In the “Pressing” program Satik Seyranyan the guest Former First Deputy Minister of Justice of the Republic of Armenia, former advisor to the President of the Supreme Court, “Justice through Law” legal consultancy of the company founderdirector Grigor Muradyanis

The main theses of the interview are below.

• Since 2018, a pattern has become evident: this government, which has been deprived of constitutional legitimacy for a long time, does not have electoral legitimacy either.: For the first time, opposition forces have quantitatively more votes than the ruling CP. And this, in the event that PAP was deprived of its votes, which was confirmed by a structure called the Constitutional Court. Despite widespread intimidation by the authorities, the people voted against this government.

• The legitimacy of these elections is highly problematic, because the elections were held in an environment of hate speech, threats, violation of the constitutional principle of presumption of innocence, in an environment of intimidation with wide information about criminal proceedings, in which psychological pressure, an atmosphere of fear, hostility, a general environment aimed at refusing to participate in the elections of important subjects with the right to be elected was formed. There is also a practice of completely ignoring the votes of tens of thousands of voters.

• Regarding the loss of votes for “Prosperous Armenia” (PAP), this is, of course, an unprecedented phenomenon, but I also remember many other electoral frauds, in particular, the presidential elections of 1996 and 2003. The 2003 elections were so problematic, to say the least, that the Constitutional Court, the legitimate Constitutional Court at that time, had to propose a confidence referendum in the final part of its decision.

Nevertheless, justifying the loss of approximately 60,000 votes of the PAP with various primitive reasons is truly an unprecedented phenomenon. This means that the vote of those voters, according to the so-called relevant bodies, has no significance. We are dealing with such structures, which, in my deep conviction, also lack constitutional legitimacy. Nevertheless, these bodies make actual decisions and implement them. 

• The number of 16,210 invalid ballots, if there were actually so many invalid ballots, speaks of the disorganized work of election commissions.

• Whether Nikol Pashinyan’s statement on the night of the elections was an impetus to the Central Election Commission is a topic of public discussion.

• The opposition forces could apply to the Constitutional Court only under the condition that they would simultaneously declare that there is at least a serious gap or deficit in the matter of the legitimacy of the same Constitutional Court. In the opposite case, it turns out that we turn to the Constitutional Court to decide the fate of the elections, which, as we all understand, depends on the fate of our people, perhaps even for the coming decades. Therefore, that statement should have been made before applying. Of course, some opposition forces partially made such statements, but it should be clearly understood that the leading opposition forces should have turned this trial of the Constitutional Court into a mere platform to present and expose the main issues of electoral fraud to the public and the international community. After that, in my opinion, since there could not really be any other expectation from this Constitutional Court, the leading applicants should have simply withdrawn their applications. 

What about the “Prosperous Armenia” party? since here it was about the validity of only 150-300 votes, they could continue to participate in the trial and expect justice to be restored (although in the case of this Constitutional Court, those expectations could not be justified either). It could be assumed that even this Constitutional Court should not have ignored the votes of approximately 60,000 voters, but it did just that.

• Instead of an adequate assessment on the issue of CC legitimacy, the opposition found itself in the trap of Seda Safaryan’s impossibility to participate in that case, the issue of legitimacy, when they only raised the issue of his legitimacy. It turned out that only Seda Safaryan was illegitimate. I don’t know how the opposition will get out of this trap. If the opposition forces do not have a conceptual approach to this issue, if they resort to piecemeal solutions, they will very quickly lose public trust.:

• Before applying to the Supreme Court and after the decision of the Supreme Court, it was necessary to assess the illegalities of the previous eight years, especially the violations of the constitutional order, because this government does not rule on the basis of the Constitution, but contrary to the Constitution. The illegitimacy of the elections is only one component of the general illegitimacy.

• To some extent, the opposition was able to present indisputable facts of flagrant election frauds in the CC. But did they turn the CC into such a platform that as many public masses as possible were aware of election violations?

• One of the most flagrant facts of election violations is the unequal environment of the election process, accompanied by hate speech, intimidation, and arrests. The chances of the opposition parties were obviously not equal because the state was working in favor of the CP by abusing all its administrative resources. The presumption of innocence of the opposition candidates was actually violated:

• We are dealing with abuse of administrative resources, intimidation of voters and candidates using criminal prosecution tools, as well as directing them to refrain from participating in the campaign. We are also dealing with proven violations of the presumption of innocence, which were recorded by the decisions of the Constitutional Court itself. 

However, there is a point in the decision of the Constitutional Court, which is of the surrealist genre and directly related to the freedom of elections. There is the decision of the Administrative Court, which directly establishes that the hate speech and threats contradicted one of the previous decisions of the Constitutional Court, where the relevant standards were defined. It was also recorded there that the defendant, the Central Electoral Commission, did not carry out a sufficient and complete evaluation of the expressions that were uttered.

The Constitutional Court says the following, evaluating that rhetoric as unacceptable, rude and highly reprehensible from the point of view of public morality, and its effect shocking, and then makes a fictitious argument. That is, there is no scientific methodology to evaluate its impact on the election results.

The court itself states that there is a serious problem related to the freedom of elections, accepts the point of view of the Administrative Court, strongly condemns that speech, but concludes that it is not capable of assessing its impact on the election results.

Moreover, the court does not substantiate this claim either by referring to any scientific literature (which is the duty of the Constitutional or any other court in such cases), nor does it involve any expert, although it had ample opportunities to do so. Without mentioning any argument, he simply says that there is no scientific methodology. It turns out that he studied the world literature, the experience of other countries and international structures and came to the conclusion that there is no scientifically based methodology.

But even if there is none, you have to develop it yourself. There are many issues where there is no ready-made scientifically based methodology, and the highest courts create them themselves, involving the best specialists and experts. If there is no methodology, then how will you evaluate the validity of the election results? Should they be recognized as valid just because there is no methodology? 

• In the combination of multiple violations of the foundations of the constitutional order committed in the previous 8 years, we are now dealing with “law-killing” in a specific country, a law-killer.

• If the fundamental principles of the electoral system are violated – equality between voters and freedom of elections, when one of the participants creates an environment of intimidation against other forces, the CC should at least assess these violations, apply the international experience of impact assessment, return the mandates stolen by the authorities to the PAP, define a new order of mandate distribution or appoint the 2nd round of elections. The best solution would be to hold the 2nd round of elections. 

• The election violations, their essential content, the evidence regarding them in the trials should be widely covered in the future, so that both our and the international community are aware of why these elections are illegitimate.

• Not taking the mandates could lead to very fatal consequences. We are talking about the opposition in general, although “Prosperous Armenia” did not get its mandates, but even if it did, giving them up could also have a bad impact. 

Various colleagues have spoken about it many times, and I agree with their belief that the ruling power had all the opportunities to create an opportunity for the following through minor changes to the Electoral Code: if the opposition parties refused their mandates, they would be transferred to the parties with the next highest number of votes, which were desirable and controllable forces for them. The logic of the government was that if you did not want to take the mandates, then you should not participate in the elections. As a result, we would actually have a one-party parliament, which would implement its plans without any problems. I am not talking about the empty rhetoric when some fake oppositionists tried to create the illusion of the presence of opposition in the parliament since 2018. In reality, we would essentially have a one-party parliament, and the Constitution would certainly be amended or at least the referendum issue would be resolved. 

In addition, the parliament would no longer be the platform where the opposition would be able to use the wide opportunities reserved for it. How the ruling power would prevent their implementation is another question, but there are also certain means of fighting against it. Nevertheless, while taking the mandates, this opposition should act in an extremely reasonable way. It should clearly formulate its vision and approaches, have clear tactics both in the parliament and outside the parliament, especially from the point of view of working with the public.

• On the other hand there is a danger that by taking the mandates, the opposition may find itself in the same situation it found itself in in 2021. For example, at that time, the major opposition force lost approximately half of its votes in the new elections, and the other force did not participate in the elections at all. Thus, there is a danger of the repetition of that situation, that is, at a time when we are facing fateful and fatal challenges.

But at the same time, today’s oppositionists should take the mandates and work with people, especially outside the Parliament. 

• So, taking the seats is inevitable, but the risk of failure and losing votes is also high.. The only solution is to ensure the activity of the opposition through permissible alternative structures, outside the National Assembly. It is necessary to have a strategy for legislative work, to develop and present only such bills for discussion, and in other matters to show tactics of ignoring the main actors of the ruling power.

• It is necessary to create a united opposition platform outside the Parliament and inside the Parliament. All works should be coordinated from one center with approaches derived from the program provisions; it is necessary to maintain and increase the confidence of the opposition. No mistakes can be made. They can determine the future of our country.

• The opposition voters who voted for the opposition did not do so to see shows in the National Assembly. You don’t have to become a willing or unwilling participant of those shows, because they will not have any meaning or result. 

• It is definitely necessary to take the positions available to the opposition, because it is not a gift given to the opposition, but the powers and opportunities defined by the law, no matter how great the danger is that the episode of Ishkhan Saghatelyan or Artur Ghazinyan will be repeated…
  Nevertheless, let that illegitimate environment be created inside the parliament as well. this parliament is not legitimate one way or another, but let that illegality be seen also from the point of view of procedures. And if, however, an opportunity arises, and they take up those positions themselves, naturally, consultants will be involved, who will guide them on how to work effectively in those positions.

• If there was a risk that participating in the elections could lead to polling of votes, then it was right not to participate, but if the public opinion polls showed that the RPA had a chance to pass, they should have participated in the elections.

• If Nikol Pashinyan were the president of the republic, in a semi-presidential or presidential system of government, how would he rule in your opinion? Is he doing it differently than now? It is obvious, isn’t it, that he would have a majority in the parliament as well.

What is the peculiarity of the semi-presidential form of government? if the president has his own majority in the parliament (slightly simplified wording), he gets super-powerful, super-presidential powers and is practically not controlled by the parliament. In other words, an environment of complete permissiveness would be created.

It is enough to look directly at the current practice of France, where the current president, even without a parliamentary majority, still tries to dominate the legislative body. Such is the semi-presidential system. And if the president has that majority, then there are no obstacles in his way. This is in contrast to the full presidential system, where the parliament has clear control over the government, which is headed by the president himself.

In other words, we were going to have a purely technical prime minister, who was supposed to be controlled by the parliament, while the president, who makes real decisions, would be out of this control. This was our previous practice and that is why we abandoned that system. Instead, we tried to introduce the model of full parliamentary control over the government, the highest body of executive power.

Some so-called oppositionists complain about this, and I ask them the following questions.

First, if Pashinyan was the president of the republic within the framework of the semi-presidential system, what would you do?

If you think that you would have been in power by assuming the position of Prime Minister and getting a parliamentary majority, don’t you think that the presidential elections would have been simply rigged? 

• Dear oppositionists, get a constitutional majority in regular or special elections, develop your concept of amending the Constitution, change the Constitution, if, of course, you get the appropriate votes for it.
  But today you second the ruling power, albeit with a different reason. Moreover, sometimes you join them with completely fictitious and even absurd justifications and become an advocate of changing the Constitution, trying to delegitimize our Mother Law, just like the ruling power is doing. You are simply repeating their steps, and here your motives have absolutely nothing to do with it. If the issue of transition to the semi-presidential system is of such central importance to you, then join the government and change the Constitution together. 

• Talks about that “super-prime ministerial” model are actually lies and do not correspond to reality. There is no super-prime ministerial model, there is unconstitutional governance. Yes, he made himself the super prime minister. But that does not mean that the management model is like that. Why are you talking about him passing illegal laws or violating the Constitution? Isn’t everything he is doing now written in the Mother Law? This is the problem.
  Allow me to ask a few questions to those presenting such arguments. if we had a legitimate Constitutional Court, how would things be arranged in our country? I mean such a Constitutional Court, which is guaranteed by this Constitution. Of course, the Constitutional Court in its previous composition was legitimate, but if the Constitutional Court, which was formed especially by virtue of this Constitution and gained complete independence, was preserved, would these authorities be able to establish dominance through illegalities, or, as you say, build a dictatorship? Of course not.
  Then what are you complaining about? After all, these institutions were formed as a result of gross violations of the Constitution.

If we had not a bogus, but a real president of the republic, who used the powers assigned to him by the Constitution and carried out his unifying function, he could change a lot. Therefore, if you are against this model of governance, speak objectively, and not ascribe your imaginary ideas to the Constitution.

 If the opposition cannot rule out vote theft, taking the mandates becomes absolutely meaningless. If Pashinyan succeeds, he will have a constitutional majority and the role of the opposition will be zero. Voting will show the bankruptcy of the opposition. All legal measures should be implemented, people with a stable profile should be sent to the Parliament: 

• European values ​​must be saved from the European leaders themselves. It is necessary to work with the Diaspora, try to influence the authorities of those countries through them. 

• At the hands of the current RA authorities, it seems that we want to end up in that anti-Russian camp. Although we have not yet fully settled there, we definitely seek to join the hybrid war against Russia. Moreover, that camp is not pro-European, but simply anti-Russian. This will certainly have fatal consequences for Armenia.

What dangers are hidden in this reality? when you directly destroy and undermine the current security system without having any alternative (even if that system does not work very clearly), you find yourself in a chaotic environment where any disaster can happen to you.

These authorities are so adventurous that they bet with the Republic of Armenia in the geopolitical casino. 

• The opposition has an overarching task of achieving a change of power and must achieve it as quickly as possible with all legitimate tools, never acting reactively. Desperation should not lead to the current opposition crumbling. You need to work with the public correctly on all platforms.

• It is not possible to expect the current CC to protect the constitutional order. 2020 The logic of “constitutional changes” was to have such a CC. 

• By restricting the voting rights of RA citizens living abroad, he is trying to forcefully overcome the opportunities of the opposition on fatal issues.

• I can’t rule it out, but I doubt that he will go to new special elections very quickly. He will try to fulfill Turkish demands in all possible ways, if it fails, in unconstitutional ways.

• Whether this Parliament will have a long life or not depends on the mood of the geopolitical centers, the mood of the opposition and the political leadership.:

Details in the video.

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