Category: News

Rosatom sees no technical obstacles to extending the Armenian NPP’s operation

Emil Lazarian
ARKA, Armenia
Sept 29, 2026
29.09.2026, 15:43

Rosatom sees no technical obstacles to extending the service life of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) until 2036, while the possibility of further extending the plant’s operation to 2046 is also being explored in Armenia.
YEREVAN, September 29. /ARKA/. Rosatom sees no technical obstacles to extending the service life of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) until 2036, while the possibility of further extending the plant’s operation to 2046 is also being explored in Armenia. Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev stated this in response to a question from the ARKA news agency during a briefing following talks with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

“We have smoothly transitioned into the second phase of the extension to 2036—a phase that can be somewhat conditionally divided into two stages: up to 2031, and from 2031 to 2036. Most of the work related to the 2031 milestone has been completed; just yesterday, within the framework of the working group, we confirmed 100% completion of the production targets,” Likhachev said.

According to him, future work will proceed with the 2036 target in mind.

“Neither I nor our specialists have any doubt that the plant’s operation will be extended to 2036,” the Rosatom chief noted.
At the same time, Likhachev emphasized that the final decision rests with the operating organization—the plant itself—and the regulator, the Nuclear Safety Regulatory Committee of Armenia.

Likhachev also reported that Armenia’s leadership and specialists are examining the possibility of extending the NPP’s operation even further—from 2036 to 2046.

“Theoretically, such a possibility exists, and we are ready to organize this work if such a decision is made.” “But beyond technical feasibility, we must also consider economic viability,” he said.

According to Likhachev’s estimates, extending the plant’s operation until 2046 would require investments amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars. These funds would be allocated for upgrading safety and automation systems, re-annealing the reactor vessel, and expanding and repairing spent nuclear fuel storage facilities.

He noted that the necessary capital expenditures could, in turn, lead to higher electricity costs during the 2036–2046 period.

“Electricity costs could even double if the full scope of work for the extension to 2046 is carried out,” Likhachev stated.

As an alternative, he proposed limiting the current power unit’s service life to 2036 while making a decision to build a new unit as soon as possible.

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London: HMRC worker accused of trying to use her position to ‘kill Russians fo

Chatinian Lara
The Independent, UK
Sept 29, 2026

The original appeal was not upheld, so the woman took HMRC to an employment tribunal in Edinburgh

Dylan Bilyard

Tuesday 29 September 2026 10:42 BST

An Armenian HMRC trainee who was accused of trying to use her position to ‘kill Russians for killing her family’ has won over £16,000 in compensation.

An employment tribunal heard that the trainee, known only as Ms X, never made comments about ‘getting back at Russians’.

Instead her ‘patronising’ manager invented the comments by making false notes during a private meeting between them.

After disciplining her for the false accusation, an inexperienced appeal officer worsened the allegation by misunderstanding that the trainee had claimed she wanted to ‘kill Russians’ as she was ‘medically paranoid’.

The government organisation has now been ordered to pay the woman £16,506.95 in compensation.

Ms X is an Armenian woman who is from the semi-autonomous state of Abkhazia in Georgia.

She speaks fluent English but her first language is Russian and she speaks with a Russian accent.

She was granted asylum in the UK in 2004 and was naturalised as a citizen shortly after.

Ms X initially began working for HMRC in January 2019 and completed her probation before leaving in January 2020.

She returned as a trainee in July 2022, where Damian Robson was her line manager.

Mr Robson described himself as ‘an empathetic and relaxed manager’, but the tribunal noted his emails to Ms X ‘did not display that’ and were in fact ‘patronising’, ‘hostile’ and ‘inappropriate’.

Ms X had changed her surname in 2019 while previously working for HMRC, as she had a very distinctive surname that ‘identified her as an Armenian from Abkhazia’.

Due to the complicated culture of Ms X’s home country, it is not uncommon for people ‘to intimidate the woman into compliance, where a woman does not behave as expected’, such as when she is unmarried or leaves home.

Ms X had previously suffered ‘a violent attack’ for these reasons and, following advice from police and a lawyer, she subsequently changed her surname in 2019.

But she saw when she re-joined HMRC that her old surname was visible for all 65,000 HMRC employees on its computer system.

Ms X sent an email to Mr Robson to bring this to his attention – but he approached her in the open plan office to ‘question her extensively’ in ‘a disturbing and an unnecessary manner’ as to why she was in danger.

The trainee was apprehensive because of the publicity of the situation in the open plan office but still attempted to explain fully her concerns.

However Mr Robson dismissed them, ‘explained that he had 29 years’ experience in law enforcement, and he could not understand’ and then ‘took no action’ to help her.

Ms X ‘remained very concerned’ but approached HR herself and her old name was removed a month later.

On August 18, the trainees were all added to an online call as it was announced which department they would go to for the next two years.

It was said that these were ‘randomly selected’, leading Ms X to question how the random selection was controlled.

She and another trainee were unhappy with their assignments so asked if they were able to swap, but Mr Robson said the request was ‘perplexing’ and denied the request in a patronising manner.

Ms X and Mr Robson were both part of a scheduled video call the next day, on August 19, and after the call the manager asked her to stay so they could discuss allocation.

During the meeting, Ms X expressed a preference to work in Customs & International Trade.

She said ‘her background in research and analysis would be better suited to that area’, and also that her experience of Russian language and culture might be useful there.

They spoke for almost an hour and Mr Robson took notes without Ms X’s knowledge, which he later compiled into 91 paragraphs of meeting minutes.

Within the six-page document, it described how Ms X had insisted she be put into Customs & International Trade because she ‘could get back at Russia for killing my family’.

Mr Robson sent the notes to the trainee 10 days after their meeting while she was on holiday and she replied that they were ‘not an accurate reflection’ of what was said.

However he used the made-up quote to bring disciplinary action against Ms X, and on September 1, 2022 an investigation was started into her conduct.

A manager was appointing to investigate, though he had never done so before.

Despite having no medical training, the manager used Ms X’s concerns for her own safety as reason to claim she was ‘medically paranoid’.

He then ignored Ms X’s evidence and said that Mr Robson would have no motive to make anything up about her.

He ‘drew a negative inference’ about Ms X because she called Mr Robson a ‘liar’, and even tried to upgrade the investigation against her to say she had committed gross misconduct, which was denied.

He found the accusation regarding ‘getting back at Russians’ proven just because Russian had been mentioned during the meeting.

Ms X was issued a first written warning.

She appealed the decision but a second manager who had no experience in the role was appointed the appeal manager.

This manager ‘conducted an extremely cursory review’, and even substantiated a completely incorrect allegation that Ms X ‘had stated that she would use her position to kill Russians’.

The appeal was not upheld, so Ms X took HMRC to an employment tribunal in Edinburgh.

There, Employment Judge Melanie Sangster concluded that she was the victim of direct and indirect race discrimination.

EJ Sangster said: “If [Ms X] had stated, as [Mr Robson] indicated, that she wished to use her position within [HMRC] to ‘get back at the Russians for killing her family’, the Tribunal concluded that the response from [Mr Robson] would not have been that he would simply ‘leave that comment to one side’ and move on.

“He would, at very least, have expressed shock at the statement and told [Ms X] that what she had stated was entirely inappropriate.”

It was found that Mr Robson had falsely accused Ms X of misconduct because of her race.

The judge continued: “The Tribunal concluded that the other comments, which [Mr Robson] stated [Ms X] said to him in his one-to-one meeting with her on August 19 2022, were not in fact said.

“The Tribunal accordingly concluded that the alleged treatment occurred: [Mr Robson] did falsely accuse [Ms X] of misconduct.

“The Tribunal accordingly finds that, in falsely accusing [Ms X] of misconduct, [HMRC] treated [her] less favourably because of race.”

HMRC has now been ordered to pay Ms X, who continues to work there, £16,506.95 for injury to feelings.

Further claims of harassment related to race were dismissed.


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Trump got the Caucasus peace deal. Now Europe is stuck in the past

Ophelia Vardapetian
Sept 29, 2026
By Taras Kuzio

When Europe’s leaders gathered in Yerevan, Armenia, in May, the sharpest words about Europe’s view of the South Caucasus came from a leader who was not in the room.

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, speaking by video link from Baku, used his allotted time at the European Political Community summit to rebuke the European Parliament for a resolution it had passed days earlier and accuse it of sabotaging his country’s peace process with Armenia.

Just years ago, an Azerbaijani leader addressing a summit in the Armenian capital would have seemed unreal.

That he spent the time scolding the Europeans and not the Armenians says even more about how relations between the two former foes have changed, and how little European thinking has changed with them. That disconnect is costly in a region whose stability is central to European interests: The South Caucasus forms the only major overland route between Europe and Asia that bypasses both Russia and Iran, while offering Europe an energy corridor for Caspian and Central Asian gas.

Six years ago this week, a 44-day conflict began that returned Karabakh to Azerbaijan — internationally recognized Azerbaijani territory that had been held by Armenian forces since the wars of Soviet dissolution. At the time, Baku’s restoration of sovereignty over the region and the departure of its Armenian population were widely expected to entrench Armenian-Azerbaijani enmity for another generation.

Instead, it created the conditions for rapprochement. The two sworn enemies are now closer to a durable peace than at any point since the bloody six-year war of the late 1980s and early 1990s that drove Azerbaijanis from Karabakh and surrounding territories.

Europe, as it tends to with wars on its eastern edges, fell back on its usual tropes. Western debate following the 44-day war revolved around the rights and security of Karabakh’s Armenians and some type of special political status for the region. Those talking points never took into account what happened on the ground — the restoration of an internationally recognized country’s territorial integrity. They remained tethered to the same prewar mediation framework that had failed for decades, leaving Europe reliant on assumptions overtaken by events and weakening its credibility as an intermediary.

For Baku, the contradiction was clear: The same European capitals that insisted on Ukraine retaining its borders defined in 1991 against Russia’s all-out invasion saw Azerbaijan’s claims as open to negotiations. That credibility deficit eventually caught up with European mediation: In October 2023, talks unraveled at the European Union-led summit in Granada, Spain, amid Azerbaijani accusations that France was siding with Armenia.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan and Armenia pressed ahead through bilateral talks, agreeing on the text of a peace treaty by March 2025. Five months later, President Donald Trump and his administration brought the two leaders to the White House to initial the deal.

Territorial claims are now over. No soldier has been killed on the border in nearly three years. Azerbaijani fuel has been flowing to Armenia by rail via Georgia since December 2025, and Armenia is now preparing to send goods the other way.

Baku and Yerevan are looking to restore and reopen shared transit routes, including the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, and both countries have hinted at reestablishing passenger train lines, shut down and dismantled nearly four decades ago.

Slowly, yet by no means universally, Europeans have begun to accept that territorial integrity lies at the heart of any settlement. Europe now needs to catch up with a reality it has only belatedly begun to recognize.

Ironically, the bloc now finds itself in a position of leverage. Armenia is turning toward the EU as it loosens its dependence on Russia, and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, reelected in June, has made European integration the centerpiece of his foreign policy.

For once, Brussels could play a decisive role in taking the peace process from an initialed agreement to a signed treaty. The last obstacle lies in Yerevan, where what Europe says carries significant weight.

Armenia’s constitution invokes the 1990 Declaration of Independence, which, in turn, cites the 1989 decision to unify Soviet Armenia with Karabakh. Baku regards that as an outstanding claim to Azerbaijani territory, and therefore a red line before any peace treaty can be signed and brought into force.

Removing the reference to Karabakh requires a new constitution adopted by referendum, which Pashinyan promised to hold once the election was behind him. His party fell short of the two-thirds majority that would have let it carry the process alone, so he will need votes from elsewhere.

SPAIN IS BECOMING NATO’S NEXT DICTATORSHIP. TRUMP MUST ACT NOW

Europe should not let that calculation become an excuse for waiting, and the EU should tie progress on Armenia’s European ambitions to Yerevan finally resolving its long-standing feud.

For decades, Europe’s capitals treated the region based on suppositions that are now long obsolete. Now, Armenia has reelected the leader who promised to remove the last barrier to the peace process. After years of finding itself behind events in the South Caucasus, Europe now has an opportunity to help bring that process to a close.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and the author of Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War and Crimea 2014-2024: Where Russia’s War Started and Where Ukraine Will Win. He is also a co-editor of Russia and Modern Fascism: New Perspectives on the Kremlin’s War Against Ukraine and a co-author of The Four Roots of Russia’s War Against Ukraine.

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/op-eds/4745602/armenia-azerbaijan-peace-treaty-europe-leverage/ 

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Armenia seeks new military partners. Why is Yerevan turning to China?

Adrine Hakobian
Defence 24
Sept 28, 2026
Natalia Adrianna Potera

The visit of Armenian Defence Minister Suren Papikyan to the People’s Republic of China, which took place from 14 to 18 September 2026, represents a key element in the systemic reorganisation of the country’s security policy. After decades of near-total reliance on Russian technology and security guarantees within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Yerevan is now implementing a doctrine, described by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan as the diversification of arms procurement, that encompasses „six or seven states”.


At the same time, the visit appears to be more than a mere formality. It signals a shift towards intensive technological and industrial negotiations with a partner outside Moscow’s traditional sphere of influence.

The industrial dimension of the visit

The significance of the visit was underscored by a packed schedule of engagements, ranging from talks with the Minister of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, Admiral Dong Jun (15 September), and participation in the 13th Beijing Xiangshan Forum (16 September) to direct discussions with the leadership of China’s defence sector (17 September) and a visit to the PLA National Defense University (18 September). Ambassador Vahe Gevorgyan’s presence at key panel discussions highlighted the diplomatic groundwork being laid for enduring, long-term military cooperation and, by extension, a partnership poised to become a pillar of Armenia’s new „sovereignty infrastructure”.


At the same time, for nations undergoing rapid technical modernisation – a group that currently includes Armenia – direct dialogue with China’s military-industrial complex (comprising giants such as CASC and CASIC) is of crucial importance. Although official statements from 17 September were brief, Papikyan’s meetings with the heads of corporations responsible for state-of-the-art missile and aviation systems suggest an interest in specific technologies capable of addressing the arms shortfalls that became apparent after 2022.

The situation is further complicated by a crisis of confidence regarding Russia. Moscow failed to fulfil arms contracts signed in 2021, forcing Yerevan to conclude an agreement under which funds paid for undelivered weaponry were credited against Armenia’s interstate debt. Faced with these gaps in defence capabilities, China offers immense production capacity and a readiness to supply systems that can be integrated into Armenia’s defence system in an exceptionally short time.

Chinese technology in Armenia’s arsenal

The effectiveness of Armenia’s Chinese arms acquisition strategy is evidenced by the presence of specific systems in Armenia’s arsenal, officially unveiled during a military parade in May 2026. The identified combat assets indicate that Yerevan is focusing on precision strike capabilities and unmanned systems, including:

–         CH-4B (Armenian designation „Aghegh”): A MALE (medium-altitude, long-endurance) unmanned system designed for reconnaissance and strike missions. It is an aircraft with combat-proven potential—having been used in conflicts in Iraq and Yemen, among others—which enhances its value in the eyes of Armenian analysts.

–         FL-300A/ASN-301 („Vorot-1” and „Vorot-2”): Anti-radar unmanned systems / loitering munitions with an estimated range of approx. 280–300 km. They have been showcased, among other configurations, with a six-tube container launcher mounted on trucks.

–         CH-901/FH-901 („Kaytsak”): Lightweight loitering munition—comparable to the American Switchblade 600 system—providing precision support at the tactical level.

–         GAM-102LR („Nizak”): A third-generation „fire-and-forget” anti-tank system, representing a technological equivalent to state-of-the-art Western solutions.

–         WM-80 and AR1A: Heavy multiple-launch rocket systems that have long formed the backbone of Armenia’s long-range ground-attack capabilities.

In Beijing, Armenia likely sought to expand this arsenal to include medium-range air defence systems, C4ISR command and control systems, and advanced electronic warfare (EW) solutions.

What capabilities might Armenia need today?

The profound transformation and modernisation of Armenia’s armed forces create an urgent need for several key categories of weaponry, including areas where the Chinese defence industry offers a wide range of proven export products. These primarily include:

–         short- and medium-range air defence systems (both mobile and stationary);

–         unmanned reconnaissance and strike systems, as well as loitering munitions;

–         radar stations and electronic warfare (EW) systems;

–         multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS);

–         command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, and precision-guided munitions.

At the same time, it should be clearly noted that there is no official information confirming which of these segments (or indeed whether any of them) were the subject of detailed arrangements during the meetings held in Beijing in September.

Personnel training at the National Defence University

Suren Papikyan’s visit to the National Defence University in Beijing on 18 September and the agreements reached there are of strategic importance. Although Beijing’s diplomatic rhetoric invokes „historical analogies between two ancient nations”, from a military analyst’s perspective, this signifies the building of a civilisational understanding that facilitates the transfer of Chinese military thought. Officer training in the PRC is intended to enable Armenia to assimilate technology more deeply and without ideological baggage, which is crucial for the independent operation and modernisation of Chinese-supplied weaponry.

This also indicates that Yerevan is seeking not only deliveries of finished weapon systems from China but also broader cooperation in the areas of military doctrine and institutional structures. Joint training programmes for senior officers and commanders could foster enduring procedural ties and enable Armenian personnel to familiarise themselves with Chinese strategic thought, command systems, and operational concepts. In the longer term, such cooperation could facilitate deeper organisational integration and make it easier for Armenia to incorporate Chinese-made systems into its evolving defence architecture.

Why Beijing?

The choice of the PRC as a strategic partner stems from technocratic pragmatism. China positions itself as a politically „neutral” supplier, guided by the principle of cooperation free from additional political conditions. For Yerevan – balancing between pressure from Moscow and a desire to cooperate with the West – Beijing represents a source of modern technology that does not require taking sides in the global ideological divide.

The appeal of the Chinese offer also lies in its cost-effectiveness and flexibility. Unlike Russia, China meets delivery deadlines, and – unlike some Western suppliers – it imposes fewer restrictions on the export of strike systems. Thus, Yerevan seeks to avoid dependence on a single source of supply, viewing Beijing not as a new, dominant supplier, but merely as a counterbalance to its existing partnerships.


Can China replace Russia?

Analysts and observers monitoring the situation in the South Caucasus naturally wonder whether Beijing could take Moscow’s place as Armenia’s new primary security guarantor. However, based on available information and diplomatic actions to date, it does not appear that Yerevan seeks to swap one form of dependency for another.

The September talks should be viewed as another deliberate step towards broadly diversifying defence partnerships. Although official statements regarding the meeting between Papikyan and Admiral Dong Jun mentioned „developing new areas of interaction” and „long-term planning”, there were no indications of an intention to form a formal military alliance or secure binding security guarantees from the PRC. Instead, China is intended to serve as a distinct, independent source of technological and political capacity, thereby increasing Armenia’s freedom of manoeuvre.

China between Yerevan and Baku

Cooperation with Armenia does not mean that Beijing is abandoning its ties with Baku. China pursues a policy of careful balance, a fact underscored by the Joint Statement on the Establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Azerbaijan signed in April 2025. Moreover, almost concurrently with Papikyan’s visit, Azerbaijani Defence Minister Colonel General Zakir Hasanov visited the production facility of the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) in Beijing.

For China, both nations represent key links in the Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing supplies weaponry to both countries, viewing the South Caucasus as a market for its goods and a region for expanding economic influence, while simultaneously avoiding the role of arbiter or ally. Consequently, Yerevan must take into account the risk that the technologies it acquires from China may also be familiar, to some extent, to Azerbaijan.

Prospects and signs of success

Suren Papikyan’s visit to Beijing confirms that Armenia has shifted away from reliance on Russian military equipment in favour of a diversified network of partnerships. For Yerevan, China is not a new patron but rather one of several independent sources of strength. By building an „infrastructure of sovereignty”, Armenia is assuming significant logistical and integration-related risks, on the assumption that a diversity of suppliers will shield it from a scenario where any single power could once again impose its political will through military pressure. The success of this effort hinges on the ability of Armenian personnel to integrate Chinese technology with Western command-and-control standards. Key indicators of success will primarily include the scale of deployment of new types of Chinese weaponry at Armenian training grounds (particularly medium-range air defence systems), as well as the growing number of Armenian officers undergoing specialised training in the PRC.




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Armenia Credits Indian Arms Deal for Breaking Global Reluctance to Supply Esse

Christine Harutyunian
Defence India
Sept 28, 2026
  • Thread starter Raj Basu
Armenia’s Defence Minister Suren Papikyan has highlighted India’s crucial role in transforming the global arms market dynamics for Yerevan.

Following the border conflict in September 2022, Armenia sought to protect its territorial integrity by acquiring modern weaponry.

Papikyan noted that India’s bold decision to supply essential defensive systems shattered international reluctance, setting a precedent that other nations could legitimately provide military equipment to Armenia.


This strategic shift occurred after Armenia lost confidence in its traditional security alliances, particularly the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

With prior weapons orders from Russia remaining unfulfilled despite advance payments, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan emphasised the need for urgent diversification.

The diplomatic breakthrough during the October 2022 Prague process, where Armenia and Azerbaijan mutually recognised each other’s borders, further accelerated Yerevan’s quest for reliable defence partners.

Consequently, Armenia effectively suspended its active participation in the CSTO proceedings and turned toward new geopolitical allies.

India rapidly emerged as Armenia’s largest new defence supplier, fulfilling a massive military modernization requirement.

The extensive procurement portfolio from Indian manufacturers includes Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, Advanced Towed Artillery Gun Systems (ATAGS), MArG 155mm wheeled self-propelled howitzers, and Swathi weapon locating radars.

Furthermore, Armenia has bolstered its airspace protection by acquiring the Akash-1S air-defence system and advanced counter-drone technologies from India.

Global security analysts estimate that recent defence contracts between New Delhi and Yerevan are worth hundreds of millions of dollars, marking a major milestone in their bilateral relations.

India’s willingness to export these critical systems provided both the justification and the momentum for other global powers to reconsider unwritten restrictions on arms sales to Armenia.

Analysts from the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and other regional think tanks have noted that France quickly followed suit, becoming Armenia’s principal Western security partner.

Paris has since signed contracts to supply advanced military hardware, including CAESAR self-propelled howitzers.

Ultimately, India’s initial involvement acted as the cornerstone of Armenia’s new multi-aligned defence doctrine, ensuring the nation can secure its borders while navigating a complex regional security environment.


https://defence.in/threads/armenia-credits-indian-arms-deal-for-breaking-global-reluctance-to-supply-essential-defensive-military-equipment.18797/ 

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Georgia expels Belarusian activist to Armenia after refusing asylum claim

Emil Lazarian
OC Media
Sept 28, 2026
Georgia

by Mikheil Gvadzabia

28 September 2026•4 min read

Georgia expelled Belarusian activist Lev Mikheev, who had unsuccessfully been seeking political asylum since 2021. Georgia deported Mikheev to Armenia, where he was briefly detained, but then released.

Mikheev was detained by Georgian migration authorities on 25 September and expelled to Armenia hours later. He had lived in Georgia for five years before he was expelled, he told independent Belarusian media outlet Pozirk.

Tbilisi-based rights group Rights Georgia, which sought to get involved in the case, said it was unable to visit Mikheev in time because of the hours set by the Migration Department. When a lawyer arrived at the department at the start of working hours the following day, they were told that the activist had left the country late the previous night.

Mikheev said that two weeks before his detention, he had gone to Martkopi — a village 30 kilometres east of Tbilisi, where the Migration Department’s reception centre is located — to legally renew his locally-issued temporary ID document. Mikheev noted that his application was accepted and he was told to return in two weeks. When he did, the Department told him he had to go with them back to Tbilisi, then took his phone and drove him away.

‘I only managed to send [Tbilisi-based Belarusian human rights activist] Roman [Kislyak] a short message before they took my phone. From that moment on, I was practically like a prisoner’, he said as quoted by Pozirk.

According to Mikheev, at the Migration Department’s office in Tbilisi, a person responsible for his case told him that he was residing in the country illegally and that his identification document, which the activist said was still valid, ‘was completely irrelevant’.

He was reportedly given two options: ‘to be thrown out of Georgia in handcuffs’ or to leave the country voluntarily, an option offered to foreigners detained for allegedly illegally staying in Georgia if they have the necessary travel documents.

Mikheev said he refused to return to Belarus since he was ‘seeking asylum precisely because he was being persecuted in his home country’. He also asked for a short extension to remain in Georgia, at least until 9 October, when his identification document was due to expire, but was rejected.

‘They herded me from office to office. A doctor came and stripped me down to my underwear — it was absolutely horrific. Then we went home, I packed a few things, and we went to the police station’, he said. Mikheev said he was ‘dumped’ on the Georgian–Armenian border.

Before being expelled, he said he was ‘forced to sign a lot of papers’ in Georgian, the meaning of which, as Pozirk noted, he did not understand.

Tbilisi-based rights group Rights Georgia, which sought to get involved in the case, stated it was unable to visit Mikheev in time because of the hours set by the Migration Department. When a lawyer arrived at the department at the start of working hours the following day, they were told that the activist had left the country late the previous night.

Responding to media reports, the Migration Department noted the information had been presented ‘incorrectly and in a distorted manner’, denying that Mikheev did not understand what he was signing.

‘Before signing the documents, he was provided with the relevant information and their contents were explained to him through an interpreter’, the agency said in a statement published on the Interior Ministry’s website on 26 September.

The agency further stated that Mikheev’s 2021 asylum application, which was based on his political activity in Belarus, was rejected in September 2024 because there were ‘no legal grounds for granting him the status’.

Mikheev appealed the rejection, but two courts upheld the decision. The agency noted that, as a result, he ceased to be considered an asylum seeker in June 2026 and was detained three months later for staying in Georgia ‘without a legal basis’.

The department also emphasised that Mikheev chose Armenia himself as a destination — something the activist confirmed, although calling it ‘a choice without a choice’.

‘I was terrified of the option where they would choose the destination country. For example, Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan. So I agreed to Armenia’.

‘I realised they were simply crazy here. It’s difficult to argue with them about anything. Let it be Armenia. And the process started rolling’, Mikheev explained.

At the border, he was briefly detained by Armenian law enforcement. Belarusian media attributed the detention to an interstate search request issued for Mikheev by Belarusian authorities through the Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), of which both Armenia and Belarus are members.

According to Mikheev, he was shown documents indicating that Belarusian authorities had opened a criminal case against him on charges of insulting President Aliaksandr Lukashenka.

‘I said, “You know, Lukashenko isn’t president”. They smiled and nodded’, he recalled.

After spending the night at the police station, the activist was on the afternoon of 26 September. He said that he was satisfied with how he was treated by the Armenian authorities, in contrast to his experience in Georgia.

Mikheev now plans to seek a legal assessment of the Georgian migration service’s handling of his case. The United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus — the Belarusian government-in-exile — which followed the case, was cited by Pozirk as saying they were setting up legal counsel for Mikheev in Georgia.

‘The most unpleasant thing here is this lack of rights and humiliation of a man who has done nothing illegal’, Mikheev said.

Belarus was swept by brutal state repression in response to mass protests following the 2020 presidential election, which is widely considered to have been rigged by Lukashenka’s government against his main opponent, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.

Some Belarusians fleeing repression moved to Georgia. While some later left, including for EU states, others remained in the country.

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Armenian Public TV apologises for airing upbeat pop concert on war anniversary

Arbi Tashjian
OC Media
Sept 28, 2026
by Ani Ghulinyan

28 September 2026•2 min read

Public TV aired an upbeat 2024 concert by the pop singer Tata Simonyan on Sunday, the sixth anniversary of the start of the Second Karabakh War, sparking outrage. On Monday, the broadcaster shared an apology, describing the choice as a ‘mistake’.

This is not the first time that Public TV has been at the centre of controversy concerning its coverage of Nagorno-Karabakh. Earlier in September, Public TV did not acknowledge the third anniversary of the 2023 exodus of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh.

Addressing outrage at the concert’s festive tone on social media, Public TV shared an apology on Monday. They said that they are reviewing relevant procedures to prevent such cases from happening again.

‘Dear viewers, the entertainment concert broadcast on the Public Television Company’s air on 27 September was a mistake, and we fully accept responsibility for it. We will not try to justify what happened by citing programming, technical, or operational circumstances. We apologise for what happened’, the statement read.

The statement followed an earlier reaction from the artist whose concert was aired on Sunday, Tata Simonyan, who condemned the broadcast and said the concert was aired without his consent.

‘I apologise for what happened, but I consider it important to note that the concert is the property of the Public Television Company. The material was used without my consent. I consider the Public Television Company’s broadcast of my concert on this day to be a gross error with no justification’, he wrote.

The concert was organised as part of the Festivar series of state-funded cultural events following a pattern of similar initiatives launched by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan since he came to power in 2018. Critics argue that the concerts allow Pashinyan to shift focus from pressing security concerns. In the past, some have also raised questions about the transparency of the selection process for those contracted to organise the events.

This is not the first time that Public TV has been at the centre of accusations that it is promoting the ruling party’s agenda.

Since the war and displacement of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, Pashinyan has repeatedly stated that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue was closed, claiming this is essential for the peace process. In step with Pashinyan’s approach, ruling party officials have avoided making public announcements to mark anniversaries and visiting the Yerablur Military Pantheon, where people usually pay their respects to those who died in the war.

The host of Public TV’s late-night political interview show, Petros Ghazaryan, has been often criticised for favouring guests from the ruling party. An analysis of 426 interviews by independent journalist Katya Mamyan found that more than half of Ghazaryan’s airtime was occupied by Civil Contract party members.

On 19 September, Public TV did not mention that it was the third anniversary of the displacement of Karabakh Armenians, when 120,000 Armenians were displaced following a large-scale assault by Azerbaijan. This assault came after a blockade of the region lasting almost 10 months. Public TV did not address the criticism it received for not acknowledging the war or its consequences.

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‘Yet another fabrication’: Armenia denies conceding land to Azerbaijan during

Hambardsumian Paul
OC Media
Sept 29, 2026
by Ani Ghulinyan

29 September 2026 (Updated:  about 4 hours ago)•2 min read

Armenia has denied reports circulating on social media that they conceded five combat positions in the north to Azerbaijan during the border demarcation process.

OC Media was unable to find the original source for the reports that Yerevan was rebutting. A couple of social media posts spread the news on Facebook without giving a specific source.

Armenia’s Defence Ministry called claims that four or five Armenian positions near the village of Berdavan in the Tavush Province had come under Azerbaijani control ‘yet another fabrication’, with the local authorities in Noyemberyan also denying the claims.

The Office of Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan has also issued a statement denying that Armenia made the concessions and said the reports did not correspond to reality.

The border delimitation commissions of the two countries were created in 2022. Armenia’s commission is headed by Grigoryan, while Azerbaijan’s is headed by Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev.

In 2024, Armenia’s agreement to delimit parts of its border with Azerbaijan, with a potential transfer of control over four disputed villages sparked protests in Tavush. The protests then escalated into a larger movement, Tavush for the Motherland, led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan. Residents raised security concerns and accused the government of making unilateral concessions.

On 5 September 2025, the heads of the border delimitation commissions of the two countries made reciprocal visits across the Armenia–Azerbaijan border. This was the first confirmed instance of the two officials visiting each other’s territory.

Armenian and Azerbaijani border delimitation chairs cross border in historic first

Earlier this year, the Defence Ministry rejected another claim that positions near Jermuk had been handed to Azerbaijan.

In early September, controversy erupted in Armenia after a newspaper quoted a local official as saying that Azerbaijan had attempted to advance towards the Hakari Bridge, which connected Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh.

Local officials have denied the reports.

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European observers criticise Armenia’s decision to annul results in three pol

Emil Lazarian
OC Media
Sept 29, 2026
by Ani Ghulinyan

29 September 2026 (Updated:  about 6 hours ago)•4 min read

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) concluded Armenia’s parliamentary elections offered voters a genuine choice and were well run. However, PACE criticised the Central Election Commission (CEC) for annulling the results at three polling stations, claiming that the excluded results could have affected the election outcome. The report suggests amending the electoral law to address this issue in the future.

In the June parliamentary elections, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won with 49.75% of the vote, winning 64 seats in parliament: a three-fifths majority.

Gagik Tsarukyan’s Prosperous Armenia party came close to entering parliament; Following a recount at several polling stations, the party secured 3.98% of the vote, falling just 0.02 percentage points short of the 4% threshold required.

The PACE report criticised the Commission’s choice to annul results in three polling stations. The CEC said they annulled the vote at these stations as, in two cases, members of the military were permitted to vote after the legal closing time. At the third station, ballots for one party were missing for most of the day.

According to calculations cited in PACE’s report, including the results from these stations could have put Prosperous Armenia over the threshold: which would have prevented Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party from achieving a three-fifth majority in parliament.

Losing this majority would prevent Civil Contract from appointing Constitutional Court judges independently and amending certain aspects of national electoral legislation. Even without Prosperous Armenia in parliament, Pashinyan still lacks the constitutional majority required to hold a referendum to amend the constitution, which he has repeatedly stated he wants to do.

Pashinyan’s Civil Contract wins parliamentary elections

The CEC declined to order a revote at the time, explaining that the invalidation did not affect the overall result. The PACE delegation described this justification as ‘very insufficient’ given the stakes.

RFE/RL reports that the CEC had previously justified their decision to hold the vote again on the basis that voters would already be aware of the number of votes each party needed to win. While the report acknowledges that the CEC cited a Venice Commission opinion on the risk of tactical voting in repeat polls, it notes that the commission’s opinion does not rule out a vote if the outcome would fundamentally change the allocation of seats.

To avoid such situations, the delegation recommends amending the electoral code to explicitly require the election to be re-held when it could fundamentally change the results.

Neither the CEC nor the government had responded to the observations. Prosperous Armenia welcomed the recommendations.

‘Of course the parliament has been formed, but this parliament will go down in history as the parliament that deprived one parliamentary faction of the chance to enter it. The historical fact has now been recorded. It is on record that, thanks to the arbitrariness of this particular government, Prosperous Armenia has been deprived of the opportunity to appear in parliament’, the party’s spokesperson Iveta Tonoyan told RFE/RL.

In July, Armenian authorities arrested Tsarukyan for alleged money laundering. He denied the charges and called them ‘fabricated’.

Armenian government faces uphill battle over new constitution following election results

Russian interference

The report states that the scale of Russian interference and foreign information operations was unprecedented for a Council of Europe member state. The report mentions several ways in which Russia tried to interfere, including restrictions on Armenian exports such as flowers, mineral water, and alcohol; threats to revise gas and oil supply terms; the demand from Eurasian Economic Union leaders that Armenia hold a referendum on choosing between the bloc and the EU; and Russian-linked information campaigns and threats against Armenian citizens and business owners. However, the delegation said allegations that tens of thousands of Russian-based Armenians would be brought in to vote remain unproven.

Observers also noted that Western leaders’ endorsement of the ruling party, including the US and French presidents, was perceived as interfering too, but the report describes these as far milder and non-coercive.

Abuse of administrative power

The PACE delegation noted significant ongoing gaps such as a lack of effective safeguards and proportionate sanctioning against administrative abuse. The delegation raised concerns about equal opportunities for political parties and stated that the campaign had become polarised. The delegation found that there were more than 200 investigations into suspected vote-buying, primarily targeting the opposition. This reinforced the perception of selective prosecution, and no convictions had been recorded by the time the report was written.

Employees in the public sector reported feeling pressured to attend rallies organised by the ruling party. Pre-election social measures, such as debt forgiveness and benefit increases, were seen as de facto campaign tools. While public television and key private broadcasters displayed a clear pro-government bias, other outlets were consistently critical of the government. The campaign also used AI-generated deepfakes.

Finally, the report noted an increase in voter turnout to 58.97%, up from 48.62% in 2018 and 49.40% in 2021. However, only 45% of polling stations were independently accessible to voters with disabilities. Observers recorded violations in around 44% of the observed precincts, primarily consisting of procedural errors, overcrowding, and breaches of secrecy.

Although the PACE 2021 report on the previous parliamentary elections did not have a single figure for violations, it stated that voting was rated positively in 98% of stations, with overcrowding in 14%, proxy or other interference in 6%,  and secrecy problems in 4%. The Prosecutor’s Office logged 319 election-day complaints.

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Armenia’s ruling party wins municipal elections uncontested

Boshkezenian Garik
OC Media
Sept 29, 2026
by Ani Ghulinyan

29 September 2026•2 min read

On Sunday, the Civil Contract party was re-elected in two of the four Armenian communities where municipal elections were held, having run uncontested. The opposition, which had promised to field candidates in the regional elections, did not do so.

In two other communities, the results have yet to be announced.

This fall, 19 areas will hold municipal elections, but the opposition isn’t contesting them widely. Strong Armenia will run only in Stepanavan, while in Hrazdan, Tsakhadzor, Martuni, Araks and Artashat the opposition will be represented by candidates from the Armenia Alliance.

Civil Contract’s candidate for the town of Tumanyan in Armenia’s Lori province, Suren Tumanyan, has been re-elected with 95.1% of the vote. He ran uncontested. In 2021 Tumanyan ran in the local elections on the opposition Republican Party list and defeated Civil Contract. He left the opposition party and joined the ruling party in 2026. He confirmed the move to Factor.am, without explaining why he left the Republican Party.

The ruling Civil Contract party often recruits popular candidates from other parties. In Goris, for example, Mayor Arush Arushanyan, a former vocal critic of the government who accused Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of losing Nagorno-Karabakh before, will ally with Civil Contract in the next elections.

Prior to the election, Pashinyan announced they would form an electoral alliance with Arushanyan’s Business Party. While Goris voters backed Civil Contract in the 2021 parliamentary election, they elected Arushanyan as mayor in the local vote that same year. Pashinyan said that the decision also reflects a wish to avoid renewed tensions in the community and added that similar ‘solidarity alliances’ could be formed in other communities.

Strong Armenia, the largest opposition force in parliament, won 26% in the Tumanyan community in June but fielded no candidate in its local election. The faction’s secretary, Tigran Abrahamyan, told Factor.am that the party will contest some local elections and skip others, focusing on communities where it sees a high chance of winning.

Tumanyan is the largest of the four communities holding elections, with a population of over 4,000. The council here is elected under the proportional system. Because Civil Contract was the only party standing, voters could only vote ‘for’ or ‘against,’ which meant the party needed more than half of the votes cast, with no minimum turnout thresholds. In Tumanyan, 2,390 of 2,520 participants voted for Civil Contract (95.1%), 123 voted against (4.9%), and seven ballots were invalid, according to Mkrtchyan.

On Sunday, Lermontovo in the Lori province, Ferik in Armavir, and Arzni in Kotayk also held local elections. In Lermontovo, Edik Chakhalyan, backed by Civil Contract, was re-elected community head with 96.6%, Governor Mkrtchyan announced.

In Ferik and Arzni, only the city council was elected. Ferik is a Yezidi-populated village where five people were nominated for five positions. At the time of writing, the Central Electoral Commission had not yet published the official results, but announced the voter turnout figures for Tumanyan (around 60%), Ferik (57%), Lermontovos (35%), and Arzni (45%).

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