August 8, 2026
The water level in the Caspian Lake is currently below the lowest level on record, and according to the Baltic High System, the average is less than 29 meters. The mentioned data was published by the Volga-Caspian Branch of the Caspian Fisheries Research Institute (КаспНИРХ) [14] [21].
The study uses the terminology pair “Caspian Lake/Caspian Sea” according to its physico-geographical characteristics as the world’s largest closed endorheic reservoir. From a legal point of view, according to the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea (2018), the term “sea” is used, but from a hydrological and water balance point of view, “lake” is correct. When discussing hydrological processes in this article, preference is given to the term “lake” and the term “sea” in the context of historically shaped geopolitical and transportation practices.
The results of chronological data analysis and prospective modeling show that the steady decline in the level of the Caspian Sea during the period 1990-2045 may be about 4.7 meters, and may reach about 18 meters by 2100. A steady decline in the level of the Caspian Sea may occur until 2100. This trend indicates the formation of a deep hydrogeodynamic and environmental crisis, which is already beginning to significantly affect the economic structure of the region, the stability of ecosystems and geopolitical processes.
If the current pace of development of events is maintained, the realization of the so-called “Aral scenario” for the Caspian Sea is becoming more and more probable. According to the available forecasts, in the medium and long term, existing transport links and coastal infrastructure may lose their functional efficiency. Such a development of events can radically change the economic, ecological and geopolitical balance not only of the Caspian Basin, but also of the entire Caucasus region. [21]:
The comparative analysis of the “Aral scenario” in relation to the Caspian Sea requires caution. In contrast to the Aral Sea, where the main reason for drying was the almost complete cessation of river flow for irrigation [36], in the case of the Caspian Sea, climate change (increased evaporation) and anthropogenic losses play a dominant role. However, the hydrodynamic similarity (both bodies of water are endorheic, shallow in the northern part) makes the “Aral scenario” a heuristically useful but not a literal analogy.
Introduction:
The relevance of the study is due to the continuous unprecedented fall in the level of the Caspian Lake, which poses threats not only to ecosystems, but also to the economic and transport infrastructure of the Caspian basin states.: Despite the existence of separate hydrological and environmental publications, comprehensive interdisciplinary studies combining hydrodynamic analysis with geopolitical and geoeconomic forecasting remain limited.
The object of the study is the hydrological regime and the modern dynamics of the water level in the Caspian Lake as a factor of regional changes.
The subject of the research is the ecological, economic and geopolitical consequences of the water level decline for the countries of the Caspian basin and neighboring states (including Armenia).
Study the aim is to identify and coordinate the main consequences of a steady decline in the level of the Caspian Lake, as well as to assess the possible transformation of regional transport corridors and geopolitical balance.
Research objectives․To analyze the modern dynamics of the water level and the quantitative parameters of the water balance of the Caspian Lake.
Assess the contribution of natural and anthropogenic factors (including oil extraction) to the recycling process.
Consider scenario forecasts (“optimistic”, “negative”, “Aral”) and their possible ecological consequences.
Determine the impact of lowering water levels on shipping, port infrastructure and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor (Middle Corridor).
To analyze the indirect consequences for countries without direct access to the Caspian Sea (for example, Armenia) in the context of CSTO and EAEU membership.
The methodological basis of the research. The study was carried out within the framework of an interdisciplinary approach, which combines the methods of hydrological analysis (water balance calculation, hydrometeorological services data processing), scenario forecasting (on the basis of three scenarios developed by KMG Kashagan B.V.), geo-economic analysis (assessing cargo flows and transit potential) and political-geographical description.
The application of the water balance formula is of a computational-illustrative nature, based on the data of open sources and official reports (World Bank, UNEP, КаспНИРХ, Kazhydromet, Azerkosmos). The limitations of the method are related to the lack of complete open-access data on underground inflow, man-made water losses during oil extraction, and water intake, which is reflected in the relevant assumptions of the calculation.
Environmental factor. Since 2006, the water level of the Caspian Lake has shown a steady decreasing trend, reaching critical indicators in 2025. The State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) has already alerted about this situation, noting that the drop in sea level has a negative impact on the normal operation of the company’s production platforms. [5]:
The mentioned circumstance most likely conditions the projects implemented by SOCAR together with the TotalEnergies company, which envisages the drilling of super-deep wells for the purpose of assimilation of new hydrocarbon reserves, despite the existing serious environmental and hydrological problems of the Caspian Sea [6].
At the same time, the international analytical agency Fitch Solutions questioned the possibility of exporting 20 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe per year until 2027. This circumstance also indicates the poor ecological, hydrological and resource situation of the Caspian Sea. [7][8][9].
According to a special report by the World Bank՝ The water level in the Caspian Sea is currently in a critical state and continues to decrease, leading to aggravating problems with the operation of infrastructure, navigation and the efficient operation of ships in ports.: The report specifically emphasizes that a number of courts are no longer able to fully utilize their technical capabilities, which turns this phenomenon into an important geopolitical factor [11].
Caspian Lake is the world’s largest closed endorheic basin (which has no flow to the ocean). Its hydrological regime is mainly determined by river inflow, atmospheric precipitation, evaporation, as well as anthropogenic “hidden” water losses related to technological water use in the process of oil extraction.
The formula of the water balance (hydrological regime) of the basin can be presented in the following form:
ΔV = (Qrivers P Gunderground) – (E Woil Way)
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ΔV – the change in water volume (related to the change in level);
Rivers – river inflow.
P – atmospheric precipitation (atmospheric inflow).
Gunderground – underground inflow (if considered).
E – evaporation.
Oil – technological water use during oil extraction (seawater injection into wells).
Other – other anthropogenic losses of water (water, technical use, etc.).
On the hydrological regime of the reservoir, bApart from natural factors, the oil and gas industry is also affected: The oil extraction process uses the water injection method (water injection), which is used to maintain reservoir pressure in oil wells and increase extraction efficiency [23] [24] [25].
As part of this process, seawater is taken from the water body and injected into wells, as a result of which it effectively ceases to participate in the natural water cycle of the Caspian Lake and is considered an anthropogenic loss of water resources [23] [24] [25] .
According to estimates, in the case of daily oil production of 1.1-1.3 million barrels in the Caspian Sea, the volume of water injection reaches about 200,000 tons, which leads to anthropogenic “hidden” loss of about 1.4 million tons of water in a week [26] [27] [31]. This process has a significant impact on the water balance of the basin [26] [31].
A nearly 1°C rise in sea surface temperatures over the past 15 years has led to increased evaporation and disrupted biological processes. Reduced water volume and increased salinity have negatively affected phytoplankton life and reproduction, which in turn has led to a decline in fish stocks.:[35] The average rate of evaporation from the sea surface is approximately 1,000–1,400 mm per year (i.e., approximately 1.0–1.4 m of water per year), which is equivalent to approximately 371 km³ of water per year.[29][30] However, this figure is somewhat offset by precipitation.
The main source of water supply to the Caspian Sea is the Volga River. Volga, Terek, Sulak and Samur rivers flow into the lake from the territory of Russia. The annual flow of the Volga River accounts for about 80% of the total surface tributary to the Caspian Lake [22].
According to scientific reviews, the total annual inflow of river water flowing into the lake is formed by more than 130 rivers, the total annual flow of which is about 300 cubic kilometers of water. This indicator reflects the total amount of net river inflow.
The annual amount of atmospheric precipitation on the surface of the sea is usually estimated at about 200 mm per year. If we consider the surface of the Caspian Sea equal to about 371,000 km², the volume of atmospheric inflow can be expressed as follows:
P ≈ 0.2 m × 371 000 km² ≈ 74 km³/year.
By combining the above information about total water losses from the sea, the following water balance equation can be formulated:
ΔV = (Qr P) – (E Woil)
ΔV = (300 77) – (371 328.5) = -322.5 km³/year
Thus, the annual water loss is approximately 320 km³.
The presented calculation does not take into account the Wproch component, which includes water withdrawals from the Caspian Sea, technical water use, water withdrawals for industrial purposes and other anthropogenic losses. Although this factor may represent a significant volume, it was not included in the balance formula because there are no available and comparable concrete quantitative estimates in open sources or official publications.
Major sea surface drivers include climate change, which leads to changes in precipitation patterns and increases in temperature. The anthropogenic factor is also of significant importance: the intensification of water use, oil extraction and other types of water use, as well as the significant increase in evaporation from the sea surface under the conditions of rising temperatures.
In addition, Held on November 26, 2024 in the city of Atyrau (Kazakhstan). «Caspian Technical Conference» according to the scores presented in the panel session՝ in the case of the most unfavorable scenario of water level change, the Caspian Lake may be divided into two separate basins. Such a development of events will have profound ecological, economic and geopolitical consequences for the entire region [1] [2].
Agreed «KMG Kashagan B. V.» according to the results of research carried out by the company, the dynamics of the Caspian Sea level change can develop in three main scenarios [3][4].
Unfavorable (negative) scenario– Within the framework of this scenario, the tendency of the water level in the Caspian Lake to decrease will continue. Currently, the average level has already reached the minus 29.8 m mark, which is the lowest level recorded in the last two decades. The average annual drop in level is estimated to be about 20 centimeters.
Optimistic scenario– This scenario assumes a stabilization of the water level and a possible slight increase in the long term. However, according to expert estimates, this scenario is the least likely to happen among the considered options.
Aralyang (worst) scenario– The most unfavorable and at the same time the most likely scenario assumes the division of the Caspian Sea into two separate water basins, on the analogy of the Aral Sea, which is currently represented by the North Aral (Kazakhstan) and the South Aral (Uzbekistan). If this scenario is implemented, the Caspian Lake can be divided into two main parts: Northern and M:the bottom–South.
In the case of any of the mentioned scenarios, serious environmental and geopolitical problems will inevitably arise in the Caspian region, as well as large-scale transformations that will affect the economic, energy, transportation and regional security systems.
According to expert estimates, the border between the two potential water basins may pass along the so-called “Caspian saddle”, which is a system of underwater ridges that extends between the Volga River delta (Astrakhan region) and the Prorva deposit in the Atyrau region of Kazakhstan.
This circumstance makes the North Caspian Sea relatively less vulnerable to drying processes. However, so called «Aral scenario» in case of implementation, the deformation of the coastline can become significant, as a result «Caspian saddle» can emerge from the water and become a narrow strip of land that physically separates the watershed.
One of the already visible manifestations of the mentioned processes is the situation prevailing in the Atyrau region of Kazakhstan, where a state of emergency is announced due to a sharp decrease in the water level in certain parts of the sea, as well as in the Kigach and Sharon rivers [15] [16]:
As of September 2025, measurements by the Kazhydromet service showed a continuous decline in the level of the Caspian Sea. According to confirmed data, the average sea level in the coastal regions of the country was minus 29.31 m (according to the Baltic height system). It is noteworthy that in the northeastern part it was minus 29.15 m, and in the eastern part – minus 29.46 m. Compared to the same period last year, the decrease is estimated to be about 17-20 centimeters [14]. The long-term trend is even more pronounced.
According to the analysis of the Russian State Oceanographic Institute and “Kazhydromet” service, in the 18-year period of 2006-2024, the surface of the Caspian Sea has decreased by 36,6 thousand square kilometers[33]. During the same period, the water level in the Kazakhstan region decreased by 2.13 m in total (from minus 27.07 m to an average of minus 29.20 m) [15]. These dynamics lead to rapid retreat of the coastline, especially in the northeastern shallow part of the sea. In separate parts of the territory of Kazakhstan, the coastline has receded to 30-35 kilometers [15][16].
According to the assessment of the Azerbaijani space agency (“Azercosmos”), during the last 20-25 years, in the northern part of the sea, where the depth does not exceed 5 meters, the reduction of the water area took place over a distance of more than 70 kilometers [34]. This process directly threatens ecosystems, fish resources, shipping and coastal infrastructure, which requires coordinated and immediate cooperation among all countries of the Caspian Basin.
The lowering of the level of the Caspian Sea is most pronounced in the Kazakh part, but has serious consequences for all states of the region. According to the actual data, the process of shallowing is already causing significant economic consequences, including the complexity of the operation of the oil extraction infrastructure, the deterioration of shipping conditions, and the increased need for regular dredging and cleaning of port facilities.
In terms of lowering the sea level in the coastal zone of Azerbaijan, the area of Kyzylagaj Bay is the most vulnerable, where the area of dry areas already exceeds 700 square kilometers.
«Azercosmos» according to the monitoring data of the space agency, if this trend is maintained, the ecosystems and geographical landscapes of the coastal regions will be under threat, in particular, the islands of Gum and Piralahi, whose possible connection with the mainland (the formation of a peninsula) is considered a real risk.
In February 2025, within the framework of the third economic conference of the Caspian region in Tehran, key attention was paid to the prospects for the development of regional transport links. In particular, the Trans-Caspian international transport corridor was discussed. «North-South» international transport corridor as well «Caspian Lake-Persian Gulf» the transport route [12].
The issue of sustainable lowering of the water level in the Caspian Lake and the related environmental and economic challenges occupied a central place in the agenda of the conference. In his speech, the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan emphasized the seriousness of the problem and the need to form a unified interstate approach to preserve the ecosystem and solve the problem [13]. M:the concerns are also confirmed by the statistical data of Azerbaijan. According to the statement of the head of the State Water Resources Agency, over the past 45 years, fresh water reserves in the country have decreased by about 25 percent, which is partly due to the drop of the Caspian Sea level by about two meters.
Geopolitical and economic dynamics. The convergence of the Caspian Sea in the medium and long term may lead to a significant weakening or termination of regular sea connections and the existing coastal border zones of the Caspian countries. The Caspian Lake is a closed reservoir, and its sea communications are only functional if there is sufficient depth, navigable roads, a stable coastline and technical access to ports.
Caspian countries that lose de facto “sea borders” in the sense of maritime connectivity;
Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan
The most vulnerable is the Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan connection. Kazakhstan’s Aktau/Kurik ports connect the country with Azerbaijan (Baku/Alyat). This is the main part of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor (Middle Corridor). In the event of a narrowing, Kazakhstan effectively loses a quick sea outlet to Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan loses a sea bridge with Central Asia. As a result, the corridor becomes more dependent on Russia or Iran, which changes the balance of economic power in the region.
Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan
Turkmenbash port connects Turkmenistan with Azerbaijan. This is an important destination for cargo transportation, gas projects and logistics. During the blockade, Turkmenistan loses a part of the Western exit, and Azerbaijan «of the energy bridge» potential sector.
Russia-Iran
This connection is of a strategic nature. The Caspian Lake is a zone of Russian-Iranian cooperation. In case of shallowing, some routes may become difficult, especially in shallow areas, which increases the load on Russian ports. and: on shipping (in particular, in the direction of Astrakhan/Dagestan).
Iran-Azerbaijan (and Turkmenistan)
Iran controls the southern part of the Caspian Sea, which is relatively deep, but if it becomes heavy, there will be problems with sea communications with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Russia.
Changing coastlines can affect the role of local ports; Iran may try to strengthen its position as «alternative land corridor»:
Economic dynamics
In the conditions of the weakening of the Caspian sea connections, the importance of the land routes of Russia, as well as the routes passing through the territory of Armenia and Iran, is increasing. This changes logistics flows and redistributes strategic advantages in the region.
Azerbaijan as «transit hub» diminishing role. Sea transportation in the structure of Azerbaijan’s foreign trade generally makes up a relatively small share (up to 5%), but if we take into account important transit cargo flows, the share of transportation through the Caspian Sea increases to 23-24%, that is, it means the key role of the sea in the transit model [32].
In monetary terms, this is approximately 6.5-6.8 billion US dollars per year. According to statistical data, the cargo turnover of Aktau and Kurik ports in 2023-2024 shows multifaceted dynamics. At the same time, the International Caspian Transport Bureau estimates that a 1-meter drop in sea level increases dredging costs by an average of 15-20% per year. In terms of money, it can be an additional 30-40 million dollars per year for the port complex of Kazakhstan.
Weakening of the midline
The Middle Corridor connects China-Kazakhstan-Caspian-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey-EU. The crossing of the Caspian Sea may result in the countries of the Caspian basin effectively losing their maritime borders and direct water connections with each other and shifting transport flows to land routes, increasing the influence of some countries and weakening the economic role of others.:
If Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey maritime communication weakens, the effectiveness of the system that limited Russia’s monopoly in the region will decrease. This means that Russia’s logistical and political role in the region may increase, while new opportunities open up for Armenia.
In the conditions of the problems related to the Caspian Lake, land routes through the territory of Iran become more significant. This gives Armenia the opportunity to turn its connection with Iran into a strategic logistics hub, develop the “North-South” concept and present itself as Iran. → Georgia → Black Sea land bridge. In other words, the weakening of the maritime corridor through the Caspian Sea can increase the strategic value of the route through the territory of Iran for Armenia.
In this context, in his speech at the UN General Assembly on September 25, 2025, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, emphasized the following. “The Caspian Lake is rapidly shrinking, and the main reason for this is not climate change at all” [20]. This statement, regardless of its causal justification, testifies to the high political significance of the problem and the fact that the countries of the region evaluate it from different perspectives, which can complicate the development and implementation of a joint strategy for solving the problem.
Analysis of indirect consequences for Armenia (hypothetical scenario)
It should be emphasized that Armenia does not have a direct access to the Caspian Sea, so any conclusions about the impact of weighting on it are hypothetical and scenario-based, and not based on proven cause-and-effect relationships.
Hypothesis 1 (transportation)․ If lowering the level of the Caspian Lake leads to a significant reduction in the flow of cargo transportation through the middle corridor (Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan-Georgia), then part of the transit volumes can theoretically be redistributed to land routes. In this context, the Iran-Armenia-Georgia route can gain a relative advantage as a stable route to the Black Sea.
Hypothesis 2 (transit)․ With the completion of the construction of the “North-South” highway and the possible opening of regional communications (within the possible settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations), the transit potential of Armenia may increase.
At the same time, it is important to consider that the process of convergence of the Caspian Sea itself, although not a direct driving force of political changes, is able to create indirect incentives for the revision of the transport logistics of the Caspian states. In particular, the countries of the Caspian Basin (especially Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) may be pushed to diversify export channels, including, other things being equal, to more pragmatic consideration of overland alternatives.
If the economic pressure caused by the narrowing (additional costs of port infrastructure, reduced predictability of maritime transport) reaches a certain threshold, it may indirectly increase the interest of the parties in finding sustainable land corridors, including those that pass through the territory of Armenia.
It is important to emphasize that any transport initiative of Armenia (including the so-called TRIPP) stems from the need for full compliance with the obligations of the Republic of Armenia within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).:
The charters and founding agreements of those organizations ratified by Armenia have direct binding force and define the foreign economic and foreign political context in which any regional cooperation is implemented. Thus, the Armenian transit potential is considered not as an alternative to Eurasian integration, but as a logical complement to it: a land bridge that connects EAEU countries through the territory of Armenia with Iran, then with the Persian Gulf, as well as with the Caspian Basin states.
Thus, the hydrological crisis in the Caspian Sea does not predetermine political decisions, but creates an additional economic context in which the benefits of unblocking regional communications (within Armenia’s existing alliance commitments) can be perceived as more weighty.: The degree to which this potential is realized remains largely dependent on political factors, and hydrological changes create an additional economic background, but do not act as an independent driving force. [17][18][19].
Conclusion
The steady and accelerating decline of the water level in the Caspian Sea has ceased to be only an isolated ecological phenomenon. It has turned into a large-scale regional crisis that is inevitably reshaping the economic, transportation and geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
Existing scenario projections (including the “Aral scenario”) indicate the possibility, but not the inevitability, of a critical transformation of the watershed, in which coastal infrastructure will lose its functionality, and key transit corridors, especially the Middle Corridor, will face serious operational difficulties.
The most significant economic and geopolitical consequence may be the weakening of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor (Middle Corridor), while simultaneously increasing the relative value of overland routes through the territory of Iran and the South Caucasus. In this context, a new geometry of transit communications is needed.
The risk of disruption to sea routes, the significant increase in costs of port operations due to shoaling, and the general unpredictability of the route increase the strategic value of sustainable land transport links. Unlike unstable waterways, land routes through the territory of Armenia can ensure stable operation of transport flows.
The analysis shows that the lowering of the level of the Caspian Sea, being a factor complicating regional stability, creates new challenges, but also opportunities. Being a landlocked country, Armenia can form an active and proactive policy that will match the national security strategy and promote economic development.
DAVIT MATEVOSIAN
vpoanalytics.com
Translation by Zhanna Avetisyan
Used literature
1. Caspian annual technical conference
2. Climate Information Portal of Central Asia (Central Asia Climate information Portal)
3. “Furnishing of Kashagan mine facilities. Marine complex. Repair deepening works” project
4. KMG Kashagan B.V. (KMG Kashagan B.V.)
5. “The lowering of the level of the Caspian Sea hinders the normal operation of the company’s production platforms”
6. TotalEnergiesin Azerbaijan
7. Fitch SolutionsFitch Solutions Casts Doubt on Azerbaijan’s 20 bcm Gas Export Target to Europe by 2027
8. Natural Gas World
9. oilprice.com
10. eurasianet.org
11. World Bank “Economic North of the Caspian Sea. challenges and opportunities” (World bank “The Caspian Sea’s Shallow North. Challenges and Opportunities»)
12. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation ministry
13. azertag.az
14. tass.ru
15. Carnegie Endowment
16. en.tengrinews.kz
17. azertag.az
18. The Diplomat – “Receding Waters, Rising Challenges: Navigating the Caspian Sea’s Geopolitical Moment”
19. Caspian – Alpine Society – “The Caspian Sea: Economic and Geopolitical Consequences of Declining Water Levels”
20. report.az/en
21. “Climate change in the Caspian Sea region” international scientific conference materials
22. State Oceanographic Institute
23. Popular Mechanics, March 1933 – on the invention of water injection for oil extraction article:
24. Mechanisms of biological clogging of materials in saturated soils and aquifers and ecological impact (Environmental Impact and Mechanisms of the Biological Clogging of Saturated Soils and Aquifer Materials)
25. Water injection (oil extraction)oil production))
26. Caspian offshore fields have collectively produced more than 1 million barrels per day in recent years, according to the EIA Regional Energy to hint.
27. Kashagan the mine produced ~378,500 barrels per day in 2024.
28. caspianpost.com
29. European Geological Society (European Geosciences Union)
30. United Nations Environment Program (UN environment program)
31. Open Data Center of Iran (Iran Open Data Center)
32. Cargo transportation by transport corridors in 2024 (Cargo transportation by transport corridors in 2024) st1yle=”box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem”>33. Kosolapov A.E., Matishov G.G. Modern changes in the level of the Caspian Sea. causes and consequences // RGA bulletin. Geographical series. – 2021. – № 4. – Page 12-28.
34. Lemeshko E.M., Kasumov A.B. The transformation of the North Caspian coast under the influence of climatic and anthropogenic factors // Geography and natural resources. – 2023. – H. 44, No. 2. – Pages 56–64.
35. Ivanov V.P., Komarova N.V. Hydro-ecological problems of the Caspian basin. – Astrakhan. Publishing house of KaspNIRKH, 2020. – 312 pages.
36. Micklin P. Aral Sea disaster. lessons for Caspian // Geography, Environment, Sustainability. – 2019. – Vol. 12, no. 3. – P. 6–21
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168: The years of Taron Chakhoyan and his wife working at “Proshyan” cognac factory
August 8, 2026
Taron Chakhoyan, the former director of the “Public Relations and Information Center” of the Prime Minister’s Office, who was called the “head of the factory of official fakes” in a number of press publications, was appointed as Pashinyan’s deputy chief of staff from 2021. Today, he is already a deputy of the CP.
How did Chakhoyan close the year 2025 and with what achievements did he enter the year 2026 and reach a new position, we learn from the declaration.
Thus, in his declaration, Taron Chakhoyan mentioned one minor living together, his son, and two adults: Ani Chakhoyan, a lecturer at YSU, and Diana Karapetyan, an accountant at “Proshyan” cognac factory LLC.
As immovable property, the official declared the apartment he bought in the capital in 2009 and owned as a sole owner, and as movable property he declared the 2017 Mercedes car he bought in 2023.
Taron Chakhoyan also informed that he has a deposit of 10 million drams and bank account balances increased by half a million drams at the end of the year, the total volume of which was around 6 million 350 thousand drams.
Another 1,365,000 AMD was made up of “bank account balances acquired on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the expense of, the declarant, owned by a third party, or the balances of those bank accounts (excluding deposits) from which the declarant actually receives benefit or manages it.”
During the year, his cash resources fluctuated within the range of 7 million drams, and the income of 19,771,916 drams for the reporting year, 2025, was generated from the salary received from Pashinyan’s staff and or from other payments equal to it.
By the way, according to the 2022 declaration, for example, he declared 4 million drams in the bank deposits section, and at the end of the year, the amount of the deposit reached 6 million drams, he had 4 million 800 thousand drams in his bank account.
Chakhoyan presented 3,500 dollars in the section of balances of bank accounts acquired on behalf of the declarant, on behalf of the declarant, and owned by a third party.
As cash, the former deputy head of the Prime Minister’s Office had 4 million 135 thousand drams at the beginning of the year, and 6.9 million drams at the end of the year.
He also received 15,234,794 drams from the RA government.
Taron Chakhoyan’s wife, Diana Karapetyan, stated in the 2025 declaration about the right to purchase a jointly owned apartment, the value of which was stated at AMD 24,024,000. the developer is Ord Development LLC.
By the way, according to open publications, the son of the owner of this company, Levon Ordukhanyan, Samvel Ordukhanyan, was one of the donors of CP in 2025.
Chakhoyan’s wife mentioned a bank deposit of 10 million drams, as well as bank account balances, the total volume of which at the end of the year was about half a million drams.
Diana Karapetyan’s 7.8 million drams in cash at the beginning of the year amounted to 27 thousand drams at the end of the year. His income of 4,880,276 drams for the reporting year was made up of 865,760 drams received from Hrant Chobanyan, 3,132,230 drams received from “Proshyan brandy factory”, 356,995 drams received from “Apex Building Care”, and received from “Mrgashen” wine-brandy factory: 525,291 drams from wages and/or other payments equal to it.
The total amount of Diana Karapetyan’s loan principal amount was 30,025,986 drams. he did not mention the names of the lenders and the purpose of the loan.
By the way, Diana Karapetyan’s main workplace, “Proshan brandy factory”, according to open source publications, participates in fundraisers of KP and “My step” fund. According to the latest information, the Proshyan brandy factory donated 3 million drams to the “My step” fund.
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Turkish Press: Azerbaijani president, Armenian premier discuss peace anniversa
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Russia and Azerbaijan: From Balancing to Confrontation
Ruslan Suleymanov on how the war in Ukraine has reshaped relations between Moscow and Baku
Read in Russian
For years after independence, Azerbaijan carefully balanced between regional powers—chiefly Russia and Turkey—avoiding any unambiguous alignment and steering clear of military alliances.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine weakened Moscow’s position in the South Caucasus and enabled Baku to resolve the Karabakh conflict decisively in its own favor, a conflict the Kremlin had long treated as a lever of influence. After restoring full control over Karabakh and securing the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers, Baku initially sought to preserve close ties with Moscow. The December 2024 disaster involving an Azerbaijani passenger aircraft, shot down by Russian air defenses near Grozny, produced a sharp cooling in bilateral relations and then an unprecedented confrontation.
Both sides still have interests in one another, yet unresolved disputes and the broader erosion of Kremlin authority have accelerated a process of “separation.” Azerbaijan now acts with growing independence and no longer feels compelled to maintain the old equilibrium.
The Sovereignty Question
On 22 February 2022, two days before Russia’s full-scale assault on Ukraine, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin. The talks were far from routine. The two leaders signed a Declaration on Allied Interaction designed to deepen cooperation across the board.
For Baku the document was another exercise in careful balancing: six months earlier Aliyev and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had signed the Shusha Declaration on allied relations with Turkey.
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine initially left the Moscow-Baku balance largely intact. Azerbaijani officials avoided direct condemnation of the Russian army’s criminal conduct while consistently upholding Ukraine’s territorial integrity—a matter of principle for a country that had itself long battled separatism. Unlike Turkey, Baku recognizes neither Kosovo nor the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
Azerbaijan’s delegation was absent from the UN General Assembly vote on 2 March 2022 condemning the aggression against Ukraine and from the 7 April vote suspending Russia’s membership of the Human Rights Council. Baku preferred not to be associated with open criticism of the Kremlin on the international stage.
Its stance on the legal status of occupied Ukrainian territory was firmer. In October 2022 Baku offered Kyiv unconditional support after the so-called referendums; in September 2023 the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry condemned Moscow’s regional “elections” in the four occupied oblasts.
Ilham Aliyev remained for a long time the only CIS head of state to meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky after 24 February 2022. Azerbaijan also made no secret of supplying transformers and generators to Ukraine as humanitarian aid—and regularly drew Moscow’s criticism for doing so.
“It Was Armenia, Not Russia, That Abandoned Karabakh”
When the leaders of Azerbaijan, Russia and Armenia signed the trilateral statement on the night of 10 November 2020 that ended the 44-day war, the Kremlin appeared the principal beneficiary. Russia reaffirmed its role as the key arbiter of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and of the South Caucasus more broadly. The deployment of Russian peacekeepers to the Lachin corridor gave Moscow a military foothold. The mandate ran for five years with the option of renewal; Russian planners clearly expected a long-term presence. The war in Ukraine forced a reassessment.
The constant drain of resources—diplomatic as well as material—on the Ukrainian front weakened Moscow’s regional position and allowed Azerbaijan to settle the Karabakh question on its own terms. In April 2023 Baku established its own checkpoint on the Lachin corridor, the sole road linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. Aliyev repeatedly told Karabakh residents they faced only two choices: accept Azerbaijani citizenship or leave.
Azerbaijan’s September 2023 military operation to reclaim the remaining territories met no Russian opposition. Against the background of growing friction with Yerevan, the Kremlin may even have viewed the outcome with quiet approval.
Nikol Pashinyan had come to power in Armenia in spring 2018 through street protests and a “velvet revolution.” Putin’s well-known hostility to “color revolutions” made relations difficult from the outset.
Tensions peaked in 2023. In January Armenia refused to host CSTO exercises; in May Pashinyan threatened to leave the organization if it proved “incapable.” A particular affront to Putin was the Armenian government’s early-September draft ratification of the Rome Statute, obliging Yerevan to implement International Criminal Court decisions—and therefore to arrest and surrender Putin should he set foot in the country.
Moscow was also angered by Armenia’s October 2022 decision, brokered by the European Union, to recognize Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity within the 1991 borders and thereby renounce claims to Karabakh. “It was not Russia that abandoned Karabakh, but Armenia itself—proactively and without informing Moscow,” Putin later emphasized.
The exodus of tens of thousands of Karabakh Armenians in autumn 2023 might have destabilized Armenia—an outcome the Kremlin appears to have anticipated. It did not materialize. Recent parliamentary elections confirmed that Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party, with roughly 50 percent of the vote, remains the country’s dominant political force.
With Turkish support, Azerbaijan secured the departure of the last Russian peacekeepers in June 2024. By then the war in Ukraine was in its third year, and the shift in the South Caucasus balance no longer carried the same urgency for Moscow that it once would have done.
Special Relations
Under Western sanctions Azerbaijan has become one of Russia’s most important economic partners. Trade turnover rose nearly 25 percent in 2022 to $ 3.7 billion. Joint projects include the International North-South Transport Corridor, intended to link the Baltic to the Indian Ocean.
Personal ties between Putin and Aliyev have always mattered. Both have ruled for more than two decades (Putin since 2000, Aliyev since 2003) and share similar authoritarian instincts; neither lectures the other on democracy, human rights or free speech. Elite connections run deeper still: Heydar Aliyev, like Putin, emerged from the KGB, and the personal contacts of the early 2000s helped cement the relationship.
That trust enabled Putin’s August 2024 visit to Baku—an event of some significance for a cautious Russian president facing an ICC arrest warrant, even though Azerbaijan is not a party to the Rome Statute. “This visit is of historic importance and will make a major contribution to strengthening friendly partnership relations,” Aliyev declared afterwards.
SOCAR and Gazprom signed an agreement deepening strategic cooperation. Within four months the relationship had been transformed beyond recognition.
The Battle of the Towers
On 25 December 2024 an Azerbaijan Airlines flight from Baku to Grozny crashed near Aktau in Kazakhstan after being hit by Russian air-defense systems. Thirty-eight people died. The drama was heightened by the fact that Aliyev’s own aircraft, en route to a CIS summit in St Petersburg, experienced GPS disruptions; the president ordered it to turn back to Baku.
Baku responded firmly, demanding that Moscow admit responsibility and apologies, pay compensation to the victims’ families, and punish those responsible. Putin confined himself to an apology that the “tragic incident had occurred in Russian airspace.” Gestures such as a Heydar Aliyev monument in Moscow and the Order of Friendship for parliamentary speaker Sahiba Gafarova proved insufficient.
Relations cooled sharply. In February 2025 the Russian House in Baku was closed, ostensibly for lack of proper legal registration. Aliyev cancelled his participation in the Victory Day parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of the Great Patriotic War at the last moment.
In Baku the prevailing view is that one of the Kremlin’s hardline “towers” seized on the incident to escalate pressure. In June 2025 roughly fifty Azerbaijanis were demonstratively detained in Yekaterinburg; two died from police violence. Similar incidents had occurred before, but never before had Baku reacted so forcefully.
Azerbaijan cancelled all major Russia-related cultural events, detained two Sputnik employees on suspicion of FSB links, and arrested eleven Russian citizens on charges of drug smuggling from Iran.
Tensions eased only when Aliyev and Putin met on the sidelines of the CIS summit in Dushanbe in October 2025. For the first time Putin acknowledged that a Russian air-defense missile had damaged the aircraft, though he still blamed a Ukrainian drone as the principal cause. Baku treated the partial admission as a diplomatic victory after months of strain—yet an incomplete one.
At a year-end press conference Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov noted that Russia had closed the criminal investigation. “Such a step naturally raises very serious questions for us,” he said. Baku was especially angered that charges against the main suspect had been dropped in September—before Putin’s Dushanbe statements.
An international technical report is still awaited, but the Kremlin shows no willingness to prosecute those responsible. Moscow’s stance is influenced by the precedent of September 2023, when six Russian peacekeepers were killed by Azerbaijani fire in Karabakh: Baku accepted responsibility and dismissed the officers involved yet never put them on trial. Russia appears determined to reserve the same latitude for itself.
Moscow and Baku’s Ukrainian Front
The diplomatic conflict between Azerbaijan and Russia remains far from resolved. A clear indicator came in March 2026 with the sentences handed down to leaders of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Yekaterinburg: seven defendants, charged with murders and attempted murders committed in 2001, received prison terms ranging from 10 to 22 years. Baku responded in kind in May and June, when 11 Russian citizens were sentenced to three to four years for drug trafficking and distribution as well as cyber fraud.
Officials in Baku acknowledge that a prisoner exchange is among the more likely paths to de-escalation. For now, however, both sides are moving in the opposite direction—escalating while carefully avoiding a direct collision and operating through proxies. One of the indirect arenas of this confrontation has become Ukraine.
Unlike in the early years of the Russia-Ukraine war, Ilham Aliyev now openly voices support for Kyiv. In July last year he accepted Ukrainian Armed Forces chevrons from a Ukrainian journalist and repeatedly urged Ukrainians “never to accept occupation.” In September it emerged that Azerbaijan had supplied Ukraine with MiG-29 fighters.
Moscow, visibly displeased by Baku’s pro-Ukrainian gestures, has answered by striking Azerbaijani assets on Ukrainian soil. During a Russian bombardment of Kyiv last November, a missile landed directly on the territory of the Azerbaijani embassy. In early July the Russian ambassador in Baku was summoned to the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry after a Russian drone attacked a SOCAR petrol station in Mykolaiv region.
No longer looking over its shoulder at Moscow
Another new instrument Azerbaijan has begun wielding against Russia is anti-colonial rhetoric—something previously absent from official Baku discourse. In August 2025 Aliyev described Azerbaijan’s incorporation into the Soviet Union as an occupation. In July of this year a conference was held whose participants demanded that Russia “stop forcibly sending representatives of ethnic minorities to the front in Ukraine” and to recognize the Circassian genocide.
The continuing confrontation has narrowed Russia’s room for maneuver as a mediator and as a key external player in the South Caucasus more broadly. The declaration on establishing peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia, signed in Washington in August 2025 under the mediation of Donald Trump, inter alia opened the way to the unblocking of communications between the two countries.
The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which will cross southern Armenia (Syunik province) and link mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave, excludes any Russian role. Should the project materialize, Turkey will gain direct access to Azerbaijan and, beyond it, to the Caspian and the markets of Central Asia—an outcome that will clearly diminish Moscow’s economic influence in the region.
Yet relations between Russia and Azerbaijan are still far from a complete rupture. The two countries remain economically interdependent and retain an interest in previously agreed projects. A telling indicator of mutual interest is the volume of bilateral trade: in 2025, despite the conflict, it did not contract but grew by roughly 2.5 percent.
In any event, over the past four years Baku has clearly concluded that it can now deal with Moscow as an equal—and, when necessary, dictate terms.
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Foreign Ministry, Huckabee pan WSJ report on harassment of Christians in Israe
Jerusalem argues story on rise in attacks on clerics ‘took radical voices, extreme cases and turned them into the face of a country’; US envoy: Attacks ‘occasional but rare’
A Wall Street Journal article about harassment suffered by some Christians in Israel drew a furious response from Israel’s Foreign Ministry on Friday, which called it “disingenuous, misleading and shameful.”
US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee, who is a Christian pastor, also criticized the article.
The WSJ piece, published earlier this week, focused on the rise in harassment of Christian clerics.
Christians in Israel say they are increasingly coming under assault, including in a series of incidents in recent years in which mostly young Orthodox Jews made a habit of spitting on the ground in front of clergy and other Christians, mainly in Jerusalem’s Old City — an act that may be prosecuted in Israel as a hate crime.
There have also been acts of vandalism against churches and cemeteries, and physical assaults, including actions that bear the hallmark of extremist Jewish settler violence familiar from the West Bank.
The publication of the article comes as Israel finds itself in repeated fiascos around its relationship with Christians.
However, the Foreign Ministry is leading a push to change the conversation around Israel’s Christian community and to get ahead of potential tensions.
Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar appointed Ambassador George Deek as the first special envoy to the Christian world. The ministry’s social media has been highlighting Christian sites and citizens in recent weeks, none of whom, it said, were included in the piece.
The Journal “took radical voices and extreme cases and turned them into the face of an entire country, while ignoring nearly 200,000 Christians whose lives tell the opposite story,” said the Foreign Ministry.
The ministry said The Journal “has now repeated the same formula: find those most willing to condemn Israel, present them as so-called ‘authentic’ Christian voices, and reduce the Christian experience here to the disgraceful actions of a tiny extremist fringe.
“Israel is the only country in the Middle East where the Christian population is consistently growing,” said the Foreign Ministry, noting Christian representation on the Supreme Court and across the country’s professional industries.
“Churches operate freely. Christians participate at the highest levels of Israeli society,” it said.
Huckabee, an outspoken Christian Zionist, also pushed back on X.
Huckabee acknowledged there were “occasional but rare” attacks that he added were condemned by Israel’s leadership.
“Occasional challenges? Sure,” wrote Huckabee. “I’ve been throughout the Middle East & know of no place where there is much religious diversity as there is in Israel.”
He added, “Israel protects Christian Holy sites & Muslim Holy sites just as they do Jewish Holy sites.”
The Journal’s report documented various instances in which Orthodox Jews harassed and spat at Christian clerics.
“We are supposed to hate them,” one teen was quoted as saying.
Benedictine Abbot Nikodemus Schnabel told the paper that things had become considerably worse in recent years. In 2000, when he first came to the city, spitting incidents were rare, he said, but “now there is no day that people are not spitting at me.”
Yisca Harani, an Israeli scholar who tracks and documents anti-Christian sentiment, said: “This is the reality: Whomever is a Christian — visibly a Christian — is becoming a target. “There are a growing number of religious Jews who do this, and it is not being taken seriously by Israeli authorities. They are turning a blind eye, and that is an encouragement.”
Harani also noted that her organization, the Religious Freedom Data Center, had recorded 107 incidents targeting Christians in the first half of this year, more than twice the number for the same period in 2024.
The Journal noted that harassers and attackers were, in the end, “a small number of extremists,” but argued they represent an alarming trend of growing intolerance in local society.
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Armenia puts Church leader on trial for allegedly being a Russian spy
Aug 8, 2026
Armenia puts Church leader on trial for allegedly being a Russian spy
Armenia’s head of the Apostolic Church and six senior clergy face up to two years in prison amid a deepening standoff with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Critics say the case is politically motivated and part of a wider crackdown on government opponents.
Published On 8 Aug 20268 Aug 2026.
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Turkish Press: Pashinyan says Armenia-Azerbaijan peace is ‘visible and tangibl
Aug 8, 2026
Pashinyan says Armenia-Azerbaijan peace is ‘visible and tangible’
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said Saturday that peace established between Armenia and Azerbaijan a year ago is “visible and tangible,” calling the Aug. 8, 2025, agreement a historic turning point for his country.
Pashinyan said Armenia now refers to the trilateral summit held at the White House with U.S. President Donald Trump as a “Peace Summit” and the joint declaration signed by the sides as a “Peace Declaration.”
“The peace established between Armenia and Azerbaijan is visible and tangible to everyone,” Pashinyan said.
He said Armenian voters reaffirmed their support for peace in the June 7 parliamentary elections, but acknowledged that the peace process had not yet reached its final stage.
The peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, initialed by the two countries’ foreign ministers in Washington last year, still requires signing and ratification, while border delimitation has yet to be completed, Pashinyan said.
Pashinyan calls agreement turning point
Pashinyan described Aug. 8, 2025, as a dividing line in Armenia’s history, saying the country had been in an “impasse” before the agreement and now faces “boundless prospects.”
He also highlighted the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) project, saying it would soon help end Armenia’s isolation and become an economic backbone for the country and the region.
Pashinyan said the project could also encourage Armenia and Azerbaijan to view each other as neighbors rather than “obstacles.”
He urged abandoning rhetoric about territorial and “reversionary” rights and focusing on the irreversible peaceful coexistence of the two peoples.
Pashinyan thanked Trump for his efforts to establish peace and congratulated the peoples of Armenia and Azerbaijan on the anniversary.
“At last, we have a day that brings us peace rather than inflaming us,” he said.
Deal signed at White House last year
In August last year, the two South Caucasus neighbors signed a joint declaration at a trilateral summit at the White House with Trump, aiming to end decades of conflict.
The declaration included commitments to cease hostilities, reopen transport routes and normalize relations.
Armenia and Azerbaijan have fought a series of cross-border wars over the Karabakh region within Azerbaijan since the late 1980s.
Baku fully liberated its territory in 2023.
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U.S. backs South Caucasus trade corridor with $201 million fund after Armenia-
A year after Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a joint declaration at the White House, the U.S. is highlighting progress on a new South Caucasus transit and investment initiative tied to that accord. The effort includes early work on the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, or TRIPP, and the launch of a government-backed fund aimed at mobilizing private sector investment across the Trans-Caspian trade corridor.
Highlights
- U.S. launches $201 million Trans-Caspian Enterprise Fund following the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal, aiming to catalyze private investment along the Middle Corridor.
- Engineering surveys for the new railway have started in Armenia as Azerbaijan nears completion of a highway and railroad link to connect the trade corridor.
- The U.S. positions the TRIPP initiative as a lever to strengthen regional connectivity, boost trade flows, and reinforce diplomatic engagement in the South Caucasus.
Transit corridor and fund rollout
As reported by U.S. Department of State, the initiative marks the first anniversary of the agreement reached when President Trump hosted Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan at the White House and witnessed the signing of a joint declaration intended to end decades of conflict in the South Caucasus.
U.S. officials say the past 12 months bring operational steps toward TRIPP, a multimodal corridor designed to upgrade rail, road, energy and digital infrastructure. Engineering surveys for the railway in Armenia are already underway, while Azerbaijan is nearing completion of a highway and railroad link intended to connect into Armenia.
The State Department also says the Trans-Caspian Enterprise Fund is now operating under a newly elected board of directors. The fund is capitalized with $201 million in U.S. government financing and is meant to spur private investment along the Trans-Caspian Trade Route, also known as the Middle Corridor, across the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
Regional economic and strategic implications
The U.S. presents the corridor as more than a transport project, arguing that the peace accord is creating broader commercial ties among the U.S., Armenia and Azerbaijan. In that framing, the infrastructure buildout and investment vehicle are meant to support trade flows, strengthen regional connectivity and widen business opportunities tied to the east-west route.
Washington also casts the project as a model for linking post-conflict diplomacy to economic development. By tying infrastructure modernization and private capital to the Armenia-Azerbaijan agreement, the U.S. says it remains committed to supporting a durable peace in the South Caucasus while expanding the commercial role of the wider Trans-Caspian corridor.
Our earlier article on the U.S. push to strengthen critical-minerals supply chains explained how Washington is using diplomacy, public finance and new agreements to secure access to strategic materials for industry and defense. We also noted initiatives such as FORGE and a growing set of critical-minerals accords, alongside targeted funding aimed at reducing reliance on foreign—especially China-linked—sources.
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Arménie : ces écrivains qui font vivre la mémoire du Haut-Karabakh
Fidèles à leur habitude, Armen Avo, Vitaly Petrosyan et Herminé Avagyan se rassemblent dans un café proche de la place de la Liberté, à Erevan. Ces trois écrivains originaires du Haut-Karabakh (l’Artsakh en arménien) se retrouvent « pour continuer à faire exister leur paradis perdu », selon la formule d’Herminé Avagyan, qui est à l’origine de ces rencontres. Ici, on parle le dialecte de l’Artsakh, on chante des chansons et on partage ses créations. « Les écrivains, les poètes, ont besoin non seulement d’être publiés, mais aussi de présenter leurs œuvres dans un cadre familier et bienveillant. Au travers de nos rencontres, nous continuons à rendre l’Artsakh vivant », estime la poétesse.
Comme 120 000 Arméniens originaires du Haut-Karabakh, ils ont été contraints de fuir vers l’Arménie voisine à la suite de l’offensive azerbaïdjanaise du 19 septembre 2023 qui entraîna l’effondrement de cette république autoproclamée. Depuis 1988, l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan étaient engagés dans une guerre qui fit plus de 37 000 victimes dans les deux camps pour le contrôle de ce territoire contesté. Bien que l’Artsakh soit considéré par les Arméniens comme le berceau de leur civilisation, plus aucun Arménien n’y réside aujourd’hui. Pour lutter contre cet effacement et dénoncer le nettoyage ethnique dont ils ont été victimes, ces écrivains ont décidé de s’engager pour porter la voix de leur peuple déraciné.
Malgré l’ambiance joyeuse qui règne autour de la table, les échanges sont emplis d’une certaine mélancolie. À seulement 24 ans, Armen Avo est le cadet du groupe. Originaire du village de Vaghuhas, il a combattu lors de la guerre des 44 jours à l’automne 2020 – un conflit qui a fait près de 7 000 victimes et coûté la vie à son frère aîné. Pour lui, l’écriture s’est imposée comme un moyen de résistance, un allié substantiel qui ne l’a jamais abandonné.
Injustice
« Pendant la guerre des 44 jours, j’ai compris que les soldats ne décidaient rien. Même si nous avons réussi à tenir certaines de nos positions, nous les avons finalement perdues à cause d’une simple signature, raconte-t-il, évoquant l’accord de cessez-le-feu signé le 9 novembre 2020 dans lequel les Arméniens ont d’abord perdu deux tiers de leur territoire, avant de le perdre complètement en septembre 2023. Face à ce sentiment d’impuissance, l’écriture est devenue une manière d’extérioriser, de traduire notre douleur qui se mêle à la fierté d’avoir réussi à résister, malgré tout. Aujourd’hui, dans chacun de mes poèmes, je continue à faire mémoire de cette vie qui n’existe plus. Cela me permet de retourner sur ma terre natale où je me sens invincible. »
Sur la table, le dernier livre dArmen Avo, publié en 2024.ARNAUD SPILIOTI
Le jeune homme lit au groupe l’un de ses derniers poèmes, écrit quelques mois après l’effondrement du Haut-Karabakh arménien. « Des épines et des blessures profondes en mon âme. Fatigué, perdu, désespéré et vieux, je retournerai à mon village natal, et ma mère m’ouvrira les portes de notre maison. Et je croirai qu’en ce monde, je suis si fort… et invincible, et que l’Homme n’est pas seul au monde, cloué sur sa croix, en sa douleur. »
Cette lecture suscite une vive réaction de la part de Vitaly Petrosyan, l’un des écrivains attablés, qui ne parvient pas à contenir son sentiment d’injustice. « La haine que j’éprouve à l’égard de ceux qui sont responsables de la disparition de notre patrie est immense. Le gouvernement arménien a créé un climat social qui ne correspond en rien à la réalité. Il est devenu difficile, voire dangereux, de mettre en avant le patrimoine de l’Artsakh dans l’espace public. Prononcer ce mot relève presque d’un acte de bravoure, explique l’écrivain et professeur de littérature. En tant qu’écrivains artsakhktsis, nous continuerons à nous battre aux côtés de ceux qui nous soutiennent en Arménie et dans le monde pour nous débarrasser de ces autorités et faire du droit au retour en Artsakh une idée nationale. L’Artsakh est l’âme de l’Arménie, mais l’Arménie a vendu son âme. »
Obstacle à la paix
Moins de trois ans après la perte de leur foyer, et alors que la plaie est encore à vif, les réfugiés du Haut-Karabakh accusent le Premier ministre arménien Nikol Pashinyan d’avoir sacrifié l’Artsakh pour conclure une paix au plus vite avec l’Azerbaïdjan. Réélu le 7 juin dernier avec 49,8 % des voix, le chef de l’exécutif, qui entend sauver ce qu’il reste de l’Arménie, a présenté ce scrutin tout au long de sa campagne comme un choix entre une paix durable, bien que controversée, avec Bakou, ou un retour à la guerre. Pour ratifier l’accord de paix, Bakou exige une condition hautement symbolique : la révision de la Constitution arménienne de 1990, qui fait explicitement référence à la « réunification » avec le Haut-Karabakh. Dans cette perspective, la question du droit au retour des déplacés du Haut-Karabakh constitue un obstacle à cette paix dictée par l’Azerbaïdjan.
Pour continuer à faire vivre la culture du Haut-Karabakh et porter la cause de son peuple au-delà des frontières de l’Arménie, Herminé Avagyan vient de publier aux éditions Newmag son sixième ouvrage, traduit en français et en arménien, Lettres du Paradis où il n’y a plus personne. Au travers de cette correspondance avec l’intellectuel français Ulysse Manhes, l’autrice arménienne, qui est également journaliste, revient sur sa vie en Artsakh, les rêves de sa génération et sur son itinéraire marqué par la guerre, la perte et les traumatismes.
Hermin Avagyan, poétesse du Haut-Karabakh réfugieé en Arménie.ARNAUD SPILIOTI
« Cette correspondance a été l’occasion d’élever la tragédie de l’Artsakh à une dimension humaine et existentielle. Que nous soyons à Paris, Erevan ou Stepanakert (capitale du Haut-Karabakh), l’âme humaine souffre de la même manière. J’espère avoir réussi à porter ce message d’espoir : même si notre paradis terrestre vient à s’écrouler, subsiste en nous un espace que nul ne peut nous ravir. C’est à partir de ce lieu que nous pouvons continuer à aimer, ressentir et partager les souffrances d’autrui. » Au-delà de ses activités littéraires, Herminé Avagyan dirige la branche de l’association éducative et culturelle arménienne « Hamazkaïne » consacrée au Haut-Karabakh. Au travers de ce programme culturel soutenu par la diaspora, elle vient en aide aux artistes et aux enfants réfugiés.
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#Հիմա. Սամվել Կարապետյանի Գործով Դատական Նիստը. #Ուղիղ
August 6, 2026
Tomorrow, on August 7, an unprecedented event in the thousand-year history of the Armenian people will take place: the Catholicos of All Armenians will stand before the court of the Armenian state as an accused.
Moreover, according to human rights defenders, His Holiness is credited with performing such an act, which refers exclusively to the spiritual sphere, is protected by the principle of “the church is separate from the state”, therefore it is legally unavailable to any secular court.
Samvel Karapetyan, the leader of the “Strong Armenia” bloc, who announced that “we will protect the church in our own way”, which is why the authorities started political persecution against him, referring to the criminal process against Vehapar in a press conference, said that he considers it a disgrace to all Armenians, which the authorities are still continuing.
“I thought they would come to their senses, but they still continue. We will see,” he emphasized.
And the journalists reminded Samvel Karapetyan that a few days ago his statement, “You see, they are Gyormamish people, let them rule, we’ll see what they will do with those factories”, became the reason for a dispute in the National Assembly yesterday. Will there be a review of the speech?
Karapetyan answered the question with a question: “Do you not regret your speech?” “Which talk, if you’re asking about taking my businesses, I have a more interesting talk.”
The leader of the “Strong Armenia” party, Samvel Karapetyan, also referred to Nikol Pashinyan’s statement that the HEC will be nationalized and will be handed over to all-tax administration.
“They must first be able to take it to hand it over. There are Armenian and international courts for that. We are now fighting against their iniquities. We are moving forward step by step in the European courts. We have an arbitration decision that prohibits them from taking any action against that asset,” he emphasized.
Referring to the government’s accusations that additional payments were written on military units and kindergartens, the businessman first said that the government does not have any evidence, on the other hand, he added.
“The National Security Agency is an active body, and about 3,000 people have the opportunity to commit such crimes.”
Regarding the data presented by Alexey Overchuk, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, that the trade turnover of the Russian Federation and Armenia decreased by 2/3 compared to the previous year, Samvel Karapetyan noted.
“I consider it the “successes” of this incompetent government, that they must impoverish our villagers.”
Samvel Karapetyan gave a positive answer as to whether the question of renouncing his citizenship of other countries is on the agenda.
“When I am given the opportunity to be released from house arrest, you will ask that question only after that,” he emphasized.
Details in the video
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