Law Is Successful In Terms Of Preventing Election Fraud

LAW IS SUCCESSFUL IN TERMS OF PREVENTING ELECTION FRAUD
By Karine Mangasarian

Yerkir.am
December 22, 2006

"Saying that no matter what kind of a law we have, the election
results are going to be falsified, is wrong. This means spreading
mistrust among the people.

We have no right to do that," Harayr Karapetian, National Assembly’s
ARF faction leader said at yesterday’s meeting of the NA, when
presenting the faction’s views on the Election Code. "Whether we are
an opposition or in the government, we have to persuade the people
that the elections will be conducted fairly," he said.

He said the law’s goal is to shut all the loopholes that make it
possible to fraud the elections. "First of all, the electoral lists are
clear and they will be posted on the web site of the Central Elections
Commission (CEC) and everybody can read them. Also, people who are
responsible for the lists are clearly indicated," Karapetian said.

He spoke about one significant provision that was entered in the
Election Code on the proposal of the ARF – envelops that are to be
used in the elections to prevent fraud.

"I think the people who have worked on these amendments have the aim
of preventing fraud," Karapetian said.

Armenia Will Celebrate New Year With Old National Anthem

ARMENIA WILL CELEBRATE NEW YEAR WITH OLD NATIONAL ANTHEM

Yerevan, December 25. ArmInfo. Armenia will celebrate New Year with
old national anthem. Today the Armenian Parliament approved the third
reading of the bill on national anthem.

The national anthem should be performed during state visits, sports and
cultural events. TV and radio should start and finish their programs
with national anthem.

The State Commission on National Anthem has not yet decided which
anthem to choose and for the time being suggests leaving the old one
"My Fatherland."

The Yezidi Kurds from Tbilisi

The Yezidi Kurds from Tbilisi

12/21/2006 Caucaz – By Nicolas Landru

On a sloping backstreet of Mtatsminda in Tbilisi, a basement marks
the entryway of the Kurdish International Centre of Culture and
Information. In this office, if any part of the community happens to
gather for the holidays, it is often the guardian, Erika Mouradian,
alone. This time, expectations of musicians to come from Armenia to
liven up the Centre will have been in vain: visible and active during
Soviet times, todayâ~@~Ys Yezidi Kurdish community in Tbilisi has
severely diminished. Unstructured and divided, the community is
without a doubt the weakest minority in Georgia.

The entryway to the Centre has only two tables and a television, but
it is rich in decoration: a Kurdish flag and star; an iconic photo of
Lalishâ~@~Tthe Yezidi Kurds religious center in Iraqâ~@~Tcontaining
religious symbols (a snow-flake, a peacock, three cupolas and an
eternal flame); and immense portraits of Abdullah Ã~Vcalan, the
leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the charismatic
figure behind the movement for the liberation of Kurds in Turkey, who
was arrested by the Turkish secret service in 1999, condemned to
death and then pardoned thanks to international pressure.

The events that occurred in Georgia at the same time as
Ã~Vcalanâ~@~Ys 1999 arrest are revealing of the Kurdish situation
there. Several hundred people went out into the streets of Tbilisi in
demonstration of their support for Ã~Vcalan, leader of the Kurdish
cause. Another part of the community, otherwise having no interest in
this fight, was opposed to the mobilization.

As for an illustration of the manner by which the Georgian society
understands the problems of Kurds, the following incident should shed
some light: it is often said that when the Chief of Police in Tbilisi
learned that because of Ã~Vcalanâ~@~Ys arrest the Kurds were
protesting in the suburb of Samgori, the Chief of Police gave his
forces the order to free the bandit. Criminals or street sweepers,
the women who clean the streets of Tbilisi at dawn are almost
exclusively Kurdish, the profession is so designated. Herein lies the
universally confirmed image of Kurds in Georgian society. Moreover,
whether it be a mere sad coincidence or not, in Georgian, the word
Kurd is pronounced â~@~kurtiâ~@~] and thief is pronounced
â~@~kurdi.â~@~]

To the sound of Kurdish television

In the Centre, Erika has access to six Kurdish television stations
including ROJâ~@~Tthe voice of the PKK broadcasted from Denmark, and
MED-TV, which is based in Belgium. She is often brought news from
Armenia, written in Armenian, Russian and Kurdish. There is no
Kurdish newspaper published in Georgian. The Centre is entiredly
devoted to the Kurdish international cause: One Russophone newspaper
is called Free Kurdistan, another is called Friendship and subtitled,
â~@~Ã~Vcalan, our leader.â~@~]

While facing the constantly blaring television, Djemal explains the
injustice Kurds face while all other nations have obtained a
territory. The construction of a Kurdish State is her dream. At the
announcement of Saddam Husseinâ~@~Ys death sentence, who is accused
of executing thousands of Kurds, Erika expressed a joy without
limits. Justice had been done.

Another identifying mark of the international Kurdish cause among the
Yezidi Kurds of Tbilisi is the name the Kurdish team took during an
interfaith football tournament organized by the Georgian Football
Federation and UNDP in December 2006. The Yezidi Kurdish team called
itself â~@~Barzaniâ~@~] in reference to the greatest Kurdish tragedy
in Iraki history. In 1983, Saddam Hussein arrested and dissapeared
everyone with the name Barzani.

Kurds or Yezidis?

All the same, this Caucasian populationâ~@~Ys identification with the
international Kurdish cause is far from apparent. The Centreâ~@~Ys
main room, among Kurdish flags and portaits of Ã~Vcalan, Yezidi
Kurdish symbols are also proudly displayed. In the rear room there is
a temple where adherents come to celebrate the saintâ~@~Ys days.
â~@~Itâ~@~Ys our Kurdish religionâ~@~] says Erika.

Moreover, the religious differences among Kurdophones, particularly
in the Caucasus, seriously shake up identities. While the majority of
Kurds in Turkey, Irak or Syria are Sunni Muslins, the Yezidi Kurds
practice an ancient religion which venerates the peacock, a symbol of
the demon which became in angel, the flame and the sun, and curious
syncretism of Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Islam and Judaism.

Because the collective identities were formed long ago around
religious principals, two distinct communities developed. In Georgia
the 1926 census counted approximately 10,000 Kurds and 2,000 Yezidi
Kurds. The Soviet authorities only recognized one Kurdish community.
All the same, the majority of were deported by Stalin in 1944 and the
Yezidi Kurds were counted at 18,329 versus 2,514 Muslims according to
the 2002 census. Additionally and separate from the religious factor,
Muslim Kurds, like those in Armenia, are well integrated in the Azeri
community. They have often been counted as Azeris, and some of them
currently present in Georgia even hold Azeri citizenship.

At the heart of the Yezidi Kurds community however, rifts are still
important. Between â~@~Ethnicly Yezidi Kurdsâ~@~], â~@~of Kurdish
ethnicity and Yezidi Kurdish religiousâ~@~], or simply
â~@~ethnically Kurdishâ~@~], different groups, organizations and
individuals represent all three options. In the small Centre of
Mtatsminda, if the word â~@~Yezidi Kurdsâ~@~] were not used, the
principal cultural organization of the community in Georgia would be
â~@~The Union of Georgian Yezidi Kurdsâ~@~], which does not
recognize a link with Muslim Kurds or the PKK movement. Armenian
scholarly manuals mention the â~@~Yezidi Kurdish nationâ~@~], but
for this reason, several Tbilisi organizations have complained to the
Armenian embassy. The community has little chance of arriving at a
consensus.

Marginalization and weakening

With nearly 40,000 souls, Armenia is host to the most important
Yezidi Kurdish community in the Caucasus, which is also the most
organized and most visible. In Georgia, they were counted at 33,331
in 1989 and 20,843 in 2002. Local associations however, estimate no
more than 6,000.

Are these figures inflated to mask the disasterous emmigration from
Georgia? In the 1980â~@~Ys, the community was still highly visible in
Tbilisi. The city containted one of the most reputed theatres of the
Kurdish world. Excluded from public positions and the majority of
professional tracks, without a port-parole or federal organization,
the Yezidi Kurds, according to a report by the International
Federation of Human Rights, occupy the most fragile social position
in the country.

The in Mtatsminda Centre, the women speak of their sons in Russia and
their daughters in Germany, France or Canada. In reality, the
community litteraly melted after 1989 and the rate of emigration is
the highest among Georgian minorities.

Another sign of the communityâ~@~Ys weakened state is that Yezidi
Kurdish youth, without any future in Georgia, often try their hand in
Armenia, although the economic situation there is in many regards
worse than in Georgia.

Translated by Christian Nils Larson (originally in French)

Caucaz

–Boundary_(ID_UrV5pyxKVXkCkl2xL0 EAYw)–

Procession In Protection Of Arrested Freedom-Fighters Held In Yereva

PROCESSION IN PROTECTION OF ARRESTED FREEDOM-FIGHTERS HELD IN YEREVAN

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 22, NOYAN TAPAN. "If Coordinator of Defence
of Liberated Territories public initiative, Zhirayr Sefilian and
Homeland and Honor party Political Board member, Vardan Malkhasian
are not released until the New Year, we will spend New Year holidays
in the street." Members of the Consolidation of Armenian Volunteers
organization and Nor Zhamanakner (New Times) party made such statement
at the December 22 procession. According to the demonstrants, arrest
of liberation fight devotees in independent Armenia is a shame.

Samvel Haroutiunian, one of the organizers of the procession in
protection of the arrested freedom-fighters, declared that they
demand from RA "illegitimate" authorities to immediately release
"the distinguished representatives of Artsakh movement" and to
grant RA citizenship to Z.Sefilian. S.Haroutiunian said that about
two dozens of parties have expressed wish to join their fight, in
particular, the People’s Party of Armenia, the Hanrapetutiun Party,
the Democratic Party, the National Democratic Union, the Union of
National Democrats, the National Revival, the Union parties, as well
as MPs Hmayak Hovhannisian and Tatul Manaserian.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Is It All Yeltsin’s Fault? 15 Years Later, the Legacy of a Russian R

The Washington Post
December 24, 2006 Sunday
Final Edition

Is It All Yeltsin’s Fault?;
15 Years Later, the Legacy of a Russian Reformer

by Stephen Sestanovich

"Great historical transformations are always bought dearly, often
after one has already thought that one got them at a bargain price,"
wrote the 19th-century historian Jacob Burckhardt. Tomorrow marks the
15th anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the
occasion will surely revive debate about how high the price really
was.

Many commentators will say this event and the hardships that followed
permanently colored the ordinary Russian’s view of democracy and gave
Vladimir Putin his chance to build an authoritarian alternative. A
few will even argue that the whole effort was a mistake — that
"reform communism" would have been better than the mess we’ve ended
up with.

Was Boris Yeltsin the gravedigger of Russian democracy? The
indictment against him looks strong. If you give people reason to
link democracy with economic privation, political corruption and the
trauma of national dismemberment, lots of them will miss the
stability of the old order. (Some will miss Joseph Stalin!) And it
isn’t much of a response to say that this wasn’t what you intended.

Yet, before we throw Yeltsin to the historical wolves, it’s important
to remember that the terrible conditions Russians associate with him
were not just the result of his policies but also their cause. The
Soviet Union collapsed because ethnic separatism, economic decline
and political paralysis were severe problems before Yeltsin came to
power. Moderate Communist reformers — even as they eased repression
and censorship — couldn’t do a thing about them.

In the summer of 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev was at the end of his rope
trying to manage the Soviet Union’s contentious ethnic politics. To
suppress movements seeking independence for the Baltic states, he had
ordered tanks into the streets. There had been ethnic pogroms against
Armenians in Azerbaijan, and a lunatic nationalist professor of
literature had become president of Georgia. Gorbachev had patched
together a new "union treaty" to redistribute power between Moscow
and the non-Russian republics, but the most important of them,
Ukraine, was having none of it. In December Ukrainians voted to leave
the Soviet Union. The Chechen parliament had already done the same
thing.

Gorbachev’s efforts at economic reform were also failing. Long before
the curtain came down on the Soviet Union, the ruble had begun a
steady slide toward worthlessness, selling at several times the
official exchange rate on the black market. Food disappeared from the
shops and foreign exchange from the treasury. Gorbachev’s own
policies tacitly authorized theft of state property; enterprises were
told to balance their books even if it meant selling off their assets
at a discount. The first "millionaires" appeared at this time: They
took advantage of "gradual economic reform" by setting up "exchanges"
to trade in stolen goods.

There was no political consensus on how to handle any of this. Some
of the Communist old guard still believed in ideas that Yuri Andropov
had espoused early in the 1980s as he rose from running the KGB to
running the Kremlin. Discipline, he insisted, would solve everything.
But in the course of the decade, the elite lost confidence in this
answer, and many joined the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators
calling for an end to the Communist Party’s monopoly on political
power. Gorbachev became an increasingly lonely figure and "reform
communism" an irrelevant idea.

At the end of 1991, Yeltsin was the only Soviet politician with a
popular mandate to act. He was the democratically elected president
of Russia. No one else was in a position to deal with the three
crises that had broken his predecessor — ethnic division, economic
chaos and a failed political system. But did his response end up
weakening Russia’s democratic prospects?

His first and most dramatic step — agreeing with the president of
Ukraine and leaders of other Soviet republics to dissolve the Union
— still gives Russians nostalgic pangs. Even so, history’s verdict
is likely to be that it was Yeltsin’s most important achievement and
a piece of simple good fortune for his country. By disbanding the
empire, Russia freed itself from a gigantic burden on its national
energies. It shed responsibility for countless problems that it could
not possibly have managed well, and it reduced the risk that popular
politics would turn into a Milosevic-style dictatorship.

By not trying to prevent Baltic or Ukrainian independence, by not
being the arbiter of war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, by staying
on the sidelines of other conflicts, Yeltsin greatly reduced Russia’s
involvement in post-Soviet violence. His success can be measured in
part by looking at those cases in which Russia did not fully turn its
back on empire. It propped up separatist enclaves inside Georgia and
Moldova and sought to crush radical separatism in Chechnya. The
results were predictable: quasi-criminal satrapies, military
brutality, deeper ethnic hostility. Had the Soviet Union been kept
intact, we’d have seen this pattern everywhere.

Yeltsin’s second step — the economic program known as "shock
therapy" — will be judged less favorably. But the verdict may say
little about his own responsibility for the fate of Russian
democracy. The elements of Yeltsin’s program that look most unwise
today — above all the privatization policies that left a large part
of the state’s most valuable industrial assets in the hands of a very
small number of owners — were not the main source of popular
unhappiness with him or with Russian democracy. What embittered
people was the squeeze on their living standards and the acute
anxiety created by years of high inflation. Given the situation
Yeltsin and his team faced when they took over, there may have been
no way to make the transition to a modern economy anything but
painful.

History’s harshest judgment about how Yeltsin handled the Soviet
collapse may be reserved for the way he dealt with the question of
political power. At a moment when he was still the towering figure of
Russian politics, he was not bold enough to insist on creating new
democratic institutions. He left the Soviet-era constitution in place
as well as the Soviet-era parliament, while he handled other
problems. The KGB was renamed but barely reformed.

It is hard to overstate the impact of these choices. By 1993 Yeltsin
was back to fighting with parliamentary leaders about changing the
constitution and holding new elections, not to speak of salvaging
something of his economic reforms. He was, ironically, almost
completely in the right, but by then his victory had to be purchased
by force.

As for the KGB and the other coercive institutions of the Soviet
state, reforming them was a project to which Yeltsin never returned.
The consequences are with us still.

The writer is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and
a professor of international diplomacy at Columbia University. He was
U.S. ambassador at large for the former Soviet Union from 1997 to
2001.

After nearly 70 years of painting, R. Tashjian still awestruck by Ne

Albuquerque Journal (New Mexico)
December 22, 2006 Friday

love of landscapes;
AFTER NEARLY 70 YEARS OF PAINTING, RICHARD TASHJIAN STILL IS
AWESTRUCK BY NEW MEXICO’S SCENERY

by DOTTIE INDYKE For the Journal

One of Richard Tashjian’s favorite places to paint is along the Rio
Grande, in the villages of Embudo and Velarde and onward to Taos. In
addition, as with thousands of painters before him, he’s drawn to the
stands of cottonwoods and red rock cliffs of Nambé, Ojo Caliente and
Abiquiu.

Ever since he landed in Santa Fe in the mid-’90s, Tashjian has been
awestruck by the scenery of the region. His latest work, on view at
Editions Gallery, features depictions of this landscape, as well as
that of Canyon de Chelly and the Grand Canyon. A portion of sales
will be donated to the Santa Fe Animal Shelter.

A painter for nearly 70 years, Tashjian still experiments with
watercolor, acrylic and oil. The Old Masters’ medium, oil, allows
easy changes and blending of colors. Acrylic, which he calls "the
modern medium," provides "a fresh, quick approach." But watercolor is
his favorite, and the material he’s used since he was a 12-year-old
boy growing up in Chelsea, Mass.

"Watercolor is the basic medium for learning to paint," he says. "A
lot of people cannot master it. It’s a separate medium altogether and
very spontaneous."

Paintings exhibited at Editions include both oils and acrylics, begun
on location with sketches and photographs. Tashjian employs the
viewfinder of his camera as an aid in composing his canvases, but the
work is always revised once he is back in his studio, where reality
and imagination are married.

Born in 1926, his earliest artistic memories are of sketching on the
back of his sister’s school notebooks. His uncle was a painter and
the career impressed him so much that he enrolled at the Boston
Museum of Fine Arts school, where he majored in commercial art and
advertising.

During WWII, stationed in Rhode Island, he was a Navy photographer
training to shoot aerial photos. After the war he worked as an art
director for advertising agencies and for Boston’s Herald Traveler
and took early retirement to paint, running his own studio and
gallery in Massachusetts. Travel in Europe and the U.S. led to his
first visit to Santa Fe, in 1995. Two years later he permanently
relocated.

Among his proudest accomplishments is the founding of the Armenian
Artists Association of America. The group, all American artists of
Armenian descent, held several shows in Armenia and America from the
1970s through the ’90s, and donated approximately 80 paintings to
Armenia’s Museum of Modern Art.

"Armenia reminds me of Santa Fe," he says. "The mountains, the rocks
… and they even have Russian olive trees. The similarities of the
land were very impressive to me."

After a decade focused on New Mexico, Tashjian has lost none of his
excitement about the painting possibilities. Driving along the Rio
Grande to Taos this fall, he says, "It just hit me. There was some
beautiful scenery to work with. It comes for every artist – you just
explode when you see things like that."

If you go

WHAT: Paintings by Richard Tashjian

WHEN: Through Dec. 31

WHERE: Editions Gallery, 731 Canyon Road

CONTACT: 820-6148,

–Boundary_(ID_yyxy8yE5dr 99Ye8V+Z9BYQ)–

www.editionsfineart.com

When east meets west

The Jerusalem Report
December 25, 2006

WHEN EAST MEETS WEST

by Yigal Schleifer

Turkey and the European Union appear to be on a collision course over
membership talks

Outside the French Consulate and Cultura Center on Istanbul’s busy
Istiklal Boulevard, along with posters advertising an up-coming film
and art exhibit, there is a metal barricade manned by stern-looking
Turkish policemen carrying submachine guns. The reason: widespread
fury in Turkey over the passing of a law in France a few weeks ago,
making it a crime to deny that the mass killing of Armenians by the
Ottoman Turks in 1915 was a genocide.

To the Turks, long intent on sweeping the Armenian issue under the
carpet, this was like a red cape to a bull. Large protests were held
denouncing France and stores put up signs in their windows proudly
announcing that they no longer sell French products. One Turkish
cosmetics company announced that it was dropping its French-sounding
brand name, Francois Patrick, for the more innocuous MW. And by
mid-November, the Turkish military had announced that it was
suspending ties with its French counterpart, even though both
countries are members of NATO.

The uproar is symptomatic of what looks like a fraying in the
relations between Turkey and Europe, casting a shadow over Turkey’s
long-standing bid to become a member of the European Union. Pope
Benedict XVI’s late November four-day visit here provided another
illustration of that when he was greeted with angry protests and
required a larger security detail than George W. Bush required during
his visit to Turkey in 2004. The Pope, who as a cardinal had come out
against admitting Turkey to the EU because of its cultural and
religious differences, also inflamed Turkish passions in a September
speech linking Islam to violence. For many here, this was yet further
proof that Europe does not want the Turks.

And much like the worker who tells his boss, "You can’t fire me, I
quit," Turks are increasingly starting to feel it is they who don’t
want Europe. A wave of anti-Western nationalism has been washing over
Turkey, fueled by a perception that the EU is asking too much of
Turkey and giving it little back in return. Cutting across Turkish
society, from staunch secularists to Islamists, this nationalist
trend threatens to turn the continuation of Turkey’s bid for EU
membership into even more of a challenge.

After waiting at Europe’s door for decades, Turkey was given the
green light two years ago to start negotiations over becoming a
member of the EU. A raft of reform packages were passed in the
Turkish parliament, in order to bring the country’s economy and
political system into line with Europe. These included a new penal
code, an easing of restrictions on the use of Kurdish, and measures
aimed at curtailing the power of the military.

However much has changed since that initial period of euphoria. Faced
with the public’s growing anti-EU mood, the Turkish government of
Recep Tayyip Erdogan has significantly slowed down its reform drive.
Laws such as the one passed by the French parliament have led many
Turks to worry that resolving the question of the Armenian genocide
will become a prerequisite for EU membership. Many are also angry
over what they see as the EU’s failure to reward Turkish Cyprus after
its citizens overwhelmingly supported a 2004 UN plan to reunite the
divided island. Greek Cypriots strongly rejected the plan, but were
still able to become EU members.

EU officials, meanwhile, have been alarmed by an article in Turkey’s
new criminal code that allowed for dozens of its writers and
journalists – including its most famous novelist and new Nobel
laureate, Orhan Pamuk – to be carted off to court for the vague crime
of "insulting Turkishness" with things they had written or said. Some
have been convicted, though Turkey has now announced that it will
amend the offending article.

While support in Turkey for EU membership stood at close to 80
percent two years ago, it has now dwindled to around 35 percent,
according to EU-led surveys. Once a project that united Turkish
society, the question of joining the EU has by now become something
quite different.

"I don’t think joining the EU would be a good thing," says Faruk
Yilmaz, a mustachioed 40-year-old who sells sandwiches of roasted
meat in downtown Istanbul’s historic Beyoglu neighborhood. "Turkey
has wanted to be a member for such a long time. We are always walking
toward them and they send us back to the start."

Suat Kiniklioglu, executive director of the Turkey office of the
German Marshall Fund, an American public policy organization, says a
large part of the Turkish public today sees EU membership as a kind
of threat. "Today it is a dividing issue," he says. "I am afraid that
the people who believe that Turkey belongs in Europe are becoming a
minority."

A mirror image can be seen in Europe, where the public – especially
in countries like France and Austria – has developed major qualms
about admitting the predominantly Muslim Turkey into its ranks,
fearing the mass immigration of low-wage laborers and an influx of
yet more Muslims who will have a tough time adapting to "European"
society.

To make matters worse, EU diplomats have been warning for months of
an impending "train crash" in the membership negotiations with
Turkey. The slowdown in Turkey’s reform process, the court cases
threatening free speech and Ankara’s continuing refusal to open up
its airports and harbors to vessels from EU member Greek Cyprus have
all raised concern in Brussels and other European capitals.

The release in early November of an EU progress report sharply
criticizing the reform slowdown was perhaps the most definitive
signal yet that a further deterioration in Turkish-European relations
could be in the offing.

"The report represents a very important point, politically, as the
trains are heading toward a collision," says Kirsty Hughes, a
London-based European affairs analyst. "There’s going to be a big
fight between the member countries over what to do."

An EU summit is coming up in mid-December, when it is expected that
the 25-member body will agree to freeze its negotiations with Turkey
in part, if not entirely. German Chancellor Andrea Merkel has already
issued a stern warning, telling a German newspaper that if Ankara
refuses to open up its ports to Cypriot trade – something it promised
to do as part of the deal to begin the negotiations – "the EU
accession talks cannot continue in this fashion."

Diplomats and analysts in Turkey are downbeat about the prospects of
Ankara breaking out of its reform slump anytime soon. Turkey will
hold parliamentary elections next November, and observers here
believe that the political parties will try to play up their
nationalist credentials and distance themselves from the currently
unpopular EU accession negotiations.

"Certainly the military and the secularists have turned against the
EU and for them a negative [EU progress] report would be welcomed,"
says the Marshall Fund’s Kiniklioglu.

In some ways, a very strange dynamic is playing out in Turkey. While
the country is closer than ever to achieving the dream of the modern
secular republic’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, of firmly becoming
part of the West, it is the military and Turkey’s secular
hard-liners, the inheritors of Ataturk’s Westernizing legacy, who
seem most opposed to the EU drive. They fear the Europeans’ demands
will threaten Turkey’s sovereignty and force it to loosen its strict
controls on religious life. Meanwhile, it is the Islamic-rooted
Justice and Development Party (AKP), which leads the government,
which has been pushing the country’s EU ambitions forward and now
finds itself trying to immunize itself from charges that it is
selling out on Turkey’s founding principles.

But if not in Europe, then where does Turkey belong? There have been
suggestions that the AKP might lead Turkey towards a closer alliance
with the Islamic world. Ioannis Grigoriadis, a professor of political
science at Istanbul’s Isik University, says that rather than
eastward, Turkey’s growing nationalism is looking inward. "It could
end up with a Turkey that is very introverted and self-reliant," he
says.

But the reorientation of Turkish policy is a distinct possibility. At
the same time it has been pursuing its EU goals – and maintaining its
close relations with Israel – Turkey, under the AKP’s leadership, has
also been forging closer ties with its Arab and Islamic neighbors.
Relations with Syria and Iran have improved significantly in the last
few years, while Turkey has also taken a more assertive role in the
wider Islamic world. A Turk, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, currently heads
the Organization of the Islamic Conference and took a lead role in
criticizing the Pope’s recent comments about Islam.

"I think that feeling of being pushed around and not being treated
fairly is coupled with another dynamic in Turkish society, something
which started after the Iraq war, which is that they have discovered
that they are Muslims," says Cagaptay. "The AKP has accelerated and
anchored that discovery with its rhetoric and policies. We are
talking about a perfect storm," adds Cagaptay, "in the sense that the
factors are exacerbating one another. More and more Turks are feeling
as if they are not Western as a result of the treatment that they are
getting from the EU and America… and are identifying with Muslim
issues next door."

A rupture between the EU and Turkey, even a temporary one, could also
have important regional implications for Europe. One of the main
benefits of Turkey becoming a member of the EU – even negotiating to
become a member – is that it extends the organization’s influence
into the Middle East. Alienating Turkey deprives Europe of a strong
Muslim voice, and of a literal and figurative bridge into the region.

"Only with Turkey as a member can the EU be a player in the Middle
East," Cagaptay says.

With its large population of 70 million, which could help offset the
potential labor shortage posed by the graying of most European
countries, and its strategic location as a transit route for Central
Asian oil and natural gas, Turkey has much to offer the EU, says
Thierry Malleret, an expert with the Geneva-based World Economic
Forum. "Turkey is perceived by many as a source of risk to Europe; it
may just be the opposite, a potential source of major risk
mitigation," Malleret says.

Furthermore, any rupture with Turkey might be seen by the growing
community of Muslims in Europe, whose own integration into the
continent has been so difficult, as a signal that there is no place
for Islam in Europe. "For them, this is a test of whether they are
European. They are following this very closely," Cagaptay says.

Despite the criticism from Brussels and the nationalist mood in
Turkey, there are indications that both sides are working to reach
some sort of compromise before the upcoming EU summit. Along with the
willingness to amend the law limiting free speech, there are also
efforts to work out an interim deal on the Cyprus issue.

"I think all parties will try until the last moment to prevent this
train crash," says Joost Lagendijk, who heads the European Parliament
delegation to the joint EU-Turkey parliamentary committee. "A real
crisis would be if both parties would be looking for a way out [of
the negotiations], and I don’t think that’s the case right now."

What may also be needed is a change in the way the EU approaches
Turkey.

Isik University’s Grigoriadis argues that if the EU wants to bring
Turkey closer, it has to reel the country in slowly. "You can’t pull
the line too tight, or it will break," he says.

Bethlehem – the last place you would want to be for Christmas

Scotsman, UK
Dec 24 2006

Bethlehem – the last place you would want to be for Christmas

ANNETTE YOUNG
IN BETHLEHEM
CHRISTMAS cheer is hard to find in this year in Bethlehem.

Inside the West Bank town’s Church of Nativity – the birthplace of
Jesus Christ – preparations were being made for Midnight Mass,
overshadowed by worsening violence between Palestinian factions and
an international aid boycott.

But outside in Manger Square, an Arab Christian youth scoffed when
asked about the expected attendance of Palestinian President Mahmoud
Abbas.

"Bethlehem is the last place in the world where I would want to be
for Christmas," he said. "Hamas and Fatah should remember the enemy
is not each other but Israel, and the longer they fight one another
the better it will be for the Israelis."

The Palestinian president’s visit to the beleaguered town comes after
gunmen from his Fatah faction spent the last week battling their
Hamas counterparts on the streets in Gaza and the West Bank.

Years of feuding and rivalry between the two Palestinian factions
came to a head when Abbas called for fresh presidential and
parliamentary elections in an attempt to remove the Hamas-led
government.

Abbas and his Fatah advisers believe such a move will allow for the
establishment of a government that would be more acceptable to the
West and thus end an international aid boycott in place since the
Islamist movement came to power in March.

Hamas immediately rejected the Palestinian president’s call,
describing it as a coup. However, Abbas has yet to name an election
date and both sides are still talking of last-minute attempts to
establish a national unity government.

Inside the Bethlehem Peace Centre located in Manger Square, its
director, Michael Nasser, tries to remain resolutely upbeat: "In view
of what’s going on at the moment, it’s important for people always to
remember that this is where the ‘Prince of Peace’ was born.

"What’s happening elsewhere in Palestine should hopefully not affect
us here since this town is not only for the Palestinians but is there
for the whole Christian world."

For Christian pilgrims making their way to Bethlehem, they have to
pass through Israel’s controversial separation barrier that now loops
its way around three sides of the town, cutting it off from the
southern edge of Jerusalem normally only a five-minute drive away.

Much of the barrier surrounding Bethlehem is an eight-metre tall
concrete wall and while foreigners are able to visit the town, local
residents cannot leave without applying for a permit from Israeli
authorities.

Israeli officials say the barrier is necessary to stop Palestinian
suicide bombers from entering Israel and that it could be re-routed
or torn down if violence ceases and peace talks resume. But
Palestinians say the barrier’s route is a de facto border and its
existence prevents the creation of the viable state they seek in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, which Israel captured in 1967.

Before the Palestinian uprising began in 2000, Bethlehem attracted
more than 90,000 pilgrims a month. At Christmas in 2005, about 20,000
visitors made their way there. However, its mayor, Dr Victor
Batarseh, said the town would be "extremely lucky if we come anywhere
close to that figure this year".

Of Bethlehem’s 30,000 residents, the number of Christians has
dwindled from about 85% in 1948 to just 25%. The Palestinian
uprising, along with the barrier’s construction, has taken its toll
on the Christian population, who due to large diaspora communities
elsewhere are able to emigrate to places such as the United States,
Latin America and Canada.

In addition, the Islamisation of Palestinian society has weakened the
Christian community’s position, although Bartaseh denied that
pressure from Muslims was a contributing factor.

"The [Israeli] occupation is solely the cause of Christian families
leaving here and seeking a life elsewhere," he said. "We happily live
in co-existence with our Arab Muslim brothers."

Bartaseh, who was recently quoted as saying there was a danger of
there being no Christians living in Bethlehem at all within a
generation, was far more circumspect when approached by Scotland on
Sunday, saying: "Of course, there will always be Christians here as
long as we have hope."

The town’s Christian community did receive a boost last week when a
delegation of British church leaders, led by the Archbishop of
Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, made a Christmas pilgrimage as a move
of solidarity with its Christian residents.

Williams condemned the barrier, saying it was "a sign not simply of
the passing problem in the politics of one region; it is a sign of
the things which are deeply wrong in the human heart itself."

"We’re here to say that the sufferings of the people here are ours
too," said Williams, joined by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Westminster, Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O’Connor; the Free Churches’
Moderator in England, the Reverend David Coffey and the Primate of
the Armenian Church of Great Britain, Bishop Nathan Hovhannisian.

"We want to do what we can to alleviate them and we hope to see a
Bethlehem that is open for all pilgrims," he told a gathering at the
Bethlehem Peace Centre.

However, while he was speaking, the violence continued.

On Friday, Fatah gunmen opened fire on Hamas members preparing for a
rally in the West Bank city of Nablus, wounding at least nine.

Gunfights also erupted near the Hamas-controlled foreign ministry and
President Abbas’s Gaza residence. It died down as Muslim clerics and
other mediators worked to restore a ceasefire. Abbas was not in Gaza
at the time.

On Friday, Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas urged gunmen to
spare Palestinian blood, and said government officials were working
to bring the violence under control.

In the meantime, Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, were
meeting last night to discuss the thorny issue of the release of
Palestinian prisoners.

It has been hoped a deal on the release of Israeli soldier Gilad
Shalit in exchange for Palestinian prisoners could be concluded by
the Islamic festival of Id al-Adha that falls this coming Friday.

However, sources in Olmert’s office have said that the prime minister
was unwilling to release any Palestinian prisoners unless Shalit is
set free beforehand.

Child born in Bethlehem made the world a better place

Child born in Bethlehem made the world a better place
by WILLIAM CHRISTIAN

Guelph Mercury (Ontario, Canada)
December 23, 2006 Saturday
Final Edition

It’s only about six miles from the centre of Jerusalem to Bethlehem,
a much shorter distance than I thought. I had an Israeli driver for
this trip, since the route took us south though the leafy, prosperous
Jewish suburbs of the city, where a driver with Palestinian plates
would have been made distinctly unwelcome by the authorities. For my
trip to East Jerusalem, the hotel was careful to order a car with a
Palestinian driver, since anyone with Israeli plates claimed to feel
unwelcome in those areas.

Most of West Jerusalem was built after 1949 and looks much like any
North American city. Before we went to Bethlehem, though, my driver
wanted to show me his house, part of a series of row houses that
overlooked the Church of the Nativity. In April 2002 Palestinian
insurrectionists seized the church and held it for 38 days. He
pointed to the bullet holes on the front of the building and told me
of the evening when a bullet from the church came close to killing
him as he parked his car on his way home from work.

Since he was unwilling to take tourists into Bethlehem, a town
controlled by the Palestinian authority, he had a system arranged
with a colleague, a Maronite Christian. He phoned him on his mobile
and we met at a pre-set point, where I switched cars.

Bethlehem is a very uninviting city. Its population is about 60,000
and it has the feel of some of the small cities in the rust belt
around Detroit. It was once prosperous, but it has fallen on hard
times. It has an educated, skilled, motivated workforce with nothing
to do, and nowhere to sell their goods if they produced them. There
were some quite nice shops on the main street, an especially
appealing one dealing in textiles by Palestinian women. I liked the
textiles and I was even happier the proceeds were going where they
were much needed.

There are only two serious reasons for going to see the Church of the
Nativity. The first is if you genuinely believe, as some people do,
that this is literally the spot where the Christ child was born. For
you, this would be a genuinely holy place. If you are among the
somewhat smaller number of people interested in early Christian
church architecture, this edifice, whose construction began after
529, is the place for you — but you already knew that. Otherwise,
you’re going to be disappointed by how rundown the church is, and how
unattractive the setting is. The church is in the care of the
Armenian, Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox churches. When I was in
the grotto of the Nativity, there was an Armenian bishop conducting a
choral mass. The chanting resonated in its narrow confines. The
experience was moving.

Which is what my guide said I should be doing, rather than dawdling
around buying textiles and listening to lengthy masses when he was
being paid by the job.

So I went to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, first built is 330 by
the mother of the Emperor Constantine to mark the tomb of Christ’s
burial. In the fine tradition of peace and understanding that has
governed the Middle East since time immemorial, the Persians
destroyed it in 614; it was promptly rebuilt. The Egyptians hacked it
down to bedrock in 1009; the Crusaders rebuilt it, and it remains
largely a Crusader church.

Control over the church has historically been the source of
considerable dissension. In 1852, the Turkish authorities had to
intervene and impose order on the disputatious Christian sects,
giving primary control to Orthodox, the Armenian Apostolic and the
Roman Catholics. Later, the Coptic, Ethiopian and Syrian Orthodox
were also conceded parts of the church. But since all the good parts
had been taken, the Coptic and Ethiopian Orthodox churches have so
far not sorted out rights over the Chapel of the Ethiopians, which is
basically the roof over one of the interior chapels. So if you wonder
what they’re doing up on the roof, they’re protecting their turf. In
fact, in 2002, one hot summer day when a Coptic monk moved his chair
into the shade, the Ethiopians interpreted this as aggression, and
the ensuing battle to remove him put eleven into hospital.

Christians, Muslims, Jews. We worship the same God, but we’re human
— all-too-human. It’s at this time of the year that Christians
especially need too take a few moments to reflect that a child born
in occupied Bethlehem has made the world, if not perfect, at least
better than it otherwise would have been.

William Christian is a professor of political science at the
University of Guelph.

BAKU: Police prevent "illegal" conference of Jehovah’s witnesses in

POLICE PREVENT "ILLEGAL" CONFERENCE OF JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES IN AZERI CAPITAL

ITV, Baku,
24 Dec 06

[Presenter] Jehovah’s Witnesses attempted to hold an illegal conference
in [Baku’s] Xatai district today. The conference was prevented,
as it was illegal, the district police said.

[Correspondent over video of a three-storey building] Jehovah’s
Witnesses, who came to Azerbaijan in 1995, have been operating
illegally for a long period. The Azerbaijani branch of the sect is
headed by a Dutch national [name withheld].

Azerbaijan’s religious law bans foreigners and those without
citizenship from engaging in religious activity in the country. Some
reports say that the work of the Azerbaijani branch [of Jehovah’s
Witnesses] is being supervised by the sect’s coordinator in the
central Caucasus [name withheld] who is an Armenian.

Members of the sect hold conferences in third countries on a regular
basis. They are trying to attract people to the sect.

Jehovah’s Witnesses attempted to hold such a conference in Baku. Some
foreign citizens had also come to attend the conference.

As the conference was illegal, the Xatai district police prevented it.

The Xatai police said that the activities of the sect prepared the
ground for provocative and sabotage acts in Azerbaijan. The discovery
of some unfamiliar equipment during the search also proved this,
the police said.

[An unidentified police officer shown speaking to reporters] The
equipment found on the lower floor is for keeping contact with foreign
states and for propagating foreign intelligence [as heard].

An investigation is under way. It has been reported by the leadership
as well [as heard].

[Correspondent] The State Committee for Work with Religious Structures
says that Jehovah’s Witnesses have been blatantly violating the law
of late. They attract minors by deceiving vulnerable parents.

[Video showed police and a cameraman entering a conference hall,
which is full of people; a police officer detaining a man and taking
him out of the hall; unspecified equipment]