Armenia’s European agenda today is shaped not only by political declarations but also by concrete initiatives — new economic packages, trade preferences and high-level visits. From political dialogue to economic cooperation, from infrastructure programmes to the security sector, the bilateral agenda continues to expand and deepen rapidly.
In an interview with Armenpress, Alberto Turkstra, Project Director of the Brussels-based analytical and public relations project Diplomatic World, shared his views on the current agenda of Armenia-EU relations, including the significance of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s regional visit, the EU’s economic initiatives and the new realities taking shape in the South Caucasus.
Nevertheless, according to the Belgian expert, the intensification of Armenia’s European direction should be seen not as a sharp geopolitical turn by Yerevan, but as the logical continuation of its foreign policy diversification.
-The President of the European Commission visited Azerbaijan and Armenia. To what extent was Ursula von der Leyen’s visit symbolic, and to what extent did it have practical significance? What could it bring to bilateral relations?
-The visit by Ursula von der Leyen was significant both symbolically and practically.
Symbolically, it demonstrated that the European Union considers the South Caucasus a region of growing strategic importance and intends to remain an active political actor there. The presence of the President of the European Commission — in Armenia’s case, just a few weeks after her previous visit to Yerevan on 4 and 5 May to attend the first EU-Armenia Summit and the meeting of the European Political Community — sent a clear message that both Armenia and Azerbaijan are important partners for the EU, albeit in different ways and with different priorities.
For Armenia, the visit confirmed high-level European political support at a time when Yerevan is seeking to diversify its foreign policy and reduce excessive dependence on any single external actor. It also reinforced the EU’s recognition of Armenia’s reform agenda and its commitment to closer engagement with European institutions.
The timing of the visit was equally important. It came shortly after the first EU-Armenia Summit and against the backdrop of the initialling of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement, as well as continued efforts to normalise Armenia-Türkiye relations. Taken together, these developments create more favourable conditions for regional cooperation and reinforce the EU’s interest in supporting long-term stability.
From a practical perspective, the visit was accompanied by several concrete initiatives rather than serving solely as an _expression_ of political support. In addition to reaffirming cooperation in infrastructure, digital transformation, transport connectivity and energy diversification, President von der Leyen announced new Autonomous Trade Measures that would liberalise approximately 80% of Armenian exports to the EU. These measures have the potential to help Armenian businesses diversify their export markets and reduce dependence on traditional trading partners.
For Azerbaijan, EU engagement remains focused primarily on energy cooperation, transport corridors and regional connectivity. The EU has a strong interest in a stable South Caucasus, as lasting peace is essential to the success of connectivity initiatives linking Europe with the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
-In your opinion, what is driving the current unprecedented intensification of Armenia-EU relations and the deepening of cooperation? How would you assess the current state of these relations?
-The current acceleration of Armenia-EU relations is the result of a combination of geopolitical, security and domestic factors.
The most important driver has been the fundamental transformation of Armenia’s security environment following the conflicts with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. These developments exposed Yerevan’s growing dissatisfaction with its traditional security arrangements, particularly the perception that the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) failed to provide the necessary support when Armenia requested assistance. As a result, Armenia has sought to diversify its external partnerships and strengthen its strategic autonomy.
At the same time, the European Union has become increasingly interested in expanding its role in the South Caucasus. The region has acquired renewed strategic importance because it connects Europe with the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, Central Asia and beyond. In this context, connectivity initiatives such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) have become central to the EU’s broader connectivity strategy. The South Caucasus is therefore viewed not only through a security lens but also as a corridor for trade, energy diversification and transport.
A third factor is the compatibility between Armenia’s domestic reform agenda and European priorities. Democratic governance, judicial reform, anti-corruption efforts, institutional modernisation and the strengthening of the rule of law have created a solid foundation for closer cooperation with the EU.
Today, Armenia-EU relations are at their most advanced stage since Armenia regained its independence. Political dialogue has intensified significantly, economic cooperation has expanded, and collaboration increasingly extends beyond traditional areas to include security resilience, border management, digital transformation and connectivity.
A particularly important milestone was the first-ever EU-Armenia Summit earlier this year, which elevated political dialogue to a new level and signalled that the relationship is becoming increasingly strategic rather than being confined to the implementation of existing agreements. The summit builds on the adoption of the new EU-Armenia Strategic Agenda in 2025, which provides a comprehensive framework for future cooperation.
The EU has also backed its political commitments with tangible initiatives, including the Resilience and Growth Plan for Armenia, Global Gateway investments, support through the European Peace Facility, and the announcement of Autonomous Trade Measures that will liberalise around 80% of Armenian exports to the EU.
However, it is important to maintain realistic expectations. Armenia is not yet an EU candidate country, and accession remains a long-term possibility rather than an immediate prospect. The current process should therefore be understood primarily as deepening European integration through stronger institutions, improved competitiveness and the gradual alignment of Armenia with European standards, rather than as a pathway to imminent EU membership.
-In your opinion, how could Armenia’s growing engagement with Europe affect the balance of power in the South Caucasus?
-A stronger European orientation by Armenia could gradually reshape the balance of power in the South Caucasus, although this should not be interpreted as an immediate geopolitical realignment.
Its most significant consequence would be greater diversification of external influence in a region historically dominated by Russia and increasingly shaped by Türkiye. Expanded EU engagement provides Armenia with additional diplomatic options, economic resources, technical expertise and institutional support.
For Armenia, closer cooperation with the EU represents an effort to increase its strategic autonomy rather than replace one external dependency with another. The objective is diversification: creating greater room for manoeuvre by developing partnerships with multiple actors, including the EU, the United States, France, India, Iran and others.
Recent diplomatic developments may reinforce this process. The initialling of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement and the gradual normalisation of Armenia-Türkiye relations create more favourable conditions for regional connectivity. If these processes continue, they could significantly enhance the effectiveness of European investment and infrastructure initiatives in the South Caucasus.
Recent progress in reopening regional transport links also illustrates this potential. The renewed use of the Akhalkalaki-Kars railway for Armenian exports and imports demonstrates how pragmatic cooperation can generate tangible economic benefits while complementing broader European connectivity initiatives.
Nevertheless, the regional balance of power will continue to depend on the interaction among Armenia, Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Russia, Iran and the European Union. Armenia’s closer relations with Europe do not eliminate existing geopolitical realities. Russia remains an important economic partner, Türkiye remains a major regional actor, and Azerbaijan retains significant geopolitical influence through its energy resources and strategic location.
Ultimately, the key question is whether the European Union can make Armenia’s European orientation economically and institutionally sustainable, rather than simply politically attractive. That will require long-term investment in economic resilience, connectivity, security cooperation and institutional development.
-Do you consider it possible for Armenia to successfully maintain its balanced foreign policy while simultaneously deepening relations with the EU and maintaining cooperation with the Russian Federation?
-Yes, although maintaining this balance is becoming increasingly challenging.
Armenia has traditionally pursued a multi-vector foreign policy, maintaining relations with Russia, the European Union, the United States, Iran and other partners. For a small, landlocked country situated in a highly complex geopolitical environment, diversification is a rational strategy because it reduces dependence on any single external actor.
However, the international environment has become increasingly polarised, particularly since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. As Armenia expands cooperation with the EU in areas such as governance, resilience, institutional reform and economic integration, differences with Moscow are likely to persist.
At the same time, a complete rupture with Russia is neither realistic nor desirable in the short term. Russia remains Armenia’s largest economic partner, and the two countries remain closely connected through trade, energy, investment, labour migration and financial flows. Armenia’s membership of the Eurasian Economic Union also creates institutional constraints, making deeper European integration more complex.
Armenia’s current approach should therefore be understood not as a wholesale geopolitical reorientation but as an effort to rebalance its foreign policy. The objective is to reduce excessive dependence on a single partner while preserving constructive relations with multiple actors wherever possible.
The success of this strategy will ultimately depend on Armenia’s diplomatic skill, the European Union’s willingness to provide consistent and sustained political and economic support, and Russia’s response to Armenia’s diversification efforts.
-To what extent can the economic support packages and trade preferences announced by the European Union transform Armenia’s economic opportunities?
-EU financial assistance and trade preferences have the potential to significantly strengthen Armenia’s long-term economic prospects, although their impact should be viewed as part of a gradual transformation rather than an immediate solution.
European support can contribute to infrastructure development, digitalisation, energy diversification, support for small and medium-sized enterprises, and improvements to the overall business environment. Taken together, these measures can increase Armenia’s attractiveness to both European and international investors.
Trade diversification is particularly important. Armenia’s economy remains heavily integrated with Russia, and recent trade disruptions have highlighted the risks associated with excessive dependence on a single market. The Autonomous Trade Measures announced by the European Commission represent an important step towards addressing this challenge. Once adopted, they will liberalise approximately 80% of Armenian exports to the EU, creating new opportunities for Armenian producers while supporting sectors affected by recent Russian trade restrictions.
Beyond their immediate commercial impact, these measures will encourage Armenian businesses to adapt to European regulatory and quality standards, thereby improving competitiveness and export capacity over the longer term.
Nevertheless, Armenia cannot realistically replace its economic ties with Russia overnight. A sudden withdrawal from Russia-centred economic structures, including the Eurasian Economic Union, would create significant short-term risks related to trade, energy, labour migration and financial stability. The most realistic scenario is therefore one of gradual diversification rather than abrupt substitution.
Over the medium to long term, deeper cooperation with the European Union could reduce Armenia’s structural vulnerabilities and contribute to a more balanced and resilient economic model. Success, however, will depend not only on continued European support but also on Armenia’s ability to implement reforms, strengthen governance, make effective use of available funding, and capitalise on the opportunities created by improving regional connectivity and the ongoing normalisation processes in the South Caucasus.