Hundreds of French schools remain closed as student protests turn violent

World15:24, 2 October 2026
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French high school students lit fires outside schools and faced off with police on Friday as a protest movement that has forced the closure of some 400 establishments showed no sign of abating, France 24 reported.

The movement, which began last week in the Paris region and rapidly spread nationwide, has seen teenage pupils at lycées in their final years of schooling block access to buildings and clash with police.

The students say their school hours are excessively long, conditions inadequate and that there are too many staff absences.

The government says the grievances are legitimate but has condemned what it has described as “urban violence”.

Students have accused police of using excessive force and causing injuries by regularly firing tear gas canisters to disperse the protests.

Education Minister Edouard Geffray said “the high school student movement is being held hostage by ultra-violent fringe groups,” adding that nearly 400 high schools out of the 3,700 in the country were expected to be closed on Friday.

Many high schools have also planned to conduct classes remotely, particularly in the southern city of Marseille.

At least 65 staff members have been injured – including 40 high school principals – since the start of the movement, Geffray told BFMTV. Some 170 students have been wounded while over 100 high schools have suffered “severe damage”.

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Child survives fall from tenth floor in China

China20:39, 2 October 2026
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A three-year-old boy has survived a fall from the tenth floor of a building in Guiyang, south-western China, the Sina news portal reported.

“A three-year-old boy accidentally fell from the tenth floor of a building in Guiyang. Fortunately, his fall was broken by the awning of a fruit shop below,” the report said.

According to the portal, the boy was bleeding from his mouth and nose after the fall but remained conscious and even smiled at passers-by. He was taken to hospital, where no fractures or internal injuries were found.

The shop’s awning was damaged, but the owner did not seek compensation.

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Expert says Gulf countries will try to persuade U.S., Iran to implement Islama

Analytical11:10, 2 October 2026
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Iranian studies expert Nver Davtyan believes that it is unlikely that new activity will be observed in the Iranian-American conflict before the midterm elections scheduled in the United States.

He does not rule out that there will be some positive messages regarding a temporary settlement.

In an interview with Armenpress, Davtyan addressed the current phase of the conflict, the negotiations held in New York, and the latest sanctions imposed on the Iranian side.

“The most important event in the current phase of the settlement of the Iranian-American conflict was the seven-point proposal of the Iranian side, conveyed to the American side within the framework of the UN General Assembly. The preconditions, the main one of which concerns the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, are built on the basis of the Islamabad Agreement signed between the United States and Iran. As far as is known, the American side has not yet agreed to these preconditions following the brief meeting in New York. As for the wartime situation, all manifestations of hybrid warfare, except for active military operations, are still present in the propaganda, economic, political, legal and other spheres,” Davtyan said.

According to his observation, energy issues and the topic of sanctions are also relevant. According to the Iranian studies expert, noteworthy was the package of sanctions recently imposed by the United States, under which the American side urged countries in the Middle East region not to accept Iranian flights. However, not all countries intend to do so because they are guided by strategic, political, economic or other interests in maintaining bilateral relations with Iran.

According to Davtyan, the Iranian-American conflict may also have various manifestations of influence on the countries of the region going forward, as each state has its own level of relations with Iran. There are countries with which Iran develops strategic and security ties, and with some others, economic ties.

“For example, flights to Iraq had not been operated for a long time, and the pressure in that Arab country was quite strong, but nevertheless, it was predictable that flights would be restored either to Baghdad or to Najaf. In the Afghan direction, the Taliban have stated that flights with Iran will not be interrupted. Pakistan has also adopted such an approach. There are reports that flights to Tajikistan have even been maintained via the Turkmen route. Flights to Armenia and Türkiye are also continuing. Meanwhile, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency has extended its warning until November 16, which means that this remains a risk zone,” he said.

Davtyan added that despite the maritime blockade, the Iranian railway is operating under heavy load. The volume of rail transportation to China through Central Asia has increased approximately tenfold. In addition, overland road freight transportation has also increased. Of course, there are problems both in financial and economic terms and in terms of logistics, but the situation is not critical.

Addressing the question of what lessons the Gulf countries have learned from the Iranian-American conflict, the Iranian studies expert emphasized that the latest noteworthy event in this regard was the visit of the Israeli Prime Minister to the UAE. According to him, certain attempts are presumed to be underway to inspire confidence in the countries of the region, form some kind of coalition, or carry out joint actions, but nevertheless, in addition to political willingness, the Gulf states must have appropriate military resources.

“For example, during the hostilities between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, it became clearly apparent that the Saudi army was unable to fulfill the tasks assigned to it. Under such conditions, when one of the leading countries in the region is in such a situation, would the others dare to enter into a confrontation with Iran? It is unequivocal that they should avoid this and try to persuade the United States and Iran to find common ground, implement the Islamabad Memorandum, or accept the seven-point proposal presented by Iran. Pakistan and Türkiye are demonstrating more active mediation initiatives so that the crisis does not deepen further,” Davtyan said.

Asked whether the Strait of Hormuz will remain closed for a long time, the Iranian studies expert stressed that this will depend on how the United States reacts to or responds to the Iranian side’s proposal.

“We are dealing with another reality: previously, under conditions of free navigation through the strait, a certain number of ships were sailing. At present, although movement is severely limited, traffic is not completely closed. For countries opposing Iran, the Strait of Hormuz is closed, but there is also an alternative option agreed between Iran and Oman, which envisages a new route, although Iranian control there is also predominant. How long the current situation will persist depends on developments in the political conjuncture,” the Iranian studies expert concluded.

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Pashinyan says Armenia committed to cooperation within EAEU

Aysor, Armenia
Oct 2, 2026

Armenia has repeatedly reaffirmed its readiness to continue mutually beneficial cooperation within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said during the extended-format meeting of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council.

Pashinyan participated in the meeting remotely.

“We have repeatedly reaffirmed Armenia’s readiness to continue mutually beneficial cooperation within the EAEU, aimed at strengthening economic stability and ensuring the sustainable development of the broader region,” he said.

Pashinyan also emphasized the importance of Armenia’s integration into the international railway network and noted that he had discussed the unblocking of regional transport links with his partners.

“During the restricted-format meeting, I informed my colleagues about certain nuances regarding the process of unblocking regional transport links – developments arising from the establishment of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. We anticipate specific decisions that will, in particular, lead to increased efficiency in Armenia’s railway system,” the Prime Minister said.

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Armenia wins first Medal of Excellence at WorldSkills Shanghai 2026

Public Radio of Armenia
Oct 1, 2026

Armenia has won its first-ever medal at the WorldSkills International competition, with Armenian contestant Arsen Armenakyan receiving a Medal of Excellence at WorldSkills Shanghai 2026.

The 48th WorldSkills International competition has concluded in Shanghai, China, where Armenia was represented by a national team competing in three skill categories: Cooking, Mobile Applications Development, and Fashion Technology.

Arsen Armenakyan, a graduate of the Yerevan State College of Vocational Education, earned the Medal of Excellence in Cooking under the guidance of expert coach Arbi Gharakhanyan. The achievement marks the first medal won by Armenia in the history of its participation in WorldSkills competitions. Armenia has taken part in the international competition six times.

Armenakyan was also named the Armenian national team’s Best of Nation.

Other members of the Armenian team also posted strong results. Aramayis Hayrapetyan, a student at the Yerevan State College of Informatics who competed in Mobile Applications Development, finished just 14 points short of a Medal of Excellence. Louise Zakaryan, a student at the French-Armenian Vocational Training Center competing in Fashion Technology, was 37 points short of the distinction.

The Armenian representatives were selected based on the results of a national skills competition.

Participation in WorldSkills is significant not only for the competitive achievements of participants and experts, but also for international professional cooperation, exchange of experience, and the study of new approaches in vocational education and training.

Armenia has been a member of WorldSkills International since 2012, represented by the National Center for Vocational Education and Training Development, which coordinates the country’s membership and related activities.

Armenia was also represented by an official delegation at the competition. Siranush Meloyan, Head of the Vocational Education and Training Policy Development and Strategy Division at the Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sports, participated as an official observer.

A three-day conference on vocational education and training was also held as part of WorldSkills Shanghai 2026. Discussions focused on skills development, the impact of artificial intelligence on educational processes, the development of vocational education in response to changing labor-market demands, the expansion of international cooperation, and other issues related to the VET sector.

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Armenia village shooting victim’s sister: After shooting, Azerbaijani wanted

News.am, Armenia
Oct 2, 2026

Armenia village shooting victim’s sister: After shooting, Azerbaijani wanted to reload the machine gun, my sister managed to hit him

Arpi Avetisyan, the sister of the woman who was shot in the leg by an Azerbaijani soldier who had entered a house in Shaki village of Sisian community of Armenia’s Syunik Province, told Armenian News-NEWS.am details of the incident.

“My sister is the director of a hotel restaurant in Sisian, the children go to Shaki’s school, after class they come to Shaki’s house, her husband goes again, picks them up, takes them to Sisian.

The children come [to the house], they see that the lock on the gate is broken. The girl calls, says, ‘Mom, the lock is broken, someone has entered the house.’ At that moment, she did not turn off the phone, while talking like that, she entered, saw the kitchen was completely cluttered, he [i.e. the Azerbaijani soldier] made food there and ate. They entered [the house], they saw him lying there with a machine gun in his hand. He reached the children, the children shouted, ‘Don’t touch, don’t hit.’ The mother heard it on the phone. My sister took the knife, she and her husband reached the village.

She arrived, saw that the gate was closed, she entered from the neighbor’s side, jumped over the wall, and passed. She says, ‘I went inside, the children shouted, ‘Mom, don’t come forward, he’s armed.’ She says, ‘What’s going to happen, the children are inside with an armed man.’ She says, ‘I didn’t even look, how I went forward?’ When she saw him, he got perplexed, held the weapon towards the child to shoot, my sister held her hand in front of the child, he hit her fingers, now three of her fingers are gone. The tips of the two fingers next to the little finger are amputated, and her thumb.

Then he shot her in the leg. At that moment, the cartridges ran out, he wanted to reload, at that moment my sister managed in that wounded state, struck several times with a knife to the neck, chest, head. At that moment, my sister was bleeding, weak, she fell, he attacked her again; whether he hit her again or with a weapon, I don’t know. She says, ‘I don’t remember anymore,’ she fainted.

At that moment, the 15-year-old boy, Kajik, who saw his mother faint, punched the Azerbaijani in the head; the child’s fingers were broken from that blow. The little finger was operated on at 3:30[am], and regarding the other fingers, they said that they would recover on their own. She is now in the Sisian hospital, my sister is here, too,” Arpi Avetisyan said.

She added that the 12-year-old daughter, Rozi, is scared. “The psychologists talked, calmed her down, now the older boy and sister are together, my aunt is with them, and her husband is with the boy in the Sisian hospital.”

Arpi Avetisyan noted that in two days it will be clear whether or not her sister will be operated on, and she is now in the intensive care unit. “A [blood] vessel was damaged, she has multiple fractures above the knee.”

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Armenia turns black and white: the new Juventus Academy officially opens

Juventus
Oct 2, 2026
Armenia turns black and white: the new Juventus Academy officially opens

On Wednesday, 30 September, Juventus Academy Armenia was officially inaugurated: a project of significant sporting and educational value that brings the Club’s methodology and values to the country.

Announced in September 2025 in the presence of David Trezeguet, the project officially got underway with a high-profile inaugural ceremony. The event was attended by leading representatives of Armenian institutions and UEFA, the presidents of the Armenian and Georgian Football Federations, Peter Silverstone, Chief Business Officer of Juventus, and Juventus legend Fabrizio Ravanelli.

In his speech, Peter Silverstone highlighted the core values behind the initiative and the contribution of the Italian coaches, while also emphasizing the important work done by the local partner to build top-level facilities in a short time frame.

From its earliest stages, the project has generated extraordinary enthusiasm and has already welcomed around 700 boys and girls. The young players’ technical and personal development will be guided by a team of 14 Italian coaches, ready to share the Club’s methodology and values.

The Academy operates across two centres of excellence, both equipped with high-level facilities designed to provide a complete development experience:

  • Avan Complex: a modern, multifunctional centre featuring one 11-a-side artificial turf pitch, one 9-a-side artificial turf pitch, and two 7-a-side artificial turf pitches, along with two 5-a-side artificial turf pitches on the rooftop. The complex also includes a fully equipped gym, 20 apartments, an operational nursery and kindergarten, as well as a bar and restaurant area.
  • Hrazdan Complex: an iconic venue featuring a main stadium with a capacity of approximately 1,500 seats and suites, one full-size 11-a-side natural grass pitch, one 9-a-side pitch, and one 5-a-side artificial turf pitch. Once completed, the complex will also include a hotel and a medical centre.

With this opening, Armenia is not simply inaugurating new football pitches: it is bringing to life the dreams of hundreds of young players, ready to take to the field and write an exciting new chapter in the black and white story together.

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Revolution or No Revolution

The Nation
Oct 2, 2026

Revolution or No Revolution

Eight years after Armenia’s “Velvet Revolution,” Nikol Pashinyan’s government has deepened the country’s neoliberal trajectory while reorienting Armenia toward the West.

Pietro A. Shakarian

This September 2026 marked the third anniversary of Azerbaijan’s ethnic cleansing of the region of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh). For Armenian society, the displacement of some 150,000 indigenous Karabakh Armenians was painful enough. Yet, in early September, several Western diplomats compounded matters by participating in a Baku-backed tour of the recently ethnically cleansed Artsakh. As investigative journalist Lindsey Snell reports, among those present were top EU diplomats and representatives of the Trump administration, including the US chargé d’affaires in Baku, Amy Carlon. While several Western diplomats danced to the tune of Azerbaijani nationalist hymns, others frivolously laughed when Hikmet Hajijev, the NATO-trained adviser of Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, cynically cracked jokes about threatened Armenian cultural heritage. Amid this ghoulish danse macabre, the visiting diplomats uncritically accepted official Azerbaijani talking points, framing the historic Armenian Gandzasar and Dadivank monasteries as “Caucasian Albanian.”

The outrage in Armenian society was palpable, but Western capitals responded only with the usual diplomatic generalities. It is unlikely that any Western government will seriously try to hold Baku accountable for its crimes or its wildly neo-fascist rhetoric. Azerbaijan is a close ally of Israel and Turkey. Its longtime despot President Aliyev is a good friend of President Trump. Western interests in the country are driven by cold geopolitical calculations. The prospect of a “Nagorno-Karabakh without Armenians” has long tickled the fancy of American neocons, in their quest to “check” Moscow and Tehran in the strategic Caucasus and to secure an energy corridor to Central Asia. None of this should be surprising to the experienced observer. What has surprised many is that the ethnic cleansing had the tacit approval of the current Armenian government of Nikol Pashinyan, as part of its effort to reorient the country toward the West.

Pashinyan rose to power in the 2018 “Velvet Revolution” on promises of delivering a more just and equitable future for the Armenian people. At that time, he espoused what some deemed to be a “hard-line” stance on the Karabakh question. However, Pashinyan had in fact long viewed the people of Nagorno-Karabakh as an “albatross” hanging over Armenia that needed to be “discarded” in order to move the country away from Moscow and Tehran, and closer to NATO. In a complete turnaround from his 2018 stance, Pashinyan revealed his true sentiments in Prague in October 2022, when he officially recognized the mountainous region as a part of Azerbaijan, against the democratic will of the Karabakh Armenians. Pashinyan’s denial of the province’s self-determination reflects his larger denial of the democratic legacies of the Karabakh movement that emerged during Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika. It likewise provides a departure point for a much more pointed question: Was the “revolution” of 2018 really a “revolution” at all?

Much of Armenia’s troubles have their roots in the “original sin” of the post-Soviet condition of the 1990s. Following the dissolution of the Soviet state, the Armenian republic successfully assisted the Karabakh Armenians in their struggle for independence from Azerbaijan. At the same time, the country suffered from the classical maladies that afflicted the post-Soviet space in the “dark and cold years” of the “wild ’90s.” Corrupt privatization, oligarchy, shock-therapy capitalism, and staggering inequality were the order of the day. The “revolution” in Armenia promised to remedy these afflictions. Yet, as in so many other post-Soviet “color revolutions,” the events of 2018 only exacerbated these ills.

As Volodymyr Ishchenko and Oleg Zhuravlev astutely argued, post-Soviet “revolutions” such as Armenia’s can best be described as “deficient revolutions” that only reinforce the post-Soviet crisis of political representation. Indeed, the question arises as to whether such “revolutions” can even be described as such at all. Unlike the classical revolutions of world history—the American, the French, the Russian, the Chinese, etc.—the 2018 events in Armenia, much like other post-Soviet “color revolutions,” did not represent a fundamental break or change from what came before. Instead, they merely signified the replacement of an old elite with a new one. The “party of power” structure of the former ruling Republican Party was merely replaced by that of Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party, with all the attendant abuses of administrative resources and political power imaginable. “Even the discourse on the government’s supposed ‘popularity’ is itself a red herring,” says Nare Navasardyan, an activist in Yerevan affiliated with the Aknandakan (“Eye for an Eye”) documentary artists’ collective. “The mechanisms of power in this country are not democratic will and popular participation but electoral fraud, bribery, and intimidation, overtly supported by Western patronage and capital.”

Unlike the classical revolutions of world history, the 2018 events in Armenia also lacked a clearly articulated set of revolutionary ideas. There was no Thomas Paine, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, or Vladimir Lenin on hand to pen a blueprint for social revolution, something that the Armenians possessed in earlier times, with writers like Mikayel Nalbandyan or Stepan Shahumyan. No, this “revolution” was only informed by the same vague neoliberal talking points about “corruption” and “freedom” that were also espoused in Ukraine in 2014 and in Georgia in 2003. In fact, the new elites who rose to power in Yerevan in 2018 were even more wedded to the gospel of neoliberalism than any of the earlier post-Soviet Armenian governments. “This is not a revolution in the classical sense,” argues Eva Hakobyan of the democratic socialist group Jaragayt. “It has not brought about any fundamental changes to the economic system. Instead, Pashinyan seeks to replace the traditional pillars of Armenian identity with a service-oriented, consumerist society, in line with radically neoliberal and increasingly far-right economic policies.”

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Much like President Trump and Argentina’s Javier Milei, Pashinyan played the populist card, employing progressive talking points to deceive the public and mask a deeply exploitative monetarist agenda. Rather than deliver on promises of democratization, the new government has engaged in a systematic de-democratization of the country. Poverty, inequality, and labor rights remain woefully unaddressed, while political opponents are routinely pressured, harassed, and often jailed. The judiciary lacks independence. An unprecedented campaign is underway to subordinate the Armenian Apostolic Church to state authority and to put Catholicos Karekin II on trial in a move widely perceived by most Armenians to be a national shame. Despite proclaimed promises of “peace,” the country faces severe security threats and creeping territorial claims from an aggressive Azerbaijan.

In 2018, Pashinyan and his team had likewise pledged that the “revolution” had “no geopolitical context“ and that Armenia would retain its traditional balance between East and West. In fact, they quickly dropped such pretenses and reoriented the country toward NATO, while betraying the innocents of Artsakh to the diktat of Baku. Swimming against the current of history, Pashinyan seems particularly intent on bringing Armenia into the EU, despite the manifold crises now facing the 27-member bloc. Overall, Armenia’s false choice of “East vs. West” is not the invention of Russia, Iran, China, or some overzealous Western journalists. No, it is the creation of Armenia’s new comprador elites, who owe their position to a constellation of Western war hawks and corporate plutocrats.

The government’s most recent endeavors only underscore this reality. In the Armenian town of Hrazdan, it has inaugurated a new Firebird AI data center, raising concern among local activists over the potential environmental impact of such a project. In the south, on the Iranian border, President Trump’s TRIPP corridor, wholeheartedly backed by Pashinyan, envisions the country ceding part of its sovereign territory to a private US company for some 49 to 99 years. Most recently, the Armenian press revealed the architect of TRIPP to be Trump loyalist Aryeh Lightstone, a man who, through his role in the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, is directly complicit in the Gaza genocide. Thus, the traditional threats facing Armenia from Turkey and Azerbaijan are now amplified by new neocolonial threats coming from the Trump administration and its allies.

On balance, the record of the Pashinyan government hardly looks “revolutionary,” let alone “democratic.” Indeed, it is often said in Yerevan that two Armenias coexist today—the Armenia of the ruling elite, constantly grabbing headlines with its various inane controversies, and the Armenia of the people, struggling to simply make ends meet. Unsurprisingly, the same can be said of Trump’s America today as well. As for the EU, the recent dance of its diplomats in ethnically cleansed Artsakh has come to symbolize the decline of the West itself. Truly, in the age of Trumpism, one would not be surprised to one day see Western elites follow their “performance” in Artsakh with yet another danse macabre in Gaza, Minab, or Havana.

Pietro A. Shakarian

Pietro A. Shakarian is a historian and a lecturer in history at the American University of Armenia in Yerevan. A native of Cleveland, Ohio, Dr. Shakarian was previously a postdoctoral fellow at the Centre for Historical Research at the National Research University–Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg.

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Iran, Armenia Push to Ease Nordooz Border Bottlenecks

Financial Tribune
Oct 2, 2026

At the Nordooz border terminal, Iranian and Armenian officials sat down this week to tackle the practical hurdles slowing trade between their countries. Reza Akbari, Iran’s deputy minister of transport and urban development and head of the Road Maintenance and Transportation Organization, led the Iranian side, while Armenia’s deputy minister of infrastructure and territorial management joined the talks. The agenda was clear: make the border work faster and smoother.

Both sides agreed to expand transport and transit cooperation, strengthen their roles in regional trade corridors, and identify obstacles that delay commercial traffic. Discussions covered increasing border exchange capacity, improving services at official crossings, facilitating the movement of commercial fleets, and upgrading logistics infrastructure and border hinterlands.

Officials described the talks as part of a broader effort to deepen logistical ties and make the most of existing infrastructure. In follow-up efforts, Tehran and Yerevan will work to cut border and customs clearance times, raise terminal efficiency, and boost regional transit capacity. Nordooz, one of the key crossings linking the two neighbors, holds significant potential for expanding trade and transit.

The meeting signals a shared push to turn that potential into real traffic and stronger economic ties. The two sides pledged to keep working together.

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TCHAKAROV: Armenia’s export shock

Intellinews
Oct 2, 2026
By Ivan Tchakarov of GlobalSource Partners October 2, 2026

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s statement that “If peppers are spoiling, I’ll pay for those peppers. If roses are spoiling, I’ll pay for them, too” was an emotionally-charged outburst that was tied to the restrictions imposed by Russia on a number of Armenian agricultural exports in May. With about three months since these sanctions were levied, we have some hard data to assess how effective they have been or, taking Yerevan’s point of view, how successful Armenia has been in diverting agricultural trade to other destinations.

From shock to adaptation

The key number I look is what I call the replacement ratio, i.e., the increase in exports to non-Russian destinations divided by the volume of lost exports to Russia. On that measure, Armenia replaced only 15% of lost Russian fresh-produce volume in June, the first full month of disruption. However, July saw a meaningful improvement to 48.5% and provisional August data points to a something in the 37-47% range.

The improvement is definitely not trivial. It shows that agricultural exporters were able to react reasonably quickly, find alternative export destinations and redirect at least part of their produce. It is also true, however, that a significant portion of the former Russian business remains unreplaced. If we take June and July together, Russia-bound shipments in the critical fresh-produce basket fell by 56,282 tonnes (Table 1). Additional shipments to other markets rose by 17,987 tonnes. In other words, only 32% of the Russian loss was replaced, leaving roughly 38,300 tonnes — or 68% of the lost Russian volume — unfilled.

The maths behind that calculation is important to catch. Simply looking at total non-Russia exports would exaggerate the adjustment because some of those exports existed before the onset of the export shock. What matters is the incremental volume that was gained after the imposition of restrictions.

The July rebound was for real as fresh-produce exports rose to 17,183 tonnes from 8,070 tonnes in June. More importantly, the total export shortfall versus the same month of 2025 narrowed sharply, while additional non-Russia exports climbed to about 13,800 tonnes. Non-Russia exports in July were roughly five times larger than the corresponding period of last year.

Table 1: About 32% of lost fresh produce exports to Russia were replaced over June-July

The apricot problem

But the aggregate numbers also conceal exceptional concentration.

Peaches, nectarines and sweet cherries performed exceptionally well. In July, additional exports to non-Russian destinations were actually larger than the volumes lost to Russia, producing replacement ratios above 100%. Total shipments of those products were also around 30% above their July 2025 levels.

Apricots told the opposite story — and it dominated the overall result

Apricot exports dropped from 42,902 tonnes in June-July 2025 to 10,376 tonnes during the same of period of 2026. That 32,527-tonne decline accounted for a hefty 85% of the net fresh-produce shortfall. Tomatoes and plums/cherry plums added most of the remaining weakness.

There could be an important catch here as the apricot collapse may not be entirely about Russia. Armenia’s economy minister pointed to frost, hail and heavy rain as reasons for a weaker harvest. A useful sensitivity test adds some weight to that argument: excluding apricots raises the June-July replacement ratio from 32% to 70%, and July’s ratio to 76%.

But that does not make the Russian restrictions irrelevant. Rather, two shocks appear to be overlapping: a market-access shock and a supply shock. It is, however, hard to disentangle the two effects without an independent harvest data.

Diversification — but where?

The geography of new export destinations is equally revealing for interpreting the results. Armenia is diversifying, but mostly within its broader (CIS) region, rather than making a dramatic leap into high-income Western markets.

Georgia and Uzbekistan together accounted for 66.5% of the incremental non-Russia gain in June-July (Table 2). Add Ukraine and the share rises to 82.4%. Uzbekistan was the largest destination by 2026 fresh-produce volume in the data, with Georgia generating the largest incremental increase.

The EU, by contrast, accounted for only 4.1% of the incremental gain.

That could potentially change. The EU has already moved to provide temporary trade preferences for Armenian products following Russia’s 2026 restrictions, potentially improving access to the European market.

But for now, Armenia’s export adaptation is overwhelmingly a regional story, not yet a European one.

There are also sectors where adaptation has been far less robust. Flowers, for example, look superficially stable in absolute shipments as the July’s replacement ratio was a mere 8.1%. Fish is even more concerning: exports fell from 823 tonnes in July 2025 to just 64 tonnes in July 2026, with additional non-Russia shipments replacing a paltry 6.1% of the Russian shortfall. A 60-tonne shipment of fish and products to the UAE announced in early September is encouraging, but still far too small and recent to talk about a durable alternative market.

Table 2: Uzbekistan, Georgia and Ukraine account for 82.4% of all incremental gain in fresh-produce exports

The investor takeaway: volume is not revenue

The central message may be one of partial adaptation without full diversification. The data weaken a claim that Armenian exporters cannot find alternative export destinations. Equally, they fail to support a claim that the Russian market has already been replaced or that the Russia-related trade risk can be removed from consideration.

Exporters have shown decent flexibility, and the improvement from June to July has been reasonably large. August, while incomplete, does not suggest that this adaptation suddenly reversed.

But there is an important catch: volume is not revenue. Exporters may be selling into new markets at different prices and with higher freight, spoilage, financing and working-capital costs. Government compensation may also affect the economics. A tonne redirected to Georgia, Uzbekistan or the UAE is not necessarily economically equivalent to a tonne previously sold in Russia. That makes it dangerous to translate the 32% volume replacement ratio mechanically into an equivalent recovery in export earnings.

This is precisely why the Russian market cannot yet be treated as “replaced” in any meaningful sense.

The most defensible conclusion then is somewhere in between the two extremes. Armenia has certainly demonstrated better capacity to re-route exports than the initial shock suggested. On the other hand, the adjustment is not yet fully realised, since it is rather localised in few products and very dependent on regional markets.

The Russia-related trade risks may have become a little less for now, but to say that they no longer exist at all would certainly be too early. The next test that lies ahead could perhaps be the most crucial one – whether the new trade routes of trade will stand the test of time or not.

Ivan Tchakarov is partner for the Caucasus and Central Asia at GlobalSource Partners.


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