Azerbaijan hails Karabakh talks

Azerbaijan hails Karabakh talks
Interfax
Dec 8 2004
Baku. (Interfax-Azerbaijan) – The way negotiations on settling the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are being handled meets the interests of
Azerbaijan, President Ilham Aliyev told a Cabinet session on Tuesday.
“Steps have been taken to put an end to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
that I think have had a positive effect on the negotiating process.
The ways the talks are proceeding meets our interests. The fair
position of Azerbaijan has started to enjoy broader support among
international organizations. As a result, positive trends at the
negotiations have increased,” Aliyev said.
“Azerbaijan, which suffered from the conflict, is waging a “Cold War,”
if I can put it this way. And I would like to say that we have been
successful. Our propaganda campaign in international organizations and
at the bilateral level has intensified. I am confident that all this
will allow us to meet our objectives. It means that international legal
norms should be applied, all occupation troops should be withdrawn
from our territories, and the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan
should be restored,” the president said.
“2004 has seen majors moves to enhance the army’s capabilities. Army
spending from the state budget will go up 30% next year. This
figure may later be increased by 50%, 100% or 200%, should it prove
necessary. Azerbaijan’s economic capabilities make this increase
possible, and Armenia, which occupied our territories, cannot compete
with us. Armenia’s budget totals $500 million today, while Azerbaijan
spends $250 million on its army,” Aliyev said.

Turkish premier showcases Turkey as a center for religions

Turkish premier showcases Turkey as a center for religions
By SUZAN FRASER
AP Worldstream
Dec 08, 2004
In a bid to showcase Turkey as a country that respects religions, Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Wednesday inaugurated a mosque, a
synagogue and church, just days before the European Union is to decide
on whether to start membership talks with the largely Muslim nation.
The side-by-side houses of worship are located in a park in the
Mediterranean resort of Belek, near Antalya, and will mainly serve
foreigners vacationing in the region. The church is partitioned into
Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox sections.
“Beyond its symbolic importance, this project gives the message of
peace and brotherhood to whole world,” Erdogan said.
European leaders will decide in a Dec. 16-17 summit whether to begin
EU accession talks with Turkey.
The 25-member bloc has expressed concern about Turkey’s treatment
of religious and ethnic minorities and has said that improved rights
for minorities are a condition for Turkish membership.
Dutch Minister for European Affairs Atzo Nicolai attended the ceremony
and urged Turkey to decrease “state intervention in worship.”
“As friends, we owe it ourselves to be critical … of each other,”
Nicolai said.
The inauguration of the mosque, church and synagogue was made possible
after Turkey changed laws that restricted the opening of houses of
worship other than mosques to boost its chances of EU membership.
Earlier this month, a nearby Protestant church that was consistently
denied permission to open finally held its first service.
Erdogan, a devout Muslim, is keen to project a positive image of the
country’s treatment of minorities. He was the first premier to visit
a chief rabbi _ visiting him shortly after suicide attacks on two
synagogues last year_ and earlier this week sent a message to Jewish
citizens for the holiday of Hanukkah.
On Sunday, Erdogan also presided over the opening of an Armenian
museum _ a rare gesture by a Turkish premier.
However, problems remain.
“Turkey’s Catholic citizens cannot claim a title of ownership on the
churches they use, let alone request permission for new ones when
there is need,” the Rev. Alphonse T. Sammut, a Vatican representative
in Turkey, said Wednesday.
Turkey is also under pressure to reopen an Orthodox theology school on
an island outside Istanbul that trained generations of church leaders,
including Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, until it was closed by
Turkish authorities in 1971.
Turkey is also locked in a dispute over the status of Bartholomew,
the Istanbul-based spiritual leader of the world’s Orthodox Christians.
Turkey has long refused to accept any international role for the
patriarch and argues the patriarch is merely the spiritual leader of
Istanbul’s dwindling Orthodox community of less than 3,000.
The EU has said “religious freedom is subject to serious limitations
as compared with European standards.”
But Erdogan has warned that EU risks being branded a “Christian club”
if it excludes Turkey.
“If the EU is not a Christian club the Turkish population, which
is Muslim, should not pose any problem,” he said in an interview
published in Italian daily La Stampa Wednesday. “We want to have
a dialogue between civilizations within the EU. Turkey will play a
fundamental role in this process.”

Turquie : =?UNKNOWN?Q?d=E9senclaver?= l’islam;

Le Figaro, France
08 décembre 2004
Turquie : désenclaver l’islam;
ASIE MINEURE Le débat sur l’adhésion à l’UE d’Ankara
par Robert MISRAHI
Comme tout autre problème, la question de l’entrée de la Turquie dans
l’Europe doit pouvoir être abordée sans esprit de parti. De même, il
convient d’écarter toute argumentation communautariste. Par exemple,
je suis tenté comme Juif français d’origine turque, de marquer ma
reconnaissance historique envers l’empire ottoman qui, tout au long
des siècles, sut accueillir généreusement les Juifs persécutés ou
chassés par les Espagnols, les Allemands, les Français, les Hongrois,
les Russes, etc. L’Europe chrétienne chassait ses Juifs tandis que
les Ottomans nous accueillaient et nous protégeaient. Fidèles, les
Juifs turcs parlèrent cependant le ladino (proche du castillan
classique) à côté du turc, et cela jusqu’à aujourd’hui. On peut
certes se référer à ce passé, pour honorer et souligner la relative
tolérance religieuse de l’empire ottoman, mais il est clair que cette
argumentation affective, passéiste et communautariste ne saurait être
ni décisive ni centrale. Bien au contraire, c’est à la lumière d’une
rationalité laïque que le débat doit être engagé. Il est alors
remarquable de constater que, depuis 1923, c’est-à-dire depuis la
libération et la construction de la Turquie moderne par Kemal Atatürk
dont mon père me parlait sans cesse du fond de notre misère
d’immigrés, à Paris , la Turquie est le seul pays musulman qui soit
laïque, et dont la laïcité est un principe fondateur.
Pourtant, dans un souci de critique rigoureuse, nous ne devons
engager pleinement l’argumentation positive qu’après avoir pris très
au sérieux l’argumentation négative. On ne peut, dans un article,
parcourir tous les arguments ; j’en soulignerai trois : crainte,
démographie, culture.
Spinoza avait pour devise « Caute », « méfie-toi ». Mais il affirmait
aussi : « L’homme libre n’agit jamais par ruse, mais toujours avec
loyauté. » Or je me souviens d’un ouvrage intitulé Le Livre des ruses
(Phaebus, 1970) qui, sous la direction d’un auteur libanais musulman,
rassemblait des textes littéraires ou politiques qui montraient la
présence et l’éloge de la ruse dans l’histoire de la politique arabe
; selon l’auteur, les Européens ne comprenaient pas la politique
arabe, parce qu’ils ignoraient ces textes et leurs implications. Bien
que les Turcs ne soient pas des Arabes, ce livre donne à penser. Le
monde turc est-il définitivement et totalement laïque ? Sa conversion
à la modernité laïque et démocratique est-elle sincère et durable ?
On ne peut pas ne pas poser toutes ces questions dès lors que
l’actuel gouvernement turc est explicitement islamiste. Un autre
élément de crainte concerne la Umma, l’unité de tous les musulmans du
monde et, avec eux, de tous les convertis à l’islam. Lorsque
j’enseignais (très librement) Spinoza, son humanisme et sa laïcité de
fait dans la magnifique université de Galatasaray sur le Bosphore,
les conversations amicales avec tel ou tel collègue exprimaient
souvent, à côté d’une tolérance sincère et d’un désir de dialogue,
une aspiration lointaine pour l’idée de la Umma. Une oreille
attentive peut saisir la permanence du désir de la Umma chez les
musulmans les plus éclairés. On peut alors se demander si le
militantisme musulman n’interpréterait pas l’entrée de la Turquie
dans l’Europe comme une victoire de l’Islam.
Ce qui peut accroître nos craintes est l’attitude du gouvernement
turc à propos des massacres des Arméniens. Devrionsnous être, nous
aussi, oublieux de ces massacres. A côté des craintes concernant les
intentions réelles de la Turquie, on peut évoquer des raisons plus
immédiates et objectives de s’interroger. A propos de la démographie
par exemple, ni les anticipations rassurantes des démographes ni les
assurances des philosophes politiques turcs ne sont en mesure de
répondre à nos questions. Sans y être contraints, les députés
européens peuvent toujours voter selon leurs nationalités. Et le
poids démographique de chaque pays interviendra dans les calculs de
péréquation lors du vote de certaines résolutions.
Remarquons enfin que toutes les difficultés tournent autour de la
question culturelle, qui est une question religieuse. Or la culture
de « ruse », par exemple, ne concerne que l’islam traditionnel ; et
les difficultés empiriques (démographie, richesse, pauvreté) ne sont
spécifiques de la Turquie que si l’on privilégie l’élément religieux
comme explication et source des futurs comportements du partenaire
turc. Or c’est cela même qui peut être mis en question.
L’interprétation religieuse que nous donnons de la société turque
(présente ou future) reste partielle puisqu’elle ne tient pas compte
de la laïcité de cette même société. Si l’on passe sous silence la
laïcité institutionnelle de la Turquie on se met dans l’incapacité de
saisir la situation dans sa totalité et l’on est donc conduit à mal
poser le problème. Si l’on se souvient qu’en Turquie, la laïcisation
de la société fut le fruit d’une décision politique radicale, entière
et immédiate, on se convaincra aisément que la laïcité est un acte
(et non une pesanteur ou un « trait » psychologique) : elle est donc
une possibilité constante, une constante « re-création », le fruit
d’une volonté politique à la fois ferme et efficace, toujours
renouvelable. Or il semble bien que ce soit là l’une des
caractéristiques fondamentales de la société turque contemporaine.
Evoquer la laïcité c’est privilégier l’avenir. Seule la laïcité
permet aux nations européennes de se tourner ensemble vers l’avenir,
qu’il s’agisse d’une laïcité de droit ou de fait. Pour forger et
réinventer cet avenir, l’Europe, en intégrant la Turquie, pourrait
alors s’inspirer toujours plus de ces deux grands pays désormais de
tradition laïque que sont la Turquie et la France. Le rayonnement
d’un tel ensemble serait tel qu’il influencerait la nature même des
relations de l’Europe avec l’Islam modéré. Celui-ci serait
désenclavé. Le dialogue pourrait devenir clair et amical, universel.
Non seulement, c’est tout le regard de l’Europe sur l’Islam qui
serait changé, mais encore c’est le regard de l’Islam sur lui-même
qui serait renouvelé. Aux Etats-Unis d’Amérique, il n’y a pas d’Etat
qui soit à la fois laïque de constitution et musulman de foi : avec
l’entrée de la Turquie, ce serait le cas en Europe. L’Islam ne
pourrait que s’en féliciter et se libérer de ses fantasmes
d’humiliation. Avec cette entrée de la Turquie, il y aurait aussi un
heureux effet en retour sur l’Europe elle-même. Sa laïcité de fait
serait renforcée, sinon même constituée. Car une véritable laïcité ne
concerne pas seulement le rapport d’un croyant chrétien et laïque
avec un autre croyant chrétien et laïque, mais encore le rapport d’un
laïque chrétien avec un laïque d’une autre origine religieuse : c’est
paradoxalement l’entrée de la Turquie laïque (dont la population est
musulmane) qui signerait vraiment et manifesterait la laïcité de
l’Europe institutionnelle (dont la majorité des habitants est
d’origine chrétienne).
On assisterait alors à l’instauration véritable d’une Europe laïque
et à son ouverture vers un avenir dynamique et original. En effet la
laïcité comme principe simplement négatif ne suffit pas à construire
une démocratie concrète ni une existence personnelle. Il faut ouvrir
la laïcité sur sa propre positivité : elle est une invitation à la
joie de vivre. Or sur ce point également la Turquie peut offrir à
l’Europe un précieux apport : par sa culture de la vie quotidienne
(notamment la vie stambouliote) elle peut enrichir notre réflexion
sur le bonheur et sur l’expérience que nous en avons. La culture
turque traditionnelle peut également être une source de joie :
splendeur des grandes mosquées « silhouettées » sur l’étonnant
Bosphore, poésie de la Corne d’or, richesse des manuscrits et de la
calligraphie, profondeur existentielle (comme chez Thérèse d’Avila)
des mystiques soufis, tout cela, intégré à une nation en plein
développement économique et moderniste et à un ensemble européen en
quête d’un nouveau bonheur, ne peut manquer de devenir un légitime
objet du désir. Inventrice du bonheur et de la liberté, comment
l’Europe pourrait-elle opposer un refus à la demande d’amitié des
Kurdes de Turquie en voie d’émancipation, ou des femmes turques sans
voile et sans culpabilité mais aussi sans autre défense, face à
l’intégrisme musulman, que l’institution laïque et la démocratie
européenne ? En ce qui concerne l’adhésion de la Turquie, les enjeux
positifs sont tels qu’ils justifient bien qu’on assume lucidement le
risque de l’ouverture.
* Philosophe, professeur émérite à la Sorbonne, spécialiste et
traducteur de Spinoza, lauréat du prix Humanisme 2004. Auteur de
nombreux ouvrages parmi lesquels Un Juif laïque en France, Editions
Entrelacs.
–Boundary_(ID_hbtXMnHf/xL0LpEF7MWTJQ)–

32 refugee families move to new apartments

32 REFUGEE FAMILIES MOVE TO NEW APARTMENTS
ArmenPress
Dec 8 2004
YEREVAN, DECEMBER 8, ARMENPRESS: Another 32 refugee families have
moved today in new apartments built by YMCA company on funds made
available by the UNHCR Yerevan agency. The new block of flats have
24 one-room and 8 two-room apartments. Until now these families lived
in two local hostels. Another block of apartments is being built now
by the Norwegian refugee Council (NRC). It will provide another 28
families with apartments.
According to Gagik Yeganian, the head of a government-affiliated
department for refugees and migrants, the first condition for refugees’
integration is having an apartment. Until now this problem has been
solved with the help of international donor organizations. However,
the government has approved a $17 million worth program for building
apartments and cottages for refugees. When accomplished it will help
some 3,400 families to improve their housing conditions.
Yet another 19 families of refugees will get cottages in three villages
of Ararat province in 2-3 days, built by the NRC. But still 11,000
refugee families face this problem. Until now the UNHCR have built
3,500 apartments and cottages for refugees with the help of the NRC.

BAKU: Armenia’s plans to open tourism outlets in Garabagh to fail

Armenia’s plans to open tourism outlets in Garabagh to fail
AzerNews, Azerbaijan
Dec 9 2004
Armenia’s intention to open tourism outlets in Upper Garabagh,
Azerbaijan’s region currently under Armenian occupation, is nothing
but nonsense, Minister for Youth, Sports and Tourism Abulfaz Garayev
told journalists.
He said that Armenia is trying to complicate the current situation.
Pointing out the low number of tourists visiting Armenia, Garayev
said that “if anyone visits Upper Garabagh, they are most likely
representatives of the Armenian Diaspora”.
The minister didn’t rule out that Armenia receives assistance
from international organizations for the development of tourism in
the occupied Azerbaijani territories. He stressed that the World
Tourism Organization has repeatedly condemned Armenia’s activities
and issued statements recognizing Upper Garabagh as an integral part
of Azerbaijan.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Tbilisi: Georgian-Israeli relations light up at Hanukah

Georgian-Israeli relations light up at Hanukah
By Keti Sikharulidze
The Messenger, Georgia
Dec 9 2004
The start of the Jewish festival of light, Hanukah, on Tuesday evening
was also a time for Georgian officials and Jewish leaders in Georgia to
cast their own light on the relationships between Israel and Georgia.
To mark the occasion, the Jewish Agency for Israel (Sokhnut) and the
Israeli-Georgia Chamber of Business celebrated with a concert December
7 at the Tbilisi Opera House.
Symbolically lighting what he called the ‘the symbol of Jewish soul,’
President Mikheil Saakashvili helped light the menorah and praised
Georgia’s rich historical friendship with Judaism.
“I am very proud of the Jewish nation, and the inspiration and
willingness of Jewish soldiers to defend their country,” he said,
“I wish that our soldiers had the same inspiration.”
Immediately after lighting the candle, the Israeli singer Liora
presented the president with a red rose.
Saakashvili added that he looks forward to a closer relationship
with Israel: “We have 2,600 years of a relationship, but it needs
broadening and there are great prospects to build it.”
Speaking with The Messenger, the president of Israel-Georgia Chamber
of Business Itsik Moshe approved the president’s words saying that a
“new stage” of relations has begun and that this holiday “has given
light” to the strong Georgia-Israeli relationship. Moshe stated this
holiday represents the beginning of a new era between Georgia and
Israel relationship.
“After 15 years there is a new reality and we have a historical
opportunity to begin a new stage of relations with the Georgian
government, and I think that the Georgian government can make it and
Israel is ready to support it,” stated Moshe.
This year is particularly significant because the Jewish Agency for
Israel is celebrating its 75th anniversary and its 15th anniversary
of its establishment in Georgia.
The head of Jewish Agency for Israel Representation in Georgia and
Armenia, Dov Pikulini, told The Messenger Tuesday evening that “our
organization will continue its traditions and activities.” Pikulini
added: “Let the candles of Hanukah lighten the victory of small
nations over large nations.”
One evidence of the ‘new era’ in relations is already being recorded
in a sound studio. The Georgian singer Merab Sepashvili and Israeli
singer Liora are compiling a new album of Georgian and Hebrew songs.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Armenian FM addressed OSCE session

ARMENIAN FM ADDRESSED OSCE SESSION
PanArmenian News
Dec 8 2004
08.12.2004 17:44
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ A group of deputies of the European Parliament,
who visited Nagorno Karabakh in 1992, made the following statement:
“Taking into consideration Azerbaijan’s advantage of man-power
and military equipment one can suppose that Karabakh will give up
in a few weeks… It is obvious that the defeat will be followed by
genocide and deportation”. Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian
brought in this extract from the Europarliamentarians’ statement when
addressing the 12-th OSCE session, and added: “Let not my words but
the words of the group of deputies of the European parliament serve
as a basis for you”. About half a million of Armenianrefugees from
Azerbaijan are still waiting for the settlement of the conflict, he
noted. V. Oskanian also reminded of Azerbaijan’s policy towards the
occupied Armenian territories of NKR, where Azeris are moving in the
houses belonging to Armenians due to state programs carried out by the
Azeri leadership. Touching upon V. Oskanian’s speech we would like to
remind of some extracts from the US Senate resolution from May 1,1991,
which says in part: “Taking into account the fact that the USSR and
the government of the Azerbaijani Republic are continuing attacks at
the Armenian population of Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan;
the Soviet and Azeri armed forces are destroying Armenian villages
and deporting the inhabitants from Nagorno Karabakh and territories
bordering with it we 1.condemn the attacks at innocent people in
Karabakh, and in the territories bordering with it 2.condemn the
military operations and firing upon the civilians at the eastern and
southern borders of Armenia.
–Boundary_(ID_yAGDn67l4MEnZpnu/IbtKQ)–

Gas Supply In The Republic

GAS SUPPLY IN THE REPUBLIC
Azat Artsakh – Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR)
08 Dec 04
At the beginning of our talk with the executive director of
“Artsakhgas” State CJSC Maxim Mirzoyan we touched upon the situation
in the sphere. In ten months of the year 2004 the number of natural
gas users in the republic grew by 1428, and thereby against the same
period in the previous year additional 78 million drams were paid to
the state budget. And in the past 18 months 809 flats in Stepanakert
were connected to the gas supply system. There were problems because
the majority of these flats were on the outskirts of the town. “On
the whole gasification of the capital may be considered complete
except for detached houses and three dormitories located far from
the main supply system,” said Maxim Mirzoyan. The question of these
remains unsolved because there are problems of usage security to be
solved. Maxim Mirzoyan drew attention to the installation of a new type
of gas stoves in block houses, which are safe to use. Already more
than 650 stoves have been installed. “Figuratively speaking, it means
saving 650 lorries of wood thereby saving the forest,” concludes the
executive director. In reference to the problem number 1 of Stepanakert
(that is, the worn-out underground pipeline which is already 25 years
old) M. Mirzoyan said that in the mentioned period 30 per cent of the
pipeline was replaced. The same cannot be said about gas distribution
booths, the replacement of which requires 200 million drams. “Today we
lay an emphasis on the regions,â~@~] says the head of ‘Artsakhgas’. In
the region of Martouni five contractors carry out the installation
of the gas pipelines and lateral gas pipelines. Gasification works
are carried out in 12 communities of the region. Two automatic gas
distribution booths have been installed in the villages Chartar
and Karmir Shuka, which will enable 100 per cent gas supply of all
the villages of the region. In the regional center low-pressure
reducers were installed most of which supply gas to 600 flats. In
parallel three medium-pressure gas reducers were placed to supply
five offices. On the whole, about 100 km of gas pipeline was built.
The schools of the villages of Shekher and Herher are heated on gas
(the school of the village of Chldran in Martakert is also heated on
gas). According to Maxim Mirzoyan, in 2005 the installation of the
pipelines of the regional center, as well as the villages of Gishi,
Khnushinak, Spitakashen, Chartar, Karmir Shuka, Taghavard will be
completed. In 2004 the number of gas users in the regional center
increased by 284, and in another 300 flats the local network has
been installed. Low-pressure pipelines were built in 17 communities
of Askeran. All the communities of the region of Shoushi except for
the small village Tsaghkadzor have gas supply. The most part of the
inhabited houses of Shoushi has natural gas. The work done here in 2004
costs 10 million drams, and another 116 families have gas supply. In
total, there are 523 users in the regional center and 298 users in
the villages. In 2005 again works of 10 million drams will be carried
out in the region. It is planned to provide the regional hospital with
gas, which means that the blocks situated along the pipeline will also
have gas supply. Despite the undeniable contribution of the region of
Martakert in the GDP of Nagorni Karabakh the region was not gasified
during the Soviet years. Today only the village of Vank has gas supply
(the gasometers were provided to the villagers by the benefactors
from Toronto through the all-Armenian foundation “Hayastan”. The
infrastructures of the villages Tsmakahogh and Shahmasur are ready
for use. In 2005 it is planned to include the region of Hadrout,
low-pressure pipelines will be installed in the villages Drakhtik,
Azokh, Mets Tagher and Togh.
NIKOLAY BAGHDASSARIAN. 08-12-2004
–Boundary_(ID_hn6nRyhPq7HDObUVVFcfOw)–
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Something Rotten in the State of Ukraine

Something Rotten in the State of Ukraine
by Chad Nagle
AntiWar.com
Dec 9 2004
One of the advantages of writing anonymous editorials is that you can
wantonly spew forth bile without worrying about anyone pointing the
finger at you individually. In the Dec. 2 issue of the pro-Yushchenko
English-language Kyiv Post newspaper, an editorial entitled “An
Orange March East” featured the following passage:
“What should Viktor Yushchenko and his team do next? Go east. One of
the many positive things this presidential election has done is
remind people in cosmopolitan Kyiv of the Appalachian levels of
ignorance and alienation that remain in Luhansk, Donetsk, and other
hardscrabble parts of Ukraine’s industrial east – in Viktor
Yanukovych country, in other words. The so-called Donbas – a massive
ghetto full of miners and steelers exploited, robbed, and manipulated
by the region’s presiding tycoons and Soviet-style government bosses
– might as well have a fence around it, sealing it off from the
country its citizens are instructed to distrust. Fed lies by the
media, isolated and undereducated and saturated with leftover Soviet
propaganda, many Donbas residents seem really to believe that
Yushchenko is an American puppet, set on enslaving them in the name
of Yankee imperialism and the CIA; that western Ukrainians are
fascists bent on eliminating the Russian language; and the like.”
The first thing I thought as I read this was: the poor people of the
Appalachians. Myself a native of Virginia, I had many times driven
around the Appalachians, enjoying not only the scenery but also the
warmth and hospitality of the native inhabitants. I could only wonder
what the “hardscrabble” folk of the Appalachians would make of such
cosmopolitan, urbanite-sophisticate commentary from faraway fellow
Americans.
The next thing that sprang to my mind was the tone of hatred running
through the piece, which I read immediately on my return from
Ukraine’s three eastern-most regions of Donetsk, Lugansk, and
Kharkov. Far from a “massive ghetto,” my discovery was a relatively
prosperous region densely scattered with economically active cities,
which, I could tell through the layer of sleet and snow, were
remarkably clean. Traveling by road through the area, I noticed that
even villages were well-kept, and the complexes around the huge mines
and industrial enterprises were pristine and affluent looking. I even
stopped off for a night in the town of Gorlovka at the suggestion of
someone I’d met in Kiev, a 24-year-old who had moved to the capital
from Donetsk region a couple of years earlier. With a look in his
eyes apparently intended to convey Apocalypse Now-type horror, he
told me of a sprawling “worker colony” – more populous than Kiev –
that I had to see to believe. What I found was a fairly typical,
small Soviet-era city where all the lights were on, shops were full,
and my hotel – the Rodina – cost $20 a night for a Euro-renovated
room with cable TV that showed all the main “opposition channels.”
The friends of the Donetsk émigré were nice enough young chaps who
met me at my hotel and took me to their favorite bar. It wasn’t my
sort of place – an alternative rock bar with entranced
twenty-somethings swaying to and fro – but I was preoccupied with the
revelation that, while Gorlovka might conceivably have been a
nightmare when the young émigré still lived there, in November 2004 I
could have been inside a bar in a working-class neighborhood on the
outskirts of Pittsburgh – hardly Kurtz’s Horror.
I had visited eastern Ukraine two and a half years earlier, going to
Kharkov for the parliamentary elections in March 2002, then visiting
Donetsk in April. Kharkov was an almost unspeakably foul dump with
garbage strewn everywhere, miserable looking inhabitants, and a
forlorn and crumbling old town. In “Freedom Square,” formerly Lenin
Square, the huge statue of Lenin gestured down toward the makeshift
go-cart course some enterprising individuals had set up, using old
tires to create the boundary of the racetrack. Donetsk was the best
put-together city I had visited in my travels outside Kiev in 2002,
including jaunts to destitute western Ukraine. Lenin presiding over a
depressing little “fun fair” in the central square put a damper on
things, as did the endless commercial billboards (like in Kiev), but
in 2002 the natives expressed no problems with infrastructure – gas,
water, and electricity were in abundant supply, unlike in the west.
By late 2004, the area had clearly undergone a striking
transformation in the previous two years, much as central Ukraine
had. When I arrived in late October for the first round of the
presidential election, it was obvious Kiev was doing better in
material terms. Trips to Zhitomir (notoriously one of the worst-off
districts in Ukraine) and Chernigov conveyed similar impressions:
Ukraine had never been doing so well economically since I had started
visiting the place in 1992. The filth of Kharkov was gone, its
now-spotless subway system having received a facelift, although the
monitors in each station playing pop videos were a bore. Historic
buildings were repainted and renovated. In Donetsk, Lenin Square was
unrecognizable except for the statue. The fun fair was no more, and
nearby was a beautifully renovated opera house where the charming
chief administrator – Tatiana Melnikova – took me on a tour and told
me in glowing terms of how much had been done for culture and the
arts during Yanukovich’s tenure as governor. She had been commission
chairman for the polling station housed in the theater, and tried to
convince me that, while the 96% for Yanukovich in the area may have
seemed ridiculous, she knew her neighbors. Their massive turnout was
not out of pressure from any authorities. It was more out of fear –
the fear of people who feel they actually have something to lose.
Why were things so visibly better? Dare it be suggested there is more
than coincidence in the fact that the period in question – coinciding
with the tenure of Viktor Yanukovich as premier – has been a time of
gently-accelerating economic reintegration with Russia? Could it be
that this reintegration has accrued to the benefit of ordinary
Ukrainians? Proponents of Ukraine’s “integration with Euro-Atlantic
structures” might get red in the face about this (I hope so), but it
feels very natural that Ukraine should benefit as a whole from closer
ties to Moscow. After all, trying to “tear away” a state that has
been closely economically integrated with Russia for its entire
existence – as our more fierce Western commentators advocate – could
not but cause serious harm to the lives of that state’s ordinary
citizens. But then, maybe these people aren’t cosmopolitan enough to
matter.
Some might argue that ripping Ukraine away from Russia is stern
medicine that must be administered if Ukraine is ever to become a
true democracy and “civil society.” Listening to the “opposition” and
its foreign supporters, one would think the place has turned into a
tyrannical despotism worse than at any time since the break-up of the
USSR. But having taken a close look at how people in Ukraine live
relative to the rest of the ex-Soviet bloc, one can only describe the
line that eastern Ukrainians are “fed lies by the media, isolated and
undereducated and saturated with leftover Soviet propaganda” as the
rant of adolescents, or liars, or both.
That isn’t to say everything is perfect in Ukraine. Of course it
isn’t. Plenty of corruption here as elsewhere (e.g., Poland and
Lithuania), but things are getting better – politically and
economically – and that is what the West can’t tolerate. Because when
things improve, people become happier, and sovereignty, democracy,
and the rule of law become strengthened. The economy flourishes in an
atmosphere of greater order, and a potential regional “rival” starts
to emerge. That’s what is happening in Ukraine. President Leonid
Kuchma was once feted by the West and promised more financial aid for
Ukraine – in real terms – than for Russia, at a time when mob murders
in Ukraine were at an all-time high and the name “Ukraine” was almost
synonymous in the world with the term “corruption.” By 2004, with
things starting to look up and life achieving some stability, Kuchma
and his government had to be removed and replaced by – to use the
Kyiv Post’s words – an American puppet.
Formally, this does in fact have something to do with democracy and
the rule of law: you have an election, you have accusations of fraud,
you have thousands of people blocking traffic and public areas in
central Kiev on a daily basis, and you have an “Orange Revolution.”
It’s “democratic” because it’s on behalf of a mythical majority of
“The People.” You keep the accusations of falsification going and
pretty soon the charges themselves become Truth. You assume massive
falsification until no one questions it any more, and those making
the charges become the heroes, democracy’s rebels fighting the
tyranny. Finally, you get a craven-looking “supreme court” (rule of
law) overturning the results of the election (democracy), and the
whole world can see democracy’s formal triumph. So you have a happy
ending: Democracy and the Rule of Law forever.
I rather feel I shouldn’t mention it but, assuming for the sake of
argument that “democracy” really is winning – that a majority of the
electorate really supports the leader of the Orange Revolution – the
concept of the “rule of law” must surely be on very shaky footing
worldwide. The West does sometimes refer to the rule of law, but it
is never expounded on. Some of the teachers in my law school used to
pay lip service to the idea, but our leaders in the West don’t like
to talk about it as much as democracy or “freedom,” George W. Bush’s
favorite term.
Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” is a good test case for studying the rule
of law. Exactly one year prior to the second round of the Ukrainian
presidential election, an armed mob stormed the Georgian parliament
building and a trembling President Eduard Shevardnadze – supported
and rewarded carte blanche by the West for more than eight years from
1992-2000 – fled in fear. On the eve of the Georgian presidential
election of January 2004, candidate Mikheil Saakashvili
(Shevardnadze’s former close lieutenant) appeared on TV (in violation
of the election law) to urge people to vote in the presidential
election on Jan. 4. He declared the need to “legitimize our victory
in the eyes of the world” – i.e., his victory wasn’t “legitimate”
yet. The “extra-constitutional” power transfer had to be
“legitimized” with an election. As it turned out, Saakashvili won
almost 97% of the vote in a poll in which the Central Election
Commission (CEC) estimated an 83% turnout. In reality, hardly anyone
showed up on the day, but “legitimacy” had been achieved and, so, the
rule of law had prevailed.
Now we have another “legitimizing” exercise. Viktor Yushchenko and
his Orange Tide scored a victory – after occupying public areas in
Kiev and blocking access to state buildings – when an evidently
bought-and-paid-for supreme court ruled on Dec. 3 that the second
round of the 2004 presidential elections had to be held again because
of “massive falsification.” The court didn’t order a re-run of the
whole election, even though it received evidence that in western
Ukraine – Yushchenko country – 100% of ballots had been cast for
Yushchenko in several precincts. This was when 24 candidates were
competing. One would have thought that, at very least, the
representatives of the other candidates on the commissions in these
polling stations, as well as other candidates’ observers, would have
voted for their guy. Unless, that is, they didn’t really represent
anyone but Yushchenko to begin with, which means the so-called
“regime” had no one looking out for procedural fairness on its behalf
at all. But the first round wasn’t important because Yushchenko had
already made it through to the second round, so why risk putting him
up against the whole range of original contestants?
It was also no matter that – much like the November 2003
parliamentary election in Georgia – the 2004 elections in Ukraine
were probably the most procedurally correct, orderly, and clean in
the history of post-Soviet Ukraine. In the places where I observed, I
did so randomly, and had no reason to believe I had stumbled into
pockets of law and order while ballot-stuffing mania was happening
everywhere else. The important thing was that Yushchenko had come out
a loser, and Washington had invested too much in the ex-Gosbank USSR
official – a perfect Sorosian New World Order candidate – to accept
that the provincial Viktor Yanukovich may (God forbid) have actually
enjoyed more support than Yushchenko among the citizenry. It was time
to get the grungy punks into the streets, get the “Rock the Vote”
concert going, and jam the center of the capital (with the help of
the city government) until the right result was obtained. This mob
was the “cosmopolitan” Kievans, more sophisticated and cultured than
their compatriots from Donetsk and Lugansk. They cheered on the usual
array of depressing rock and rap, Mahler and Wagner being
conspicuously left off the repertoire, and the ubiquitous orange lent
a Satanic air to the festival, with Viktor Yushchenko’s disfigured
face a Halloween mask under the stage lights. The favorite chant of
the mob: “We are many, and you will not defeat us” (i.e., “My name is
Legion, for we are many”). Images from Channel 5, the Ukrainian
version of Soros-financed Rustavi-2 TV in Georgia, would provide all
the images the world needed to believe that a spontaneous nationwide
revolution was taking place. Those Appalachian-level ignoramuses from
the more populated eastern and southern areas … well, they could go
to Hell.
So what were the protesters in the east like? Not terribly
impressive, to be honest, although the crowds at the demonstrations I
briefly attended in Donetsk and Lugansk looked no more disreputable,
ignorant, or uncultured than their cosmopolitan counterparts in Kiev.
There were too many leather jackets for my liking, but their wearers
looked like average working-class stiffs in duffle coats and woolen
hats as opposed to high-brow Kievan fashion victims sporting their
own, more cosmopolitan leather garments. People of all ages packed
into Lenin Square in Donetsk to hear the various speakers denounce
the “orange orgy” going on in Kiev, the CIA, etc. It was almost
unbearably cold, making it a wonder that a crowd of 5,000-plus could
stand out there for so many hours. After all, they were essentially
preaching to the converted. They didn’t need to block public areas to
get their way. In Lugansk, about the same number packed the square in
front of the Taras Shevchenko statue on the evening of Dec. 1 to hear
a series of speakers denounce the American-financed “coup” that was
already “winning,” and to say that Ukraine now faced the same fate as
“Serbia and Georgia.” These Donbas residents seemed “really to
believe” this stuff! People in “cosmopolitan Kiev” know it’s all just
the ranting of Appalachians “saturated with leftover Soviet
propaganda.”
That said, after I took time to talk to officials in Donetsk,
Lugansk, and Kharkov, I was sadly left with the distinct impression
that the “frightening” Soviet holdover areas of eastern Ukraine were
not about to threaten the “eastern march” of the New World Order.
Accusations of “separatism” sprang up after a congress of
pro-Yanukovich officials from 14 of Ukraine’s 27 regions was held in
the eastern city of Severodonetsk on Nov. 28. I watched the congress,
and do not remember a single speaker calling for “independence” or
“secession.” Viktor Yushchenko and his supporters found it
advantageous to demand prosecution for the “separatists,” but there
was nothing of the kind on offer in Severodonetsk on Nov. 28.
Yanukovich himself made a speech calling on his supporters to refrain
from “radical acts,” observe the law, and respect the constitution.
In fact, some of the officials simply spoke of the right to raise the
issue of “autonomy” (a vaguely defined concept) in light of the
actions of the pro-Yushchenko mob in Kiev. It was all nebulous waffle
about Ukraine’s constitutional structure, but never came close to
advocating civil war.
The head of the pro-Yanukovich “Party of the Regions” in Donetsk,
Alexander Bobkov, told me his party had always favored more rights
and powers for the regions vis-à-vis the center. It didn’t make sense
for people in Kiev to allocate funds from the budget to the regions
while retaining the power to specify how those funds were spent.
Kiev-based officials were unlikely to know how best to dispose of
resources in the region in question, since each region had its own
strengths and weaknesses (yawn). The Party of the Regions supported
Yanukovich because he personified the “opposition” (!) to current
state policy, and had always advocated devolution of power to the
regions. However, Bobkov didn’t even go so far as to advocate
replacement of the unitary state with a federal model, meaning that
his party’s position ultimately represented little more than the
usual tinkering characteristic of limp-wristed reformers.
In Lugansk, the head of the internal affairs department of the
regional administration, Vladimir Zablodsky, engaged in similar
waffle for my benefit. He seemed almost apologetic as he explained
that it would be “unheard of for a region not to support its native
son,” so Donetsk and Lugansk really had voted 90-something percent
for Yanukovich. He explained that a “Soviet” mentality still
prevailed in the east to the extent that, well, people expected to
work until retirement and then collect their pensions(!), and they
voted Soviet-style as well, as if in huge “blocks” – like block
voting by labor unions in the West. Zablodsky looked vaguely
embarrassed for some reason, but the pivotal moment in our talk came
when I asked whether people realized they had something to lose. The
West would operate very fairly: it would come in, offer to buy up
enterprises for a song, then shut them down once they were
“privatized,” putting millions out of work. The region would suffer,
but it would all be fair because the “free market” and “freedom”
would be working. This appeared to register briefly with Zablodsky
before his eyes glazed over, and for a moment I almost thought I
could see the dollar signs ring up in his eyes as he said: “But …
moshnii kapital.” “Powerful capital” was the point. When the
privatizers arrived they would, after all, pay for the resources. It
wouldn’t be much relative to actual value, of course, but it would
certainly be enough for regional government officials to benefit
handsomely. As for ordinary workers and pensioners, well…. Our
conversation was over.
As I headed off to Kharkov, I started to sense the plot becoming
clearer. The Ukrainian government had fixed the country up
handsomely, like a homeowner fixing up his house for the market. The
current, post-election crisis period was “Let’s Make a Deal” time,
and apparatchiks all over Ukraine were drooling at the thought of the
Western takeover, the American puppet in the top slot ensuring that
the fire sale went off without a hitch. Statements by Kuchma and
Yanukovich after the mob started filling Independence Square on Nov.
21 – that everything must proceed through “negotiations” – took on
new meaning. “Negotiations” would be over the “price” of the
Ukrainian presidency. All the talk about Yanukovich as pro-Russian
authoritarian was hot air. Quite the opposite, Yanukovich was the
soft-in-the-middle ex-Party man, and no Lukashenko in Belarus. He
might have proven himself a competent administrator who had presided
over the betterment of ordinary people’s lives, but he could be
relied on to serve as the more naïve, popular candidate who would
ultimately take the fall, fulfilling the Party’s will.
Everything was going according to plan. Soon the OSCE would succeed
in removing the chairman and deputy chairman of the CEC and imposing
more outside control on Ukraine’s electoral process. It was not a
total victory for the OSCE, not yet, since the original demand had
been a replacement of the entire CEC and all the regional election
commissions. But then, Ukraine has nothing to fear from increased
OSCE involvement, since the OSCE is a “European” organization and, of
course, completely objective. Everyone wants to belong to the OSCE,
just ask Tatiana Prosekina, head of the Secretariat of the Kharkov
District Soviet. She told me she had met with several OSCE
representatives before and during the election. On the subject of
Viktor Yushchenko’s demand that the OSCE administer (not merely
observe) repeat elections, Ms. Prosekina said that if Yushchenko had
so little respect for his own people that he would recommend that
outsiders control the electoral process, “Who needs him?” But, she
added, she had “no evidence” the West was disappointed by
Yushchenko’s electoral loss, and at this she diverted her glance down
toward the desk. She’d make a perfect OSCE official one day.
So the stage is set for a happy ending to the Orange Revolution.
Yanukovich has said he will compete in the third round, and may now –
buoyed by the taste of victory – really believe he can win. It
doesn’t look encouraging that his campaign manager, Sergei Tygipko,
resigned and appeared on TV with members of his until-recently
pro-government party, wearing orange and congratulating each other on
their conversion to the forces of freedom. Likewise, Yanukovich’s
decision to portray Yushchenko as a representative of the “old
authorities,” and himself as the candidate of the “new power,” does
not offer much hope. In a sense, Yanukovich is a “new power,” in that
he is from Donetsk, not Dnepropetrovsk, origin of most of the
post-Soviet Ukrainian political elite (including gas queen Yulia
Tymoshenko) until now. But Yushchenko is far worse than the “old
authorities,” since his presidency would be something “new” to
Ukrainians: total collapse. If, by some fluke, Yanukovich managed to
win what promises to be a chaotic shambles of a third round (i.e., a
return to the conditions of previous polls in Ukraine), then the tall
man from Donetsk could look forward to a Western bid to remove him
from office à la Rolandas Paksas of Lithuania, on trumped-up charges
of corruption. He would then be replaced by Yushchenko, U.S.-backed
counterpart of unpopular septuagenarian President Valdus Adamkus, in
Kiev so much lately to lecture the Ukrainian leadership about
democracy and the rule of law.
Then it will be on to the next Victory of the People somewhere else.
As Mrs. Tymoshenko has promised: “As soon as our Orange Revolution
has been completed, we’ll transfer it to Russia.” Some opposition
politician in Armenia recently referred to a coming “Apricot
Revolution” in his country. I’m not sure how the Azeris will take
this, since I remember about 10 years ago they used to tell me the
best apricots in the world grew in Azerbaijan, not Armenia. The
Azeris may feel slighted, but why not go for something a bit more
unusual, say, a Persimmon Revolution? In any case, for some reason
the Directors of the New World Order have chosen brand names of
fruits, flowers, and nuts for their various enterprises so we’ll have
to wait and see. How sad, though, that far from bringing forth the
flavors and scents of a lustrous spring, it all smells rotten and
tastes rancid.
–Boundary_(ID_wYbxkLuMFOAJjIZ/M0X2gw)–