Students, faculty and community members gathered to honor Armenian history and identity.

USC’s Armenian Students Association kicked off Armenian heritage month on Tuesday afternoon with an immersive celebration of Armenian cuisine, traditional dance and live cultural performances.

The opening ceremony marked how far the event has come since its founding just three years ago. What began as a student-led initiative for visibility has grown into a campus-wide tradition supported by the USC Dornsife Institute of Armenian Studies.

“Just a few years ago, this moment did not exist,” said Lori Gaboudian, president of the Armenian Students Association. “What began as a vision rooted in the desire for recognition, visibility and belonging has now become a lasting tradition on this campus.”

The third annual event brought together students, faculty, and community members to celebrate Armenian identity and culture. The opening ceremony at Hahn Plaza highlighted the importance of preserving Armenian tradition, particularly in Los Angeles.

Armenian Heritage Month is observed in April and coincides with the remembrance of the 1915 Armenian genocide which resulted in 1.5 million deaths in the Ottoman empire. Turkey denies the deaths of the constituted genocide, saying those killed were victims of the civil war.

The month serves as both a commemoration and an opportunity to preserve Armenian culture.

“You want to make sure that you preserve our culture, our language, our stories, our history and not just assimilate,” said Lana Tolmajian, a senior studying biomedical engineering.

Armenian Heritage Month at USC is a collaborative initiative between the USC Dornsife Institute of Armenian Studies and the Armenian Students Association, bringing together campus leadership and the Trojan community.

The Armenian Students Association is one of the largest cultural organizations on campus, with hundreds of active members and a range of social, cultural and professional programming throughout the year.

The program featured university leadership guest speakers including remarks from USC Provost Andrew T. Guzman, student leaders and representatives from the Institute of Armenian Studies.

Throughout the event, student organizers emphasized that Armenian Heritage Month is not only a celebration, but also an opportunity to raise awareness.

“I think it’s even more important that we continue to spread awareness,” Tolmajian said, referencing the 2023 displacement of Armenians in Artsakh. “Over 100,000 Armenians had to leave their homes… and even today, we’re still facing discrimination and conflict.”

Los Angeles County is home to the largest Armenian population in the United States, and attendees said growing up in the region shaped their connection to Armenian culture.

“There was such an Armenian presence around me at all times,” Tolmajian said. “It always reminded me how important it is to stay true to my culture, keep my stories, keep my language and continue practicing it.”

The USC Dornsife Institute of Armenian Studies, founded 20 years ago, plays a key role in promoting Armenian scholarship and engagement on campus.

The institute focuses on contemporary Armenian issues, connecting historical scholarship with present-day experiences through research, public programming and student opportunities.

Margarita Baghdasaryan, associate director of the institute, said its mission is “not simply to examine the Armenian experience, but to rethink how it is studied, thought and shared.”

Baghdasaryan added that students encounter Armenian studies as “something alive” through courses, student-worker positions, scholarships and mentorship opportunities.

“So as we celebrate Armenian history month, we are not only looking back—we are looking forward,” Baghdasaryan said. “Forward to new questions, new voices and new ways of connecting Armenian studies to the world around us.”

At a dorm room tucked into the northwest corner of Pepperdine’s George Page Apartments, students step into a slice of home.

Senior Kristina Urfalyan grew up cooking traditional Armenian dishes. Now that she’s a student at Pepperdine, she invites her fellow Armenian students to her dorm where she feeds them the foods they grew up eating.

“For me, sharing a meal is very important,” Urfalyan said. “I love splitting bread — that’s kind of how we say it in Armenian, where it’s like you split bread with someone, you trust them.”

Urfalyan said she’s always had a heart for the kitchen and began learning from a young age — her mom taught her how to make her signature Manti at 8 years old.

When Urfalyan’s grandmother would come down from Fresno to Urfalyan’s home in Las Vegas, she would be working all day in the kitchen — Urfalyan was tied to her hip. She said some of her best memories come from being in the kitchen with her grandmother or mom.

Urfalyan carried that piece of home with her to Malibu.

“I’m someone that absolutely adores cooking,” Urfalyan said. “It’s kind of like my getaway from classes and from work and all the stress that comes with everyday life.”

In her first two years, Urfalyan lived on-campus without a kitchen in her dorm, meaning she would either have to eat the food on-campus or go out and buy food. Not having a kitchen or being able to cook for herself made the switch to university a lot harder, Urfalyan said.

Urfalyan’s friend, senior Suzy Mirzakhanyan, found herself in a similar situation. Unsatisfied with the school’s cafeteria food, she said she started buying food from restaurants, which turned out to be costly. Now, she cooks Armenian food in her dorm — she calls it comfort food.

This year, Urfalyan moved into the George Page Apartments, where she has a kitchen in her dorm. Urfalyan and Mirzakhanyan started cooking at school, for themselves and their friends.

At one point, Mirzakhanyan said her and Urfalyan were cooking food every day. One day, dinner would be at Urfalyan’s dorm, and the next it would be at Mirzakhanyan’s dorm.

Then, Urfalyan and Mirzakhanyan decided to set a standard — they needed to cook at least one Armenian meal every week.

“We make an effort to do it because — I guess our culture feels like home,” Mirzakhanyan said.

Urfalyan’s roommate, senior Elen Akopyan said Urfalyan taught her how to make Manti, and she now uses that recipe with her own family.

Urfalyan invites her friends over to her dorm two to three times a week to share a meal. Typically, she said she’ll decide in the morning if she’s going to cook that day, and then she sends out a text in a group chat with some friends. It isn’t planned days in advance — unless it’s a meal that requires more preparation.

Urfalyan cooks for a big group, even if the group is just five or six people. She said she doesn’t want anyone feeling like they can’t get seconds.

When she goes shopping for food, she said she buys for a group.

“I genuinely feel like a mom of three kids,” Urfalyan said.

Mirzakhanyan said their tight-knit bond comes from their culture.

Their memories might be shared at the dinner table, but it’s not dedicated wholly to the meal. Urfalyan said everyone is kind of doing their own thing — conversing, doing homework, studying and watching Armenian soap operas together.

“We honestly just hang out,” Urfalyan said. “It’s just kind of quality time that we’re all spending together.”

Akopyan said their dinner nights are probably one of their most cherished memories from this current academic year.

“It’s spontaneous, but it’s also just a way for us to have conversation and hang out when the topic isn’t always about school,” Akopyan said.

After dinner, cleaning up is short — five to 10 minutes. Urfalyan said everyone helps contribute to the cleaning process. Usually, at the end of the night, they close off with a fruit board or a cup of tea, maybe some dessert.

Mirzakhanyan cooks for the group as well. She said that it’s been harder for her to cook and host this semester because of school, but that her and Urfalyan would regularly contribute to a night together.

“If she was making dinner, I was hitting dessert, or if she was making something, I was hitting a side, or if I was making dinner, she was bringing a side or dessert,” Mirzakhanyan said.

Urfalyan’s cousin and her best friend are first year students. She doesn’t want them to go through the same dilemma she did, so Urfalyan said she told them to just text her when they want food, and that she’ll have something on the table for them.

“We’re always making an effort to meet up and talk about our week and spend time together,” Mirzakhanyan said. “We genuinely do prioritize that.”

Armenia, a former Soviet republic, and Russia were members of the Soviet Union and were strictly guided by rules and regulations. After the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991, the republics have legitimacy to their sovereignty and territorial integrity. But that has not been the case. Kazakhstan operates a liberal economic system, as do other republics, including Armenia. These republics mostly have a tough time and, to some extent, control from Russia.

At a tense meeting in early April with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Vladimir Putin issued an ultimatum to its neighbor Armenia over maintaining closer ties with the European Union (EU).

“We see that there is a discussion in Armenia about developing relations with the European Union,” Putin said at the meeting with Pashinyan, adding that Moscow treats it “absolutely calmly.” But it should be obvious and honestly stated upfront that membership in a customs union with both the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union is impossible,” Putin told Pashinyan as recorded on camera.

The Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), created in 2015, includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, and it is meant to enable the free movement of goods, capital, and labor among its members. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and others have an increasing interest in getting closer with trade and establishing a working mutual economic cooperation with the EU, with Pashinyan even declaring an intention to join the 27-member bloc in the future.

During the meeting at the Kremlin, Putin followed up on Moscow’s gas supplies to Armenia, saying that Russia now sells gas to its neighbor at a “substantially” lower price than the EU does. ” Gas prices in Europe exceed 600 dollars per 1,000 cubic meters, whereas Russia provides gas to Armenia at 177.5 per 1,000 cubic meters,” he told Pashinyan, adding that “the disparity is vast; the difference is substantial.”

The Case of Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan, one of the Russian neighbors and former Soviet republics, also opens its doors for a broader external expansion. Given its geographical location and combined with current political reforms aimed at transforming its economy from the Soviet system to a more modernized system infused with Western culture of life, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has chosen multi-vector policies, consistently advocating for more openness and improving necessary conditions for attracting foreign businesses and investors to participate in the various economic sectors, including the cultural and educational sectors.

Declaring that the creation of a fair Kazakhstan is its main goal, Tokayev has emphasized that the foreign policy course must also aim at the protection of national interests, the strengthening of mutually beneficial cooperation with all interested states, and international peace and security. As part of promoting a multicultural and friendly society, Kazakhstan has seriously made inbound tourism one of its priority spheres, so it has established a visa-free regime for citizens of 54 countries, including the European Union and OECD member states, the United States, Japan, Mexico, Australia, and New Zealand.

Kazakhstan has a GDP of $179.332 billion and an annual growth rate of 4.5%. Per capita, Kazakhstan’s GDP stands at $9,686. Its increased role in global trade and central positioning on the new Silk Road gave the country the potential to open its markets to billions of people. Further to this, it joined the World Trade Organization in 2015.

According to some reports, Kazakhstan has an abundant supply of accessible mineral and fossil fuel resources. Development of petroleum, natural gas, and mineral extractions has attracted most of the over $40 billion in foreign investment in Kazakhstan since 1993 and accounts for some 57% of the nation’s industrial output (or approximately 13% of gross domestic product).

The Concept of the Foreign Policy of Kazakhstan for 2020–2030, as announced and made public, outlines the following main points:

– An open, predictable, and consistent foreign policy of the country, which is progressive in nature and maintains its endurance by continuing the course of the first president—the country at a new stage of development;

– Protection of human rights, development of humanitarian diplomacy, and environmental protection;

– Promotion of the country’s economic interests in the international arena, including the implementation of state policy to attract investment;

– Maintaining international peace and security;

– Development of regional and multilateral diplomacy, which primarily involves strengthening mutually beneficial ties with key partners, for example, Russia, China, the United States, Central Asian states, and the EU countries, as well as through multilateral structures

– The United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Kazakhstan is the world’s largest landlocked country, located in Central Asia and partly in Eastern Europe. It declared independence on 16 December 1991, thus becoming the last Soviet republic to declare political independence. Nursultan Nazarbayev became the country’s first president. Kazakhstan was the last Soviet republic to declare independence after the Soviet collapse in 1991. With a population of approximately 25 million, Kazakhstan strictly recognizes its political freedom, national interest, and territorial sovereignty.

Comparing EU with EAEU

The European Union (EU) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU/Eurasia Union) are distinct regional blocs with major differences in scope, purpose, and scale. The EU is a deeply integrated economic and political union of 27 democratic, mostly Western European nations, while the EAEU is a Russia-led economic union focusing on trade among post-Soviet states, featuring smaller GDP and less political integration.

Here are key differences: Membership & Leadership: The EU includes 27 mostly Western/Central European countries (e.g., Germany, France). The EAEU consists of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia.

Economic Scale: The EU’s economy is significantly larger—roughly four times larger in GDP than the EAEU (approx. $19.4 trillion vs. $4.8 trillion in 2023).

Integration Level: The EU is both a monetary (for most) and political union with strong democratic institutions, shared policies, and a common market. The EAEU is primarily an economic union focused on free movement of goods, labor, and capital, but it lacks the deep political integration of the EU.

Geopolitics & Values: The EU is built on shared democratic values and legal frameworks (EU law). The EAEU is often seen as a political tool for Russia to retain influence over post-Soviet states.

Conflicts & Stability: EAEU members are closely tied to Russia, which has created tensions in the post-Soviet space, especially following the war in Ukraine. The EU has increasingly become a preferred partnership for Eastern European nations over the EAEU.

According to the Kutafin Law Review, in essence, the EU is a deep political and economic integration project, whereas the EAEU is a smaller, trade-focused, post-Soviet initiative.

Exchanging Thoughts Over Political Sovereignty

The Armenian leader made it clear that when the time comes to make a choice, it will be solemnly made by the citizens of Armenia, without any interference. “And when the processes reach the point where it will be necessary to make a decision, I am sure that we, I mean the citizens of the Republic of Armenia, will make that decision,” Pashinyan told Putin, not mincing words.

With its long-standing influence in the South Caucasus fading and what appears to be the Kremlin’s ongoing intent to have a say in Armenia’s political decision-making, Putin told Pashiyan that Moscow hopes pro-Russian forces will be allowed to compete freely in Armenia’s parliamentary elections set for June.

Without mentioning names, Russia’s president claimed that some of their representatives have been put in custody, saying, “Some are in detention despite having Russian passports.” Putin, however, referred to Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who was arrested last year after calling for the ouster of the government.

Pashinyan, also without naming Karapetyan, noted that Armenian law requires political candidates to hold exclusively Armenian citizenship, adding that “no restrictions” are being imposed on political opposition under such circumstances. “Persons with Russian passports, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, cannot be either a candidate for deputy or a candidate for prime minister,” Pashinyan explained to Putin.

Pashinyan firmly stated to Putin that “Armenia is a democratic country,” where the political processes are ongoing at all times. “In fact, twice a year we hold municipal elections, which are also very politicized, because as a result of our political reforms, people there also vote for or against political parties,” Pashinyan said.

The Armenian prime minister, then, referred to the internet outrage in Moscow and the Kremlin-introduced restrictions on the popular Telegram messaging app. “Our social networks, for example, are 100% free, with no restrictions at all,” Pashinyan told Putin on camera and added that, unlike Russia, there are no political prisoners in Armenia, stating that “in the general context, to be honest, we do not have participants in political processes in places of detention.”

“We have citizens who think that there is too much democracy in Armenia. But this is a matter of principle for us,” Pashinyan said.

Yerevan’s Balancing Act

Armenia’s relations with Russia have grown increasingly strained after Azerbaijan fully reclaimed the Karabakh region in 2023. Decades of bloody conflict ended as the two former bitter rivals embarked on a historic peace process, launching an economic revival in the region amid new stability in the South Caucasus. In 2024, Armenia suspended its membership in the Russia-led Yerevan Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) after Moscow failed to support Yerevan during the 2022 Karabakh escalation.

“In my opinion, the CSTO mechanisms should have been activated (in 2022),” Pashinyan told Putin, adding that “they were not activated, and this, of course, led to the situation that we have in relations with the CSTO.” He confirmed that Armenia is currently not participating in the CSTO for what he described as a “simple reason.”

“We are still unable to explain to our people, our citizens, why the CSTO did not respond, and did not respond despite the obligations that exist under the Collective Security Treaty,” the Armenian leader told Putin.

Putin called Armenian concerns “certain grievances” as he argued that Moscow’s decision not to intervene was on Yerevan and Russia did not see a point in stepping in. “It is obvious that after you accepted in Prague in 2022 that Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan, the CSTO’s intervention in this process, which has acquired an intra-Azerbaijani nature, was simply absolutely wrong in this matter,” Putin told Pashinyan.

“This is not an assessment; I am not saying that this is good or bad. From the point of view of organizing peaceful life, I think that, probably, it made sense,” the Russian president added. “Here we simply need to look for ways to further strengthen relations. But it seems to me that here too we need to finish here,” Putin concluded.

Since reaching an agreement to put an end to almost four decades of a bloody conflict in Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been working on normalizing and strengthening their bilateral relations as well as the cooperation in the region, with one exception. Russia has been notably absent from the Karabakh peace process, both during and after the agreement was reached, and both Yerevan and Baku have been distancing themselves from Moscow while jointly redirecting their foreign policy focus toward the EU and the US.

Tracking the Argumentative Sequence

In this analysis, tracking the argumentative sequence, with notable precision, the significant differences between the European Union and the Eurasian Union, sometimes referred to as the ‘Greater Eurasian Union,’ are as follows:

In either case, Armenia is a sovereign republic; it has its own right to determine the political system of governance, the parameters of economic development, and the shape of its own diplomatic directions with external partners without any restraint or restrictions. Armenia operates within the constitutional framework, and the prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, has the mandate from the electorate of Armenia. The choice of political sovereignty and foreign relations are stipulated in the constitution.

Russia’s political regulatory architecture, the system of restraints and mechanisms of instructing directives, is optional but not necessarily compulsory. The logic that any former Soviet republic must only maintain membership with the Eurasian Union and not at the same time with both is rather illogical, particularly when Russia is a staunch advocate of ‘multipolarism,’ which ascribes to flexible and broad practice and openness to global integration. An argument for making choices based on restrictions does not, precisely, fit into the context of global unity, new liberal architecture, and emerging multipolarism.

While the US’s role in the South Caucasus is expanding, significant political and economic factors argue against a full partnership reset.

US Vice President JD Vance’s trip to the South Caucasus highlighted the rising American interest in the region and placed new focus on the US’s deepening bilateral relationships with Armenia and Azerbaijan, both of which hosted Vance. Meanwhile, Georgia, once the US’s closest partner in the region, found itself left off the itinerary.

These expanding relations were initiated by the US’s role in securing a preliminary peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which was initialled by the leaders of both countries in August 2025. That agreement envisioned a significant role for the US in promoting regional connectivity through the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). The Trump administration is also increasingly involved in expanding economic investment and fostering nascent security relationships with both countries.

Vance’s trip was especially notable for including the announcement that, for the first time ever, the US would complete sales of military equipment to both countries

It is clear the Trump administration is pursuing a policy of actively expanding American arms exports worldwide in order to strengthen the American defense industrial base. Armenia and Azerbaijan are simply opportunities to expand American production within that overarching policy framework.

The peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan is also arguably the only case where the Trump administration’s focus on achieving peace through bilateral negotiations and business deals has enjoyed unalloyed success. Consequently, the administration is eager to take actions that further that process and allow them to publicise that success. It is unclear, however, whether American interest in the region will continue beyond the current administration.

Indeed, while the announcement of the sale of surveillance drones to Armenia and naval patrol boats to Azerbaijan appears to augur a new era in US arms exports to the region, political and economic constraints will limit the South Caucasus’s potential as a market for US defence exports.

Armenian attempts to diversify amidst economic constraints

Prior to the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the overwhelming majority of Armenia’s arms imports came from Russia, which often subsidised Armenia’s purchases. This dynamic has changed significantly in recent years. Relations between Armenia and Russia deteriorated rapidly after Russia’s inaction in the face of continued military pressure from Azerbaijan in the aftermath of the war. Yerevan also lost faith in Russia’s reliability as an arms supplier after Russia failed to deliver weapons systems Armenia had ordered, which Russian officials blamed on the impact of their full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

‘The prior strategy of embedding Armenia within only one major external relationship is seen in Yerevan today as a catastrophic error’, Laurence Broers, Associate Fellow with Chatham House’s Russia and Eurasia Programme, tells OC Media.

As a result, Armenia has sought to diversify its security relationships and, to that end, suspended its participation in the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Armenia has since imported weapons systems from France and India, with the latter becoming the largest provider of arms to Armenia in 2024.

‘French weaponry indicates some European concern for Armenia’s security, while Indian weapon imports do not trigger Russian fears as much as European or American weapons’, Joshua Kucera, a senior analyst with the International Crisis Group, tells OC Media, highlighting how these new partnerships also serve a specific political purpose.

Given its significant geopolitical reorientation in recent years, the Armenian government would likely welcome the opportunity to add the US to its list of security partners. In 2025, the country hosted US military forces for bilateral exercises for the first time. This eagerness for security cooperation includes an openness to purchasing American military equipment, though, as previously mentioned, any opportunity would have to be weighed against further deterioration of relations with Russia. However, economic and political factors constrain Armenia’s ability to dramatically expand its imports of US material.

Economically, Armenia’s central challenge in its long rivalry with Azerbaijan is the considerable material disparity between the two countries. Armenia’s population of 3 million and GDP of $26 billion are each only approximately a third the size of Azerbaijan’s population of 10 million and GDP of $74 billion. This discrepancy means that Armenia must be highly efficient with its limited resources to be capable of matching Azerbaijan’s considerably larger military potential. American military equipment is not renowned for being inexpensive and is almost certainly less cost effective for Armenia than alternative suppliers.

Politically, while tensions have certainly lessened since the initialling of the draft peace agreement, Azerbaijan and Armenia continue to regard each other as their primary security threat. This dynamic means that any extensive weapons sales to Armenia would likely strain relations between the US and Azerbaijan as well as Azerbaijan’s partner, Turkey. As the controversy over Vance’s tweet about the Armenian genocide neatly demonstrates, Trump’s administration prioritises its relationship with Baku and especially Ankara over its relationship with Yerevan, making significant arms sales to Armenia an undesirable prospect for both sides.

Both politics and economics argue against the US emerging as a major arms supplier for Armenia; however, ad hoc deals remain possible, especially in emerging areas such as unmanned systems where US equipment may be more cost competitive.

Azerbaijan’s wider strategic alliances

Like Armenia, Azerbaijan also relied heavily on Russian imports to equip its armed forces in the early post-Soviet era, though by the 2000s, it had a relatively diversified set of arms suppliers. This trend intensified in the years leading up to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, though the US was not one of these diversified suppliers due to Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act, which de-facto banned US security assistance to Azerbaijan.

In contrast, the second Trump administration has been quite clear about its desire to develop a robust security relationship with Azerbaijan. Indeed, defence sales were explicitly mentioned in the US–Azerbaijan Strategic Partnership Charter, signed in February. Washington’s interest in building this security relationship also has much to do with the extensive relationship between Israel and Azerbaijan. As the war between the US and Iran continues to expand, the Trump administration likely sees Azerbaijan as a potential regional security partner.

The economics of the US exporting weapons systems to Azerbaijan are also reasonably sound. Azerbaijan’s extensive oil and gas revenues support a robust defence budget, with the country spending an estimated $3.7 billion on defence in 2024 with recent increases potentially bringing the budget to over $5 billion. The former figure is over twice the size of Armenia’s 2025 defence budget and could enable them to purchase expensive American systems, if permitted by Washington.

However, despite the interest from Washington in expanding American defence exports to Azerbaijan, actual arms purchases are likely to be limited. During the 30 years that Azerbaijan was de-facto banned from receiving American security assistance, Baku invested significant diplomatic energy and economic resources into building defence industrial cooperation with Israel, Turkey, and Pakistan. Israel and Turkey in particular provided the advanced missile and drone systems that enabled Azerbaijani victory in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Meanwhile, Pakistan recently supplied Azerbaijan with JF-17 fighter jets to supplement its existing Russian-made fighters.

‘Baku has multifaceted ties with each of those countries, so the military element is embedded in these wider strategic relationships’, Broers tells OC Media, adding that beyond the specific equipment provided ‘with Israel, this was about breaking the Russian monopoly on arms supplies balancing the Armenian-Azerbaijani rivalry; with Turkey this is about a more rounded military alliance and transfer of NATO know-how and standards; with Pakistan it’s about diversification and joint production potential’.

Beyond the political depth and unique strategic context of each of these relationships, ‘having multiple partners is always better than depending on one power’, Kucera assesses.

These middle powers are viewed by Baku as reliable security partners. While Baku may welcome attempts by the Trump administration to develop a US–Azerbaijan security partnership, it likely does not view Washington as a sufficiently reliable long-term security partner to make extensive purchases of American materiel, nor does it see such a relationship with the US as necessary, given its recent success enabled by its existing partners.

Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act remains on the books, and, while the Trump Administration will likely continue issuing annual waivers to the act, there is no guarantee that future US administrations will continue this practice. The Armenian diaspora in the US remains influential within Congress and it is entirely possible a future US administration might share the Biden administration’s concerns with Azerbaijan’s human rights record. Baku has not forgotten the Biden administration’s re-imposition of Section 907 bans in response to Azerbaijan’s actions during the blockade and subsequent conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023.

Significant arms deals are often at least as much about the underlying bilateral relationship as they are about economics or the technical capabilities of any equipment purchased, and for Azerbaijan, the American relationship is too uncertain to replace its current partners.

Even so, limited purchases are still likely since, as Kucera notes, ‘American weapons, even in symbolic amounts, help the country move past the perceived stigma of Section 907’.

Vance’s trip to Armenia and Azerbaijan highlighted that the US’s role in the South Caucasus is expanding. The announcement of the sales of defence material to both Azerbaijan and Armenia during that visit is a significant development in this regard as it represents a serious commitment by the Trump Administration to be a security partner for each country.

However, significant political, and in Armenia’s case economic, factors argue against the US being able to step into Russia’s old role as the primary provider of arms to the South Caucasus. Instead, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are likely to use whatever military equipment they purchase from the US to supplement militaries that will be primarily equipped with the weaponry of a diverse collection of middle powers that they see as individually more reliable and collectively less risky than relying on any single partner.

The views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent Georgetown University or any employer past or present

https://oc-media.org/could-vances-visit-to-armenia-and-azerbaijan-herald-further-american-weapons-deals/

As an addiction medicine specialist in Armenia, I often meet patients that, lowering their voices, tell me: “Doctor, please don’t let anyone know I am on methadone.”

Addiction treatment in many post-Soviet healthcare systems has historically been associated with shame, stigma, fear of being monitored and distrust toward health institutions. These forms of stigma are not only social, but also embedded in legal frameworks, healthcare structures and everyday interactions, shaping how individuals experience and access treatment. 

This shame persists despite the fact that Opioid Substitution Therapy (OST, also referred to as Opioid Agonist Therapy) is widely recognised as one of the most effective evidence-based treatments for opioid dependence and is recommended as a core component of modern public health responses to opioid dependence.

For decades, Armenians living with opioid dependence have consistently been the second largest group in drug treatment settings, second only to cannabis. Heroin is the drug of choice, with consumers mostly injecting it. In recent years, changing drug markets impacting heroin’s supply in Eastern Europe, as well as the inherent risks to drug injecting, have made accessible and effective treatment more important than ever. 

OST was introduced in 2009 at the National Centre for Addiction Treatment in Armenia (under the Ministry of Health). When it started, only 32 patients received methadone doses; today, around 1,200 patients are enrolled in OST treatment programmes across the country and even within Armenian prisons, with just over half (625 patients) at the National Centre. 

Uptake still lagging

Despite this expansion, increased access has not translated into full uptake among those who could benefit from OST. A significant treatment gap likely remains between those in need of treatment and those who actually receive it. This gap is not only structural, but deeply rooted in stigma, legal barriers, and long-standing social perceptions of addiction. In many post-Soviet contexts, opioid dependence continues to be viewed as a moral failure rather than a medical condition, which directly affects how treatment is perceived and accessed.

In Armenia, OST access is also regionally limited. While Armenia has ten regions, substitution therapy is currently available primarily in the capital, Yerevan, and in only three others – Lori, Shirak (Gyumri), and Syunik. For those living elsewhere, treatment access usually means long travels and greater expenses. Treatment choice is also restricted. OST in Armenia mostly means methadone; there’s little access to alternatives like buprenorphine, particularly in the public settings. This limits the ability to tailor treatment to individual needs and preferences, discouraging some from entering care.

Legal and administrative barriers further complicate access. Many people avoid substitution therapy due to fear of being formally registered as a person with substance dependence. As in many other post-Soviet nations, once you’re in treatment, the label of “drug addict” will follow someone for years, recorded clearly in official documents for law enforcement and other public officials to see.

This registration can have long-term consequences: people can lose their driving licenses or be limited from certain types of employment, such as public service positions, security-related jobs, transport and driving roles, and other positions involving a high level of responsibility. Even if someone’s not using drugs anymore, they may remain under observation for up to five years and be subjected to regular drug testing during that period to be removed from the “addict” registry.

Sadly, little has been done to change public perceptions around drug treatment, particularly of opioids. OST is often perceived by the general public – including family members – and in clinical settings as replacing one drug with another, rather than as a legitimate form of treatment. True “recovery” is only seen as achieving abstinence, with stable life on a medicine still seen as a failure. 

This narrative is incredibly damaging to evidence-based care. In my clinical practice, including my experience working in the OST department between 2019 to 2026, it is not uncommon for family members of those in treatment to oppose substitution therapy or question my or my colleague’s decisions, even urging clinicians to discontinue treatment. There have also been cases in clinical practice, including my own experience, where patients said that family members threw away their take-home methadone doses, throwing their treatment into disarray and potentially causing acute opioid withdrawal.

As a result, many in Armenia delay treatment or avoid it entirely: it’s understandable that some may feel that navigating opioid drug use by themselves may be easier than going through a treatment system that exposes them to long-term legal and social consequences.

Criminalisation continues to play a significant role in shaping these dynamics. When problematic drug use is framed primarily as a criminal issue rather than as a health condition, it reinforces punitive responses and perpetuates stigma. In Armenia, drug criminalisation remains unchallenged: under current government policy, drug use and possession are addressed primarily through legal and punitive measures, and there is no legal framework for the decriminalisation or legalisation of drug use.

In practice, gaps in coordination between health and law enforcement systems can create additional barriers. Patients receiving methadone treatment may be temporarily detained by police on suspicion of illegal possession of methadone until their treatment status is verified. In some cases, this detention can last up to 72 hours. Verification may be completed more quickly on working days, but delays are more likely during weekends on non-working hours, when official confirmation is harder to obtain. Even short disruptions in treatment can negatively affect continuity of care and further discourage engagement.

The need for reform

While comprehensive national data is limited, clinical experience suggests that engagement in substitution therapy is associated with improved social outcomes, including reduced involvement in criminal activity and better reintegration into daily life.

So can we, in Armenia and beyond, make sure that patients feel confident that treatment will be beneficial to them? 

A key turning point came in 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, when Armenia introduced more flexible approaches to opioid substitution therapy (OST). Stable patients – defined as those who are clinically stable on treatment, adhere to prescribed medication, do not exhibit high-risk behaviours, and can safely manage take-home medication – were able to attend clinics once a week, taking one supervised dose at the clinic while receiving take-home doses for the following six days.

This patient-centred adjustment helped improve treatment retention by reducing the burden of daily clinic visits and enabling individuals to maintain employment and social stability. These practices were later reinforced through regulatory changes, with amendments introduced by the Ministry of Health in 2022 allowing take-home medication for multiple days, in some cases covering up to 10 days treatment.

Although Armenia has made important progress toward a more health-oriented drug policy, stigma and criminalisation continue to shape public attitudes and institutional practices. Building on recent reforms requires long-term efforts to improve treatment quality and access while strengthening trust in the healthcare system. Dependence must be recognised as a health condition rather than a moral or legal failing, requiring coordinated responses across healthcare, social services, education, law enforcement, and media.

Reducing stigma should be a central priority. This includes promoting person-centred approaches, eliminating harmful language, and removing legal and administrative barriers that discourage people from seeking treatment due to fear of social or legal consequences. Expanding services beyond major cities, ensuring continuity of care, and supporting early prevention efforts are also key to improving outcomes.

These challenges reflect broader patterns across post-Soviet systems, where drug use has historically been framed as deviant behaviour rather than a medical issue. Yet the effectiveness of opioid substitution therapy depends not only on pharmacology but also on trust: when people trust healthcare providers, they are more likely to seek support, remain in treatment, and rebuild their lives.

Armenia’s experience shows that expanding access to OST is necessary but insufficient without tackling stigma, reforming legal frameworks, and prioritising a comprehensive, health-based response.

https://www.talkingdrugs.org/dont-let-anyone-know-ost-stigma-in-armenias-post-soviet-healthcare-system/