18-year-old Davit Minasyan, a participant in the incident in Saint Anna Church, will be detained for 2 months

Garnik Zakarian

18-year-old student Davit Minasyan, who participated in the incident with Nikol Pashinyan in Saint Anna Church, was detained for 2 months by the decision of judge Mnatsakan Martirosyan.


To remind, he was arrested on Sunday after the incident in Saint Anna Church, when, according to the law enforcement officers, he tried to hit Pashinyan.


The CC reported that a public criminal prosecution was initiated against 3 persons in connection with the incident that took place in the Saint Anna Church.

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The condition of the detained 18-year-old Davit’s mother worsened in the court yard

Emil Karabekian
Լուսանկարը՝ aysor.am

Davit Minasyan, one of the twin brothers involved in the incident with Nikol Pashinyan in St. Anna Church, was detained for 2 months by the decision of judge Mnatsakan Martirosyan.


After hearing the news about her son’s arrest, Davit’s mother, Ms. Gayane’s health condition worsened.


An ambulance approached the court yard to provide medical aid, but Mrs. Gayane refused medical treatment.


It should be reminded that the ban on absenteeism was chosen against one of the brothers, Mikael Minasyan, the day before.


In a conversation with journalists, lawyer Armen Melkonyan said that they have not yet received the court’s justifications regarding the detention.


“They find that the 12th grade student should be in custody, but a number of people accused of particularly serious crimes can be under administrative control. The judge did not take anything into account,” said the lawyer, noting that they will definitely appeal the decision.

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Prime Minister of Armenia receives newly appointed Head of EU Civilian Mission

Hagop Kamalian
Commonspace.eu
April 1 2026

On Tuesday (31 March), the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, received the newly appointed Head of the European Union Civilian Mission to the Republic of Armenia, Satu Koivu.

The Prime Minister congratulated Ms. Koivu on assuming the responsible position and highlighted the activities of the EU Civilian Mission. Nikol Pashinyan emphasised that the Armenia-EU relations are of a dynamic development nature and emphasised the EU’s consistent support for the development of democratic institutions.

Satu Koivu thanked him for the warm welcome and touched upon the activities of the EU Civilian Mission. She expressed confidence that close cooperation and active dialogue with the partners of the Armenian Government will continue.

During the meeting, the interlocutors touched upon issues related to the establishment of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as ensuring stability in the region.

Source: commonspace.eu with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia

https://www.commonspace.eu/news/prime-minister-armenia-receives-newly-appointed-head-eu-civilian-mission


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Armenian leader meets Putin in the Kremlin

Nahapetian Samvel
Commonspace.eu
April 1 2026

Armenian prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, met at the Kremlin in Moscow, on Wednesday 1, April, with Russian president Vladimir Putin.

The current state and prospects of Russian-Armenian strategic partnership and alliance, integration cooperation in the Eurasian region, and current issues on the regional agenda, in particular the development of economic and transport-logistics ties in the South Caucasus, were discussed, according to the Kremlin website.

In his remarks before the meeting, Prime Minister Pashinyan said our relations with the Russian Federation are very deep, they are very important to us, and, in my opinion, they are developing dynamically in the context of the new realities in our region, when peace has finally been established between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

And I think this has a positive impact on our relations with the Russian Federation, because for the first time since our independence, we have a railway connection with the Russian Federation. We import goods from Russia via Azerbaijan by rail. I hope we will also export in the near future. This, of course, strengthens our traditional economic ties, and it strengthens our ties within the Eurasian Economic Union.

Regarding the European Union, of course, we know that, in principle, membership in the two associations is incompatible. But what we’re doing and the agenda we have, at least for now, are compatible. That’s a fact. And as long as there’s an opportunity to combine these agendas, we will. And when processes develop to the point where a decision must be made, I’m confident that we, the citizens of the Republic of Armenia, will make that decision.

Of course, in this context, our relations with the Russian Federation have never been and never will be in question, because, as I have already said, these ties and relations are very deep and not subject to discussion.

Of course, we cooperate in the energy sector. We traditionally have very strong ties and cooperation here, too. I must say that we are currently working very closely with the Russian side to develop [interaction] in the area of new technologies—I mean new technologies in the energy sector, because new energy technologies, solar energy, and so on, are developing very well in Armenia. You know that we are also discussing the construction of a new nuclear power plant with the Russian Federation. But we are completely transparent on these matters, because we do not hide the fact that we are discussing these issues not only with our Russian partners but also with other partners, because we are looking for the most advantageous offer for the Republic of Armenia.

As I already said, peace has been established between Armenia and Azerbaijan. You mentioned President Trump, and it’s clear he contributed to this process. But it’s also clear that you personally played, and continue to play, a key, very important role in the normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. You’ve always been supportive throughout all these processes; we’ve always been in close contact, and I’ve always kept you informed periodically of ongoing developments.

And by the way, last August, when I returned from Washington and called you, I said that what happened in Washington also opened up new opportunities for our relations, and now that’s a fact. I already mentioned the railway connection between Russia and Armenia. We’ve been working on this issue for decades, but unfortunately, we’ve never been able to reach such a conclusion.

Regarding issues related to Karabakh, I have already very transparently and publicly announced, stated in the Republic of Armenia, that we should not continue the Karabakh movement because peace has already been established between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia and Azerbaijan recognized each other’s territorial integrity, political independence, and sovereignty on the basis of the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1991, which means that we mutually recognize that an independent Armenia is 100 percent identical to Soviet Armenia, and an independent Azerbaijan is 100 percent identical to Soviet Azerbaijan. And I think this is a fairly solid foundation for the further development of peace. And, of course, I want to once again thank you for the support I have always felt in the process of establishing peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Regarding Karabakh: we have discussed this repeatedly, primarily in a working format. Yes, we recognized Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. But we did so only after the Russian Federation’s top leadership publicly stated this twice, and you remember, we have spoken about this repeatedly. We have also never hidden our problems with the CSTO, because we had a specific situation in 2022, and, in my opinion, the CSTO mechanisms should have worked, but they did not. And this, of course, led to the situation we have in our relations with the CSTO. We are currently not participating in the CSTO for a simple reason: we still cannot explain to our people, our citizens, why the CSTO has not responded, and has not responded despite the obligations it has under the Collective Security Treaty.

Regarding our domestic political processes, you know, Armenia is a democratic country, and we practically always have political processes, and this has become a routine thing for us. And we actually hold municipal elections twice a year. They are also highly politicized, because based on the results of our political reforms, people also vote for or against political parties. I mean, not very many, but there are citizens who think there’s too much democracy in Armenia.

But this is a matter of principle for us. Our social media, for example, is 100 percent free. There are no restrictions whatsoever. And many citizens think this is too much. And in the general context, frankly, we don’t have any remote participants in the political process in our localities.

I’d like to point out that, for example, we have parliamentary elections coming up, elections for members of parliament, and based on these elections—which, de facto, will also be the election of the Prime Minister. I’d like to point out that only citizens who hold Armenian passports can participate in these elections. That is, with all due respect, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, people with Russian passports cannot be candidates for either parliament or prime minister. So, there are no restrictions here.

And I’m 100 percent sure that you know that both our relations with the Russian Federation and our personal relationships have been through many trials over the past few years. I’m very pleased and would like to thank you once again for the trusting atmosphere that you, first and foremost, have created. Because if you hadn’t wanted us to have such an open, trusting relationship, I think, obviously, I wouldn’t have been able to do this, and I want to thank you again.

And I am confident that, following the results of our upcoming elections, democracy in Armenia and the power of the people in Armenia will be further strengthened, and our relations will also continue to develop dynamically following the elections.

I’ve already said that our agenda is very rich, but there are still many untapped opportunities. I’m confident that these opportunities will be exploited as a result of our dialogue, the Armenian Prime Minister concluded.

source: commonspace.eu with kremlin.ru and agencies


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Russia at Risk of Losing Control of Railways in Armenia

Badalian Vardan
Jamestown Foundation
Mar 31 2026

Russia at Risk of Losing Control of Railways in Armenia

Executive Summary:

  • Yerevan wants Moscow to cede Russian control of South Caucasus Railway to a third country with good relations with both Armenia and Russia, with Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar most often mentioned.
  • That would end Russia’s control of railways in Armenia under a 2008 agreement currently set to run to 2038 and deprive Moscow of yet another of its levers in the South Caucasus, thereby allowing Yerevan to pursue a more independent line.
  • Moscow is reluctant, and if it resists, Yerevan could denounce the 2008 agreement and seek a partner even less to Russia’s liking, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the European Union, which would not want Moscow to slow east–west trade.

Russia’s once powerful railways once dominated both the entire Soviet space and the Soviet empire abroad. They are now at the point of collapse, however, both domestically and internationally. Within the Russian Federation, Russian Rail is suffering from sanctions, aging equipment, and a lack of investment that is reducing its effectiveness in tying the country together and helping Moscow export raw materials (Riddle, December 12, 2025; see EDM, January 13, February 18; Svobodnaya Pressa, March 28). Abroad, ever more countries that Moscow formerly dominated are going their own way, changing from Russian gauge to international gauge tracks and otherwise limiting Russian influence in ways that will make it ever more difficult for Moscow to recover its former position (Window on Eurasia, April 28, 2016, December 1, 2023, May 14, 2025). Moves in that direction are becoming clear in Armenia, whose position as a potential transit country has dramatically increased amid the peace process for the Second Karabakh War, and whose government is now seeking to get out from under the Russian influence it tolerated earlier when it had few alternatives.

In recent weeks, Yerevan has been pressing Moscow to sell its control of South Caucasus Railway, Armenia’s sole railway operator and a subsidiary of Russian Railways, to a third country with good relations with both Armenia and Russia. Armenian officials have suggested that Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar are among the interested parties. If that happens, it would end Russia’s control over railways in Armenia—which is under a 2008 agreement set to run to 2038—and deprive Moscow of yet another of its levers of control in the South Caucasus. This would not only help Armenia develop economically but also allow it to pursue a foreign policy increasingly independent of Russia (see EDM, August 5, 2024). The Russian government does not want to agree, but if it resists too much, Yerevan could respond by denouncing the 2008 agreement and seeking an alternative partner to help run its railways. This would be even less to Russia’s liking, as Yerevan appears confident that other partners—particularly the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the European Union, which would not want Moscow to slow east–west trade —would back Yerevan, further reducing Moscow’s leverage.

Railways played a key role in Armenia’s integration into the Russian and then Soviet political space. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, those links were largely shattered. Armenia’s railway problems were compounded by the closure of the country’s borders with Azerbaijan and Türkiye following the First Karabakh War, and by Yerevan’s inability to prevent the deterioration of the lines (Journal for Conflict Transformation: Caucasus Edition, April 30, 2025). The situation became so dire that in 2008, Yerevan agreed to transfer control of Armenian Railways to Russian Railways under an agreement scheduled to run until 2038. With the end of the Second Karabakh War, the opening of transit with Azerbaijan, and the warming of Yerevan’s relations with Türkiye, the situation has dramatically changed. As a result, Armenia under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has been seeking to increase Yerevan’s control over its railway system, which requires reducing Russia’s role in that sector and will inevitably lead to a decline in Moscow’s influence in Yerevan more generally (Caspian Post, February 18).

Since the August 2025 summit in Washington D.C., at which the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia announced plans for the opening of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) (formerly referred to as the Zangezur Corridor by Azerbaijan) transportation corridor via Armenia’s Syunik Province, Armenia has increasingly questioned Russia’s role in controlling its railways (see EDM, August 12, September 8, 2025). In December, Pashinyan announced that he had asked Moscow to “urgently address” the restoration of rail links in Armenia to Nakhchivan and Türkiye, steps he said were required by Russian Railway’s current role as the owner of South Caucasus Railway (OC Media, December 19, 2025). A few weeks later, Baku said it would reopen transit to Armenia and provide a link so that Armenia could reach Russian rail via Azerbaijani territory (see EDM, November 6, 2025; International Railway Journal, January 26).

In early February, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk said that Moscow had “decided to begin substantive negotiations” with Yerevan about the restoration of the two short sections of rail in Armenia connecting it with Türkiye and Nakhchivan (OC Media, February 13). In response, Pashinyan said that “there is no need for negotiations” for something Russia is required to do by the 2008 accord. He then raised the discussion to a political level by suggesting that Russian Railways’ role in Armenia was causing Yerevan to lose its competitive advantage, as some countries do not want to invest in Armenian routes because of Russia’s presence there. He pointed out that several states, including Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, could serve as replacements for Russia as the manager of South Caucasus Railway (RBC, February 13; International Railway Journal, March 5; Arka. am, March 26). Commentators in Kazakhstan have shown enthusiasm for this possibility (Altyn-Orda, March 26).

Moscow reacted with outrage. The Russian Foreign Ministry denounced Pashinyan’s words, and Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu said that Armenia’s railways would simply collapse “overnight” if Russia were to lose its management rights (TASS, February 18; Türkiye Today, February 19). Despite this language, the Russian government decided that it risked more by not engaging and subsequently entered into working-level talks with Yerevan about the future of Russia’s role in managing Armenia’s railways. Pashinyan suggested that this became possible because cooler heads in Moscow recognized that Armenia’s proposals were not directed against Moscow and that shifting control to a third country with good ties to both Russia and Armenia would be a workable compromise (Armenpress, March 5).

Unsurprisingly, Moscow is resisting. Pashinyan has since taken a more cautious position, saying that any change in the status of the South Caucasus Railway must be achieved through negotiations rather than unilateral action. “Scrapping a contract is always a bad thing,” he said, with a negotiated agreement the best way forward (Oragark, March 9). Armenian Speaker of Parliament Alen Simonyan said that several countries have already expressed interest in acquiring the Russian concession for the South Caucasus Railway. He said he had been meeting with various ambassadors. He believed that such a change in railway management would align with Yerevan’s national interests (Russia’s Pivot to Asia, March 5).

Other Armenian officials, including most prominently Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, are maintaining a tougher line. If Moscow modernizes the links Yerevan is most concerned about, that would be well and good. If it does not, or if it acts in ways that discourage investment by other countries in Armenia, however, then other steps will have to be considered (1lurer.am, March 23).

It is unlikely that any decision will be made in the immediate future. That such statements are being made at all, however, shows just how much the situation has changed not only in transportation in Armenia with the development of the TRIPP, but also in Armenia’s relations with Moscow more generally—and how much influence Russia has already lost.

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The Iran War Shows Why the “TRIPP” Caucasus Corridor Matters

Emil Karabekian
The National Interest
April 1 2026
The Iran War Shows Why the “TRIPP” Caucasus Corridor Matters
The Nakhchivan Corridor crossing through Armenia could become an essential American economic lifeline to Asia—and America’s adversaries are taking note.

Five weeks into “Operation Epic Fury,” the war with Iran shows no end in sight. Some 1,500 miles to the north, however, a far more effective peace process is underway. Last week, the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan praised “positive developments” in their normalization process. Buried inside the two sides’ peace deal is a 27-mile corridor that may be the most consequential piece of infrastructure the United States has built abroad in a generation—and the war in Iran is proving why.

American power has historically followed the world’s narrowest passages. The Panama Canal is the defining example: a 50-mile strip across the Isthmus of Panama that reshaped global trade, projected US influence across the Western Hemisphere, and remained under American control for nearly nine decades.

The US-backed “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) follows the pattern. The TRIPP is a transit corridor linking Azerbaijan’s mainland to its exclave of Nakhchivan through southern Armenia, near the Iranian border. Initialed at the White House last August after 32 years of war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, TRIPP has the potential to become a new Eurasian chokepoint.

Like Panama in its early days, TRIPP is not valuable because of its size, but because of its vital location. The corridor would allow goods to pass from Asia to Europe while skirting both Russia and Iran, giving the West access to Central Asian strategic minerals and rare earths without requiring them to move through China first.

The Iran War Shows the Importance of TRIPP

The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz underscores the importance of such a passageway in real time. Within hours of the first strikes on February 28, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) began blocking passage through the strait, leading to the worst disruption to global energy supply since the 1970s.

The US Navy’s Fifth Fleet sits permanently in Bahrain in order to keep Hormuz open. When Houthi militants disrupted shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb, Washington responded with military force. TRIPP applies the same logic to an overland corridor—but the logic is no longer theoretical. The maritime chokepoints the global economy depends on are now contested in a shooting war.

Iran’s hostility to TRIPP has also moved from rhetoric to kinetic action. On March 5, Iranian drones bombed Nakhchivan International Airport and a nearby school, injuring civilians and damaging the terminal building, marking the corridor’s first direct encounter with the threat its designers anticipated. An IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel described the target zone as a place where “foreign officials” were planning attacks against Iran—a thinly veiled reference to TRIPP infrastructure. President Ilham Aliyev placed Azerbaijan’s military on full combat readiness in response.

Yet the strike on Nakhchivan did not derail the peace process, but rather accelerated it. Within hours, the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers discussed the strike, emphasizing the need to avoid escalation. Last week’s call between the two foreign ministers—the second in three weeks—was notably warmer in tone, commending the Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization progress and discussing regional cooperation. NATO, in its annual report released the same day, welcomed “meaningful progress” toward peace.

America Is a More Reliable Partner for Armenia and Azerbaijan than Russia

Russia has a vested interest in prolonging the Iran conflict, as doing so has led to skyrocketing oil prices, allowing Russian exporters to reap a windfall and the Kremlin to devote greater resources to its cash-strapped war machine. For the same reason, Moscow has sought to undermine or shut down the TRIPP—but has so far been unable to.

Russia’s position in the Caucasus has weakened considerably since the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2023. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan replaced Moscow with Washington as their primary mediator last year, and the war in Iran has further exposed the limits of Russian influence in the region. Moscow’s response to the Nakhchivan strike was telling: it called on Azerbaijan and Iran—which it nominally continues to refer to as its “strategic partners”—to “exercise maximum restraint” in their relations with Iran, effectively blaming the victim for actions taken by the aggressor.

Other overland routes remain at risk. Georgia, long considered a key transit hub in the Caucasus, continues its drift toward Moscow. The main East-West highway there runs a mere 400 meters away from Russian troops in South Ossetia, making large-scale logistics vulnerable to disruption. TRIPP offers a secure alternative, complementing the broader Middle Corridor linking Asia to Europe.

For over 30 years, Armenia and Azerbaijan were entrenched in one of the fiercest ethnic conflicts of the post-Soviet era, with more than 30,000 killed on both sides and one million displaced. Russia cynically exploited the conflict to keep both neighbors dependent, selling weapons to both sides and propping up separatists in Nagorno-Karabakh while playing mediator. Both sides grew wise to the Kremlin’s strategy, and swapped Moscow out for Washington, leading to a peace summit in August. The United States agreed to secure TRIPP in exchange for a 74 percent stake in the company that will develop and manage the corridor for the first 49 years. Armenia retains a 26 percent share, but operational control rests firmly with Washington.

The time for the United States to act in securing the corridor is now. The Hormuz crisis has exposed the structural fragility of maritime-dependent energy supply chains. America still relies on China for the lion’s share of its rare earth imports, a strategic vulnerability Beijing exploited twice last year with export controls. Central Asia holds some of the world’s largest critical mineral reserves. But accessing those resources has historically meant moving goods through China, undermining supply-chain diversification. TRIPP creates a secure, US-controlled corridor that links Central Asia directly to European markets outside Beijing’s grasp.

Political Opposition to TRIPP Is Short-Sighted

The corridor has also found a surprising opponent in Armenian diaspora lobbying groups. The Armenian National Committee of America called the route a “surrender of Armenia’s sovereign rights to a neo-colonial US-backed corporate consortium.” The American wing of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation called TRIPP a “calculated loss of sovereignty” and “betrayal without mandate.”

But the war in Iran has made the counterargument plain. Armenia’s 26 percent stake in the corridor provides sustained revenue from a project that will exist regardless of its participation, while US security guarantees offer protection from precisely the regional powers that have historically constrained Armenian sovereignty. For a landlocked country of three million, the alternative to American strategic engagement is not autonomy, but exposure.

Tehran and Moscow see TRIPP as a shift in the balance of influence in Eurasia. The United States should take that opposition as confirmation of the corridor’s value—and ensure it is secured, funded, and operational before the war ends and the window of strategic urgency closes.

About the Author: Joseph Epstein

Joseph Epstein is the director of the Turan Research Center, a senior fellow at the Yorktown Institute, an expert at the N7 Foundation, and a research fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University. He also sits on the advisory board of the Alekain Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to providing education to women and girls in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. He specializes in Eurasia and the Middle East, and his work has been featured in various outlets such as Newsweek, The Wall Street Journal, The Hill, the Atlantic Council, Novaya Gazeta, RFE/RL, Foreign Policy, and others.


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Russia At Risk Of Losing Control Of Railways In Armenia – Analysis

Badalian Vardan
Eurasia Review
Apr 1 2026
 April 1, 2026  0 Comments

By Paul Goble

Russia’s once powerful railways once dominated both the entire Soviet space and the Soviet empire abroad. They are now at the point of collapse, however, both domestically and internationally. Within the Russian Federation, Russian Rail is suffering from sanctions, aging equipment, and a lack of investment that is reducing its effectiveness in tying the country together and helping Moscow export raw materials (Riddle, December 12, 2025; see EDM, January 13, February 18;Svobodnaya Pressa, March 28).

Abroad, ever more countries that Moscow formerly dominated are going their own way, changing from Russian gauge to international gauge tracks and otherwise limiting Russian influence in ways that will make it ever more difficult for Moscow to recover its former position (Window on Eurasia, April 28, 2016, December 1, 2023, May 14, 2025). Moves in that direction are becoming clear in Armenia, whose position as a potential transit country has dramatically increased amid the peace process for the Second Karabakh War, and whose government is now seeking to get out from under the Russian influence it tolerated earlier when it had few alternatives.

In recent weeks, Yerevan has been pressing Moscow to sell its control of South Caucasus Railway, Armenia’s sole railway operator and a subsidiary of Russian Railways, to a third country with good relations with both Armenia and Russia. Armenian officials have suggested that Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar are among the interested parties. If that happens, it would end Russia’s control over railways in Armenia—which is under a 2008 agreement set to run to 2038—and deprive Moscow of yet another of its levers of control in the South Caucasus. This would not only help Armenia develop economically but also allow it to pursue a foreign policy increasingly independent of Russia (see EDM, August 5, 2024).

The Russian government does not want to agree, but if it resists too much, Yerevan could respond by denouncing the 2008 agreement and seeking an alternative partner to help run its railways. This would be even less to Russia’s liking, as Yerevan appears confident that other partners—particularly the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the European Union, which would not want Moscow to slow east–west trade —would back Yerevan, further reducing Moscow’s leverage.

Railways played a key role in Armenia’s integration into the Russian and then Soviet political space. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, those links were largely shattered. Armenia’s railway problems were compounded by the closure of the country’s borders with Azerbaijan and Türkiye following the First Karabakh War, and by Yerevan’s inability to prevent the deterioration of the lines (Journal for Conflict Transformation: Caucasus Edition, April 30, 2025).

The situation became so dire that in 2008, Yerevan agreed to transfer control of Armenian Railways to Russian Railways under an agreement scheduled to run until 2038. With the end of the Second Karabakh War, the opening of transit with Azerbaijan, and the warming of Yerevan’s relations with Türkiye, the situation has dramatically changed. As a result, Armenia under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has been seeking to increase Yerevan’s control over its railway system, which requires reducing Russia’s role in that sector and will inevitably lead to a decline in Moscow’s influence in Yerevan more generally (Caspian Post, February 18).

Since the August 2025 summit in Washington D.C., at which the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia announced plans for the opening of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) (formerly referred to as the Zangezur Corridor by Azerbaijan) transportation corridor via Armenia’s Syunik Province, Armenia has increasingly questioned Russia’s role in controlling its railways (see EDM, August 12,September 8, 2025). In December, Pashinyan announced that he had asked Moscow to “urgently address” the restoration of rail links in Armenia to Nakhchivan and Türkiye, steps he said were required by Russian Railway’s current role as the owner of South Caucasus Railway (OC Media, December 19, 2025). A few weeks later, Baku said it would reopen transit to Armenia and provide a link so that Armenia could reach Russian rail via Azerbaijani territory (see EDM, November 6, 2025;International Railway Journal, January 26).

In early February, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk said that Moscow had “decided to begin substantive negotiations” with Yerevan about the restoration of the two short sections of rail in Armenia connecting it with Türkiye and Nakhchivan (OC Media, February 13). In response, Pashinyan said that “there is no need for negotiations” for something Russia is required to do by the 2008 accord. He then raised the discussion to a political level by suggesting that Russian Railways’ role in Armenia was causing Yerevan to lose its competitive advantage, as some countries do not want to invest in Armenian routes because of Russia’s presence there. He pointed out that several states, including Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, could serve as replacements for Russia as the manager of South Caucasus Railway (RBC, February 13; International Railway Journal, March 5; Arka. am, March 26). Commentators in Kazakhstan have shown enthusiasm for this possibility (Altyn-Orda, March 26).

Moscow reacted with outrage. The Russian Foreign Ministry denounced Pashinyan’s words, and Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu said that Armenia’s railways would simply collapse “overnight” if Russia were to lose its management rights (TASS, February 18; Türkiye Today, February 19). Despite this language, the Russian government decided that it risked more by not engaging and subsequently entered into working-level talks with Yerevan about the future of Russia’s role in managing Armenia’s railways. Pashinyan suggested that this became possible because cooler heads in Moscow recognized that Armenia’s proposals were not directed against Moscow and that shifting control to a third country with good ties to both Russia and Armenia would be a workable compromise (Armenpress, March 5).

Unsurprisingly, Moscow is resisting. Pashinyan has since taken a more cautious position, saying that any change in the status of the South Caucasus Railway must be achieved through negotiations rather than unilateral action. “Scrapping a contract is always a bad thing,” he said, with a negotiated agreement the best way forward (Oragark, March 9). Armenian Speaker of Parliament Alen Simonyan said that several countries have already expressed interest in acquiring the Russian concession for the South Caucasus Railway. He said he had been meeting with various ambassadors. He believed that such a change in railway management would align with Yerevan’s national interests (Russia’s Pivot to Asia, March 5).

Other Armenian officials, including most prominently Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, are maintaining a tougher line. If Moscow modernizes the links Yerevan is most concerned about, that would be well and good. If it does not, or if it acts in ways that discourage investment by other countries in Armenia, however, then other steps will have to be considered (1lurer.am, March 23).

It is unlikely that any decision will be made in the immediate future. That such statements are being made at all, however, shows just how much the situation has changed not only in transportation in Armenia with the development of the TRIPP, but also in Armenia’s relations with Moscow more generally—and how much influence Russia has already lost.

  • This article was published at The Jamestown Foundation

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Armenian court bans screening of documentary about Declaration of Independence

Ani Basmajian
OC Media
Apr 1 2026

A Yerevan court has banned the screening and distribution of Our Road to Independence, a documentary about Armenia’s Declaration of Independence by its director, Tigran Paskevichyan. The Public TV holds the rights to the film, and has not broadcast or published it since its production in 2020.

The court ruling was issued on 27 March following a case launched in June 2025, by which the Yerevan court recognised Public TV’s exclusive property rights to the film, prohibiting its director, Paskevichyan, from using it in any form, including public screenings.

The court also ordered Paskevichyan to pay ֏40,000 ($100) to the Public TV to reimburse the state fee paid for the initial court proceedings.

The lawsuit concerned the screening of the documentary by Paskevichyan in May 2025, without the Public TV permission.

The two-episode documentary was produced for the 30th anniversary of Armenia’s Declaration of Independence, adopted on 23 August 1990.

According to the case materials, Paskevichyan’s company signed a contract with the Public TV in July 2020 and delivered the finished film in November of the same year. Under the agreement, the filmmaker transferred the film’s property rights to the Public TV, and received ֏4,240,000 ($11,000) in return.

During the court proceedings, Paskevichyan argued that he had previously attempted to discuss the film’s status with the director of the Public TV. He said that a letter he sent to the broadcaster’s director on 3 March 2023 requesting to ‘discuss issues related to the film’ remained unanswered.

Speaking with CivilNet, Paskevichyan stated that he had requested permission to screen the film in his letter.

In court, Paskevichyan also said that when he delivered the documentary in November 2020, as Armenia was defeated in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, he had himself proposed postponing its debut screening, ‘considering the moral and psychological state of society’.

Paskevichyan said that after Armenia held snap parliamentary elections in June 2021, the Public TV never aired it or uploaded it to its YouTube channel, despite ‘dozens of opportunities to broadcast the film’.

In a separate Facebook post, Paskevichyan accused the channel of ‘locking away’ the documentary for the past four and a half years.

‘How much must one hate the history and achievements of one’s own country to take such a petty step?’, Paskevichyan wrote, in what appears to be a statement directed at both the management of the Public TV and the Armenian authorities.

‘Nevertheless, I am not discouraged. […] I am used to waiting, being patient, and enduring for as long as necessary’, Paskevichyan wrote in his post.

The filmmaker also recalled that his earlier documentary, Armenia’s Lost Spring, about the violent crackdown on opposition protests in March 2008, faced similar difficulties, but eventually was broadcast by the Public TV.

ECHR rules Armenia violated rights of victims of deadly 2008 protest crackdown

Despite the court ruling, Paskevichyan vowed to continue screening the film in other formats.

The dispute over the documentary comes amid ongoing debates in Armenia about references made to the Declaration of Independence in the country’s constitution. The document states it is ‘based’ on a joint decision made by Soviet Armenia’s Supreme Council and the Nagorno-Karabakh National Council on the ‘reunification’ of the two territories.

Azerbaijani officials, including President Ilham Aliyev, have repeatedly stated in past years that Armenia’s constitution contains territorial claims against Azerbaijan, demanding that Yerevan change it.

While the Armenian authorities have confirmed plans to hold a referendum on changes to the constitution, also hinting that references to the Declaration of Independence would be removed, they have continuously denied that they were doing so under Azerbaijani pressure.

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Dr. Oz Sued By Meat Market Owner: Your ‘Fraud’ Vid Screwed My Biz!!!

Emil Lazarian
TMZ
April 1 2026

Dr. Oz Sued By Meat Market OwnerYour ‘Fraud’ Vid Screwed My Biz!!!

Dr. Oz is being dragged to court by an L.A. Armenian meat market owner … claiming the former TV doc falsely tied her shop to massive healthcare fraud and the mafia in a viral video.

According to a new lawsuit — obtained by TMZ — Anna Ivanyan, who owns Tigranakert Meat Market in Van Nuys, says Oz trashed her reputation by featuring her business in a clip about alleged fraud in the Armenian community.

In late January … Oz posted a video across social media showing him riding in a car and posing outside businesses, claiming billions of dollars in healthcare fraud — including alleged hospice schemes — are tied to what he describes as the “Russian Armenian Mafia.”

Ivanyan says Oz filmed right outside her business while laying this out … making it look like her shop is part of a criminal operation — something she says is completely false.

The lawsuit claims the video reached millions of viewers … and Oz’s defamatory statements were also amplified by L.A. local news outlets, which added fuel to the fire.

As a result … Ivanyan claims the alleged defamatory statements spread rapidly — reaching her customers and the broader community. She says the video hurt her business and reputation … and she’s now seeking damages.

We reached out to reps for Oz … so far, no word back.

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