Category: News

In recent weeks, Agos published an important three-part series by Zakarya Mildanoğlu on Kurdish-Armenian relations in the context of the early twentieth century with direct references to written sources of the period. We learn from Mildanoğlu that more installments are forthcoming. Although this is a very important subject, it has remained in the shadow of debates over genocide, particularly in popular discourse, where it has largely been discussed on the basis of the agency of Kurds in the Armenian Genocide. Yet Armenian-Kurdish relations are a multifaceted subject that cannot be confined to the genocide and that, naturally, stretches back much further in time.

Fortunately, we are in a better position in academic domain than we are in popular discourse. Although there is still a long way to go and many questions that need to be explored, there are academic studies, or at least works that follow a certain methodology and discipline, that can help us in exploring and establishing the outlines of the subject. (I have also tried to make a contribution to the literature by an article, namely “White Man’s Burden” or Victim’s Hope(lessness): Armeno-Kurdish Relations and Mutual Perceptions before the Genocide, in the edited volume titled “Kurds and Yezidis in the Middle East: Shifting Identities, Borders, and the Experiences of Minority Communities”.) What we need is the infusion of academic knowledge to the masses and get more widespread. In this article, as a contribution toward that goal, I will try to outline some of the key aspects of this history. My comments apply generally to the post-Tanzimat period, meaning from mid-19th century to the end of the Ottoman Empire.

The first thing that needs to be underscored is this: Kurdish-Armenian relations are a phenomenon too complex, fluid, multi-actor, and variable across time and space to fit into a simple “friend-foe” dichotomy. Undoubtedly, this history is not a bed of roses; it involves conflict, massacres, and blood, but alongside these, it also contains solidarity, protection and mutual patronage, joint production, and cultural exchange.

Secondly, these relations do not actually fit into the categories of “Kurd” or “Armenian” either; they cannot be discussed or explained solely through these two categories, which are thought to be national. One must also consider the internal divisions, conflicts, and groupings within both societies. For example, tribal divisions among Kurds, the contradictions between the agha-bey (landlord/chief) class and Kurdish peasants or laborers; or when we look at the Armenian side, the oligarchic class known as the amira in the earlier 19th century, Armenian political parties from the second half of the 1880s onward, and the conflicts of the Armenian Church both with certain segments of society and within itself are elements that must be taken into consideration when discussing Armenian-Kurdish relations.

In this respect, different groups, classes, and social strata within Armenian and Kurdish communities established relationships with one another independently of the rest of their respective communities, without necessarily implicating or binding them. Consequently, Indeed, it was not unusual in this history for some Armenians to ally with some Kurds against other Armenians, or for some Kurds to join forces with some Armenians against other Kurds. To be more specific and refer to actual events, this is a history in which a cleric within the Armenian Church might collaborate with local Kurdish authorities to eliminate a rival within the church hierarchy, or Kurdish peasants suffering under the oppression of a Kurdish agha might seek support and solidarity from an Armenian political party.

This situation also serves as a reminder of how we should -or rather should not- approach this subject today. For instance, there is no historical, political, or moral basis for a Kurdish laborer today to embrace and defend the actions of a Kurdish agha from more than a century ago simply on the grounds of Kurdish identity. Nor is there any such basis for an ordinary Armenian today to adopt and defend, on the grounds of Armenian identity, the actions of the Armenian Church as an institution or of any Armenian political party from more than a century ago. What should determine our attitudes and guide our judgements about historical events and figures today is not our Armenian or Kurdish identity, but the contemporary values that prioritize human rights, dignity, freedom, and justice, even if those very priorities and values are now both domestically and internationally under threat.

I cannot even go beyond methodology and start talking about the content. Let’s continue handling this subject.

Armenia does not plan to resume its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), despite statements by its leadership about the possible expulsion of the country. Armenia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Ararat Mirzoyan stated this during a joint press conference with Slovenia’s Foreign Minister Tanja Fajon on October 28, UNN reports, citing Armenpress.

The issue of Armenia’s further membership may be considered as early as November 11 at the CSTO summit in moscow. For now, Yerevan formally remains a member of the military-political organization led by russia.

Details

According to Mirzoyan, Armenia has not participated in the CSTO’s activities for a long time and is not considering the possibility of resuming cooperation with the organization. At the same time, Yerevan’s position remains unchanged regardless of statements by the organization’s leadership or its member states.

We stopped participating in the work of this structure a long time ago and froze our membership. If other members of the organization or its secretariat make any statements, they are futile. We will not change our position and see no possibility of returning to the CSTO

– Mirzoyan said.

The head of Armenia’s foreign policy agency effectively confirmed that Yerevan does not intend to return to full participation in the military-political alliance led by russia.

CSTO discusses expelling Armenia

Mirzoyan’s statement came amid a discussion about the country’s further membership in the organization. In particular, on October 28, former CSTO Secretary General Nikolay Bordyuzha stated that Armenia should be expelled from the organization, as it had effectively ceased cooperation but continued to enjoy the status of a member state. In his view, this situation creates contradictions in the organization’s work, since its decisions are adopted on the basis of consensus, which requires taking the positions of member states into account.

Bordyuzha noted that Yerevan should make the decision to leave the alliance independently. If the Armenian authorities do not intend to do so, the issue of expulsion should be considered by the other CSTO members.

Earlier, on October 23, the organization’s incumbent Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov said that the issue of Armenia’s membership could be submitted to a meeting of the Collective Security Council scheduled for November 11 in moscow. According to him, the Armenian side continues to receive the organization’s documents, but systematically refuses to participate in discussions and decision-making. At the same time, Armenia’s representative attends the CSTO Permanent Council’s weekly meetings.

Masadykov also emphasized that Yerevan does not participate in military exercises or the organization’s main events. At the same time, he clarified that for the issue of Armenia’s membership to be officially considered, the relevant proposal must be submitted by the chairing state or another CSTO member.

Why Armenia froze its CSTO membership

Relations between Yerevan and the organization began to deteriorate after the conflict with Azerbaijan escalated.

The Armenian authorities repeatedly accused the CSTO of failing to fulfill its obligations to ensure the republic’s security. Yerevan was particularly dissatisfied with the organization’s response to the border clashes with Azerbaijan in 2021–2022. Armenia insisted that the hostilities had taken place, in particular, on its internationally recognized territory, and therefore expected its allies to take specific measures within the framework of collective security mechanisms.

In February 2024, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that the country was freezing its participation in the CSTO. He explained this by saying that, in the view of the Armenian leadership, the organization had failed to fulfill its security obligations. In May of the same year, Yerevan officially refused to participate in financing the CSTO’s activities. Since then, Armenia has effectively distanced itself from the organization’s work, but has not initiated a formal withdrawal procedure.

In August 2026, Pashinyan stated that over the next five years the country did not plan to resume active involvement in the CSTO. Moreover, he said he would welcome a decision to expel Armenia, as this would relieve Yerevan of the need to resolve the issue of withdrawal independently.

Armenia has left the CSTO and does not plan to return – Pashinyan04.12.24, 17:20 • 21746 views

Could Armenia be expelled from the CSTO?

The possibility of expelling a state is provided for by the charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. In particular, Article 20 of the document allows the Collective Security Council to suspend a state’s participation in the work of the organization’s bodies if it fails to fulfill its established obligations. If the violations continue, the Council may decide to expel the respective state.

At the same time, Article 25 of the charter provides for restrictions on participants that fail to fulfill their obligations to repay debts to the organization’s budget for two years. In particular, this involves depriving them of the right to vote and suspending their right to nominate their citizens for quota positions in the CSTO until the debt is fully repaid. Such restrictions are introduced by a decision of the Collective Security Council.

Separately, Article 19 provides for the possibility of voluntarily withdrawing from the organization. To do so, the state must settle its obligations and officially notify the CSTO of its intention to leave at least six months before the relevant date.

However, in practice, Armenia’s future status will depend either on its own decision to withdraw or on decisions by other member states within the procedures provided for by the charter.

What happens next

The nearest important date for future relations between Armenia and the CSTO will be November 11, when a meeting of the Collective Security Council is scheduled to take place in moscow. The meeting may raise the issue of applying the restrictions provided for by the charter to Yerevan or expelling the country from the organization.

Yerevan’s refusal to return to the organization comes amid the country’s gradual review of its security policy and the development of cooperation with European partners, particularly France, as well as with the United States.

We remind you

Back in June 2023, the then-incumbent Secretary of Armenia’s Security Council, Armen Grigoryan, stated that membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) brought nothing to Armenia.

In the historic Ani archeological site in Kars, Turkey, the ruins of an ancient Armenian civilization serve as a reminder of the shared history between the two nations despite the now 33-year border closure.

Downhill from Ani’s Menucihr mosque, built by the Seljuk Turks, lie the remains of the Ani bridge, where two large slabs of volcanic rock sit across from each other on each side of the Arpaçay River bank, surrounded by miles of rolling hills. On one side of the river lies Turkey, on the other Armenia. Despite this, those who wish to simply wade across the border cannot and instead have to endure the long, ill paved road through Georgia. Turkey closed the land border in 1993 during the first Nagorno-Karabakh war in support of Azerbaijan and the border has remained closed to this day.

Now after three decades, the border opening looms closer than ever. Officials confirm that it could happen any day now.

As one traverses the cities of eastern Turkey and western Armenia, the memories of this shared history remain among older folks on each side of the border. Elders spoke of joint memories, business leaders of commercial opportunities and locals about much needed economic growth for cities like Kars, Van and Diyarbakir in Turkey, and Gyrumri in Armenia.

‘Open roads are better in any case’

Artyon Mkrtchy, a 64-year-old potato farmer in Gyumri on the Armenian side of the border remembers life prior to the closure. His home is only a short walk from the historic Kars-Gyumri railway, now out of service. He didn’t interact with Turks, although his distant ancestors descend from Diyarbakir, but he remembers goods flowing between the two countries, specifically wheat, animals, agricultural machines and cement.

“In any case closed roads are not good, open roads are good, even if we don’t make our own business we will give workers to train stations, to the custom service — it will create jobs in any case,” Mkrtchy said.

Mkrtchy sells potatoes to Kazakhstan and Georgia by truck. If the border opens he said he will sell to Turkey as well.

He’s not the only one who shares these memories. One Armenian worker at a textile and hosiery factory in Gyumri said that although she is too young to remember meeting any Turks, her parents used to work in a factory with Turkish coworkers. They would sometimes sit and enjoy tea or coffee together.

These shared memories lie on the Turkish side of the border too. Born-and-raised Kars resident and journalist Olcay Okan Avşar remembers that, when he was a child, a bazaar selling Armenian products shipped via the Kars-Gyumri railway would come to town twice a week. He even still owns an organ mini piano he bought from an Armenian seller to this day.

Avşar was young in the days before the border closure, but he described it as a loss of the “color from our lives,” referring to a rich former diversity.

“The cities on the west side of Kars are not actually aware … but for regional cities closer to the border, we used to have this interaction with Armenian people both person-to-person and trade, that’s why we remember this and why we remember the culture — which is why for us it’s important,” Avşar said.

He said that the normalization process especially makes sense for people in eastern cities like Kars as they would be the ones who see the most benefit. He also noted many cultural similarities and memories with Armenians.

“Ordinary people [in Kars and Armenia] already have so much in common, music, dances and food, they’re not strangers to each other, they used to live together so they’re not very different,” Avşar said.

Turkey has faced major economic crises and inflation over the years. The issue is even more pronounced in many of Turkey’s eastern cities. Locals hope that the opening will provide much needed economic relief.

In a press meeting with Turkish and Armenian journalists, including bianet, President of the Diyarbakir Chamber of Commerce Mehmet Kaya said that Armenian tourism could pose a special opportunity for Diyarbakir given the shared history between the two peoples. Additionally, easier travel will improve trade and business prospects.

“Given the strength of Turkey’s business community, if such a crossing were kept open and good neighborly relations were developed, we could quite easily reach an annual trade volume of up to $10 billion,” said Kaya. “That is why there should be no border between us.”

According to Kaya, Armenian tourists do visit Diyarbakir to see historical Armenian sites, such as the Church of St. Giragos. However, the Chamber does not have any specific statistics on the number of visitors from Armenia. Kaya said that most tourists must travel by plane due to the closed land border, and thus are concentrated in Ankara or Istanbul.

“I can say that we have considerable potential for tourism in both directions, and we need to work on it,” said Kaya. “Such cooperation would not only develop tourism; it would also contribute to social peace.

“It could help our countries recognize the benefits of cooperation and encourage them to adopt more peaceful policies; that is why we are promoting tourism,” he added.

Some Armenians have expressed concern about the ability of domestic businesses to compete with the larger Turkish market. Several Armenian business leaders brushed off this risk though, noting significant cost savings on logistics.

Vachagan Karapetyan, General Director of Artashat Cannery, a preserved food company based in Armenia, said that the majority of Armenian business people are in support of opening the border.

According to Karapetyan, one Turkish truck through Georgia costs about $4,000. He estimates that costs could be reduced by about 30 to 40 percent if the border were open. An open border would also grant the business direct access to the Mersin port and thus the Mediterranean. For now, shipments must go from Poti, Georgia, to Istanbul in order to access the Mediterranean.

Karapetyan said that Turkish companies could also benefit from partnerships with Armenian companies like his, as they could help better access Russian markets.

M. Hakan Mestandoğan, the export manager of Seramiksan, a Turkish ceramic business based in İzmir, has already been shipping to Armenia for over 15 years despite the closed border, but always through Georgia. Mestandoğan believes that Seramiksan may be the first Turkish company to export directly to Armenia, but this only refers to the tax code, rather than the actual path the goods cross. Prior to May 2026, there was no way for Turkish business to list Armenia as the final destination on tax codes.

Ultimately though, the roundabout system through Georgia proves needlessly expensive for both Turkish and Armenian exporters, with Armenians having to navigate the additional barrier of accessing the Mediterranean as a landlocked country.

‘We could see the headline “Armenia-Turkey border has opened” tomorrow’

According to Dr. Stepan Grigoryan, political analyst and Chairman of the Board of the Analytical Centre on Globalization and Regional Cooperation (ACGRC), Turkey’s relationship with Azerbaijan has long posed a significant obstacle in the normalization process.

Turkey has historically operated off of what some call an “Azerbaijan first” policy where Ankara consults Baku in its negotiations with Yerevan. However, Grigoryan believes that the original justifications for the border closure are now moot.

Turkey closed the border due to Azerbaijan and Armenia’s dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh territory. However, an Azerbaijan military victory in 2024 led to the dissolution of the majority-Armenian unrecognized Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) and the mass exodus of Armenians from the region. Some international human rights groups have called the exodus an ethnic cleansing.

Grigoryan said that now that Armenia has recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan following its defeat, the issue of the Turkish border should be put to rest.

“Now the Karabakh issue is resolved, our leaders reached an agreement so the conflict is resolved, even no single Armenian stayed in Karabakh, so I cannot understand what is the reason to keep the border closed in this case,” Grigoryan said.

He added that the current rift between Turkey and Azerbaijan over the hijab bans in Azerbaijani schools could also influence Turkey to move ahead in the normalization process without Azerbaijani consultation.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has expressed a desire to expand relationships with the European Union and Turkey to move beyond Russian dependence. His re-election in June despite the lost Nagorno-Karabakh war could be viewed as a referendum on the normalization process.

Armenian officials have also hinted at the nearing of normal relations. In an Oct. 13 Warsaw Security Forum panel, Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Ararat Mirzoyan spoke optimistically about the border.

“The border is still closed, but I think the process has now matured considerably,” said Mirzoyan. “So much so that it is entirely possible that we could wake up tomorrow morning and see the headline ‘Armenia-Turkey border has opened’ in the news,”

In a meeting with journalists from Turkey and Armenia, including bianet, The European Union ambassador to Armenia Vassilis Maragos called a normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey a “win-win.”

“I think that there is a dimension of economic cooperation, but there is also a dimension which is more human,” said Maragos. “It’s about people to people contacts, people want to get to know each other, they want to get to know better their neighbors, and they feel actually this, that this is also an investment in their security.”

In the latest update on normalization this past weekend, the Turkish Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir Uraloğlu announced the completion of the tender process for the restoration of the Ani bridge — a joint project between Turkey and Armenia. This joint restoration could mark a symbolic next step in relations between the two countries.

Years ago Hrant Dink, the Turkish-Armenian journalist and Editor-in-Chief of the Turkish-Armenian bilingual weekly Agos, wrote his only book titled “Two Close People, Two Distant Neighbors” about Turkey-Armenia relations. Now, a decade later it looks like those two distant neighbors could become much closer very soon. (İK/VK)