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In the conditions of the rapidly changing geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus, Armenia’s foreign policy is going through a phase of deep transformation. The freezing of participation in the CSTO, the announced diversification policy and the active search for new partners in the West raise many questions about the future of regional stability. Will Yerevan be able to find reliable security guarantees outside the usual alliances? How realistic is the country’s rapprochement with NATO in the presence of strict regional restrictions? to these and other key questions about the present and future of Armenia’s foreign policy VERELQ political scientist, expert of APRI Armenia Analytical Center answered in an interview to the periodical Sergey Melkonyan:

Photo: Sergey Melkonyan, source: Sputnik

VERELQ. Armenia has frozen its participation in the CSTO, but the doors of NATO are objectively closed for it. With this “between blocks” status, how can Yerevan guarantee its security on the ground in the short term?

Sergey Melkonyan. Deterrence policies are always built on fear of consequences, so any security guarantee is relevant only when there is a clear understanding of the existence of two key components. First, it is the political will, that is, the willingness to use force within the framework of security guarantees by bilateral or multilateral agreements. Second, it is the availability of appropriate forces and means.

In the case of the CSTO, and more precisely, Russia (since everyone understands that the CSTO is the first thing they mean), it was announced at the political level that Moscow is committed to all its commitments in the field of security, both bilateral and multilateral. However, the problem is that in Armenia already the first component – political will – is being questioned after the events of September 2022, when the country did not receive the expected political assessment of what happened by the CSTO. It is at this stage that a fundamental misunderstanding arises.

As for the military component, which is absolutely necessary for the deterrence factor, despite Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine, it is still much easier to concentrate forces and resources in the Southern Military District than to do it in the Syrian theater or separately in Artsakh, which was actually cut off from the main Russian group. In other words, the technical possibility of ensuring security is more or less present.

But in the end it all comes down to point one. When we talk about security, we need to specify exactly where the threat is coming from. Personally, I see that the threat comes primarily from Azerbaijan with the support of Turkey. Although there are also other assessments in Armenia. some believe that the threat does not come from Baku at all, that we are confidently moving on the “path of peace”, and the real sources of danger are located in a completely different place. Therefore, first of all, at the national level, it is necessary to specify where we see this threat.

And security can be guaranteed in several ways. The first and the most reliable one is due to the strengthening of deterrence, the development of existing alliances and the creation of new bilateral unions, which should be accompanied by the parallel development of one’s own military potential. However, the leadership of Armenia now preferred another way, the promotion of the “peace agenda”, within the framework of which attempts are made to reach agreements that, as it seems to the authorities, will be able to provide certain security guarantees.

VERELQ. Is the “diversification of relations” announced by the authorities a transitional phase preceding the attempt to fully integrate with Western structures, or is the government’s strategy primarily aimed at obtaining the status of a non-aligned state?

Sergey Melkonyan. First of all, it is necessary to clarify what exactly we mean by the attempt of “full integration with Western structures”. If we are talking about integration with NATO, joining the alliance or joining the European Union, then neither the first nor the second will happen either in the short or medium term. It is simply impossible for completely objective reasons. To analyze in detail what steps are required and how long it will take in practice would require a separate full lecture.

Therefore, the diversification of relations can be manifested in completely different ways. We are already noticing this in the field of military-technical cooperation. Economic diversification is not very noticeable so far. Political diversification really exists, but in the case of other strategic directions, everything is much more complicated. this applies, for example, to energy and food security issues.

Any process has its limitations. rapprochement with western structures and their hypothetical integration have severe limitations for countries like Armenia. That is why I currently see no serious prospects for full integration, despite the political rhetoric gaining momentum. Yes, there is a certain convergence path that can be taken without critical negative consequences, and there is no problem with that. We hear statements from Moscow that, in general, Russia is not against the development of Armenia’s relations with the European Union and the USA in the economic sphere, because the Russian side understands that in the future it may also be interested in it. But here it is fundamentally important to distinguish between the possible and the impossible. Integration with the Western bloc seems impossible to me at this stage.

VERELQ. Disengagement from Moscow’s security architecture is happening noticeably faster than building real, rather than declarative, guarantees with the West. At the expense of what resources does Armenia plan to minimize risks during this unbalanced period?

Sergey Melkonyan. In this context, I would divide Western politics into several levels. there are multilateral formats, there are so-called minilateral (small alliances) formats and there are bilateral relations. Today, we notice systemic problems in all major alliances, be it the CSTO, NATO, or within the framework of bilateral agreements that the USA signs with other countries. The world is changing rapidly, political interests are becoming more flexible and transitory. Therefore, under the existing conditions, bilateral and minilateral agreements should become the support, rather than global multilateral structures.

At the expense of what resources does Armenia plan to minimize the risks? Here again we return to the root problem. those risks are perceived differently among society and elites. If one part of the expert community sees threats coming from Baku, another part may see the main danger from Moscow, the third from the West, and so on. We do not even have a common denominator when it comes to defining the source of threats.

As I have already mentioned, I see the main risks and threats from Azerbaijan itself. How can Armenia minimize them? Only at the expense of the development of real alternatives. But for now, no serious alternatives have been built in the field of security. The same negotiated peace treaty is the factor that only delays the escalation, but does not eliminate it for good. Even if the tension is temporarily reduced, it is rather simply “stuck” and will remain frozen in the long run. This only gives a postponement, because Ilham Aliyev’s geopolitical appetite has not run out. It is possible that Armenia will try to somehow address these risks by making successive concessions and searching for new formulas, because at the moment we do not have real alliances in the classical sense, and I do not think that they are fundamentally possible in the created realities.

VERELQ. Considering Turkey’s veto right and geopolitical weight in the North Atlantic Alliance, is any serious institutional rapprochement of Yerevan with NATO possible without prior political agreements with Ankara?

Sergey Melkonyan. I am not a NATO specialist, but from a geopolitical point of view it is obvious that Armenia’s integration into the alliance is now impossible.

Cooperation with NATO, development of partnership relations, conducting joint military exercises. all this is quite feasible. The alliance has a rich set of tools and formats of interaction with countries that are not part of the bloc, up to the point of aligning the national armed forces with certain NATO standards (as it happened for a long time, for example, in the case of Finland and Sweden). But the actual institutional integration is now excluded. As long as Turkey is a full member of NATO, Armenia’s membership will be blocked by it. An exception can only be the scenario in which Armenia voluntarily agrees to become a Turkish protectorate. In that case, why not? Turkey’s de facto satellite will become its legal ally in the bloc. But at the moment this scenario is unlikely. Moreover, even if Ankara suddenly sees Armenia as their situational ally, the deep historical and political mistrust will not disappear anywhere. We see this with the example of Greece, which joins NATO together with Turkey, which does not prevent them from being in constant tension.

Moreover, if Armenia deepens its relations with NATO mediated through individual countries of the bloc (for example, by strengthening bilateral ties with France or the same Greece), then at some point it may get quite close to the alliance de facto, while remaining outside it de jure.

In addition to the Turkish veto, there are also many other important factors at work here. First of all, the Iranian factor. For Tehran, NATO is one of the main sources of national security threats. Striving for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization while having a common border with Iran is a step that borders on geopolitical suicide.

VERELQ. The change of vector implies the transition of the army from Russian to Western standards, which requires huge resources and time. How realistic is such structural restructuring right now, given the tensions and logistical constraints in the region?

Sergey Melkonyan. I am not a military expert, so it is difficult for me to give an exact definition of what exactly is hidden under the term “Western standards” at the moment. Let me explain my point. many so-called Western military standards are currently being tested and transformed. Modern Western military thought is actively formed and revised based on the experience of military operations in Ukraine. Experts from NATO countries come there, and often the Ukrainian military teaches them a lot. If before the situation was one-sided, Western instructors came and taught the local army, now it is the opposite.

Therefore, it is difficult to say exactly what these “Western standards” are in their current form. If we are talking about reforming the structure of military management, introducing new communication and management systems, then it is quite feasible. But it should be noted that the Russian army is not standing still either. The Russian armed forces of 2000, 2020 and 2026 are completely different structures. Of course, professional military specialists will answer this question in more depth, but even with the naked eye it is visible that concepts are changing among all players.

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Although the official Yerevan sent an invitation to Baku as well, Azerbaijan will not participate in the May 4 summit of the European Political Community. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov officially announced in February (and earlier in October 2025) that “Azerbaijan’s participation is not planned at any level.” This is the official position of Baku.

This circumstance becomes an important political indicator to assess Nikol Pashinyan’s claim that peace has already been established between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Now let’s get out of the rhetoric and talk about the substance.

Peace cannot be established by declarations. It presupposes behavioral matching of the parties, a minimum level of mutual trust and at least simultaneous presence on international platforms.

However, Baku’s non-participation is the direct opposite of this logic. It shows that Azerbaijan does not share Pashinyan’s idea of ​​”already established peace” and continues to act according to its own calculations.

First of all, this is an indication that the negotiation process has not yet reached the level of stability where the parties can act as peace partners. Naturally, such summits should become platforms for dialogue if peace was truly achieved.

Secondly, participation in international high-level events is not only meaningful, but also important in terms of message. By not participating, Baku avoids such a situation where the impression of “normalization” of relations could be formed.

Thirdly, this is a negotiation tactic. Baku maintains the tools of pressure and avoids such environments where its field of maneuver can be limited or a certain range of political commitments can be fixed.

Thus, a significant contradiction is formed. Yerevan talks about already established peace,
while Baku’s practical steps show that the process remains unfinished, unstable and largely determined by power and political calculations.

As a result, a dangerous situation arises – “imitation of peace”, when the declared narrative does not match the reality. This not only reduces trust in the process, but also creates false perceptions of security.

In this case, the facts speak more about ongoing tension than established peace.

Political scientist Suren Surenyants

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