Armenian MPs’ visit to Baku will not do any harm – Azeri minister
ANS Radio, Baku
30 Sep 04
[Presenter] It is still not known if Armenian MPs Vaan Ovanesyan and
Gagik Lazarian, who are going to attend the Rose-Roth seminar of
the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO in Azerbaijan on 26-28 November,
have been given visas. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov
has said that the issue will be tackled in the near future.
[Elmar Mammadyarov] In general, we protested against NATO’s Cooperative
Best Effort exercises in order to prevent Armenian officers from
coming to Azerbaijan. We thought that such a visit to Azerbaijan by
Armenian officers could be more damaging than helpful.
However, we think that Azerbaijan has made certain commitments
to NATO. From this viewpoint, we should continue NATO-Azerbaijani
relations. In general, I think that the Armenian MPs’ presence at
NATO’s Rose-Roth seminar in Azerbaijan will not do any harm and this
is not a problem.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Category: News
UPI Intelligence Watch- Military News
UPI Intelligence Watch
Sept 30, 2004
By John C.K. Daly and Martin Sieff
UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
The Caucasus, since the end of the Cold War a scene of rivalry
between Russia and the United States, has another foreign player. The
U.K. Ministry of Defense and Armenia’s Ministry of Defense have
concluded a memorandum of understanding on defense contacts and
cooperation. Armenian Minister of Defense Serzh Sarkisyan and
the British Ambassador to Armenia Thorda Abbott-Watt signed the
memorandum in Yerevan at the Armenian Ministry of Defense. The
memorandum aims is to further strengthen relations between the two
ministries and increase cooperation in defense matters. Since 2003,
the United Kingdom has sponsored a variety of training courses outside
Armenia for 16 members of the Armenian Armed Forces, including the
first Armenian cadet ever to attend the Royal Military Academy at
Sandhurst. The British Ministry of Defense also funds English-language
courses under the Peacekeeping English Program run by the British
Council Armenia at the Armenian Ministry of Defense. The MOU will
put existing cooperation programs on a formal footing, enabling the
United Kingdom and Armenia to develop further contacts in areas such
as defense management in democratic societies, language training,
peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and arms control.
Beyond Beslan, The Caucasus’s Fissures Run Deep
Beyond Beslan, The Caucasus’s Fissures Run Deep
Jean-Christophe Peuch
23/09/2004 | RFE/RL |
Analysis. Prague. Gunmen with links to Chechen separatists seized
a school in Russia’s autonomous republic of North Ossetia on 1
September. The three-day hostage crisis ended with the death of more
than 330 people, nearly half of them children.
The tragedy — for which radical Chechen field command Shamil
Basaev has claimed responsibility — sent a shockwave across the
small northern Caucasus republic, which more than a decade ago saw
predominantly Orthodox Christian Ossetians clash with minority Muslim
Ingush. Although the conflict lasted only six days, it claimed hundreds
of lives.
Moscow’s initial claims that some of the Beslan hostage takers were
Ingush have sparked concerns that the crisis could rekindle interethnic
and interreligious strife in the North Caucasus region.
Convinced that their Ingush neighbors bear responsibility for the
Beslan bloodshed, some Ossetians have vowed to retaliate for the
death of children and other relatives. Others fear Moscow’s apparent
reluctance to shed light on the tragedy might prompt the Ossetians to
simply look for scapegoats. As for Vladikavkaz resident Ruslan Bzarov,
he believes Ossetians on both sides of the Russian-Georgian border
are being victimized.Whatever the consequences of the Beslan tragedy,
it will remain a milestone in the Caucasus’s troubled history.
“We Ossetians feel depressed and paralyzed by humiliation,” Bzarov
tells RFE/RL’s North Caucasus Service. “We understand that what
happened did not happen by chance. We are in the center of the
Caucasus. For 15 years now, we’ve been struggling so that our people
are reunited. First, there were attempts to bring South Ossetia to
its knees, then this tragedy in North Ossetia. We were hit because
we’re Ossetians. The pain we’re enduring, I think, will force us to
assess the situation and stick together,” he adds.
Whatever the consequences of the Beslan tragedy, it will remain a
milestone in the Caucasus’s troubled history.
Home to speakers of over 50 languages, this mountainous area had a
long record of unrest before the Bolsheviks imposed their rule in
the early 1920s. The breakup of the Soviet empire in the late 1980s
brought new disturbances and armed rebellions that, for the most part,
continue today.
The region, in part, owes its past troubles to its strategic location
at the crossroads of civilizations.
Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Khazars, Huns, Mongols, Persians, Seljuks,
Arabs, and Ottomans have throughout history partly dominated the
Caucasus, giving the region its ethnic, linguistic, and religious
complexity.
Then, in the 18th century, came the Russians. And with the Russians
more conflict.
Marie Bennigsen-Broxup is a leading expert on the Caucasus and the
editor of the London-based “Central Asian Survey” quarterly. She
tells RFE/RL that the arrival of the Russians marked a turning point
in the region’s history.
“Historically, I think, a first event that would kind of set the
tone for future developments was the uprising led by Sheikh Mansur
at the end of the 18th century, during the reign of Catherine
the Great. Sheikh Mansur was a Chechen and it was under him that
for the first time a coalition of northern Caucasus peoples made
up exclusively of Muslims fought the advance of Russian troops,”
Bennigsen-Broxup says.
“Then, with Georgia asking to join Russia [as protection against the
Ottoman Turks], we see a first real cleavage emerge between Muslim
and Christian Orthodox nations. It is also around that time that
Russia started relying on the partially Christianized Ossetians to
expand its territorial conquests [in the north],” she adds.
Sheikh Mansur’s uprising was ruthlessly quelled in the late 1780s-early
1790s and its leader imprisoned in the Schlusselburg fortress.
Unrest resumed a few decades later under the guidance of a
Daghestani-born Sufi mullah, known as Imam Shamil. It took Russia
nearly a quarter-century to defeat the new rebellion and become the
unrivaled power in the region.
Thornike Gordadze, who teaches Caucasus history at the Paris-based
Institute of Political Studies, argues Russia’s military power is
not the only reason for Shamil’s failure.
“Shamil is the only leader who ever managed — though imperfectly —
to unify the North Caucasus against the Russians. But [paradoxically],
by dividing its territory into separate regions and trying to impose
his own lieutenants at the head of each region, he was also, in a way,
responsible for the division and feudalization of the Caucasus. In the
final analysis this is what precipitated his political and military
end,” he says.
Whatever his errors, Shamil’s legacy remains vivid in the North
Caucasus, especially among Chechens.
The aforementioned Shamil Basaev was reportedly named after the
legendary Daghestani mullah. Born in Vedeno, near the place where
Imam Shamil eventually surrendered to Russian troops in 1859, Basaev
reportedly claims ancestry from one of the imam’s Chechen lieutenants.
For most Russians, Basaev is nothing more than a terrorist. But,
despite his fighting alongside Moscow-backed Abkhaz separatists in
the early 1990s, he is seen by many in the North Caucasus as a symbol
of Chechnya’s struggle for independence against Russia.
In December 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin ordered troops to
invade Chechnya and bring the breakaway republic back into the fold.
Confronted with a series of military setbacks, the Kremlin agreed to
sign a peace agreement in 1996. But war resumed three years later.
The two successive conflicts have already claimed tens of thousands of
lives — mostly civilians — and, despite President Vladimir Putin’s
assurances, nothing suggests a quick end to the fighting.
For nearly 10 years separatist fighters have been scoffing at Russia,
raiding military positions in areas nominally under federal control,
and carrying out attacks outside of Chechnya.
Separatist movements had stirred the Caucasus even before Chechnya
declared its independence.
In June 1988, Azerbaijan’s predominantly ethnic Armenian enclave
of Nagorno-Karabakh demanded to join Soviet Armenia, triggering war
between Yerevan and Baku.
Further north, Abkhazia and South Ossetia seceded from the government
of Georgia’s nationalist leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia before forcibly
winning de facto independence.
Experts believe the Karabakh conflict could have been easily prevented
were it not for the Soviet leadership’s failure — whether deliberate
or not — to correctly assess political developments in the region.
Moscow, which lent military and political support to both the Abkhaz
and South Ossetian separatists, is similarly blamed for Georgia’s
separatist conflicts.
But for Ronald Grigor Suny, who teaches Georgian history at the
University of Chicago, things are not so clear-cut.
“During the Soviet period, the Abkhaz went through a number of
different levels of control over their republic, always, of course,
under the ultimate authority of Moscow. Up to the 1930s Abkhazia was
a union republic but then, gradually, as you move into the 1930s and
on, it lost power [over its territory] as control was taken over by
the Georgians and there was a kind of ‘Georgianization’ of Abkhazia.
This, of course, led to bad feelings and antagonism and when the
Abkhaz had a chance, eventually, they asserted their rights. When the
Soviet Union collapsed, the Abkhaz became fearful because the empire —
the umpire — was gone. They felt they had to reassert their control
and they very radically took over their little republic, throwing
the Georgians out,” Suny says.
Ethnic and religious diversity is often cited as the main source of
unrest in the Caucasus. Georgians and Russians have, in the past,
blamed religion for their conflicts with the Abkhaz and Chechens,
respectively.
Yet, Suny argues cultural diversity is not enough to spur
violence. During the 19th century, Armenians were the predominant
ethnic group in the Georgian capital Tiflis and dominated the city’s
economic life. Yet, as he points out, peace between Armenians and
Georgians prevailed.
“What you have in the Caucasus, even more acutely than almost anywhere
else, is a combination of ethnicity, political power, and territorial
control. In other words, each little unit is contested by a particular
ethnicity that considers that unit to be its national homeland and
it doesn’t want interference, or it fears control by another. So
you’ve got this very intense struggle where ethnicity, politics,
and territory all match — or want to match — each other and you
have problems with other peoples who wish they had sovereign control
over that area,” Suny says.
Soviet rulers are responsible for what historians call the “ultimate
ethnicization” of the Caucasus.
“In the 19th century, especially in the North Caucasus, ethnic
borders were extremely blurred and ethnicity was not the most
salient identity. People were defining themselves with regard to
a particular clan, or village, or ‘cemaat’ (religious community)
— as in Daghestan for example — or even to a vague Caucasian or
[Circassian] identity. Someone living on the territory of Chechnya
was unable to define himself, or herself, as a Chechen, Ingush,
or Kabard. Today, ethnicity is really what helps Chechens define
themselves and the current ethnic borders that exist [in the region]
have been drawn up by the Soviet administration,” Gordadze said.
Soviet leader Josef Stalin further encouraged divisions in the Caucasus
by sponsoring scientific studies and population censuses that promoted
ethnic identity among its various peoples.
He notably drew an artificial line between Adygeis, Kabards, and
Cherkess, who were actually various subgroups of a single northwestern
Caucasian people.
Stalin’s “divide and rule” policy culminated in the deportation of
entire ethnic groups for alleged collaboration with Nazi occupation
troops during World War II.
In 1943 and 1944, hundreds of thousands of Karachais, Chechens, Ingush,
Balkars, Kalmuks, and Meskhetians were forcibly sent to the deserted
Central Asian steppes, where many of them died.
Most of these “punished peoples” — as late historian Aleksandr
Nekrich once called them — were rehabilitated and allowed to return
home after Stalin’s death. Others, like the Meskhetians, are still
fighting for rehabilitation and remain scattered throughout the former
Soviet Union pending their hypothetical return to southern Georgia.
In parallel to the deportation of entire populations, the Soviet
leader ordered that the administrative borders of the Caucasus be
redelineated.
The Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Republic was abolished and part of its
territory given to neighboring North Ossetia. When Ingush returned
from exile in the late 1950s, many of them discovered that their
property had been sold to Ossetians following the transfer of the
territory to North Ossetia.
A similar pattern was followed in the Karachai Republic after its
predominant ethnic group was deported and parts of the autonomy given
to other regions.
Bennigsen-Broxup says that Stalin — by ordering some communities
deported while sparing others — sowed ultimate disunion among
regional peoples.
“In Kabardino-Balkariya, for example, there is a cleavage between the
Kabards and the Balkars. The Kabards consider themselves privileged
and ‘morally superior’ to the Balkars because they haven’t been
deported. The same goes for the Cherkess and the Karachais. One
can also notice the same phenomenon in Daghestan, where people
often say the Chechens are ‘bad,’ otherwise they wouldn’t have been
deported. Thus I would say the Soviet period turned into enemies
peoples who earlier had been governed by some sort of cultural and
historical unity and ruled by a common code of honor.”
Demands by the Ingush that Ossetians return lands and houses
appropriated during the war paved the way for the 1992 interethnic
conflict.
In the restored Karachayevo-Cherkessiya autonomy, tensions brought
the republic’s two main communities on the verge of civil strife in
the early 1990s.
Stalin’s policy, it could be argued, also had a positive effect since
disunion among people in the Caucasus prevented the Chechen war from
spreading throughout the region.
Ingush and Daghestanis have resisted Chechen attempts to draw them
into the conflict — partly out of fear of a Russian backlash,
partly because they did not have particularly warm feelings toward
their neighbors.
Yet, the conflict created new fault lines in the region.
Soon after the first Chechen war broke out, radical Salafi preachers
arrived in the North Caucasus from the Arab Peninsula and elsewhere
to fight Russian troops. Only a few of these clerics are believed to
remain in the region today.
But they have left an imprint, especially on young people.
“Starting from the early 1990s, there has been a religious revival
which is not a repetition of the traditional religious cleavages of
the years 1800-1850 that lasted up to the Soviet period. This reform
movement is represented by a few extremely radical groups which have
broken away from both the region’s Islamic traditions and the older
generations and who believe that the ethnic divides that exist in the
region have been imposed upon them by outsiders and must be abolished,”
Gordadze says.Stalin — by ordering some communities deported while
sparing others — sowed ultimate disunion among regional peoples.
Both economic hardship and social exclusion have helped radical
Islamic organizations spread throughout Chechnya, Daghestan,
Kabardino-Balkariya, and Karachayevo-Cherkessiya. However, Gordadze
believes these groups remain marginal and do not represent a serious
threat to the region’s traditional clan-based societies.
“Political Islam somehow remains a minority movement,” Gordadze
says. “It is not powerful enough to impose itself upon the North
Caucasus society. Yet this movement exists and, of course, the war
and the behavior of Russian troops in Chechnya can only add fuel to
it. But, as of today, it does not represent a predominant ideology
and most people in the Caucasus do not share the world view of these
groups.”
Yet, political infighting may prove an additional factor of instability
in multiethnic Daghestan. Local leader Magomedali Magomedov has hinted
he may retain power — in violation of the constitution that calls for
a rotation among representatives of various ethnic groups — this amid
a series of political assassinations in Daghestan in recent months.
“We may soon see in Daghestan a combination of ethnic and religious
problems. In addition, we should keep in mind that, traditionally,
Islamic groups there are much more radical than in Chechnya,”
Bennigsen-Broxup says.
Recent wars have already had such devastating effects that restoring
peace in neighboring Chechnya looks to be nearly impossible.
“In 1996 I would have certainly said that [peace was still possible],”
Bennigsen-Broxup says. “But now we have a situation that is similar
to that of Afghanistan. The war has been going on for 10 years almost
without interruption. There is an entire generation of Chechens who
know only war and that will have devastating consequences even if
Russia were to agree to [separatist foreign minister] Ilyas Akhmadov’s
plan to deploy an international peacekeeping force. One cannot create
a generation which knows only war and hope everything can go well.”
Political developments in Abkhazia, where ailing, pro-Russian leader
Vladislav Ardzinba is about to step down, are also a source of concern,
as are Georgia’s possible moves to restore control over both the
Black Sea province and South Ossetia.
Last month fighting broke out between Georgian troops and South
Ossetian armed militias, threatening to degenerate into war.
The Georgian leadership blamed Russia for the unrest, accusing its
peacekeeping forces of siding with the separatist leadership and
demanding that they leave South Ossetia.
But settling Georgia’s separatist conflicts requires more than just
Russian neutrality.
“It is wrong to believe that provided [Tbilisi] manages to
strike a deal with Moscow these conflicts will be automatically
settled. Separatism is a real issue in Abkhazia. It is, of course,
supported by Moscow. But it is also largely founded on the experience
of the 1930s and 1940s. Georgia has often in the past denied the
existence of the Abkhaz as a distinct people and nation and this is
a major concern for the Abkhaz,” Gordadze says.
“Unless the Georgians critically reassess their history and stop being
obsessed with Moscow, they will be unable to find a durable solution
to these conflicts,” he adds.
Extinguishing the Post Cold War Dream
Extinguishing the Post Cold War Dream
World Bank-Mandated Energy Privatization Taxes
Armenia’s Poor
Grassroots National Newspaper
Canada
by Rob Maguire
Late last month, an independent Armenia became a teenager. Food,
fireworks and a festive atmosphere commemorated the 13th anniversary
of its independence, declared on September 21, 1991. As the first
Soviet republic to proclaim sovereignty during the collapse of the
USSR, Armenians have reason to rejoice – after decades of cultural and
political oppression they may finally flout their language, heritage
and national identity without fear of reprisal.
A boy heading home from school in Karabagh, Armenia.
photo: Rob Maguire
Many in this tiny republic, however, have little else to
celebrate. While civil liberties were subject to Soviet-style
constraints, the Armenia of the 1980s enjoyed a strong economy, a
healthy and highly educated public, and one of the most egalitarian
distributions of wealth in the USSR. Once the newly independent
government began to adopt market reforms and neoliberal values, gross
domestic product plummeted, prices for basic needs such as food and
water increased dramatically, while public goods like health care
and education began to crumble.
Over a decade later, GDP has finally returned to pre-reform levels. Who
has benefited from renewed economic growth, however, is not so
clear. Spending on education and health remains low. Real wages are
less than one-eighth of what they were in 1990, and economic inequality
in Armenia has become extreme. In Yerevan, Armenia’s capital, the
number of BMWs seen rolling along city streets has mushroomed; and so
have the ranks of panhandlers roaming those very same urban boulevards.
Poverty has indeed become widespread in Armenia. Affecting roughly
fifty percent of the population, it has quickly become an epidemic
that shows little sign of subsiding.
An old man in Yerevan, Armenia. photo: Rob Maguire
Living on less than two dollars a day, the poor are
particularly vulnerable to increases in the price of basic
commodities. Privatization within the energy sector, however, has
preyed upon this very weakness. Imposed by the World Bank through
loan conditions, reforms designed to make electric utilities more
attractive to foreign takeover left people paying more than twice as
much for electricity then they were in the mid-1990s.
Furthermore, inability to pay these inflated rates now results in
disconnection. This strict marketplace logic is expressed by Andrei
Rappaport, a senior official for Unified Energy System of Russia, and
the new owner of several Armenian generating facilities: “If you want
energy pay for it, and if there is not any money to pay, then goodbye.”
Not unsurprisingly, these new conditions led to a serious decline in
household energy consumption. The poor in particular were forced to cut
electricity use considerably, by twenty percent on average. According
to a World Bank report, the typical household barely has enough
electricity to power a refrigerator and a handful of light bulbs.
Despite the decline in consumption, increased energy costs now account
for approximately thirty percent of all household expenditures, with
electricity making up the bulk of these payments. A related concern
is the move towards greater wood consumption. While this reduces the
reliance on costly electric power, it has also contributed to higher
levels of indoor air pollution and accelerated deforestation.
Energy – widely recognized as a fundamental need for human development
– has become increasingly inaccessible in Armenia. At the insistence of
the World Bank, control over this precious commodity has been handed
over to foreign interests, where social priorities are sacrificed in
the name of corporate profit and capitalist ethos.
The picture is similar in much of the former Soviet Union:
increases in cultural and, to a lesser degree, political freedoms
have been overshadowed by a sharp decline in the freedom to meet
basic human needs. This failure is directly related to the “shock
therapy” imposition of market capitalism on countries with centralized
economies – a prescription borne more of ideological zeal than sound
economic principles.
Soviet leftovers. photo: Rob Maguire
Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief Economist of the World Bank, explains:
“From this cold-war perspective, those who showed any sympathy to
transitional forms that had evolved out of the communist past and
still bore traces of that evolution must themselves be guilty of
‘communist sympathies.’ Only a blitzkrieg approach during the
‘window of opportunity’ provided by the ‘fog of transition’ would
get the changes made before the population had a chance to organize
to protect its previous vested interests.”
Poverty and inequality remain Armenia’s greatest challenges, and
some question whether the political will exists to tackle these vital
problems. This is true for the Armenian government, but perhaps more
importantly, for the World Bank and related organizations such as
the International Monetary Fund and the United States Agency for
International Development. The coercive pressure these institutions
place upon governments to engage in fire sale privatisation tactics
could be redirected to produce publicly owned utilities that are
transparent, efficient, and designed to serve the public good.
Unfortunately, these institutions appear more concerned with
ideological imperialism and creating profit opportunities for Western
corporations than they are with promoting sustainable economics,
accountable governance, and poverty reduction – all of which are
necessary for human beings to truly prosper.
Rob Maguire is a Canadian activist and graduate student living in
Yerevan, Armenia. He can be found online at
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Parliament’s Decision May Impede Armenian MPs’ Participation In NATO
Parliament’s Decision May Impede Armenian MPs’ Participation In NATO Seminar
Baku today
30/09/2004 09:03
The participation of Armenian parliamentarians in the “Rose Roth”
seminar of NATO Parliamentary Assembly to be held in Baku in
November depends on the decision to be adopted by the Milli Majlis
(Azerbaijan’s parliament). AssA-Irada — This statement was made by
Araz Azimov, Deputy Foreign Minister also the Azerbaijani President’s
special envoy on Karabagh issue. Azimov noted that the Azerbaijani
MPs’ position will play a particular role in impeding the visit by
Armenian parliamentarians to Baku as well.
“The Azerbaijani parliament is the organizer of the seminar and should
express its position on the matter,” said Azimov, adding that Armenians
won’t be able to attend the seminar if Azerbaijani parliamentarians
reject their participation.
Russia May Stop Navigational Service For CIS Airlines
RUSSIA MAY STOP NAVIGATIONAL SERVICE FOR CIS AIRLINES
30-09-2004 19:31
RIA Novosti
MOSCOW, September 30 (RIA Novosti) – On October 1, Russia may stop
navigational service in Russia for CIS countries’ airlines because
of the airlines’ debts, the Russian Transportation Ministry’s press
service reported.
“The Russian side raised the question of Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Ukraine and other CIS countries’ airlines’ debts for navigational
service during flights through the Russian Federation’s territory
more than once,” the ministry’s press release said.
On September 3, 2004, the main center for planning and regulating air
traffic officially notified the CIS countries’ air authorities that
on October 1, 2004, it would stop providing navigational services
for their airlines in Russia if they do not pay off their debts,
the press release said.
The Transportation Ministry noted that this was not the first
notification. “The Russian side believes that the issue of paying
off the debts by bankrupt airlines that have stopped flying should be
considered by the inter-governmental commissions on cooperation with
the given countries,” the press release said, “while the problem of
the debts of the airlines that continue to fly should be considered
by the aviation authorities of the sides. The biggest difficulties
may be from bankrupt airlines that have stopped flying. In a number of
cases, there are grounds to assert that the companies were deliberately
bankrupted to avoid paying debts for navigational service.”
The ministry said that under the inter-governmental agreements on
air traffic between the Russian Federation and Armenia, Georgia,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine, the airlines whose planes fly along the agreed
upon routes are appointed by the governments of the sides.
The ministerial statement offers CIS airlines debt statistics.
Thus, Armenian companies flying via and within Russia owe $5,527
for navigation services, and companies who have by now terminated
activities, $2,681,544.
Russian and Armenian air authorities met at the negotiation table,
September 9. Armenia acknowledged the debt, and said it was willing
to join hands with the creditor, and together grope for ways to settle
the debt. Sixteen Georgian-based companies who no longer have flights
via Russia are owing more than $3.6 million fir navigation alone-a
stale debt of 1994-2001. Russian authorities appealed to Georgia on
the issue four times this month alone-all to no avail. The requests
stayed unanswered, points out the Transport Ministry.
Kazakh airlines who have terminated flights owe $5,515,783 for
1994-2001 alone. The government-authorised Kazakhstan Aue Zholy Co. is
the biggest debtor, with $3,559,005.
An official reply has come from Kazakh air authorities, who say they
are willing to settle the issue together.
Ukrainian airlines who are making flights in and via Russia owe a
token $251.96 for navigation services. 37 companies who have terminated
such flights, on the contrary, are more than five million dollars in
debt for 1994 through last year. Ukrainian Airlines accounts for 4.5
million of the lump.
Ukraine’s State Air Transport Department has taken the obligations
upon itself, and drawn a payment schedule. Payments never started,
however. A bilateral conference of September 20-22, 2004, acknowledged
the debt and drew a pattern to reschedule it, reports Russia’s
Transport Ministry.
From: Baghdasarian
Dido Sotiriou
Dido Sotiriou
The Times (London)
September 29, 2004, Wednesday
Dido Sotiriou, writer, was born on February 18, 1909. She died on
September 23, 2004, aged 95.
Writer whose bestselling Farewell Anatolia documented her family’s
expulsion from Turkey in 1922.
THE WRITER Dido Sotiriou was the chronicler of Greece’s turbulent and
often traumatic passage through the 20th century and in her most
famous novel, Farewell Anatolia, acted as the recording angel of the
“catastrophe”, as it is known the expulsion from Turkey in 1922 of
more than a million Greeks, domiciled there for millennia, of whom
she was one.
When Greece achieved independence from the Ottoman Empire in the
mid-19th century, the new kingdom was less than half the size it is
now. The vast territorial gains it made in the North and in the
Aegean in the First Balkan War of 1912 encouraged its nationalist
leader Eleftherios Venizelos to take advantage of the sultanate’s
weakness after 1918 to press ahead with the “Great Idea”, the dream
of uniting all the Greek-speaking regions around the Aegean, notably
on the coast of Asia Minor, where there had been Greek communities
since the time of Homer.
These had largely preserved their identities under the Turks, with
whom they lived in harmony, and in 1919 (prompted in part by vague
assurances from the British Government) Greek forces occupied the
most important of these entrepots, Smyrna (now Izmir). Dido
Sotiriou’s father, a prosperous industrialist, encouraged by the
Greek advance towards Ankara, moved the family there from the hills
near Ephesus, where they had lived previously.
Three years later, however, the teenage Dido and thousands of others
were forced to flee in terror when Kemal Ataturk’s troops
unexpectedly routed the Greek Army and seized back Smyrna. More than
30,000 Christians -Greeks and Armenians were slaughtered in the
ensuing massacre. The Sotirious escaped to Athens, but 12 of their
relations had perished in Smyrna and the family had lost everything.
Dido’s father was reduced to working as a dockhand at Piraeus.
In the subsequent exchange of populations agreed between the two
countries, 380,000 Muslims left Greece for Turkey, while 1.1 million
Ottoman Greeks moved the other way. Their experiences and memories of
their land of lost content, shared by Sotiriou, provided the raw
material for Matomena Chomata (“Bloodied Earth”, available in English
as Farewell Anatolia), which she wrote in 1962. It has since been
republished 65 times and has sold half a million copies in ten
languages, including Turkish.
In common with Sotiriou’s other novels, it reads as loosely
fictionalised fact, taking as its protagonist Manolis Axiotis, a
Greek villager from “Kirkica” (Sotiriou’s native Sirince), caught up
in an increasing spiral of hatred that sets former Turk and Greek
neighbours against each other (the framework, too, for Louis de
Bernieres’ recent Birds Without Wings). “War is Circe for all of us,”
reflects one of the characters. “It turns men into swine.”
The book acts as a receptacle for many dearly held Greek sentiments
about the past, which undoubtedly aided its popularity, but it also
urges reconciliation with Turkey and its objective tone gained
Sotiriou a wide following in her homeland. Perhaps surprisingly, too,
after such a disrupted childhood, Sotiriou devoted much of the rest
of her long life to radical, even revolutionary, politics.
She was born Dido Pappas, a citizen of the Ottoman Empire, at Aydin,
Turkey, in 1909. Her parents died shortly after their enforced
exodus; she was raised in Athens by an aunt, but soon began to
evidence a rebel’s temperament, taking up smoking, riding a
motorcycle and swimming naked. An early marriage to a mathematics
professor, Plato Sotiriou, uncle of the author Alki Zei, freed her
from her family, and soon afterwards she moved to Paris to study
literature at the Sorbonne.
France became almost a second home to her, and in time she came to
know writers such as Andre Malraux, Andre Gide and Louis Aragon. She
had meanwhile begun to espouse the causes both of feminism and the
far Left, and she began her writing career as the French
correspondent for several Greek newspapers and magazines, being one
of the first Greek women to break into journalism. Her rather saintly
husband did her typing for her.
When Greece fell under the dictatorship of Metaxas in the mid-1930s,
she joined the Greek Communist Party (KKE), and during the German
occupation she was active in its underground press and resistance
movement, as was her sister, Elli Pappas.
By 1945 she had become editor of its newspaper, Rizospastis, and that
year she attended the first meeting of the International Democratic
Confederation of Women in Paris.
During Greece’s subsequent civil war between the communists and the
restored conservative Government, however, she was expelled from the
party for voicing criticisms of its actions. Then in 1950, her
sister’s lover, Nikos Beloyiannis, a senior figure in the KKE, was
captured by the Government. The party had been outlawed, and
Beloyiannis was declared a traitor and given a show trial. The grace
with which he conducted himself during this was memorialised in
Picasso’s sketch of him, The Man with the Carnation, but despite
widespread outcry, he was shot in 1952.
Elli Pappas was sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment, and the couple’s
newborn son, also Nikos, whom Beloyiannis had seen once before his
execution, was brought up by Dido Sotiriou, who had no children of
her own. Before these events, she said, she had no literary
ambitions, but now “I had a duty to society, to tell the truth”.
Her first book, a study of American imperialism in the Mediterranean,
written in 1947, was censored and not published until 1975. She thus
first came to attention with Oi Nekri Perimenoun (The Dead Are
Waiting, 1959), something of a dry run for Farewell Anatolia, which
made her name, though it was banned under the Colonels’ regime from
1967 until 1974. Electra (1961) dealt with her time in the
Resistance, while Entoli (The Command, 1976) was a novelisation of
the Beloyiannis case.
She also wrote two books for children, a last novel, Katedafizometha
(Demolished, 1982), about a man in prison, and a monograph on the
theatre. Several other works, including an autobiography, remain
unpublished.
In 1990, Sotiriou was awarded Greece’s highest honour for a writer,
the prize of the Athens Academy. Some years ago she gave her flat in
Codrington Street, Athens, to the Hellenic Society of Authors to
serve as its offices.
Her nephew survives her.
Russian cleric calls for boosting public relations against terror
Russian cleric calls for boosting public relations against terror
By Viktoria Sokolova
ITAR-TASS News Agency
September 29, 2004 Wednesday 8:56 AM Eastern Time
MOSCOW, September 29 — Terrorism and counteraction to this menace
were the main subjects discussed by the Council for cooperation with
religious organisations under the Russian president on Wednesday.
“The main issue is terrorism, mobilisation of public forces, the entire
spiritual resource of the country to make Russia capable of stopping
activities of terrorists,” Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad
Kirill said after the meeting.
Metropolitan Kirill called for “giving a new impetus to public
relations, in order to make the country capable of stopping war that
has not been declared but is being waged on Russia.”
All the Council members noted the importance of the meeting, especially
the fact that it was held under the chairmanship of Russian President
Vladimir Putin after a pause in its meetings.
The presidential Council meeting was held in the Kremlin.
The meeting also focused on discussing ‘activities of religious
organisations on consolidating the civil society and counteracting
to the global threat of terrorism and extremism.’
The Council has recently undergone changes.
By his decree the president included in the Council the head of
the Russian Orthodox Church of Old Belief, Metropolitan Andrian
(Chetvergov).
So now the Council consists of 22 members.
There are four hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church, three muftis,
the Chief Rabbi of the Federation of Jewish Communities, the Head of
Buddhists of Russia, the Old Believers Metropolitan, a representative
of the Armenian Church, heads of Russian Catholics, Lutherans,
Baptists and Adventists, as well as seven secular experts among them.
Addressing the Council meeting Putin said it is inadmissible and
harmful to wreak wrath against terrorists on people of other faith
and other nationality.
“It is inadmissible to toe the line of criminals and terrorists, as
well as to wreak wrath against terrorists on people of other faith and
nationality, and it is even pernicious to do so in a multi-confessional
and multinational country,” Putin stressed.
Alcatel to supply equipment worth 2 mln euro to ArmenTel
Alcatel to supply equipment worth 2 mln euro to ArmenTel
Prime-Tass English-language Business Newswire
September 29, 2004
MOSCOW, Sept 29 (Prime-Tass) — France’s telecom equipment supplier
Alcatel SA is to provide equipment worth 2 million euros to Armenia’s
national fixed-line and mobile operator ArmenTel by August 2005,
Alcatel said in a press release Tuesday.
The equipment includes high-capacity switching units that are to be
installed in the cities of Stepanavan and Gyumri. This will improve the
telecommunications infrastructure in northern areas of the country,
which has a population of about 235,000 and has not yet completely
recovered from the damage incurred from an earthquake in Armenia in
December 1988.
ArmenTel shareholders are Greece’s Hellenic Telecommunications
Organizations SA (OTE) with 90% and Armenia’s government with 10%.
OTE has invested more than U.S. USD 200 million in upgrading and
development of Armenia’s telecom infrastructure, Alcatel said. End
SOCHI COMPACT. — Russia Casts Its Vote for President of Abkhazia
Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press
September 29, 2004
SOCHI COMPACT. — Russia Casts Its Vote for President of Abkhazia.
Kommersant, Aug. 31, 2004, p. 9. Condensed text of first and complete
text of second of two items:
(By Alla Barakhova in Sochi and Vladimir Novikov in Tbilisi). —
Moscow has made its choice for the presidential election in Abkhazia,
set for Oct. 3. On Sunday evening [Aug. 29], . . . Russian President
Vladimir Putin, who was vacationing in Sochi, met with Abkhaz Prime
Minister and presidential candidate Raul Khadzhimba. In Tbilisi,
officials saw the meeting as indicating that, for all practical
purposes, Moscow has recognized Abkhazia’s independence.
Mr. Putin’s visit to Sochi’s Dagomys Hotel, which is about a
30-minute drive from Bocharov Ruchei, the president’s Sochi
residence, was portrayed as an impromptu occurrence. The head of
state was accompanied by just a few bodyguards and a small group of
reporters. . . .
Vladimir Putin . . . sequestered himself with Raul Khadzhimba in
the Panorama Cafe, on the Dagomys Hotel’s 22nd floor.
Members of the Kremlin administration have declined to comment on
what the Russian president and Abkhaz premier discussed at the
meeting. According to the official account, the parties discussed
“matters relating to cooperation between Russian and Abkhaz veterans’
organizations.” Unofficially, however, Kremlin spokesmen have
acknowledged that the meeting was directly connected to recent
developments in Georgia. It may be recalled that, one week ago,
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili said in an interview in the
French newspaper Liberation that Georgia was “on the brink of war
with Russia.” At the same time, mass protests were being held in
Georgia in front of the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi. The Russian
leadership was particularly outraged by slogans that were projected
onto the building and that read, “Putin is a liar” and “The
double-headed eagle is a two-faced birdie.” In connection with these
actions, the Russian Foreign Ministry sent a protest note to the
Georgian leadership, and the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi was even
forced to suspend its operations for a time. . . .
A source in the Kremlin administration told Kommersant that the
meeting between Putin and the Abkhaz prime minister at the Dagomys
should serve as a “lesson in peaceableness” to the Georgian
president. The source added, “If we wanted to destroy Georgia, all we
would have to do is switch off the gas. End of story.”
Messrs. Putin and Khadzhimba left the Dagomys together around 8
p.m., to the sound of applause from vacationers [who had gathered in
front of the hotel]. . . . Kremlin officials conceded later that that
“lesson” might not find much favor with Mikhail Saakashvili, who has
repeatedly voiced his intention to reassert Georgian control over
Abkhazia. According to the Kremlin, however, technically he has no
grounds for complaint, since no political statements were made at the
meeting.
In Tbilisi, reports of the Sochi meeting between Putin and
Khadzhimba set off shock waves. Members of the Georgian Parliament
whom a Kommersant correspondent asked for comment were bewildered,
and even said initially that the reports were disinformation, “since
Vladimir Putin could not possibly have taken such a step.” Officials
at the Georgian Foreign Ministry told Kommersant they were studying
reports of the meeting between the Russian president and the Abkhaz
prime minister, and that an official response might come later. . . .
In the absence of Georgia’s president [who was away in Athens], the
chairwoman of the Georgian Parliament, Nino Burdzhanadze, commented
on the meeting between Putin and Khadzhimba. After expressing
puzzlement at the very fact the meeting took place, she posed a
question: Does this mean that Russia recognizes Abkhazia’s
independence and the legitimacy of a presidential election that will
be held “in the absence of two-thirds of Abkhazia’s population?”
[Burdzhanadze was alluding to the Georgian refugees who fled during
the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict in 1992-1993. — Trans.] She promptly
answered her own question: Russia would find itself the only country
in the world taking the Abkhaz election seriously. “Along, perhaps,
with Belarus,” Ms. Burdzhanadze added, correcting herself.
Our sources in Tbilisi confirm that during the Putin-Khadzhimba
meeting, one of the matters discussed was that of reestablishing rail
links. As long ago as last year, Putin and [former Georgian
President] Eduard Shevardnadze agreed on the need to open a
through-traffic rail line from Russia through Abkhazia and on to
Tbilisi and Armenia, but the Georgian side linked the issue to a
return of Georgian refugees to Abkhazia’s Gali District, which was
inhabited almost exclusively by Georgians prior to the war. Tbilisi
and Sukhumi have deep disagreements over this matter. And that is why
no decision on restoring full-scale rail connections has been reached
as yet. Nevertheless, all indications are that a Sukhumi-Moscow route
will start operating at full capacity in the near future, first for
freight trains and later for passenger service.
Overall, the meeting between the Russian president and the Abkhaz
prime minister indicates that the Kremlin has cast its lot with Mr.
Khadzhimba in the upcoming presidential election in the unrecognized
republic. The Abkhaz prime minister is supported not only by the
“party of power,” but also by the republic’s incumbent leader,
Vladislav Ardzinba, who will not be running in the election. Mr.
Ardzinba is seriously ill and is quitting the political arena,
although he remains a very respected figure in Abkhazia, since he
symbolizes Sukhumi’s victory in the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992-1993
and Abkhazia’s secession from Georgia. The Abkhaz leader’s top aides
believe that Raul Khadzhimba will continue Mr. Ardzinba’s policies.
As does Moscow, apparently.
* * *
What’s at Stake. (By commentator Gennady Sysoyev). — Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with the prime minister of
Abkhazia, a candidate for president of that unrecognized republic,
had nothing to do, of course, with discussion of the social welfare
of Great Patriotic War veterans, as the official protocol reads. The
meeting was immediately taken as a sign of Moscow’s direct support
for Mr. Khadzhimba’s candidacy in the coming election. Abkhazia is a
tiny republic, so the news that its premier had met with the
president of Russia would presumably spread to the whole population
in minutes, and everyone would know which candidate to support on
Oct. 3.
This is all undoubtedly true. But the real import of the meeting at
the Dagomys Hotel lies much deeper. By arranging the meeting, Moscow
clearly indicated that it views Abkhazia as, at the very least, a
zone in which it has special interests. And there are a great many
reasons for this.
Abkhazia is traversed by a road that connects Russia with Armenia,
Moscow’s chief ally in the Transcaucasus. Not far from the Abkhaz
city of Gudauta is a strategically important air base that
specialists describe as unique: Takeoffs of military aircraft from
this base are virtually undetectable by NATO radar installations in
Turkey. In addition, the Russian president’s southern residence,
Krasnaya Polyana, is situated on the Psou River within 10 kilometers
or so of the unrecognized republic’s border, and Abkhaz leaders
regularly remind Moscow that the moment Georgia regains political
power in Sukhumi, a NATO observation and listening post will go up in
that same area along the banks of the Psou. Finally, Moscow has
financial motives for keeping Abkhazia within its zone of influence
as well: Over the past few years, Russia has acquired a considerable
amount of real estate in the unrecognized republic, and the drumbeat
of statements from Georgian politicians about reviewing privatization
outcomes in Abkhazia once Tbilisi reestablishes its rule there is
compelling Moscow to do everything it can to prevent Tbilisi from
doing so.
But that’s still not all. Moscow would like to preserve its
influence with Georgia, since in view of its strategic partnership
with Armenia, this would give it control over the Transcaucasus as a
whole. And retaining its influence in Tbilisi is something Moscow
expects to do primarily through preserving its control over Abkhazia.
Formally, Moscow is unlikely to question the territorial integrity
of Georgia, which officially includes Abkhazia. And so Abkhazia is
unlikely to become part of the Russian Federation. But there is no
need for it to do so. From Moscow’s point of view, it is sufficient
that virtually all the residents of Abkhazia hold Russian
citizenship. This, Moscow considers, gives it the right — at the
very least — to keep Abkhazia under its special care.
Georgia could, of course, take umbrage at this and resume drawing
parallels between Abkhazia and Chechnya. It might ask, as Georgian
Defense Minister Georgy Baramidze did, why it is that when Russia
defends its borders, it’s entirely within its rights, but when
Georgia tries to do the same, it’s engaging in aggression. To all
such objections, it would appear that Moscow has a ready answer:
There are no Georgian citizens in Chechnya, and the Abkhaz aren’t
blowing up Georgian airliners.