168: How will we get out of this adventure? if they tell me: MFA is your trash

Satik Seyranyan on the air of “Pressing” program the guest “Genesis Armenia” cerebral center-foundation director, political of sciences candidate, associate professor Abraham Gasparyan is.

The main theses of the interview are below.

• The South Caucasus, as the northern border of the Greater Middle East, cannot remain apart from all the influences that

taking place in the Middle and Middle East itself. It is clear that what happened in Yemen and Saudi Arabia should not be considered at the local or regional level. This is of great importance and reaches up to Abyssinia (Ethiopia), Eritrea, Egypt, Pakistan and even up to one of the other states that joined the so-called Mecca Declaration, Turkey. 

And we will, of course, feel and see the impact of all this in terms of the events or potential events taking place on the Iran-Armenia border.

The Houthis have already become an Iranian proxy force and tool to carry out some kind of anti-American or anti-Saudi activities in that region, like Hezbollah did back in the mid-2000s on Israel’s northern border. In Lebanon, the Houthis already have a large social support, political representation, economic levers and, of course, a foreign political protege in the form of Iran, through which they are able not to change the security balance in that region, at least in the Bab el Mandeb strait, from the Red Sea to the ocean, but to make that imbalance more noticeable.

However, the Houthis’ struggle or movements in general cannot come down to one button, which, if pressed in Tehran, will end everything. disagreements with their authorities have also been going on for a long time.

• What does Egypt have to do with all this? Egypt has a long border along the Red Sea, like Saudi Arabia, they have border and island problems. And all of that, naturally, is connected with the Bab el Mandeb strait, through which these routes pass. From Turkey to Iran, to Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea, these countries have both military representation and, of course, security interests in relation to that strait. Israel is also involved in all this. Remember, the Pentagon warned that Ethiopia might also be hit. Because the Israeli special intelligence services also operate in Ethiopia. 

If we look at the map of the Bab el Mandeb Strait, Turkey, Israel, and Egypt operate in the countries adjacent to that strait, Eritrea, Djibouti, etc., which, by and large, do not have full self-sufficient sovereignty. Even China has acquired large ports there. Why? Because they understand very well that a significant part of the world’s oil and gas resources, which, along with the Strait of Hormuz, also passes through that area, requires that they have a clear security presence there. 

Egypt, yes, with Ethiopia, has a problem of managing the water resources of the Nile, in general, water resources. And during the last 1.5 years, the situation there is almost like a war, 5 years less than a war. Egypt, taking advantage of this opportunity, will naturally try to solve its problems so that Iranian Shiite influence is stopped or not expanded. For this purpose, he is trying to provide support to Saudi Arabia unofficially, informally, within the framework of the Mecca Declaration. 

Three days ago, the Egyptian foreign minister made a statement, but did not mention that they supported the Saudis, but Egypt provided very serious military assistance to some Arab countries in the Gulf. In other words, it turns out that Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan, the four main Sunni states, have joined this anti-Iranian anti-Shia coalition.

All this, all these developments should also be considered in the context of TRIPP. 

• Saudi Arabia has 280 billion barrels of oil. Kuwait, the country with the second largest reserves, has 210 billion, Russia as a whole has 180 billion. In other words, the problem here, by and large, is to take over the oil and gas resources of the Sunni Arab countries. Will the United States provide a security umbrella or not? They are trying to exaggerate Iranian political Shiism, present it as an enemy and move the problem from the field of economic resources to the field of faith and religion. And they more easily succumb to the bait of religious war, and do not understand what is really happening. 

The United States is not directly involved in providing that security umbrella, also taking into account that during the past two or three years on the Ukrainian front, on the Eurasian front, a significant part of the military equipment provided by the United States has been used up. Donald Trump has set a problem for the leadership of the Pentagon: until 2027. to ensure the necessary amount of ammunition, because their warehouses, including those in Europe, have been exhausted. 

• If you have given TRIPP to the US for 49 years with a 74% profit in revenue, it is politically naive to think that it is purely an economic project. The income for Armenia will not exceed 70-80 million dollars, which could be attracted as an international loan, instead of auctioning the strategically important territory of your country. It turns out that Syunik is the main geopolitical key after Artsakh, and if you lose geopolitical independence, you are not taken into account when making decisions, because you are just a transit area.:

And the problem is not only Syunik. A pillar is a goal. And if we let go of geopolitical independence and the opportunity to play with that card, or, to put it bluntly, we sold it cheaply by auctioning it off, it means that we are not an actor. During the last 10 days, high-ranking American officials met with Azerbaijani and Turkish officials in the framework of the United Nations, and discussed the issue of the so-called Zangezur Corridor, but Armenia is not there. In other words, they don’t take you into account. 

• Now, instead of the word “corridor”, the Americans use the word “connectivity” in order not to inflame additional passions here and, by and large, not to meet internal resistance. They say, well, they are connecting the roads, you will use them, they will use them too. But when the problem concerns the border of Iran, the calculations here have changed a little.

Let’s analyze what happened in the last 2 years on 3 main levels: narrative, procedural and institutional.

Iran strongly opposed TRIPP, even threatening military action if its red lines were crossed on its northern border. Then, if you noticed, at some stage that rhetoric changed, the tone decreased. Meetings and contacts between Armenian and Iranian officials intensified, at least during the last 6 months. What is the reason for this? After the last war between Iran and Israel, naturally, after every war, every state reviews its policies, mistakes and strategies. Now they are revising their country’s doctrine, just as they have revised the security doctrine in the United States.

What are the Iranians doing now, and why have contacts with Iran become more frequent, meetings at the level of officials? The main question is not the road, but who will control the road when you only have 26% sovereignty. In the 13 pages of the TRIPP document, you will not find any point that they are ready to ensure Armenia’s security in case of danger to Armenia. So the Persians are negotiating for control of the road, because if the US has to control it, it’s a problem for Iran.:

• Until 2020 Signing of the Abrahamic Accords The security of the Gulf Arab countries was ensured through outsourcing.
• A very significant change has been made in the rhetoric of Iran, just by transposing or moving a word or two. We may not see it with the naked eye. If before, 2 years ago, Iran was strongly against such a situation, now it clearly says that it can agree to the road on its own terms. That’s it the same is the concept of connectivity.

Sh:We understand very well that the relations between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan were carried out through Iran during the last 35 years. In other words, for Iran, this is not only an economic, but also a geopolitical factor. Turkey and Azerbaijan have a land connection with each other through the territory of Iran. Where else should they have that connection? They will not go to Georgia from Nakhichevan, and from there to Azerbaijan, and then where will they go? Those economic keys may be lost somewhere, in the case of the so-called corridor or road, but there is a very important issue here. who will control the security in this region? The main question is this.

• The problem is not the road. The existence of the road can somehow be tolerated by regional and global forces. But who will control it in the territory of Armenia? If you gave 74 percent to the United States, who will control it? Actually, in reality, you only have 26 percent of the sovereignty. And let’s agree that the legal sovereignty that these authorities are shouting about, saying that we signed a document with the signature of the President of the United States, and we have Trump’s path or I don’t know what, still does not guarantee geopolitical independence. If the Americans will be there, it is a concern for Iran and the Russians. For the Turks, by and large, it is not a problem. We understand very well that the United States has no intention of going further east in the region, with its direct presence, with its face. But… in the end they can say: come on, we have the second army of NATO here, in this region it is Turkey, and we can trust Turkey as our regional policeman in the South Caucasus, in the Eurasian region, in the entire zone stretching from the South Caucasus to Central Asia.

Moreover, Turkey can act in a mediated way, through a third organization. Were there no such distributors? During the last 20-25 years, how did Turkey and Azerbaijan create their influence here, through soft power, various structures and NATO?

• TRIPP is a very small, very small section, 42 kilometers. If we look at the borders of the 8 countries bordering Iran, starting from Central Asia to Turkey, which has one of the longest borders with Iran, we will see that the entire region is, by and large, under American or pro-American influence. Based on the principles of Anaconda, this 42-kilometer section is left for Iran. Iran is trying to find alternative means of communication. I won’t open many parentheses, but if we take into account the advisers of the former ambassador of Iran to Armenia in the last 4-5 years, the answers to many questions will become clear. We are talking about those Armenian people who have used western grants for decades and preached anti-church, anti-national, anti-army, anti-Iran theses in Armenia. And those people provided advice to the ambassador of Iran in Armenia. We know all that, we know who was going, and we know about the exchange of those messages.

Iran is going for surgery. Not by his will, the geopolitical reality has changed. The United States has come to this region and says it will pass through here. And how can you solve your problems under these conditions? Are you making reservations? By and large, the economic capacity of that border is relatively much smaller than, for example, the economic ties between Iran and the United Arab Emirates or Iran’s economic ties with the countries of Central Asia and the Middle East. Considering the length of the land border with Iran, we will not even compare the border with Turkey. Therefore, when the economic factor is pushed to the secondary plan, the problem of opening geopolitical airways becomes primary. If you are completely surrounded by the anaconda principle, then you should try to find an alternative.

• The Iranian elite has had 3 layers for centuries: the radical conservatives, the Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the merchants. The central, de facto ruling elite, the Revolutionary Guard Corps, is under serious pressure from the other two layers. All 3 layers of the elite want to get out of the war with the US, the question is, at what cost? There is no official in Iran who does not want the war to end.

• If 2 months ago Pashinyan was talking about signing the peace agreement quickly, today or tomorrow, today he has already announced: “I want the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan to reach its logical end in 2031.” Time is running out. Soft change of this narrative or change of statements speaks of very hard processes taking place deep or behind it. They also include the contradictions between Armenia and Iran in this matter. Because if the Iranians say, well, we agree, but if these, these, these conditions are met, then those Iranian concerns should also be transferred to the main beneficiary, which owns 76 percent, that is, the United States.

• Iran is not a small state, it is a state of regional importance, which has a serious weight in the region and also claims a global role. Iran has been claiming an international role for a long time, spreading its influence in all the Arab countries of the Gulf, up to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Turkey, Azerbaijan… People are trying in every way to make it clear that they must be reckoned with.

• Iran is not only sending messages to the USA through Armenia. It also does this through Russia, by the passivity of the Iranian armed groups in Syria, by not escalating Hezbollah’s actions, by all possible means it tells the USA: you have to reckon with us.

• If we leave aside the two world wars, Russia, Turkey and Iran are competing states that ensure and passivate geopolitical tectonic movements in this region. After the 1830s, they did not go to war with each other, except for the Crimean War. After the Berlin Congress, they generally reached a certain consensus not to go to war against each other.

But there is a very interesting circumstance․ to this day, the Iranian political mind is always skeptical about cooperation with Russia. Iranians have serious reservations.

That is, if Russia puts the issue before the Armenian authorities like this: TRIPP cannot be implemented, or, I don’t know, I will take some steps, then it does not automatically mean that if Iran has reservations about the presence of the United States here, then Russia should come and replace Iran. 

• Regularly a message comes from Russia to Armenia: don’t try to play your game by bypassing us. We must definitely have our share there, both in terms of communication security and other issues.

Now, to be honest, I don’t know what they decided. After all, Russia is not a homogeneous state either. Russia also has different towers, different worlds. After all, it is not known what the Kremlin will decide in the end: a hard policy or the use of non-existent Russian soft power. 

• I have no idea how we are going to get out of this diplomatic adventure. If they tell me now that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is at your disposal, come and collect what was destroyed from the beginning, I will sit down and cry. 

• Turkey is actually in a very difficult process. Turkey’s South Caucasus policy is based on one main principle. with Azerbaijan, regardless of the contradictions that may exist between the leaders of the two countries. And that bait should not be swallowed. You see, even among CP members I encountered a sick approach. they say, look, Nikol played so that Turkey and Azerbaijan would have problems with each other… They are very funny. Turkey and Azerbaijan are connected by very serious security, political, energy and economic ties. The evidence of their strategic ties is the declaration of Shushi.

• Recently, I conducted an interesting research and tried to find out from a political science point of view what is the essence of the Turkish decision-making mechanism, how it is formed in the context of relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan. And I came to quite interesting results. Turkey studies the South Caucasus at four levels. The first is Armenia-Turkey relations. Quite interesting changes have taken place here. The second is Turkey-Azerbaijan strategic and military relations. The third is the context of the “3 3” format. The fourth is the Iran factor. Iran has been included as a separate level because the changes taking place in that direction may affect the first three as well. Much also depends on what will happen in terms of the involvement of the United States in the region. However, the limitation or expansion of Turkey’s role in the South Caucasus is not determined exclusively by this region. Syria and Iraq, Lebanon and the Balkans also play a role here.

• Most likely, in November we will also witness the escalation of tension between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea. All indicators and pointers testify that such escalation is possible. Especially considering the two internal factors present in Turkey. The first is “Blue Homeland”. Mavi Vatan is the project, which is a state narrative, not a mere political or governmental agenda. That narrative is being promoted by other forces in parallel. The “blue homeland” concept is naturally opposed by Greece. In the Aegean region, it faces the Greek approach, which is opposed to the idea of ​​neo-Ottomanism. If we study the list of military purchases of Greece in the last three years, we will understand what the country is preparing for. And it doesn’t matter here that Turkey’s economy is seven times larger than Greece’s, and its population is about eight times larger. Greece is seriously preparing. 

• Before bringing the TRIPP to the National Assembly, you should say who will monitor it, with what resources of the security ecosystem will Armenia ratify and implement that document? Do you know that you have signed an agreement with the African “C” class state, we are talking about the USA, they will say: provide security. Due to the interests of Azerbaijan, something happened, what will you do?:

• The main opposition faction, which has given creative hands with its passive loyalty to this government that has dragged our country into these dangerous political games, has said that they are in favor of TRIPP. There is no one in the parliament who will say they are against TRIPP, because no one will go to the political inquisition. Which opposition faction should want to say no to the US?

• Russia’s red lines in Armenia are energy, concessions, economic investments. Although the Russians do not resort to active actions, they cannot sit idly by. It’s an empire anyway. Maybe they are calling Russia so that Pashinyan will tell what they talked about with the Iranians and the Americans, including the TRIPP issue.

• When we negotiated CEPA with the European Union, we closely cooperated with Russia on security and economic issues within the EAEU and CSTO. Now the world has changed. At that time it was possible, but the leadership of Armenia, in the person of Serzh Sargsyan, put specific questions to the EU leadership in Vilnius: they will not become an anti-Russian platform, what will happen to the issue of weapons, the border with Iran and Artsakh. The Europeans gave no guarantees. At that time they were negotiating in the interest of the country, now to keep their seat:

• You are such a hypocrite that you say I need to eliminate Russian influence, but to run the factories you need to build a Russian-made 1000 megawatt nuclear power plant… what kind of bullshit is this, what kind of disgrace? This has nothing to do with foreign policy. 

• Who will oversee TRIPP? Have you considered Armenia’s security system and security ecosystem? Let’s start with this issue before bringing TRIPP to the National Assembly. Do you have a resource for that? With what resources of the security ecosystem will Armenia ratify that document and implement it?

• I said a long time ago that Armenia has never seen a more pro-Russian government than this one. 

• From Trans-Caspian oil, gas and energy resources to Turkey, this entire region is Russia’s southern geopolitical sphere of influence. This region is very important for Russia. And all these issues can have very serious consequences. That’s why they say, “Boy, this has its price.” 

• At the meeting with Putin, most likely, in addition to EAEU, they will also talk about TRIPP. In that matter, Russia cannot be bypassed. Maybe Pashinyan should also report to Moscow: what is the news, what did they talk to the Iranians, what did they talk to the Americans? Russians cannot sit idly by. It will mean that Russia should leave the South Caucasus. Yes, outwardly we see that Russia is not taking any serious steps as such. But does this mean that the empire, if it is busy solving its problems in the Eurasian region, for example with the United States or the West, should ignore this region? After all, Azerbaijan has fully adopted a pro-Russian position. It is visible. At the same time, we also see the policy of diversification, including in matters related to relations with Turkey and Israel. Parallel to the strategic, allied relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan welcomes the President of Israel and demonstrably says that it is diversifying its security options. Basically, he is trying to do the same in relations with Russia. 

• I don’t know, he will go, what will he say to Ladimir Ladimirich? The media cannot draw conclusions and say that everything is ok, because the Russian president has openly said what he used to say behind the scenes: decide, make a choice. He is facing a very difficult choice. I don’t think that Russia will take drastic steps openly. If he only has to tighten the sanctions, they don’t work like that, because the Armenian people feel the consequences of those sanctions on their skin.

• If he went to Russia now and was told that by December 31st you should have a decision whether to stay here or not, he has no other option. If he was left between a rock and a hard place, the best option would be to resign. I am not yet talking about what will happen if Azerbaijan attacks at the right moment. There is a risk of escalation at any time:

• What did the head of the state say during Shaki’s incident: wait, die, we will come, we will record your death posthumously. Armenia has not been a state for a long time. If an Azerbaijani soldier enters your country, goes 15 km deep into your country, it doesn’t matter if he is “lost” or “hit”, if he doesn’t meet any border guards or soldiers, it means you don’t have a state. I think this was another inspection to fix weak points. People prepare for all scenarios. Who are they arming themselves against… Is Azerbaijan strong enough to arm itself against Iran… When we were a state, we also made such inspection visits: 

• The ethno-religious map of Azerbaijan is very interesting. One of the reasons for the hijab protests is Pashazadeh because it was her failure. Aliyev handed over the religious dossier to Pashazadeh. The religious and denominational presence of Iran in Azerbaijan is very strong. Iranians tell Azerbaijan to be smart, we are capable of many things. Iran also has capital in Azerbaijan. It is not the case that Azerbaijan is free in this matter, it can do whatever it wants, but the fact that this is the overthrow of Pashazade is of the same value. What did Aliyev do? He entrusted Pashazade with religious and denominational matters. The Shiite direction, however, is quite an interesting phenomenon. In the last 20 years, the Shiite religious trends in Azerbaijan have gained quite serious momentum. The number of both Shiite mosques and religious schools has increased. They are quite active. This process is particularly noticeable in the last 10-15 years, but its foundation was laid already during Heydar Aliyev’s time. This is also the failure of the state of Azerbaijan․ it cannot stop the transformation of movements started under religious or denominational guise into social movements. They are quickly transferred to the field of ensuring social justice. In other words, oppositional or protest movements that start on religious grounds in Azerbaijan later turn into demands for social justice. We are the witnesses of this process.

• Here there is also a problem of imposing the image of Aliyev as the winner of the 44-day Artsakh war to the domestic audience and consuming that image. He tries to show a monarchical approach inside. But such behavior means that he does not take into account the factor of at least two states, Turkey and Iran. In the conditions of deteriorating relations between Turkey and Israel and intensifying rhetoric, Azerbaijan’s anti-Turkish steps are also worthy of attention. When Netanyahu gives a speech at the UN, the Turkish delegation leaves the hall, and the Azerbaijani delegate remains there. This is quite serious. Turkey is trying to have a systemic and institutional presence in Azerbaijan. This became evident even during the July 2020 military operations, before the 44-day war.

• Turkey is trying to have a systemic and institutional influence in Azerbaijan. I repeat, Azerbaijan and Turkey have very close relations, and no hijab issue can disrupt them.

• After the war, Aliyev became very cocky. This speaks of its internal complexes, because without the help of Turkey, Pakistan, Israel and terrorists, it could not do anything in Artsakh… Mercenaries were brought and filled from Syria, Yemen and other places, snipers from Ukraine… Azerbaijan wants to have Turkey’s institutional strategic patronage, but to make independent decisions regarding security decisions. Azerbaijan has fallen into a trap, and clear messages are coming from Turkey: stay smart:

• The basis of these attacks against the Church is in the United States, from where various organizations clearly direct their donations. Այդ գործընթացը շարունակվում է դեռևս անցած դարի 70-ականներից․ where there is orthodox Christianity, to attack its foundations. Why? Because, according to that approach, this is what the new architecture of the world requires, related to faith and the ideology of restoring Solomon’s temple. Look where Christianity has suffered great losses. Now everyone is talking about the Arab spring, they say that civil war has been going on in Syria for 10 years. But where were the strikes? To all those churches, including the Armenian church in Der Zor. In 2011, when Mubarak’s government was overthrown in Egypt, the Copts, one of the oldest communities of Christianity, were also targeted. In other words, the most traditional, orthodox foundations were attacked. Theologically, there are five ancient Eastern Christian traditions, including the Coptic, Indian Malabar, Armenian, and Assyrian churches. Serious pressures and movements towards all these communities have been observed since the 70s of the last century. Finally, remember that in the 70s and 80s of the last century, when there was no independent Armenian state in the Diaspora, the armed struggle began. At that time, one of the targets was, in fact, the churches, as well as the World Council of Churches, which, in my opinion, was one of the tools for promoting this policy. By and large, the same is happening now. The problem is to completely destroy the authority of the Armenian Church and other Orthodox churches, to nullify their authority. Remember, on July 24, 2020, before the war, the question of the conversion of the Hagia Sophia into a mosque and the reaction of the Christian, ecumenical world. That reaction, in fact, was not very different from the reaction that happened in other cases. There is also the issue of the idea of ​​the “Third Rome”, to which Russia has ambitions. There is huge pressure on the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Armenian Apostolic Church is also under pressure. 

• I don’t think that during the past 3-4 years, when the struggle against our Church intensified, there was no kamikaze in the bureaucratic apparatus who was not told not to enter this field. Pashinyan is taking revenge.

• I can understand the answers of the ex-married young man. he is a classic populist and he must say: the people brought me.

Details in the video.

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