Chamlian Armenian School Visited by State Superintendent Tony Thurmond

May 28 2026

On Friday, State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tony Thurmond visited Chamlian Armenian School, which earned a 2025 California Blue Ribbon School recognition, to learn more about the school’s science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM)-aligned learning and heritage-based educational programs. During the visit, Superintendent Thurmond toured classrooms and school facilities alongside student leaders and school administrators before delivering remarks to an assembly of approximately 700 students, educators, and staff.

“What I saw today impressed me, and I believe we can learn from this school’s focus on STEM learning while grounding students in their heritage and cultural history,” said Superintendent Thurmond. “There’s a reason Chamlian Armenian School was recognized as a 2025 California Blue Ribbon School. Students need to be prepared for the economy of the 21st century and have the skills necessary for the future job market while also having a sense of shared community. This approach provides that foundation.”

Chamlian Armenian School is a private K–8 school in north Glendale that was one of 31 California schools nominated for National Blue Ribbon School recognition in 2025. However, the U.S. Dept. of Education then eliminated the National Blue Ribbon School program. As a result, Chamlian Armenian School was awarded the distinction of a 2025 California Blue Ribbon School, ranking among the state’s highest-performing schools that close achievement and opportunity gaps and where students demonstrate especially high levels of academic success.

Superintendent Thurmond’s visit is part of the California Dept. of Education’s efforts to support heritage language programs and culturally responsive learning opportunities for students across California. 

Superintendent Thurmond is the co-chair of the California Commission on Holocaust and Genocide Education and has supported efforts to train approximately 5,800 educators on the history of the Armenian Genocide as part of the state’s History–Social Science Framework.

Submitted by the California. Dept. of Education


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A Democracy in Danger – The Kremlin’s Shadow over Yerevan

Fair Planet
May 28 2026
May 27, 2026
topic: Election
tags: #Armenia, #elections, #Russian Interference, #disinformation, #Hybrid Warfare, #European Union, #South Caucasus
located: Armenia, Russia
by: Marspet Movsisyan
As Armenia prepares for parliamentary elections, the country faces a wave of Russian disinformation and hybrid interference. Moscow is employing a ‘Moldovan-style’ playbook to torpedo Armenia’s democratic shift toward the West and undermine the integrity of the upcoming election.

On June 7, 2026, Armenian citizens will be called to the polls for parliamentary elections – a vote that goes far beyond everyday party politics. Since the peaceful Velvet Revolution in 2018, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has gradually steered the small South Caucasian state, traditionally strongly tied to Moscow, in a new direction. 

While Pashinyan’s leadership style is contested by some human rights activists including Kenneth Roth who recently voiced concerns that ‘Pashinyan’s populism borders on authoritarianism’, his pro-European Civil Contract party is securing a substantial lead according to recent polls. His government’s efforts to steer Armenia towards tackling systemic corruption, elite decision-making, weaknesses in the electoral framework, and the fragile rule of law are acknowledged by Freedom House, which currently awards the country a score of 54 out of 100, a notable improvement from the 41–46 range seen in the years preceding Pashinyan’s tenure.

In light of Russia’s security passivity during the recent conflicts with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, Yerevan froze its participation in the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) on February 24, 2024, and is instead striving for deeper integration into the European Union. 

Yet the current elections and especially the candidacy of Pashinyan are being targeted by Russian disinformation operations as highlighted in a report by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. For the Kremlin, Armenia’s potential exit from its decades-old sphere of influence is a strategic defeat that it wants to prevent. Unlike the internal challenges addressed in a recent FairPlanet article, the threat posed by Russian disinformation represents an external risk. The upcoming elections are widely seen by the interviewed experts as a test for the country’s alignment between Western-style democratic reforms and traditional ties to Moscow.

The “Moldova Playbook” 

Intelligence experts note that the tactics currently observed in Yerevan are a direct evolution of the strategies Russia has already tested during the elections in the Republic of Moldova. At the core of this Moldova playbook is the creation of a permanent crisis narrative designed to wear down and polarise the electorate.

Political analyst and president of the NGO Free Citizen, Hovsep Khurshudyan, emphasised that a massive ‘battle for minds’ is taking place ahead of the election: ‘A battle for minds is primarily fought in the information sphere, where disinformation plays an extremely important role. For those voters who are motivated more by material interests, pre-election bribery may also have a significant impact. According to available information, such practices have already been initiated by one of the pro-Russian political forces.’ According to Khurshudyan, Russia has almost completely forfeited the organic trust of Armenian society due to its inaction during the ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, therefore Moscow is primarily shifting its efforts to the information space.

Human rights expert Artur Sakunts, head of the human rights organization Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly in Vanadzor, concretised this threat by pointing out that disinformation campaigns are increasingly accompanied by open threats at the highest political level. For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin – especially following Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to the European Summit – bluntly referred to the fate of Ukraine to illustrate what could happen to Armenia if it draws closer to the EU.

At the same time, the country is being flooded with targeted fake news that appeal to the deep-seated existential fears of the population. ‘The second main method is the dissemination of disinformation about the current government’s policy, which exploits sensitive topics for the public, in particular, the alleged consent of the government to the resettlement of 300,000 Azerbaijanis in the territory of the Republic of Armenia,’ an entirely baseless claim serving solely to sow panic and portray the incumbent government as traitors to national security, according to Sakunts. 

However, this propaganda thrives because it exploits genuine public anger: a December 2023 IRI poll showed that 36 per cent of Armenians view the government’s actual handling of Nagorno-Karabakh as its greatest failure, which caused Pashinyan’s trust ratings to plummet to 17 per cent. While the specific claims are fabricated, the underlying sense of betrayal and security fears among the population are deeply rooted.

Economic Blackmail and the Illegal Flow of Rubles

In addition to disinformation, Russia holds significant structural leverage over the Armenian economy, which can be utilised for political pressure. Armenia is heavily dependent on the Russian market, particularly for agricultural exports and energy imports.

Khurshudyan strongly warned about the role of economic blackmail. According to the expert, voters are deliberately intimidated by the narrative that a victory for pro-Western, democratic forces would inevitably lead to harsh Russian economic sanctions, the collapse of bilateral trade relations, and skyrocketing energy prices. This pressure especially affects rural families whose relatives live as migrant workers in Russia and whose remittances ensure their survival.

Furthermore there are growing concerns that direct financial incentives and illicit funds are being

used to influence voters. Both Khurshudyan and  Sakunts highlighted the danger of direct voter bribery. According to Sakunts the Armenian Anti-Corruption Committee has uncovered concrete cases of bribery by supporters of the ‘Strong Armenia’ party and ‘has initiated criminal proceedings, within the framework of which there are arrested and detained persons.’ This party is financed by the pro-Kremlin oligarch Samvel Karapetyan, who has been declared as the party’s candidate for prime minister despite being constitutionally ineligible due to his multiple citizenships, including Russian citizenship.

The Role of the Fifth Column and Moscow’s “Plan B”

Moscow’s primary goal is to prevent a pro-Western majority, Khurshudyan explained and warned of a Russian ‘Plan B’ for the post-election period should pro-Russian forces fail to gain a majority. This pro-Russian opposition is anchored by traditional conservative blocs like Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance and newly formed Kremlin-backed movements, most notably the Strong Armenia party led by Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan. According to Khurshudyan, they will use their resources to continuously sabotage Armenia’s European integration from the opposition: ‘This could include mobilising paid groups, as well as some genuinely dissatisfied citizens, provoking clashes, creating an atmosphere of chaos, and ultimately delegitimising the elected authorities.’

For Armenian citizens, this election is about the fundamental foundation of their civil liberties. Sakunts believes that a return to Moscow’s orbit would inevitably be accompanied by a massive democratic backslide. The Russian-led structures like the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are based on authoritarian models of governance: ‘These processes and these programmes are aimed at strengthening human rights protection mechanisms and are in contradiction with the obligations stipulated by the membership of the EAEU and the CIS.’

European Support and Civil Society Gaps

In response to these hybrid threats, the Armenian government and its Western partners have begun strengthening the country’s resilience. The role of the European Union is perceived extremely positively by the Armenian public. Sakunts highlighted its civilian monitoring mission (EUMA), which plays a crucial role in preventing military actions by Azerbaijan at the border and countering Kremlin-narratives of a nation abandoned by the West: ‘The EU is providing serious expert support to the RA government in order to identify and prevent various hybrid threats from the Russian Federation, which is perceived as hostile by the Kremlin. International monitoring missions, namely those of the EU, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE, are also of key significance.’

Despite these developments, the architecture of Western support faces significant structural vulnerabilities. Khurshudyan sharply criticised the bureaucratic implementation of European aid. While the will to support Armenia is clearly recognisable at the highest political levels of the EU, this engagement fizzles out at middle and lower institutional levels.

‘Civil society organizations that serve as locomotives of the pro-European agenda in Armenia are also not meaningfully involved in strategic communication with the European Union at the middle and

lower institutional levels, including structures such as the Strategic Communication division within the European External Action Service,’ Khurshudyan said, calling for an investigation into this gap, as the lack of structural and financial support for these NGOs weakens Armenia’s resilience against Moscow’s hybrid attacks.

A test for Armenia’s future

As the June 7, 2026, elections approach, international observers are closely monitoring the South Caucasus. The upcoming vote is widely considered a significant test of whether Armenia can successfully diversify its security and economic partnerships away from its traditional reliance on Moscow.

An outcome that favors pro-Kremlin forces could slow down regional integration with the West and impact similar reform movements across the post-Soviet space. Conversely, if Armenia maintains its current political trajectory and ensures a transparent electoral process, it could solidify a shift in the regional dynamics of the South Caucasus, demonstrating the resilience of its democratic institutions under external pressure.

Interview requests were sent to both the Prime Minister’s press office and Armen Grigoryan, Secretary of the Security Council. Neither had responded by the time of publication.

Article written by:
Marspet Movsisyan
Author

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2,700-Year-Old Irrigation System Reveals Engineering Power of Ancient Armenia

Greek Reporter
May 28 2026

A 2,700-year-old irrigation system near Armavir in Armenia is giving researchers new insight into how ancient rulers turned dry land into fields, gardens, and vineyards. The study, led by Nazarij Buławka and published in “Antiquity,” shows how water management helped shape one of the region’s most important ancient cities.

An ancient city depended on water

Armavir sits on the edge of the Araks Valley. In ancient times, the site stretched for about 3.5 kilometers (2.17 miles). That made it one of the largest archaeological complexes in Armenia.

The city’s early growth was closely tied to the kingdom of Urartu. The powerful state ruled parts of the South Caucasus and eastern Anatolia from the ninth century B.C. to about 590 B.C.

During the reign of King Argishti I, the Araks Valley came under Urartian control. The king founded the fortress city of Argishtikhinili between two natural hills. Each hill held a citadel. One served political power. The other had religious importance.

Ancient inscriptions say five irrigation channels once carried water to the city and nearby farmland. They supplied fields, gardens, and vineyards. One inscription said the land had previously been unused. Researchers said that the detail suggests water shortages may have limited settlement before Urartian rule.

Satellite images reveal hidden canals

The new study set out to find traces of that ancient water network. Researchers used modern satellite images, Cold War-era spy satellite photos, and elevation data to study the land around Argishtikhinili.

The team used images from Landsat 5 and Sentinel-1. It also studied archival CORONA and GAMBIT satellite photographs from the 1960s and 1970s. These older images helped researchers see the landscape before modern farming and development changed many surface features.

Researchers also used digital elevation models to find small changes in the ground. These changes can reveal buried or eroded canals, levees, and abandoned river channels.

The team mapped the features using ArcGIS software. The goal was to separate modern irrigation works from older water-management systems.

More than 1,000 kilometers mapped

The results were large in scale. Researchers identified more than 1,019 kilometers (633.1 miles) of water-management features in the study area.

Modern canals make up about 429 kilometers (266.5 miles). Old mountain streams or former Araks River channels made up about 420 kilometers (260.9 miles). Researchers also found about 36 kilometers (22.3 miles) of deeply cut ancient channels.

Another 134.6 kilometers (83.6 miles) may represent ancient canals. Many of those possible canals sit near Argishtikhinili.

Researchers said the evidence points to a long, evolving irrigation system. Some parts may date to the Urartian period. Others may have been repaired, reused, or expanded in later centuries.

A system used for generations

The history of the irrigation system remains difficult to trace. It likely stayed in use until the fall of Urartu around 590 B.C. Irrigation appears to have returned during the Hellenistic period, when Armavir grew again.

Some canal sections may preserve earlier routes. Others may have been built later. Armavir remained important into the medieval period, which means the system may have changed many times.

That long history makes the network hard to date. Ancient canals may lie beneath later ones. Some modern canals may follow older paths. Farming has also damaged or hidden many surface traces.

Still, the study shows that irrigation was central to life in the Ararat Plain. Without engineered water channels, much of the land may not have supported large-scale farming.

Water helped build a city

Researchers said the canals helped make the area suitable for intensive agriculture. They may also help explain why Argishtikhinili became such an important Urartian center under Argishti I.

The study found that many levees run toward the northeast. Researchers said some may connect to dry stream beds or larger water systems. Others may have drawn water from branches of the Araks River.

Buławka and the research team said more fieldwork is needed. Future studies could help confirm which canals are Urartian and which belong to later periods. Researchers also need more data to link the water system with nearby settlements.

For now, the findings show how ancient engineering transformed the landscape. The irrigation system did more than move water. It helped build a city, support farming, and shape the history of Armenia’s Ararat Plain.

https://greekreporter.com/2026/05/28/irrigation-system-ancient-armenia-engineering/

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A large hidden hydraulic system mapped around the Urartian fortress of Argisht

World Atlas
May 28 2026

Azerbaijan launched a military offensive on September 19, 2023; local Armenian authorities agreed to a ceasefire the following morning. By the end of September, more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians, roughly 99 percent of the region’s population, had fled through the Lachin Corridor into Armenia. Shusha, the city overlooking the regional capital Stepanakert from the ridge above, had already fallen during the 44-day war in 2020, strengthening Azerbaijan’s hand before the 2023 offensive. Artsakh’s de facto president Samvel Shahramanyan issued a decree on September 28, 2023, ordering all state institutions dissolved by January 1, 2024. Azerbaijan administers the entire territory directly today.

The Conflict Emerged During The Soviet Collapse

During the Soviet period, Moscow organised Nagorno-Karabakh as the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, even though ethnic Armenians made up most of the local population. Political tensions intensified on February 20, 1988, when the regional Soviet voted 110 to 17 to request the transfer of the territory out of Azerbaijan and into Soviet Armenia. The vote triggered intercommunal violence across both republics, including the Sumgait pogrom of February 27 to March 1, 1988, in which dozens of ethnic Armenians were killed.

Violence escalated further after Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent states in late 1991. Armenian-backed forces gained control over most of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding Azerbaijani districts during the war that followed. Hundreds of thousands of people fled their homes during the fighting: roughly 724,000 Azerbaijanis were displaced from Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the seven adjacent districts, while several hundred thousand ethnic Armenians left Azerbaijani cities. Total deaths from the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994) are estimated at around 30,000 on both sides combined.

Russia brokered the ceasefire that ended the war. The Bishkek Protocol was signed by parliamentary representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh on May 5, 1994, and the ceasefire took effect on May 12, 1994. The agreement froze the front lines but did not resolve the region’s political status. Armenian-backed authorities continued governing the territory as the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, later also called the Republic of Artsakh, although no United Nations member state, including Armenia itself, formally recognised it as independent.

For more than two decades, negotiations produced little progress. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, co-chaired by Russia, France, and the United States, led most international mediation efforts, while periodic clashes continued along the line of contact, including the Four-Day War of April 2016.

The 2020 War Reshaped The Region

Large-scale fighting resumed on September 27, 2020. Azerbaijan launched a coordinated offensive that drew heavily on Bayraktar TB2 and Harop drones for surveillance and strikes, supported by artillery and armoured units. Turkey openly backed Azerbaijan; Russia maintained ties with both sides and chose not to invoke the Collective Security Treaty Organization commitments that Armenia argued should have applied.

The 44-day war significantly changed control of the region. Azerbaijani forces recaptured the seven surrounding districts (Agdam, Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Zangilan, Gubadli, Khojavend, and Kalbajar) and on November 8, 2020, took the city of Shusha (Shushi in Armenian) after a week of close-quarters fighting. The city overlooks Stepanakert from a clifftop ridge and was strategically decisive: its capture made the Armenian position in the regional capital untenable.

Russia brokered the trilateral ceasefire agreement, signed by Ilham Aliyev, Nikol Pashinyan, and Vladimir Putin on November 9, 2020, with the ceasefire taking effect at midnight Moscow time on November 10. Under the agreement, Armenia transferred additional territories to Azerbaijan; roughly 1,960 Russian peacekeepers deployed to the remaining Armenian-administered area and the Lachin Corridor; and the parties committed to a future transit route connecting Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenia. In all, the Armenian side lost roughly 75 percent of the territories in and around Nagorno-Karabakh that it had controlled before the war, including Shusha, Hadrut, and the seven surrounding districts.

The Lachin Corridor Crisis And The 2023 Offensive

Conditions inside Nagorno-Karabakh deteriorated sharply through 2022 and 2023. On December 12, 2022, Azerbaijani demonstrators (described by Armenia and several Western governments as state-backed) blockaded the Lachin Corridor, the only road link between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. On February 22, 2023, the International Court of Justice ordered Azerbaijan, by a vote of 13 to 2, to ensure unimpeded movement along the corridor. On April 23, 2023, Azerbaijan instead opened a permanent checkpoint on the route, which it framed as a customs and security measure but which Armenian officials and the Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention argued was a continuation of the blockade.

Diplomatic efforts involving Russia, the European Union, and the United States did not produce a long-term settlement, and food, medicine, and fuel shortages worsened throughout 2023. On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan launched what it called an “anti-terror operation” against Armenian armed formations remaining in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani forces advanced rapidly through high ground and key road junctions; within about 24 hours, local Armenian authorities accepted a Russian-mediated ceasefire on September 20. Casualty figures reported by the two sides were 192 Azerbaijani military personnel killed and 511 wounded, against more than 200 Armenian killed and more than 400 wounded.

The offensive ended the separatist administration’s ability to govern the territory. A mass exodus through the Lachin Corridor began within days. The Berkadzor fuel depot explosion on September 25, 2023, killed at least 218 evacuees who had queued for fuel before the long drive to Armenia; another roughly 70 people died on the road during the exodus itself. By October 3, 2023, more than 100,617 ethnic Armenians had crossed into Armenia, roughly 99 percent of the pre-offensive population of Nagorno-Karabakh. On September 28, 2023, Artsakh president Samvel Shahramanyan signed a decree formally dissolving all state institutions of the self-proclaimed republic by January 1, 2024.

Nagorno-Karabakh In 2026

Azerbaijan controls the entirety of Nagorno-Karabakh and administers the territory directly. Reconstruction has progressed across the seven surrounding districts and within Nagorno-Karabakh proper, with substantial public investment in roads, housing, an international airport at Fuzuli (opened October 2021), and the planned return of Azerbaijani families displaced in the 1990s. Russia confirmed in April 2024 that it was withdrawing the peacekeeping contingent deployed under the 2020 agreement; the withdrawal was completed in mid-2024, roughly a year and a half before the original five-year mandate would have ended in November 2025.

The status of negotiations between Yerevan and Baku has moved further than at any previous point. On March 13, 2025, the two foreign ministries jointly announced that they had finalised the text of an Agreement on Peace and the Establishment of Interstate Relations. On August 8, 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev initialled the agreement at the White House under the mediation of US President Donald Trump, and the three leaders signed a separate Joint Declaration on Future Relations the same day. The agreement commits the two parties to establish diplomatic relations, delimit their shared border, and develop a transit corridor through southern Armenia connecting Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave; the corridor has been branded the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), with the United States granted exclusive 99-year development rights.

The agreement has been initialled but not yet signed or ratified by either parliament. Azerbaijan has stated that it will not sign until Armenia removes from its constitution language that Baku interprets as a territorial claim; Armenia has begun preparing the constitutional amendments, with a national referendum likely required in 2027. Armenian parliamentary elections are scheduled for June 7, 2026, with constitutional changes and the peace process both shaped by the result. Many of the roughly 100,000 ethnic Armenians displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 remain in Armenia and have not returned.

Nagorno-Karabakh occupies a small section of the South Caucasus, but it has shaped the region’s politics for almost four decades. Soviet administrative borders, mountainous geography, ethnic demographics, and successive military realities all contributed to one of the longest-running territorial disputes to emerge from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Whether the August 2025 agreement ultimately ends that dispute or only the most recent phase of it depends largely on what happens in Armenian domestic politics and in the eventual ratification process.

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Armenia Faces Rising Russian Pressure Ahead of Key June Election

Modern Diplomacy
May 28 2026

Russia has sharply criticized Armenia for its closer ties with the European Union, arguing that Armenia is not maintaining a balanced relationship with Moscow and is working with countries that wish Russia harm.

Russia has sharply criticized Armenia for its closer ties with the European Union, arguing that Armenia is not maintaining a balanced relationship with Moscow and is working with countries that wish Russia harm. This criticism comes ahead of Armenia’s parliamentary vote on June 7, where the ruling Civil Contract party, led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, is seeking a third term and has shown interest in strengthening ties with the West against various pro-Russian opposition groups. Recent polls suggest that Pashinyan’s party holds about 30% support.

Moscow’s discontent with Armenia’s warming relationship with the West was expressed by Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, who emphasized that while Russia sees Armenia as a partner, it questions Armenia’s partnerships with the EU, especially given claims from Western nations about a “hybrid war” against Russia.

In response to these developments, Russia’s agricultural safety agency announced new temporary bans on Armenian produce, including tomatoes and strawberries, set to take effect on Saturday. Russia has warned Armenia that it may halt supplies of cheap oil, gas, and diamonds if Armenia continues pursuing EU membership. Armenia, with a population of around 3 million, depends heavily on Russian energy and military support.

With information from Reuters

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BrahMos, LR-LACM fear grips Turkey amid reports of India arming Greece, Cyprus

Z news, India
may 28 2026

A flurry of analysis within Turkey’s strategic circles reveals growing anxiety over the prospect of advanced Indian missile systems—most notably the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile—entering the highly contested Eastern Mediterranean theatre.

During the 2025 Operation Sindoor, Pakistan saw the lethality of Indian BrahMos missiles. Now, even Pakistan’s ally Turkey is feeling the heat. Turkish media reports are abuzz with India arming Greece and Cyprus with advanced missiles, as a counterweight to Ankara’s Pakistan pivot and anti-India stand. Not only Greece and Cyprus, but also Indian-made artillery, radars, missiles and rocket systems have been spotted moving through Armenia and were sufficient enough to ring alarm bells in Turkey.

Deeper strategic alignment between New Delhi, Athens, and Nicosia is sending ripples through Ankara’s security establishment. A flurry of analysis within Turkey’s strategic circles reveals growing anxiety over the prospect of advanced Indian missile systems—most notably the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile—entering the highly contested Eastern Mediterranean theatre.

https://zeenews.india.com/india/brahmos-lr-lacm-fear-grips-turkey-amid-reports-of-india-arming-greece-cyprus-armenia-with-advanced-missiles-radars-3051176.html#goog_rewarded

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On June 7, Armenia will decide its fate: either with Russia or along the path

Eurasia Daily
May 28 2026
On June 7, Armenia will decide its fate: either with Russia or along the path of Ukraine

The parliamentary elections in Armenia, which will be held on June 7, are approaching. Nikol Pashinyan’s election program, which treats Armenia as a “crossroads of the world”, may lead to a financial collapse amid a conflict with the EAEU. Columnist Lyubov Stepushova writes about the situation.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan bases the election platform of his Civil Contract party on two postulates: Armenia intends to remain a member of the Eurasian Economic Union and at the same time continue reforms according to European standards as long as possible.

“As soon as the time comes to make a choice, the people of Armenia will make that choice,” he said.

On the antithesis of the words of President Alexander Lukashenko “Who needs Armenia, where will it go” Pashinyan plays on the pride of Armenians. He demonstrates confidence that everyone needs Armenia, as it is becoming a “crossroads of the world”, “which is needed and East, and West, and North, and South.” This refers to transport corridors that pass through Armenia and will enable Yerevan to raise the economy on tariffs.

Let’s examine in detail what these corridors are.

1. International Transport Corridor (ITC) “North — South”. These cargo flows are provided by Russia and the EAEU, and it works.
2. The East—West Transport Corridor (TRIPP), or “Trump’s Peace Road”, formerly the Zangezur Corridor, which includes the restoration and construction of railway and automobile communication between the main territory of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic through Syunik and other regions of northern Armenia and further to Turkey.

The route runs in close proximity to the border with Iran, with which the United States, appointed by the governor, is in a state of permanent war, so investors are still “thinking.”

TRIPP itself is part of the Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian Route), which connects China and Central Asian countries with Europe bypassing the territory of Russia. On this route, cargo delivery takes place through a constant change of transport (train — ferry across the Caspian Sea — train — car), which increases the cost of transit. In addition, the port infrastructure in the Caspian Sea, including the shortage of container ships and terminals, is not yet ready for a sharp increase in cargo traffic. Besides, Azerbaijan and Iran began to actively build a bypass route along the southern bank of the Araks River.

The availability of this ready-made alternative reduces the commercial attractiveness and monopoly status of TRIPP. And finally, while Armenia is in the EAEU, customs control at the border with Turkey will be difficult.

Thus, the “crossroads of the world” exists so far only hypothetically, a lot of money needs to be invested in it, which Armenia itself does not have, and the political situation in the region is very difficult. Nevertheless, Pashinyan behaves as if he is the “king of the mountain.” He warned Russia and Belarus, without naming them directly, that Armenia is no longer the country that can be frightened by rising prices for potatoes and gas. Not having the courage to attack Moscow, he is constantly attacking Minsk, which allegedly “activated its agent” in order to “bind Armenia again, as it was before 2018.”

Everything is going to ensure that after a while the Armenians start asking: “What are we for?” Let’s try to answer.

There is such a good Russian saying — “you have to walk on your own.” Armenia buys from Russian gas at $ 177.5 per thousand cubic meters and then charges taxes on this amount (VAT and others). As a result, the tariff set by the Armenian regulator (the Commission for the Regulation of Public Services of the Republic of Armenia, CRU) for the population grows to $ 400 per thousand cubic meters.

The share of Gazprom (Gazprom of Armenia) in this tariff is also there, but it is not the net profit of the company. These are the costs of internal services for the operation of main gas pipelines and low-pressure distribution networks, for gas accounting, dispatching and technological maintenance of networks and compensation for losses in the delivery of fuel over mountainous terrain (gasification of Armenia is 95%). These shares are set by the CROWE, and if Gazprom Armenia wants to raise the price of gas, the company cannot do it itself — it is obliged to submit an application to the CROWE, which makes the final decision.

Russia has already issued a warning to Armenia, supplies of Armenian mineral water and cognac have been stopped, but this does not frighten Pashinyan.

He is sure that Russia will tolerate his rudeness, as it needs a military base in Gyumri. But Armenians need it no less — as the main deterrent against potential aggression from Ankara and Baku. The West cannot give such guarantees without having a common border with Armenia.

Russia also has leverage besides gas. The decline in production in the food, alcohol and tobacco industries of Armenia is estimated by experts at 30% with the closure of transport routes in Russia.

By the beginning of 2026, due to changes in trade rules and a drop in re-export volumes, the Russian-Armenian trade turnover had almost halved (to $6.4 billion). The complete closure of trade channels will lead to a sharp shortage of liquidity in the Armenian banking sector and a drop in the dram exchange rate.

However, such losses did not stop Ukraine from a destructive course. Armenia, literally, decides its future fate on June 7.

Read more: https://eadaily.com/en/news/2026/05/28/on-june-7-armenia-will-decide-its-fate-either-with-russia-or-along-the-path-of-ukraine

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Trump seeks to help US energy companies ‘gain access’ in Central Asia

The Hill
May 28 2026

by Rachel Frazin

President Trump said this week that he wants to help U.S. energy companies “gain access” in Central Asia, saying an agreement with Armenia is in the works.

“Soon, the United States and Armenia will break ground together on the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, which will transform the South Caucasus, and help our wonderful American Energy Companies gain access from Central Asia all the way to the United States,” Trump wrote in a Truth Social post Wednesday evening.

His post did not specify which companies he was hoping to assist or what type of energy they will produce, but his administration has been particularly friendly to fossil fuels.

In his post, he also praised Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, saying that Pashinyan has his “COMPLETE and TOTAL Endorsement for Re-Election.”

Trump said Secretary of State Marco Rubio had advanced deals between the two countries.

Armenia has no proven reserves of oil or gas, according to the International Energy Agency, which has described the nation’s hard coal deposits as “modest.”

However, nearby Azerbaijan and Georgia do have oil and gas reserves.

Much of the Trump administration’s foreign policy has involved attempts to open up access to foreign resources, including energy. In Venezuela, for example, Trump has repeatedly emphasized his interest in getting the South American country’s vast oil reserves. In Ukraine, Trump has pushed for access to minerals.

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Armenian Minister Calls for Immigration and an End to the “Mono-Ethnic Mindset

The European Conservative
May 28 2026

Armenian Minister Calls for Immigration and an End to the “Mono-Ethnic Mindset”

The speech by a Civil Contract MP, delivered weeks after the Armenia–EU summit, has opened a fierce internal debate about national identity, demographics, and the country’s strategic direction.

Javier Villamor

Armenia has spent decades defining itself as a demographic exception in a region marked by ethnic fault lines, wars, and mass displacement. A small country of barely three million inhabitants, with a population that is homogeneously 97–98% Armenian, it is built politically around national survival in the wake of the Ottoman genocide, the Soviet collapse, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Now, for the first time, figures close to Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan are beginning to speak publicly about breaking that model.

We need to organize immigration. Tens of thousands of people need to immigrate here. We also need to change this mono-ethnic mindset in our heads. Because there is no other way to survive in this region.

🇦🇲🇦🇿 Pashinyan’s MP: Armenia needs to stop being a monoethnic country.

“We need to organize immigration, even if it doesn’t fit with the so called national ideas. Tens of thousands of people need to immigrate here. It won’t happen without that. We also need to change this… pic.twitter.com/59J7Kesmcw

— Prince du Karabaque (@hayqmets) May 27, 2026

The words belong to Arsen Torosyan, a member of parliament for the ruling Civil Contract party and current minister of labour and social affairs. The speech, delivered in the Armenian Parliament and widely shared on social media over recent days, has triggered fierce internal controversy—not only because of what it proposes, but because of the political moment in which it has emerged.

The statements come just weeks after the Armenia–EU summit held in Yerevan on May 4–5, where Brussels and the Armenian government deepened their economic, institutional, and strategic cooperation. The European Union pledged new investments, financial support, and greater political integration amid an accelerating Armenian drift away from Russia.

The timing has fed speculation about whether deeper European alignment brings implicit pressure to adopt migration frameworks common in EU institutions. No such demand has been made officially, and the claim has been dismissed as disinformation by sources close to the government. But the internal debate the speech has ignited is real, regardless of its origins.

That debate matters because Armenia is not simply facing a demographic growth problem. It is facing an existential one. The country has been losing population for decades through emigration, ageing, and low birth rates. The fertility rate currently stands at between 1.7 and 1.9 children per woman—clearly below replacement level. United Nations projections point to a progressive population decline over the coming decades if the trend does not change.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan already exceeds ten million inhabitants. Turkey is approaching ninety million. The regional asymmetry is stark.

From a purely technical standpoint, the Armenian government’s logic is sound. An organised inflow of between 20,000 and 50,000 people per year could stabilise the population, partially rejuvenate the labour force structure, and prevent a gradual demographic collapse.

But the problem emerges on the political and cultural level—as it does everywhere else.

Because Armenia is not Canada or France. It is arguably one of the most ethnically homogeneous states on the planet, and one of the few where national identity, religion, and a history of survival continue to function as a single, unified political structure.

Altering that balance is not an administrative matter. It is a profound national transformation—all the more so in a country surrounded by regional adversaries that has just lost Nagorno-Karabakh after decades of conflict.

In Brussels, diversity, openness to migration, and multicultural societies form part of the dominant ideological core within much of the EU’s institutions. As Armenia moves deeper into that political orbit, the tension between European integration and Armenian national exceptionalism is unlikely to remain merely theoretical.

The situation is made yet more complex by an unexpected geopolitical variable: Donald Trump.

Thank you, President @realDonaldTrump for the high appreciation and friendly words 🫶❤️🇦🇲🇺🇸🫶 pic.twitter.com/sn0BMEnKhi

— Nikol Pashinyan (@NikolPashinyan) May 28, 2026

The U.S. president has recently expressed support for Pashinyan and for Armenia’s westward turn—breaking with the assumption that the Trump–Orbán axis would uniformly oppose the dynamics associated with Brussels. Armenia now introduces an anomaly that is difficult to fit into that framework.

Meanwhile, Moscow is watching Armenia’s pivot with growing hostility, and has reportedly threatened to review energy supplies and economic cooperation if Yerevan continues distancing itself from the Russian orbit.

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Key Dynamics Shaping Armenia’s 2026 Parliamentary Elections – Analysis

Eurasia Review
May 28 2026

By Eurasianet

By Hripsime Hovhannisyan 

(Eurasianet) — Armenia will hold parliamentary elections on June 7 under circumstances that may seem disadvantageous for the governing Civil Contract Party. Recent surveys indicate that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s public support has fallen to around 32 percent in vote intention among all respondents, rising to 38 percent among likely voters, a sharp decline from the support he enjoyed after the 2018 Velvet Revolution.

This erosion of trust was reflected, in part, in the March 2025 municipal elections in Gyumri, Armenia’s second-largest city, where the Civil Contract party failed to secure a governing majority. 

Public dissatisfaction appears closely linked to several unresolved policy issues. The proposed peace agreement with Azerbaijan, brokered last August in Washington, remains deeply divisive, with the most recent polling showing public opinion almost evenly split, with 44 percent in support and 41 percent opposed. At the same time, Russia has intensified its efforts to shape Armenia’s political and information environment, employing methods similar to those observed earlier in Moldova and Georgia. 

Despite these pressures, Pashinyan continues, for now, to lead most pre-election projections. This creates a central paradox in the 2026 contest: an unpopular prime minister remains the frontrunner largely because the opposition appears even weaker and divided. 

Ultimately, the election will determine whether Armenia continues to distance itself from Moscow or moves back into Russia’s sphere of influence. 

Several factors explain the paradox of the upcoming elections, though none of them is decisive on its own. The first is the structure of Armenia’s electoral system, which strongly favors the largest political force in a fragmented field. Under the current election rules, a party can convert a relatively modest share of the vote into a dominant parliamentary position if its competitors remain divided.

With Civil Contract polling at around 32 percent in the most recent polls, most opposition parties remain clustered near the electoral threshold of 5 percent. Their support is dispersed across multiple platforms, limiting their ability to challenge the ruling party effectively. Even if several opposition groups were to reach 8-10 percent individually, they would still struggle, in aggregate terms, to surpass Civil Contract.

A second constraint on the opposition is reputational. Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, both former presidents who continue to dominate the main opposition networks, register consistently low levels of public trust. Both remain closely associated with the pre-2018 political order, and that legacy continues to shape voter perceptions. Survey data suggest that around 60 percent of Armenians distrust both the government and the opposition. Among those who express a preference, however, Pashinyan still outperforms his rivals by a wide margin. This reflects less a vote of confidence than a pragmatic calculation: many voters appear reluctant to return to figures they associate with the old system. 

Beyond the traditional opposition, Samvel Karapetyan was for a while widely seen as representing a potential wildcard. The Russian-Armenian billionaire and owner of Electric Networks of Armenia entered the political arena in mid-2025 after being detained on charges related to alleged attempts to destabilize the government. Karapetyan is not closely linked to the pre-2018 elite, and his profile differs in important ways from that of established opposition figures. But Pashinyan’s government appears to have successfully blunted his ability to influence the election’s outcome. 

Karapetyan was the force behind the formation in late 2025 of a pro-Russian opposition bloc called Strong Armenia. The bloc nominated him as its prime ministerial candidate in early 2026, but he was deemed ineligible due to the fact that the Armenian constitution prohibits dual citizens from running for a parliamentary seat. Karapetyan holds Russian and Cypriot citizenship in addition to having an Armenian passport. 

The Pashinyan-dominated parliament subsequently amended the electoral code in ways that have hampered Strong Armenia’s ability to campaign. And in late May, Armenia’s Investigative Committee announced an investigation into Narek Karapetyan, Samvel’s nephew and a leading Strong Armenia candidate, over allegations of concealing Russian citizenship, which is a disqualifying status under Armenian constitutional law.

According to an investigative report published May 19 by an exiled Russian media outlet, The Insider, Samvel Karapetyan has ties to Russia’s Federal Security Service, known as the FSB. The report also published evidence that the Kremlin is engaged in a wide-ranging campaign to influence the Armenian election’s outcome in ways that favor Russian interests.

Since April 2025, Kremlin-linked disinformation networks have increasingly targeted Armenia’s political space. Moscow has reportedly tasked Sergei Kiriyenko, who previously oversaw influence operations in Moldova and Georgia, with coordinating efforts in Armenia. The effectiveness of these initiatives, however, remains unclear.

The Moldovan experience suggests that even substantial Russian investments in information campaigns do not necessarily guarantee success when domestic institutions are resilient and Western partners are engaged. In December 2025, Armenia requested additional EU support in this area, and Brussels agreed to expand its anti-disinformation assistance. 

Beyond the information campaign, Russia retains significant economic leverage. It accounts for a large share of Armenia’s foreign trade and continues to supply natural gas at preferential rates. In reality, however, overt economic pressure can prove counterproductive by reinforcing Pashinyan’s narrative of the need for external diversification.

In the absence of a unified opposition or a broadly credible alternative, Pashinyan seems likely to retain power. As long as opposition forces remain fragmented, any runoff scenario would probably favor the incumbent over former presidents whose public support remains limited.

The deeper challenge, however, is one of legitimacy. Armenia may emerge from the election governed either by a prime minister with minimal popular backing or by opposition figures who also command little public trust. In either case, the next government is likely to face constraints in asserting a strong mandate.

This matters beyond Armenia itself. The country occupies a strategically sensitive position in the South Caucasus and has traditionally been a Russian foothold in the region. A Pashinyan victory would likely consolidate Armenia’s gradual integration with Western institutions, including closer ties with the EU and the United States, as well as continued engagement in the peace process with Azerbaijan. An opposition victory could, at least in the short term, redirect this trajectory.

Either outcome points to a period of governance marked by limited public confidence at a time when Armenia must make far-reaching strategic choices.

  • Hripsime Hovhannisyan is a policy analyst specializing in South Caucasus affairs. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has been actively conducting research on the region, with a focus on Armenia’s political landscape and regional dynamics.
https://www.eurasiareview.com/28052026-key-dynamics-shaping-armenias-2026-parliamentary-elections-analysis/

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