Paris is launching an oil transit project it would like to see under its control

Since the start of the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, France has been exploring alternative routes, including projects under discussion that would involve transporting oil through Syria and Lebanon to Europe and beyond.

French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Baron about this to announce on July 9 on the French TV channel TF1, after President Macron’s visit to Damascus.

The minister noted that Iran, “by attacking ships in the region, violates both the memorandum of understanding signed with the US in June and the norms of international law, and called on the parties to calm down and resume negotiations”, without mentioning the real aggression of the US and Israel against Iran, which is being defended and, as we see, unsuccessful.

At the same time, the head of French diplomacy emphasized that “there are no winners in the war in the region, and among the losers are the people of Iran, the Americans, and the French. We have no intention of continuing to pay for wars we are not fighting.”

Despite the renewed conflict between the US and Iran in July՝ French major «Charles de Gaulle» the aircraft carrier will not return to the Middle East, Mr. Barro informed, adding that Paris is in favor of the establishment of calm in the region, the start of demining operations and the restoration of freedom of navigation, because “we are categorically against any obstruction, blackmail, both in the Strait of Hormuz and in all other straits of the world.”

Meanwhile, the “Charles de Gaulle” aircraft carrier group continues to be on duty near the French islands in the region of Madagascar and the Seychelles, that is, almost halfway between them and the southern coast of the Arabian Peninsula.։ In June, it was observed near the French military bases (ROU and RAF) located in the former French Djibouti, in the vicinity of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, in the territory of which the joint naval command of several countries of the Indian Ocean basin (under the auspices of France) operates from 2023-2024.

To the question whether it will be observed՞Who has the possibility of supplying oil to the Mediterranean Sea through the territory of Syria, Barro gave a positive answer. “Of course, from the very beginning of this crisis, we have considered, among other things, the idea of ​​preparing alternative routes, including Iraqi-Syrian, in order not to depend on shipping restrictions in different parts of the world,” especially since “Syria is gaining strength and becoming a potential center of economic and transit interaction, including in the energy sector.”

By entering the process of “reunification” after the collapse of the “Assad regime”, Syria could become a “new regional hub”, a strategic corridor through which oil can be transported from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, thereby reducing the consequences of a possible disruption. The implementation of this program requires a comprehensive assessment of the existing infrastructure and the provision of the necessary security guarantees, which will be important for ensuring the security of global energy markets.

It is not surprising that all these statements were made after the visit of French President Emmanuel Macron to Damascus on July 7. In the delegation that communicated «interim president» TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanne was spotted with Ahmed al-Sharaa. Describing Syria as a country at the “crossroads of the Middle East,” he said it could provide a vital energy link between Iraq and the Mediterranean.

In response to the disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, Iraq has been exporting its oil in tankers through Syria since April.։ In April-June, more than 600,000 tons of fuel were exported through that route. In June, Iraqi and Syrian officials discussed the resumption of the Kirkuk-Banias oil pipeline and the establishment of energy transit mechanisms.

TotalEnergies has also signed a memorandum of understanding to develop an offshore block in the Mediterranean Sea, but there are no concrete plans yet. According to Puyane: «today it is clear that the security situation m:he does not allow me to work here for now. However, I think that coming here to Damascus is a positive initiative»։

Immediately after these announcements, two bombs exploded near the Four Seasons Hotel, where the French delegation was staying, which became a visible confirmation of the aforementioned problems.:

Declaring that the Syrian administration needs time to establish control over the country, Pouyane admitted. “We shouldn’t ask for too much…we just need a little patience.”

In France, as well In the White House, are looking at Kirkuk-Haditha-Banias / Tartus ports in 2026-2027 (Initially the end point of the oil pipeline was the Palestinian Haifa (now a port in the north of Israel), the prospects of expanding the capacity of the oil pipeline branch with a branch to Tripoli in the north of Lebanon and possible concession control over this artery in order to escalate the situation in the region and In case of agreement between Damascus and Beirut.

In this regard, it should be noted that the Kirkuk-Haditha-Banias/Tartus/Tripoli pipeline was created from the mid-1930s to the second half of the 1940s (with a gap of 1941-1944) with the participation of the French Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (from 1986, the same TotalEnergies), that is, after the declaration of independence of the former French protectorates of Syria and Lebanon. (1943-1945) shortly after. However, in the second half of the 1950s, American and British corporations pushed the French out of control of the energy arteries of the Levant.

Despite the change of regime, “dissatisfaction” with France persists in Damascus due to its transfer of northwestern Syria’s Alexandretta (Iskenderun) region to Turkey in 1939 and the separation of Lebanon from the French protectorate of the Levant in 1942-1943.

French colonialism brought many disasters to the Middle East, including the systematic destruction (albeit under benign pretexts) of local cultural values., and symbolic steps such as the Paris Institute’s return to Arab world owners of 23 artifacts that had remained in France far longer than previously thought are hardly accidental.

The historical heritages provided by the museums of Damascus, Aleppo, Latakia and Palmyra in 2010-2011 were returned to Syria by the French presidential plane. These include Roman bronzes, Byzantine and Islamic coins, funerary reliefs from Palmyra dating to the 2nd and 3rd centuries, a fragment of a mosaic from an Umayyad mosque, and an ivory statuette of Ishki-Mar, which French archaeologists discovered in the Ishtar Temple of the ancient city of Mari in 1934.

The official handover ceremony took place on July 7 at the People’s Palace in Damascus, in the presence of Macron and al-Shara. On social networks, the owner of the Elysée Palace wrote that during the war, France carefully stored the archaeological treasures of Syria, protecting them from destruction and illegal trade, and expressed pride in returning them to Damascus. Anne-Claire Legendre, president of the Institute of Archeology (IMA), also welcomed the return of the artifacts, noting that the institute is preparing a major exhibition dedicated to Syria in 2028, marking a new phase of cooperation between the two countries.

Among the French-Syrian agreements signed in Damascus are the strategic partnership in sea and air transport, logistics between the General Directorate of Land and Sea Ports and the Syrian Customs Service, and many others. However, the implementation of even some of these agreements will require significant efforts, and it is not certain that they will be successful.

ALEXEY BALYEV

vpoanalytics.com

Translation by Zhanna Avetisyan

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Alisa Gevorgyan, senior journalist of the Radio News program, writes: “During the days of the war, the KP MP, who searched for her father in the morgues for several days and found him alive, gets emotional in the NA auditorium, says that she was shocked, jumped up from Vardevanyan’s words, remembering her sufferings. I understand, even the thought of looking for your relative in the morgue is maddening, the memory is indelible. But, listening to the speech, a question arises. doesn’t the same person get shocked and jump up when the boss says to the parents who have been searching for their children for six years: don’t you have other children, take care of them, when they drag and spread asphalt in Yerablur to the parents who came to the morgues and found only the remains of their sons, when the bodies of the boys thrown in bags on the floor decompose in the morgues…

Delivering a moral slap to the opposition MP, Taguhi Ghazaryan sums it up with a sigh: I just don’t want to imagine the insult of the people whose family members did not return from the war. He says that you have to have those feelings in order to have that sensitivity towards people.

Again, a question to the KP MP. Is that “sensitivity” manifested, for example, when in front of their parents they erase the pictures of the fallen boys from the walls, remove the corners of glory, devalue everything for which they died, say that they died for nothing, or is “sensitivity” only for one’s own person and a narrow circle of their own?”

—

Naira Margaryan, the mother of the fallen soldier, writes:

«I appeal to you, Taguhi Ghazaryan

And you are talking about sensitivity and feelings.

You say you haven’t heard from your father for ten days. It is undoubtedly a difficult test, and no one has the right to belittle it. If you felt 10 days, experienced that pain, feelings, I experienced exactly 9 months. You entered the morgue for 10 days, I for 9 months.

Thank God you found your father alive, but I found the dishonored, decayed relics of my grandfather.

So keep quiet, keep quiet, stop talking about war and pain and feelings.

Be quiet, please. There are mothers who have been looking for their 18-20-year-old sons for six years. Boys who had not yet managed to live, form a family, enter life. They stood up for the defense of the motherland, fought, died, disappeared and were injured for the sake of Artsakh.

And then as soon as your government refused Artsakh, recognized it as part of Azerbaijan, months later the representatives of the same government started asking questions. “And when was Artsakh part of Armenia?” “Why was Artsakh a part of Armenia?”

If Artsakh was not ours, then tell me, what did your father and brother do in Artsakh during the war? What were they fighting for? Who were they fighting against? Why were they risking their lives?

Before the war, you were declaring with all your might. “Artsakh is Armenia, and that’s it.” Then what changed?

What changed in relation to the blood shed by those boys, their sacrifice and the loss of thousands of families?

After the war, we heard statements that the same result could have been achieved without so many victims.

Those words became the second tragedy for thousands of parents.

Even today, many families see with pain how the pictures of the heroes are removed, the memorial corners are removed, and the memories related to Artsakh are erased. It opens their unhealed wounds again and again.

Therefore, before talking about the sensitivity of people, remember those parents who have been living with the pain of losing or waiting for their children every day for six years.

Before the war, you were declaring with all your might. “Artsakh is Armenia, and that’s it.” Then what changed?

SOFT LADY SHUT UP!
SPEAK ABOUT YOURSELF WHAT YOU DID FOR ARTSAKH. YOUR AUTHORITY HAS PUT ARTSAKH ON A STAGE AND RUINED AZERBAIJAN. YOUR AUTHORITY BETRAYED THE BOYS FROM BEHIND.

Therefore, keep quiet. Do not manipulate the name of the heroes and their memory. Leave our boys alone. They gave their lives for the motherland, and their memory should be respected, not used in political words.”

Naira Margaryan wrote earlier. “All day I can’t get out of my head the heartbreaking cry of that soft lady Azh um…

Searching for my father in morgues for 10 days, living the most terrible waiting every day, and then finding him alive is really a terrible pain. And no one has the right to diminish that pain.

But remember one more thing, lady.

There are mothers who did not look for their sons for 10 days…

They searched for months. They have been waiting for years.

And they were not even given a chance to kiss their son’s forehead for the last time.

Their sons were brought in closed coffins wrapped in tricolor.

And the mothers didn’t even know who they were burying for the last time.

And today, six years later, there are still parents waiting for their sons to return. Six years. Not six hours, not six minutes.

SIX YEARS.

For six years, mothers have the same question in their hearts: “Where is my son?”

And you want to talk about pain?

Speak, but first remember those mothers whose pain no one could end. To those mothers who didn’t even have the right to kiss their sons’ cold foreheads.

Don’t put people’s grief into competition. And what’s more, don’t use our boys’ names for your words.

Respect the memory of the victims.

Respect the waiting of the parents of the missing.

Respect those mothers whose hearts are still open after six years.

Leave the boys alone.

Instead of manipulating their memory, at least shut up for once.”

—

The first impression of the parliament of the 9th convocation: déjà vu.

In many issues, we see the same as in the last five years, during the sessions of the National Assembly of the 8th convocation.

Especially, the absolute majority of CP members reproduced the same, with their brazen and impudent behavior.

Empty rhetoric, zero value system, political thinking and culture are the same, or rather, their absence.

Details in the video

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A few days ago, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, took a picture rearrangements has done in the country’s defense department, focusing on combat generals and officers.

In addition, the head of Russia made a very important decision in the conditions of modern wars based on the proposal of the country’s defense minister Andrey Belausov, which was ignored even by experts.

We are talking about concentrating all the rear services “in one hand”, which means that the officer appointed in that direction will be responsible for the logistics of the troops, organization of military transport, supply of fuel, food and equipment, maintenance of material reserves, medical support and other rear functions.

“As you know, we continue to improve the structure of the Ministry of Defense in connection with the experience of a special military operation and the needs of the army.

Most recently, you are aware, a decision was made to concentrate everything related to armaments in one hand; these are the functions of both the ordering and supplying bodies. That work in the Ministry of Defense, as Deputy Minister of Defense, is headed by Sanchik Aleksandr Semyonovich, who until recently was one of the commanders of one of the groups and was a successful commander.

And now, at the suggestion of the Minister of Defense, a decision has been made to concentrate all rear services in one hand. I want to draw attention to the fact that in modern conditions this is also a completely combat work. A decision was made by me to the post of Deputy Minister of Defense in this direction has been appointed Valery Nikolayevich Solodchuk.

Valery Nikolayevich, you are also a combat officer who has shown himself well as a commander who competently managed the troops,” Putin said at the meeting with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.:

This decision of the military-political leadership of Russia is important, because in the conditions of modern military operations, the rear has become the front line, in fact, and the target is logistics, road, infrastructure, and if there is a problem of reaching the position, it becomes more and more difficult.

Accordingly, based on the experience of special military operations, Putin decided to radically revise the role of the logistical support system, by which the rear services were effectively integrated into combat planning, and the failure of supply was equated with the failure of the combat mission.

Isn’t it clear that when rear support is considered a combat task, it also implies adequate armament?

Has Armenia learned lessons in this regard from the April four-day war of 2016, after the 44-day war of 2020, of course not.

These authorities did not even make serious follow-ups after the Azerbaijani incursions in 2021-2022, when Armenian roads came under the direct or visual control of the enemy.

In other words, in practice, perhaps, they did not consider rear support as a combat problem, and in 2024, in the logic of the fight against de jure corruption, the General Staff of the RA Armed Forces from subordination removed The Rear Department of the RA Armed Forces and was transferred to the RA Ministry of Defense, being renamed the Department of Rear Support of the RA Defense Ministry. At the same time, the armaments and military medical departments were transferred from the General Staff to the Ministry of Defense.

Maybe these are “minor” and “unimportant” problems for the leadership of Armenia, which is going for peace with Azerbaijan, but no one has yet canceled the difficulties of the Armenian personnel to reach positions and provide adequate supplies to the front line. Nor is the era of modern technological warfare coming to an end, including in our region, where there are problems to settle.

And finally, even striving for peace does not mean ignoring the military, military-political, military-technical and geopolitical developments taking place in the modern world or giving them favorable interpretations for one’s own political conjuncture.

—

Today’s realities were formed as a result of the low level of governance and crisis of these authorities. We never saw that a development concept or plan was formed as a result of the analysis and consequences of the 44-day war. This government not only did not prevent the emigration of the Armenian population of Artsakh, which was defined by its own National Security Strategy, but also contributed to it. 168TVof « expressed such an opinion during the program Former RA Defense Minister Seyran Ohanyan.

“Instead of “combat-capable army,” the authorities started saying “defensive army,” in order to make the enemy understand that we are only going to defend ourselves and that we have no intention of taking an offensive action. Nikol Pashinyan says that we do not set the problem of restoring the territorial integrity of our country. He should be asked the question: Are there any actions in today’s plan for the use of the Armed Forces that should be aimed at restoring our territorial integrity? If so, those who develop and approve the implementation plan, starting with the head of the country, should leave the state management,” said the politician.

“Pashinyan says that peace is the guarantee of our security, while peace is a fundamental value. If the head of the country says that peace is a guarantee, how do you talk to that person? The state is capable of defense, and the army must be capable of fighting. These authorities say that they are creating an army from scratch, while the Armenian army was formed in 1992.

They deny the path taken by the army, as well as our entire history, in the terminology of “real Armenia”. The Armenian army was formed from scratch, but the head of this government has nothing to do with that, he only has to do with bringing the army to zero,” said Ohanyan.

According to the opposition figure, Pashinyan continues the style of his activity that everyone is to blame for the 44-day war, the failure of diplomacy, illegal border demarcation and demarcation, except him.

“The head of this government is the first bearer of intolerance, atmosphere of hatred, inhuman treatment.

He himself is the cause of the formation of vicious phenomena. Today, the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem is being strengthened, and after the 44-day war, sensing the defeatist and capricious policy of our authorities, it is increasing its pressure. Their goal is the complete elimination of the Republic of Armenia from our region.”

“The acquisition of modern weapons and military equipment has turned them into propaganda. New artillery systems are shown at the parade, but the volley in memory of the fallen is carried out by D-30 systems. If the new systems have been appropriated, let them show those systems as well.

The head of the General Staff has turned into a sergeant who reports to the Minister of Defense to open new facilities,” Seyran Ohanyan said.

Details in the video

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The water level in the Caspian Lake is currently below the lowest level on record, and according to the Baltic High System, the average is less than 29 meters. The mentioned data was published by the Volga-Caspian Branch of the Caspian Fisheries Research Institute (КаспНИРХ) [14] [21].

The study uses the terminology pair “Caspian Lake/Caspian Sea” according to its physico-geographical characteristics as the world’s largest closed endorheic reservoir. From a legal point of view, according to the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea (2018), the term “sea” is used, but from a hydrological and water balance point of view, “lake” is correct. When discussing hydrological processes in this article, preference is given to the term “lake” and the term “sea” in the context of historically shaped geopolitical and transportation practices.

The results of chronological data analysis and prospective modeling show that the steady decline in the level of the Caspian Sea during the period 1990-2045 may be about 4.7 meters, and may reach about 18 meters by 2100. A steady decline in the level of the Caspian Sea may occur until 2100. This trend indicates the formation of a deep hydrogeodynamic and environmental crisis, which is already beginning to significantly affect the economic structure of the region, the stability of ecosystems and geopolitical processes.

If the current pace of development of events is maintained, the realization of the so-called “Aral scenario” for the Caspian Sea is becoming more and more probable. According to the available forecasts, in the medium and long term, existing transport links and coastal infrastructure may lose their functional efficiency.  Such a development of events can radically change the economic, ecological and geopolitical balance not only of the Caspian Basin, but also of the entire Caucasus region. [21]:

The comparative analysis of the “Aral scenario” in relation to the Caspian Sea requires caution. In contrast to the Aral Sea, where the main reason for drying was the almost complete cessation of river flow for irrigation [36], in the case of the Caspian Sea, climate change (increased evaporation) and anthropogenic losses play a dominant role. However, the hydrodynamic similarity (both bodies of water are endorheic, shallow in the northern part) makes the “Aral scenario” a heuristically useful but not a literal analogy.

Introduction:

The relevance of the study is due to the continuous unprecedented fall in the level of the Caspian Lake, which poses threats not only to ecosystems, but also to the economic and transport infrastructure of the Caspian basin states.: Despite the existence of separate hydrological and environmental publications, comprehensive interdisciplinary studies combining hydrodynamic analysis with geopolitical and geoeconomic forecasting remain limited.

The object of the study is the hydrological regime and the modern dynamics of the water level in the Caspian Lake as a factor of regional changes.

The subject of the research is the ecological, economic and geopolitical consequences of the water level decline for the countries of the Caspian basin and neighboring states (including Armenia).

Study the aim is to identify and coordinate the main consequences of a steady decline in the level of the Caspian Lake, as well as to assess the possible transformation of regional transport corridors and geopolitical balance.

Research objectives․To analyze the modern dynamics of the water level and the quantitative parameters of the water balance of the Caspian Lake.

Assess the contribution of natural and anthropogenic factors (including oil extraction) to the recycling process.

Consider scenario forecasts (“optimistic”, “negative”, “Aral”) and their possible ecological consequences.

Determine the impact of lowering water levels on shipping, port infrastructure and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor (Middle Corridor).

To analyze the indirect consequences for countries without direct access to the Caspian Sea (for example, Armenia) in the context of CSTO and EAEU membership.

The methodological basis of the research. The study was carried out within the framework of an interdisciplinary approach, which combines the methods of hydrological analysis (water balance calculation, hydrometeorological services data processing), scenario forecasting (on the basis of three scenarios developed by KMG Kashagan B.V.), geo-economic analysis (assessing cargo flows and transit potential) and political-geographical description.

The application of the water balance formula is of a computational-illustrative nature, based on the data of open sources and official reports (World Bank, UNEP, КаспНИРХ, Kazhydromet, Azerkosmos). The limitations of the method are related to the lack of complete open-access data on underground inflow, man-made water losses during oil extraction, and water intake, which is reflected in the relevant assumptions of the calculation.

Environmental factor. Since 2006, the water level of the Caspian Lake has shown a steady decreasing trend, reaching critical indicators in 2025. The State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) has already alerted about this situation, noting that the drop in sea level has a negative impact on the normal operation of the company’s production platforms. [5]:

The mentioned circumstance most likely conditions the projects implemented by SOCAR together with the TotalEnergies company, which envisages the drilling of super-deep wells for the purpose of assimilation of new hydrocarbon reserves, despite the existing serious environmental and hydrological problems of the Caspian Sea [6].

At the same time, the international analytical agency Fitch Solutions questioned the possibility of exporting 20 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe per year until 2027. This circumstance also indicates the poor ecological, hydrological and resource situation of the Caspian Sea. [7][8][9].

According to a special report by the World Bank՝ The water level in the Caspian Sea is currently in a critical state and continues to decrease, leading to aggravating problems with the operation of infrastructure, navigation and the efficient operation of ships in ports.: The report specifically emphasizes that a number of courts are no longer able to fully utilize their technical capabilities, which turns this phenomenon into an important geopolitical factor [11].

Caspian Lake is the world’s largest closed endorheic basin (which has no flow to the ocean). Its hydrological regime is mainly determined by river inflow, atmospheric precipitation, evaporation, as well as anthropogenic “hidden” water losses related to technological water use in the process of oil extraction.

The formula of the water balance (hydrological regime) of the basin can be presented in the following form:

ΔV = (Qrivers P Gunderground) – (E Woil Way)

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ΔV – the change in water volume (related to the change in level);

Rivers – river inflow.

P – atmospheric precipitation (atmospheric inflow).

Gunderground – underground inflow (if considered).

E – evaporation.

Oil – technological water use during oil extraction (seawater injection into wells).

Other – other anthropogenic losses of water (water, technical use, etc.).

On the hydrological regime of the reservoir, bApart from natural factors, the oil and gas industry is also affected: The oil extraction process uses the water injection method (water injection), which is used to maintain reservoir pressure in oil wells and increase extraction efficiency [23] [24] [25].

As part of this process, seawater is taken from the water body and injected into wells, as a result of which it effectively ceases to participate in the natural water cycle of the Caspian Lake and is considered an anthropogenic loss of water resources [23] [24] [25] .

According to estimates, in the case of daily oil production of 1.1-1.3 million barrels in the Caspian Sea, the volume of water injection reaches about 200,000 tons, which leads to anthropogenic “hidden” loss of about 1.4 million tons of water in a week [26] [27] [31]. This process has a significant impact on the water balance of the basin [26] [31].

A nearly 1°C rise in sea surface temperatures over the past 15 years has led to increased evaporation and disrupted biological processes. Reduced water volume and increased salinity have negatively affected phytoplankton life and reproduction, which in turn has led to a decline in fish stocks.:[35] The average rate of evaporation from the sea surface is approximately 1,000–1,400 mm per year (i.e., approximately 1.0–1.4 m of water per year), which is equivalent to approximately 371 km³ of water per year.[29][30] However, this figure is somewhat offset by precipitation.

The main source of water supply to the Caspian Sea is the Volga River. Volga, Terek, Sulak and Samur rivers flow into the lake from the territory of Russia. The annual flow of the Volga River accounts for about 80% of the total surface tributary to the Caspian Lake [22].

According to scientific reviews, the total annual inflow of river water flowing into the lake is formed by more than 130 rivers, the total annual flow of which is about 300 cubic kilometers of water. This indicator reflects the total amount of net river inflow.

The annual amount of atmospheric precipitation on the surface of the sea is usually estimated at about 200 mm per year. If we consider the surface of the Caspian Sea equal to about 371,000 km², the volume of atmospheric inflow can be expressed as follows:

P ≈ 0.2 m × 371 000 km² ≈ 74 km³/year.

By combining the above information about total water losses from the sea, the following water balance equation can be formulated:

ΔV = (Qr P) – (E Woil)

ΔV = (300 77) – (371 328.5) = -322.5 km³/year

Thus, the annual water loss is approximately 320 km³.

The presented calculation does not take into account the Wproch component, which includes water withdrawals from the Caspian Sea, technical water use, water withdrawals for industrial purposes and other anthropogenic losses. Although this factor may represent a significant volume, it was not included in the balance formula because there are no available and comparable concrete quantitative estimates in open sources or official publications.

Major sea surface drivers include climate change, which leads to changes in precipitation patterns and increases in temperature. The anthropogenic factor is also of significant importance: the intensification of water use, oil extraction and other types of water use, as well as the significant increase in evaporation from the sea surface under the conditions of rising temperatures.

In addition, Held on November 26, 2024 in the city of Atyrau (Kazakhstan). «Caspian Technical Conference» according to the scores presented in the panel session՝ in the case of the most unfavorable scenario of water level change, the Caspian Lake may be divided into two separate basins.  Such a development of events will have profound ecological, economic and geopolitical consequences for the entire region [1] [2].

Agreed «KMG Kashagan B. V.» according to the results of research carried out by the company, the dynamics of the Caspian Sea level change can develop in three main scenarios [3][4].

Unfavorable (negative) scenario– Within the framework of this scenario, the tendency of the water level in the Caspian Lake to decrease will continue. Currently, the average level has already reached the minus 29.8 m mark, which is the lowest level recorded in the last two decades. The average annual drop in level is estimated to be about 20 centimeters.

Optimistic scenario– This scenario assumes a stabilization of the water level and a possible slight increase in the long term. However, according to expert estimates, this scenario is the least likely to happen among the considered options.

Aralyang (worst) scenario– The most unfavorable and at the same time the most likely scenario assumes the division of the Caspian Sea into two separate water basins, on the analogy of the Aral Sea, which is currently represented by the North Aral (Kazakhstan) and the South Aral (Uzbekistan). If this scenario is implemented, the Caspian Lake can be divided into two main parts: Northern and M:the bottom–South.

In the case of any of the mentioned scenarios, serious environmental and geopolitical problems will inevitably arise in the Caspian region, as well as large-scale transformations that will affect the economic, energy, transportation and regional security systems.

According to expert estimates, the border between the two potential water basins may pass along the so-called “Caspian saddle”, which is a system of underwater ridges that extends between the Volga River delta (Astrakhan region) and the Prorva deposit in the Atyrau region of Kazakhstan.

This circumstance makes the North Caspian Sea relatively less vulnerable to drying processes. However, so called «Aral scenario» in case of implementation, the deformation of the coastline can become significant, as a result «Caspian saddle» can emerge from the water and become a narrow strip of land that physically separates the watershed.

One of the already visible manifestations of the mentioned processes is the situation prevailing in the Atyrau region of Kazakhstan, where a state of emergency is announced due to a sharp decrease in the water level in certain parts of the sea, as well as in the Kigach and Sharon rivers [15] [16]:

As of September 2025, measurements by the Kazhydromet service showed a continuous decline in the level of the Caspian Sea. According to confirmed data, the average sea level in the coastal regions of the country was minus 29.31 m (according to the Baltic height system). It is noteworthy that in the northeastern part it was minus 29.15 m, and in the eastern part – minus 29.46 m. ​​Compared to the same period last year, the decrease is estimated to be about 17-20 centimeters [14]. The long-term trend is even more pronounced.

According to the analysis of the Russian State Oceanographic Institute and “Kazhydromet” service, in the 18-year period of 2006-2024, the surface of the Caspian Sea has decreased by 36,6 thousand square kilometers[33]. During the same period, the water level in the Kazakhstan region decreased by 2.13 m in total (from minus 27.07 m to an average of minus 29.20 m) [15]. These dynamics lead to rapid retreat of the coastline, especially in the northeastern shallow part of the sea. In separate parts of the territory of Kazakhstan, the coastline has receded to 30-35 kilometers [15][16].

According to the assessment of the Azerbaijani space agency (“Azercosmos”), during the last 20-25 years, in the northern part of the sea, where the depth does not exceed 5 meters, the reduction of the water area took place over a distance of more than 70 kilometers [34]. This process directly threatens ecosystems, fish resources, shipping and coastal infrastructure, which requires coordinated and immediate cooperation among all countries of the Caspian Basin.

The lowering of the level of the Caspian Sea is most pronounced in the Kazakh part, but has serious consequences for all states of the region. According to the actual data, the process of shallowing is already causing significant economic consequences, including the complexity of the operation of the oil extraction infrastructure, the deterioration of shipping conditions, and the increased need for regular dredging and cleaning of port facilities.

In terms of lowering the sea level in the coastal zone of Azerbaijan, the area of ​​Kyzylagaj Bay is the most vulnerable, where the area of ​​dry areas already exceeds 700 square kilometers.

«Azercosmos» according to the monitoring data of the space agency, if this trend is maintained, the ecosystems and geographical landscapes of the coastal regions will be under threat, in particular, the islands of Gum and Piralahi, whose possible connection with the mainland (the formation of a peninsula) is considered a real risk.

In February 2025, within the framework of the third economic conference of the Caspian region in Tehran, key attention was paid to the prospects for the development of regional transport links. In particular, the Trans-Caspian international transport corridor was discussed. «North-South» international transport corridor as well «Caspian Lake-Persian Gulf» the transport route [12].

The issue of sustainable lowering of the water level in the Caspian Lake and the related environmental and economic challenges occupied a central place in the agenda of the conference. In his speech, the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan emphasized the seriousness of the problem and the need to form a unified interstate approach to preserve the ecosystem and solve the problem [13]. M:the concerns are also confirmed by the statistical data of Azerbaijan. According to the statement of the head of the State Water Resources Agency, over the past 45 years, fresh water reserves in the country have decreased by about 25 percent, which is partly due to the drop of the Caspian Sea level by about two meters.

Geopolitical and economic dynamics. The convergence of the Caspian Sea in the medium and long term may lead to a significant weakening or termination of regular sea connections and the existing coastal border zones of the Caspian countries. The Caspian Lake is a closed reservoir, and its sea communications are only functional if there is sufficient depth, navigable roads, a stable coastline and technical access to ports.

Caspian countries that lose de facto “sea borders” in the sense of maritime connectivity;

 Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan

The most vulnerable is the Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan connection. Kazakhstan’s Aktau/Kurik ports connect the country with Azerbaijan (Baku/Alyat). This is the main part of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor (Middle Corridor). In the event of a narrowing, Kazakhstan effectively loses a quick sea outlet to Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan loses a sea bridge with Central Asia.  As a result, the corridor becomes more dependent on Russia or Iran, which changes the balance of economic power in the region.

Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan

Turkmenbash port connects Turkmenistan with Azerbaijan. This is an important destination for cargo transportation, gas projects and logistics. During the blockade, Turkmenistan loses a part of the Western exit, and Azerbaijan «of the energy bridge» potential sector.

Russia-Iran

This connection is of a strategic nature. The Caspian Lake is a zone of Russian-Iranian cooperation. In case of shallowing, some routes may become difficult, especially in shallow areas, which increases the load on Russian ports. and: on shipping (in particular, in the direction of Astrakhan/Dagestan).

Iran-Azerbaijan (and Turkmenistan)

Iran controls the southern part of the Caspian Sea, which is relatively deep, but if it becomes heavy, there will be problems with sea communications with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Russia.

Changing coastlines can affect the role of local ports; Iran may try to strengthen its position as «alternative land corridor»:

Economic dynamics

In the conditions of the weakening of the Caspian sea connections, the importance of the land routes of Russia, as well as the routes passing through the territory of Armenia and Iran, is increasing. This changes logistics flows and redistributes strategic advantages in the region.

Azerbaijan as «transit hub» diminishing role. Sea transportation in the structure of Azerbaijan’s foreign trade generally makes up a relatively small share (up to 5%), but if we take into account important transit cargo flows, the share of transportation through the Caspian Sea increases to 23-24%, that is, it means the key role of the sea in the transit model [32].

In monetary terms, this is approximately 6.5-6.8 billion US dollars per year. According to statistical data, the cargo turnover of Aktau and Kurik ports in 2023-2024 shows multifaceted dynamics.  At the same time, the International Caspian Transport Bureau estimates that a 1-meter drop in sea level increases dredging costs by an average of 15-20% per year. In terms of money, it can be an additional 30-40 million dollars per year for the port complex of Kazakhstan.

Weakening of the midline

The Middle Corridor connects China-Kazakhstan-Caspian-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey-EU. The crossing of the Caspian Sea may result in the countries of the Caspian basin effectively losing their maritime borders and direct water connections with each other and shifting transport flows to land routes, increasing the influence of some countries and weakening the economic role of others.:

If Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey maritime communication weakens, the effectiveness of the system that limited Russia’s monopoly in the region will decrease. This means that Russia’s logistical and political role in the region may increase, while new opportunities open up for Armenia.

In the conditions of the problems related to the Caspian Lake, land routes through the territory of Iran become more significant. This gives Armenia the opportunity to turn its connection with Iran into a strategic logistics hub, develop the “North-South” concept and present itself as Iran. → Georgia → Black Sea land bridge. In other words, the weakening of the maritime corridor through the Caspian Sea can increase the strategic value of the route through the territory of Iran for Armenia.

In this context, in his speech at the UN General Assembly on September 25, 2025, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, emphasized the following. “The Caspian Lake is rapidly shrinking, and the main reason for this is not climate change at all” [20]. This statement, regardless of its causal justification, testifies to the high political significance of the problem and the fact that the countries of the region evaluate it from different perspectives, which can complicate the development and implementation of a joint strategy for solving the problem.

Analysis of indirect consequences for Armenia (hypothetical scenario)

It should be emphasized that Armenia does not have a direct access to the Caspian Sea, so any conclusions about the impact of weighting on it are hypothetical and scenario-based, and not based on proven cause-and-effect relationships.

Hypothesis 1 (transportation)․ If lowering the level of the Caspian Lake leads to a significant reduction in the flow of cargo transportation through the middle corridor (Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan-Georgia), then part of the transit volumes can theoretically be redistributed to land routes. In this context, the Iran-Armenia-Georgia route can gain a relative advantage as a stable route to the Black Sea.

Hypothesis 2 (transit)․ With the completion of the construction of the “North-South” highway and the possible opening of regional communications (within the possible settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations), the transit potential of Armenia may increase.

At the same time, it is important to consider that the process of convergence of the Caspian Sea itself, although not a direct driving force of political changes, is able to create indirect incentives for the revision of the transport logistics of the Caspian states. In particular, the countries of the Caspian Basin (especially Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) may be pushed to diversify export channels, including, other things being equal, to more pragmatic consideration of overland alternatives.

If the economic pressure caused by the narrowing (additional costs of port infrastructure, reduced predictability of maritime transport) reaches a certain threshold, it may indirectly increase the interest of the parties in finding sustainable land corridors, including those that pass through the territory of Armenia.

It is important to emphasize that any transport initiative of Armenia (including the so-called TRIPP) stems from the need for full compliance with the obligations of the Republic of Armenia within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).:

The charters and founding agreements of those organizations ratified by Armenia have direct binding force and define the foreign economic and foreign political context in which any regional cooperation is implemented. Thus, the Armenian transit potential is considered not as an alternative to Eurasian integration, but as a logical complement to it: a land bridge that connects EAEU countries through the territory of Armenia with Iran, then with the Persian Gulf, as well as with the Caspian Basin states.

Thus, the hydrological crisis in the Caspian Sea does not predetermine political decisions, but creates an additional economic context in which the benefits of unblocking regional communications (within Armenia’s existing alliance commitments) can be perceived as more weighty.: The degree to which this potential is realized remains largely dependent on political factors, and hydrological changes create an additional economic background, but do not act as an independent driving force.  [17][18][19].

Conclusion

The steady and accelerating decline of the water level in the Caspian Sea has ceased to be only an isolated ecological phenomenon. It has turned into a large-scale regional crisis that is inevitably reshaping the economic, transportation and geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Existing scenario projections (including the “Aral scenario”) indicate the possibility, but not the inevitability, of a critical transformation of the watershed, in which coastal infrastructure will lose its functionality, and key transit corridors, especially the Middle Corridor, will face serious operational difficulties.

The most significant economic and geopolitical consequence may be the weakening of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor (Middle Corridor), while simultaneously increasing the relative value of overland routes through the territory of Iran and the South Caucasus. In this context, a new geometry of transit communications is needed.

The risk of disruption to sea routes, the significant increase in costs of port operations due to shoaling, and the general unpredictability of the route increase the strategic value of sustainable land transport links. Unlike unstable waterways, land routes through the territory of Armenia can ensure stable operation of transport flows.

The analysis shows that the lowering of the level of the Caspian Sea, being a factor complicating regional stability, creates new challenges, but also opportunities. Being a landlocked country, Armenia can form an active and proactive policy that will match the national security strategy and promote economic development.

DAVIT MATEVOSIAN

vpoanalytics.com

Translation by Zhanna Avetisyan

Used literature

1. Caspian annual technical conference

2. Climate Information Portal of Central Asia (Central Asia Climate information Portal)

3. “Furnishing of Kashagan mine facilities. Marine complex. Repair deepening works” project

4. KMG Kashagan B.V. (KMG Kashagan B.V.)

5. “The lowering of the level of the Caspian Sea hinders the normal operation of the company’s production platforms” 

6.  TotalEnergiesin Azerbaijan

7. Fitch SolutionsFitch Solutions Casts Doubt on Azerbaijan’s 20 bcm Gas Export Target to Europe by 2027

8. Natural Gas World

9. oilprice.com 

10. eurasianet.org 

11. World Bank “Economic North of the Caspian Sea. challenges and opportunities” (World bank “The Caspian Sea’s Shallow North. Challenges and Opportunities»)

12. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation ministry 

13. azertag.az

14. tass.ru

15. Carnegie Endowment

16. en.tengrinews.kz

17. azertag.az

18. The Diplomat – “Receding Waters, Rising Challenges: Navigating the Caspian Sea’s Geopolitical Moment”

19. Caspian – Alpine Society – “The Caspian Sea: Economic and Geopolitical Consequences of Declining Water Levels”

20. report.az/en

21. “Climate change in the Caspian Sea region” international scientific conference materials

22. State Oceanographic Institute 

23. Popular Mechanics, March 1933 – on the invention of water injection for oil extraction article:

24. Mechanisms of biological clogging of materials in saturated soils and aquifers and ecological impact (Environmental Impact and Mechanisms of the Biological Clogging of Saturated Soils and Aquifer Materials)

25. Water injection (oil extraction)oil production))

26. Caspian offshore fields have collectively produced more than 1 million barrels per day in recent years, according to the EIA Regional Energy to hint.

27. Kashagan the mine produced ~378,500 barrels per day in 2024.

28. caspianpost.com

29. European Geological Society (European Geosciences Union)

30. United Nations Environment Program (UN environment program)

31. Open Data Center of Iran (Iran Open Data Center)

32. Cargo transportation by transport corridors in 2024 (Cargo transportation by transport corridors in 2024) st1yle=”box-sizing:border-box;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:1rem”>33. Kosolapov A.E., Matishov G.G. Modern changes in the level of the Caspian Sea. causes and consequences // RGA bulletin. Geographical series. – 2021. – № 4. – Page 12-28.

34. Lemeshko E.M., Kasumov A.B. The transformation of the North Caspian coast under the influence of climatic and anthropogenic factors // Geography and natural resources. – 2023. – H. 44, No. 2. – Pages 56–64.

35. Ivanov V.P., Komarova N.V. Hydro-ecological problems of the Caspian basin. – Astrakhan. Publishing house of KaspNIRKH, 2020. – 312 pages.

36. Micklin P. Aral Sea disaster. lessons for Caspian // Geography, Environment, Sustainability. – 2019. – Vol. 12, no. 3. – P. 6–21

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Taron Chakhoyan, the former director of the “Public Relations and Information Center” of the Prime Minister’s Office, who was called the “head of the factory of official fakes” in a number of press publications, was appointed as Pashinyan’s deputy chief of staff from 2021. Today, he is already a deputy of the CP.

How did Chakhoyan close the year 2025 and with what achievements did he enter the year 2026 and reach a new position, we learn from the declaration.

Thus, in his declaration, Taron Chakhoyan mentioned one minor living together, his son, and two adults: Ani Chakhoyan, a lecturer at YSU, and Diana Karapetyan, an accountant at “Proshyan” cognac factory LLC.

As immovable property, the official declared the apartment he bought in the capital in 2009 and owned as a sole owner, and as movable property he declared the 2017 Mercedes car he bought in 2023.

Taron Chakhoyan also informed that he has a deposit of 10 million drams and bank account balances increased by half a million drams at the end of the year, the total volume of which was around 6 million 350 thousand drams.

Another 1,365,000 AMD was made up of “bank account balances acquired on behalf of, for the benefit of, or at the expense of, the declarant, owned by a third party, or the balances of those bank accounts (excluding deposits) from which the declarant actually receives benefit or manages it.”

During the year, his cash resources fluctuated within the range of 7 million drams, and the income of 19,771,916 drams for the reporting year, 2025, was generated from the salary received from Pashinyan’s staff and or from other payments equal to it.

By the way, according to the 2022 declaration, for example, he declared 4 million drams in the bank deposits section, and at the end of the year, the amount of the deposit reached 6 million drams, he had 4 million 800 thousand drams in his bank account.

Chakhoyan presented 3,500 dollars in the section of balances of bank accounts acquired on behalf of the declarant, on behalf of the declarant, and owned by a third party.

As cash, the former deputy head of the Prime Minister’s Office had 4 million 135 thousand drams at the beginning of the year, and 6.9 million drams at the end of the year.

He also received 15,234,794 drams from the RA government.

Taron Chakhoyan’s wife, Diana Karapetyan, stated in the 2025 declaration about the right to purchase a jointly owned apartment, the value of which was stated at AMD 24,024,000. the developer is Ord Development LLC.

By the way, according to open publications, the son of the owner of this company, Levon Ordukhanyan, Samvel Ordukhanyan, was one of the donors of CP in 2025.

Chakhoyan’s wife mentioned a bank deposit of 10 million drams, as well as bank account balances, the total volume of which at the end of the year was about half a million drams.

Diana Karapetyan’s 7.8 million drams in cash at the beginning of the year amounted to 27 thousand drams at the end of the year. His income of 4,880,276 drams for the reporting year was made up of 865,760 drams received from Hrant Chobanyan, 3,132,230 drams received from “Proshyan brandy factory”, 356,995 drams received from “Apex Building Care”, and received from “Mrgashen” wine-brandy factory: 525,291 drams from wages and/or other payments equal to it.

The total amount of Diana Karapetyan’s loan principal amount was 30,025,986 drams. he did not mention the names of the lenders and the purpose of the loan.

By the way, Diana Karapetyan’s main workplace, “Proshan brandy factory”, according to open source publications, participates in fundraisers of KP and “My step” fund. According to the latest information, the Proshyan brandy factory donated 3 million drams to the “My step” fund.

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