkhazia, Georgia and
South Ossetia. Solana’s concept would seem to transform Russia from
initiator of and party to these conflicts into their bona-fide solver; and
EU help seems confined to post-conflict reconstruction, without seriously
attempting to shape the political settlements. Further illustrating the
drift in EU policy, France and Germany each sent a second-tier official to
this summit.
Russia’s use of energy supplies for political leverage was a constant
reference point during the conference. Adamkus and Polish President Lech
Kaczynski criticized the German government for the signing of gas deals with
Russia without even informing, much less consulting with, its partners in
the European Union. Meanwhile, Norway’s Statoil, bidder for a stake in
Russia’s Shtokman gas field, declines to comment on possible oil deliveries
to Lithuania’s Mazeikiai refinery for fear that Moscow could retaliate by
excluding Statoil and its Norwegian partner Norsk Hydro from the Shtokman
deal.
()
–Vladimir Socor