Tuesday,
Armenia, Azerbaijan Preparing For Further Talks
• Shoghik Galstian
U.S. -- Foreign Ministers Ararat Mirzoyan of Armenia and Jeyhun Bayramov of
Azerbaijan meet in Washington, November 7, 2022.
Armenia and Azerbaijan are discussing the date and venue of an upcoming meeting
of their foreign ministers, the Armenian Foreign Ministry said on Tuesday.
The leaders of the two South Caucasus states reached an agreement on that
meeting during weekend talks in Munich hosted by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.
They said the ministers will focus on an Armenian-Azerbaijani peace treaty.
“The parties are working out [a date for the meeting,]” Ani Badalian, the
Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service. “In case of
reaching a final agreement, we will inform you further.”
It remained unclear whether the upcoming negotiations will be direct or mediated
by a third party.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken had been scheduled to host his Armenian
and Azerbaijani counterparts in Washington last November. Azerbaijan’s Foreign
Minister Jeyhun Bayramov withdrew from the trilateral meeting in protest against
what his office called pro-Armenian statements made by a senior U.S. diplomat.
Washington afterwards failed to convince the Azerbaijani leadership to
reschedule it.
Speaking three days before Saturday’s summit, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev
said that Baku “doesn’t need mediators to normalize relations with Yerevan” and
that the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict “should be removed from the international
agenda.”
Yerevan has insisted on continued Western mediation. In the run-up to the Munich
talks, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian accused Baku of walking away from
understandings reached during his earlier encounters with Aliyev organized by
the European Union. But he said on Sunday that both sides are “committed to
those understandings” relating to the basic parameters of the peace treaty.
“A number of articles of the peace treaty have been agreed but a number of
articles of fundamental importance have not yet been agreed, and efforts must be
made in that direction,” said Pashinian.
Karabakh Leaders ‘Working On Mass Repatriation’ (UPDATED)
• Ruzanna Stepanian
• Astghik Bedevian
A satellite image shows a long traffic jam of vehicles along the Lachin corridor
as ethnic Armenians flee from the Nagorno-Karabakh, September 26, 2023.
A member of Nagorno-Karabakh’s exiled leadership said on Tuesday that it is
taking “concrete steps” for the eventual repatriation of the region’s ethnic
Armenian population displaced by last September’s Azerbaijani military offensive.
“Our struggle will continue,” Gagik Baghunts, the acting Karabakh parliament
speaker, told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service. “The Armenians of Artsakh will not
accept the idea that we have closed the page of Artsakh, and the desire to
return will always stay with us. I hope that we will have significant success in
that direction already in the not-so-distant future.”
“We are taking concrete steps, we will continue to do everything possible so
that the Artsakh Armenians return to the homeland, our historical homeland, and
I hope that despite my rather old age, I will return, not my grandchildren.”
Baghunts refused to shed light on those efforts, saying only that the Karabakh
leaders are ready for “cooperation with world powers” and even “contacts with
the Azerbaijani authorities.” He would not say whether there have already been
such contacts.
Armenia - Gagik Baghunts, the acting Karabakh parliament speaker, talks to
RFE/RL, .
The Azerbaijani government says that the Karabakh Armenians are free to return
to their homes if they agree to live under Azerbaijani rule. Karabakh’s leaders
and ordinary residents rejected such an option even before the Azerbaijani
offensive forced them to flee to Armenia. None of the more than 100,000 Karabakh
refugees are known to have expressed a desire to return home in the current
circumstances.
The Russian Foreign Ministry said last week that Moscow and Baku are now
“discussing prospects for the return of the Armenian population to Karabakh.”
Karabakh’s human rights ombudsman, Gegham Stepanian, dismissed the statement,
saying that only “international guarantees” could convince the Karabakh
Armenians to return to their homeland.
Armenia’s government does not seem to be seeking such guarantees. Prime Minister
Nikol Pashinian has repeatedly indicated that the Karabakh issue is closed for
his administration.
Pashinian’s political allies lashed out at Samvel Shahramanian, the Karabakh
president, in late December after he declared null and void his September 28
decree liquidating the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Shahramanian
said that he had to sign the decree in order to stop the Azerbaijani assault and
enable the Karabakh Armenians to safely flee to Armenia.
Shahramanian, Baghunts and other Yerevan-based Karabakh leaders laid flowers at
the Yerablur military ceremony in Yerevan on Tuesday as they marked the 36th
anniversary of the start of a popular movement for Karabakh’s unification with
Karabakh. Later in the day, the Karabakh legislature held a special session on
the occasion.
Nagorno-Karabakh - Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian holds a rally in
Stepanakert, August 5, 2019.
For the first time, Pashinian, who had famously declared in 2019 that “Artsakh
is Armenia,” issued no statement on the anniversary.
“Both in 1988 and today, the realization of peoples’ right to self-determination
and democratic freedoms remain a clear goal for us,” he stated in February 2020.
“And we are sure that we will achieve our goals with joint efforts.”
Pashinian stopped championing that right in early 2022 and publicly recognized
Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh a year later. His critics say that the
drastic policy change paved the way for Baku’s recapture of the depopulated
region. The premier has reportedly refused to meet Shahramanian and other
Karabakh leaders since they took refuge in Armenia.
“Armenia did not have a foreign policy, it had a Nagorno-Karabakh policy,”
Pashinian claimed in December 2023. “Armenia did not have a security agenda, it
had a Nagorno-Karabakh security agenda. The resources that we should have
invested in creating the Republic of Armenia we have invested in creating the
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.”
Growth In Armenian Exports To Russia Moderates
Armenia - Commercial trucks parked at the Bagratashen border crossing with
Georgia, November 29, 2018. (Photo by the State Revenue Committee of Armenia)
A rapid growth in Armenia’s exports to Russia, driven in large measure by
Western sanctions against Moscow, appears to have slowed down significantly in
the fourth quarter of last year.
Armenia was quick to take advantage of the sweeping sanctions imposed following
the Russian invasion of Ukraine, re-exporting second-hand cars, consumer
electronics and other goods manufactured in Western countries and their allies
to Russia. This explains why its exports to Russia tripled in 2022 and doubled
in January-August 2023.
Full-year data released by the Armenian government’s Statistical Committee shows
that they rose by less than 39 percent, to $3.4 billion, in 2023. This suggests
that the lucrative re-exports largely stagnated last fall and December. The
recent introduction of a new Russian tax on imports of used and old cars may
have been one of the factors behind the slowdown.
Also, the re-exports prompted concern from European and especially U.S.
officials in early 2023. They pressed the Armenian authorities to comply with
the Western sanctions. The authorities introduced in May mandatory government
licenses for shipments of microchips, transformers, video cameras, antennas and
other electronic equipment to Russia.
Overall Russian-Armenian trade soared by more than 43 percent to $7.3 billion.
It grew steadily even before the war in Ukraine not least because of Armenia’s
accession in 2014 to the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union.
Russia has since replaced the EU as Armenia’s number one trading partner.
According to the Armenian government data, it accounted last year for over 35
percent of the South Caucasus country’s foreign trade, compared with the EU’s 13
percent share in the total.
Reposted on ANN/Armenian News with permission from RFE/RL
Copyright (c) 2024 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Inc.
1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
Armenpress: Thousands of relics found in 6,000-year-old tomb in Armenian village
09:47,
YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 21, ARMENPRESS. Archaeologists have uncovered over 30,000 relics from a 6,000-year-old tomb in Yeghegis, Armenia. The tomb was discovered during excavations which began in 2020.
Professor Levon Yepiskoposyan, the Head of the Evolutionary Genomics Laboratory at the Institute of Molecular Biology, told Armenpress that the 6,000-year-old relics reflect the transitional period when hunter-gatherers shifted to agriculture.
The discovered items include remains of both domesticated and wild animals, with the latter evidencing that humans were engaged in hunting at that time, according to junior researcher Satenik Mkrtchyan.
The Yeghegis 1 archeological site has drawn much interest among international expedition teams and experts, which once again proves that ‘Armenia has always been an interesting location on the world’s archaeological map’, Professor Yepiskoposyan said.
“Armenia’s territory is situated is such a location which, according to experts, has always been the crossroads of migration of people and animals during all periods of time,” the professor added.
The excavations will continue in July 2024.
Armenia and France to cooperate in cinema
10:17,
YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 21, ARMENPRESS. The National Cinema Center of Armenia and the French Center of Cinema and Animation have signed a cooperation agreement during the European Film Market in Berlin.
The Armenia-France Action Plan in cinema includes cooperation in film heritage, training, vocational education, joint production and partnership festivals.
The Armenian National Cinema Center is represented in the European Film Market at the 74th Berlin International Film Festival.
Prime Minister Pashinyan to attend pantheonization of WWII hero Missak Manouchian in France
11:12,
YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 21, ARMENPRESS. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his wife Anna Hakobyan have left for France on a two-day visit.
Government officials and Members of Parliament are included in the delegation, the Prime Minister's Office said.
The Armenian Prime Minister will have a meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron on February 21. Later on the same day, Prime Minister Pashinyan, together with his wife Anna Hakobyan, alongside French President Emmanuel Macron and his wife Brigitte Macron, will attend the pantheonization ceremony of WWII hero, Resistance fighter Missak Manouchian and his wife Mélinée.
Pashinyan will also have meetings with Prime Minister Gabriel Attal, President of the Senate Gérard Larcher and Paris Mayor Anne Hidalgo.
Missak Manouchian, an Armenian poet and fighter in World War II, will enter the French Pantheon mausoleum and join an elite group of France's revered historical figures, French President Emmanuel Macron announced in 2023.
Known as being "pantheonized," the rare tribute is reserved for those who have played an important role in the country's history.
He led a small group of foreign Resistance fighters against the Nazi occupation, carrying out attacks on German forces and acts of sabotage in Nazi-occupied France in 1943. Macron said in 2023 that Manouchian "embodies the universal values" of France and "carries a part of our greatness."
In 1944, the group, which included a number of Jews, was put out of action when 23 of its members were rounded up and sentenced to death by a German military court. Manouchian was shot by the Nazis on February 21, 1944. By entering the Pantheon, Manouchian will become the first foreign Resistance fighter to be awarded the honour. Manouchian will enter the Pantheon alongside his wife Mélinée, who survived him by 45 years and is buried alongside him at the Ivry-sur-Seine cemetery.
Macron paid tribute to Manouchian's "bravery" and "quiet heroism" in a statement back in 2023, as well as to other foreign Resistance fighters.
Manouchian arrived in France in 1925 after surviving the Armenian Genocide.
Purported Azerbaijani ex-serviceman arrested in Russia is wanted by Armenia for murder
12:51,
YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 21, ARMENPRESS. Azeri national Kamil Zeynalli, who has been arrested by Russian police in Moscow, is wanted by Armenia, police confirmed to Armenpress.
Zeynalli is on Armenia’s interstate wanted list, Ministry of Internal Affairs spokesperson Narek Sargsyan told Armenpress. He did not elaborate. “The mentioned individual is on the interstate wanted list on a murder charge,” he said.
Zeynalli, who is apparently a former Azeri serviceman, claimed on social media that Russian police told him that he has been arrested pursuant to an international arrest warrant issued by Armenia. The Azeri national is scheduled to make a court appearance in Moscow on February 21, according to the reports. Zeynalli claims that he could be extradited to Armenia.
He was placed under arrest at the Domodedovo airport and then booked at a police station.
The general prosecution of Armenia, however, told Armenpress that they don’t have any official information about Zeynalli’s arrest in Moscow.
According to unconfirmed media reports, Kamil Zeynalli is suspected of war crimes committed during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war when he fought from the Azeri side against Armenian forces, particularly of killing and beheading an elderly civilian hostage. According to the media reports Zeynalli is a recipient of Azeri medals for his military service. According to the reports, the man is now a 'blogger' and a ‘fitness trainer’.
Kazakhstan sent $2.5 million worth of milk and dairy products to Armenia in 2023
Dairy News
Feb 20 2024
Source: lsm.kz
The export of Kazakhstani goods to Armenia increased by 6.1%, but the volume remains relatively small at 7.1 thousand tons (worth $33.3 million). Import from Armenia also grew by 19.8% to 3.1 thousand tons, or $19.7 million.
Regarding other EAEU countries, it is noted that in 2023, 46.1 thousand tons of milk and dairy products worth $22.9 million were imported from Kyrgyzstan to Kazakhstan, marking a 1.5-fold increase compared to the previous year.
In 2023, Kazakhstan purchased 35.1 thousand tons of milk and dairy products from Belarus, amounting to a total of $98.7 million, reflecting a 9.2% reduction in supplies.
It was previously reported that milk production volumes in 2023 increased by 3% in all EAEU countries except Armenia.
Pashinyan Says Armenia, Azerbaijan Agree To Remain Faithful To Agreements
Feb 20 2024
By PanARMENIAN
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that he and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev have agreed that the sides will remain faithful to agreements they have reached.
Pashinyan made the remarks at a meeting with representatives of the Armenian community in Munich and neighboring regions.
During the meeting, the Prime Minister weighed in on the results of the meetings and discussions held within the framework of the Munich Security Conference, as well as the meeting with the President of Azerbaijan with the participation of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.
Pashinyan answered a number of questions, which were related to the challenges facing Armenia, the steps to overcome them and other topics.
Pashinyan’s three-day working visit to Munich has ended.
https://www.eurasiareview.com/20022024-pashinyan-says-armenia-azerbaijan-agree-to-remain-faithful-to-agreements/
Anger and grief as Russians in Armenia and Georgia mourn Navalny’s death
Feb 20 2024
This article was first published on OC Media. An edited version is republished here under a content partnership agreement.
Hundreds of protesters gathered in Armenia and Georgia following the news that Alexey Navalny, 47, well-known Russian opposition figure and Putin’s long term critic died in prison under suspicious circumstances on February 16, 2024.
In December 2020, Navalany was poisoned with what was later confirmed by German doctors to be a military-grade nerve agent from the Novichok family of chemical weapons. The opposition politician survived the poisoning and, after receiving treatment in Germany, decided to return to Russia, despite knowing he would be arrested if not on the spot, then at a later time. On January 17, 2021, Navalny was arrested after landing at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo airport. At the time of his death, he was serving a 19-year prison sentence in a maximum-security prison north of the Arctic Circle, nicknamed the “Polar Wolf” prison and notorious for its ill-reputation over the treatment of prisoners serving time there.
As such, when the Russian Penitentiary Service announced Navalny’s death, claiming the opposition politician died of thromboembolism or a dislodged blood cot, questions over the actual cause of death and Kremlin’s involvement in it spread quickly.
That his family and team have not been able to retrieve the body of Navalny puts authorities under the spotlight over suspicions that they are trying to cover up the real reason behind his death. According to Kira Yarmysh, Navalny’s spokesperson:
In a separate interview with TV Rain, Yarmush said: “There’s no doubt that this murder was planned. We don’t currently have any information except for the colony’s official confirmation of his death.”
When Navalny’s mother showed up at the morgue on February 19, she and the team of lawyers accompanying her were prevented from seeing Navalny’s body:
Alexey’s mother and his lawyers arrived at the morgue early in the morning. They were not allowed to go in. One of the lawyers was literally pushed out. When the staff was asked if Alexey’s body was there, they did not answer
— Kira Yarmysh (@Kira_Yarmysh)
On February 20, Yarmush wrote, “The investigators told the lawyers and Alexey’s mother that they would not give them the body. The body will be under some sort of ‘chemical examination’ for another 14 days.”
Meanwhile, scores of Russians continue to express their grief at home, even at the cost of being arrested.
At the time of writing this story, at least 396 people have been detained at events across 39 Russian cities since Navalny’s death, according to the Russian human rights group OVD-Info.
For Russians living abroad, including in Armenia and Georgia, it has been easier to demonstrate their anger.
In the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, as well as in the city of Batumi and in Armenia’s capital, Yerevan, Russians chanted Navalny’s name, anti-war and anti-Putin slogans.
“I’m angry; I’m mostly angry, then sad,” one demonstrator named Nikolay told the news outlet OC Media, adding that he was grateful that in Armenia, he was able to express his feelings openly.
“We expected it, but the feelings are still anger, rage, grief,” said another demonstrator, Mikhail Yershov.
In Tbilisi, a demonstration was held outside the Russian Interests Section at the Swiss Embassy. Georgia severed diplomatic relations with Russia after the 2008 August War. Navalny was among many Russians who supported the invasion at the time, however he publicly apologized for it five years later.
Memorial to Alexei Navalny in Tbilisi near the Russian Interests Section at the Swiss Embassy. People have been coming for the third day to lay flowers in memory of the politician after the news of Navalny’s death in the colony. Activists assembled an installation in the shape of a heart made of flowersç Video: TV Rain
One protester who asked to remain anonymous told OC Media that Navalny’s death came as a shock to her.
“What brought me [here]? It’s shock because everything has its limits […] he was killed, like Boris Nemtsov,” she said, adding she was worried for the fate of other political prisoners in Russia.
Boris Nemtsov was a liberal politician and ardent critic of Vladimir Putin who was gunned down in the street near the Kremlin in Moscow in 2015.
Despite the growing rift between Armenia and Russia, Armenian authorities have so far remained silent, as have those in Azerbaijan.
In Azerbaijan, there was just one memorial reported:
Hüseyn Javid was a renowned Azerbaijani poet and playwright of the early 20th century who was a victim of Stalin’s repressions in 1937, and who died in Siberia as a result.
On February 20, ambassadors of the United Kingdom and the United States also paid tribute to Navalny by the same statue:
In Georgia, President Salome Zourabichvili was quick to speak out, calling Navalny’s death a “tragedy for all democracy and human rights defenders.”
Mamuka Mdinaradze, the ruling Georgian Dream party’s parliamentary leader, said Navalny was Putin’s latest victim when asked a question by a journalist before moving to complain about Georgia’s own politics, including the opposition United Nation Movement’s time in power before 2012, when prisoner deaths weren’t unheard of.
The speaker of parliament, Shalva Papuashvili, preferred not to comment when asked a similar question.
Opposition leaders in Georgia were more outspoken.
The United National Movement, in a statement, praised Navalny for returning back to Russia “to fight against Putin’s dictatorship and murderous regime” despite the danger to his life.
The party’s founder and Georgia’s former president, Mikheil Saakashvili, who is currently serving a prison sentence for abuse of power, wrote, “Navalny is gone. Am I the next one on Putin’s death row?”
The leader of the opposition Droa Party, Elene Khoshtaria, wrote on X that “Navalny’s death was a testament to the true, brutal, callous nature of Russia and Putin.”
Giorgi Gakharia, former Prime Minister and now leader of the For Georgia party, expressed condolences to Navalny’s family and friends on X, adding the opposition politician’s death was “a poignant symbol of Russia’s enduring modernized totalitarianism.”
https://globalvoices.org/2024/02/20/anger-and-grief-as-russians-in-armenia-and-georgia-mourn-navalnys-death/
Mixed messages after Armenian, Azerbaijani leaders meet in Munich
eurasianet
Feb 20 2024
Feb 20, 2024
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met in Munich on February 17 with the mediation of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.
According to Azerbaijan's APA news agency, Scholz left the room at some point and the meeting continued in bilateral format.
Afterwards, the sides expressed satisfaction with the meeting but offered few specifics on a way forward.
It was the first meeting between the two leaders since last July, though they did have a brief encounter at a CIS summit in December.
One of the main reasons for their failure to meet has been disagreement over who should mediate, particularly since Azerbaijan's seizure of Nagorno-Karabakh in September and the exodus of the region's Armenian population.
Armenia has favored mediation by the EU and U.S. while Azerbaijan first expressed preference for authoritarian regional powers Russia and Turkey, and then began rejecting all outside mediation.
The sides have met in bilateral format several times, however, to discuss border delimitation in November and agree a prisoner exchange in December.
Armenia has not explicitly rejected bilateral talks on a comprehensive peace deal, though its preference for Western mediation is evident as it seeks closer ties with the EU and U.S. and attempts to move away from its traditional strategic partner Russia.
The Aliyev-Pashinyan-Scholz meeting took place just four days after Azerbaijan killed four Armenian soldiers in what it called a "revenge operation" for the wounding of an Azerbaijani serviceman.
And the previous day, February 16, Pashinyan had said that his government's "analysis" showed that Azerbaijan was preparing for a full-scale war.
After the meeting, on February 18, Pashinyan said the two countries' foreign ministers would meet soon for peace talks. It is not clear whether or not any mediators will be present.
Aliyev, meanwhile, called his meeting with Pashinyan "constructive and useful." He declared that there is "de facto peace in the region" and expressed readiness to sign a peace treaty.
At the same time, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry in a February 18 statement reiterated Baku's demand that Armenia revise its constitution and other laws to remove all reference to Nagorno-Karabakh.
Following the Munich meeting, Olaf Scholz stated that the sides agreed to resolve their differences "without violence." No details about any specific agreements were made public. The meeting took place within the framework of the Munich Security Conference. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Aliyev and Pashinyan separately, expressing support for the peace process.
While the two countries' leaders maintain that the main principles of the peace treaty have been agreed, the sides voice disagreement over almost all of the parts of the deal, including the opening of the transport links and border delimitation/demarcation.
The mentioned principles include Armenia and Azerbaijan recognizing each other's territorial integrity, with the latest USSR and Almaty declaration maps being used for the demarcation of the borders and opening of the regional infrastructure based on the respective country's legislation and jurisdiction. Baku, however, demands a corridor through Armenia connecting mainland Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan to be controlled by Russian border troops and without Armenian customs or border checks.
Why the US Needs Stability in the South Caucasus
InkStick
Feb 20 2024
The most significant escalation across the Armenia-Azerbaijan border since the September 2023 military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan occurred on the morning of Feb. 13, leading to the death of four Armenian soldiers. The violence came just days after Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev was reelected with more than 90% of the vote in the country’s “boringest” election ever. The lingering uncertainty over Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations and the continuing threat of renewed violence demands US attention and a coherent policy towards the South Caucasus.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 brought the post-Soviet space back to the forefront of US foreign and security policy. To counter Moscow, the US and its allies imposed sanctions against Russia coupled with military and economic support to Ukraine. As part of the broader strategy of harming Russia’s influence, the US has focused its attention on other areas of the former Soviet space such as Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Moldova. The South Caucasus is a uniquely situated geostrategic region nestled between Russia, Iran, and Turkey — and thus a growingly coveted transit hub connecting Europe, Asia, Russia, and the Middle East.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus has been a region of several ethnopolitical conflicts — Abkhazia, Nagorno–Karabakh, and South Ossetia. Russia mediated ceasefire agreements in all three regions in the early 1990s, and they began to be described as “frozen” and “protracted” conflicts.
In its efforts to decrease post-Soviet Russian influence, the US helped to facilitate the creation of the Azerbaijan–Georgia–Turkey strategic partnership and supported the launch of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil and Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipelines, which transported Azerbaijani oil and gas to international markets circumventing both Russia and Iran. The US also supported the launch of the “Southern Gas Corridor,” a project to bring additional Azerbaijani gas to Europe.
At the same time, Armenia established a military alliance with Russia, hosted a Russian military base and border troops, and eventually joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
Beginning in the mid-2010s, the regional security architecture of the South Caucasus entered a phase of transformation. The key driver was Turkey’s policy to achieve strategic autonomy and become an independent regional power. Russia viewed this approach as an opportunity to weaken Turkey-US and Turkey-NATO ties. The subsequent and evolving Russia–Turkey partnership has impacted the regional security architecture of the South Caucasus, and continues doing so to this day.
Another factor of the changing regional dynamics was the growing military strength of Azerbaijan due to the rainfall of oil and gas money.
These factors, coupled with the lack of strategic thinking of successive governments of Armenia, which failed to understand the changing nature of regional geopolitics, paved the way for the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War that Azerbaijan launched. The defeat in that war significantly weakened Armenia’s position and transformed the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic into a nonviable entity under Russian protection while increasing Turkey’s influence in Azerbaijan and making Baku a de facto regional hegemon.
The South Caucasus is a uniquely situated geostrategic region nestled between Russia, Iran, and Turkey — and thus a growingly coveted transit hub connecting Europe, Asia, Russia, and the Middle East.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has limited its ability to allocate the necessary resources to the South Caucasus and increased the importance of Azerbaijan and Turkey for Moscow. Russia uses Azerbaijan for direct land access to Iran and to South East Asia, while both Azerbaijan and Turkey support Russia in circumventing Western sanctions. While Armenia recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan in October 2022, hoping that it would pave the way for normalization with Azerbaijan and then Turkey, Russia proved unwilling or unable to protect Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijani military attacks contrary to the general understanding of the Russian peacekeepers’ mission following the Nov. 9, 2020 Trilateral Statement. However, after a 10-month blockade by Azerbaijan cutting the civilians from the outside world, and despite orders by the International Court of Justice to reopen the Lachin corridor connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, Baku — with Russian peacekeepers acting as bystanders — used this strategic opening for a military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023 thereby forcing over 100,000 Armenians to leave the area. Furthermore, the CSTO and Russia failed to meet Yerevan’s security expectations when Azerbaijan launched multiple assaults on Armenia proper throughout 2021-2022.
In current circumstances, Russia understands that it lacks the resources to control the region alone and believes that the tangible way to secure its role in the South Caucasus is to coordinate its policy with the other regional powers — Turkey and Iran. The launch of the 3+2 platform (Russia, Turkey, Iran, Armenia, Azerbaijan) serves this goal.
After closing “the Nagorno-Karabakh chapter by force,” Baku disengaged from Brussels- and Washington-facilitated platforms of Armenia–Azerbaijan negotiations, instead insisting on bilateral talks. On Dec. 7, 2023, Yerevan and Baku reached a limited bilateral agreement that included the exchange of some POWs. On Jan. 31, 2024, the Armenia-Azerbaijan commission on delimitation and demarcation met on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and more bilateral negotiations are anticipated. However, according to the Armenian minister of foreign affairs, there are certain setbacks by Azerbaijan in negotiations.
Since February 2022, the US appears to have concentrated its efforts on reducing Russia’s influence and presence in the South Caucasus through the pursuit of a peace agreement between Yerevan and Baku facilitated by Brussels and Washington. As Armenia serves as Russia’s primary power base in the region, it seemed that the quickest way to decrease the latter’s influence was to support Yerevan in moving away from Moscow. On the premise that Armenia initially chose Russia as an ally to counter Azerbaijan and Turkey, the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Turkey normalization processes appeared the most efficient way to encourage Armenia’s foreign policy shift and to “take some distance,” as one NATO representative phrased it, from Russia.
The potential decoupling of Armenia from Russia was likely one of the driving factors for Washington’s active involvement in the negotiation process in 2022-2023, including the organization of two Ministers of Foreign Affairs summits in Washington in May and June 2023. Following this logic, the US should continue to increase its efforts to facilitate a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan this year at any cost, hoping that it will pave the way for Armenia to substantially decrease its reliance on Russia.
However, the decrease of Russian influence in the region and the weakening of the Armenia–Russia alliance are not ends in and of themselves. The strategic interest of the US has been to have a stable South Caucasus, that can serve as a transit for energy and cargo flows between Asia and Europe, circumventing Russian and Iranian territory. However, efforts aimed at encouraging Armenia’s drift away from Russia contradicts this goal. Any legal steps by Yerevan to move away from Russia (withdrawing from the CSTO or EAEU, or ending the deployment of the Russian military base or border troops in Armenia) will trigger a harsh response from Russia, which would likely destabilize the region and move it further away from Western prospects.
If this were to happen, Russia may use a variety of coercive measures against Armenia, including economic pressure on Armenia’s strategic sectors under its control and even seeking to trigger new Azerbaijani military attacks. Azerbaijan and Turkey may exploit the Russia-Armenia confrontation by seeking the establishment of an extraterritorial land corridor between Azerbaijan and Turkey via Armenia by force. This itself may trigger a tough Iranian response, which views any additional increase in Turkey’s role in the region with great suspicion. The destabilization of Armenia, and potential military flare ups will destabilize the region as a whole.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan puts more demands on Armenia to reach the peace deal. President Aliyev, elaborating on his earlier comments from 2021, recently stated that by “changing Armenia’s constitution and other documents, peace could be achieved.”
This is a continuation of Azerbaijan’s policy, backed by the threat of use (or real use) of force, that pushes Yerevan to pursue appeasement with the hopes of securing an elusive peace treaty. However, an appeasement policy towards Azerbaijan only encourages Baku to put forward additional demands to Armenia, making the signature of the peace deal less and less likely. At the end of the day, in face of growing Azerbaijan’s assertiveness and limited diplomatic efforts from the West, Armenia may be forced to look to Russia (again) and Iran as hard power deterrent factors.
Given these uncomfortable realities, the US should reevaluate its objectives in the South Caucasus and the role of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict in achieving them. This by no means suggests that Washington should forego its engagement in the region or its expanding relations with Armenia.
Still, it does mean that the US must recognize that a policy that encourages Armenia to move away from Russia through the blind pursuit of peace with Azerbaijan and normalization with Turkey by any means is likely to provoke further instability in the South Caucasus.
Alas, Armenia cannot rely on Washington in the event of a worst case scenario: The US has already made clear in Georgia and Ukraine it is not willing to risk American lives for the territorial integrity or security of these former Soviet states. Instead, the US would be better served by supporting Armenia as it seeks to diversify its foreign and security policy without antagonizing Russia and appeasing Azerbaijan. The US also should pressure Azerbaijan to prevent new attacks against Armenia and make more efforts to convince Turkey to restart the normalization process with Armenia without preconditions. This policy will also reap dividends for Washington and its allies.
Benyamin Poghosyan is a senior research fellow at the APRI Armenia. His research focuses primarily on Armenian foreign policy and the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. Prior to joining APRI, in 2010-2019, he was a deputy director and director of the Armenian MOD think tank – Institute for National Strategic Studies. He holds a PhD degree in history from Armenian National Academy of Sciences. Artin DerSimonian is a junior research fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. His research focuses primarily on Russian foreign policy and the South Caucasus. He holds a master’s degree in Russian, East European, and Eurasian studies from the University of Glasgow.
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