Armenian Directory & News – Page 3 – Armenian Business Directory & News

Samvel Karapetyan pledges one-year military service, free education in Armenia

May 23, 2026May 23, 2026 Albert Nalbandian Leave a comment

Panorama, Armenia

May 23 2026

Armenian businessman and philanthropist Samvel Karapetyan pledged sweeping reforms to the country’s military and education system if elected prime minister in the June 7 parliamentary elections.

Karapetyan, the leader of the Strong Armenia party, said his government would reduce compulsory military service to one year and provide salaries to conscripts. He also promised to modernize the armed forces with new equipment and make higher education free of charge.

“We will build a new Armenia — the safest country — and strengthen the army with modern weapons. Military service will be one year and conscripts will be paid,” Karapetyan declared on Saturday.

He criticized Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s record, claiming poverty had doubled in Pashinyan’s native Tavush Province. “At least for his own province, he could have had the brains to do something,” Karapetyan said.

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Strong Armenia candidate rejects ‘zero-point’ foreign policy reset, criticizes

May 23, 2026May 23, 2026 Emil Lazarian Leave a comment

Panorama, Armenia

May 23 2026

Gohar Meloyan, a lawyer and parliamentary candidate of the Strong Armenia party, said her team would reject any attempt to restart Armenia’s foreign policy from a “zero point,” arguing that similar approaches had already led to devastating consequences for Armenia and Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh).

“We are not going to start from a zero point,” Meloyan said in an interview with CivilNet on Friday. “We have already witnessed the tragic consequences such an approach brought upon our state, nation, the Republic of Artsakh and Armenian statehood as a whole.”

Meloyan sharply criticized the current Armenian leadership, accusing it of failing to uphold the overwhelming majority of its political commitments while abandoning the very principles that brought it to power in 2018.

“We saw a government that returned to the electorate warning that if it was not re-elected, Artsakh would cease to exist,” she said. “The public entrusted them with its mandate, and today Artsakh no longer exists.”

She further accused Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s administration of political hypocrisy over the issue of extended tenure in office.

“The same political team that once denounced the prospect of a third term in power and built an entire revolution around opposing it is now aspiring to a third term itself,” Meloyan said. “This government has failed to fulfill roughly 80 to 90 percent of the promises outlined in its program.”

Addressing questions about TRIPP (the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity), Meloyan said the initiative could present opportunities for Armenia, but stressed that any engagement must remain firmly grounded in national interests.

“TRIPP may offer certain opportunities,” she said. “But any opportunity that emerges must be carefully balanced and evaluated through the prism of Armenia’s national interests.”

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Tatoyan vows to reveal findings of 2020 war inquiry

May 23, 2026May 23, 2026 Kanayan Tamar Leave a comment

Panorama, Armenia

May 23 2026

Arman Tatoyan, the prime ministerial candidate of the Unity Wings party, pledged to disclose the findings of a parliamentary commission investigating the circumstances of the 2020 Artsakh war.

Addressing families of missing soldiers on Saturday, Tatoyan said he had witnessed their suffering firsthand and promised transparency. “You, your heroes, feel betrayed. I promise to reveal everything, to ensure you have all the information,” he said, referring to the commission’s report that has not been made public.

Tatoyan emphasized that parents of missing servicemen should be among the most respected citizens in the country and that fallen soldiers must truly be honored as heroes.

Armenia is set to hold parliamentary elections on June 7.

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Russia Tightens Inspections on Armenian Products

May 23, 2026May 23, 2026 Chakhmakhchian Vatche Leave a comment

Uzbekistan – May 23 2026

Russia has tightened controls on fruit and vegetable products imported from Armenia. According to Sergey Dankvert, head of Rosselkhoznadzor, Armenian products entering the country are now being inspected based on phytosanitary safety requirements.

At the same time, the Russian side has temporarily suspended the import of flower products from Armenia to ‘ensure phytosanitary safety.’ This decision could significantly impact trade relations between the two countries, as the Russian market is a key destination for Armenian fruit, vegetable, and flower exports.

Dankvert emphasized that Russia demands full compliance with product safety guarantees. A future decision regarding flower imports will be made following the visit of Russian inspectors to Armenia. Whether the restrictions will be long-term or eased depends on the results of these inspections.

According to data, between May and November 2025, Armenia exported over 40 million euros worth of fruit and over 50 million euros worth of vegetables to Russia. These figures indicate a significant volume of agricultural trade between the two nations, making the tightened controls a serious economic risk for Armenian exporters.

Furthermore, Russia’s Rospotrebnadzor agency has banned the import and sale of ‘Jermuk’ mineral water produced in Armenia. The agency stated that the levels of hydrocarbonate, chloride, and sulfate in the water were found to exceed established standards.

This is not the first time such a restriction has been applied to ‘Jermuk’ water. In April, imports of certain batches were banned for the same reason. Now, the restriction has returned to the agenda, placing additional pressure on Armenian producers.

Media outlets note that in recent years, Russia has frequently used import restrictions on food, beverages, and other products against countries with which its political relations have cooled. In this case, there is speculation that political tensions between Moscow and Yerevan are casting a shadow over economic decisions.

Currently, disagreements between Russia and Armenia have intensified following Yerevan’s policy of rapprochement with the West. As the Armenian government seeks new directions in foreign policy, relations with Moscow have entered a complex phase.

In short, Russia is increasing controls and restrictions on Armenian fruits, vegetables, flowers, and ‘Jermuk’ water. The official explanation is phytosanitary and sanitary safety. However, given the political backdrop, these decisions seem to carry more weight than mere technical inspections. Trade routes sometimes cool faster than diplomacy, and this situation proves it once again.

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Russia Is Turning the Screws on Armenia Over Its Tilt to Europe

May 23, 2026May 23, 2026 Badalian Vardan Leave a comment

Financial Post

May 23 2026

Armenia’s pivot toward the West is coming under increasing pressure from Vladimir Putin’s Russia as the South Caucasus nation prepares for parliamentary elections next month.

(Bloomberg) — Armenia’s pivot toward the West is coming under increasing pressure from Vladimir Putin’s Russia as the South Caucasus nation prepares for parliamentary elections next month.

For decades, Armenia was seen as Russia’s closest ally in the region — hosting Russian troops at a military base, relying heavily on the Kremlin for weapons, and integrating deeply into Moscow-led political and economic structures. But Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s aspirations to join the European Union and engineer Armenia’s most significant realignment since the collapse of the Soviet Union have exacerbated already strained ties.

Yerevan’s hosting of a European summit this month that was attended by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy drew Moscow’s particular ire. Armenian flower imports were subsequently banned, as Russian officials branded Armenia’s actions “unfriendly.”

The Kremlin’s now threatening to raise Armenia’s continued membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, a customs bloc of former Soviet states, at a May 29 summit in Kazakhstan.

Putin addressed the deterioration in ties on May 9, telling reporters that Armenia should put the issue to a referendum and that Russia was ready to conduct an “intelligent and mutually beneficial divorce” if voters chose a European path.

But he also drew parallels with Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine stretching back to 2014. “How did it start? It started with Ukraine’s joining or attempting to join the EU,” Putin said.

Pashinyan pushed back Friday, saying only Armenia can discuss its membership status in the EEU. He plans to skip the summit in Kazakhstan to campaign for his ruling Civil Contract party in the June 7 parliamentary elections in Armenia.

Several opposition groups in the election want closer ties with Russia, including the Strong Armenia alliance led by Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, the Prosperous Armenia Party of tycoon Gagik Tsarukyan and the Armenia alliance led by ex-President Robert Kocharyan, who ruled the country for a decade until 2008.

Karapetyan is campaigning while facing prosecution in Armenia on charges including money laundering, tax evasion and attempts to usurp power. He has rejected the allegations as politically motivated.

The Foreign Ministry in Moscow late Wednesday denounced as “fake news” a report alleging that the Kremlin was coordinating an information campaign against Pashinyan, and that several Armenian opposition figures had links to Russian intelligence.

“We view the latest ‘sensation’ about ‘Russian agents in Yerevan’ as yet another episode in the campaign to oust Russia from the South Caucasus,” the ministry said in a Telegram post that blamed “Brussels-based propagandists.”

The standoff carries echoes of 2013, when then-President Serzh Sargsyan abruptly abandoned plans to sign an association agreement with the EU and instead joined the EEU under Kremlin pressure.

Tensions began to spiral after Azerbaijan’s military victories in 2020 and 2023 over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh exposed the limits of Russian security guarantees to Armenia. Officials in Yerevan increasingly questioned the value of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a Moscow-led military alliance that Armenia once viewed as the cornerstone of its security doctrine.

The Pashinyan government effectively froze participation in the CSTO and repeatedly skipped high-level meetings, triggering hostile responses from Russian officials and state media. It also began to strengthen cooperation with the US and NATO.

A preliminary peace accord signed by Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev at White House talks with President Donald Trump in August opened the door for deeper US engagement in Armenia, too.

The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, a transport and energy corridor linking Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenia, will give the US a stake in the Caucasus region potentially for a century through a joint venture with Yerevan.

Yet Armenia’s attempt to distance itself from Moscow remains constrained by deep economic and structural dependence.

Russia continues to dominate key sectors of Armenia’s energy system, including its nuclear power plant, as well as transport infrastructure and trade flows. Remittances from Armenians working in Russia remain a critical source of income for thousands of households.

Still, the nation of about 3 million people is accelerating cooperation with Brussels, which held its first-ever summit with Armenia this month. That’s after Armenian lawmakers voted last year to commit the government to begin preparations for seeking eventual EU accession.

Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan told reporters Tuesday that Yerevan isn’t contemplating divorce from Russia and wants good relations with Moscow even as it builds ties with the EU.

“We understand perfectly well — and we don’t need Russia to tell us — that membership in the EEU and membership in the EU are incompatible,” Mirzoyan said. When the moment comes to choose “we will make that decision,” he said.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin said Armenia’s approach of remaining in the EEU until it switches to the EU was “absolutely unacceptable” to Moscow, the Interfax news service reported Wednesday.

“Armenia won’t be able to dance at two weddings at the same time,” Galuzin said.

—With assistance from Chris Miller.

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Armenian Cognac Banned in Russia

May 23, 2026May 23, 2026 Emil Lazarian Leave a comment

May 23 2026

Russia has temporarily halted the sale of a number of alcoholic beverages produced in Armenia. This decision was made by Rospotrebnadzor after checking products circulating in the country, writes The Moscow Times.

According to the Russian agency, Armenian products that do not comply with mandatory requirements were found on sale. In this regard, a restriction was introduced by decree: the sale of these goods is halted, and importers and trade organizations are ordered to remove them from sale.

The restrictions affected products from three major Armenian producers — VEDI-ALCO, Abovyan Cognac Factory, and Shahnazaryan Wine and Cognac House. Specific items mentioned include both wines and cognacs. For example, these include the red semi-sweet wine ‘Getap Vernashen’, the white dry wine ‘Vedi Alco’ from the ‘Legends of ARNI’ line, ‘Armenian 5-star cognac’, and the seven-year-old ‘Shahnazaryan XO’ cognac.

However, Rospotrebnadzor did not specify which particular requirements were violated — it only stated that the products do not comply with the standards. Therefore, the exact reasons — for example, problems with composition, labeling, or safety — have not yet been disclosed.

This is not the first such decision concerning Armenian goods in recent days. Previously, it was completely forbidden to import and sell ‘Jermuk’ mineral water in Russia. In that case, the reason was specifically stated: the water allegedly showed an excess of permissible levels of chemical substances, including bicarbonates, chlorides, and sulfates. It was also noted that inaccurate information about the product’s medicinal properties could mislead consumers and even harm health. Armenian flowers also fell under restrictions, in which some infection was also suddenly found unexpectedly.

Against this backdrop, experts and media outlets point out that the restrictions may be linked not so much to quality control as to the general deterioration of relations between Russia and Armenia. Recently, tensions have been observed between the two countries. The Russian side has criticized Armenian authorities for a number of political steps, including rapprochement with the European Union and other decisions that Moscow considers unfriendly.

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Armenia’s election: Choosing between peace, integration, and isolation

May 23, 2026May 23, 2026 Boshkezenian Garik Leave a comment

Weekly Blitz

May 23 2026

Armenia’s election: Choosing between peace, integration, and isolation

Vijaya Laxmi Tripura

On June 7, Armenians will head to the polls in what may prove to be the most consequential parliamentary election since the country’s independence. While parliamentary elections often revolve around domestic concerns such as economic performance, governance, and political leadership, this contest carries implications that extend far beyond Armenia’s borders. The outcome will shape not only who governs in Yerevan but also the country’s strategic orientation, its prospects for peace with neighboring states, and its role in a rapidly changing Eurasian landscape.

At its core, the election represents a choice between two competing visions of Armenia’s future. One path, championed by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party, seeks normalization with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, closer engagement with Europe and the United States, and greater participation in regional trade and transportation networks. The other path, represented by a fragmented but determined opposition, emphasizes a more traditional nationalist outlook and favors maintaining closer strategic ties with Russia while challenging the concessions made in the pursuit of peace.

The significance of this election cannot be understood without acknowledging the profound transformations that have reshaped the South Caucasus in recent years. For decades, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh defined regional politics. Closed borders, military confrontations, mutual distrust, and geopolitical competition prevented meaningful regional cooperation and left Armenia economically constrained and strategically dependent on external powers.

The aftermath of the conflicts of 2020 and subsequent developments fundamentally altered this reality. The military balance shifted decisively, forcing Armenian policymakers to confront difficult questions about national strategy. For the first time in a generation, Armenian leaders faced the challenge of adapting to a regional order in which the previous status quo was no longer sustainable.

Pashinyan’s response has been controversial but pragmatic. Rather than attempting to reverse geopolitical realities, he has argued that Armenia must focus on strengthening the internationally recognized Republic of Armenia itself. His concept of “Real Armenia” emphasizes state sovereignty, economic development, and national security within existing borders rather than pursuing broader historical or territorial aspirations.

This approach has generated intense debate. Critics accuse Pashinyan of abandoning national interests and making excessive concessions to Azerbaijan. Supporters counter that his policies reflect realism rather than surrender. They argue that Armenia’s long-term prosperity and security depend not on unresolved territorial disputes but on stable relations with neighbors and integration into regional economic networks.

The election will effectively serve as a referendum on this strategic vision.

Perhaps the most immediate issue at stake is the future of Armenian-Azerbaijani normalization. Despite decades of hostility, recent diplomatic efforts have created the most promising opportunity for lasting peace since the collapse of the Soviet Union. While many obstacles remain, negotiations have advanced further than many observers believed possible only a few years ago.

Yet the process remains fragile. One of the most contentious issues concerns Armenia’s constitution. Azerbaijani officials have repeatedly argued that constitutional language contains references that imply territorial claims against Azerbaijan. As a result, Baku has made constitutional amendments a key condition for concluding a comprehensive peace agreement.

Pashinyan has acknowledged that constitutional reform may ultimately be necessary and has proposed addressing the issue through a referendum following the parliamentary election. Such a move would undoubtedly be politically sensitive and potentially divisive. Nevertheless, it represents an attempt to resolve one of the remaining obstacles to a final peace settlement.

Should the opposition gain power, the prospects for constitutional reform and broader normalization could diminish significantly. Even if negotiations continue, political momentum would likely slow, increasing the risk that longstanding tensions once again dominate regional affairs. The election therefore carries implications not only for Armenia’s domestic politics but also for the future stability of the entire South Caucasus.

A second major issue concerns Armenia’s geopolitical orientation. Since independence in 1991, Armenia has maintained close political, economic, and military ties with Russia. Moscow has traditionally been viewed as Armenia’s primary security partner, and Russian influence remains deeply embedded across multiple sectors of Armenian society.

However, recent years have witnessed growing public disillusionment with this relationship. Many Armenians were disappointed by what they perceived as Russia’s limited support during critical moments of regional conflict. These frustrations have fueled debates about whether reliance on Moscow continues to serve Armenia’s national interests.

Pashinyan has responded by cautiously expanding cooperation with Western institutions. Armenia has pursued deeper engagement with the European Union, increased dialogue with the United States, and suspended active participation in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. These steps do not constitute a complete geopolitical realignment, but they signal a desire for greater strategic flexibility and diversification.

The June election will reveal whether Armenian voters support this gradual reorientation. A strong mandate for Civil Contract could encourage further integration with Western political and economic structures. Conversely, a resurgence of opposition forces aligned with more traditional geopolitical preferences could slow or reverse this trajectory.

The implications extend beyond Armenia itself. Both Russia and Western governments view the South Caucasus as strategically significant. The election outcome will therefore be closely monitored in capitals from Moscow and Brussels to Washington and Ankara.

Economic considerations further heighten the election’s importance. Armenia remains a landlocked country facing substantial developmental challenges. Limited regional connectivity has historically constrained trade opportunities, restricted foreign investment, and increased dependence on a narrow range of economic partners.

Recognizing these challenges, Pashinyan has promoted the “Crossroads of Peace” initiative, an ambitious vision aimed at transforming Armenia into a regional transportation and logistics hub. The concept seeks to reconnect transportation corridors linking the Black Sea, the Caspian region, Türkiye, and broader Eurasian markets.

If successfully implemented, these projects could generate significant economic benefits. Transit revenues, infrastructure investment, job creation, and enhanced commercial integration could strengthen Armenia’s economy and reduce its isolation. Improved connectivity would also increase Armenia’s strategic relevance in regional trade networks at a time when alternative transportation routes are becoming increasingly important.

Supporters view this strategy as a pathway toward sustainable economic growth and enhanced national resilience. Critics remain skeptical, questioning whether the proposed benefits justify the political compromises required to achieve them. Once again, voters will determine which vision prevails.

Outside powers are keenly aware of what is at stake. Regional connectivity initiatives could alter existing economic patterns and reduce reliance on traditional transit routes. Such developments inevitably affect the interests of neighboring states and major geopolitical actors. Consequently, Armenia’s election is attracting attention far beyond its borders.

Even if Pashinyan secures victory, substantial challenges will remain. Constitutional reform, peace negotiations, and economic integration projects will all require sustained political leadership and public support. Opposition forces are unlikely to disappear, and debates over national identity, sovereignty, and historical memory will continue to shape Armenian politics.

Nevertheless, the broader significance of the election is unmistakable. Armenia stands at a crossroads between competing strategic futures. One emphasizes reconciliation, economic integration, and geopolitical diversification. The other reflects skepticism toward rapid change and a preference for more traditional security arrangements and nationalist narratives.

Rarely does a parliamentary election carry such profound consequences for a nation’s regional position and long-term trajectory. The decisions made by Armenian voters on June 7 will resonate far beyond the walls of parliament in Yerevan. They may help determine whether the South Caucasus moves toward an era defined by cooperation, connectivity, and peace-or remains trapped by the divisions and conflicts that have shaped the region for decades.

For Armenia, this is more than an election. It is a defining national choice about what kind of state it seeks to become in the twenty-first century.

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Russia steps up economic pressure on Armenia ahead of pivotal election

May 23, 2026May 23, 2026 Emil Lazarian Leave a comment

Intellinews

May 23 2026

By IntelliNews May 23, 2026

Russia has intensified trade restrictions and public warnings over energy pricing against Armenia, as Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan steers the country closer to the European Union and prepares for a closely watched general election in June.

The escalation comes amid rapidly deteriorating relations between Moscow and Yerevan, once among the closest partners in the post-Soviet space, and follows months of political tension over Armenia’s foreign policy shift, its handling of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and its engagement with Western institutions.

At the centre of the latest dispute is energy. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently highlighted that Armenia receives Russian natural gas at a deeply discounted price of around $177.50 per thousand cubic metres, compared with more than $600 in Europe, and suggested that Armenia should “decide on its geopolitical vector”.

Pashinyan responded that gas prices are governed by long-term contracts between the two countries and cannot be altered unilaterally, seeking to frame the issue as a technical, not political, matter.

Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk, meanwhile, warned in an interview with Vesti News Agency that closer Armenian alignment with the European Union could lead to higher energy costs and trade barriers, saying that if Yerevan changes course “customs duties will arise, gas prices will change, and so will energy prices”, reported Interfax.

While Russian officials have repeatedly insisted that economic relations remain stable, a series of regulatory actions in recent days has fuelled concerns in Armenia that Moscow is applying coordinated pressure.

Russia’s agricultural watchdog Rosselkhoznadzor has banned imports of Armenian flowers, citing phytosanitary concerns, and warned that vegetables and fruits could also be affected, according to reports in the Russian and Armenian press. The agency has also raised issues about traceability and increased inspections of Armenian agricultural exports, according to TASS.

Separately, Russia’s consumer protection authority Rospotrebnadzor has suspended sales of several Armenian alcoholic products, including wine and cognac from multiple Armenian producers, citing quality violations, Interfax reported. It has also expanded earlier restrictions on Armenian mineral water, including the well-known Jermuk brand, citing chemical composition issues and labelling concerns.

The watchdog said the water did not match declared specifications and could mislead consumers, while Armenian producers have in the past rejected similar allegations.

Armenian officials have responded cautiously. Pashinyan has said that restrictions on goods that do not meet sanitary or phytosanitary standards have occurred repeatedly over the past eight years and are not unprecedented, though he has not directly commented on whether the latest wave is politically motivated.

Election pressure point

The escalation comes less than three weeks before Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary election, a vote widely seen as a critical test of Pashinyan’s domestic legitimacy and foreign policy direction.

A new opinion poll by MPG LLC, the Armenian member of the GALLUP International Association, suggests the ruling Civil Contract party leads with 28.8% support, followed by opposition blocs Strong Armenia at 14.9% and the Hayastan alliance at 12.1%. Two other parties hover near or above the parliamentary threshold, pointing to a fragmented legislature but continued dominance by the ruling party.

The same survey indicated that nearly 60% of respondents were certain they would vote, suggesting relatively high engagement in what is expected to be a decisive election.

The campaign, which runs until June 5, has been dominated by competing narratives over Armenia’s geopolitical future: whether it should continue its cautious pivot toward the European Union or restore closer alignment with Russia-led economic and security structures.

The vote follows years of political turbulence, including protests, economic reforms, and a major shift in foreign policy after Armenia’s 2023 loss of control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which was recaptured by Azerbaijan in a military operation despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers.

That episode severely damaged public trust in Moscow’s security commitments and became a turning point in Armenia’s foreign policy trajectory.

Strained Russia ties under Pashinyan

Relations between Moscow and Yerevan have deteriorated steadily under Pashinyan, who came to power in 2018 following mass protests that brought down the previous government.

The divisions were on show during an April 1 meeting at the Kremlin between the two leaders, that revealed widening differences over Armenia’s political direction, democratic processes and foreign policy.

While Armenia remains formally allied to Russia through the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and hosts Russian military bases, Pashinyan has increasingly distanced the country from Moscow-led institutions.

In early 2024, Armenia froze its participation in the CSTO, citing dissatisfaction with the bloc’s response to security threats. Armenian officials have also accused Russia of failing to adequately support Yerevan during clashes with Azerbaijan.

Pashinyan has further signalled a foreign policy realignment by engaging more actively with European institutions. Armenia hosted a European Political Community summit in Yerevan in 2026, bringing together dozens of European leaders, and has held multiple EU-Armenia meetings focused on trade, governance and security cooperation.

European officials have described Armenia as an increasingly important partner in the South Caucasus, particularly as the EU seeks to diversify energy and transport routes and reduce geopolitical risks in its neighbourhood.

Russia, however, has warned that Armenia’s westward shift carries consequences. Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova previously accused Armenia of moving into what she called an “anti-Russian orbit,” saying such a course would bring “negative political and economic consequences.”

Armenian officials have rejected such characterisations, insisting that Yerevan is pursuing a balanced foreign policy based on national interests and economic development.

Economic interdependence still strong

Despite political tensions, the two countries remain deeply economically intertwined.

Russia is a key supplier of energy to Armenia, with Gazprom Armenia, a subsidiary of Russia’s Gazprom, holding a monopoly over domestic gas distribution. Gas is delivered via Georgia, and Armenia benefits from prices significantly below European market levels.

Russia is also a major destination for Armenian exports and a source of remittances from Armenian workers abroad, making the relationship economically sensitive for both sides.

Armenian officials have repeatedly stressed that existing contracts govern energy pricing and supply, and have denied reports of any formal discussions on price increases.

At the same time, Russian officials have suggested that Armenia could lose preferential trade terms if it further integrates with the European Union or diverges from Russia-led economic structures.

The dispute highlights Armenia’s increasingly difficult balancing act between competing geopolitical blocs. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the collapse of security guarantees in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia has moved cautiously but steadily toward closer ties with the EU and the United States, while still relying heavily on Russia for energy and trade.

Western officials have welcomed Armenia’s outreach, while urging reforms in governance, rule of law and economic policy. Moscow, meanwhile, has warned former Soviet republics against deeper integration with Western institutions, arguing that EU and Nato expansion threatens regional stability and Russia’s strategic interests.

https://www.intellinews.com/russia-steps-up-economic-pressure-on-armenia-ahead-of-pivotal-election-444562/

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Armenia Says It Wants Stronger Russia Ties Despite Growing EU Push

May 23, 2026May 23, 2026 Emil Lazarian Leave a comment

Eastern Herald
May 23 2026

Armenia Says It Wants Stronger Russia Ties Despite Growing EU Push

Yerevan signals balancing strategy as Moscow warns against Armenia’s westward drift

Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said Saturday that Armenia continues to value its partnership with Moscow even as Russian officials intensify criticism of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s westward pivot.

“We remain consistently interested in preserving and developing a normal partnership with Russia,” Mirzoyan said in an interview with Armenian outlet News.am, pushing back against claims that Yerevan is abandoning its long-standing alliance with Moscow.

The comments came after Russian officials warned that Armenia was being pulled into an “anti-Russian camp” orchestrated by Western powers determined to weaken Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev also accused Pashinyan of trying to benefit simultaneously from European integration and membership in the Eurasian Economic Union.

The sharp rhetoric reflects mounting unease inside the Kremlin over Armenia’s rapidly evolving geopolitical orientation following the collapse of Armenian control over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 and Yerevan’s growing dissatisfaction with Russia’s regional security role.

For decades, Armenia depended heavily on Russia for military protection, energy supplies, and economic stability. Moscow maintained military bases inside Armenia, while the country remained deeply integrated into Russian-led structures including the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union. But relations have deteriorated dramatically since Azerbaijan regained control over Nagorno-Karabakh during military operations that many Armenians believed Russia failed to prevent.

The fallout fundamentally altered Armenian public opinion and accelerated calls inside the country for strategic diversification away from Moscow.

Mirzoyan attempted to reassure Russia that Armenia’s outreach to Western partners should not be interpreted as hostile.

According to the Armenian foreign minister, cooperation with the EU and the US is not directed against Russia but instead reflects Armenia’s effort to establish mutually beneficial relations with multiple global actors. He argued that Yerevan seeks pragmatic partnerships in trade, infrastructure, governance, and technology while preserving working relations with Moscow.

Nevertheless, Russia increasingly views Armenia’s Western engagement as part of a broader geopolitical campaign aimed at reducing Russian influence across the former Soviet space.

Russian officials have repeatedly accused Brussels and Washington of exploiting regional instability to pull Armenia into Western political and security structures. Moscow’s concerns intensified earlier this month after Armenia hosted a major Armenia-EU summit in Yerevan focused on expanding economic cooperation, democratic reforms, transport connectivity, and security coordination.

European officials openly signaled support for Armenia’s deeper integration with European institutions during the summit, while Brussels pledged additional assistance packages aimed at governance reforms and resilience against foreign interference.

For the Kremlin, those moves represent another stage in what it sees as a coordinated Western strategy to isolate Russia across Eurasia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has already warned publicly that Armenia cannot fully integrate into both the European Union customs framework and the Eurasian Economic Union simultaneously. Putin described the contradiction as an unavoidable economic reality rather than simply a political disagreement.

Russian presidential aide Yury Ushakov used even harsher language, accusing Armenian authorities of trying to “sit on two chairs” by maintaining access to Russian economic benefits while simultaneously moving politically toward Europe.

Despite the growing tensions, Armenia remains economically dependent on Russia in several critical sectors. Russia continues to dominate Armenian energy infrastructure, banking flows, remittances, and trade channels. Thousands of Armenian workers are employed inside Russia, and bilateral commerce remains essential to the Armenian economy.

Mirzoyan acknowledged that serious disputes continue to affect the relationship.

“Many of these problems existed in the past as well,” he said, citing recurring tensions over Armenian agricultural exports and trade restrictions involving products such as apricots, wine, and vodka.

Trade disputes between Russia and neighboring states have frequently become political flashpoints during periods of geopolitical disagreement. Armenian officials, however, are attempting to avoid escalation by emphasizing dialogue and negotiation rather than confrontation.

At the same time, Pashinyan’s government has continued expanding strategic cooperation with Western capitals.

Armenia and the United States signed a Strategic Partnership Charter earlier this year focused on defense cooperation, institutional reforms, cybersecurity, and economic modernization. Armenian officials have also increased defense consultations with France, India, and several European governments as Yerevan seeks to diversify military procurement beyond Russia.

India has emerged as one of Armenia’s most important new defense partners, supplying advanced artillery systems, missile technology, and radar platforms amid growing regional tensions with Azerbaijan. France has also stepped up military assistance and political backing for Armenia in recent months.

The geopolitical transformation taking place in the South Caucasus reflects broader shifts unfolding throughout the region as powers reposition themselves amid the continuing confrontation between Russia and the West.

Analysts say Armenia’s leadership is attempting to navigate an increasingly dangerous strategic environment where dependence on any single power carries growing risks. While Yerevan seeks closer ties with Europe and Washington, Armenian leaders also understand that a complete break with Moscow could trigger severe economic and security consequences.

That balancing act has become more difficult as relations between Russia and the West continue deteriorating over Ukraine, sanctions, NATO expansion, and competing influence campaigns across Eurasia.

Inside Armenia, the debate over the country’s future geopolitical direction is intensifying ahead of upcoming parliamentary elections that many observers view as a referendum on Yerevan’s foreign policy orientation.

Supporters of closer European integration argue that Russia failed to guarantee Armenia’s security during the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis and can no longer be relied upon as a strategic protector. Critics of the government, however, warn that abandoning Russia entirely would expose Armenia to economic instability and greater regional isolation.

Public frustration toward Moscow has grown sharply since 2023, particularly among younger Armenians who increasingly favor stronger ties with Europe. At the same time, older generations and business elites remain wary of jeopardizing economic relations with Russia.

Moscow appears determined to preserve its influence in Armenia despite the tensions.

Russian officials continue emphasizing historical, cultural, and economic links between both nations while avoiding direct threats against Yerevan. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk recently stated that Moscow would treat “any choice made by the Armenian people with understanding,” though the Kremlin continues warning about the long-term consequences of European integration.

The situation places Armenia at the center of a widening geopolitical contest between Russia and the West for influence in the strategically vital South Caucasus region, which serves as a key transit corridor connecting Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

For now, Armenian officials are attempting to maintain relations with all sides simultaneously. But as pressure from both Moscow and Western capitals intensifies, Yerevan may eventually face difficult choices that could reshape the regional balance of power for years to come.

—Inputs from Sputnik.

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ARMENIA: Conscientious objector’s repeat trial delayed and delayed

May 23, 2026May 23, 2026 Emil Lazarian

May 22 2026

22 May 2026
Felix Corley, Forum 18

Molokan conscientious objector Ivan Mikhailov, refused alternative civilian service in 2018, is on criminal trial for the second time. His original 2-year jail term was eventually overturned. His current case reached court in July 2025 but hearings have been repeatedly postponed. He remains under travel restrictions. Baptist conscientious objector Davit Nazaretyan is due to complete his 2-year jail term in August. His case is at the European Court of Human Rights. The Alternative Service Commission refused one young man in January. It grants alternative civilian service only to Jehovah’s Witnesses.

A Molokan Christian from Dilijan in north-eastern Armenia, Ivan Mikhailov, is on trial again for refusing military service on grounds of conscience. Now 27, he was refused alternative civilian service in 2018. He was then sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, but this was overturned on appeal. In 2025, Tavush Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office brought a new case against him and placed him under travel restrictions. Prosecutors handed the case to Tavush Region First Instance Court in July 2025, but the court has repeatedly postponed hearings for various reasons.

Davit Nazaretyan speaks in his church

Baptist Council of Churches [CC BY-NC-ND 4.0]

Public prosecutor Vahagn Vardanyan is leading the prosecution case. Forum 18 was unable to reach him as officials did not answer the phone at Tavush Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office each time Forum 18 called (see below).

Molokans are a traditionally pacifist Christian religious community which emerged in the 18th century.

Council of Churches Baptist Davit Nazaretyan, now 22, is serving a 2-year jail term after the Alternative Service Commission rejected his application in January 2023. He is due to complete his sentence in August 2026. Officials refused to grant him amnesty in August 2025 when he had completed half his jail term. A case has been lodged on his behalf to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (see below).

“We don’t know if Davit will be called up again after the end of his sentence on 20 August,” Pastor Mikhail Shubin told Forum 18. “We asked, but have had no answer” (see below).

The government’s Alternative Service Commission refuses to grant alternative civilian service to conscientious objectors who are not Jehovah’s Witnesses, such as Molokans and Baptists. Vardan Astsatryan of the government’s Department for Ethnic Minorities and Religious Affairs refused to explain to Forum 18 why this discrimination exists (see below).

In January 2026, the Alternative Service Commission rejected the application from a young man (who is also not a Jehovah’s Witness) who is unable to perform military service on grounds of conscience. The young man reluctantly accepted service in the military without weapons and without swearing the military oath. His service is to last 30 months rather than the 18 months of military service. “He wanted not to be in the army at all,” a person close to him told Forum 18. “Others also want alternative civilian service, but in practice officials don’t offer it” (see below).

The office of the Human Rights Defender Anahit Manasyan did not respond to Forum 18’s questions about what she and her office might have done to protect the rights of those who cannot serve in the military on grounds of conscience (see below).

Jailing conscientious objectors to military service and not respecting their right to a genuinely civilian alternative service violates Armenia’s legally-binding international human rights obligations (see below).

Human rights defender Isabella Sargsyan of the Eurasia Partnership Foundation calls for reforms to the Alternative Service Commission. “I would like to see a different type of Commission to discuss these issues, not an inter-governmental body, but a more professional body,” she told Form 18. “The Commission should be more transparent over how decisions are taken, because we couldn’t find much information about who was granted this alternative civilian service and who not” (see below).

In 2026 the length of military service was reduced from 24 months to 18 months. The length of alternative military service (30 months) and alternative civilian service (36 months) have not been reduced, despite Armenia’s international human rights obligation to ensure that such service is not punitive in length (see below).

“We are aware that that individual lawyers have directed inquiries to the relevant authorities, including the Defence Ministry, the Justice Ministry, and Parliament’s Standing Committee on Protection of Human Rights and Public Affairs,” Jehovah’s Witnesses told Forum 18 from Yerevan. “However, no official response or indication of any adjustment to the duration of alternative civilian service has been received to date” (see below).

Mikhailov: First conviction for conscientious objection overturned

Conscientious objector Ivan Nikolai Mikhailov (born 28 July 1998), a Molokan from the north-eastern town of Dilijan, was refused alternative civilian service. The rejection order, signed by the Justice Minister on 15 August 2018, notes that “the applicant failed to justify that his duty to perform mandatory military service is in serious and weighty conflict with his conscience or with his deep and genuine religious faith or other beliefs”.

Prosecutors then brought a criminal case against Mikhailov for evasion of military service. Tavush Regional Court handed him a two-year jail term on 11 November 2019. On 11 February 2021, the Criminal Court of Appeal rejected Mikhailov’s first appeal.

However, on 5 April 2023, the Cassation Court overturned the conviction (meaning that Mikhailov was never sent to prison as the sentence never came into force). It sent his case back to Tavush Regional Court for a new trial. On 6 October 2023, a Judge closed the criminal case because of the statute of limitations. The Judge finally removed the restrictions on Mikhailov’s movements.

Mikhailov: Second case for conscientious objection to military service

In 2025, Tavush Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office brought a new case against Mikhailov under Criminal Code Article 461, Part 1 (“Avoidance of mandatory military or alternative service or conscription”). It accused him of failing to appear for the 2024 winter call-up. Mikhailov was once again placed under a travel ban.

On 25 July 2025, Tavush Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office sent the new criminal case against Mikhailov to Tavush Region First Instance Court, according to court records. The case was assigned to Judge Narek Badalyan. Public prosecutor Vahagn Vardanyan led the prosecution case, while lawyer Rafik Melkonyan defended Mikhailov.

Officials did not answer the phone at Tavush Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office each time Forum 18 called on 21 and 22 May 2026.

The Court held a preliminary hearing in Mikhailov’s case on 11 August 2025. However, the hearing was postponed as the parties to the case failed to appear. The hearing was rescheduled for 8 September 2025 but did not take place as the Judge was taking part in a training course. The Judge was also not available for the next scheduled hearing on 11 November 2025.

The 8 December 2025 hearing did not take place at the request of the Prosecutor. The 19 January 2026 hearing was postponed at the request both of the Prosecutor and the defence lawyer. Judge Badalyan was unable to attend the 6 March 2026 hearing and it did not take place. The 13 May hearing was postponed as defence lawyer M. Manukyan was unable to attend.

The next hearing has now been set for 17 July, nearly a year after the case first reached the court. Mikhailov has remained under a travel ban since the case against him was launched.

Nazaretyan: “Jesus Christ teaches us not to kill”

Davit Nazaretyan (centre) with parents, Gagik Mirzoyan (left), Mikhail Shubin (right), Kentron District Court, Yerevan, 25 October 2023

Davit Nazaretyan

Davit Tigrani Nazaretyan (born 23 July 2003) lives in the capital Yerevan and is a member of a Council of Churches Baptist congregation in Arinj, a town next to Yerevan. The congregation – which chooses not to seek state registration – is led by Pastor Mikhail Shubin.

“I am a Christian and I read the Bible,” Nazaretyan told Forum 18 from Yerevan in November 2023. “Jesus Christ teaches us not to kill and he followed this also. We have to love one another, even our enemies, and not kill people.” He added that Jesus Christ also instructed his followers not to swear oaths. “If I was given alternative civilian service now, I would do it.”

The Alternative Service Commission rejected Nazaretyan’s application in January 2023. Vardan Astsatryan of the government’s Department for Ethnic Minorities and Religious Affairs, who is part of the Alternative Service Commission, claimed to Forum 18 in February 2024 that the Commission rejected Nazaretyan’s application as it had not been convinced by his case. “Why couldn’t he present his views convincingly?”

Forum 18 told Astsatryan that in November 2023, Nazaretyan had clearly and logically explained his conscientious reasons why he could not serve in the military and his readiness to perform alternative civilian service. Yet Astsatryan claimed again that Nazaretyan had not been able to explain this to the Commission.

On 25 October 2023, Yerevan’s Kentron District Court handed the then 20-year-old a two-year jail term under Criminal Code Article 461, Part 1 (“Avoidance of mandatory military or alternative service or conscription”).

On 7 February 2024, a panel of three judges at Yerevan’s Criminal Court of Appeal rejected Nazaretyan’s first appeal.

On 10 July 2024, without a hearing, the Cassation Court rejected Nazaretyan’s final appeal against his two-year jail term. He received the Cassation Court’s rejection of his appeal on 16 July 2024, one week before his 21st birthday. “I am very disappointed by this decision,” human rights defender Isabella Sargsyan of the Eurasia Partnership Foundation told Forum 18 after his final appeal was rejected.

Nazaretyan: Two-year jail term to end in August 2026

Police arrived on the morning of 20 August 2024 at the home in Yerevan of Baptist conscientious objector Davit Nazaretyan. They arrested him and took him initially to Nubarashen prison in southern Yerevan to begin his two-year jail term, a month after the Cassation Court rejected his final appeal. He was able to take his Bible with him, Pastor Shubin said.

“Unfortunately we knew this would happen,” Vardan Astsatryan of the government’s Department for Ethnic Minorities and Religious Affairs told Forum 18 in August 2024. “The law gives two possibilities – go to the army or, unfortunately, jail.” (The law also gives the possibility of alternative civilian service, which Nazaretyan applied for unsuccessfully.)

Astsatryan is a member of the government’s Alternative Service Commission which rejected Nazaretyan’s alternative service application.

“We offered him alternative service within the army without weapons,” Astsatryan insisted. “Had I found that his conscience was hurt through this [serving in the military], I would have helped him. But I didn’t see it. The six members of the Commission didn’t see it. We asked him many questions and gave him the chance to answer.”

In early September 2024, prison authorities transferred Nazaretyan to Sevan open prison, where conditions are better than in Nubarashen prison. On arrival at Sevan prison, he was placed in quarantine for two weeks.

Nazaretyan’s prison address:

Armenia
Kotayk marz
2302, Hrazdan
Sevan Road
Prison

Officials refused Nazaretyan amnesty in August 2025 after he had served half his sentence.

“We don’t know if Davit will be called up again after the end of his sentence on 20 August,” Pastor Shubin told Forum 18 on 19 May 2026. “We asked, but have had no answer.”

Nazaretyan: Appeal to European Court of Human Rights

Anna Maralyan, February 2022

Azatutyun.am (RFE/RL)

Anna Maralyan of Rights Centre, an Armenian non-governmental organisation, brought a case on Davit Nazaretyan’s behalf to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg. The Court registered the case (Application No. 36510/24) on 7 November 2024.

“It will not make much change to Davit’s case because the Strasbourg court’s decisions are released quite late, but it might be a precedent,” the Eurasia Partnership Foundation told Forum 18 in August 2024, as the application to the ECtHR was bring prepared.

The Court has issued many rulings in favour of individuals – including from Armenia – who were denied the right not to serve in the armed forces on grounds of conscience (see below).

“The case has been registered, but not communicated yet,” Maralyan told Forum 18 from Strasbourg on 21 May 2026.

Other conscientious objectors

Davit Nazaretyan and Ivan Mikhailov are the only conscientious objectors known to be currently jailed or facing jail under Criminal Code Article 461, Part 1 (“Avoidance of mandatory military or alternative service or conscription”).

At least two Molokans (including Mikhailov) have faced criminal prosecution in recent years for refusing to serve in the armed forces on grounds of conscience.

The last known previously-convicted conscientious objector, Maksim Mikhaili Telegin (born 15 November 1998), a Molokan from Yerevan who had been refused alternative civilian service in 2016, was jailed for one year at Yerevan City Court on 23 March 2021. He was taken into custody to begin his prison term on 10 May 2021, but was freed early from his jail term in August 2021 after an amnesty reduced his prison term by nine months.

Does Human Rights Defender defend human rights?

Anahit Manasyan, 30 May 2024

Azatutyun.am (RFE/RL)

Officials at the office of the Human Rights Defender Anahit Manasyan told Forum 18 in July 2024 that it could not speak to her directly, citing “procedural rules”.

On 21 May 2026, Forum 18 wrote to the office of Human Rights Defender Manasyan, pointing to the cases of conscientious objectors Davit Nazaretyan and Ivan Mikhailov and the conscientious objector refused alternative civilian service in January 2026. Forum 18 asked:
– What she and her office have done to defend the right not to serve in the armed forces on grounds of conscience in accordance with the law;
– What she has done and is doing now to protect conscientious objectors from punishment for trying to exercise this right.

Forum 18 also asked Manasyan’s office what are the “daily activities” to protect the right not to serve in the armed forces on grounds of conscience it wrote to Forum 18 about in February 2024.

Forum 18 had received no response from the Human Rights Defender’s office by the end of the working day in Yerevan of 22 May 2026.

The Human Rights Defender’s office had claimed to Forum 18 in February 2024 that it conducts “daily activities” to find solutions to “issues related to alternative service”.

In its reply, the Human Rights Defender’s office did not specify what the claimed “daily activities” were. “The Human Rights Defender conducts discussions and cooperates with the competent state authorities related to the issues of alternative military service,” her office told Forum 18. “Regarding written or oral applications addressed to the Defender, appropriate actions are carried out within the scope of the Defender’s powers, which are summarised in the Annual Report or other reports of the Human Rights Defender.”

Asked what action (if any) Human Rights Defender Manasyan would take to defend the rights of conscientious objector Davit Nazaretyan after the Cassation Court rejected his final appeal against his two-year jail term, her office noted that no one had appealed to her over Nazaretyan’s case. Her office claimed it had conducted research into his case, and found that he had been sentenced to a jail term and banned from leaving the country while appeals were pending. Her office did not appear to know that the Cassation Court had already rejected his final appeal.

The Human Rights Defender’s office also did not explain what, if any, action it is taking to end Armenia’s repeated violations of its legally-binding international human rights obligations by jailing conscientious objectors to military service and not respecting their right to a genuinely civilian alternative service.

The Human Rights Defender’s office also insisted that Manasyan “refers to the above-mentioned issues from systemic perspective, outlines the importance of the proper realisation of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion”. It claimed that she is “also conducting analysis of the mentioned issues”.

International standards

The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee has stated in its General Comment 22 that conscientious objection to military service comes under International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Article 18 (“Freedom of thought, conscience and religion”). General Comment 22 notes that if a religion or belief is official or followed by a majority of the population this “shall not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights under the Covenant .. nor in any discrimination against adherents to other religions or non-believers.”

In relation to conscientious objection to military service, General Comment 22 also states among other things: “there shall be no differentiation among conscientious objectors on the basis of the nature of their particular beliefs; likewise, there shall be no discrimination against conscientious objectors because they have failed to perform military service.”

This has been reinforced by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) recognising “the right of everyone to have conscientious objection to military service as a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion”. The OHCHR has also noted in its Conscientious Objection to Military Service guide that ICCPR Article 18 is “a non-derogable right .. even during times of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation”.

In 2022 the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention stated (WGAD-HRC50) that “the right to conscientious objection to military service is part of the absolutely protected right to hold a belief under article 18 (1) of the Covenant, which cannot be restricted by States”. The Working Group also stated: “States should refrain from imprisoning individuals solely on the basis of their conscientious objection to military service, and should release those that have been so imprisoned.”

Various judgments (including against Armenia) of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg have also defined states’ obligations to respect and implement the right to conscientious objection to military service, as part of the right to freedom of religion or belief.

Military service, alternative civilian service

All Armenian men between the ages of 18 and 27 are subject to military conscription. Call-ups take place twice a year, and deferments of service are available in strictly limited circumstances. Military service was generally of 24 months. Parliament approved an amendment to the Military Service Law on 16 December 2025, reducing the service term for future conscripts from 1 January 2026 to 18 months. President Vahagn Khachaturyan signed this into law on 19 December 2025.

Those subject to conscription who object to military service with weapons can legally apply for either:
– alternative military service in the armed forces without weapons, having sworn the military oath. This lasts for 30 months;
– or for alternative civilian service, which is not within or controlled by the armed forces and does not involve swearing the military oath. This lasts for 36 months.

Conscientious objectors who are refused alternative civilian service and who refuse to do alternative military service can be prosecuted under Criminal Code Article 461, Part 1 (“Avoidance of mandatory military or alternative service or conscription”). This carries a jail term of two to five years.

For many years, Armenia jailed everyone unable to perform military service on grounds of conscience, despite a commitment to the Council of Europe to introduce a civilian alternative to military service by January 2004. In May 2013, amendments to the 2003 Alternative Service Law and to the 2003 Law on Implementing the Criminal Code were passed, and a fully civilian alternative service was created. By November 2013, the authorities had freed all the then-jailed conscientious objectors. All were Jehovah’s Witnesses.

Alternative Service Commission

Young men’s applications to be allowed to do alternative civilian service are considered by the Alternative Service Commission. This is a state body chaired by a Deputy Minister of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure (currently Avetik Darbinyan), and made up of deputy ministers from five other ministries, as well as Vardan Astsatryan of the government’s Department for Ethnic Minorities and Religious Affairs.

The Alternative Service Commission meets twice a year, typically considering the cases of about 20 applicants at each six-monthly session. Applicants can be accompanied by a lawyer. The Commission appears to seek information on applicants before the sessions, including by looking at their social media accounts.

After each session, the Commission issues decisions, listing which applicants have been accepted and which rejected. The Justice Ministry published such decisions on its website in 2018 and 2019. Later decisions do not appear to be public.

Jehovah’s Witnesses told Forum 18 in February 2024 that their young men do not have problems opting for alternative civilian service. Since 2013, hundreds of their young men have undertaken alternative civilian service.

However, applications for alternative civilian service from conscientious objectors who are followers of other beliefs are only rarely accepted. Molokans, for example, are a traditionally pacifist Christian religious community which emerged in the 18th century. Like Jehovah’s Witness young men before 2013, Molokan young men were also jailed before Alternative Civilian Service was introduced.

As noted above, Molokan and Baptist conscientious objectors to military service still – against Armenia’s legally-binding international human rights obligations – risk being jailed for their beliefs.

A typical rejection order signed by the Justice Minister (for example in the case of Molokan conscientious objector Ivan Mikhailov in August 2018 – see above) notes that “the applicant failed to justify that his duty to perform mandatory military service is in serious and weighty conflict with his conscience or with his deep and genuine religious faith or other beliefs”.

“The Commission does not give alternative service to Molokans,” a member of the Molokan community told Forum 18 from Yerevan in July 2024. “The last Molokan to be granted alternative service was in about 2015.”

“All are equal before the law”?

The Alternative Service Commission held sessions in January 2026 to consider applications from young men for alternative civilian service. Vardan Astsatryan of the government’s Department for Ethnic Minorities and Religious Affairs insists that “all can be assigned alternative service if they can confirm what their beliefs are – they just need to present their views”.

Astsatryan refused to say why no applicants other than Jehovah’s Witnesses appear to be able to undertake alternative civilian service. “All are equal before the law,” he claimed to Forum 18 on 21 May.

From January to May 2026, 11 young Jehovah’s Witnesses applied to the Alternative Service Commission. “They are currently successfully serving in alternative civilian service,” Jehovah’s Witnesses told Forum 18 from Yerevan on 22 May.

However, Astsatryan refused to say how many applicants the Commission considered in January 2026. “One person was refused, if I remember rightly,” he told Forum 18. He refused to give any further details.

Forum 18 asked the Territorial Administration and Infrastructure Ministry in writing on 21 May:
– How many young men applied to the Commission to its hearings held in 2026;
– Of these applications, how many young men were approved to undertake alternative civilian service and how many were rejected.
Forum 18 had received no response by the end of the working day in Yerevan of 22 May 2026.

January 2026: Commission rejects alternative service application

Young men whose alternative civilian service application is rejected by the Alternative Service Commission are forced to choose between either being prosecuted and possibly jailed (like Davit Nazaretyan and Ivan Mikhailov), or doing a form of military service. Such young men are normally forced to serve in the military.

The Commission rejected the application of a young man (who is not a Jehovah’s Witness) at its sessions in January 2026. Instead of offering him alternative civilian service in line with his conscientious objections, they offered him a non-military role within the army, as a cook or a driver. They said he could serve without weapons but service would last 30 months rather than the 18 months of military service. The young man reluctantly agreed.

The army then took the young man into its ranks. He is currently serving without weapons. Instead of the military oath, to which the young man objected on grounds of conscience, the army devised a special promise for him, someone close to him told Forum 18.

“He wanted not to be in the army at all,” the person close to him told Forum 18. “Others also want alternative civilian service, but in practice officials don’t offer it.”

“A compromise not in accordance with the law”

Such service within the military without weapons and without swearing the military oath is not, under Armenia’s legally-binding international human rights obligations, an adequate way of allowing conscientious objectors to military service to exercise their right to a genuinely civilian alternative service.

“Most of our young men therefore have to serve in the military, though without weapons and without swearing the oath,” the Molokan told Forum 18 in 2024. “They don’t complain, but many would undertake alternative civilian service if they could.” The Molokan noted that allowing those who object to serving with weapons and swearing the oath to serve without either is “a compromise not in accordance with the [Armenian] law”.

The Molokan added that on some occasions, those who had applied for alternative civilian service would be found not to be medically fit for military service. “In those cases they would be given a deferment for five years. We had once such case a month ago.” Human rights defender Isabella Sargsyan described such instances to Forum 18 in 2024 as “a quick fix”.

Some applicants given second chance, others not

The Alternative Service Commission approves applications from Jehovah’s Witness young men who can explain clearly their objection to serving in the military. Some Jehovah’s Witness young men, however, are not able to make their case clearly, an individual close to the process told Forum 18 in 2024.

These Jehovah’s Witness young men then come back to the Alternative Service Commission six months later. Almost all are then able to present their case to be exempted from military service on conscientious grounds clearly and the Commission grants them alternative service.

Molokans and Baptists whose applications are rejected are not allowed to present their case to the Alternative Service Commission a second time. “The Commission issues the decision once and for all,” a Molokan told Forum 18 in 2024. “Further applications are rejected without being considered.”

“Unfortunately, nothing has really changed”

Isabella Sargsyan, 5 October 2023

OSCE/Piotr Dziubak [CC BY-ND 2.0 Deed]

“Unfortunately, nothing has really changed” since the jailing of Davit Nazaretyan in August 2024, says human rights defender Isabella Sargsyan of the Eurasia Partnership Foundation. She has long worked on freedom of religion or belief issues, including the right not to perform military service on grounds of conscience.

Sargsyan calls for reforms to the Alternative Service Commission. “I would like to see a different type of Commission to discuss these issues, not an inter-governmental body, but a more professional body,” she told Form 18 from Yerevan on 21 May 2026.

“The Commission should be more transparent over how decisions are taken, because we couldn’t find much information about who was granted this alternative civilian service and who not,” Sargsyan added. “There should be a better discussion around the decision-making procedures, how the Commission is composed, and how those decisions are made.”

No reduction in alternative civilian service length

Following the reduction from 1 January 2026 of the length of military service from 24 months to 18 months (see above), no moves appear to have yet been enacted to reduce the length either of military service without weapons (30 months) or alternative civilian service (36 months).

International human rights commitments require alternative service not to be “punitive” in length compared to military service. “Its duration shall, in comparison to that of military service, remain within reasonable limits,” the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers declared in April 1987.

“We are aware that individual lawyers have directed inquiries to the relevant authorities, including the Defence Ministry, the Justice Ministry, and Parliament’s Standing Committee on Protection of Human Rights and Public Affairs,” Jehovah’s Witnesses told Forum 18 from Yerevan on 22 May. “However, no official response or indication of any adjustment to the duration of alternative civilian service has been received to date.”

On the afternoon of 22 May, Forum 18 asked Rustam Bakoyan, Acting Chair of Parliament’s Standing Committee on Protection of Human Rights and Public Affairs, whether there are plans to reduce the length of alternative military service and alternative civilian service following the reduction in the length of military service. Forum 18 had received no response by the end of the working day in Yerevan. (END)

More reports on freedom of thought, conscience and belief in Armenia

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