All Armenian opposition parties sympathetic to Russia should be able to run in Armenia’s upcoming parliamentary elections, Russian President Vladimir Putin told Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian during talks held in Moscow on Wednesday.
He also repeated Russia’s warnings about economic consequences of Armenia’s possible membership in the European Union sought by Pashinian’s government.
“We have a lot of friends in Armenia, a lot,” Putin said in his opening remarks at the talks. “We know that. Many Armenians live in the Russian Federation. There are different ways to count [their number.] We believe there are over 2 million of them … And there are many political forces [in Armenia] that are pro-Russian.”
“Of course, I will tell you completely frankly, we have such a dialogue that we always speak honestly and directly with you. We would really like all these political parties, politicians to be able to take part in this domestic political work during the elections,” he said.
Some of those politicians are currently under arrest “despite holding Russian passports,” Putin pointed out in a clear reference to Samvel Karapetian, a Russian-Armenian billionaire prosecuted after condemning Pashinian’s attempts to depose Catholicos Garegin II.
Karapetian set up an opposition movement shortly after his arrest last year. It is now expected to be one of the main opposition contenders in the elections slated for June 7. Two other major opposition groups are led by former President Ronbert Kocharian and businessman Gagik Tsarukian.
In series of statements made earlier this year, senior members of Pashinian’s Civil Contract party said that the Armenian government will not “allow” the three opposition forces to collectively win a majority in the country’s next parliament and form a new government. The statements raised opposition fears that some or all of them will be barred from participating in the elections.
Pashinian’s administration added to those fears when it officially asked the EU in February to deploy a “hybrid rapid response team” to Armenia after implicitly alleging Russian “hybrid” threats to the integrity of the electoral process. The EU formally agreed to that last month
The EU sent such a mission in Moldova during parliamentary elections held there last September. Two Moldovan opposition parties deemed pro-Russian were disqualified from the vote won by the former Soviet republic’s pro-Western leadership.
The Russian Foreign Ministry claimed on March 4 that the EU is gearing up for a repeat of “the Moldovan scenario” in Armenia. Some Armenian opposition figures and commentators have also made such claims. The Armenian authorities insist, however, that they only want the EU to assist in the proper conduct of the polls.
Responding to Putin’s election-related warning, Pashinian said that under the Armenian constitution, dual citizens like Karapetian cannot become prime minister or even hold a parliament seat. The tycoon’s party has made clear that it will try to remove this constitutional hurdle if it wins the elections.
Tensions between Moscow and Yerevan have run high in recent years amid Pashinian’s efforts to reorient Armenia towards the West. The Armenian government enacted last year a law calling for the “start of a process of Armenia’s accession to the European Union.” Moscow has since repeatedly warned that seeking to join the EU is “not compatible” with Armenia’s continued membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), a Russian-led trade bloc that gives Armenian exporters tariff-free access to Russia’s vast market.
Putin repeated those warnings during his meeting with Pashinian which is understood to have been requested by the latter in a recent phone call. He noted that Russia remains Armenia’s most important trading partner and supplies natural gas to the South Caucasus state at a significant discount.
“As you know, energy prices, gas prices in Europe, for example, are currently skyrocketing to over $600 per thousand cubic meters,” he said. “Russia sells gas to Armenia for $177.5 per thousand cubic meters. The difference is significant.”
Pashinian responded by again saying that Armenia will eventually have to choose between the two blocs.
“As long as there is an opportunity to combine these two agendas, we will do so,” he said. “And when the processes develop to a point where a decision needs to be made, I am confident that we, I mean the citizens of the Republic of Armenia, will make that decision.”
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Netanyahu’s government is no longer talking about a change of power in Iran
This morning, Iran was actively shelling Israeli territory.
It is remarkable that, despite the obvious propaganda claims that communication between different units of the IRGC has been disrupted, Iran is even able to coordinate its strikes with the Lebanese Hizballah and the Yemeni Houthis, who are conducting simultaneous operations.
Netanyahu’s government is no longer talking about a change of power in Iran, and Israeli experts claim that Iran is capable of striking that country until the last minute of the war.
Iranologist Vardan Voskanyan
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Pashinyan was invited to the bicycle race to be held in Moscow at the end of May
The organizers of Cyclingrace told RIA Novosti that they would be happy to invite Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to the “Sadove Koltso” cycling race, which will take place in Moscow at the end of May.
“We would very much like to invite the Prime Minister to return to Moscow at the end of May and take part in our main event, the “Sadovoe koltso” bicycle race, which has an international status,” the organizers noted.
The company noted that many cyclists from abroad will arrive in Moscow to participate in the race. The race has a long and rich history. it was not canceled even during the Great Patriotic War.
Let us remind you that on April 1, Russian President Vladimir Putin will hold talks with Pashinyan, who will be in Moscow on a working visit.
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“Ruler of the world” or Washington’s hostage?
Trump has made a new announcement that the war against Iran will end in two to three weeks. Moreover, he stated that they will finish regardless of whether Iran will go to a deal or not.
As they say, the tone of Trump’s statements changes perhaps more often than his socks. It is either the evidence of a really glaring and political impasse, in which Trump is trying to save face by conjuring statements, or he is thus trying to disorient the Iranian side, so to speak. But can the Iranian side be disoriented by any of Trump’s statements after all that has happened during the war or in the past months? Hardly.
According to that, Trump is probably trying to maneuver in the political network in which he found himself. On the one hand, of course, the Christian-Zionists and the Israeli lobby continue to exert strong pressure on him, on the other hand, he feels the pressure of public distrust, which may cost the Republicans Congress in November.
For example, information was published yesterday that only 7 out of 10 Republicans support Trump’s Iran actions, and only 1 out of 10 Democrats. It turns out that only eight out of 20 congressmen support Trump. And no matter how much he tries to present himself as a global leader, one thing is for sure that he is not an “American leader”. Meanwhile, that’s where Trump’s main problem lies.
This is perhaps the reason why he talks about the imminent end of the war, although I repeat, those who pushed Trump to the decision to start the war have no plans or intentions for that end.
Analyst Hakob Badalyan
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18-year-old Davit Minasyan, a participant in the incident in Saint Anna Church, will be detained for 2 months
18-year-old student Davit Minasyan, who participated in the incident with Nikol Pashinyan in Saint Anna Church, was detained for 2 months by the decision of judge Mnatsakan Martirosyan.
To remind, he was arrested on Sunday after the incident in Saint Anna Church, when, according to the law enforcement officers, he tried to hit Pashinyan.
The CC reported that a public criminal prosecution was initiated against 3 persons in connection with the incident that took place in the Saint Anna Church.
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The condition of the detained 18-year-old Davit’s mother worsened in the court yard
Davit Minasyan, one of the twin brothers involved in the incident with Nikol Pashinyan in St. Anna Church, was detained for 2 months by the decision of judge Mnatsakan Martirosyan.
After hearing the news about her son’s arrest, Davit’s mother, Ms. Gayane’s health condition worsened.
An ambulance approached the court yard to provide medical aid, but Mrs. Gayane refused medical treatment.
It should be reminded that the ban on absenteeism was chosen against one of the brothers, Mikael Minasyan, the day before.
In a conversation with journalists, lawyer Armen Melkonyan said that they have not yet received the court’s justifications regarding the detention.
“They find that the 12th grade student should be in custody, but a number of people accused of particularly serious crimes can be under administrative control. The judge did not take anything into account,” said the lawyer, noting that they will definitely appeal the decision.
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Davit Minasyan lost consciousness. he was taken to the hospital
Davit Minasyan lost consciousness without entering the “Armavir” penitentiary, lawyer Lusine Martirosyan reports.
David was taken to the hospital.
Let’s remind that today 18-year-old Davit Minasyan, who participated in the incident with Pashinyan in Saint Anna Church, was detained for 2 months.
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Prime Minister of Armenia receives newly appointed Head of EU Civilian Mission
On Tuesday (31 March), the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, received the newly appointed Head of the European Union Civilian Mission to the Republic of Armenia, Satu Koivu.
The Prime Minister congratulated Ms. Koivu on assuming the responsible position and highlighted the activities of the EU Civilian Mission. Nikol Pashinyan emphasised that the Armenia-EU relations are of a dynamic development nature and emphasised the EU’s consistent support for the development of democratic institutions.
Satu Koivu thanked him for the warm welcome and touched upon the activities of the EU Civilian Mission. She expressed confidence that close cooperation and active dialogue with the partners of the Armenian Government will continue.
During the meeting, the interlocutors touched upon issues related to the establishment of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as ensuring stability in the region.
Source: commonspace.eu with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia
https://www.commonspace.eu/news/prime-minister-armenia-receives-newly-appointed-head-eu-civilian-mission
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Armenian leader meets Putin in the Kremlin
Armenian prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, met at the Kremlin in Moscow, on Wednesday 1, April, with Russian president Vladimir Putin.
The current state and prospects of Russian-Armenian strategic partnership and alliance, integration cooperation in the Eurasian region, and current issues on the regional agenda, in particular the development of economic and transport-logistics ties in the South Caucasus, were discussed, according to the Kremlin website.
In his remarks before the meeting, Prime Minister Pashinyan said our relations with the Russian Federation are very deep, they are very important to us, and, in my opinion, they are developing dynamically in the context of the new realities in our region, when peace has finally been established between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
And I think this has a positive impact on our relations with the Russian Federation, because for the first time since our independence, we have a railway connection with the Russian Federation. We import goods from Russia via Azerbaijan by rail. I hope we will also export in the near future. This, of course, strengthens our traditional economic ties, and it strengthens our ties within the Eurasian Economic Union.
Regarding the European Union, of course, we know that, in principle, membership in the two associations is incompatible. But what we’re doing and the agenda we have, at least for now, are compatible. That’s a fact. And as long as there’s an opportunity to combine these agendas, we will. And when processes develop to the point where a decision must be made, I’m confident that we, the citizens of the Republic of Armenia, will make that decision.
Of course, in this context, our relations with the Russian Federation have never been and never will be in question, because, as I have already said, these ties and relations are very deep and not subject to discussion.
Of course, we cooperate in the energy sector. We traditionally have very strong ties and cooperation here, too. I must say that we are currently working very closely with the Russian side to develop [interaction] in the area of new technologies—I mean new technologies in the energy sector, because new energy technologies, solar energy, and so on, are developing very well in Armenia. You know that we are also discussing the construction of a new nuclear power plant with the Russian Federation. But we are completely transparent on these matters, because we do not hide the fact that we are discussing these issues not only with our Russian partners but also with other partners, because we are looking for the most advantageous offer for the Republic of Armenia.
As I already said, peace has been established between Armenia and Azerbaijan. You mentioned President Trump, and it’s clear he contributed to this process. But it’s also clear that you personally played, and continue to play, a key, very important role in the normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. You’ve always been supportive throughout all these processes; we’ve always been in close contact, and I’ve always kept you informed periodically of ongoing developments.
And by the way, last August, when I returned from Washington and called you, I said that what happened in Washington also opened up new opportunities for our relations, and now that’s a fact. I already mentioned the railway connection between Russia and Armenia. We’ve been working on this issue for decades, but unfortunately, we’ve never been able to reach such a conclusion.
Regarding issues related to Karabakh, I have already very transparently and publicly announced, stated in the Republic of Armenia, that we should not continue the Karabakh movement because peace has already been established between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia and Azerbaijan recognized each other’s territorial integrity, political independence, and sovereignty on the basis of the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1991, which means that we mutually recognize that an independent Armenia is 100 percent identical to Soviet Armenia, and an independent Azerbaijan is 100 percent identical to Soviet Azerbaijan. And I think this is a fairly solid foundation for the further development of peace. And, of course, I want to once again thank you for the support I have always felt in the process of establishing peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Regarding Karabakh: we have discussed this repeatedly, primarily in a working format. Yes, we recognized Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. But we did so only after the Russian Federation’s top leadership publicly stated this twice, and you remember, we have spoken about this repeatedly. We have also never hidden our problems with the CSTO, because we had a specific situation in 2022, and, in my opinion, the CSTO mechanisms should have worked, but they did not. And this, of course, led to the situation we have in our relations with the CSTO. We are currently not participating in the CSTO for a simple reason: we still cannot explain to our people, our citizens, why the CSTO has not responded, and has not responded despite the obligations it has under the Collective Security Treaty.
Regarding our domestic political processes, you know, Armenia is a democratic country, and we practically always have political processes, and this has become a routine thing for us. And we actually hold municipal elections twice a year. They are also highly politicized, because based on the results of our political reforms, people also vote for or against political parties. I mean, not very many, but there are citizens who think there’s too much democracy in Armenia.
But this is a matter of principle for us. Our social media, for example, is 100 percent free. There are no restrictions whatsoever. And many citizens think this is too much. And in the general context, frankly, we don’t have any remote participants in the political process in our localities.
I’d like to point out that, for example, we have parliamentary elections coming up, elections for members of parliament, and based on these elections—which, de facto, will also be the election of the Prime Minister. I’d like to point out that only citizens who hold Armenian passports can participate in these elections. That is, with all due respect, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, people with Russian passports cannot be candidates for either parliament or prime minister. So, there are no restrictions here.
And I’m 100 percent sure that you know that both our relations with the Russian Federation and our personal relationships have been through many trials over the past few years. I’m very pleased and would like to thank you once again for the trusting atmosphere that you, first and foremost, have created. Because if you hadn’t wanted us to have such an open, trusting relationship, I think, obviously, I wouldn’t have been able to do this, and I want to thank you again.
And I am confident that, following the results of our upcoming elections, democracy in Armenia and the power of the people in Armenia will be further strengthened, and our relations will also continue to develop dynamically following the elections.
I’ve already said that our agenda is very rich, but there are still many untapped opportunities. I’m confident that these opportunities will be exploited as a result of our dialogue, the Armenian Prime Minister concluded.
source: commonspace.eu with kremlin.ru and agencies
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Russia at Risk of Losing Control of Railways in Armenia
Russia at Risk of Losing Control of Railways in Armenia
Executive Summary:
- Yerevan wants Moscow to cede Russian control of South Caucasus Railway to a third country with good relations with both Armenia and Russia, with Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar most often mentioned.
- That would end Russia’s control of railways in Armenia under a 2008 agreement currently set to run to 2038 and deprive Moscow of yet another of its levers in the South Caucasus, thereby allowing Yerevan to pursue a more independent line.
- Moscow is reluctant, and if it resists, Yerevan could denounce the 2008 agreement and seek a partner even less to Russia’s liking, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the European Union, which would not want Moscow to slow east–west trade.
Russia’s once powerful railways once dominated both the entire Soviet space and the Soviet empire abroad. They are now at the point of collapse, however, both domestically and internationally. Within the Russian Federation, Russian Rail is suffering from sanctions, aging equipment, and a lack of investment that is reducing its effectiveness in tying the country together and helping Moscow export raw materials (Riddle, December 12, 2025; see EDM, January 13, February 18; Svobodnaya Pressa, March 28). Abroad, ever more countries that Moscow formerly dominated are going their own way, changing from Russian gauge to international gauge tracks and otherwise limiting Russian influence in ways that will make it ever more difficult for Moscow to recover its former position (Window on Eurasia, April 28, 2016, December 1, 2023, May 14, 2025). Moves in that direction are becoming clear in Armenia, whose position as a potential transit country has dramatically increased amid the peace process for the Second Karabakh War, and whose government is now seeking to get out from under the Russian influence it tolerated earlier when it had few alternatives.
In recent weeks, Yerevan has been pressing Moscow to sell its control of South Caucasus Railway, Armenia’s sole railway operator and a subsidiary of Russian Railways, to a third country with good relations with both Armenia and Russia. Armenian officials have suggested that Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar are among the interested parties. If that happens, it would end Russia’s control over railways in Armenia—which is under a 2008 agreement set to run to 2038—and deprive Moscow of yet another of its levers of control in the South Caucasus. This would not only help Armenia develop economically but also allow it to pursue a foreign policy increasingly independent of Russia (see EDM, August 5, 2024). The Russian government does not want to agree, but if it resists too much, Yerevan could respond by denouncing the 2008 agreement and seeking an alternative partner to help run its railways. This would be even less to Russia’s liking, as Yerevan appears confident that other partners—particularly the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the European Union, which would not want Moscow to slow east–west trade —would back Yerevan, further reducing Moscow’s leverage.
Railways played a key role in Armenia’s integration into the Russian and then Soviet political space. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, those links were largely shattered. Armenia’s railway problems were compounded by the closure of the country’s borders with Azerbaijan and Türkiye following the First Karabakh War, and by Yerevan’s inability to prevent the deterioration of the lines (Journal for Conflict Transformation: Caucasus Edition, April 30, 2025). The situation became so dire that in 2008, Yerevan agreed to transfer control of Armenian Railways to Russian Railways under an agreement scheduled to run until 2038. With the end of the Second Karabakh War, the opening of transit with Azerbaijan, and the warming of Yerevan’s relations with Türkiye, the situation has dramatically changed. As a result, Armenia under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has been seeking to increase Yerevan’s control over its railway system, which requires reducing Russia’s role in that sector and will inevitably lead to a decline in Moscow’s influence in Yerevan more generally (Caspian Post, February 18).
Since the August 2025 summit in Washington D.C., at which the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia announced plans for the opening of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) (formerly referred to as the Zangezur Corridor by Azerbaijan) transportation corridor via Armenia’s Syunik Province, Armenia has increasingly questioned Russia’s role in controlling its railways (see EDM, August 12, September 8, 2025). In December, Pashinyan announced that he had asked Moscow to “urgently address” the restoration of rail links in Armenia to Nakhchivan and Türkiye, steps he said were required by Russian Railway’s current role as the owner of South Caucasus Railway (OC Media, December 19, 2025). A few weeks later, Baku said it would reopen transit to Armenia and provide a link so that Armenia could reach Russian rail via Azerbaijani territory (see EDM, November 6, 2025; International Railway Journal, January 26).
In early February, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk said that Moscow had “decided to begin substantive negotiations” with Yerevan about the restoration of the two short sections of rail in Armenia connecting it with Türkiye and Nakhchivan (OC Media, February 13). In response, Pashinyan said that “there is no need for negotiations” for something Russia is required to do by the 2008 accord. He then raised the discussion to a political level by suggesting that Russian Railways’ role in Armenia was causing Yerevan to lose its competitive advantage, as some countries do not want to invest in Armenian routes because of Russia’s presence there. He pointed out that several states, including Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, could serve as replacements for Russia as the manager of South Caucasus Railway (RBC, February 13; International Railway Journal, March 5; Arka. am, March 26). Commentators in Kazakhstan have shown enthusiasm for this possibility (Altyn-Orda, March 26).
Moscow reacted with outrage. The Russian Foreign Ministry denounced Pashinyan’s words, and Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu said that Armenia’s railways would simply collapse “overnight” if Russia were to lose its management rights (TASS, February 18; Türkiye Today, February 19). Despite this language, the Russian government decided that it risked more by not engaging and subsequently entered into working-level talks with Yerevan about the future of Russia’s role in managing Armenia’s railways. Pashinyan suggested that this became possible because cooler heads in Moscow recognized that Armenia’s proposals were not directed against Moscow and that shifting control to a third country with good ties to both Russia and Armenia would be a workable compromise (Armenpress, March 5).
Unsurprisingly, Moscow is resisting. Pashinyan has since taken a more cautious position, saying that any change in the status of the South Caucasus Railway must be achieved through negotiations rather than unilateral action. “Scrapping a contract is always a bad thing,” he said, with a negotiated agreement the best way forward (Oragark, March 9). Armenian Speaker of Parliament Alen Simonyan said that several countries have already expressed interest in acquiring the Russian concession for the South Caucasus Railway. He said he had been meeting with various ambassadors. He believed that such a change in railway management would align with Yerevan’s national interests (Russia’s Pivot to Asia, March 5).
Other Armenian officials, including most prominently Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, are maintaining a tougher line. If Moscow modernizes the links Yerevan is most concerned about, that would be well and good. If it does not, or if it acts in ways that discourage investment by other countries in Armenia, however, then other steps will have to be considered (1lurer.am, March 23).
It is unlikely that any decision will be made in the immediate future. That such statements are being made at all, however, shows just how much the situation has changed not only in transportation in Armenia with the development of the TRIPP, but also in Armenia’s relations with Moscow more generally—and how much influence Russia has already lost.
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