Turkish Press: Armenia expects Turkey border to reopen as route linking Azerba

Turkish Minute
Oct 7, 2026

Armenia expects its border with Turkey to reopen in the near future as plans advance for a transport route through Armenia connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan, a part of Azerbaijan separated from the rest of the country by Armenian territory, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said Tuesday in Armenia’s capital of Yerevan.

Pashinyan also said Armenia expects rail links with Turkey and Azerbaijan to be restored as regional transport connections develop.

He made the remarks at the Armenia-United Kingdom Business Forum, where he discussed the implementation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), the planned connection through Armenia’s southern Syunik province.

Armenian officials expect construction related to TRIPP in Syunik to begin early next year. The project is intended to create a new transport connection across the South Caucasus as Armenia and Azerbaijan move forward with their peace process.

“Armenia and our region are undergoing a transformation associated with the peace established between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the developments resulting from it,” Pashinyan said. He added that work was underway to begin implementing TRIPP on the ground.

Pashinyan said investment interest in Armenia was already increasing but did not give a specific date for reopening the border with Turkey or restoring rail connections with Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan said at the forum that the opening of transport infrastructure in the South Caucasus could create new economic opportunities and expand cooperation between Armenia and its international partners. He also discussed TRIPP’s role in expanding regional connectivity, according to Armenia’s Foreign Ministry.

Turkey and Armenia have no diplomatic relations, and their land border has been closed to regular traffic since 1993. The two countries began a new process of normalization in 2021, but regular border crossings have not resumed. Armenia and Azerbaijan have also been working toward a peace agreement following decades of conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, which is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan.

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Beyond the Mono-Alliance: Armenia’s Search for Strategic Alternatives

Oct 8, 2026

Elijah Novak 

Staff Writer 

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Kyrgyzstan, a clash occurred between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin over the possibility of a referendum in support of Armenia integrating into the European Union, reports OC Media. President Putin said such aspirations would directly oppose Armenia’s current place in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Russian-led economic bloc that includes several post-Soviet states. 

This clash was the Armenian government’s most recent move to signal its desire to move away from its previous Russian-dominated foreign relations. This suggests Armenia is moving away from a Russia-dominated foreign policy toward a more diversified, multipolar one. Yet, why now, and what does this indicate for Armenia’s future? 

Since Prime Minister Pashinyan and his Civil Contract Party’s victory over Pro-Russian Parties in June, Armenia’s long-term relationship with Russia has changed, reports Carnegie REC. For years, the Armenian-Russian alliance was held by the promise of security guarantees on behalf of Moscow, but those guarantees have faltered before. 

In 2023, Azerbaijan launched an offensive, annexing the Armenian exclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, and has since held it. Despite Russia’s security commitments in the region, Russian peacekeepers did not prevent Azerbaijan from taking control of the territory. The subsequent exodus of more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians provoked widespread anger toward Russia in Armenia and contributed to growing doubts about Moscow’s reliability as a security partner, reports the Washington Post. 

The unmasking of Russian security guarantees as limited and exception-laden has since raised several issues between the two states. Armenia’s openness to a more multipolar world view outside Russian dominance is clearest in its recent desire for the Russian subsidiary, South Caucasus Railways, to sell its maintenance rights to a third-party nation. South Caucasus Railways has held the rights to the network since 2008 and holds a 30-year contract with a possible 10-year extension, but the rail line’s condition illustrates the difficulty. The outdated rail, with areas in need of major maintenance, is not being managed properly, and international investors are hesitant to invest in Armenia as a logistics hub because of its rail network’s ties to heavily sanctioned Russian Companies, reports OC Media. 

So what is Armenia’s future? Prime Minister Pashinyan has indicated that “in the near future,” Armenia will hold a referendum on EU integration. The European pathway has also found support from the Union itself. Recently, the EU dropped 80 percent of the tariffs it had on Armenian goods, displaying Brussels’ support for strengthening ties between the Union and Armenia, reports CEPA. 

Tightening ties with the United States has also been a tactic Prime Minister Pashinyan has used to challenge the previous mono-alliance worldview. He openly supports the TRIPP, the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, negotiated in 2025, with a heavy focus on economic and logistical infrastructure buildup across Türkiye, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Armenia’s desire to diversify its finances and investments is fueled by its support for Trump’s peace plan in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan and Türkiye are signaling a shift away from a foreign policy guided by security guarantees and toward economic cooperation and development, according to Foreign Policy. 

Recent tensions between Armenian and Russian leadership have raised renewed questions about the future of Russia’s military presence in Armenia. In September 2026, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reiterated that Armenia had never formally requested the withdrawal of Russia’s 102nd Military Base in Gyumri, while stating that Armenia would not object if Russia itself decided to withdraw the base, reports JAM News.

Despite its growing engagement with Western partners, Armenia has expanded defense cooperation with China. In September 2026, the Armenian Defense Minister met his Chinese counterpart to discuss the future of the two nations’ military and defense relationship. The meetings included talks with leading defense industry officials and suggested possible new supply pathways, Armenian Mirror-Spear reports. Rather than a straightforward replacement of Russia with China, these developments reflect Armenia’s greater effort to diversify its defense partnerships as it reviews its long-standing reliance on Russian military structures.

Armenia’s foreign-policy shift signals a new period in the country’s attempt to navigate towards a more multipolar region. Its navigation and opening to the world, away from a Russian-dominated sphere of influence, offer challenges and obstacles for the region and the future of the country.


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‘No right to enter classroom’: Teacher beats pupil at Armenian school

JAM News
Oct 8, 2026
  • JAMnews
  • Yerevan

A video showing a teacher beating a second-grade pupil at a school in the Armenian village of Vardadzor has shocked people across Armenia. A relative of the girl told journalists that she was so frightened by the incident that she had refused to return to school.

The girl’s parents appealed to the Gegharkunik regional administration, demanding that the teacher be dismissed. However, they were told that this would only be possible if complaints were filed by at least seven parents.

Social media users responding to the video called on the Interior Ministry to investigate the incident and launch criminal proceedings.

The Education Ministry said it had contacted the Interior Ministry, the Education Inspectorate and the National Centre for Educational and Psychological Support to ensure a thorough investigation.

“Relevant legal procedures will begin shortly to strip this teacher of the right to teach,” the ministry said.

Armenia’s Human Rights Defender, Anahit Manasyan, described the violence against the schoolgirl as “unacceptable and deeply concerning”.

The Investigative Committee opened a criminal case over allegations of “inflicting severe physical pain or serious mental suffering on a minor”.

By the time of publication, reports had emerged that the teacher had been detained.


  • Shortage of sign language interpreters leaves deaf Armenians without access to education
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  • ‘Parent hour’ and flexible schedules: Armenia changes labour code

What happened

A relative of the second-grade pupil told Shamshyan.com that the class teacher had first beaten the girl in the classroom. The violence continued in the corridor after the pupil left the classroom. The girl returned home with swollen eyes and marks from the blows on her neck and arms.

“There had been slaps before, but never beatings like this – with hands and a pointer,” the relative said.

The girl has not attended school since the incident. According to family members, she later encountered the teacher by chance in the street and ran home in terror.

The girl’s mother said she did not want the teacher to face criminal prosecution but insisted that she be dismissed.

Armenian media reported that the incident was discussed at the school the following day.

“The teacher admits her guilt. She submitted a written statement acknowledging what she had done and asked not to be punished. As a result, I issued her a written reprimand,” school headteacher Gevorg Nersesyan said.

He also said such incidents were unacceptable and expressed surprise that a teacher with 30 years of experience could have treated a second-grade pupil in this way.

‘Polite children are seen as weak’: violence among teenagers on rise in Armenia

What is happening in schools: the story of a mother and her 15-year-old son. An expert explains the situation and suggests ways to address it.

‘Schools must be a safe environment for children’

Armenia’s Human Rights Defender, Anahit Manasyan, stressed that schools must provide a safe environment for children.

“Any form of violence against a child or any other form of inappropriate treatment is fundamentally incompatible with respect for the child’s dignity, safety and rights,” she said.

According to Manasyan, children must be protected not only through responses to individual incidents, but also through effective measures to prevent and address potential cases of violence.

Manasyan also questioned the effectiveness of mechanisms designed to protect pupils in schools, particularly the work of pupil protection groups.

“The effectiveness of these mechanisms should be assessed primarily on the basis of how they work in practice,” she said.

Pupil protection groups were established in all schools on 1 September 2026 by order of the Minister of Education, Science, Culture and Sport. They were specifically set up to prevent violence, bullying and other high-risk situations. Following the incident at the school in Vardadzor, the pupil protection group held a meeting. However, according to the girl’s relatives, no steps were taken to help her return to school.

The Office of the Human Rights Defender said it had launched an investigation into the incident.

What makes Armenian migrants return home: personal stories

Recently many have been returning to Armenia, but few talk about the reasons

Not the first case of violence since start of school year

Two weeks ago, a maths teacher at a school in the village of Berdavan in Armenia’s Tavush region slapped a 13-year-old boy across the face. He also pushed the pupil, forcibly made him sit at his desk and hit him on the head with a notebook, striking the child’s eye with its edge.

According to the boy’s mother, the teacher’s wife, who is the school’s deputy headteacher, also treated him harshly. She slapped him across the face, pushed him into her office and made him stand in the corner.

Although the boy continues to attend school, his mother told journalists that he had been left psychologically distressed by the incident.

The teacher has also been charged with “inflicting severe physical pain or serious mental suffering on a minor”. He has been released on an undertaking not to leave the country and suspended from his duties.

‘Major cause for concern’: expert view on Armenian school students’ low level of knowledge

According to an OECD study, 15-year-old Armenian school students rank last in the region in terms of their level of knowledge, particularly in mathematics, science and their ability to analyse what they read. Comment

“A written reprimand is not enough. A teacher like this should be barred from working in education.”

“If people like this were prosecuted, teachers would think twice before raising a hand against someone else’s child.”

“Someone who displays such aggressive and unacceptable behaviour simply has no right to call themselves a teacher. What can such a person teach children – respect, kindness or compassion for others?“

“If a similar incident had happened in Germany, for example, the teacher could have faced up to five years in prison. Moreover, if the headteacher had seen the footage – had seen a child being beaten – but failed to take appropriate action, questions would also arise about his professional responsibility.“

“If the teacher behaves so brazenly in front of a camera, it is frightening to imagine what she might have done in a classroom without cameras. She should be dismissed, made to apologise to the child and permanently banned from teaching.”

“The situation is much the same in almost every school. In some, there is physical violence; in others, psychological pressure; and in some, children are simply ignored. At parents’ request, cameras should be installed not only in school corridors but also in classrooms.”

“When such incidents become public, headteachers condemn the teacher’s actions and express utter surprise that someone with more than 30 years of teaching experience could behave this way. But before things reach that point, when we ask for cameras to be installed, those same headteachers come up with a thousand excuses to prevent it.”

“They just don’t want teachers to be embarrassed or parents to see how often a teacher talks on the phone during lessons.“

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Why does Medvedev say Armenia is at risk of becoming another Ukraine?… Pashi

Aysor, Armenia
Oct 8, 2026

Armenia has already faced the risk of becoming another Ukraine when the CSTO failed to fulfill its allied obligations toward the country, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said during a briefing.

Dmitry Medvedev had previously spoken about the possibility of such a risk.

Pashinyan remarked: “Someone else could say, ‘We don’t want Armenia to turn into a new Russia,’” referring to explosions occurring in various parts of the Russian Federation. “It’s not a good precedent.”

“Armenia will become a more sovereign state; it will not turn into anything else,” he said.

Pashinyan added that there would be contacts with the presidents of both the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan.

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Charles Aznavour a Singer Who Surpasses Time

Oct 2026

Times Square Chronicles

Charles Aznavour a Singer Who Surpasses Time

Legendary singer Charles Aznavour is returning to the Theater at Madison Square Garden on Saturday, October 15, 2016 at 8:00PM. With a career spanning over 70 years and thousands of concerts, Charles Aznavour continues to perform at major venues across the globe and has sold over 180 million records, with 1,200 songs and 294 albums released during his prolific career. Aznavour has performed and recorded in eight languages and in 94 countries alongside some of the most famous entertainers of all time including Edith Piaf, Frank Sinatra, Ray Charles, Andrea Bocelli, Sting, Celine Dion, Josh Groban and Bob Dylan.

Charles Aznavour and Edith Piaf

Discover by Edith Piaf, Aznavour is a recipient of the MIDEM Lifetime Achievement Award and a member of the Songwriters Hall of Fame, with scores of albums certified gold, platinum and diamond. A singer, songwriter, entertainer, actor, author and humanitarian, Aznavour was named “Entertainer of the Century” by CNN/Time Online in 1998. As a result of his humanitarian efforts, Aznavour received the title of National Hero of Armenia, the country’s highest honor, and is an Ambassador and Permanent Delegate of Armenia to UNESCO.

T2C’s Magda Katz had a chance to ask and learn about this truly gifted musician and we share this with you.

T2C: Your song  “What Makes a Man a Man” was written so far a head of it’s time. What made you write it and was the process?

Charles Aznavour: I’m always attracted by difficult subjects or themes that no one has tackled before. Over the years I had met a lot of gay people, some were friends or collaborators, and I use to hear them talk  about their life, the difficulties they had with relationship so in 1972 I wrote “What Makes a Man! ” I remember the first time I played it to my entourage on the piano, when I finished the song, an eerie silence followed, till someone said “and who’s gonna sing this? ” I said “Me!” Needless to say everyone was shocked! Everyone tried to persuade me not to do it saying it will be the end of my career, that I will be crucified by the press and the public!  I ignored everyone and recorded the song and sung it on stage, at first it was not easy to impose the song as it was “a taboo” subject, but for me it was important to accept and respect the right to be different! And as I demand that my songs are translated with exactly the same lyrics, I started to sing the song all over the world in Spanish, English, Italian and still do, because now the song has become one of the key song of my repertoire that cannot be overlooked!!

I was  ahead of time and I was proved right!  I am very proud of that song ,and the way the public adopted it

T2C: Your songs tell stories. Where do you get your inspiration?

Charles Aznavour: Everywhere, I read a lot, I observe people around me, I am not scared of words or subjects! But I always try to find a different angle, a new story!

T2C:. Do you have a favorite American composer, song or artist?

Liza Minnelli and Charles Aznavour

Charles Aznavour: Too many to name, Gershwin, Irving Berlin, Cole Porter, Sondheim, Bernstein, Rogers and Hammerstein, Bob Dylan, Leonard Cohen. My friends Liza Minelli, Sinatra, Sammy Davis and Quincy Jones. And people I would love to work with  like Aretha Franklin, Barbra Streisand. I have known her for years but we never worked together, Lady Gaga, Stevie Wonder, Beyoncé, Usher, Cher, Bette Midler and many more …

T2C: You have had such a long successful career. What still motivates you to take on world tours?

Charles Aznavour: It’s my life! I love to perform, write. To travel the world and meet the public is fantastic for me! I guess I have been very lucky that my songs stood the test of time and it’s really great to see an 18 year old tell me, I can identify with any of my songs, some I’ve written over 60 years ago! We do very big venues all over the world and it goes without saying that if I didn’t have a new generation coming to see I could never do what I do and that’s exciting!!

T2C: What moment in your life has effected you the most?

Charles Aznavour: A lot of them. The loss of my parents, was very traumatic as we were a very close nit family. The loss of my son Patrick, or my brother in law George Garvarentz who was a very talented composer and my main collaborator for 40 years !!

T2C:  What is your favorite memory with Edith Piaf?

Charles Aznavour: Too many! I stayed 8 years with her! I managed that length of time because we were never lovers!! She thought me lot, how to listen to a song, stage presence, the respect of the public!

T2C: Songs are like children, do you have a favorite and why?

Charles Aznavour: No .

T2C: You write about human frailty, what do you think of all of the ones we have is the most inspirational for you as a songwriter?

Charles Aznavour: We are not perfect and if you manage to express sentiment and feelings that other feel , then they can identify with your song and see themselves in it or claim to know someone who is just like that !

T2C: You have seen so much in your life, what has been the biggest surprise?

Charles Aznavour: Professionally, is the fact that despite what everyone said about me at the beginning, he is small, ugly, has a broken voice, writes depressing songs, he will never succeed, I proved everyone wrong and I am still here!! On a private matter that I have been with my Ulla for nearly 50 years and I have great children and grandchildren!!

T2C: What would you like our readers to know most about you?

Charles Aznavour: I love America. I first came in 1948 and since it’s an everlasting love story between us! America has been very generous and welcoming and I love to come back and perform over here!  I am very excited with my forthcoming dates, New York on October 15, Boston on the 18th, Miami on the 25th and Los Angeles on the 28th. Hope to see all there!

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TRIPP Reorienting Armenia and Azerbaijan Toward the West

Jamestown Foundation
Oct 7, 2026

TRIPP Reorienting Armenia and Azerbaijan Toward the West

Foreign Policy Publication Eurasia Daily Monitor South Caucasus

10.07.2026

Fuad Shahbazov

TRIPP Reorienting Armenia and Azerbaijan Toward the West

Executive Summary:

  • Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan indicated on August 28 that Moscow is no longer Yerevan’s strategic partner, as Russia’s relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan deteriorate and both countries deepen engagement with the West.
  • Azerbaijan is pushing for the swift implementation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). Since a Russian missile struck an Azerbaijani passenger aircraft in 2024, Baku has strained its partnership with Moscow, backed Ukraine, and offered to supply Armenia with electricity.
  • Russian ownership of Armenia’s railways slows Yerevan’s part of the route. Armenia is using Moscow’s reluctance to rebuild the lines to justify ending the concession and seeking Western funding.

On August 28, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated at a press conference that Moscow can no longer be regarded as Yerevan’s strategic partner (Armenpress, August 27). His sharp rhetoric toward Russia is hardly unexpected, given that relations between Moscow and both Yerevan and Baku have recently deteriorated again. Yerevan attributes its stance to Moscow’s failure to fulfill its treaty obligations during the Second Karabakh War with Azerbaijan in 2020 (Armenpress, August 27). While Pashinyan’s remarks underscored Yerevan’s intention to strengthen its engagement with Western partners, they also triggered renewed controversy within Armenia’s political establishment. The debate now centers on whether the long-standing Moscow–Yerevan strategic partnership remains relevant in the country’s recalibrated foreign policy and regional security strategy (The Armenian Mirror-Spectator, August 27).

Moscow’s growing discontent with Yerevan also stems from Armenia’s vigorous embrace of the U.S.-backed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) transit corridor agreement with Azerbaijan, signed in Washington in August 2025 (Caucasus Watch, August 6). The project envisions linking Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia’s Syunik province, while granting Armenia access to the broader east–west trade network. In January, Armenia confirmed the establishment of the TRIPP+ Enterprise Fund, aimed at investing $201 million in the South Caucasus and Central Asia (Hetq, August 5). This development is poised to erode Russia’s long-term leverage over Armenia while fostering stronger intraregional connectivity across the South Caucasus that circumvents Russian territory (Interfax, August 24). By opening new trade and transit pathways, it also creates opportunities for external actors to establish a more tangible presence in Moscow’s immediate neighborhood.

Armenia’s firm stance on remaining in the European Union’s close orbit since Pashinyan’s re-election in June has further contributed to tensions with Russia. Economically, a fully functioning TRIPP route, which will form the southern part of the Middle Corridor, would compete with the Russian–Iranian-backed North–South Corridor, undermining Moscow’s long-term geoeconomic strategy (SpecialEurasia, January 28). Armenia’s coordination with Azerbaijan on constructing TRIPP-related railway and highway infrastructure also complicates Moscow’s relations with Baku.

Over the past three years, Russia–Azerbaijan relations have deteriorated following the incident in which a Russian missile struck an Azerbaijani passenger aircraft over the North Caucasus (see EDM, January 15, 2025). Moscow’s initial restricted apology, coupled with its orchestrated anti-Azerbaijani campaign in domestic media, further strained bilateral ties (AzerNews, September 11). Baku suspended its partnership with Russia and moved away from its neutrality on Russia’s war against Ukraine, voicing support for Kyiv and hosting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Gabala in April (President of Ukraine, April 25; see EDM, May 4).

Baku perceived the systematic anti-Azerbaijani campaign as part of Russia’s hybrid operations and pushed for the swift implementation of the TRIPP. Against the backdrop of Moscow’s strained ties with both Yerevan and Baku, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev proposed that Azerbaijan could supply Armenia with electricity, effectively positioning itself as a substitute for Russia in regional energy connectivity (Arab News, August 12). The envisioned linkage of Azerbaijan’s power grid with Nakhchivan via Armenia underscores this ambition. Baku interprets Russia’s assertive rhetoric and its reliance on information campaigns, diaspora mobilization, and economic pressure as evidence that Moscow’s traditional political instruments in the South Caucasus are eroding (European Pravda, September 14).

Armenia has moved closer to Azerbaijan’s more distant stance toward Russia. Pashinyan publicly acknowledged for the first time that Azerbaijani specialists visited Armenia in 2025 and 2026 to discuss the development of power transmission lines, railway construction, and energy pipelines, while Moscow remained a passive bystander (Report, August 13). As tensions with Russia persist, Azerbaijan has set its sights on starting construction of the Armenian segment of the TRIPP corridor. The process appears more complicated on Yerevan’s side due to persistent issues with Armenia’s railway company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Russian Railways (RZhD) (SpecialEurasia, January 28).

Armenia’s only viable course is to show that Russia is unwilling or unable to run the country’s railways. In early 2026, Yerevan formally asked Moscow to speed up the reconstruction of Soviet-era lines along Armenia’s segment of TRIPP, expecting Moscow to refuse (CivilNet, January 15; see EDM, March 31). These include the stretch in the Akhurik area from the Armenia–Türkiye border to the existing operational network, the line from the Armenia–Nakhchivan border to Yeraskh, and the Tavush section up to and including the Ijevan railway station (CivilNet, January 15). Such reluctance gives the Armenian government greater latitude to criticize Moscow, highlight the urgency of revoking the concession awarded to RZhD, and actively pursue financial backing from external partners, particularly in the West (CivilNet, January 15). External funding would effectively internationalize the TRIPP project, an outcome that has already unsettled both Russia and Iran, given its potential to recalibrate regional connectivity.

Challenges within the regional security architecture, such as resistance from the Moscow–Tehran axis and the U.S.–Iran war, are causing some delays. On September 8, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov, during a meeting with U.S. diplomats, put a positive spin on the delay, saying that “according to the information we have received, the process is proceeding successfully” (Eurasianet, September 10).

Baku seeks to establish durable commercial ties with both Armenia and Europe at a time when Russia is distracted by Ukraine’s recent drone strikes and is losing leverage in the South Caucasus. For Armenia, the drive behind the rapid development of this new route stems from its determination to diversify the economy, reduce dependence on Russia, and expand exports to Europe. In the first half of this year, Armenia’s exports to the European Union surpassed $516 million, an increase of more than 80 percent year-on-year, while trade turnover with Russia fell by 20.5 percent over the same period (OC Media, July 13; Public Radio of Armenia, August 20).  

A fully operational TRIPP would deepen U.S. and EU influence in the South Caucasus. The route would also limit Russia’s leverage over market access and expand Armenia’s economic autonomy and Azerbaijan’s room for political and security partnerships beyond the region (Eurasianet, August 28). Despite Russia’s pressure on Armenia to choose between the European Union and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Yerevan is buying time, arguing that it has not reached the critical moment when it must make a definitive choice.

From Russia’s perspective, Armenia’s pro-Western orientation and growing estrangement should hardly surprise it (Eurasianet, August 28). Beyond its political symbolism, Armenia has tangible economic and sanctions-evasion value for Russia as the only viable land corridor to Iran outside Azerbaijan’s and Türkiye’s control. This geographic leverage explains why Moscow views Yerevan’s pivot with unease. Russia’s relations with Azerbaijan are even more turbulent. On August 27, posters with anti-Azerbaijani slogans were placed outside the guest house of Azerbaijan’s embassy in Moscow. Baku condemned the act as a provocation, linked it to a biased campaign in Russian media, and demanded that Moscow investigate (Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 27).

Azerbaijan signals with such uncompromising statements that it is prepared for diplomatic escalation with Russia and willing to confront actions that challenge Baku’s self-perception as a “middle power.” Baku interprets Moscow’s attempts to undermine strategically significant interregional projects, many of which Azerbaijan pursues with Armenia, as little more than efforts to preserve residual leverage in the South Caucasus.


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Armenian Prisoners in Azerbaijan Report Restrictions on Religious Practice Oct

Oct 9, 2026

Armenian Prisoners in Azerbaijan Report Restrictions on Religious Practice 

October 9, 2026 | Middle East

Armenian prisoners held in Azerbaijan are being denied meaningful contact with their families, independent medical professionals, and international humanitarian monitors, while reports of restrictions on their Christian religious practice have raised additional concerns about their treatment in detention. 

Siranush Sahakian, a human rights lawyer representing Armenian prisoners before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), said in September that the detainees were being held in “absolute isolation” from the outside world. According to Sahakian, their only contact with the outside is through monitored telephone calls that Azerbaijani authorities can terminate at any time. 

Her allegations included inadequate medical care, the reported denial of Bibles to Christian Armenian prisoners, and a case in which a cross-shaped tattoo was allegedly removed by burning. Azerbaijani officials rejected the religious discrimination and mistreatment allegations as unfounded, though the country has a long and dismal human rights record. 

The reports have renewed concerns over the treatment of ethnic Armenian Christians detained following Azerbaijan’s 2023 military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, known to Armenians as Artsakh. Human rights organizations have separately raised questions about the fairness of proceedings against former regional officials convicted in Azerbaijani courts. 

Armenian Prisoners Held in Isolation  

According to Sahakian, 20 ethnic Armenians remain imprisoned in Azerbaijan, including eight former leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh. They were detained following Azerbaijan’s military operation in September 2023, which ended the region’s de facto self-government and prompted the mass displacement of its Armenian population. 

Courts have tried and convicted all 20 prisoners on various charges, with sentences ranging from 20 years to life imprisonment. Their legal representatives are pursuing cases before the ECHR, seeking to challenge their detention. 

“There is no physical contact with the outside world,” Sahakian said at a news conference in Yerevan. She said the prisoners were not permitted to meet their families, consular officials, independent doctors, independent lawyers, or representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross. 

Although monitored telephone calls are permitted, Sahakian said authorities can interrupt them, limiting the prisoners’ ability to communicate with loved ones and raise concerns about their conditions. 

She also reported complaints of inadequate medical care. According to Sahakian, medication may be provided to alleviate acute symptoms, but treatment for existing illnesses and measures to prevent their deterioration are reportedly lacking. She said that she did not have an independent medical assessment of the prisoners’ current health. 

The absence of independent access makes it difficult to assess the detainees’ conditions and verify allegations of mistreatment. Independent medical professionals and humanitarian monitors could evaluate health, document treatment, and identify urgent needs. 

Reports of Restrictions on Christian Faith 

Sahakian also said that the Armenian Christian prisoners have faced actions specifically targeting their religious identity. 

According to the lawyer, international reports have documented a case in which a cross-shaped tattoo was removed from an Armenian prisoner’s skin by burning. She characterized the reported act as torture. Sahakian further alleged that Christian prisoners had been denied access to the Bible and that some had been forced to read the Quran. 

These reports raise concerns about the ability of Christian detainees to practice their faith while in custody. Access to religious texts and the freedom to observe one’s religion are important aspects of religious liberty, including for people deprived of their freedom. 

If confirmed, the reported treatment of Christian symbols is particularly troubling. Deliberately inflicting pain to remove a religious symbol would raise concerns not only about physical abuse but also about degrading treatment and religious discrimination.  

Fair Trial Concerns 

The allegations concerning detention conditions come amid wider scrutiny of Azerbaijan’s prosecution of former Nagorno-Karabakh officials. 

Among those imprisoned is Ruben Vardanyan, an Armenian-born businessman and philanthropist who served briefly as the region’s state minister in late 2022 and early 2023. In February 2026, an Azerbaijani military court sentenced him to 20 years in prison after convicting him of numerous offenses, including terrorism-related charges and alleged violations of the laws of war.  

Vardanyan has denied the charges and challenged the proceedings’ legitimacy. Sahakian, who represents him before the ECHR, said the evidence presented did not establish his involvement in the crimes attributed to him. 

Amnesty International also raised serious concerns about the trial, noting that Vardanyan and other defendants faced proceedings before a military court in hearings that were largely closed to independent scrutiny. The organization reported that evidence was presented in a language the defendants did not understand and was not adequately translated. 

The treatment of Armenian prisoners also reflects the continuing human consequences of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan’s 2023 military takeover prompted about 100,000 ethnic Armenians to flee the region, leaving behind homes, churches, monasteries, and other elements of a centuries-old Christian heritage. 

For many Armenians, the fate of those still detained is inseparable from concerns about the survival and protection of their community’s religious and cultural identity. 

Azerbaijan should ensure Armenian detainees can regularly contact their families, access independent medical care and legal counsel, and receive visits from international humanitarian organizations. Allegations of abuse and restrictions on religious practice should be investigated impartially, with findings made public where possible. 

International governments and human rights institutions should press for transparent monitoring of detention conditions and credible investigations into reported violations. They should also continue to emphasize fair-trial standards and the protection of religious freedom as part of broader efforts to secure lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

The future of regional reconciliation depends not only on diplomatic agreements but also on how people whose lives remain shaped by the conflict are treated. Protecting the rights of Armenian prisoners — including their ability to maintain contact with loved ones and practice their Christian faith — must remain part of that effort. 

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EU backs Armenia with trade support amid fallout from Russian restrictions

Brussels Times
Oct 9, 2026

The EU will grant Armenia temporary trade preferences for two years from 10 October to support Armenian exporters after Russia imposed trade restrictions.

The measures will temporarily liberalise almost 80% of Armenian exports to the EU, including almost all exports of fresh fruit, vegetables and flowers affected by the Russian restrictions, the European Commission announced on Friday.

They will also cover more than 91% of exports of beverages and spirits.

Trade preferences typically mean reduced tariffs or fewer limits on goods entering a market, making it easier for exporters to sell abroad.

Safeguards and wider EU support

The arrangement comes with conditions and includes safeguard measures that would allow the EU to act if imports adversely affect EU producers, the Commission said.

It added that the preferences form part of a broader support package for Armenia announced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen following Russia’s trade restrictions.

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Armenian AI factory rejects Russian allegations of intelligence gathering

JAM News
Oct 9, 2026
  • JAMnews
  • Yerevan

“Claims circulating about Firebird AI’s activities are untrue and have no factual basis,” the Armenia-based company Firebird AI said in response to remarks by Alexei Shevtsov, deputy secretary of Russia’s Security Council.

On 8 August 2026, Firebird AI opened the first AI factory in the city of Hrazdan. It is the largest data centre in the region and plans to expand its operations further. The facility already uses more than 6,000 NVIDIA Blackwell B200/B300 graphics processing units (GPUs). By the end of 2027, the company plans to deploy more than 70,000 NVIDIA Blackwell and Vera Rubin chips. The project has received around $500 million in initial investment. Total investment could reach $4 billion or more.

The Russian official claimed that this powerful data centre could be used for espionage: “Such centres could support analytical and intelligence operations on behalf of Western intelligence agencies, including against Iran, Russia and countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.”

This is not the first time Alexei Shevtsov has criticised projects under way in Armenia. Around the same time, he also expressed concern about the Armenian-American TRIPP initiative, known as the “Trump Route”, which aims to unblock regional transport links. According to Shevtsov, the project could lead to the deployment of US private military companies and intelligence infrastructure in Armenia.


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“The computing capacity is used exclusively for civilian purposes”

Firebird AI said its AI factory is a technology company that develops and operates high-performance computing infrastructure.

“The US export licence issued to the company restricts the use of the relevant computing capacity exclusively to civilian purposes.”

Firebird AI’s management said the Russian Security Council deputy secretary’s claims showed a lack of understanding of how AI computing infrastructure operates.

“The geographical location of these services does not, in itself, determine the nature or purpose of their use.”

Armenia officially opens its first AI factory

Built on NVIDIA Blackwell B300 technology, it is the first AI factory in the South Caucasus. The project envisages total investment of $120m.

What concerns Russia

Alexei Shevtsov said that Firebird AI’s US jurisdiction could allow US intelligence agencies to access all the data stored on its servers.

“This means that data belonging to Armenian government agencies, companies and citizens could become accessible to the United States without the consent of the Armenian authorities.”

However, the main concern centres on the possibility that the data centre could gather intelligence. This could allegedly affect not only Russia’s interests but also those of Iran, for example.

The Russian Security Council representative then turned to Armenia’s energy capacity.

“According to announced plans, Firebird intends to increase the capacity of its Hrazdan complex to 300 MW by the end of 2027. This represents almost a quarter of Armenia’s winter peak electricity demand of 1.3 GW. The announced plans will require additional generating capacity to keep the centre running.”

This issue concerns Russia because Armenia plans to build a new nuclear power plant, and Russia hopes to secure the contract. Russia built the existing Metsamor nuclear power plant. Against this backdrop, Shevtsov questioned the need to diversify Armenia’s partnerships in the nuclear energy sector.

Armenia may instead opt for the small modular reactors that the United States has offered, as previously discussed. In that case, Shevtsov said:

“I would like to emphasise that the United States has not built and is not building any small modular reactors abroad. Meanwhile, Rosatom is currently building 30 power units abroad, including small modular reactors. The choice, as they say, is obvious.”

https://jam-news.net/armenian-ai-factory-rejects-russian-allegations-of-intelligence-gathering/

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Why TRIPP is stalled: Iran, Russia, and the geopolitics of the Middle Corridor

Eurasianet
Oct 9, 2026

Partner post from Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst.

Suren Sargsyan Oct 9, 2026

More than a year has passed since Armenia and Azerbaijan signed the Washington agreement under the direct mediation of President Trump. Nevertheless, the TRIPP project, an approximately 40-kilometer route that would constitute the shortest segment of the Middle Corridor, has yet to be implemented, leaving the broader project incomplete. Notably, the principal obstacles to its implementation originate neither in Armenia nor Azerbaijan but are predominantly external factors that continue to impede the project’s realization.

BACKGROUND: 

In August 2025, the Trump administration initiated a process aimed at normalizing relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in which an enhanced U.S. strategic presence in the South Caucasus, particularly in Armenia, was expected to play a significant role. A central element was the proposed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) on Armenian territory, which would provide Azerbaijan with a direct connection to its Nakhchivan exclave without transiting Iran. The TRIPP would also offer Armenia and Azerbaijan an opportunity to strengthen their integration into the Middle Corridor, connecting Central Asia with Europe via the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Turkey.

In other words, the TRIPP would facilitate the development of the Middle Corridor through Armenia and Azerbaijan, which, according to the Trump administration, would contribute significantly to the normalization of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. From a strategic perspective, the route also offers the prospect of transporting Central Asian energy resources to Europe while bypassing Russia and Iran. At the same time, it would provide Central Asian states with greater opportunities to diversify their export routes and reduce their dependence on China. Kazakhstan has shown particular interest in the project, as reflected in its deepening relations with Armenia, alongside its traditionally close ties with Azerbaijan.

Nevertheless, the project has experienced significant delays despite sustained efforts by Washington to advance its implementation. The U.S. has allocated financial resources for infrastructure development, established a dedicated fund to support the project, and appointed a manager with extensive knowledge of Armenia and its business environment, as well as direct ties to the Trump administration. Despite these measures, construction has yet to begin, and little information has been made available regarding the implementation process. The clearest indication of a potential timeline came from Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, who recently stated that construction on Armenian territory may begin in early 2027.

IMPLICATIONS:

Developments over recent months provide a broader picture of the factors that have delayed the implementation of the TRIPP project on Armenian territory and, consequently, the project as a whole. The first concerns Iran. The U.S.-Israeli war with Iran has fundamentally altered the regional security environment, with Tehran targeting U.S. military bases and other facilities in neighboring states within range of its missile capabilities. Against this backdrop, TRIPP represents a U.S.-backed strategic transport route running directly along Iran’s northern border, in some places only a few hundred meters away. Its location and strategic significance have generated considerable concern in Tehran, which has publicly expressed its opposition to the project.

It therefore cannot be ruled out that the delays are partly linked to the negotiations between Iran and the U.S. and uncertainty over their outcome. In the event of renewed hostilities, the route could potentially become a target for Iran despite being located on the territory of a third country. Moreover, prior to the proposed implementation of TRIPP, Iran provided Azerbaijan with its shortest transit route to the Nakhchivan exclave, creating a degree of Azerbaijani dependence on Tehran that TRIPP would substantially reduce. Iran therefore also has an economic and geopolitical interest in the project’s development. Yet another significant obstacle concerns the railway component of TRIPP. A functioning rail connection is central to the project’s ambition to facilitate trade between Central Asia and Europe and is therefore of critical logistical importance to the viability of the corridor as a whole.

However, Armenia’s railway network remains under concession to the state-owned Russian Railways, with the agreement set to remain in force for a considerable period. Russia has shown little willingness to relinquish control, although recent developments suggest that the issue may be subject to negotiation. When the possibility of returning the railway network to Armenian control was raised, the head of Russian Railways emphasized that Russia had invested approximately US$ 400 million in Armenia’s railway infrastructure. This statement can be interpreted in two ways. Moscow may be signaling that it expects compensation for its investments as a condition for terminating the concession. Alternatively, it may indicate an interest in participating in the TRIPP project itself, with its existing investment potentially forming the basis for such involvement. In either case, control over Armenia’s railway infrastructure introduces a significant Russian dimension into the implementation of TRIPP.

This considerably complicates the situation, as both Moscow and Tehran are capable of exerting pressure on Armenia, albeit in different ways and in pursuit of their respective strategic interests. Any potential Russian participation in TRIPP would not, however, be a matter for Yerevan and Baku alone, as Washington and Moscow could potentially reach a separate agreement on Russia’s role in the project. At present, however, Iranian security concerns and Russia’s control over Armenia’s railway infrastructure remain among the principal external factors hindering the implementation of TRIPP.

CONCLUSIONS:

At present, Armenia and Azerbaijan have limited scope to advance the implementation of TRIPP independently. The outcome of potential negotiations between the U.S. and Iran, and ultimately the termination of hostilities, may prove critical to the project’s future. Should the parties pursue a diplomatic settlement, TRIPP may need to form part of a broader package of agreements between Washington and Tehran. The Russian dimension is equally complex. Moscow may seek compensation for its investments in Armenia’s railway infrastructure, a substantial burden for Armenia, or demand some form of participation in the project. The latter would present Washington with a strategic dilemma: whether to accommodate Russian involvement in a transport corridor whose broader geopolitical rationale includes reducing regional dependence on Russia.

In either case, the Trump administration would need to engage in substantive negotiations with Moscow, whether to agree on compensation or determine the terms of potential Russian participation in the project. The implementation of TRIPP therefore depends on a broader set of political and strategic agreements extending well beyond Armenia and Azerbaijan. Without such arrangements, the corridor will continue to entail significant geopolitical and security risks, potentially undermining its attractiveness to businesses seeking reliable routes for transporting goods between Central Asia and Europe.

 

This article was originally published by the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst and reprinted under a partner post arrangement with Eurasianet.

Suren Sargsyan is a PhD candidate Political Science. He holds LLM degrees from Yerevan State University, the American University of Armenia, and Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is the director of the Armenian Center for American Studies.

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