May 1, 2026
Yesterday, in the context of the restoration of the Gyumri-Kars railway, its economic, geopolitical significance and Armenian and Armenian-Georgian relations. about risks we talked Shiraz Khachatryan, an expert of the “Henaket” analytical center with
Today, one of the Azerbaijani propaganda media is day.az in the editorial also referred to the restoration of the Gyumri-Kars railway and made certain comments.
“Attempts to consider the Kars-Gyumri railway exclusively as a bilateral project between Turkey and Armenia ignore the regional reality. The South Caucasus is a system of interconnected interests, where the actions of one side inevitably affect the others. Azerbaijan is a key player in this system. Its economic, transport and political potential makes it an irreplaceable participant for any major regional project.
Moreover, Baku is the driving force behind the development of transport corridors, including the “Middle Corridor” and projects connecting Europe to Asia. And even trying to ignore this fact is a strategic mistake. It is obvious that the Azerbaijani-Turkish relations remain one of the stable factors of the development of the region, and they should be put or taken into account in the basis of any decision. Without this, any project runs the risk of turning into a stillborn initiative that will not withstand a collision with reality.” it is mentioned in the Azerbaijani analysis and it is reminded that any step by Turkey in the Armenian direction is considered through the prism of Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance relations.
Is this talking about a certain Turkish game, or about differences in some issues in Turkish-Azerbaijani relations? “Henaket” analytical center expert Shiraz Khachatryan we asked to discuss these issues this time.
According to him, there can be a Turkish game here, and taking into account that Turkey is playing its big game in the South Caucasus, this can also suggest the Baku-Ankara contradictions.
“It is possible that Turkey can take various steps to curb Azerbaijan’s whims, including in relations with Armenia. On the other hand, if we take a global look at where Turkey’s logistics routes go, from China through Central Asia to Europe, it is clear that at some point the still “unofficial” relations with Armenia may disappear. But, I repeat, Turkey is able to play with Azerbaijan’s nerves as well, to show that at any time such things are possible, such as a railway passing through the territory of Armenia, etc. In fact, the topic of the Gyumri-Kars railway is multi-layered, and here a separate geopolitical one for Turkey taking into account the ambitions, it is clear that it is also playing a separate game, regardless of the whims of Azerbaijan.
However, one should not ignore Turkey’s priorities at the global level: energy, logistics, extending to Central Asia, they are connected with Azerbaijan in many ways, so it will have to take into account not only the whims of Baku, but also the existing realities, if faced with a dilemma. And when I say that this is a multi-layered issue, I also mean that another step to strengthen Turkey’s position in the South Caucasus is the restoration of the Gyumri-Kars railway, within the framework of which there may also be goals of making Armenia economically dependent,” explained Shiraz Khachatryan.
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Kristine Grigoryan admitted to the report of the Armenian Security Service about the security risks of the Republic of Armenia
May 1, 2026
On April 30, the National Defense and Security Affairs Standing Committee discussed the first reading of the draft law “On Amendments and Additions to the Law on Foreign Intelligence Activities and Foreign Intelligence Service” with an attached legislative package, which was presented by the head of the RA Foreign Intelligence Service Kristinne Grigoryan.
After the discussion in the parliament, journalists tried to get a comment from her on several issues: the war against Armenia from the outside, the possibility of war in the fall if Nikol Pashinyan is not elected.
To counter: if you don’t see any danger in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, then what explanation would you give regarding this statement about a possible war, the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service limited with the following:
“The statement made in our public annual report is valid.”
And what claims were published in 2026? APS in the report:
RA external security risks. Possibility of escalation
■ As a result of intensively continued bilateral high-level negotiations in 2025, as well as the initial signing of the Washington Declaration and the Agreement “On the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations” achieved with the active involvement of US President Donald Trump on August 8, the probability of military escalation has significantly decreased, and the probability of a peaceful settlement has increased.
As a result of the comprehensive analysis of the mentioned and accompanying processes and data, we consider the military escalation of various scales between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2026 due to the military-political intention to be almost unbelievable. We also consider such local actions or incidents, which are not caused by military-political intention, to be unlikely.
■ A comprehensive analysis of the service shows that in the long run The so-called “Western Azerbaijan” and “return of Western Azerbaijanis” speeches and accompanying actions promoted by Azerbaijan at the state level are a significantly negative and risky factor for peace building.։
The data of the service shows that After the Washington Declaration, Azerbaijan not only did not reduce, but also significantly intensified this propaganda, which creates significant risks for regional stability, security and long-term peace.
■ Service observations indicate that Azerbaijan’s military spending continues to increase. The basis for evaluating this issue as risky is not only the growth of net military expenditures, but also the fact that the rate of growth of military allocations significantly exceeds the rates of allocations in other sectors and in many cases, it is apparently carried out at the expense of other sectors.
2024-2026 military and other spheres in the budget of Azerbaijan. allocations were compared to the same allocations in 2023. As a result, military allocations for 2026 increased by about 44%, and other sector allocations – by only 7.4%. In the case of 2026, there is even a slight decrease in non-military allocations compared to 2025, while military allocations for 2026 continued to increase.
■ Regional infrastructural and economic programs, although they are not the only driving force for institutionalizing peace, nevertheless, they have a great potential, on the one hand, to increase the price of military escalation in the region, and on the other hand, to offer the states of the region a strengthening of their own political and economic factor through involvement in these programs.
In the context of the last point, note that the report was published in January 2026, after which the US-Israeli war against Iran took place, and this allowed experts to talk about possible revisions of the TRIPP project.
By the way, in the context of military risks, let us add that The New Indian Express details said in connection with the results of the visit of Edward Asryan, head of the General Staff of the RA Armed Forces, to India.
Specifically, according to India’s Joint Defense Staff, “the parties have explored the possibility of establishing joint ventures in the development of military equipment,” indicating a shift from traditional buyer-seller relationships to joint development and local manufacturing partnerships.
According to the media, Armenia is studying the options of domestic production or integration of certain Indian-made defense systems.
At the same time it became known that Negotiations are underway over the cost of acquiring India’s surface-to-surface Pralay tactical quasi-ballistic missile systems as Yerevan seeks to bolster Azerbaijan’s long-range precision strike capabilities, including the Israeli-made LORA, according to Indian sources. missile deterrence.
In addition, according to the Indian media, Armenia is considering the possibility of acquiring long-range “Astra MK1” air-to-air missiles and possible modernization of its Su-30SM fighters.
Time will tell how accurate the information reported by The New Indian Express is, perhaps the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia will speak about this at some point.
By the way, we sent requests to the defense department much earlier about the modernization of Su-30s and the acquisition of new ones, but the requested information was considered a state secret. However, in January of this year, to the question of 168.am: will we be able to use the Su-30SMs with their full power one day, RA Defense Minister Suren Papikyan answered.
“We have enough certain weapons for Su-30SMs, but additions are also expected. The Su-30SMs are pretty good fighters, I appreciate their role very much. And I think that they can play a big role both in air defense and territorial integrity of our country.”
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Zelensky’s visit to Yerevan is in the center of attention of Moscow and Tehran. ինչպիսի՞ ա
May 1, 2026
The 8th summit of the European Political Community to be held on May 4 will be followed by the first Armenia-European Union summit, which will take place on May 5. The other day, Nikol Pashinyan announced during a briefing after the session of the RA government that he is waiting for all members of the European political community in Armenia, including the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky.
Earlier 168․am-ը, հղում անելով դիվանագիտական աղբյուրներին, գրել էր, որ Զելենսկին կժամանի Երևան՝ մասնակցելու Եվրոպական քաղաքական համայնքի մայիսյան գագաթնաժողովին: It is noteworthy that he was in Azerbaijan a few days ago. According to a number of estimates, the visit to Azerbaijan was conditioned by the need to maintain parity with the visit to Armenia.
It should be noted that on May 4, the 8th summit of the European Political Community founded by French President Emmanuel Macron will be held in Yerevan, which will be followed by the first Armenia-European Union summit on May 5. On those days, about 50 high-ranking delegations will arrive in Armenia, including the President of the European Council, Antonio Costa, and the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen.
French President Emmanuel Macron will also be in Armenia on May 3-5. He will participate in the summit of European leaders, after which his state visit to the Republic of Armenia will begin.
The upcoming visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to Armenia to participate in the summit of the European Political Community is beyond the purely ceremonial field and has multi-layered political significance, especially in the context of Armenian-Russian and Armenian-Iranian relations. Armenia’s acceptance of Zelensky in Moscow will most likely be perceived not as a neutral diplomatic step, but as a certain geopolitical impulse. In that logic, Zelensky’s presence in Yerevan can be considered as another manifestation of Armenia’s more visible integration into Western platforms.
At the same time, Yerevan is trying to demonstrate a “multi-vector” foreign policy, not severing relations with Russia, but activating and deepening political ties with European structures and the West. These aspirations of Yerevan have received a number of messages, impulses, warnings from Moscow, and now, steps similar to economic “sanctions”.
Russia is beginning to react harshly to such “multi-vector” manifestations, especially from those countries that have traditionally been considered in its sphere of influence. Therefore, if Yerevan tries to present the visit as a normal diplomatic contact within the multilateral platform, Moscow will interpret it as another manifestation of political alienation.
In recent years, a crisis of trust has already been observed between Yerevan and Moscow. Zelensky’s visit can deepen that perception, especially in the Russian media-discourse.
Russia has concrete instruments of influence over Armenia: gas, energy system, labor market, business, so pressures are possible, taking into account that Armenian business is already starting to face problems in Russia. Most likely, Zelensky’s visit to Armenia will not cause a sharp break in Armenian-Russian relations, but it will become another impulse in the process of deepening mistrust and collision of different geopolitical vectors.
Vladimir Zelensky’s visit to Armenia within the framework of the European Political Community will most likely be perceived by Moscow not as a technical episode of the multilateral format, but as an indicator of political position. In Russia’s foreign policy thinking, the issue of Ukraine has a systemic importance, and any diplomatic activity related to Zelensky is considered in the context of this broad contrast.
Under these conditions, Russia’s response can be harsh, especially at the level of rhetoric and political impulses.
It is also not excluded that this visit will receive some reactions from the Islamic Republic of Iran, because during the US-Israel war against Iran, Vladimir Zelensky stood out for his strong anti-Iranian positions and statements, appearing in the center of attention of the leaders of Iran. It is difficult to say what the RA government gets by accepting the pro-Azerbaijani Zelensky. Maybe the European officials will once again be convinced that the RA authorities are steadfast in their commitment to European integration.
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168: Not “brotherhood”, but interests. The real lesson of May 1st. … The operation will be called
May 1, 2026
Arman Tatoyan, head of the “Wings of Unity” political initiative, writes: “Today is May 1. Labor Day…Not a working day. Most of the world celebrates this holiday.
In the history of Armenia, however, the first days of May are known for another reason. On April 30, 1991, units of the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Soviet Army and the Azerbaijani OMON entered the Armenian-inhabited villages of the northern part of Artsakh.
In the first days of May, Getashen and Martunashen were “cleansed” of Armenians. villages were suddenly surrounded, men were arrested, women and children were deported in buses under surveillance, houses were looted, property and lands were handed over to Azerbaijanis.
The operation was called “Koltso”. Beginning on the actual May 1st, it lasted throughout 1991. summer, covered dozens of Armenian villages and became the last major punitive action of the Soviet army in its own territory against its own people. The USSR army deported Soviet citizens in trucks to the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs
(NKVD) with the methodical instructions inherited from the troops.
“Koltso” is the direct methodological heir of Stalin’s national deportations. The same troops, the same methods. the start of the operation on the same day as the holiday, the same logic. there is a population that prevents the solution of the problem, therefore it is moved. Only the formal reasons changed: “unreliability” in 1944, “passport regime” in 1991, but the essence of the procedure was the same.
In Artsakh, the architect of this model was Major-General Vladislav Safonov, the military commandant of the emergency region of Nagorno-Karabakh. For Azerbaijan, he is a hero with the nickname “iron general”. In the Armenian memory, he, like the whole action, was carefully pushed into the background, because remembering was inconvenient due to geopolitical considerations.
Why return to all this today and why exactly like this?
Not to say “Russia is bad, USSR was bad”. It is a pointless thesis. States are not “good” or “bad”. they have interests, resources and instruments with which they realize those interests.
USSR in 1991 was solving its problem of keeping Azerbaijan within the collapsing Union at the expense of the population of dozens of Armenian villages. An understandable, cynical, rational problem.
The problem of the Armenian political tradition lies elsewhere. It was built for decades on the thesis of “special”, “fraternal”, “inviolable” relations.
In theory, this is convenient, but in practice it is disastrous, because it interferes with calculation. It is difficult to see when Russian interests coincide with Armenian ones, and when they conflict. It is difficult to understand that the inactivity of the peacekeepers in Stepanakert in September 2023 was not a “betrayal of the company”, but a consistent implementation of interests that were visible for a long time, and never meant to sacrifice something for the sake of Armenia.
So that Koltso, Sumgait, Artsakh are not repeated, the solution is neither to restore the myth of “friendship” nor to reject it (for those who reject it, “Russia is an eternal enemy”, which is equally absurd).
The solution is a sober understanding: with whom do Armenia’s interests coincide, in which sector, on what issue, under what conditions?
Boring, unromantic, pragmatic work. But it is precisely the lack of it that has cost the Armenian people what it has cost them in the last 35 years.
Labor Day is a good occasion to remind that sober calculation is also work.”
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RFE/RL – Armenia Falls In Press Freedom Rankings
- Astghik Bedevian
The French-based international organization Reporters without Borders (RSF) has significantly downgraded Armenia’s position in its annual survey of press freedom around the world.
The group ranked Armenia 50th out of 180 countries in its latest World Press Freedom Index released on Thursday. The South Caucasus country occupied 34th place in its previous rankings.
“Despite Armenia’s varied media landscape, its media remains polarized,” RSF said in a report. “The country is facing an unprecedented level of disinformation and hate speech fed by internal political tension, security problems at the country’s borders and the country’s complicated position between Russia and the European Union.”
“Only a handful of media outlets demonstrate independence,” it said, listing the Azatutyun.am website of RFE/RL’s Armenian Service among them.
“Journalists are often subjected to pressure, insults and violence by both ruling party officials and opposition politicians, as well as their supporters — whether in Parliament, the street, or on social media,” added the report. “In general, violence towards journalists goes unpunished.”
Artur Papian, the chairman of the Yerevan Press Club, believes that RSF painted an objective picture of the Armenian media landscape.
“The indicator that we have now is closer to the reality which I saw even last year,” Papian told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service.
According to Aram Abrahamian, the veteran editor of the independent Aravot daily, the pressure cited by RSF is aggravated by Armenian officials’ and their loyalists’ claims about Russia’s “hybrid war” against Armenia.
“Of course, they do not directly apply only to journalists,” said Abrahamian. “But that intolerant atmosphere, their fairy tales that all oppositionists, including critical journalists, come from some hostile camps — from Armenia, abroad, etc. — of course, also add to and spoil the atmosphere.”
The Committee to Protect Freedom of Speech, another Yerevan-based watchdog, recorded eight instances of insults and threats addressed to Armenian journalists or obstruction of their work in the first quarter of this year. All but one of them emanated from the government, it said in a recent report.
The RSF report also noted that Armenia’s “state-owned media outlets refrain from all criticism of the government,” contradicting Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian’s assertion earlier this week that the Armenian media is free from any government control or influence.
“If I stop being prime minister you will lose your jobs four hours later,” Pashinian told journalists.
“You just cannot fail to vote for us in the 2026 parliamentary elections,” he said. “Or else, you will at least become jobless or at most acquire disability … if you continue to exercise your right to free speech the way you do now.”
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Online Sales Of Armenian Goods Halted In Russia
- Narine Ghalechian
Russia’s leading online retailers appear to have stopped sales of Armenian-made products, stoking speculation about Moscow’s retaliation against the Armenian government’s pro-Western foreign policy.
Some Armenian entrepreneurs using the Wilberries and Ozon online marketplaces were the first to report the disruption on Friday morning. Both Russian firms implicitly confirmed it later in the day, citing new customs rules and procedures introduced in Russia late last month. They also said they continue selling goods already imported from Armenia and stored in their Russian warehouses.
“In order to comply with the new requirements, additional documents necessary within the updated procedures have been requested from sellers,” Wilberries said in a statement.
The company said its representatives in Armenian have met with over 50 local exporters to discuss “possible solutions” to the problem.
Armenia last year exported almost $3 billion worth of goods to Russia, its leading trading partner. It is not known what percentage of them was sold through Wildberries and Ozon.
Earlier this week, Russian authorities suspended on sanitary grounds sales of Armenia’s most famous brand of mineral water. Officials in Moscow said more than 1.3 million bottles of the water produced by Armenia’s Jermuk Group will be taken off the Russian market pending an ongoing inspection of its quality.
Jermuk Group has still not commented on the ban that came about one month after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s stern warnings to Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian issued during their most recent meeting at the Kremlin. Putin indicated, in particular, that Armenia will lose its tariff-free access to the Russian market and a significant discount on the price of Russian natural gas if Pashinian’s government keeps seeking membership of the European Union.
Pashinian downplayed the ban on Jermuk on Thursday, saying that “such issues arise and are resolved from time to time.” His economy minister, Gevorg Papoyan, likewise insisted on Friday that it is not politically motivated.
“I have no doubts that the Jermuk problem will be solved and we will continue exporting millions of bottles of Jermuk,” he told reporters.
Papoyan seemed more concerned when he commented on the actions of the Russian e-commerce leaders a few hours later. He blamed two unnamed Armenian opposition groups for the suspension of the online sales of Armenian goods in Russia.
“You have achieved this after spending months writing reports against Armenia to officials of other countries; we will solve the issue soon,” Papoyan wrote on Facebook. “Those who write false denunciations about Armenia and Armenian producers in foreign countries have no place in the political life of Armenia.”
The minister offered no proof of his allegation or elaborate on it otherwise.
Putin also warned Pashinian on April 1 against disqualifying pro-Russian opposition groups or politicians from running in Armenia’s upcoming parliamentary elections. The Armenian authorities raised opposition fears of such bans late last year after implicitly alleging Russian “hybrid” threats to the integrity of the electoral process and asking the EU to send a special mission to Yerevan for the June 7 vote.
A similar EU mission was deployed in Moldova ahead of parliamentary elections held there last September. Two Moldovan opposition parties deemed pro-Russian were disqualified from the vote won by the former Soviet republic’s pro-Western leadership.
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RFE/RL – More Details Emerge Of Government Efforts To Nationalize Armenian Ele
- Mkrtich Karapetian
The Armenian government offered billionaire and opposition leader Samvel Karapetian to give up ownership of the national electric utility practically for free before pressing ahead with its controversial nationalization, according to a document obtained by RFE/RL’s Armenian Service.
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian called for the nationalization of the Electric Networks of Armenia (ENA) operator last June just hours after Karapetian was arrested on charges stemming from his strong criticism of Pashinian’s crackdown on the Armenian Apostolic Church.
Karapetian was also charged with tax evasion, fraud and money laundering following his subsequent decision to set up his own political group. It is now expected to be the main opposition contender in Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections. The tycoon, who was moved to house arrest in late December, rejects all the accusations as politically motivated.
The government forcibly took over ENA’s management in July, accusing its parent company owned by Karapetian’s Moscow-based business conglomerate, Tashir Group, of mismanaging the power distribution network. Tashir rejected the accusations before appealing to the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC).
Armenia’s Public Services Regulatory Commission (PSRC), a body headed by a political ally of Pashinian, formally revoked Tashir’s operating license on November 17. The decision meant that ENA can be nationalized if the two sides fail to agree within the next three months on its sale to another investor.
The government has still not disclosed the price of ENA set by it in a formal proposal submitted to Tashir on February 17. A copy of the proposal obtained by RFE/RL’s Armenian Service shows that it valued the utility employing thousands of people at just 23.3 billion drams ($62 million). What is more, payment of that sum was conditional on Karapetian and his family returning about 23.2 billion drams in dividends from ENA profits paid to them over the past decade.
The proposed deal would leave the tycoon with a net gain of 142 million drams ($380,000). The Forbes magazine estimates his fortune at over $4 billion.
“I don’t know how on earth the company was valued at 23 billion drams,” said Davit Ghazinian, ENA’s former chief executive close to Karapetian. “I presume that was done by a local appraisal company under government pressure.”
Tashir has used its ENA shares as collateral to receive at least $125 million in loans from international development banks. This suggests that those banks had a much higher estimate of the utility’s market value than the Armenian has now.
Under Armenian law, Tashir has three months to formally reply to the government proposal. Citing this provision, Armenia’s Administrative Court banned the government recently from nationalizing ENA before May 25.
Pashinian’s government will have to compensate Tashir even in the likely event of the nationalization which Karapetian’s group will almost certainly challenge in court. Tashir is already seeking $500 million in damages for what it calls an illegal “expropriation” of Karapetian’s biggest asset in Armenia.
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APPLICATIONS AVAILABLE FOR SERVICE ARMENIA 2026 PROGRAM
PRESS RELEASE
The Paros Foundation
2217 5th Street
Berkeley, CA 94710
Contact: Peter Abajian
Tel: 310-400-9061
E-mail: [email protected]
Web:
Los Angeles, CA, May 1, 2026 – The Paros Foundation is excited to
announce the launch of its SERVICE Armenia 2026 program, inviting
young adults from around the U.S. to participate in impactful
volunteer projects throughout Armenia this summer. The initiative
continues the Foundation’s commitment to fostering meaningful
connections and positive change within Armenian communities.
SERVICE Armenia 2026 offers participants the opportunity to engage in
hands-on humanitarian activities, including community development,
education support, and environmental projects. Through these
experiences, volunteers will not only contribute to Armenia’s progress
but also gain valuable leadership skills and a deeper understanding of
the country’s rich culture and heritage.
The program is open to individuals ages 17 to 22 and will run from
July 2 to July 23, 2026. Participants will work alongside local
partners and community members to address pressing needs, build
lasting friendships, and inspire future civic engagement. The Paros
Foundation provides logistical support, mentorship, and cultural
immersion activities to ensure a rewarding and safe experience for all
involved.
“We believe SERVICE Armenia empowers youth to become agents of change
while strengthening the bonds between the global Armenian diaspora and
Armenia itself,” said Peter Abajian, Executive Director of the Paros
Foundation. “We look forward to welcoming a new generation of
volunteers eager to make a positive impact.”
Applications for SERVICE Armenia 2026 are now open and will be
accepted through May 31, 2026. For more information or to apply, visit
www.parosfoundation.org.
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Warmest regards,
Peter J. Abajian
Executive Director
The Paros Foundation
Telephone (310) 400-9061
In Armenia (093) 99-80-99 From US dial 011-374-93-99-80-99
Be sure to visit our website at www.parosfoundation.org and listen to
our new Podcast Pari Louys with Paros!
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There Is No Shortcut for Europe in Armenia
There Is No Shortcut for Europe in Armenia
Europe has an interest in supporting Armenian leader Nikol Pashinyan as he tries to make peace with neighbors and loosen ties with Russia. But it is depersonalized support in the long term, not quickfire flash, that will win the day.
Armenia has never received so much attention. The smallest of the three South Caucasus republics is now the most dynamic and most democratic, emerging from years of semi-isolation. The reward is for Yerevan to host the eighth summit of the European Political Community (EPC) on May 4, 2026, followed immediately by the first ever bilateral EU-Armenia summit.
European leaders—most prominently French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen—are expected to show support for Armenia’s outreach to the EU and for the peace process with Azerbaijan. The visa liberalization process will likely be moved forward and new financial assistance will be announced.
The timing is, of course, no coincidence. As in Moldova in 2025, the EPC summit is designed to show support for a European-friendly government facing reelection and pressure from Russia: This time, it is Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party.
European leaders will have to walk a fine line in Yerevan, however. As they hold what looks like a pre-election rally for Pashinyan, they must also have a bigger conversation about building a more robust and less polarized Armenia.
The country itself deserves full European attention. It is on the verge of a painful but transformative peace agreement with Baku that will lead to the reopening of its two long borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey, which have been closed since the 1990s. The country also has a historic opportunity to loosen its overdependence on Moscow, as the war in Ukraine continues to distract and drain Russia.
Pashinyan, the man spearheading these changes, also deserves support—but in a qualified way. He is the only politician who sets out a real vision for Armenia’s future and actively seeks to throw off the burden of conflict with Azerbaijan and Turkey. The main opposition is currently comprised of three unsavory opposition parties, all of which are linked—in one way or another—to Russia.
The lack of an attractive alternative means Pashinyan’s Civil Contract is likely to win, more by default than because of mass voter enthusiasm. But he needs more than a simple win: He requires a two-thirds majority in parliament to be able to hold a referendum to adopt a new constitution, Azerbaijan’s last remaining prerequisite for signing a historic normalization agreement.
Yet, the history of this region tells us that relying on a single leader without building other democratic institutions is a risky proposition.
The story of Georgia in the 2000s is a cautionary tale. Its Western backers, especially in George W. Bush’s U.S. administration, treated the country as a pro-Western project and laboratory. They called it a “beacon of democracy” in a troubled region, and did not treat it as a real country with specific challenges.
Back then, over-personalized attention was paid to the former president, Mikheil Saakashvili. In the end, the spectacular success of the early Saakashvili years morphed into perpetual domestic and foreign crisis, intolerance of dissent, and war with Russia. That caused a backlash and ushered in the Georgian Dream government, which has turned away from Europe while telling voters to be wary of Western promises.
Like his Georgian forebear, Pashinyan could be both the short-term answer and the long-term problem for his country.
Pashinyan is an increasingly polarizing figure in Armenian society. He frames the pursuit of peace in black-and-white terms, repeatedly warning that if his party is not reelected there will be a “catastrophic war.” That does not encourage voters who are still traumatized after two military defeats by Azerbaijan in 2020 and 2023 and need more persuasion on the benefits of peace.
Pashinyan also displays a worrying lack of interest in building institutions that will consolidate democracy and provide constructive feedback to the government. As in other post-Soviet democracies, the judiciary is the weakest point, still unreformed and used as a political weapon by the authorities. In its 2025 report on Armenia, Freedom House said: “The courts face systemic political influence, and judicial institutions are undermined by corruption.”
The authorities have used this weapon to arrest podcasters for insulting the speaker of the parliament and put members of the main rival party, Strong Armenia, in pre-trial detention.
Over-personalized government—by the prime minister and his inner circle—also holds back the institution-building that is needed to drive Armenia forward, and limits the capacity to make use of the Global Gateway funds the EU is offering.
The European message on Armenia’s relationship with Russia also needs handling with care. Everyone knows that Moscow is a problem. It is barely a secret that the declining regional hegemon harbors dreams of limiting or getting rid of the powers of the Pashinyan government. A discordant conversation in front of television cameras between Pashinyan and President Vladimir Putin made Russia’s displeasure obvious.
Moscow is currently busy trying to contaminate the election, using Armenian social media to spread disinformation and inflammatory messages to voters—which is why Brussels is setting up a small EU Partnership Mission in Armenia to help the authorities deal with misinformation, cyberattacks, and illicit financial flows.
Yet most Armenians, including the current leaders, aspire to diversification—not divorce—from Russia. Fifty-six percent of Armenians, according to a February 2026 opinion poll, say they want a foreign policy that has them on good terms with both the West and Russia. Armenia’s economy is still highly dependent on Moscow, with hundreds of thousands of jobs linked to Russia, and Armenia will stay a member of the Eurasian Economic Union for the next few years at least.
For these reasons, Pashinyan’s government is loosening Russia’s economic and security grip on Armenia, slowly and step-by-step. Europeans should take note and be patient. In both domestic and foreign affairs, Armenia needs slow and steady support, not just a brief and bright show of preelection solidarity.
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Thursday Interview: Dr. Andrzej Klimczyk
The Armenian parliamentary elections on 7 June are crucial in more ways than one. A fragile peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan is still at stake. While progress has been made since President Trump’s August 2025 meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, where a peace agreement was initialled, much remains uncertain. Key elements of the settlement are yet to be finalised, and the political will required to sustain momentum will depend heavily on the outcome of the vote. The peace agenda is heavily politicised, adding further sensitivity to the process, as conduits for Kremlin policy continue to disseminate fear and uncertainty within Armenian society regarding the ongoing peace process with Azerbaijan.
In this week’s Thursday Interview, former Polish diplomat Dr. Andrzej Klimczyk draws on decades of experience across the post-Soviet space to reflect on Armenia’s upcoming parliamentary elections and the wider dynamics in the South Caucasus. He argues that while the European Union has the potential to play a stronger geopolitical role in the region, its approach remains too bureaucratic and insufficiently attuned to local realities.
Klimczyk also outlines his proposal for a “South Caucasus Euroregion” as a long-term framework for cooperation between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, aimed at unlocking the region’s economic and geopolitical potential.
On Armenia’s June 2026 elections, he highlights a highly polarised political environment, with competition focused more on personalities than programmes and a fragmented opposition. He also warns of growing risks of disinformation and hybrid interference, cautioning that the main challenge may be the erosion of trust in the information environment rather than the integrity of the vote itself.
“We can already observe significant social polarisation, the use of hate speech, and brutal media attacks by competing electoral entities on each other. Unlike Georgia or Moldova, Armenia is operating under intense and immediate security pressure following the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Border issues, normalisation of relations with Azerbaijan, and relations with Türkiye are not just foreign policy issues, they are existential political issues. This raises the stakes of each election and increases the likelihood of hardline rhetoric that could complicate post-election management.”
A note to our readers:
This interview marks the start of a special “Armenia Season” on commonspace.eu. The summit of the European Political Community will be held in Yerevan on 4 May. This will be immediately followed by an EU-Armenia summit. On 7 June Armenia will hold parliamentary elections.
Our twice-weekly newsletter Armenia Election Monitor, will be published between 1 May and 15 June, and will track and analyse key developments ahead of the parliamentary elections on 7 June, with concise, fact-based and non-partisan insights, and will after analyse the results.
LINKS Europe Foundation will host a webinar titled: Armenia between a historic summit and a crucial election. Join us on 6 May at 15:00 (Amsterdam) / 17:00 (Yerevan) for a panel discussion on the European Political Community Summit in Yerevan and Armenia’s upcoming parliamentary elections. Sign up using this link.
Read the full text of our interview below:
Welcome, Dr. Klimczyk. Could you start by telling us about your professional journey, and what drew you to focus extensively on the South Caucasus and wider region?
I am a former Polish diplomat with over 25 years of experience in post-Soviet countries. I worked, among others, at the Polish Embassy in Moscow, at the OSCE Mission in Moldova, and at the NATO Liaison Office in Georgia. In Moscow I met my wife. She was Armenian. Wanting to learn more about the culture, the history of Armenia, and the traditions prevailing in this country, I became interested not only in Armenia, but in the entire South Caucasus.
After becoming more familiar with the region, the South Caucasus became increasingly interesting to me. According to many of my colleagues, it is a region that does not always receive consistent global attention. I consider it to be of immense importance in terms of energy routes, security dynamics, and cultural complexity. It quickly became a topic of great interest and fascination for me. After my wife passed away, I established the Anush Klimczyk Foundation in March 2025 in Yerevan, Armenia.
You’ve criticised the EU’s approach to Georgia, and noted similar patterns in Armenia and Azerbaijan. What do you consider the EU’s shortcomings as they pertain to the South Caucasus, and do you believe the EU has the capacity to act as a meaningful geopolitical actor in the region?
The short answer is yes, the European Union can play a significant role, but only if it moves away from an approach based mainly on bureaucratic procedures. The EU should try harder to understand local people, their history, and their mentality, which is slightly different from the mentality of a European.
The EU can become a significant geopolitical player if it tries to view Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia not as separate states, but as a single whole, as a region. The EU possesses real advantages. It has significant influence on the global economy, many EU countries are among the world’s richest states, and it offers political attractiveness and a code of values.
The EU can provide financial support and build ideological clout, especially among societies that perceive a European orientation as a long-term goal. It can influence reforms, infrastructure development, and transport accessibility, which are gaining importance with the emergence of new transit routes connecting the Black Sea with Central Asia and Europe. In one word, the European Union can be a partner you can rely on.
At the same time, the EU is a very bureaucratic organisation. Decision-making is slow, lengthy, and not always accurate. Speaking about Georgia, the EU has invested heavily in democratisation, the rule of law, and institutional reforms through programmes such as the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership. While these programmes appear logical on paper, in practice they are often perceived as technocratic, slow, and sometimes out of touch with the political realities of partner countries.
When domestic political crises arise, Brussels typically vacillates between excessive diplomatic caution and declarative pressure that is not supported by real leverage. In my opinion, a large part of the responsibility for what we are currently seeing in Georgia, the retreat from democratic standards, lies with the bureaucratic approach of the EU.
The EU has to be more active in areas such as democratisation, good governance, and the rule of law. An integral part of this process is strengthening the independence of the judiciary, implementing public administration reforms, creating a cohesive and professional civil service, and ensuring the effective functioning of institutions in law enforcement and the market economy.
Building on that, you’ve championed the idea of a South Caucasus “Euroregion”. How realistic is trilateral integration given current politics?
A long time ago, in November 2023, I presented my idea of a “Euroregion South Caucasus”. The idea was born after the exodus of residents of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023. It became clear that the region needed an idea that could contribute to the peaceful coexistence of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
As I mentioned, the EU is a very bureaucratic organisation, and Brussels is staffed mostly by bureaucrats rather than politicians or diplomats. Therefore, it is difficult to expect new ideas or concepts for the South Caucasus region from there. I would also add that, in my opinion, the idea of the Eastern Partnership, initiated in 2009 by Poland and Sweden, has exhausted itself.
It seemed natural to me that someone should take the initiative and develop a new idea for the countries of the South Caucasus. In the course of more than 30 years of independence, the region lost the chance, unlike the Baltic states, to establish a stable and secure space with broad prospects for economic cooperation. Instead, divisive lines emerged, separating nations and diminishing the prospects of shared prosperity.
This is precisely where this concept still has value. It transforms the region from a set of bilateral conflicts into a potential shared space of cooperation and good neighbourly relations. The South Caucasus has immense geopolitical and geo-economic opportunities. It has significant transit and tourist potential, important natural resources, and an educated, almost fully literate, and relatively cheap labour force. In other words, all the necessary factors are in place for the region to succeed and to occupy a worthy place in international relations.
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia could create unique conditions for common development, allowing them to capitalise on their geopolitical and geostrategic location, natural resources, and human capital. The creation of a South Caucasus Euroregion would bring these countries closer to the European Union and would contribute to stability and security in the region. Integration and trust could create a cumulative effect, and the region could follow examples of cooperation such as Benelux and the Visegrad Group.
In the longer term, this could lead to a European model of cooperation, with a common space, freer movement, and more symbolic borders. Military expenditure could be reduced, living standards improved, and the region’s economic and transit potential more fully developed. It would also increase confidence in the future.
The benefits for the countries would be clear, starting with the integration of economic interests. In a more distant perspective, this could include the abolition of trade barriers and the development of free movement of people, goods, and business. It would mean a common market, stronger security guarantees, shared infrastructure projects, increased attractiveness for investors, and better prospects for future generations.
After presenting the idea, I held consultations with experts from Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. They agreed that the concept has potential, but needs to be thoroughly studied. I believe it would be worthwhile to organise a meeting of experts from these countries together with EU representatives to discuss it further. I remain open to any proposal that could bring this idea closer to realisation.
Based on your experience observing elections in Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, how do you assess the prospects and challenges of the upcoming June 2026 Armenian parliamentary elections?
The upcoming parliamentary elections will undoubtedly be crucial for the country’s future. We can already observe significant social polarisation, the use of hate speech, and brutal media attacks by competing electoral entities on each other. Unlike Georgia or Moldova, Armenia is operating under intense and immediate security pressure following the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Border issues, normalisation of relations with Azerbaijan, and relations with Türkiye are not just foreign policy issues, they are existential political issues. This raises the stakes of each election and increases the likelihood of hardline rhetoric that could complicate post-election management.
Armenia continues to hold genuinely competitive, free elections. Compared to countries such as Russia, this remains an important strength. The main problem is not the lack of competition, but the quality of it. Politics is highly polarised and often based on support for or opposition to Nikol Pashinyan. This risks narrowing the political debate and turning elections into referendums on leadership rather than on future-oriented programmes.
On April 23, the Central Election Commission registered 19 entities, including 17 political parties and 2 electoral alliances. In my view, this is too many. At present, I do not observe a real contest over programmes, but rather a contest over names. Voters are being asked to choose between party leaders, not between policy proposals.
Another major challenge is the fragmented opposition. In Armenia, opposition forces often unite around protest movements, but struggle to maintain cohesion during elections. This situation favours the ruling party, despite high levels of public dissatisfaction.
Do you see risks of disinformation or hybrid interference in these elections, and is Armenia prepared to counter them effectively?
If I had to give a short answer, yes. There are real threats not only during the campaign, but also on election day and afterwards. In my opinion, the greatest threat is the constant flow of hate-driven narratives, which reinforce existing polarisation rather than creating a stable pre-election environment.
Hybrid interference may focus on issues such as security and stability. Messages related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, including peace agreements, borders, and refugees, can be used to polarise voters or lower turnout. Disinformation can also target the diaspora. Armenia’s large diaspora is an asset, but it also allows narratives to spread outside the country and return through social media platforms.
Is Armenia prepared to counter external disinformation? I would say partly. There are many organisations, civil society groups, and independent media outlets actively engaged in fact-checking and monitoring, often with support from the European Union. This is an important strength.
At the same time, there are weaknesses. There are institutional gaps, including the lack of a fully integrated, state-led strategy that combines cybersecurity, strategic communications, platform engagement, and crisis response. Responsibilities are fragmented, and responses are often reactive. Public awareness is also relatively low, which allows even weak or poorly documented claims to gain traction quickly.
There is an important role here for official authorities and fact-checking organisations. Faster and clearer communication from authorities is needed to prevent information vacuums. Coordination across social platforms and closer cooperation with major technology companies may also be necessary to detect coordinated behaviour at an early stage.
In summary, Armenia is better prepared than it was a decade ago, but its defences against hybrid interference are still not fully integrated. The greatest risk is not that the elections will be technically manipulated, but that the information environment becomes so polarised that the outcome is widely questioned.
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