Armenia braces for winter of Russian pressure over gas, rail and EU path

Intellinews
Nov 16, 2026

Russia has several levers it can pull on Armenia, and most of them come with deadlines in the next few months.

The disputes now run across four fronts: the price Armenia pays for Russian gas, Russia’s operation of the Armenian railway, who builds the successor to the Soviet-era Metsamor nuclear plant, and Yerevan’s drift towards the European Union. Whether Moscow means to use them or is only signalling is the open question, Dr Narek Sukiasyan, a political scientist and senior policy researcher at the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Armenia, told IntelliNews.

“It is early to make a call whether this is an actual leveraging with an intention to act upon it, or this is simply signaling,” he said.

The rupture has its roots in security. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russian-led military alliance, gave Armenia no military help after Azerbaijani attacks on Armenian territory in 2022. Russian peacekeepers deployed after the 2020 war did not stop Azerbaijan’s September 2023 offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh, which sent more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians fleeing, and Armenia accused Moscow of failing to deter it. Yerevan froze its participation in the CSTO in 2024.

Armenia then turned West. In 2025 its parliament passed a law launching a process towards possible EU accession, and in August that year Yerevan and Baku initialled a peace agreement in Washington. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan argues that relations with Russia must change in conditions of peace.

Moscow, meanwhile, insists Armenia cannot belong to both the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and has answered with import bans on Armenian farm goods. On November 11 the CSTO summit in Moscow barred Armenia from voting or appointing senior officials, with Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov citing its failure to meet its membership obligations.

Gas is the nearest and, in Sukiasyan’s view, the most real short-term challenge, with price talks due this winter. Armenia pays Gazprom $177.5 per thousand cubic metres, and Russia first threatened to end that discount in a May letter from Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev, RFE/RL’s Armenian Service reported.

On October 6, senior foreign ministry official Mikhail Kalugin repeated that if Armenia revises its allied status, it must forgo preferences such as cheap gas.

Two weeks later, the Russian government published a report by representatives of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan on the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council, the EAEU’s government-level body. It says suspending Armenia from the bloc could lift the gas price by about 69%, to an indicative $300, and cut Armenia’s GDP by 15.6%, or $4.6bn.

Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan told journalists on November 2 that the report’s calculation was incorrect, and said the bloc has no legal grounds to suspend Armenia, according to Azatutyun. He conceded, though, that a price rise is a real possibility and said the government is making contingency plans. Finance Minister Vahe Hovhannisyan told a parliamentary meeting the same day that he did not expect catastrophic consequences.

Sukiasyan said the discount cannot be judged on price alone. Moscow likes to compare Armenia with Europe, he said, but “doesn’t mention and tends to forget the cheaper price that the Chinese are paying for [gas]”.

The deeper dispute, he said, lies in how the Armenian gas network came under Russian ownership. One live question is “what investments that Gazprom has committed to has it done or not, and how does that build into the price?”

He also asked whether a cheap tariff outweighs terms that, in his words, mean “the contract limits Armenia’s possibilities to trade with others”.

Armenia has few ways out, he said. Iran supplies about 15% of its gas, but it is burned in Armenian plants and returned as electricity, so Armenia does not gain a true second source. Gazprom’s ownership of the Armenian section of the pipeline adds a further limit.

Turkmen gas would also have to come through Iran, and Middle East Eye reported this month that Turkmen supplies to Turkey via Iran were halted over US sanctions concerns. Azerbaijan is technically possible, but “switching from full dependence from Russia to Azerbaijan might not be the most wise solution for Armenia’s sustainable development”, Sukiasyan said.

The next test is rail, on a similar timeline. After Pashinyan met Russian Railways chief Oleg Belozerov on October 14, they agreed a working group with three months to find ways to make Armenia’s network competitive.

Russian Railways has run the Armenian network through its South Caucasus Railway subsidiary since 2008 under a 30-year concession, and Yerevan wants to change that. Pashinyan has proposed that a country friendly to both sides buy the concession rights, and on July 30 he said Armenia was ready to go to arbitration if no amicable solution emerges, suggesting as an example a demand of $2bn a year. Moscow says the company has fulfilled its obligations, and Belozerov puts its investment at about $396.3mn.

Sukiasyan said the working group’s deadline falls close to the gas price renegotiation, around mid-winter, so both issues will force a decision or a next step by the sheer weight of the calendar.

The nuclear decision is slower but more loaded. The Metsamor nuclear power plant, which Sukiasyan said supplies around 30% of Armenia’s electricity, runs on enriched uranium from Russia, and the technology requires Rosatom’s involvement, he said. Rosatom has already extended the plant’s life to 2036, so the question now is what replaces it. Sukiasyan noted that Russia wants to build and run the successor.

After a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States in February, Yerevan had leaned towards American small modular reactors. Then Rosatom chief Alexei Likhachev visited on September 29 and offered a 1,000MW VVER-1000.

Pashinyan said on October 1 that a small reactor would probably not be enough, as investment programmes had turned a surplus into a deficit, and that a large unit could be the most logical choice. He says the decision rests on economics and expects it by the end of 2027, perhaps sooner. He has said the extension gives the government time to settle the question. US and Armenian officials were still discussing the project on October 23.

Sukiasyan said the choice was always political. “It has always been, and it is today,” he said, even though the government presents it as economic.

“Nuclear always comes with political strings attached,” he said, because it is a strategic sector that creates dependency in a vital policy area. The Russian offer, he added, “comes with a continued, if not deepened, dependence on Russia”, though its larger size might look technically more sensible given demand from data centres.

Behind all of this sits the question of Armenia’s course. Sukiasyan said everyone in Brussels, Yerevan and Moscow knows EU accession is nowhere near in the short or medium term, so pressing Armenia on it looks more like coercion than a response to a real threat.

Moscow wants Armenia to choose. Putin and the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan urged a referendum on the EU in May, and Russian Security Council deputy chairman Dmitry Medvedev warned on October 4 that Armenia’s EU course could turn it into another Ukraine. Armenia has been pressed to announce its intentions and a timeline at the EAEU summit in December.

Pashinyan told RFI, in an interview recorded on October 6, that Armenia has yet to apply for EU membership and that an imminent referendum was off the table. He said relations with Russia can no longer be what they were, whoever is in power, but that he wants to develop them.

The military question is live too. In September, Putin said Russia would leave its base in Gyumri “even tomorrow” if Armenia decided it no longer needed it, and Pashinyan replied that Yerevan would not object. The base hosts about 3,000 troops, according to AFP, and a 2010 deal lets Russia stay until 2044.

Putin and Pashinyan are expected to meet before the December summit. How that meeting, the gas talks and the railway review play out, Sukiasyan said, will show whether this has been signalling or “a certain critical juncture in the Armenian-Russian relations”.

https://www.intellinews.com/armenia-braces-for-winter-of-russian-pressure-over-gas-rail-and-eu-path-483840/ 

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