The report condemned Azerbaijan for the destruction of Armenian religious heritage and numerous violations of religious freedom.

The report states that the Azerbaijani government committed gross violations of religious freedom in 2025. Authorities implemented the country’s highly restrictive Freedom of Conscience and Religious Practice Law, which criminalizes unregistered religious activity and grants the government full control over registered religious organizations.

The report states that historic Armenian religious sites in Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding areas remain at risk following Azerbaijan’s reassertion of control over the areas in 2020 and 2023.

As of July 2025, satellite imagery revealed 8 destroyed and 10 damaged religious sites, including churches, cemeteries, and other cultural monuments.

In addition, relatives of Armenian prisoners report that Armenian prisoners are denied access to religious materials, including Bibles, although the Azerbaijani government claims that detainees have access to religious materials.

In February, a delegation from the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) traveled to Azerbaijan to review religious freedom conditions and meet with government officials. Although the Azerbaijani government has expressed willingness to engage in dialog, the country has not made any significant progress since then in implementing USCIRF’s recommendations.

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has recommended that the U.S. government place Azerbaijan on its Special Watch List (SWL) under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) for serious violations of religious freedom. The Commission makes such a recommendation to countries whose governments have committed or tolerated serious violations of religious freedom, even if the abuses do not yet reach the threshold of being designated as a Country of Particular Concern (CPC). According to the report, Azerbaijan, one of 11 countries included in this list (Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Qatar, Turkey, Uzbekistan), is characterized by the following problems:

Discrimination against religious minorities, restrictions on places of worship,

Restrictions on freedom of religious _expression_.

In addition, the commission instructed the government to apply targeted sanctions against Azerbaijani state agencies, such as the Main Department for Combating Organized Crime of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan, and against officials responsible for gross violations of religious freedoms, by freezing the assets of these individuals and/or prohibiting their entry into the United States under financial and visa authorities related to human rights, citing specific violations of religious freedoms.

The Committee also directed the U.S. Government to conclude a Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Department of State and the Government of Azerbaijan to develop and implement strategies to improve religious freedom and other human rights in the country.

Provide funding to programs that document and/or report on religious freedom and other human rights violations in Azerbaijan, such as Voice of America (VOA), Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

The report’s section on Azerbaijan states that the U.S. Congress should:

Set conditions on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and other security assistance to Azerbaijan requiring specific improvements in religious freedom and human rights.

Raise ongoing religious freedom concerns through hearings, meetings, letters, and other actions.

Advocate for the freedom of religion or belief of prisoners of conscience.

Here is the report’s section on Azerbaijan:

AZERBAIJAN

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

KEY FINDINGS

In 2025, Azerbaijan’s government committed severe violations

of religious freedom. Authorities enforced the country’s highly

restrictive religion law, which criminalizes unregistered religious

activities and grants the government full control over registered

religious organizations. The religion law furthermore mandates

the official review and approval of religious materials, restricts who

can engage in missionary activities, and requires state approval of

religious leaders, among other limitations.

In April, law enforcement in Nakhichevan reportedly raided a

Protestant worship service for gathering without state permission.

Courts later reportedly fined five Azerbaijani citizens 1,500 manats

($882) each and fined and deported a family of foreign citizens over

the incident. Also in April, police in Baku reportedly detained mem-

bers of the unregistered religious group Ahmadi Religion of Peace

and Light for unfurling banners with religious slogans and imagery in

a public space. In June, the State Security Service and State Migra-

tion Service announced the deportation of three foreign citizens

for organizing religious meetings and engaging in missionary activ-

ities for “non-traditional religious movements.” In July, Shi’a Muslim

activists claimed that the government had placed restrictions on

Ashura-related religious activities that did not occur on the day the

state-controlled Caucasus Muslim Board recognized as the holiday.

The government continued not to process the registration applica-

tions of several nondenominational Protestant groups and still has

not granted Jehovah’s Witnesses registration outside of Baku.

Azerbaijan has yet to implement an alternative civilian service for

conscientious objectors. Dozens of military-age male Jehovah’s Wit-

nesses who reject military service on religious grounds have received

travel bans that prevent them from leaving the country, and in July,

a court sentenced Jehovah’s Witness Elgiz Ibrahimov to one year

in prison for refusing to serve in the military in accordance with his

religious beliefs. An appeals court later released him on probation.

Azerbaijan continued to unjustly imprison more than 200

Shi’a Muslims who practice their religion outside the government’s

preferred interpretation of Islam. Most Shi’a detainees face dubi-

ous drug-related charges, which authorities have a history of using

to target political dissent. Many Shi’a detainees have accused law

enforcement of torture and other abuse during their arrests and

imprisonment. In June, law enforcement detained and allegedly

abused Elgiz Mammadov, a member of the unregistered Shi’a

group the Muslim Unity Movement (MUM), which the govern-

ment has targeted for years. Authorities had previously arrested

and allegedly sexually assaulted Mammadov in 2022 after he

protested the trial of one of his fellow MUM colleagues. In July,

a court sentenced MUM member Tarlan Sayyadov to three years

in prison on drug-related charges. In August, police arrested

six women reportedly while distributing alms and protesting in

commemoration of the Shi’a holiday of Arba’in. Officers allegedly

threatened the women with sexual assault and forcibly removed

one woman’s hijab.

Historic Armenian religious sites in Nagorno-Karabakh and the

surrounding territories remain at risk following Azerbaijan’s retak-

ing of the territories in 2020 and 2023. As of July, satellite imagery

identified eight destroyed and another 10 damaged religious sites,

including churches, cemeteries, and other artifacts. Additionally,

family members have reported that Armenian prisoners are pre-

vented from receiving religious items, such as the Bible; however,

the Azerbaijani government has claimed prisoners have access to

religious materials.

In February, a USCIRF delegation traveled to Azerbaijan to

survey religious freedom conditions and meet with government

officials. While the Azerbaijani government has been willing to

engage with USCIRF, it has not made any significant progress since

then to address USCIRF’s recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

■ Maintain Azerbaijan on the Special Watch

List for engaging in or tolerating severe

violations of religious freedom pursuant

to the International Religious Freedom

Act (IRFA);

■ Impose targeted sanctions on Azerbaijani

government agencies, such as the Ministry

of Internal Affairs’ Main Department for

Combating Organized Crime (also known

as Bandotdel), and officials responsible for

severe violations of religious freedom by

freezing those individuals’ assets and/or

barring their entry into the United States

under human rights-related financial and

visa authorities, citing specific religious

freedom violations;

■ Enter into a memorandum of under-

standing between the U.S. Department

of State and the Azerbaijani government

to develop and implement strategies

to improve religious freedom and other

human rights within the country; and

■ Allocate funds to programs that document

and/or report on religious freedom and

related human rights violations in Azerbai-

jan, such as Voice of America (VOA), Radio

Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and the

National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

The U.S. Congress should:

■ Set conditions on foreign military financ-

ing and other security assistance to

Azerbaijan, requiring specified improve-

ments in religious freedom and related

human rights;

■ Raise ongoing religious freedom issues

through hearings, meetings, letters, and

other actions; and

■ Advocate for freedom of religion or belief

prisoners of conscience, including sup-

porting individuals in the Tom Lantos

Human Rights Commission’s Defending

Freedoms Project.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Commission Delegation Visit: Baku in February 2025

■ Hearing: Religious Freedom Conditions in Azerbaijan

■ Country Update: Religious Freedom Conditions in Azerbaijan

■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List and Appendix 2

Background

Azerbaijan has an estimated population of 10.6 million. Azerbaijan has

no official state religion. Approximately 96 percent of the population

identify as Muslim, composed of around 65 percent Shi’a and 35 per-

cent Sunni. The remaining four percent of the population consists of

atheists, Armenian Apostolic, Baha’is, Catholics, Georgian Orthodox,

Jehovah’s Witnesses, Jews, members of the International Society for

Krishna Consciousness, Molokans, Protestants, and Russian Orthodox.

Civil Society Crackdown

Azerbaijan’s ongoing repression of independent civil society, espe-

cially journalists and human rights defenders, has resulted in less

reporting and credible information on religious freedom and related

human rights within the country. In March, authorities arrested Bashir

Suleymanli, head of the Civil Rights Institute, one of Azerbaijan’s

remaining human rights organizations. In May, authorities arrested

VOA journalist Ulviyya Guliyeva (known as Ulviyya Ali) on spurious

smuggling charges in retaliation for her work. Guliyeva had consis-

tently reported on the human rights issues in Azerbaijan, including

the detention of Shi’a Muslim activists. During Guliyeva’s interroga-

tion, police allegedly physically assaulted her and threatened her

with sexual violence. In June, a court sentenced seven journalists

to between seven and nine and a half years in prison on fabricated

charges tied to their alleged work for Abzas Media, a local indepen-

dent Azerbaijani news outlet that reports on human rights issues.

As of the end of the reporting period, Azerbaijan was imprisoning

around 25 journalists.

International Bodies and Mechanisms

European bodies regularly highlighted Azerbaijan’s human rights

record, including on cases related to religious freedom. In July, the

European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ordered Azerbaijan to

compensate Vugar Rafiyev for violating his freedom of religion or

belief after authorities fined him and others for gathering to study the

writings of Muslim theologian Said Nursi in 2017. In September, the

Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhu-

man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) visited Azerbaijan

to examine detainee conditions. The CPT had criticized Azerbaijan in

2024 for failing to cooperate with the organization and implement its

recommendations. In October, the ECHR ruled that Azerbaijan had

wrongfully disbarred human rights lawyer Yalchin Imanov for publicly

commenting in 2017 on torture allegations made by his client, MUM

leader Abbas Huseynov.

Key U.S. Policy

U.S.-Azerbaijani bilateral relations primarily focused on securing a

peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, with the U.S.

government playing a mediating role. In August, President Donald J.

Trump hosted Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime

Minister Nikol Pashinyan at the White House for peace talks. There,

both countries entered into memoranda of understanding with the

United States meant to facilitate peace through economic develop-

ment, trade, and defense cooperation.

The Trump administration’s cuts to broader human rights

programming and U.S.-funded international media impacted organi-

zations that documented or reported on religious freedom violations

in Azerbaijan. A funding freeze for the U.S. Agency for Global Media

resulted in the shutdown of VOA and a major reduction in reporting

from RFE/RL. Organizations receiving funding from NED reported

major disruptions to their operations as NED’s funding was temporar-

ily paused amid the administration’s review of foreign aid.

Congress elevated human rights concerns in Azerbaijan through-

out the year, including related to religious freedom. In March, 60

bipartisan members of Congress urged U.S. Secretary of State

Marco Rubio to enforce prohibitions on U.S. military assistance to

Azerbaijan under Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act in part

due to Azerbaijan’s destruction of Armenian religious heritage in

the Nagorno-Karabakh region. In April, Representative Chris Smith

(R-NJ) led a Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission hearing on human

rights in Azerbaijan following its hosting of the United Nations’

annual climate conference. In July, more than 80 bipartisan mem-

bers of Congress urged Secretary Rubio to ensure the safe return of

Armenians displaced during Azerbaijan’s 2023 military campaign in

Nagorno-Karabakh. The letter mentioned Azerbaijan’s destruction of

Armenian religious sites in the region.

In September, Representatives Dina Titus (D-NV) and Gus Bili-

rakis (R-FL) reintroduced the Azerbaijan Sanctions Review Act (H.R.

5369), which, if passed, would require the Trump administration to

determine whether Azerbaijani officials mentioned in the bill par-

ticipated in human rights abuses and qualified for sanctions under

relevant U.S. law. Some of the Azerbaijani judges mentioned in the

bill have been involved in sentencing Shi’a Muslim activists. Members

of both the House and Senate introduced bipartisan resolutions con-

demning Azerbaijan’s crackdown on civil society and mistreatment of

academic and political activist Gubad Ibadoghlu, who faces charges

in relation to his alleged possession of religious materials.

The U.S. Department of State last placed Azerbaijan on its Spe-

cial Watch List under IRFA for severe violations of religious freedom

on December 29, 2023.

AZERBAIJANChair Vicky Hartzler Dissent on Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan should be designated a Country of Particular Concern

rather than Special Watch List due to its ongoing, egregious, and

severe violations of religious freedom. The country outwardly claims to

support religious freedom, yet inwardly does the opposite. It tortures

its citizens, controls religious activity, expels independent media and

the Red Cross, and destroys religious heritage sites.

Control of religion involves government approval for the pub-

lication and distribution of religious materials, requirements on the

registration of churches, appointments by the government of imams

to mosques, and government writing of sermons for Muslim services.

Shi’a religious actors imprisoned for their faith have been

subjected to beatings, threats of rape, and detention in horrid con-

ditions. The nearly two dozen Armenian Christian prisoners from

Nagorno-Karabakh, who were tried behind closed doors without

adequate legal counsel, have received beatings, psychological abuse,

lack of access to medical care and proper food, denials of Bibles,

and the erasure of cross tattoos through burning. Police are not held

accountable for these actions.

In addition, Azerbaijan continues to destroy religious monu-

ments and churches in Nagorno-Karabakh, erasing over 2,000 years

of Christian presence in that area. Satellite imagery has identified eight

destroyed and another 10 damaged religious sites as of July, including

churches, cemeteries, and other artifacts.

Azerbaijan’s treatment of religion and its people needs to

change. If Azerbaijan wants to be a full partner with the United States

and advance shared economic and strategic goals, it needs to take

meaningful steps to truly embrace religious freedom

Washington, DC – The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) reiterates its recommendation for the U.S. Department of State to place Turkey on its Special Watch List for severe violations of religious freedom. This recommendation echoes actions taken by the European Court of Human Rights and European Parliament this month in response to Turkey targeting foreign Christians.

“Turkey’s arbitrary labeling of foreign-born Protestant Christians as national security threats is meant to intimidate the Christian community and prevent them from gathering for worship. Everyone, regardless of residency status, has the right to freedom of religion or belief under international law,” said Chair Vicky Hartzler. “The U.S. administration should maintain the momentum President Trump made in his September meeting with President Erdoğan and push for tangible improvements to Turkey’s religious freedom record, including an end to its repressive tactics against Christians.”

Turkey maintains several laws and policies restricting religious freedom for religious minorities, including both religious minority groups and secularists. For example, authorities prevent Christian communities from training their clergy domestically, obstruct the registration of Alevi, Protestant, and Jehovah’s Witness houses of worship, and refuse to grant legal personality and full autonomy to religious communities. The government also imposes its preferred interpretation of Islam on the population, regardless of religion or belief, prosecuting those it deems to have expressed offensive religious views. Additionally, authorities hinder the exemption of students, including dissenting Muslims, from state-mandated courses on Sunni Islam.

“We welcome steps European bodies have taken to hold Turkey accountable for its systematic violations of religious freedom,” said USCIRF Vice Chair Asif Mahmood. “We urge the U.S. government to prioritize freedom of religion or belief as part of its bilateral relations with Turkey and raise with Turkish government officials the obstacles to religious minorities’ access to houses of worship and clergy, such as barriers to continued legal residency and restrictions on clerical institutions including the Theological School of Halki.”

In its 2025 Annual Report, USCIRF recommended that the State Department place Turkey on the Special Watch List for severe violations of religious freedom. In August 2025, USCIRF held a hearing on freedom of religion or belief in Turkey.

Here is the report’s section on Turkey:

TURKEY

USCIRF–RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL WATCH LIST

KEY FINDINGS

In 2025, the government of Turkey (Türkiye) engaged in systematic

and ongoing severe violations of religious freedom, consistent

with the previous year. At the same time, the administration

of President Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an continued its dialogue with

certain historical religious communities, including negotiations

with the Eastern Orthodox Christian Church to potentially reopen

the Halki Theological School, which closed in 1971 in response to

government policies. The government also continued restoring

some historical houses of worship, with the Ministry of Culture

and Tourism beginning renovations on Cappadocia’s medieval St.

George Church as part of a tourism promotion campaign. However,

many religious communities did not substantially benefit from such

measures, with several—including Alevis, Protestant Christians,

and Jehovah’s Witnesses—unable to secure legal recognition as

religions or approval to register, build, or restore houses of worship

for day-to-day use.

Amid a large-scale government crackdown on political expres-

sion in support of opposition leaders, authorities also systematically

violated religious freedom by punishing secularist sentiment in state

institutions and continuing to enforce Article 216 of the Turkish

Penal Code as a de facto law against blasphemy. In January, the

Ministry of Defense officially dismissed five new lieutenants and

their three superior officers for choosing a secularist oath for their

swearing-in ceremony. The government also monitored online

activity for perceived insults to Islam and prosecuted religious

dissenters under Article 216(3) for “incitement of hatred toward

another group based on religious differences.” For example, in

June, the Ministry of the Interior arrested and detained at least

four employees of the satirical magazine LeMan for publishing a

cartoon that rioters decried as an alleged caricature of the Prophet

Muhammad. Ministry of Justice officials also announced their inves-

tigation of the journalists for “publicly insulting religious values.” In

˙September, the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office charged

YouTube interviewer Bog˘aç Soydemir and his guest Enes Akgündüz

with “inciting hatred and enmity or insulting a segment of the

public” for reading aloud a viewer-submitted joke relating to the

Prophet Muhammad. In contrast to these and other state restric-

tions on religious _expression_, in March, Turkey’s top appeals court

overturned the conviction of a man who had publicly vowed to kill

Jews, Americans, and Kurds.

The national legislature also imposed additional, systematic

restrictions on freedom of religion or belief (FoRB). In June, the par-

liament enacted a legislative amendment expanding the authority

of the state-controlled Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) to

ban the distribution of Qur’an translations it considers inconsistent

with Islamic principles. Prison authorities, too, restricted access to

Qur’ans, other religious literature, and daily Islamic ablutions for

some defendants, such as former detainee Aysu Öztas¸ Bayram.

Alevi advocates continued raising their own concerns over the

scope of the Diyanet, pointing to its almost exclusive emphasis on

Sunni Muslim institutions and communities—affording them official

recognition as a religion and providing them with public funding

and support for which Alevis, as part of a designated “cultural”

tradition, remained ineligible.

The government reportedly intensified a multiple-year cam-

paign invoking spurious national security concerns to cut off the

legal residency status of at least 375 foreign national Christian

clergy, their family members, and other religious workers, to date.

Throughout 2025, authorities continued to use immigration codes

N-82 and G-87 to designate these clergy and laity as “national

security threats,” barring them from renewing their residency

status or reentering Turkey after travel abroad. These religious

leaders had long resided lawfully in the country, serving Turkish

Protestant Christian communities in part due to ongoing govern-

ment restrictions on domestic Christian clergy training programs

and educational institutions. Protestant Christians and Jehovah’s

Witnesses reported additional obstacles to their legal recognition

and access to houses of worship, with officials thwarting both their

applications for new construction and their attempts to repurpose

disused historical churches for their regular worship needs.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

■ Include Turkey on the Special Watch List,

or SWL, for engaging in or tolerating

severe violations of religious freedom

pursuant to the International Religious

Freedom Act (IRFA);

■ Link future U.S. security assistance and

bilateral trade policies to improvements

of religious freedom in Turkey; and

■ Capitalize on the U.S-Turkey bilateral rela-

tionship to stress the importance to FoRB

in Turkey of ceasing national security bans

on foreign national clergy and easing

restrictions on clergy training programs

and institutions, registration of religious

groups, and access to houses of worship.

The U.S. Congress should:

■ Hold hearings on religious freedom in Tur-

key and send congressional delegations to

the country to raise specific issues, including

the repression of FoRB in public education,

the denial of U.S. clergy from re-entering

the country on false security threats, and

conditions for refugees in Turkey who have

a credible fear of expulsion back to religious

persecution in their home countries; and

■ Invoke its legislative authority to conduct

an investigation into Turkey’s enforcement

of Article 216 of the Penal Code as a de

facto blasphemy law to inform future leg-

islation addressing this issue.

KEY USCIRF RESOURCES & ACTIVITIES

■ Hearing: Freedom of Religion or Belief in Turkey

■ Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List and Appendix 2

Background

Turkey’s distinct legacy of political secularism is a founding principle

of the 102-year-old republic, reflected in the constitution’s emphasis

on the secular nature of the state and its acknowledgment of free-

dom of religion and conscience. However, both demographic and

political trends have contributed to a recent increase in state-spon-

sored and social marginalization of non-Sunni Muslims. Turkey

classifies 99.8 percent of its almost 85 million population as Muslim,

including an estimated 10–25 million Alevis—many of whom do not

consider themselves Muslim. Ja’fari Shi’a Muslims constitute a tiny

minority of the population, and the government regards less than

one percent of the population as non-Muslim, including Greek and

Syriac Orthodox Christians, Roman and Chaldean Catholic Chris-

tians, Armenian Apostolic and Protestant Christians, Baha’is, Jews,

Yazidis, and others.

The government maintains formal relationships with some of

these religious minorities, partly in interpretation of the 1923 Treaty

of Lausanne, which acknowledged “[non-Muslim] minorities” with

longstanding ties to the former Ottoman Empire. In 2025, such rela-

tions included President Erdog˘an’s condolences in January to Turkish

Jewish communities upon the death of the country’s Chief Rabbi Rav

Isek Haleva. In November, President Erdog˘ an welcomed Pope Leo

XIV, who visited Turkey for the global celebration of the 1,700th anni-

versary of the Council of Nicaea. The pontiff met with the Ecumenical

Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew I of the Eastern Orthodox

Church, as well as other Turkish Christian communities.

Other Government Policies Restricting FoRB

Eastern Orthodox Church members continued to await the results of

protracted negotiations between church leaders and the government

of Turkey to set a public date for the reopening of the Halki School, 54

years after government policies induced its closure. In the meantime,

Eastern Orthodox Christians, like their Protestant and other Christian

counterparts, remained ineligible for domestic training, resorting to

seminary programs abroad.

TURKEY

In other forms of education, a lack of religious choice and diver-

sity remained a major concern for Christian, Alevi, Shi’a Muslim, and

secularist parents. Even as new research revealed a significant decline

in the number of Turks who describe themselves as devout and an

increase in those who identify as atheists or nonbelievers, public

schools continued to require the majority of pupils to take courses in

religion, pursuant to the constitution. In light of other state policies

blocking Alevis, atheists, Protestant Christians, and others—especially

converts from Islam—from obtaining accurate and official documen-

tation of their religious identity, many pupils from these backgrounds

faced misidentification as Sunni Muslims and, consequently, compul-

sory coursework on the tenets of Islam.

Key U.S. Policy

In 2025, the administration of President Donald J. Trump maintained

the United States’ strategic bilateral relationship with Turkey. How-

ever, the administration’s pause on foreign assistance in 2025 had an

immediate impact on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Tur-

key, such as the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC)

that had supported people seeking protection from severe religious

persecution in their home countries.

In March, the House Foreign Affairs Europe Subcommittee held a

hearing on Turkey. In June, the Tom Lantos Human Rights Committee

held a hearing on human rights in Turkey, citing USCIRF’s 2025 Annual

Report recommendation that the United States add Turkey to the

Special Watch List.

In September, the administration took several measures to high-

light religious freedom in Turkey. Michael J. Rigas, deputy secretary

of state for Management and Resources, hosted an event in honor of

Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I. The next day, the ecumenical

patriarch and President Trump met and reportedly discussed chal-

lenging religious freedom conditions for Christians in Turkey. Later

that month, President Trump received President Erdog˘an, affirmatively

raising the question of the Halki School’s potential reopening