News – Page 192 – Armenian Directory & News

The Road to the First Nagorno-Karabakh War

October 17, 2026October 17, 2026 Badalian Vardan

· October 16, 2026

By Kyle Orton
It can always get worse

Armenian soldiers in the Karabakh during a ceasefire, 19 April 1993

Imperial Russia, under its policy of “defensive expansionism”, conquered a series of Muslim-ruled khanates in the Caucasus from the Qajar Persians in the 1810s and 1820s. The mixed population of Armenian Christians and Turkic-speaking Muslims in the area would be afflicted by nationalism through the nineteenth century, and the First World War created opportunities for the nationalist elites to put their theories into practice.

The hopes of Tsarist Russia to use Armenian revolutionary nationalism to defeat and dismember the Ottoman Empire led the Armenians into the great catastrophe of 1915 when “Western Armenia” was lost forever amid the deportations. But the collapse of Russia itself into the civil war engendered by the Bolshevik coup gave the Armenians a second chance and they seized it, as did the Caucasian Muslim leaders who identified as Azerbaijanis or Azeris. Apart from the opportune circumstances as their former master disintegrated, the States of Azerbaijan and Armenia proclaimed in mid-1918 had reason to think history was on their side, given U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric, particularly focused on Russia, about self-determination for nations heretofore supposedly oppressed by the multiethnic Empires.

Caucasians experienced independence, however, as a war of all against all. The Armenians and Azeris used their freedom to wage an internecine ethno-irredentist on-off war against one another, while variously manipulating and being manipulated by the Bolsheviks, the Ottomans, and the British. The conventional invasions and stirring up of compatriot minorities behind the lines resulted in a bitter conflict marked by omni-directional massacres and expulsions, though both sides would enshrine memories where they were “suffering and innocent, eternally the massacree and never the massacrer”.¹

Wilson’s debilitating stroke in October 1919 and the shattering of the anti-Bolshevik forces around the same time weakened the moral and practical climate for self-determination,² and a year later it was all over in the Caucasus. The moment the Bolshevik regime had any sense of security, it set about expanding the Revolution, starting by restoring the old Imperial frontiers. The Miracle on the Vistula spared Poland and the Baltics, and shored-up Finland’s freedom, but that was the exception. From Ukraine to Mongolia, Lenin’s Revolution crushed those who had been so foolish as to believe his promises on the “Nationalities Question”. The exhausted Azeris and Armenians folded quickly when the Red Army came for them in 1920.

A particular focus of the Armenian-Azeri fighting in 1918-20 had been the Nagorno-Karabakh region, an Armenian-majority enclave mostly occupied by Azerbaijan when the Red Army arrived. Inheriting this problem as Imperial overlord, the Soviets—inevitably after much discussion in a committee—decided on 4 July 1921 to redraw the internal borders so the Karabakh was in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. For reasons still unclear, the Kavbiuro reversed itself the next day, deciding to leave the Karabakh in the Azerbaijani SSR, and made it an autonomous oblast in 1923.³ Such was the Karabakh’s status for more than half-a-century.

Under the “New Thinking” of Mikhail Gorbachev after he became General-Secretary in 1985, the Terror that held the Soviet Empire together was scaled back, opening the space for the Karabakh conflict to be resumed.

Gorbachev’s key aim was to rein-in the KGB and erode its anti-reformist allies in the bureaucracy. It was within this framework Gorbachev purged Heydar Aliyev, an old Chekist, from the Politburo in October 1987. Aliyev had been ruler of Soviet Azerbaijan (1969-82) and he retained influence there after being elevated to the capital. Aliyev was inter alia patron of the Karabakh soviet, ensuring it was dominated by Baku-loyal Armenians. Aliyev’s fall furnished Armenians in the nomenklatura, in the Karabakh and in the Armenian SSR, with a chance for “bureaucratic insurgency”. The insurgents’ hope was to acquire Gorbachev’s patronage so they could displace Aliyev’s people, and have the Karabakh handed to the Armenian SSR by staging demonstrations to convince Gorbachev this was the popular will of the oblast.⁴ Which it probably was: over-75% of the Karabakh population was Armenian,⁵ and every time there had been a political thaw letters and petitions from Armenians asking for the Karabakh to be made part of the Armenian SSR had flooded into Moscow.⁶

Armenian insurgent bureaucrats diverted “administrative resources to sponsoring popular rallies” in the Karabakh and Yerevan calling for “reunifying” the Karabakh and Armenia, which began in February 1988. Even at this early stage, however, it was apparent that the bureaucratic insurgents’ “carefully planned” campaign was “provincially naïve”: they were unleashing forces they could not control.⁷ The bureaucrats believed the crowds were a means to an administrative end—having the Karabakh transferred to Soviet Armenian jurisdiction—but the crowds had ideas of their own, which for some included expelling the Karabakh Azeris.⁸ This miscalculation was compounded by the Armenian nomenklatura being divided among themselves. Some believed the system was eternal and they had to achieve their goals through Moscow Centre. Others were envisioning a radically different future, and they had more than imagination to work with.⁹

Over the previous two decades, an Armenian “internal diaspora” had been created in the Soviet Union, with many Karabakhi members, which would emerge in 1988-89 as the Pan-Armenian National Movement (HHSh). The HHSh network stretched from Yerevan to Tashkent, and was able to reach into the Karabakh. HHSh tested its capacity with the Karabakh Armenian protests. When the KGB did not crush them immediately, the HHSh was emboldened.¹⁰ HHSh, with the advantage of its strategic depth outside the Karabakh, was swiftly able to compete for popularity and power with the remnants of Aliyev’s Armenians and those looking to the Centre, and to coordinate and sustain activities in the Karabakh on an unprecedented scale.¹¹

The speed and organisational skill with which the Armenian nationalists acted convinced many Azeris that the Armenians had Moscow’s sanction.¹² In truth, the Soviet leadership, which looked on Armenian nationalism with as much distaste as it had for any other, however willing Moscow had been to instrumentalise it, was taken off-guard, hence its improvised responses—intended to restore calm—often backfired.¹³

After about a week of protests by Armenians, in the Armenian SSR and in the Karabakh—in the enclave’s capital, Stepanakert or Khankendi,¹⁴ and in Askeran in the Khojaly District—the Karabakh Regional Soviet voted for the oblast to be administered by the Armenian SSR on 20 February 1988.¹⁵ Moscow rejected the resolution out of hand, but news was already spreading of two Azeri women raped in Stepanakert/Khankendi, and two days later the atmosphere was inflamed further when an Azeri protest march was attacked in Askeran. Two Azeris were killed, one by a policeman in murky circumstances, and the other by an Armenian villager with a hunting rifle—“the first victim of intercommunal violence”, as Thomas de Waal puts it in Black Garden, his classic study of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.¹⁶

Less than a week later, on 28 February, another milestone in the Soviet Union’s demise took place with the first explosion of peacetime ethnic violence in Sumgait/Sumqayit, a grim Communist-built town twenty miles north of Baku. Two days of incitement at rallies boiled over into a horrifying Azeri pogrom against Armenians in Sumgait that lasted until 29 February. The official tally about thirty Armenians murdered, but the mutilation and burning alive of victims made counting the dead difficult, and nobody ever comprehensively documented the rapes.¹⁷

The Armenians continued lobbying Moscow to transfer the Karabakh to them until July 1988 when the Supreme Soviet definitively ruled the Karabakh was staying in the Azerbaijani SSR. Switching tactics, a campaign of popular terror with official backing unfolded against the Azeri minority in the Armenian SSR. By the late summer, this evolved into the wholesale deportation of the Azeris to the Azerbaijani SSR, though it did not stop the terror.

In November 1988, for instance, twelve Azeris in Vartan, a village in north-east Armenia, were burned alive.¹⁸ Around the same time, Armenians in the Azerbaijani SSR were massacred at Kirovabad/Ganja: nobody knows from that day to this how many were killed, but the Armenians claimed 130 fatalities and it was enough for the “human rights” groups to start raising the spectre of “genocide”, a word central to the political warfare and identity of both sides. The Karabakh was already following in microcosm the broader dynamics, with the Armenians expelled from the main Azeri town of Shusha and the Azeris expelled from the main Armenian town of Stepanakert/Khankendi.¹⁹ The tit-for-tat massacres and expulsions lasted another half-decade, each side convinced from beginning to end—and long afterwards—that they were the real and sole victim.

The Soviet “special regime” for the Karabakh—effectively direct rule from Moscow—put in place in late 1988 became official in January 1989 and brought down levels of overt violence. But political fragmentation and the proliferation of (relatively) organised armed units was overtaking the Karabakh. In late November 1989, amid the shock to the Soviet system of Gorbachev failing to send the Red Army to thwart the Captive Nations’ bids for freedom, a calamitous decision was taken to transfer the new Karabakh “Organisational Committee” to the Azerbaijani SSR, i.e., to put the Karabakh under direct rule from Baku. In retaliation, the Armenian SSR declared full “reunification” with the Karabakh on 1 December 1989.²⁰

Armenians were euphoric; Azeris were enraged. Intercommunal village clashes in the Karabakh escalated. As a by-product, the Azeri nationalist opposition, the Popular Front, was empowered—and Moscow’s alarm turned to panic as the nationalists usurped power on the streets from the Communist authorities in Azerbaijan. These two trends met fatefully in Baku in January 1990.

The Armenians in Baku—a terrified remnant of what had once been a community of 200,000 (10% of the city’s population)—were set upon in a ferocious pogrom on 12 January 1990. Violence raged in various ways for a week and at the conclusion of it perhaps ninety Armenians were dead. The survivors were packed onto boats across the Caspian to Turkmenistan, and from there flown to Yerevan. “With this terrible flourish”, writes De Waal, “Armenia and Azerbaijan completed their ethnic cleansing of each other’s populations.”²¹

Barely had the pogromshchiki gone home when there was another massacre in Baku on 20 January 1990, this time of Azeris—perhaps 130 of them—by the Soviet army as it repressed the nationalists and installed a “healthy” Communist regime led by Ayaz Mutalibov.²² It was within the formal boundaries of the Soviet Union what had happened multiple times in the contiguous Soviet Empire—in East Germany in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Afghanistan in 1979—and for a time it seemed similarly successful. But time was running out.

As Gorbachev plotted a new Union Treaty to save the U.S.S.R., he now had a reliable ally in Azerbaijan—if he met the quid pro quo of Moscow taking a hard line on the Karabakh and the Armenians in general. This was not a difficult sell. The Karabakh situation had nearly spiralled out of control after the “Black January”, and the façade of order brought by the deployment of Soviet state of emergency forces and the new Azeri “special police” or OMON was breaking down. The Armenian Nationalist Movement led by Levon Ter-Petrosyan (LTP) completed its capture of Yerevan in the summer of 1990, one of the first non-Communist governments to take power in a Soviet republic, and began infiltrating fedayi into the Karabakh, reviving the name used by the Armenian guerrillas or terrorists (as you prefer) in the early part of the twentieth century. The Armenian fedayi blew up bridges, invaded Azeri villages, took hostages, assassinated local officials, and caused general mayhem.²³

The mingling of Moscow and Azeri politics in approaching the Karabakh in 1990-91, and the fact those two elements were mingled, while the Armenians were on a different trajectory, laying the foundations for independence by constructing their own domestic military-security capability—and a paramilitary apparatus in the Karabakh—was to crucially determine the course of the First Karabakh War.²⁴

After Baku delivered its vote in mid-March 1991 for Gorbachev’s referendum on a reformed Soviet federation—and the Armenians (with five other SSRs²⁵) boycotted it entirely—Moscow delivered Operation RING at the end of April, sending Soviet troops to support the Azerbaijani SSR in securing the Karabakh. “Operation RING marked the beginning of the open, armed phase of the Karabakh conflict”, writes De Waal. Its public objective was eliminating the Armenian paramilitaries. Its undeclared objective was altering the demographics to clear the Armenian populations surrounding the Karabakh and replace them with a “ring” of loyal Azeris. Militarily, the RING operation proceeded smoothly if brutally, and by mid-June 1991 the Armenians, in Yerevan and the Karabakh, were putting out feelers asking for a compromise.²⁶

However, there was a problem inherent to Operation RING: it was, as De Waal argues, “the first and last ‘Soviet civil war’,” with uniformed elements of the Soviet State fighting each other, which did not augur well for the Soviet Union’s durability.²⁷ And in terms of the dynamics of revolutionary warfare—where military victories come and go but political victories endure—RING heavily redounded to the Armenians’ advantage.

The entanglement of Operation RING with Moscow politics made it an issue for the Russian SSR, led by Boris Yeltsin, which wanted to rein-in the Soviet security establishment even further—a common objective with the Armenian SSR. Yeltsin sent representatives down to the Caucasus and they returned declaring themselves appalled by the killings and deportations of Armenians. While the Soviet Union lasted, it was effective political warfare to destabilise the KGB faction and Azerbaijan. Beyond that, the campaign revived the Russian-Armenian political relationship that had been such an important factor in the previous Armenian independence struggle and would influence the next one, to Baku’s detriment. In parallel, the Armenians had been radicalised and unified. The ranks of the fedayeen swelled, and Armenian moderates were sidelined. These dynamics came into sharp focus soon after Valery Grigorian—the Karabakhi Armenian leader who tried for a compromise of restoring the enclave’s autonomy within Azerbaijan—was branded a “collaborator” by his own and shot down in the street in Stepanakert/Khankendi on 10 August 1991.²⁸

Soviet citizens awoke on 19 August 1991 to find Tchaikovsky’s Swan Lake playing on a loop on State television, the first they knew of the coup d’état led by KGB chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov. The KGB, having triumphed over the Dissidents in the late 1970s, was out of patience with Gorbachev, who had constrained the Chekists’ war against “ideological subversion”, and refused to change course even as deviationism of all kinds tore the U.S.S.R. apart.²⁹ So far as the gekachepisty were concerned,³⁰ the coup was a rescue operation “to prevent society from sliding into a nationwide catastrophe”. For Azerbaijan, this was vindication: Mutalibov had bet on the Communist security sector and now Baku’s loyalty would be rewarded with an even harsher crackdown on the Armenians.³¹

Except, as everybody knows, the putsch was a shambles; it collapsed on 21 August and hastened the fragmentation of the Soviet Union it was designed to forestall. Yeltsin emerged as the undisputed victor, after rallying Moscow for a counter-coup, and, in the disarray as Gorbachev cleaned house at the KGB, a vacuum opened up in the Karabakh, into which the Armenians—understanding that their bet on independence had been vindicated—started re-inserting guerrillas, occupying villages cleared during Operation RING.³²

Changing lanes rapidly, Azerbaijan declared independence on 30 August 1991. Mutalibov had himself elected president in an absurdly rigged plebiscite nine days later, but the internal trouble that would rack Azerbaijan in the coming war was already visible. Heydar Aliyev, who had gained popularity by publicly opposing the “Black January” events that installed Mutalibov, got himself elected speaker of parliament in Nakhichevan and swiftly built up an independent powerbase in the exclave.³³ Still, Mutalibov’s manoeuvre strengthened significantly Baku’s position over the Karabakh. Under the universally recognised, if regularly abused, principle of uti possidetis juris (“as you possess under law”), States emerging from decolonisation inherit their pre-existing administrative boundaries as international frontiers, meaning the Karabakh was—and remains—part of Azerbaijan’s sovereign territory.

When Armenia declared independence on 23 September, it had already orchestrated “a sleight of hand that allowed Armenia to say that it was only an interested observer [in the Karabakh], not a party to the conflict”, as De Waal explains. To avoid the political opprobrium that attaches to expansionist designs on neighbouring countries—this being six months after Saddam Husayn’s annexation of Kuwait had been reversed in a United Nations-blessed, U.S.-led operation—Yerevan had prodded the Karabakh Armenians to declare an independent “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” on 2 September 1991. The argument was that autonomous oblasts, no less than SSRs, had a legal right to independence. Armenia initially had some internal tension, too, namely between the HHSh in Yerevan and the Dashnak leadership under Artur Mkrtchian in Stepanakert. But Yerevan, unlike Baku, resolved this quickly by eliminating Mkrtchian.³⁴

There was a moment at the last when it seemed the descent into all-out war would be avoided. Yeltsin, using his newfound prestige, mediated the Zheleznovodsk Accords, which both sides signed. Announced the same day as Armenia’s independence, the accords were blown apart with the helicopter shot down by the Karabakh Armenians on 20 November 1991. All twenty-two on board were killed, including thirteen Azeri government officials, and Russian and Kazakh representatives coming to implement the peace deal. There was then a brief “war of laws”. Azerbaijan abolished the Karabakh’s autonomous status on 26 November, making it officially a province like any other with no special rights—a response of sorts to Armenia’s claim autonomous zones were entitled to independence. This was the point where Stepanakert was formally renamed Khankendi. Yerevan retaliated with a referendum on independence in the Karabakh on 10 December: the Armenians voted “yes” nearly unanimously and the Azeris boycotted.³⁵

There would be no de jure declarations of war in the Karabakh, not least because Armenia pretended throughout it was not a party to the conflict. Nor is a de facto beginning of armed conflict easy to detect; the nearest to a candidate is the Soviet-Azeri Operation RING in April 1991, but, of course, that was initiated in response to the Armenian guerrilla warfare. Most historians date the outbreak of the First Karabakh War to February 1988, i.e., the Armenian vote to transfer the Karabakh to Armenia, and, in the sense that the cliché “war is politics by other means” contains an implicit vice versa, one would have to say this is reasonable. The militarisation of the conflict thereafter—amid massacre and counter-massacre, expulsion and counter-expulsion, and Soviet measures aimed at pacification—was incremental and uneven, but nevertheless inexorable. As the flag of the Soviet Union was lowered over the Kremlin for the last time on 25 December 1991, all political avenues to a settlement in the Karabakh were closed and the military struggle was already underway.

While neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan had a conventional army as 1992 dawned, Armenia had far more access to resources and instruments that could be used for making war in the near-term.

There were thousands of Armenian veterans of the Red Army, many infantry with frontline training and experience, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, plus senior officers with the prestige and administrative skills to organise and lead these men. The new Armenian Chief of the General Staff Norat Ter-Grigoriants, for example, had been the deputy head of the Soviet General Staff. There were also Russians who had been high-ranking Soviet officers that joined the Armenian cause as “advisers”, like retired Lieutenant General Anatoly Zenevich.³⁶ Still, it took time to construct a cohesive Armenian army, and longer still for Yerevan to all-but openly deploy the army to the Karabakh, tacitly dropping the pretence it was not a combatant.

Until then, the Armenians in the Karabakh had the great advantage of the 366th Motorized Regiment. Based in Stepanakert/Khankendi since August 1988, about fifty of the 350 men in the 366th were Armenians, including one battalion commander. The 366th had been selling weapons to the Armenian guerrillas and using their own weapons against the Azeris for a price—usually vodka—even before the August 1991 putsch. By January 1992, the Armenians in the 366th had functionally defected and the Regiment “borrowed” its ten tanks—the only such heavy armour in the Karabakh—to the Armenians many times.³⁷

For all that, until early 1993, the most important Armenian armed force was the fedayeen: the battle-hardened guerrillas already in the Karabakh hills were joined by “a new flood of … volunteers” from Armenia proper in late 1991 and early 1992, writes De Waal. “The situation was chaotic. Weapons were being handed out to men who had displayed nothing more than a willingness to go and kill.”³⁸

“Azerbaijan was in a much weaker position”, as De Waal explains, in two interlinked ways. First, militarily. The militant godless distrusted Muslims, so Azeris in the Red Army had more often been cooks or builders than professional soldiers. The main basis for an Azeri army was OMON, which on its best day was, by structure and culture, more a police force than a military unit. OMON had played only a supporting role to the Soviets in the Karabakh,³⁹ and was mostly known for its abusive behaviour at the Khojaly Airport it took over, shaking down passengers and sexually abusing women.⁴⁰

Second, politically. Mutalibov had created a Defence Ministry in October 1991, but for the aforementioned reasons there were few officers to staff it. Worse, when Azeri armed factions began to appear, they were spawned by the Popular Front and other opposition elements. Mutalibov inclined to annex these forces by having them brought under the Defence Ministry,⁴¹ then realised this was unworkable and tried to impede their creation altogether, fearing, correctly, that these militias would be used inside Azerbaijan against him. “For many [Azeri] politicians, the war effort was less important than the domestic power struggle”, as De Waal bluntly puts it.⁴²

The upshot was that the Azeri cause in the Karabakh in the opening phase was outsourced to criminals over whom Baku had varying levels of control, and these Azeri gangsters fought each other nearly as much as the Armenians.⁴³

The mosaic of Armenian and Azeri villages in the Karabakh at the end of 1991 was regarded by both sides as a problem. “The less numerous Karabakh Azerbaijani villages found themselves in dozens of small traps, at the mercy of Armenian fedayin”, writes De Waal, while “the Armenians found themselves in one large trap”, namely Stepanakert/Khankendi, which was “surrounded by Azerbaijani settlements”: “Aghdam and the plain of Azerbaijan” to the east; Khojaly to the north with the Karabakh’s only airport; and to the south, on higher ground, was Shusha. “Stepanakert’s only link to the outside world was by helicopter across the mountains to Armenia.”⁴⁴

The Armenians made the first organised move to “reduce the line of the front”, as one fedayi euphemistically put it, intimidating the Karabakh Azeris to flee their villages. The Azeris soon responded in kind, trying to redraw the demographic map to their advantage.⁴⁵ The term “ethnic cleansing” was coming into common use at this time in association with Bosnia’s nasty civil war. It described the intentions and conduct of the Karabakh’s warring parties, too, but the Caucasus never received anything like the media coverage devoted to the Balkans.

“Most of the [Karabakh] conflict was irregular, improvised, even intimate”, De Waal concludes. “The lack of any rules of engagement made it more brutal. Both sides revived the practice of the early 1900s employed by the Armenian guerrilla commander Andranik: chopping off the ears of enemy dead as war trophies. … [O]ften this was, literally, a neighbors’ war.”⁴⁶

The Armenian move to break the siege of Stepanakert/Khankendi took them first to Khojaly, which was captured, with assistance from the Soviet 366th Regiment, in late February 1992 in circumstances the Azeris call “genocide”, a claim that will be examined in the next post. Though the fallout destabilised Azerbaijan’s politics, toppling the ruler, Ayaz Mutalibov, and Shusha fell to the Armenians in May 1992, events seemed to break Baku’s way. Russia withdrew the 366th and over the summer of 1992 a major Azeri offensive captured most of the northern Karabakh. But the 366th had left their equipment and the Armenians staunched the Azeri tide by September 1992. In February 1993, the Armenians launched a counter-offensive spearheaded by Yerevan’s army.

The fact of an inter-State war now barely concealed, the Armenians took Kelbacar in April 1993 and soon recaptured the northern Karabakh. Azerbaijan’s stressed politics snapped this time: a military rebellion in June 1993 created months of turmoil that ended with Heydar Aliyev in power. Armenia took full advantage of Azerbaijan’s internal chaos, rolling through the Azeris’ Karabakh headquarters at Agdam, and on to Fuzuli and Jabrail. A costly Azeri push in the southern Karabakh from December 1993 to February 1994 recovered Horadiz, but not much else. The Armenians were back on the offensive when a Russian-mediated ceasefire went into effect on 12 May 1994.

Each ethno-religious group in the Karabakh had fled or been expelled when the other side captured their area during the war. Since the conflict froze with Armenia holding the Karabakh—and a significant surrounding zone—the Azeris emptied out entirely. For a quarter-century this was the status quo, but it was always fragile because Armenia lacked legitimacy. The fig-leaf of Karabakh autonomy under the “Republic of Artsakh” notwithstanding, the “international law” situation was that Armenia occupied 13.5% of Azerbaijan’s territory.⁴⁷

Aliyev’s son, Ilham, who succeeded to the throne in 2003, set about using Azerbaijan’s oil money to cultivate a favourable political environment in the West for reconquest, the (in)famous “caviar diplomacy”, and to build an army, with Turkey’s help, capable of pulling it off. The Armenians continued relying on Russia for protection, and only at the end realised it was a mirage. Backed by Turkish (and Israeli) drones, and Turkish advisers, Azerbaijan shattered Armenia’s hold on the Karabakh in a six-week campaign in September-November 2020, but left in place the shell of Armenian administration. A two-day demonstrative Azeri offensive in September 2023 forced the total Armenian capitulation, and within a week the entire Karabakh Armenian population of more than 100,000 had emptied out. Of the Azeris settled in the Karabakh since then as Azerbaijan seeks to integrate the province, 40,000 are reportedly returnees from the 1990s.

FOOTNOTES

Rebecca West (1941), Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey Through Yugoslavia, p. 20.

The Communist premise being that ultimately nations would be dissolved in a global brotherhood of man, and in the meantime the nations would be held in trust in Lenin’s big prison, the Bolsheviks obviously had little respect for Wilson’s Fourteen Points. But the Allies were not that much more sympathetic to Wilson, regarding him as embodying an irritating combination of naivety and hubris. Famously, the French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau remarked with acid contempt, “Even the good Lord contented Himself with only ten commandments”.

Franziska Smolnik (2016), Secessionist Rule: Protracted Conflict and Configurations of Non-State Authority, pp. 41-42.

Georgi M. Derluguian (2005), Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus: A World-System Biography, pp. 191-192.

The final Soviet census in 1989 recorded approximately 189,000 inhabitants of the Karabakh, 145,500 or 77% of them Armenian, and 40,700 or 21.5% Azeris. See: ‘Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing the Conflict From the Ground’ (2005, Sept. 14), International Crisis Group, p. 4. Available here.

Thomas de Waal (2003), Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, p. 16.

Derluguian, Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus, pp. 191-192.

Witnesses from the time report that Armenians in Yerevan in February 1988 were chanting slogans such as: “Armenia without Turks” and “Armenia belongs to the Armenians”. Older Azeris I spoke to in Stepanakert/Khankendi similarly reported that Armenian protesters in the earliest stages, on what was then Lenin Square (now Victory Square), were chanting and waving placards calling for the expulsion of Azeris.

It is probable that the extent of such slogans and placards is exaggerated as part of the competitive victimhood propaganda in the historiography, intended to emphasise that such aggressive Armenian designs were present before the hideous Sumgait pogrom against the Armenians at the end of February 1988. It is even possible they are all lying, but I do not think so. The evidence, as I read it, is that there was a fundamental distrust and fear on both sides from the beginning, amounting to a view of coexistence as existentially dangerous, which is what underlay the expulsionist conduct of the two armies when war came.

Derluguian, Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus, p. 192.

De Waal, Black Garden, pp. 15-16.

Azeris still believe this, if the conversations I had in Azerbaijan six weeks ago are anything to judge by.

De Waal, Black Garden, pp. 15-16.

As so often, even the naming is political in this conflict.

More precisely, the Armenians on the Regional Council voted for Karabakh unity with Armenia; the Azeris boycotted. See: De Waal, Black Garden, p. 12.

De Waal, Black Garden, p. 15.

De Waal, Black Garden, pp. 32-37.

De Waal, Black Garden, pp. 61-62.

De Waal, Black Garden, p. 69.

De Waal, Black Garden, pp. 71-72.

De Waal, Black Garden, pp. 87-90.

De Waal, Black Garden, pp. 92-95.

De Waal, Black Garden, pp. 108-113.

De Waal, Black Garden, pp. 113-114.

Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, and Moldova were the others who boycotted.

De Waal, Black Garden, pp. 114-122.

De Waal, Black Garden, p. 120.

De Waal, Black Garden, pp. 114-122.

Vasili Mitrokhin and Christopher Andrew (1999), The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB, pp. 329-332.

The word derives from GKChP (ГКЧП), the Russian abbreviation for “State Committee on the State of Emergency”, the name the putschists gave to their junta.

De Waal, Black Garden, pp. 159-160.

De Waal, Black Garden, p. 160.

De Waal, Black Garden, p. 161.

The official cause of Mkrtchian’s death in April 1992 is accidentally shooting himself while cleaning a gun. There must even be people who believe that. See: De Waal, Black Garden, p. 161.

De Waal, Black Garden, p. 162.

De Waal, Black Garden, pp. 162-163.

De Waal, Black Garden, pp. 166-167.

De Waal, Black Garden, pp. 162-163.

De Waal, Black Garden, pp. 163-165.

De Waal, Black Garden, p. 110.

For those familiar with Syria at the present time, this solution will sound familiar, and the potential downsides will be readily apparent.

De Waal, Black Garden, pp. 163-165.

Even in Azerbaijan’s notional army forward post in the Karabakh, at Aghdam, on the plains below Stepanakert/Khankendi, a half-hour drive from the Karabakhi Armenians’ capital, gangsters had the run of the ground. The Azeri strongmen in Aghdam were figures such as Yaqub Mamed, whom Azerbaijan itself “later arrested and charged with drawing the pay of dead soldiers whom he kept frozen in cold storage tanks”, and Asif Makhamerov, a murderer recently released from prison. See: De Waal, Black Garden, p. 165.

De Waal, Black Garden, p. 166.

De Waal, Black Garden, pp. 168-169.

Another politicisation of the numbers surrounding the Karabakh is the false claim that Armenia occupied 20% of Azerbaijan. All of Baku’s official statements use this figure, and it is invariably cited in conversations with “ordinary” Azeris.

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The locks of Derik Sourp Kevork Church have been changed, and the controversy

October 17, 2026October 17, 2026 Jane Topchian

· October 16, 2026

Iskhan Erdinc
Agos

Zekerya Sabunci, who lives in the Derik district of Mardin, had been voluntarily responsible for the Sourp Kevork Church in the district for years. However, last week, the Keçecioğlu family, who owns the church and are members of the Derik Armenian community, claimed in a press statement that Sabunci had changed the church’s locks without their knowledge and that the church and its garden were neglected. The family also stated that the paintings in the church were missing. Sabunci’s son, Ğazar Sabunci, said that the paintings were brought to Istanbul for restoration with the knowledge of the Patriarchate.

The locks of Derik Sourp Kevork Church have been changed, and the controversy has been taken to the Patriarchate.

The Sourp Kevork Church in Derik was built in 1650. After 1915, the church passed into the ownership of the Treasury. Until 1957, it was used as a stable and arsenal. In 1957, the church was put up for sale and purchased by the Armenian community in Derik. The title deed was registered in the name of Garabet Keçecioğlu, who was involved in the process. After Keçecioğlu’s death in 2000, the title deed passed to his family. The number of Armenians living in Derik gradually decreased, and no services were held in the church for many years. The maintenance of the church was undertaken by Zekerya Sabunci, who returned to his hometown of Derik in 2014. Sabunci, who is involved in the family profession of olive farming, was also one of the three Armenian citizens living in the district and was interested in the historical Sourp Kevork Church. However, last week, Sabunci made a post on his personal Facebook account stating that the Keçecioğlu family came to Derik and broke and changed the lock on the church.

Statement from the Keçecioğlu Family

Following comments made after a social media post, the Keçecioğlu family issued a press statement. In their statement, the family stated that Zekerya Sabunci had changed the church’s locks without their knowledge or the knowledge of the Derik Armenians, that the church was neglected, and that the paintings in the church were missing.

The explanation is as follows:

“The Sourp Kevork Armenian Church in Derik, Mardin, was repurchased by the Derik Armenian Community in 1957, and the title deed of the church was registered in the name of Karabit Keçecioğlu (Oruz), who made significant contributions during this process.”

After Karabit Keçecioğlu’s death in 2000, the maintenance and security of the church were carried out for many years by Naif and Yürşalin Demirci.

However, without the knowledge of our family and the Derik Armenian community, the church’s keys were taken, as Zekerya Sabunci himself stated, by the police, the locks were changed, and access to the church was brought under control.

It was observed that the church and its garden, which Zekerya Sabunci claimed to be maintaining, were in serious disrepair; various items unrelated to the church (stretcher’s chair, barber’s chair) and fighting roosters were found in the garden.

The most important and serious issue is the absence of historically valuable paintings from the church. We do not know who removed these paintings, for what reason, or with whose knowledge. Furthermore, the allegations that forgeries have been made must also be clarified.

We have also determined that Zekerya Sabunci collected money under the guise of donations by sharing his personal information. We do not accept the accusations of “robbery” leveled against the Keçecioğlu family in various forums.

On behalf of the public, we expect answers to the following questions:

– Why was the church key taken and why were the locks changed?

– Why is the church in such a neglected state?

– Where and how are the donations collected on behalf of the church used, and have any permits been obtained from the relevant authorities for receiving these donations?

– Where are the historical paintings, and by whom were they removed from the church?

– Is it true that forgeries of the paintings were made? If so, what was the purpose of this?

The Sourp Kevork Armenian Church is not the personal property of anyone. It is part of the shared history, faith, and cultural heritage of the Derik Armenian community.

Our aim is not to accuse anyone prematurely; it is to ensure the protection of the church, historical artifacts, and community heritage, and to ensure that the events are clarified by the relevant authorities.

This is respectfully announced to the public.

Statement from Sabunci

Speaking to Agos, Ğazar Sabunci, the son of Zekerya Sabunci, stated that the church’s title deed should actually have been transferred to a foundation, that the paintings in the church date back to the 1700s, and that they were brought to Istanbul for restoration. Sabunci stated that the Armenian Patriarchate of Turkey was aware of the restoration process of the paintings. Sabunci claimed that the paintings are currently kept in the Samatya Sourp Kevork Church, and that the Keçecioğlu family is aware of this. Sabunci said the following:

“Naif Demirci, being elderly, gave the church’s key to a woman. She then used the church for purposes other than its intended use. After my father returned to Derik in 2014, he went to the Derik District Governorship and retrieved the key. Until this last incident, he had been maintaining the church on a voluntary basis. Because the church’s title deed does not belong to a foundation, support from public institutions for renovations and restoration could not be obtained. With the support of members of the Derik Armenian community, a guesthouse was built in the church, and the toilets were renovated. The church has no income whatsoever. Three paintings in the church are valuable. They were brought to Istanbul for restoration. Through the mediation of the Armenian Patriarchate of Turkey, the paintings were taken to the Samatya Sourp Kevork Church. The restoration of two of them has been completed, but work has not yet begun on the third. The paintings have been at the Samatya Sourp Kevork Church since the end of July. The Keçecioğlu family is aware of this. I told them that restoration would be done. These paintings were to be preserved, and replicas were to be sent to Mardin. The title deed of this church actually belongs to a foundation should be transferred.”

Samatya Foundation: The paintings were brought to us.

On the other hand, the Samatya Sourp Kevork Church Foundation released a statement on social media regarding the paintings at the Derik Sourp Kevork Church. In its statement, the Samatya Foundation noted that the paintings were brought to their church by Ğazar Sabunci. The statement reads as follows:

“The aforementioned paintings were brought to the Samatya Sourp Kevork Armenian Church through Gisasargavak Gazar Sabunci and with the permission and guidance of the Armenian Patriarchate of Türkiye.”

The before and after versions of one of the restored paintings.

Our foundation has no knowledge or involvement in any matter or organization related to the transportation or restoration of the paintings.

Only members of the Foundation’s Board of Directors and those authorized by them have the authority to make statements and inform the public on behalf of our Foundation.

Please disregard any statements or posts made by individuals or social media accounts other than this official source.

This is respectfully announced to the parties and the public.”

Meeting at the Patriarchate

Following these developments, a meeting was held at the Patriarchate on Wednesday, September 9th, regarding the future of the Sourp Kevork Church in Mardin. The meeting, chaired by Patriarch Maşalyan, was attended by members of the Keçecioğlu and Sabunci families, as well as individuals from the Armenian community of Derik. Currently, the ownership and use of the church belong to the Keçecioğlu family. In a statement to our newspaper, Sabunci said that no conclusion was reached at the meeting and that the original paintings would be sent to Derik.

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CC: Tribute to Ivette Aexander

October 17, 2026October 17, 2026 Dabaghian Diana

· October 16, 2026

By Marine Sarkisjan

I pay tribute to Ivette Alexander — a remarkable Armenian woman, a storyteller, and a guardian of memory who reminds us that our roots can never be erased and that our stories are our legacy to future generations.

Some homelands are taken from us. But they cannot be erased from our memory.

There are stories that go far beyond the pages of a book. Stories that carry the weight of an entire people, the fragrance of childhood, the silence of abandoned homes, and the unbreakable bond between a person and the land that shaped their soul.

“Lyalya and 100 Lives, or The Girl with the Guitar” by Ivette Alexander is one such story.

Born from the memories of Khndzristan, Artsakh, and a childhood filled with family, music, nature, and the warmth of village life, her book is much more than an autobiographical novel. It is a testament to a world that its people were forced to leave behind — but have never stopped carrying within themselves.

Ivette writes about a childhood that many of us recognise: the homes of our grandparents, the voices of our families, the summers that seemed eternal, and the quiet certainty that our world would always be there.

Until one day, it was not.

War, displacement, and exile can separate people from their homes. They can scatter families across continents and turn familiar landscapes into painful memories. But can they erase the identity of a people? Can they sever the roots of generations? Can they take away the truth of a lived experience?

No. Because a homeland is not merely a place on a map. It is a place within us.

What moved me most about Ivette’s story is the realisation that her memories are no longer hers alone. Through her words, the story of one Armenian family becomes a mirror reflecting the experiences of countless others — people whose lives have been shaped by displacement, loss, and the struggle to preserve their identity.

And this is where literature becomes an act of remembrance.

A writer does not simply preserve the past. A writer gives the future a chance to know it.

When homes are lost, stories become their witnesses. When generations are scattered, books become bridges between them. And when history is contested, the responsibility to preserve memories with honesty and integrity becomes even more profound.

For the Armenian people of Artsakh, this responsibility carries a particular poignancy. Behind every family story lies a landscape of belonging, a cultural inheritance, and a human world that cannot be understood through political maps alone.

Ivette’s hope is that future generations will one day read her book in Artsakh itself.

I hope so, too.

Because children deserve more than stories about the homes of their ancestors. They deserve the possibility of knowing those places, walking those paths, hearing those voices, and creating memories of their own.

We do not choose the land into which we are born. But we can choose whether its memory will disappear with us or live on through the generations.

Perhaps this is the deepest meaning of “Lyalya and 100 Lives”: that one life can hold a hundred stories, and a hundred stories can preserve the memory of an entire world.

Some books entertain us.

Some books educate us.

And some books remind us who we are — and what we must never allow the world to forget.

Artsakh lives wherever its people remember, speak, write, and refuse to surrender their identity.

And sometimes, the most powerful resistance begins with a simple act: telling your story.

Discover more about Ivette Alexander and follow her literary journey:
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168: Քոչարյանի գործով դատական նիստին դատախազ Հայկ Հովհաննիսյանն իրեն վատ զգաց

October 17, 2026October 17, 2026 Lilit Nahapetian

Հոկտեմբեր 16, 2026

«Մարտի 1-ի» գործով դատական նիստի ժամանակ վատացավ դատախազ Հայկ Հովհաննիսյանի ինքնազգացողությունը, դատական նիստն ընդմիջվեց։

Հայկ Հովհաննիսյանը կարդում էր 2008թ. մարտի 1-ի գործով կատարված փորձաքննությունների արդյունքները և այդ պահին անսպասելի դադար տվեց:

Դա նկատեց մեղադրյալներից մեկը ՝ ՀՀ ԶՈւ գլխավոր շտաբի նախկին պետ Յուրի Խաչատուրովը։

«Գուցե հանգստանա՞լ է պետք»,– ասաց Խաչատուրովը։

Դրանից հետո դատախազը ընդմիջում խնդրեց, դատավոր Սարգիս Պետրոսյանը չառարկեց։

Հիշեցնենք, որ գործը վերաբերում է 2008 թվականի մարտի 1–ի ողբերգական իրադարձություններին: ՀՀ 2–րդ նախագահ Ռոբերտ Քոչարյանին, նախկին փոխվարչապետ Արմեն Գևորգյանին, նախկին պաշտպանության նախարար Սեյրան Օհանյանին և ԳՇ նախկին պետ Յուրի Խաչատուրովին սկզբում մեղադրանք էր առաջադրվել ՀՀ քրեական օրենսգրքի 300.1 հոդվածով («Սահմանադրական կարգի տապալում»):

2021 թվականին Սահմանադրական դատարանն այս հոդվածը համարեց Սահմանադրությանը հակասող, և գործը կարճվեց: Սակայն 2023 թվականին գործը վերաբացվեց զրոյից՝ միաժամանակ նոր ընդունված Քրեական օրենսգրքում նոր հոդված ներմուծելով՝ նոր մեղադրանք առաջադրելու համար:

«Մարտի 1-ի» գործով քրեական հետապնդում է հարուցվել մահացած Գորիկ Հակոբյանի նկատմամբ
ՀՀ հակառոուպցիոն կոմիտեն փետրվարի 12-ին հայտնեց, որ «Մարտի 1-ի» գործով մեղադրանքներ են ներկայացվել նաև Վալերի Օսիպյանին և Ռոբերտ Մելքոնյանին (Ռոբերտ Մելքոնյանը 2008 թվականի հայտնի իրադարձությունների ժամանակ ՊՊԾ գնդի հրամանատարն էր, Վալերի Օսիպյանը` նրա տեղակալը)։

—

Երևանում կկայանա անհայտ կորածների հարցերով համաժողով․ պայմանագրի մանրամասները

October 17, 2026October 17, 2026 Boshkezenian Garik

Հոկտեմբեր 16, 2026

Նոյեմբերի 19-ին Երևանում նախատեսվում է անցկացնել անհայտ կորած կամ բռնի անհետացած անձանց հարցերին նվիրված միջազգային համաժողով, որին նախատեսվում է շուրջ 150 անձի մասնակցություն, այդ թվում՝ 15 ներկայացուցիչներ արտերկրից։ Համաժողովի առանցքում լինելու է հակամարտությունների հետևանքով անհետ կորածների ճակատագրի պարզաբանման հումանիտար խնդիրը։

Անհայտ ճակատագրերի վիճակագրությունը

Հայաստանի Հանրապետությունն անհայտ կորած անձանց խնդրին առնչվում է դեռևս Ղարաբաղյան առաջին պատերազմից սկսած։ Պաշտոնական կառույցների և Կարմիր խաչի միջազգային կոմիտեի (ԿԽՄԿ) տվյալների համաձայն՝ 1990-ականների սկզբից Լեռնային Ղարաբաղի հակամարտության հետևանքով անհետ կորած է համարվում շուրջ 1000 հայ։ Նրանցից ավելի քան 700-ն Արցախից/ԼՂ-ից անհայտ կորած անձինք են, իսկ շուրջ 400-ը՝ Հայաստանի տարածքից Առաջին պատերազմի հետևանքով անհետացածներ։

Խնդրի երկրորդ ալիքն արձանագրվեց 2020 թվականի 44-օրյա պատերազմից հետո։ ՀՀ պաշտոնական ճշգրտված տվյալներով՝ առ այսօր անհայտ է մնում ևս 191 անձի գտնվելու վայրը (172 զինծառայող և 19 քաղաքացիական անձ)։ Այսպիսով, Հայաստանը միջազգային տարբեր հարթակներում ներկայումս բարձրաձայնում է ընդհանուր առմամբ շուրջ 1200 անհայտ կորած հայերի ճակատագիրը պարզելու հրատապությունը։

Անհայտ կորածների հարազատների իրավունքների պաշտպանությանն ուղղված պետական քայլերը հանրային ու քաղաքական տարբեր շրջանակների դիտարկումներով երկար ժամանակ գնահատվել են անբավարար։ Սակայն այս ուղղությամբ ինչ-ինչ քայլեր նախաձեռնվել են․ Արդարադատության նախարարությունն, օրինակ, շրջանառության մեջ է դրել համապարփակ օրենսդրական փաթեթ, որը հստակ սահմանում է անհայտ կորած անձի իրավական կարգավիճակը, իսկ Ազգային անվտանգության ծառայությունը ներկայացրել է նախագիծ, որով նախատեսվում է ստեղծել ռազմական գործողությունների հետևանքով անհայտ կորածների միասնական պետական ռեեստր։

Նշենք նաև՝ «Հայաստանի Հանրապետության և Ադրբեջանի Հանրապետության միջև խաղաղության և միջպետական հարաբերությունների հաստատման մասին» վաշինգտոնյան համաձայնագրում ևս արձանագրում կա այս հարցի առնչությամբ։

«Կողմերը պարտավորվում են հասցեագրել երկու Կողմերի ներգրավմամբ զինված հակամարտությունում անհայտ կորած անձանց և բռնի անհետացումների դեպքերը, այդ թվում՝ ուղղակիորեն կամ հարկ եղած դեպքում համապատասխան միջազգային կազմակերպությունների հետ համագործակցությամբ այդ անձանց վերաբերյալ առկա բոլոր տեղեկությունների փոխանակման միջոցով: Սույնով Կողմերը ճանաչում են այդ անձանց ճակատագրերի բացահայտման, այդ թվում՝ մասունքների որոնման և ըստ պատշաճի վերադարձման, պատշաճ քննության միջոցով այդ անձանց առնչությամբ արդարության ապահովման կարևորությունը` որպես հաշտեցման և վստահության ամրապնդման միջոց: Այս առնչությամբ համապատասխան կարգավորումները կբանակցվեն և մանրամասն կհամաձայնեցվեն առանձին համաձայնագրով»,- ասվում է համաձայնագրի 9-րդ հոդվածում։

Միջոցառման կազմակերպիչների մասին

Էլեկտրոնային գնումների համակարգում օրերս տեղ գտած պայմանագրից տեղեկանում ենք՝ վարչապետի աշխատակազմն «Արմենիա Մարիոթ» հյուրանոցում կազմակերպվելիք այս համաժողովի համար գնանշման հարցում գնման ընթացակարգով ընտրել է «Արմենիա Թրավել+Մ» ՍՊԸ–ն։ Պայմանագրի գին է նշվել 16 միլիոն 440 հազար դրամը։ Այս գումարի շրջանակում մատակարար ընկերությունն ապահովելու է ավիատոմսերի ձեռքբերումը, հյուրանոցային կացության, տրանսֆերների իրականացման ծառայությունները, կամավորների ներգրավում, սուրճի ընդմիջում, ֆուրշետ, թարգմանություն, բրենդինգ և տեղեկատվական արշավ։

«Արմենիա Թրավել+Մ» ՍՊԸ-ն ըստ իրավաբանական անձանց ռեգիստրի տվյալների՝ իր գործունեությունը մեկնարկել է 1996 թվականից, 2009 թվականից ընկերության մասնաբաժինները պատկանում են Հայկ և Արմեն Գրիգորյաններին։

Ըստ էլեկտրոնային գնումների համակարգի՝ այս ընկերությունը պետգնումներին սկսել է մասնակցել 2016 թվականից, սակայն միայն 2019 թվականից հետո է սկսել ակտիվորեն ոչ մրցութային գնման ընթացակարգերով պայմանագրեր կնքել պետական գերատեսչությունների հետ՝ հիմնականում համագործակցելով Ազգային ժողովի և Արտաքին գործերի նախարարության հետ։

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Ալիևը 44-օրյա պատերազմի պատասխանատվությունը դնում է Փաշինյանի վրա․ Ալեն Սիմոն

October 17, 2026October 17, 2026 Chakrian Hovsep

Հոկտեմբեր 16, 2026

Բաքվում կայացած Ասիայում փոխգործակցության և վստահության միջոցների խորհրդակցության (ԱՓՎՄԽ) 7-րդ գագաթնաժողովի ժամանակ Ադրբեջանի նախագահ Իլհամ Ալիևն իր ելույթում 2020 թվականի պատերազմի պատասխանատվությունը բարդել է Նիկոլ Փաշինյանի վրա:

«Պատերազմը մեր ընտրությունը չէր, Հայաստանը մեզ ստիպեց պատերազմի մեջ մտնել»,- շեշտել է նա՝ այդպիսով փորձելով արդարացնել 2020 թվականի սեպտեմբերի 27-ին Ադրբեջանի սկսած պատերազմը և դրա պատասխանատվությունը բարդել հայկական կողմի վրա։ Մինչդեռ Ալիևի՝ պատերազմից հետո արած հայտարարությունները ցույց են տալիս, որ ադրբեջանական կողմը ռազմական գործողությունների պլաններ էր մշակել դեռ շատ ավելի վաղ։

Դեռ 2021 թվականին Ադրբեջանի նախագահ Ալիևը մի քանի գաղտնազերծում էր արել և հայտնել, որ «սառեցված հակամարտության» պայմաններում Ադրբեջանը, նախքան 2020 թվականի պատերազմը, տարբեր իրավիճակների համար սցենար և գործողությունների պլան է մշակած ունեցել, և որ, իր տեղեկացմամբ, այդ տարիներին հայկական կողմը ևս գործողությունների պլան է ունեցել՝ հնարավոր պատերազմը հաշվի առնելով:

«2020 թվականի պատերազմի ընթացքում մեր գործողությունների հիմքը մշակվել է պատերազմից շատ ավելի վաղ: Սակայն պատերազմի ընթացքում ռազմական օպերացիաներում մենք փոփոխություններ ենք մտցրել, այդ թվում՝ հաշվի առնելով, որ հակառակորդը կարող է տեղեկություն ունենալ մեր մտադրությունների մասին»,- 44-օրյա պատերազմից հետո «Ազգային պաշտպանություն» ամսագրին տված հարցազրույցում, մասնավորապես, ասել էր Ալիևը:

168.am-ը գրել է, թե կոնկրետ ո՞ր ուղղությամբ օպերացիաների պլաններն է փոխել Ադրբեջանի ղեկավարը: Եվ հենց այստեղ է, որ անհրաժեշտ է դառնում նաև 44-օրյա պատերազմի քննիչ հանձնաժողովի զեկույցի հանրայնացումը, ինչը հնարավորություն կտա առավել ամբողջական պատկերացում կազմել ոչ միայն հայկական կողմի որոշումների, այլև Ադրբեջանի գործողությունների և դրանց հաջորդականության մասին։

Իսկ Ալիևը փորձել է հիմնավորել, թե ինչով է Հայաստանը և Նիկոլ Փաշինյանի իշխանությունն իրեն ներքաշել պատերազմի մեջ: Նա նախ հերթական անգամ հիշեցրել է Ստեփանակերտում 2019 թվականի օգոստոսին արած Նիկոլ Փաշինյանի հայտարարությունը՝ «Արցախը Հայաստան է, և վերջ», և 2019 թվականի մարտին այդ ժամանակ ՀՀ պաշտպանության նախարար Դավիթ Տոնոյանի «սպառնալիքը»՝ «նոր պատերազմ՝ նոր տարածքներ»:

Այնուհետև ադրբեջանական պետության ղեկավարն Ասիայում փոխգործակցության և վստահության միջոցների խորհրդակցության (ԱՓՎՄԽ) 7-րդ գագաթնաժողովի ժամանակ իր ելույթում 2020 թվականի պատերազմը Հայաստանի գործողություններով պայմանավորելու համար այլ դրվագներ է հիշել:

«2020 թվականին Հայաստանը երկու ռազմական «սադրանք» է իրականացրել՝ հուլիսին և օգոստոսին, ինչի հետևանքով ադրբեջանցի զինծառայողներ են զոհվել: Եվ հենց այդտեղ ադրբեջանցի ժողովրդի համբերությունը հատեց և եկավ հատուցման ժամանակը»:

2020 թվականի հուլիսյան մարտերի ընթացքում ադրբեջանական կողմը կորցրել է 12 զինծառայողի, այդ թվում՝ բարձրաստիճան սպաների։ Սա շուրջ երեք անգամ գերազանցում էր հայկական կողմի ռազմական կորուստները։

Մենք գրել ենք, որ Ադրբեջանը հուլիսյան մարտերի ժամանակ, մասնավորապես, կորցրել էր իր երրորդ բանակային կորպուսի շտաբի պետին՝ գեներալ-մայոր Փոլադ Հաշիմովին, ինչպես նաև՝ 3-րդ բանակային կորպուսի հրետանու պետ, գնդապետ Իլգար Միրզաևին և այլ սպաների:

Ավելին, հայտնել ենք, որ հուլիսյան մարտերից հետո ադրբեջանցի գեներալ Փոլադ Հաշիմովի մայրը հայտարարել էր, որ որդու մահվան պատասխանատվությունը կրում է Ադրբեջանի ԶՈւ ԳՇ պետ Քերիմ Վելիևը, որն այդ ժամանակ Ադրբեջանի պաշտպանության փոխնախարարն էր, այսինքն, տարբեր շարժառիթներից ելնելով՝ Ադրբեջանի ռազմական ղեկավարությունը Փոլադ Հաշիմովին ուղարկել է մարտական գործողությունների վայր՝ գուցե հաշվարկով, որ նա այնտեղից չի վերադառնա:

Եվ, թերևս, դրա համար է Ալիևի ընտանիքը հատուկ ուշադրության և հոգածության կենտրոնում պահում Հաշիմովի մորը, և իրենց գեներալի համար Բաքուն նույնիսկ պատասխանատվություն էր պահանջում Բաքվի «դատավարության» ժամանակ:

Իսկ դրանից առաջ, ինչպես հայտնել ենք, հուլիսյան մարտերի օրերին այդ ժամանակ Թուրքիայի պաշտպանության նախարար Հուլուսի Աքարը սպառնացել էր պատժել Հայաստանին ադրբեջանցի բարձրաստիճան զինվորականների ոչնչացման համար:

Իսկ Ալիևը «օգտագործեց» Հաշիմովի կերպարը՝ ադրբեջանցի երիտասարդության և հասարակության մեջ ակտիվացնելու հայերի հանդեպ վրեժը, ինչը, կարելի է ասել, որ ստացվել է, հատկապես, երբ Բաքուն «մաքուր» հերոսների անհրաժեշտություն ժամանակ առ ժամանակ ունեցել է:

Ի դեպ, վերջերս ներկայացրել ենք անվտանգության և ռազմավարության հարցերով թուրք մասնագետ Աբդուլլահ Աղարի «գաղտնազերծումը», թե ինչու էր Բաքուն վախեցել հուլիսյան մարտերից և ինչ ռազմավարական նշանակություն ունի Տավուշը:

Ինչ վերաբերում է Ալիևի ասած՝ 2020 թ. «օգոստոսյան սադրանքին», ապա նա, թերևս, նկատի ունի հայ սպա Գուրգեն Ալավերդյանի՝ ադրբեջանական կողմում հայտնվելու դեպքը, ում Բաքուն ներկայացրել էր՝ որպես դիվերսիոն խմբի ղեկավար, և 5 հոդվածներով քրեական գործ հարուցել: Ավելին, Ադրբեջանը կոպտորեն խախտել էր ժնևյան կոնվենցիաները, որոնք երաշխավորում են ռազմագերիների պատվի և արժանապատվության նկատմամբ հարգանքի իրավունքը, ինչն ապացուցում է այդ օրերին Բաքվի հրապարակած տեսանյութը: Ալավերդյանն, արդեն մի քանի տարի է, վերադարձվել է հայրենիք:

Այստեղ հիշեցնենք մեկ այլ դրվագ. 2019թ. հունիսին vzglyad.az-ը մի հոդված էր հրապարակել ՝ «Տոնոյանը պետք է պատասխան տա Էլշան Խալիլովի սպանության համար»: Խոսքն ադրբեջանցի զինծառայողի մասին էր, որի չեզոքացմանը նախորդել էր հայ զինվորի սպանությունը՝ Սիփան Մելքոնյանի: Եվ հայկական կողմը պատժիչ գործողություններ էր ձեռնարկել: Ավելին, Դավիթ Տոնոյանը պարգևատրել էր գործողության մասնակիցներին: Ո՞վ գիտի՝ միգուցե Բաքուն մի օր նաև իրենց իսկ մեկնաբանմամբ այս դեպքը հիշի, այնպես, ինչպես դեռ նախկին իշխանությունների օրոք Տավուշի հատվածում և արցախյան թևում դիվերսիոն-հետախուզական ներթափանցման փորձ կատարած ադրբեջանցի զինծառայողների ոչնչացման դեպքերն է ժամանակ առ ժամանակ հիշում:

Իսկ մինչ այդ արդեն երկրորդ անգամ Ալիևը Նիկոլ Փաշինյանին դնում է ՀՀ նախկին նախագահների հետ նույն հարթության մեջ, ևս որոշ դեպքերում համարում «ռազմական հանցագործ», ընդ որում՝ շատ ժամանակ չանցած:

«Հայաստանի նախկին ղեկավարությունը՝ բոլոր երեք նախկին նախագահներն ու նրանց կողմնակիցները՝ այդ «ռազմական հանցագործներն ու մանկասպանները» (չակերտները.- Մ.Պ.), մինչ օրս չեն կրել իրենց արժանի պատիժը։ Հայաստանի ներկայիս ղեկավարությունը 2018 թվականից շարունակել է իր նախորդների հանցավոր քաղաքականությունը»,- Բաքվում կայացած Ասիայում փոխգործակցության և վստահության միջոցների խորհրդակցության (ԱՓՎՄԽ) 7-րդ գագաթնաժողովի ժամանակ հայտարարել է Ալիևը, Արցախի ռազմաքաղաքական նախկին ղեկավարության դեմ դատավարությունը և դատավճիռը համարելով «նյուրնբերգյան արդարադատություն»:

Այսինքն, Ալիևը, ում «ձեռքերին» հայ երեխաների արյուն կա, ՀՀ նախկին նախագահներին, և, ըստ էության, Նիկոլ Փաշինյանին համարել է երեխասպան:

Նշենք, որ «Գյանջայի դեպքերն» առնչվում են 44-օրյա պատերազմի հետ, որի հետ կապված Ալիևն ավելի վաղ պնդել է, որ դրա ժամանակ «ադրբեջանցի երեխաներ են սպանվել»:

Բայց Նիկոլ Փաշինյանը և նրա թիմն Ալիևի այս մեղադրանքին դարձյալ չի պատասխանել, համենայնդեպս, հրապարակային:

Փոխարենը՝ ՀՀ ԱԽ քարտուղար Ալեն Սիմոնյանը Բաքվում պահվող հայերի, Արցախի ռազմաքաղաքական նախկին ղեկավարության վերադարձի մասին լրագրողների հարցին ի պատասխան՝ նշել է, թե պետք է հասկանանք՝ «էդ մարդկանց ադրբեջանական կողմը քրեական հանցագործությունների մեջ է մեղադրել, և ինքն իր հասարակությանը բացատրելու խնդիր ունի»:

Իսկ Ալիևի մեղադրանքները Փաշինյանին վերը նշվածով չեն ավարտվել, նա հայտարարել է, թե իբր 44-օրյա պատերազմից հետո «Հայաստանն օգտագործել է հրադադարի ռեժիմը՝ իր ռազմական ուժը վերականգնելու և Արևմուտքի իր նոր հովանավորների օգնությամբ կրկին Ադրբեջանի վրա հարձակվելու համար»:

Ալիևի այս պնդումը, բնականաբար, վիճարկելի է։ Հայաստանի՝ Ֆրանսիայից և եվրոպական այլ երկրներից սպառազինություն ձեռք բերելու որոշումները պետք է դիտարկել ըստ դրանց ընդունման ժամանակագրության։ Մասնավորապես, Ֆրանսիան Հայաստանին որոշել է սպառազինություն մատակարարել 2023 թվականին՝ Լեռնային Ղարաբաղի հայաթափումից հետո։

Բացի այս, Փաշինյանը հստակ հայտարարել էր, որ ՊԲ-ն չի ստանալու ՀՀ զինված ուժերի աջակցությունը»՝ ցանկալի է կցել այդ հայտարարության սկզբնաղբյուրը։ Դեռ մի կողմ ենք դնում այն, որ Ադրբեջանն արդեն ՀՀ ինքնիշխան տարածքներից էր հասցրել օկուպացնել, և Հայաստանը ռազմական բավարար միջոցներ չէր ձեռնարկել դա կանխելու համար, նաև՝ հետո ադրբեջանական զորքին հեռացնելու:

Վերջերս Ալիևը խոստովանել է հայ-ադրբեջանական սահմանին ռազմական բախումների հեռահար նպատակը:

Նույն Ալիևն այսօր համարում է, որ Հայաստանի հետ հաստատված խաղաղությունը դեռ փխրուն է: ՀՀ ղեկավարության հայտարարություններից էլ պարզ է դառնում, որ սահմանների ճշգրտման հարցում լուրջ խնդիրներ կան՝ տեխնիկականից մինչև իրավաքաղաքական:

Այս պայմաններում զարգացումների հնարավոր տարբերակները կարող են տարբեր լինել՝ սահմանազատման գործընթացում Հայաստանի համար տարածքային կորուստներից մինչև Ադրբեջանի համար շահավետ պայմանավորվածություններ։

Չի կարելի բացառել նաև լոկալ ռազմական բախման սցենարը, որի դեպքում Բաքուն կարող է փորձել դրա պատասխանատվությունը բարդել Երևանի վրա։

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Zelensky is an agent of Israel… Russia’s enemies are Turkey and Azerbaijan

October 17, 2026October 17, 2026 David Nargizian

October 16, 2026

168TVof “Trigger” the guest of the program political scientist, head of Yerevan Institute of Network Research Gagik Harutyunyann: is

During the program, the internal political situation of Azerbaijan, the relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as the possible consequences of their further development were discussed.

Particular attention was paid to the color revolutions taking place in the world and the prospects of new political upheavals.

The possibility of a new phase of confrontation between the US and Iran, the role of Israel in the Middle East processes and its influence on world politics were among the key topics of discussion. In addition, the interlocutors touched on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the possible consequences for Ukraine and the prospects for the formation of a new world order, including the possibility of concluding a new agreement modeled on the Yalta conference with the participation of the USA, Russia and China.

At the end of the program, the geopolitical situation of the South Caucasus, the prospects for the development of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as possible scenarios for the further development of regional processes were discussed.

Hayk Derzyan

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Turkey. Will demographic change become a major policy factor?

October 17, 2026October 17, 2026 Torgomian Varazdat

October 16, 2026

The latest presented by Nationalist Movement Party leader Devlet Bahceli of the report According to the report, the total birth rate in Turkey decreased from 2.38 in 2001 to 1.44 in 2025. For the last 9 years, the birth rate has been kept below the level of 2.10 children per woman, which is considered sufficient for the minimum reproduction of the population.

Turkey’s population increased from 70.6 million in 2007 to 86.1 million in 2025, but the annual population growth rate has declined to one of the lowest levels in history, amounting to only 1.1 thousand people in 2023 (5 thousand in 2025).

Among the most remarkable points of the report were the one-time, zero-interest housing loans and long-term car loans offered to families with 3 or more children. These families were also offered a 50 percent discount on electricity, natural gas, water, and internet bills. It was proposed to gradually reduce the income tax rates of working mothers and fathers, depending on the number of children, and to completely cancel these deductions in the case of families with 3 or more children. It is also proposed to increase the paid maternity leave of mothers working in the state system to 12 months for each child, and to two months for fathers.

In addition, it is planned to gradually reduce the age limit for mothers’ retirement and the necessary insurance length of service, again depending on the number of children.

It is also planned to provide free diapers and baby food to families in need, as well as to promote flexible and remote work formats for mothers. In addition, it is proposed to allocate an apartment to those young married couples who want to move from the city to rural areas, where living conditions will be closer to urban standards.

The concern of the nationalists (and not only them) is obviously well-founded. Turkey’s population is aging at such a pace that it is beginning to change the economic and social prospects of the country. writes The Nordic Monitor. The median age will reach 34.9 in 2025, up from 34.4 last year and around 28 in 2007. New data recently published by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) indicate that these changes are mainly due to a steady decline in the birth rate, coupled with a decline in the death rate.

Moreover, the population of Turkey is still significantly younger than the residents of the European Union countries. The average age in the EU in 2025 was 44.9 years, compared to 34.9 years in Turkey. Citizens aged 65 and over make up 22% of the EU population, which is twice as much as in Turkey (11.1%). However, Turkey is moving in the same direction, and rather quickly. In 2007, children under the age of 14 made up 26.4% of its population, and in 2025 their share was reduced to 20.4%.

Over the same period, the share of people aged 65 and over increased from 7.1% to 11.1%. The demographic load factor, which shows how many citizens aged 65 and over per 100 people of working age (15-64 years), increased from 15.5 in 2024 to 16.2 in 2025. If current trends continue, this figure could reach 19.5 in 2030, 26.5 in 2040, and 45.5 in 2060.

According to the main forecast, if the current demographic trends are maintained, the population will reach 93.8 million by 2050, after which it will begin to decrease and will fall below 77 million by 2100. Thus, the immediate problem is not the reduction of population size itself, but the combination of slowing growth rates and rapid aging.

The older population is more in the north and the younger in the south and southeast, including the Kurdish regions, which may entail ethnopolitical risks. It is interesting that the “demographic” report was presented by the nationalist party itself, whose leader has previously made famous initiatives to solve the Kurdish issue.

Thus, in 2025, Sinop on the Black Sea had the highest average age of 44 years, followed by the northern provinces of Giresun (43.5 years) and Kastamonu (43.3 years).

Meanwhile, the average age of the population in southern Şanlıurfa remained the lowest at 21.8 years, in neighboring Şırnak at 23.3 years and in Siirt at 25 years. This gap shows that in some northern regions of the country demographic aging has already reached a higher level than in the younger south and southeast.

According to TurkStat forecasts, the period of relatively favorable ratio of working population to dependents (demographic load) will end around 2030. According to the same forecasts, the average age at that time will be 37.1 years, after 10 years, in 2040, it will reach 41.4, and in 2060, it will reach 48 years.

so shortens the period during which Turkey can use the large potential of its working population to expand its economic advantages before the aging population begins to put more pressure on public finances.

As the number of pensioners increases relative to the number of working-age citizens, social security and healthcare systems will face an increasing burden.. As the proportion of older adults increases, spending priorities will shift toward chronic disease treatment, rehabilitation, and long-term care. The European Union is already on that path.

Demographic aging also affects the compulsory military service system in Turkey․ the smaller the generation of young men, the smaller the reserve from which citizens can be drafted. This does not necessarily mean a reduction in the size of the army, as the importance of professional personnel, technology and unmanned systems is increasing, which is fully in line with modern trends.

Almost the opposite trend is observed in the field of education. For decades, new schools, universities and other educational institutions have been built in the country, often to the detriment of the quality of education. Falling birth rates will gradually reduce the number of schoolchildren and potential students known for their libertarian sentiments (especially in large megacities). This may lead to the need to consolidate schools in economically depressed regions, as well as to review the requirements for teachers and educational institutions.

Economic factors play an equally important (though not absolute) role in the birth rate, which is also paid attention to by the relevant structures of the United Nations. A shrinking workforce could make economic growth increasingly dependent on increased productivity: Turkey still has a demographic advantage over most EU countries, but the structural gap is narrowing as the birth rate remains significantly below the population reproduction rate.

It can be assumed that the demographic problem, one way or another, will come to the public’s attention as the next election cycle of 2028 approaches, which, it is not excluded, will become extraordinary. The partners of the “Justice and Development” party, which is part of the ruling coalition, have perhaps made a competent political-technological step with their report and the proposals contained in it.

STANISLAV To Kotyolkin

vpoanalytics.com

Translation by Zhanna Avetisyan

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168: How will we get out of this adventure? if they tell me: MFA is your trash

October 17, 2026October 17, 2026 Albert Nalbandian

October 16, 2026

Satik Seyranyan on the air of “Pressing” program the guest “Genesis Armenia” cerebral center-foundation director, political of sciences candidate, associate professor Abraham Gasparyan is.

The main theses of the interview are below.

The South Caucasus, as the northern border of the Greater Middle East, cannot remain apart from all the influences that

taking place in the Middle and Middle East itself. It is clear that what happened in Yemen and Saudi Arabia should not be considered at the local or regional level. This is of great importance and reaches up to Abyssinia (Ethiopia), Eritrea, Egypt, Pakistan and even up to one of the other states that joined the so-called Mecca Declaration, Turkey.

And we will, of course, feel and see the impact of all this in terms of the events or potential events taking place on the Iran-Armenia border.

The Houthis have already become an Iranian proxy force and tool to carry out some kind of anti-American or anti-Saudi activities in that region, like Hezbollah did back in the mid-2000s on Israel’s northern border. In Lebanon, the Houthis already have a large social support, political representation, economic levers and, of course, a foreign political protege in the form of Iran, through which they are able not to change the security balance in that region, at least in the Bab el Mandeb strait, from the Red Sea to the ocean, but to make that imbalance more noticeable.

However, the Houthis’ struggle or movements in general cannot come down to one button, which, if pressed in Tehran, will end everything. disagreements with their authorities have also been going on for a long time.

What does Egypt have to do with all this? Egypt has a long border along the Red Sea, like Saudi Arabia, they have border and island problems. And all of that, naturally, is connected with the Bab el Mandeb strait, through which these routes pass. From Turkey to Iran, to Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea, these countries have both military representation and, of course, security interests in relation to that strait. Israel is also involved in all this. Remember, the Pentagon warned that Ethiopia might also be hit. Because the Israeli special intelligence services also operate in Ethiopia.

If we look at the map of the Bab el Mandeb Strait, Turkey, Israel, and Egypt operate in the countries adjacent to that strait, Eritrea, Djibouti, etc., which, by and large, do not have full self-sufficient sovereignty. Even China has acquired large ports there. Why? Because they understand very well that a significant part of the world’s oil and gas resources, which, along with the Strait of Hormuz, also passes through that area, requires that they have a clear security presence there.

Egypt, yes, with Ethiopia, has a problem of managing the water resources of the Nile, in general, water resources. And during the last 1.5 years, the situation there is almost like a war, 5 years less than a war. Egypt, taking advantage of this opportunity, will naturally try to solve its problems so that Iranian Shiite influence is stopped or not expanded. For this purpose, he is trying to provide support to Saudi Arabia unofficially, informally, within the framework of the Mecca Declaration.

Three days ago, the Egyptian foreign minister made a statement, but did not mention that they supported the Saudis, but Egypt provided very serious military assistance to some Arab countries in the Gulf. In other words, it turns out that Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan, the four main Sunni states, have joined this anti-Iranian anti-Shia coalition.

All this, all these developments should also be considered in the context of TRIPP.

Saudi Arabia has 280 billion barrels of oil. Kuwait, the country with the second largest reserves, has 210 billion, Russia as a whole has 180 billion. In other words, the problem here, by and large, is to take over the oil and gas resources of the Sunni Arab countries. Will the United States provide a security umbrella or not? They are trying to exaggerate Iranian political Shiism, present it as an enemy and move the problem from the field of economic resources to the field of faith and religion. And they more easily succumb to the bait of religious war, and do not understand what is really happening.

The United States is not directly involved in providing that security umbrella, also taking into account that during the past two or three years on the Ukrainian front, on the Eurasian front, a significant part of the military equipment provided by the United States has been used up. Donald Trump has set a problem for the leadership of the Pentagon: until 2027. to ensure the necessary amount of ammunition, because their warehouses, including those in Europe, have been exhausted.

If you have given TRIPP to the US for 49 years with a 74% profit in revenue, it is politically naive to think that it is purely an economic project. The income for Armenia will not exceed 70-80 million dollars, which could be attracted as an international loan, instead of auctioning the strategically important territory of your country. It turns out that Syunik is the main geopolitical key after Artsakh, and if you lose geopolitical independence, you are not taken into account when making decisions, because you are just a transit area.:

And the problem is not only Syunik. A pillar is a goal. And if we let go of geopolitical independence and the opportunity to play with that card, or, to put it bluntly, we sold it cheaply by auctioning it off, it means that we are not an actor. During the last 10 days, high-ranking American officials met with Azerbaijani and Turkish officials in the framework of the United Nations, and discussed the issue of the so-called Zangezur Corridor, but Armenia is not there. In other words, they don’t take you into account.

Now, instead of the word “corridor”, the Americans use the word “connectivity” in order not to inflame additional passions here and, by and large, not to meet internal resistance. They say, well, they are connecting the roads, you will use them, they will use them too. But when the problem concerns the border of Iran, the calculations here have changed a little.

Let’s analyze what happened in the last 2 years on 3 main levels: narrative, procedural and institutional.

Iran strongly opposed TRIPP, even threatening military action if its red lines were crossed on its northern border. Then, if you noticed, at some stage that rhetoric changed, the tone decreased. Meetings and contacts between Armenian and Iranian officials intensified, at least during the last 6 months. What is the reason for this? After the last war between Iran and Israel, naturally, after every war, every state reviews its policies, mistakes and strategies. Now they are revising their country’s doctrine, just as they have revised the security doctrine in the United States.

What are the Iranians doing now, and why have contacts with Iran become more frequent, meetings at the level of officials? The main question is not the road, but who will control the road when you only have 26% sovereignty. In the 13 pages of the TRIPP document, you will not find any point that they are ready to ensure Armenia’s security in case of danger to Armenia. So the Persians are negotiating for control of the road, because if the US has to control it, it’s a problem for Iran.:

Until 2020 Signing of the Abrahamic Accords The security of the Gulf Arab countries was ensured through outsourcing.
A very significant change has been made in the rhetoric of Iran, just by transposing or moving a word or two. We may not see it with the naked eye. If before, 2 years ago, Iran was strongly against such a situation, now it clearly says that it can agree to the road on its own terms. That’s it the same is the concept of connectivity.

Sh:We understand very well that the relations between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan were carried out through Iran during the last 35 years. In other words, for Iran, this is not only an economic, but also a geopolitical factor. Turkey and Azerbaijan have a land connection with each other through the territory of Iran. Where else should they have that connection? They will not go to Georgia from Nakhichevan, and from there to Azerbaijan, and then where will they go? Those economic keys may be lost somewhere, in the case of the so-called corridor or road, but there is a very important issue here. who will control the security in this region? The main question is this.

The problem is not the road. The existence of the road can somehow be tolerated by regional and global forces. But who will control it in the territory of Armenia? If you gave 74 percent to the United States, who will control it? Actually, in reality, you only have 26 percent of the sovereignty. And let’s agree that the legal sovereignty that these authorities are shouting about, saying that we signed a document with the signature of the President of the United States, and we have Trump’s path or I don’t know what, still does not guarantee geopolitical independence. If the Americans will be there, it is a concern for Iran and the Russians. For the Turks, by and large, it is not a problem. We understand very well that the United States has no intention of going further east in the region, with its direct presence, with its face. But… in the end they can say: come on, we have the second army of NATO here, in this region it is Turkey, and we can trust Turkey as our regional policeman in the South Caucasus, in the Eurasian region, in the entire zone stretching from the South Caucasus to Central Asia.

Moreover, Turkey can act in a mediated way, through a third organization. Were there no such distributors? During the last 20-25 years, how did Turkey and Azerbaijan create their influence here, through soft power, various structures and NATO?

TRIPP is a very small, very small section, 42 kilometers. If we look at the borders of the 8 countries bordering Iran, starting from Central Asia to Turkey, which has one of the longest borders with Iran, we will see that the entire region is, by and large, under American or pro-American influence. Based on the principles of Anaconda, this 42-kilometer section is left for Iran. Iran is trying to find alternative means of communication. I won’t open many parentheses, but if we take into account the advisers of the former ambassador of Iran to Armenia in the last 4-5 years, the answers to many questions will become clear. We are talking about those Armenian people who have used western grants for decades and preached anti-church, anti-national, anti-army, anti-Iran theses in Armenia. And those people provided advice to the ambassador of Iran in Armenia. We know all that, we know who was going, and we know about the exchange of those messages.

Iran is going for surgery. Not by his will, the geopolitical reality has changed. The United States has come to this region and says it will pass through here. And how can you solve your problems under these conditions? Are you making reservations? By and large, the economic capacity of that border is relatively much smaller than, for example, the economic ties between Iran and the United Arab Emirates or Iran’s economic ties with the countries of Central Asia and the Middle East. Considering the length of the land border with Iran, we will not even compare the border with Turkey. Therefore, when the economic factor is pushed to the secondary plan, the problem of opening geopolitical airways becomes primary. If you are completely surrounded by the anaconda principle, then you should try to find an alternative.

The Iranian elite has had 3 layers for centuries: the radical conservatives, the Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the merchants. The central, de facto ruling elite, the Revolutionary Guard Corps, is under serious pressure from the other two layers. All 3 layers of the elite want to get out of the war with the US, the question is, at what cost? There is no official in Iran who does not want the war to end.

If 2 months ago Pashinyan was talking about signing the peace agreement quickly, today or tomorrow, today he has already announced: “I want the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan to reach its logical end in 2031.” Time is running out. Soft change of this narrative or change of statements speaks of very hard processes taking place deep or behind it. They also include the contradictions between Armenia and Iran in this matter. Because if the Iranians say, well, we agree, but if these, these, these conditions are met, then those Iranian concerns should also be transferred to the main beneficiary, which owns 76 percent, that is, the United States.

Iran is not a small state, it is a state of regional importance, which has a serious weight in the region and also claims a global role. Iran has been claiming an international role for a long time, spreading its influence in all the Arab countries of the Gulf, up to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Turkey, Azerbaijan… People are trying in every way to make it clear that they must be reckoned with.

Iran is not only sending messages to the USA through Armenia. It also does this through Russia, by the passivity of the Iranian armed groups in Syria, by not escalating Hezbollah’s actions, by all possible means it tells the USA: you have to reckon with us.

If we leave aside the two world wars, Russia, Turkey and Iran are competing states that ensure and passivate geopolitical tectonic movements in this region. After the 1830s, they did not go to war with each other, except for the Crimean War. After the Berlin Congress, they generally reached a certain consensus not to go to war against each other.

But there is a very interesting circumstance․ to this day, the Iranian political mind is always skeptical about cooperation with Russia. Iranians have serious reservations.

That is, if Russia puts the issue before the Armenian authorities like this: TRIPP cannot be implemented, or, I don’t know, I will take some steps, then it does not automatically mean that if Iran has reservations about the presence of the United States here, then Russia should come and replace Iran.

Regularly a message comes from Russia to Armenia: don’t try to play your game by bypassing us. We must definitely have our share there, both in terms of communication security and other issues.

Now, to be honest, I don’t know what they decided. After all, Russia is not a homogeneous state either. Russia also has different towers, different worlds. After all, it is not known what the Kremlin will decide in the end: a hard policy or the use of non-existent Russian soft power.

I have no idea how we are going to get out of this diplomatic adventure. If they tell me now that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is at your disposal, come and collect what was destroyed from the beginning, I will sit down and cry.

Turkey is actually in a very difficult process. Turkey’s South Caucasus policy is based on one main principle. with Azerbaijan, regardless of the contradictions that may exist between the leaders of the two countries. And that bait should not be swallowed. You see, even among CP members I encountered a sick approach. they say, look, Nikol played so that Turkey and Azerbaijan would have problems with each other… They are very funny. Turkey and Azerbaijan are connected by very serious security, political, energy and economic ties. The evidence of their strategic ties is the declaration of Shushi.

Recently, I conducted an interesting research and tried to find out from a political science point of view what is the essence of the Turkish decision-making mechanism, how it is formed in the context of relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan. And I came to quite interesting results. Turkey studies the South Caucasus at four levels. The first is Armenia-Turkey relations. Quite interesting changes have taken place here. The second is Turkey-Azerbaijan strategic and military relations. The third is the context of the “3 3” format. The fourth is the Iran factor. Iran has been included as a separate level because the changes taking place in that direction may affect the first three as well. Much also depends on what will happen in terms of the involvement of the United States in the region. However, the limitation or expansion of Turkey’s role in the South Caucasus is not determined exclusively by this region. Syria and Iraq, Lebanon and the Balkans also play a role here.

Most likely, in November we will also witness the escalation of tension between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea. All indicators and pointers testify that such escalation is possible. Especially considering the two internal factors present in Turkey. The first is “Blue Homeland”. Mavi Vatan is the project, which is a state narrative, not a mere political or governmental agenda. That narrative is being promoted by other forces in parallel. The “blue homeland” concept is naturally opposed by Greece. In the Aegean region, it faces the Greek approach, which is opposed to the idea of neo-Ottomanism. If we study the list of military purchases of Greece in the last three years, we will understand what the country is preparing for. And it doesn’t matter here that Turkey’s economy is seven times larger than Greece’s, and its population is about eight times larger. Greece is seriously preparing.

Before bringing the TRIPP to the National Assembly, you should say who will monitor it, with what resources of the security ecosystem will Armenia ratify and implement that document? Do you know that you have signed an agreement with the African “C” class state, we are talking about the USA, they will say: provide security. Due to the interests of Azerbaijan, something happened, what will you do?:

The main opposition faction, which has given creative hands with its passive loyalty to this government that has dragged our country into these dangerous political games, has said that they are in favor of TRIPP. There is no one in the parliament who will say they are against TRIPP, because no one will go to the political inquisition. Which opposition faction should want to say no to the US?

Russia’s red lines in Armenia are energy, concessions, economic investments. Although the Russians do not resort to active actions, they cannot sit idly by. It’s an empire anyway. Maybe they are calling Russia so that Pashinyan will tell what they talked about with the Iranians and the Americans, including the TRIPP issue.

When we negotiated CEPA with the European Union, we closely cooperated with Russia on security and economic issues within the EAEU and CSTO. Now the world has changed. At that time it was possible, but the leadership of Armenia, in the person of Serzh Sargsyan, put specific questions to the EU leadership in Vilnius: they will not become an anti-Russian platform, what will happen to the issue of weapons, the border with Iran and Artsakh. The Europeans gave no guarantees. At that time they were negotiating in the interest of the country, now to keep their seat:

You are such a hypocrite that you say I need to eliminate Russian influence, but to run the factories you need to build a Russian-made 1000 megawatt nuclear power plant… what kind of bullshit is this, what kind of disgrace? This has nothing to do with foreign policy.

Who will oversee TRIPP? Have you considered Armenia’s security system and security ecosystem? Let’s start with this issue before bringing TRIPP to the National Assembly. Do you have a resource for that? With what resources of the security ecosystem will Armenia ratify that document and implement it?

I said a long time ago that Armenia has never seen a more pro-Russian government than this one.

From Trans-Caspian oil, gas and energy resources to Turkey, this entire region is Russia’s southern geopolitical sphere of influence. This region is very important for Russia. And all these issues can have very serious consequences. That’s why they say, “Boy, this has its price.”

At the meeting with Putin, most likely, in addition to EAEU, they will also talk about TRIPP. In that matter, Russia cannot be bypassed. Maybe Pashinyan should also report to Moscow: what is the news, what did they talk to the Iranians, what did they talk to the Americans? Russians cannot sit idly by. It will mean that Russia should leave the South Caucasus. Yes, outwardly we see that Russia is not taking any serious steps as such. But does this mean that the empire, if it is busy solving its problems in the Eurasian region, for example with the United States or the West, should ignore this region? After all, Azerbaijan has fully adopted a pro-Russian position. It is visible. At the same time, we also see the policy of diversification, including in matters related to relations with Turkey and Israel. Parallel to the strategic, allied relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan welcomes the President of Israel and demonstrably says that it is diversifying its security options. Basically, he is trying to do the same in relations with Russia.

I don’t know, he will go, what will he say to Ladimir Ladimirich? The media cannot draw conclusions and say that everything is ok, because the Russian president has openly said what he used to say behind the scenes: decide, make a choice. He is facing a very difficult choice. I don’t think that Russia will take drastic steps openly. If he only has to tighten the sanctions, they don’t work like that, because the Armenian people feel the consequences of those sanctions on their skin.

If he went to Russia now and was told that by December 31st you should have a decision whether to stay here or not, he has no other option. If he was left between a rock and a hard place, the best option would be to resign. I am not yet talking about what will happen if Azerbaijan attacks at the right moment. There is a risk of escalation at any time:

What did the head of the state say during Shaki’s incident: wait, die, we will come, we will record your death posthumously. Armenia has not been a state for a long time. If an Azerbaijani soldier enters your country, goes 15 km deep into your country, it doesn’t matter if he is “lost” or “hit”, if he doesn’t meet any border guards or soldiers, it means you don’t have a state. I think this was another inspection to fix weak points. People prepare for all scenarios. Who are they arming themselves against… Is Azerbaijan strong enough to arm itself against Iran… When we were a state, we also made such inspection visits:

The ethno-religious map of Azerbaijan is very interesting. One of the reasons for the hijab protests is Pashazadeh because it was her failure. Aliyev handed over the religious dossier to Pashazadeh. The religious and denominational presence of Iran in Azerbaijan is very strong. Iranians tell Azerbaijan to be smart, we are capable of many things. Iran also has capital in Azerbaijan. It is not the case that Azerbaijan is free in this matter, it can do whatever it wants, but the fact that this is the overthrow of Pashazade is of the same value. What did Aliyev do? He entrusted Pashazade with religious and denominational matters. The Shiite direction, however, is quite an interesting phenomenon. In the last 20 years, the Shiite religious trends in Azerbaijan have gained quite serious momentum. The number of both Shiite mosques and religious schools has increased. They are quite active. This process is particularly noticeable in the last 10-15 years, but its foundation was laid already during Heydar Aliyev’s time. This is also the failure of the state of Azerbaijan․ it cannot stop the transformation of movements started under religious or denominational guise into social movements. They are quickly transferred to the field of ensuring social justice. In other words, oppositional or protest movements that start on religious grounds in Azerbaijan later turn into demands for social justice. We are the witnesses of this process.

Here there is also a problem of imposing the image of Aliyev as the winner of the 44-day Artsakh war to the domestic audience and consuming that image. He tries to show a monarchical approach inside. But such behavior means that he does not take into account the factor of at least two states, Turkey and Iran. In the conditions of deteriorating relations between Turkey and Israel and intensifying rhetoric, Azerbaijan’s anti-Turkish steps are also worthy of attention. When Netanyahu gives a speech at the UN, the Turkish delegation leaves the hall, and the Azerbaijani delegate remains there. This is quite serious. Turkey is trying to have a systemic and institutional presence in Azerbaijan. This became evident even during the July 2020 military operations, before the 44-day war.

Turkey is trying to have a systemic and institutional influence in Azerbaijan. I repeat, Azerbaijan and Turkey have very close relations, and no hijab issue can disrupt them.

After the war, Aliyev became very cocky. This speaks of its internal complexes, because without the help of Turkey, Pakistan, Israel and terrorists, it could not do anything in Artsakh… Mercenaries were brought and filled from Syria, Yemen and other places, snipers from Ukraine… Azerbaijan wants to have Turkey’s institutional strategic patronage, but to make independent decisions regarding security decisions. Azerbaijan has fallen into a trap, and clear messages are coming from Turkey: stay smart:

The basis of these attacks against the Church is in the United States, from where various organizations clearly direct their donations. Այդ գործընթացը շարունակվում է դեռևս անցած դարի 70-ականներից․ where there is orthodox Christianity, to attack its foundations. Why? Because, according to that approach, this is what the new architecture of the world requires, related to faith and the ideology of restoring Solomon’s temple. Look where Christianity has suffered great losses. Now everyone is talking about the Arab spring, they say that civil war has been going on in Syria for 10 years. But where were the strikes? To all those churches, including the Armenian church in Der Zor. In 2011, when Mubarak’s government was overthrown in Egypt, the Copts, one of the oldest communities of Christianity, were also targeted. In other words, the most traditional, orthodox foundations were attacked. Theologically, there are five ancient Eastern Christian traditions, including the Coptic, Indian Malabar, Armenian, and Assyrian churches. Serious pressures and movements towards all these communities have been observed since the 70s of the last century. Finally, remember that in the 70s and 80s of the last century, when there was no independent Armenian state in the Diaspora, the armed struggle began. At that time, one of the targets was, in fact, the churches, as well as the World Council of Churches, which, in my opinion, was one of the tools for promoting this policy. By and large, the same is happening now. The problem is to completely destroy the authority of the Armenian Church and other Orthodox churches, to nullify their authority. Remember, on July 24, 2020, before the war, the question of the conversion of the Hagia Sophia into a mosque and the reaction of the Christian, ecumenical world. That reaction, in fact, was not very different from the reaction that happened in other cases. There is also the issue of the idea of the “Third Rome”, to which Russia has ambitions. There is huge pressure on the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Armenian Apostolic Church is also under pressure.

I don’t think that during the past 3-4 years, when the struggle against our Church intensified, there was no kamikaze in the bureaucratic apparatus who was not told not to enter this field. Pashinyan is taking revenge.

I can understand the answers of the ex-married young man. he is a classic populist and he must say: the people brought me.

Details in the video.

https://168.am/2026/10/16/2498854.html?fbclid=IwY2xjawVAGQlleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBwZG9mAXNydGMGYXBwX2lkEDIyMjAzOTE3ODgyMDA4OTIAAR43dVPzEAp2E9_vv4q3WW448ZSIISUDMbaHr2mlASV2jfQAjqT_EF404H3JxA_aem_hhnfk8qgsEp7cRqIOdHMxQ

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RFE/RL – Turkish Minister Visits Armenia

October 17, 2026October 17, 2026 Khoyetsian Rose

Robert Zargarian

October 16, 2026

Armenia – Turkey’s Agriculture Minister Ibrahim Yumakli attends the COP17 Biodiversity Conference in Yerevan, October 16, 2026.

Turkey’s Agriculture Minister Ibrahim Yumakli visited Yerevan on Friday to participate in the latest UN Biodiversity Conference held there.

Yumakli, who is the first Turkish cabinet member to arrive in Armenia in more than a decade, met with Armenian Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan on the sidelines of the COP17 forum.

“We discussed opportunities arising from the establishment of direct trade between Armenia and Turkey,” Papoyan said in a social media post. “We reviewed procedures for the transport and transit of goods subject to sanitary and veterinary control.”

Ankara continues to make the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border contingent on the signing of an Armenian-Azerbaijani peace treaty. It remains reluctant to implement a 2022 agreement to open the border to holders of Armenian and Turkish diplomatic passports and citizens of third countries. Yumakli signaled no change in this policy when he spoke to reporters in Yerevan.

“Turkey wants to see greater peace, tranquility and prosperity in the region, and, naturally, we are continuing this [normalization] process,” he said.

In his words, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s direct contacts with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian are giving new impetus to the process.

Erdogan and Pashinian most recently met in New York late last month on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. According to Pashinian’s office, the two leaders expressed readiness to “advance” Turkish-Armenian commercial ties.

The head of Turkey’s national electricity transmission network visited Armenia last week to discuss power supplies between the two neighboring countries. Other Turkish and Armenian officials met in the Turkish city of Kars in April this year for fresh talks on restoring a railway connecting them.

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FOOTNOTES

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