April 6 2026
Once state-funded, the centre now faces possible closure after the government withdrew support, saying the treatment lacks scientific evidence.
Deep beneath Armenia’s capital, a Soviet-era salt mine turned wellbeing hospital has become the unlikely centre of a growing debate over alternative medicine and modern healthcare.
Visitors descend 235 metres underground into the Republican Centre of Speleotherapy in Yerevan, where treatment consists not of medication but of breathing mineral-rich air inside huge salt caves believed to ease respiratory illness.
Speleotherapy – from the Greek word spḗlaion, meaning “cave” – is a form of alternative respiratory therapy based on spending extended periods in underground environments such as salt mines.
The clinic opened in 1987 and for decades operated as part of Armenia’s public healthcare system. But in 2019, the government cuts its funding, saying the treatment did not meet the evidence-based standards required under the country’s new universal healthcare reforms.
Since then, the centre has been fighting to stay open, even as patients continue travelling long distances in search of relief.
An unusual medical retreat beneath the earth
Armen Stepanyan, a 63-year-old mechanical engineer from the Siberian city of Kemerovo in Russia, has returned to the caves every year for more than a decade to treat severe asthma. “I’ve had asthma since I was 37. It got really bad at some point, and nothing would help. I went to a sanatorium for treatment, but that didn’t help either, so eventually I came here.”
He describes the therapy as life-changing: “I thought it was salvation. After that, I came to Yerevan every year, except for the coronavirus year. This is already the 13th time I’ve come to these caves for treatment.”
Inside the tunnels, patients rest in rows of beds, exercise, or sit together in group therapy sessions while doctors monitor their breathing and lung function. The underground environment is shielded from allergens, pollution and temperature fluctuations.
Doctor Anush Voskanyan has worked at the clinic since it opened nearly four decades ago. “The Republican Centre of Speleotherapy is located at a depth of 235 metres, deep in the salt mines. Our hospital was founded about forty years ago, and I’ve been working here since its creation. We treat mainly patients with bronchial asthma, allergic diseases, especially respiratory allergies, and skin allergies.”
She says the conditions underground are key to the treatment’s effects: “The air here is ionised, and the temperature is constant year-round, 19–20°C, and doesn’t fluctuate constantly. This is due to the depth down the earth’s crust. Radiation is reduced to zero here.”
“There are no surface magnetic radio waves, noise, dust, or allergens, and thanks to all these factors, we obtain the healing effect,” she adds.
An old medicine under scrutiny
Supporters argue that speleotherapy has long been part of healthcare traditions across eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where natural environments such as mineral springs and mountain sanatoriums were widely used to treat chronic illness.
However critics argue there is still not enough large-scale scientific research proving the treatment actually works, and Armenian health officials say that with limited healthcare budgets, priority has to go to treatments supported by stronger evidence.
The withdrawal of state support has sharply reduced patient numbers and placed the centre’s future in doubt.
“Our centre is currently facing a crisis, as we no longer receive government funding. The centre is at risk and may be forced to close down completely. As a result, patients are unable to receive treatment due to the lack of government support. We hope that investors will come forward and that the centre will be revived,” Voskanyan says.
The government is now trying to privatise its share in the facility, raising hopes that private investors or medical tourism could potentially help keep the underground clinic open.
Check out the video above to see inside the underground retreat. https://www.euronews.com/video/2026/04/06/inside-armenias-underground-wellbeing-retreat-where-asthma-patients-seek-relief
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Heading west
Armenia’s economy is thriving as it loosens ties with Russia and looks towards Brussels. That may be no coincidence.
It was, even by the standards of what passes as Kremlin diplomacy, an extraordinary piece of theatre. On April 1, Vladimir Putin sat across from Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia’s prime minister, and told him bluntly that membership in both the EU and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) was impossible. He dangled the price of Russian gas (177.50 US dollars per thousand cubic metres, against more than 600 US dollars in Europe) as a reminder of what Yerevan stood to lose. Pashinyan did not flinch. When the time comes to choose, he replied, the citizens of Armenia will make that decision.
The exchange would have been unthinkable a few years ago. Armenia was, for three decades after independence, firmly within Moscow’s orbit: a member of the EAEU and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), host to a Russian military base, dependent on Russian gas and arms. What changed everything was Azerbaijan’s reconquest of the Karabakh region in 2023. Russia, Armenia’s nominal security guarantor, did nothing. Pashinyan has not forgiven this, and nor have ordinary Armenians. The country suspended its CSTO membership in 2024. Its parliament passed an EU accession law in March 2025. And this March Pashinyan stood before the European Parliament in Strasbourg and declared that Armenia’s path led to Brussels.
The economy, meanwhile, is giving him cover. The World Bank’s latest economic update, published in March, paints a picture of robust health. Economic activity grew by 7.6 per cent year on year in January, powered by an 18.7 per cent surge in construction and a 25.2 per cent jump in mining. Retail expanded by 7.9 per cent. Tourist arrivals were up 28.6 per cent. The financial system looks solid: the capital adequacy ratio stands at 20.3 per cent and non-performing loans at just 1.3 per cent. A budget surplus equivalent to 0.9 per cent of projected annual GDP was recorded. Gross reserves reached 5.5 billion dollars at the end of February, enough to cover 4.1 months of imports.
Dig beneath the headline figure and the story gets more interesting. Exports and imports both fell sharply in January (by 13.5 and 11.2 per cent respectively), largely because the re-export boom in precious stones and appliances that accompanied Russia’s war in Ukraine is winding down. Strip those categories out and exports actually rose by eight per cent. Armenia’s economy, in other words, is weaning itself off the sanctions-arbitrage windfall that briefly inflated its trade figures in 2022 and 2023. Mining exports (up 43 per cent) and a fast-growing technology sector are picking up the slack. Tech now accounts for roughly seven per cent of GDP, and the number of active high-tech companies surged from around 8,000 in 2024 to more than 10,700 in 2025. A 500 million US dollars partnership between Firebird, an American AI cloud start-up, NVIDIA and the Armenian government to build an AI computing facility may sound fanciful for a country of three million. But Armenia has deep roots in mathematics and semiconductor design stretching back to the Soviet era.
Manageable risks
Remittances tell a more complicated tale. Net non-commercial money transfers grew by 43.7 per cent in January, with Russia accounting for 52 per cent of inflows and the United States 38 per cent. Armenia remains tethered to Russian money, even as it drifts politically westward. Inflation, too, needs watching: it rose to 4.3 per cent in February, driven mostly by food prices (up 6.5 per cent). The central bank’s policy rate sits at 6.5 per cent, but food-price pressure in a country where groceries make up around 40 per cent of the consumption basket is not something any government can ignore before an election.
And an election is coming. Armenians go to the polls in June for parliamentary elections that will amount to a referendum on Pashinyan’s westward turn. Putin made his interest in the outcome plain at the Kremlin, expressing hope that ‘pro-Russian forces’ would be allowed to compete freely and noting that some of their representatives were in custody. He was referring to Samvel Karapetyan, a Russian-Armenian billionaire arrested last year after calling for the government’s ouster. Pashinyan’s reply was characteristically pointed: Armenian law bars dual citizens from standing for office. Moscow’s preferred candidates are welcome to run, provided they choose Armenia over Russia first.
The EU, for its part, is rolling out the welcome mat. A 270 million euros Resilience and Growth Plan for 2024 to 2027 is already in place. A new Strategic Agenda was adopted in December 2025. In May, Yerevan will host both the eighth European Political Community summit and the first ever EU-Armenia summit. Visa liberalisation talks are under way. And the EU monitoring mission deployed along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border since 2023, modest in size but potent in symbolism, is a quiet reminder that Europe has skin in the game.
None of this makes the path smooth. Armenia is landlocked, shares no border with the EU, and gets its gas from Russia at a fraction of European prices. Georgia, its only plausible land corridor to Europe, has its own fraught relationship with Brussels. The World Bank projects growth will moderate to around 4.6 per cent in 2026 as the post-invasion sugar rush fades. And Russian interference in the June elections is likely.
Pashinyan appears to have decided that these are manageable risks. His message to Putin was polite but unmistakable: Armenia is a democracy where social networks face no restrictions, where there are no political prisoners, and where citizens (not foreign presidents) determine the country’s direction. The formal EU membership application has not yet been submitted. The trajectory, though, is plain enough. Armenia’s future, its prime minister reckons, lies in Brussels, not in a customs union designed in Moscow. The numbers, so far, suggest he might be right.
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Yerevan threatens to leave Russia-led blocs in latest diplomatic row with Mosc
Armenia has threatened to leave Russian-led economic and security blocs in response to possible economic pressure from Russia. The two countries have been engaged in a contentious back-and-forth following a meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
During the meeting on 1 April, the sides discussed bilateral issues, as well as Armenia’s relations and ongoing projects with the EU and the US.
Although both Armenian and Russian officials assessed the talks positively, developments in the aftermath suggest cracks and deeper tensions in the bilateral relationship.
Even so, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that ‘understanding was demonstrated’ by the Armenian side regarding the concerns expressed by Russia. Lavrov added that the development of relations remains to be seen.
Separately, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk issued another warning, saying that if Armenia joins the EU, there would be no flights between Armenia and Russia, considering that ‘there is currently no air travel with EU countries’.
Overchuk had previously accused Armenia after the meeting of coming ‘very close to the point where we will have to restructure our economic relations with this country’.
Shortly after, Russia announced ‘stricter requirements’ on the import of Armenian products.
Armenia threatens to withdraw from the EAEU and CSTO
In response to comments suggesting that the Russia had given Armenia ultimatums during the Pashinyan–Putin meeting, Yerevan has suggested it could leave the Russian-led security and economic blocs, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CTSO), if economic pressure from Russia continue.
Asked about the threats last Saturday, Armenian Parliamentary Speaker Alen Simonyan noted that such conversations ‘have been going on for years’.
‘If they make such a decision, Armenia will also make its own decision and will withdraw once and for all from the CSTO, and the EAEU, and from the remaining structures as well’, Simonyan said. He further assessed this as unlikely, noting that following the tense public statements, Pashinyan and Putin had ‘a very good’ and ‘very effective’ conversation.
During the talks, Putin underscored the impossibility of being in a customs union with the EU and the EAEU. He additionally addressed gas prices, highlighting the significant discount Armenia receives from buying Russian energy.
‘The price of gas in Europe exceeds $600 per 1000 cubic meters, and Russia sells gas to Armenia for $177.5 per 1000 cubic metres’, Putin said.
Similarly to Simonyan, Armenian Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan expressed confidence that gas prices would not change, because ‘Armenia is needed by its partners so that it remains both in the CSTO and in the EAEU’.
‘If Armenia is not supposed to receive those benefits, then why should it remain in that union? A process of joining another union will begin, and it will happen in a more accelerated manner’, Papoyan said.
He also questioned the benefits the CSTO provided to Armenia, at the same time highlighting Armenia’s value as a member, serving as a passage for goods to the bloc.
Following Armenian official statements, on Monday, Belarusian President Aliaksandr Lukashenka suggested that CSTO Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov visit Armenia to speak with Pashinyan and ‘learn their position on the future’ regarding Armenia’s membership.
Armenia had ‘frozen’ its membership in the CSTO in February 2024, citing its refusal to aid Armenia in the face of Azerbaijani attacks in 2021 and 2022.
However, Armenian officials, including Pashinyan, appear to be more inclined towards leaving the CSTO, rather than ‘unfreezing’ Armenia’s membership. In an interview with RFE/RL last Friday, Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan stated that Armenia was ‘practically out of the CSTO’.
‘I do not see any possibility that Armenia will return, and the remaining steps should be taken when necessary and at the appropriate time’, Kostanyan said.
Armenia appears to reject Russia’s aid to tackle hybrid threats
In the same interview, Kostanyan also responded to Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, who recently expressed Moscow’s readiness to assist Armenia in tackling hybrid attacks, citing its resources and capabilities.
‘Russia has other resources too, the same “Matroshka” and “Storm” networks. We would be happy to receive information from them, for example, how these Telegram bots connected to them work’, Kostanyan said.
The two bot networks, affiliated with Russia, were launched in 2023. Records indicate they have been active in Armenia, Moldova, France, Germany, and other countries.
Kostanyan further accused Russia of often being more interested in the continuation of the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict rather than finding a resolution to it.
‘It has shown over the years that it is often more interested in the existence of conflict than in the presence of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan’, Kostanyan said.
Zakharova’s statement followed remarks by Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan in March.
Responding to a question about the possibility of requesting similar support from Russia to tackle hybrid attacks, as they did from the EU, Mirzoyan noted: ‘If Russia has its own experience in combating hybrid attacks and is ready to share it, we are not against it. Let them share it, and we will see what kind of experience it is’.
The Nagorno-Karabakh question and CSTO mechanisms
On Monday, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry responded to Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov’s recent comments where he said ‘the question of Karabakh’s ownership is in no way related to Russia; that decision rests with the Armenian authorities’. Peskov had made the remark following Putin’s meeting with Pashinyan.
Baku noted that ‘no country, including Russia, […] has ever questioned the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan, including the Karabakh region’. It also urged that ‘issues related to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty will not become a subject of public clarification at a time when Russian–Armenian relations are complex’.
Addressing Armenia’s frozen status in CSTO, Putin repeated previously debunked claims in the meeting, insisting that following Pashinyan’s government’s recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan in Prague in October 2022, ‘the CSTO’s intervention in this process […] was simply absolutely wrong in this matter’.
Armenia had only appealed for CSTO assistance following the Azerbaijani attack on Armenia in September 2022. In his response during the meeting with Putin, Pashinyan insisted that in 2022, ‘CSTO mechanisms should have been activated, but they were not activated, and this, of course, led to the situation that we have in relations with the CSTO’.
He also said that before Armenia’s recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, ‘the top leadership of Russia […] twice publicly announced this’.
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Lukashenko: “The situation in Armenia is complicated”
Yerevan /Mediamax/. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated today that the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) “needs to be very careful and correct while dealing with Armenia.”
According to BELTA, at a meeting with CSTO Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov, Alexander Lukashenko noted:
“You know, Armenia doesn’t seem to support the CSTO, but at the same time, it remains a member. We need to be very careful. Armenia is in a complicated situation in this regard, especially during the election period. Therefore, we need to be very careful and cautious in our relations with Armenia.”
“If you had visited Armenia and held discussions with the prime minister, the president, and the secretary of the Security Council to understand their position on the future, it would have been nice,” the president of Belarus said, addressing Taalatbek Masadykov.
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Lukashenko urges CSTO to be more careful with Armenia
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) needs to be very careful in working with Armenia. This was announced today, April 6, by President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko at a meeting with CSTO Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov.
Lukashenko recalled that along with certain achievements in the CSTO, there are also problematic issues, which he has repeatedly openly talked about, including at international meetings and events. The Belarusian leader called the relationship with Armenia one of such issues requiring special attention.
“We need to be more correct and careful in our work with Armenia. You know that Armenia does not seem to support work in the CSTO, but at the same time remains in Organizations. You have to be very correct. The situation in Armenia is difficult in this regard, especially during the electoral period (parliamentary elections are scheduled in the summer – EADaily). A very difficult situation. Therefore, we need to be very careful and careful in our relations with Armenia,” he said.
In this regard, Lukashenko considers it important to organize meetings at the level of the CSTO Secretary General and the leadership of Armenia.
“Especially now, in this acute electoral period, when the Armenian leadership will speak honestly and frankly about the situation, including on the CSTO track… If you would visit there and talk with the Prime Minister, the president, the Secretary of the Armenian Security Council, find out their position for the future, it would be nice,” the Belarusian leader said.
Recall that Belarus and Armenia is a member of the CSTO. However, they are due to the close ties between Minsk and Baku- Yerevan has almost completely frozen political contacts with the Belarusian authorities.
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Armenian PM’s Moscow pushback plays to a domestic audience pre-election
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s unusually blunt comments to Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow last week indicate he was playing as much to a domestic audience ahead of the June general election as at recalibrating ties with Armenia’s long-time ally.
During an April 1 meeting at the Kremlin, both leaders struck a formally cordial tone, emphasising continued cooperation. Yet beneath the surface, the joint press conference revealed widening differences over Armenia’s political direction, its democratic processes and its evolving foreign policy.
Putin used the occasion to signal concern over Armenia’s internal political climate ahead of the vote, highlighting the role of pro-Russian figures. “In Armenia we have many friends, many, we know that. Many Armenians live in the Russian Federation… we consider it more than 2mn people,” he said. “And there are many political forces that have a pro-Russian position.”
He added pointedly: “We would very much like all these political parties, political figures to be able to participate in this internal political work during the elections. Some, I know, are in places of detention, despite the fact that they have a Russian passport. That is your decision, we do not interfere, but we would like them to be able to participate, at least, in this internal political process.”
Pashinyan responded with a firm defence of Armenia’s democratic credentials, pushing back against what appeared to be an implicit criticism of his government. “As for our domestic political processes… Armenia is a democratic country, and we almost always have political processes,” he said. “In fact, twice a year we hold municipal elections… I want to say that we have citizens who think that there is too much democracy in Armenia. But this is a matter of principle for us.”
On the question of whether Russian citizens can participate, he said: “Only those citizens who have exclusively Armenian passports can participate in these elections… with all due respect, but persons with Russian passports… cannot be either candidates for deputies or candidates for prime minister.”
He also highlighted freedoms in Armenia, which contrast with the recent clampdown in Russia. “Social networks are 100% free in our country, there are no restrictions at all,” he told the Russian president. Addressing Putin’s remarks on detained figures, Pashinyan added that there are no political prisoners in Armenia.
The unusually direct rebuttals, delivered in Moscow, were a departure from the more cautious language Yerevan has traditionally used with its strategic partner, and the timing is unlikely to be coincidental.
With parliamentary elections approaching in June, Pashinyan faces a complex political landscape shaped by the aftermath of Armenia’s defeat in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which resulted in the enclave’s return to Azerbaijani control. Since then, he has pursued a peace process with Azerbaijan, and a gradual but unmistakable shift away from Russia’s orbit.
His Civil Contract party remains the frontrunner, but support has been eroded by territorial losses and domestic controversies, including a bitter confrontation with the Armenian Apostolic Church. Opposition blocs with closer ties to Moscow have sought to capitalise on this discontent, accusing the government of conceding too much to Azerbaijan and pursuing unrealistic Western ambitions.
While the political contest does not fall neatly along pro-West versus pro-Russian lines, divisions over the nature of Armenia’s relationship with Moscow are increasingly central. None of the main political forces advocate a complete rupture with Russia, widely still seen as a key partner, but they differ sharply on how much autonomy Yerevan should assert.
That debate is unfolding alongside a broader change in the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus. Since the 2018 “Velvet Revolution” and the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia has moved to diversify its foreign relations. Long dependent on Russia for security guarantees and economic stability, Yerevan has stepped up engagement with the European Union and the United States, while seeking to redefine ties with both Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Differences over this trajectory surfaced clearly in Moscow. Putin adopted a cautionary tone on Armenia’s growing links with the EU. “We see that Armenia is discussing developing relations with the European Union. We are completely calm about this,” he said. “We understand that any country seeks maximum benefits from cooperation with third countries.”
However, he warned: “Being in a customs union with the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union is impossible. It is simply impossible by definition… this isn’t even a political issue, but a purely economic one.”
Pashinyan acknowledged the tension but signalled that Armenia would continue its balancing act. “As long as it’s possible to combine these agendas, we will do so,” he said. “And when processes develop to the point where a decision must be made, I am confident that the citizens of the Republic of Armenia will accept it.”
At the same time, he sought to reassure Moscow: “Our relations with the Russian Federation have never been and never will be in question, because these ties and relations are very deep and non-negotiable.”
Security tensions, however, remain unresolved. Armenia has effectively frozen its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russian-led military alliance, after it failed to intervene during military clashes with Azerbaijan.
Putin linked that inaction to Armenia’s own political decisions. “After you accepted in Prague in 2022 that Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan, the CSTO’s intervention… was simply absolutely wrong,” he said.
Pashinyan reiterated his frustration. “We have never hidden our problems with the CSTO,” he said. “In 2022 we had a specific situation… and, in my opinion, the CSTO mechanisms should have been activated, but they were not activated.” As a result, Armenia has stepped back from the bloc: “We are not currently participating in the work of the CSTO for a simple reason: we are still unable to explain to our people… why the CSTO did not respond, despite the obligations that exist.”
The dispute reflects a deeper erosion of trust that began during the war with Azerbaijan, when Russia did not provide the level of support many Armenians expected. That perception has fed a gradual shift in public opinion.
Recent polling by the International Republican Institute suggests a growing openness to a Western orientation, particularly among younger voters, though most Armenians still favour maintaining balanced relations with both Russia and the West. The latest poll from the institute showed that almost half of Armenians want Yerevan to pursue a pro-Western foreign policy, though most also want to maintain relations with Russia.
External pressure is also becoming a factor. Armenian authorities have warned of possible foreign interference ahead of the election, with intelligence officials citing attempts to mobilise diaspora communities.
The European Union stepped in at the Armenian government’s request, agreeing to deploy a specialised team to help Armenia counter potential hybrid threats. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said the bloc had already observed disinformation patterns similar to those seen elsewhere. “The European Union will do everything to be there for you,” she said, adding that support would focus on “detection, analysis and response to foreign interference”.
The situation echoes developments in other post-Soviet states. Moldova has moved to exit the Commonwealth of Independent States as part of its push towards EU integration.
Even Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev defied Russia over its annexation of parts of Ukraine’s Donbas region, when he publicly refused to recognise the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) and Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) in Ukraine as independent republics.
In Armenia, the balancing act is particularly delicate. Russia remains deeply embedded in the country’s economy and infrastructure, and millions of Armenians live and work in the Russian Federation.
By publicly asserting Armenia’s sovereignty and democratic credentials, Pashinyan appears to be appealing to voters who favour a more independent course, while still stopping short of a full break with Russia.
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Armenia And Former Soviet Republics To Choose Between European Union And EAEU/
By Kester Kenn Klomegah
Armenia, a former Soviet republic, and Russia were members of the Soviet Union, and were strictly guided by rules and regulations. After the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991, the republics have legitimacy to their severeignty and territorial integrity. But that has not been the case. Kazakhstan operates a liberal economic system, so are other republics including Armenia. These republics, mostly have a tough time and, to some extent, control from Russia.
At a tense meeting in early April with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Vladimir Putin issued an ultimatum to its neighbour Armenia over maintaining closer ties with European Union (EU).
“We see that there is a discussion in Armenia about developing relations with the European Union,” Putin said at the meeting with Pashinyan, adding that Moscow treats it “absolutely calmly”. But it should be obvious and honestly stated upfront that membership in a customs union with both the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union is impossible,” Putin told Pashinyan as recorded on camera.
The Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) created in 2015 includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and it is meant to enable the free movement of goods, capital and labour among its members. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and others have an increasing interest to get closer with trade and establish a working mutual economic cooperation with the EU, with Pashinyan even declaring an intention to join the 27-member bloc in the future.
During the meeting at the Kremlin, Putin followed up on Moscow’s gas supplies to Armenia, saying that Russia now sells gas to its neighbour at a “substantially” lower price than the EU does. “Gas prices in Europe exceed 600 dollars per 1,000 cubic metres, whereas Russia provides gas to Armenia at 177.5 per 1,000 cubic metres,” he told Pashinyan, adding that “the disparity is vast, the difference is substantial.”
The Case of Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan, one of the Russian neighbours and former Soviet republics, also opens its doors for a broader external expansion. Given its geographical location and combined with current political reforms aim at transforming the its economic from the Soviet system to a more modernized system infused with western culture of life, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has chosen multi-vector policies, consistently advocating for more openness and improving necessary conditions for attracting foreign business and investors to participate in the various economics sectors and including the cultural and educational sectors.
Declaring that the creation of a fair Kazakhstan as its main goal, Tokayev has emphasized that the foreign policy course must also aim at protection of national interests, strengthening of mutually beneficial cooperation with all interested states, international peace and security. As part of promoting multi-culture and friendly society, Kazakhstan has seriously made in-bound tourism as one of its priority spheres, so it has established a visa-free regime for citizens of 54 countries, including the European Union and OECD member states, the United States, Japan, Mexico, Australia and New Zealand.
Kazakhstan has a GDP of $179.332 billion and an annual growth rate of 4.5%. Per capita, Kazakhstan’s GDP stands at $9,686. It’s increased role in global trade and central positioning on the new Silk Road gave the country the potential to open its markets to billions of people. Further to this, it joined the World Trade Organization in 2015.
According to some reports, Kazakhstan has an abundant supply of accessible mineral and fossil fuel resources. Development of petroleum, natural gas, and mineral extractions has attracted most of the over $40 billion in foreign investment in Kazakhstan since 1993 and accounts for some 57% of the nation’s industrial output (or approximately 13% of gross domestic product).
The Concept of the Foreign Policy of Kazakhstan for 2020–2030, as announced and was made public, the document outlines the following main points:
– An open, predictable and consistent foreign policy of the country, which is progressive in nature and maintains its endurance by continuing the course of the First President – the country at a new stage of development;
– Protection of human rights, development of humanitarian diplomacy and environmental protection;
– Promotion of the country’s economic interests in the international arena, including the implementation of state policy to attract investment;
– Maintaining international peace and security;
– Development of regional and multilateral diplomacy, which primarily involves strengthening mutually beneficial ties with key partners, for example: Russia, China, the United States, Central Asian states and the EU countries, as well as through multilateral structures – the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Kazakhstan is the world’s largest landlocked country, located in Central Asia and partly in Eastern Europe. It declared independence on 16 December 1991, thus becoming the last Soviet republic to declare political independence. Nursultan Nazarbayev became the country’s first President. Kazakhstan was the last Soviet republic to declare independence after Soviet’s collapse in 1991. With population approximately 25 million, Kazakhstan strictly recognizes its political freedom, national interest and territorial sovereignty.
Comparing EU with EAEU
The European Union (EU) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU/Eurasia Union) are distinct regional blocs with major differences in scope, purpose, and scale. The EU is a deeply integrated economic and political union of 27 democratic, mostly Western European nations, while the EAEU is a Russia-led economic union focusing on trade among post-Soviet states, featuring smaller GDP and less political integration.
Here are Key Differences:
Membership & Leadership: The EU includes 27 mostly Western/Central European countries (e.g., Germany, France). The EAEU consists of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia.
Economic Scale: The EU’s economy is significantly larger—roughly four times larger in GDP than the EAEU (approx. $19.4 trillion vs. $4.8 trillion in 2024).
Integration Level: The EU is both a monetary (for most) and political union with strong democratic institutions, shared policies, and a common market. The EAEU is primarily an economic union focused on free movement of goods, labor, and capital, but it lacks the deep political integration of the EU.
Geopolitics & Values: The EU is built on shared democratic values and legal frameworks (EU law). The EAEU is often seen as a political tool for Russia to retain influence over post-Soviet states.
Conflicts & Stability: EAEU members are closely tied to Russia, which has created tensions in the post-Soviet space, especially following the war in Ukraine. The EU has increasingly become a preferred partnership for Eastern European nations over the EAEU.
According to the Kutafin Law Review, in essence, the EU is a deep political and economic integration project, whereas the EAEU is a smaller, trade-focused, post-Soviet initiative.
Exchanging Thoughts Over Political Sovereignty
The Armenian leader made it clear that when the time comes to make a choice, it will be solemnly made by the citizens of Armenia, without any interference. “And when the processes reach the point where it will be necessary to make a decision, I am sure that we, I mean the citizens of the Republic of Armenia, will make that decision,” Pashinyan told Putin, not mincing words.
With its long-standing influence in the South Caucasus fading and what appears to be the Kremlin’s ongoing intent to have a say in Armenia’s political decision-making, Putin told Pashiyan that Moscow hopes pro-Russian forces will be allowed to compete freely in Armenia’s parliamentary elections set for June.
Without mentioning names, Russia’s president claimed that some of their representatives have been put in custody, saying, “Some are in detention despite having Russian passports.” Putin, however, referred to Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who was arrested last year after calling for the ouster of the government.
Pashinyan, also without naming Karapetyan, noted that Armenian law requires political candidates to hold exclusively Armenian citizenship, adding that “no restrictions” are being imposed on political opposition under such circumstances. “Persons with Russian passports, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, cannot be either a candidate for deputy or a candidate for prime minister,” Pashinyan explained to Putin.
Pashinyan firmly stated to Putin that “Armenia is a democratic country”, where the political processes are ongoing at all times. “In fact, twice a year we hold municipal elections, which are also very politicised, because as a result of our political reforms, people there also vote for or against political parties,” Pashinyan said.
The Armenian prime minister, then, referred to the internet outrage in Moscow and the Kremlin-introduced restrictions on the popular Telegram messaging app. “Our social networks, for example, are 100% free, with no restrictions at all,” Pashinyan told Putin on camera, and added that, unlike Russia, there are no political prisoners in Armenia, stating that “in the general context, to be honest, we do not have participants in political processes in places of detention.”
“We have citizens who think that there is too much democracy in Armenia. But this is a matter of principle for us,” Pashinyan said.
Yerevan’s Balancing Act
Armenia’s relations with Russia have grown increasingly strained after Azerbaijan fully reclaimed the Karabakh region in 2023. Decades of bloody conflict ended as the two former bitter rivals embarked on a historic peace process, launching an economic revival in the region amid new stability in the South Caucasus. In 2024, Armenia suspended its membership in the Russia-led Yerevan Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) after Moscow failed to support Yerevan during the 2022 Karabakh escalation.
“In my opinion, the CSTO mechanisms should have been activated (in 2022),” Pashinyan told Putin, adding that “they were not activated, and this, of course, led to the situation that we have in relations with the CSTO.” He confirmed that Armenia is currently not participating in the CSTO for what he described as a “simple reason”.
“We are still unable to explain to our people, our citizens, why the CSTO did not respond, and did not respond despite the obligations that exist under the Collective Security Treaty,” the Armenian leader told Putin.
Putin called Armenian concerns “certain grievances” as he argued that Moscow’s decision not to intervene was on Yerevan and Russia did not see a point in stepping in. “It is obvious that after you accepted in Prague in 2022 that Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan, the CSTO’s intervention in this process, which has acquired an intra-Azerbaijani nature, was simply absolutely wrong in this matter,” Putin told Pashinyan.
“This is not an assessment, I am not saying that this is good or bad, from the point of view of organising peaceful life, I think that, probably, it made sense,” the Russian president added. “Here we simply need to look for ways to further strengthen relations. But it seems to me that here too we need to finish here,” Putin concluded.
Since reaching an agreement to put an end to almost four decades of a bloody conflict in Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been working on normalising and strengthening their bilateral relations, as well as the cooperation in the region, with one exception. Russia has been notably absent from the Karabakh peace process, both during and after the agreement was reached, and both Yerevan and Baku have been distancing themselves from Moscow while jointly redirecting their foreign policy focus toward the EU and the US.
Tracking the Argumentative Sequence
In this analysis, tracking the argumentative sequence, with notable precision, the difference between European Union and Eurasian Union, sometime referred to as ‘Greater Earasian Union’ are noted.
In whichever either case, Armenia is a sovereign republic, has its own right to determine the political system of governance, the parameters of economic development, and shape its own diplomacy directions with external partners without any restrain or restrictions. Armenia operates within the constitutional framework, and the Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, has the mandate from the electorate of Armenia. The choice of political sovereignty and foreign relations are stipulated in the constitution.
Russia’s political regulatory architecture, the system of restraints and mechanisms of instructing directives, are optional but not necessarily compulsory. The logic that any former Soviet republic must only maintain membership with Eurasia Union, and not at the same time to both is rather illogical, particularly when Russia is a staunch advocate of ‘multipolarism’ which ascribed to flexible and broad practice, openness, to global integration. An argument for making choices based on restrictions does not, precisely, fit into the context of global unity, new liberal architecture, and emerging multipolarism.
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Opinion: ‘Russia ‘blackmails’ Armenia with threat of gas price hikes’
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Armenpress: Bulagaria Fuel Prices Up by Between 18.7% and 37% During First Fiv
The price of diesel at gas stations in Bulgaria has increased by 37% since the beginning of the conflict in the Middle East, while the price of petrol has risen by 18.7%, according to data published on Sunday on the National Revenue Agency’s website.
The average price of diesel in the country reached EUR 1.74 as of Saturday, April 4, representing a 37% increase compared to February 28, when the United States and Israel launched strikes against Iran.
During the same five-week period, the average retail price of A95 petrol increased by 18.7% to EUR 1.46 per liter, according to NRA data.
The NRA publishes daily updates on its website with current average retail fuel prices, as well as monthly statistical data on the changes in diesel and A95 gasoline prices. To calculate the average prices, information is used from fiscal receipts issued at fuel sales, which the NRA receives from traders.
On February 28, the average price of A95 petrol in Bulgaria was EUR 1.23 per liter, and diesel fuel was EUR 1.27 per liter.
Following the start of the US-Israeli offensive against Iran at the end of February and the subsequent Iranian retaliatory strikes against countries in the region, crude oil prices surged sharply, leading to an increase in fuel prices worldwide. Many countries implemented measures to counter rising energy costs.
In Bulgaria, the caretaker government of Prime Minister Andrey Gurov approved a compensation scheme, under which end consumers of A95 petrol and diesel can receive a monthly compensation of EUR 20 if, over three consecutive days, the price per liter of A95 or diesel reaches or exceeds EUR 1.60. The average diesel price reached EUR 1.60 per liter for three consecutive days on March 24, triggering the measure.
The compensation is available to all individuals who, in 2025, received an average monthly income of EUR 652.41 or less, which is twice the poverty line for that period, or an average monthly gross income for 2024 of EUR 537.88 or less, also twice the poverty line for 2024.
Labor Minister Hasan Ademov said on Sunday that around 50,900 applications have been submitted for the additional EUR 20 compensation for the rise in fuel prices. Additional applications are expected through the Ministry of e-Government, which means the total number of submitted applications will likely exceed 60,000, Ademov added.
(This information is published according to an agreement between Armenpress and BTA).
Published by Armenpress, original at
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168: Depreciation of money and increase in the price of loans. why is the government a card to the banks?
April 5, 2026
The authorities gave freedom to the banks, and the banks enjoy that freedom. By setting widespread high prices for intermediary services, they have been emptying the pockets of citizens and businesses for years. Nikol Pashinyan and members of the Communist Party, who once thought that banks were engaged in robbery, have turned the banking system into a scourge for citizens and businesses. Despite widespread complaints, nothing is being done to curb the banks’ appetite.
After massive complaints, recently, of course, the Central Bank decided to slightly reduce the commissions charged for cashless transactions with bank cards for small businesses. But they did it not because they are worried about small business and decided to curb the appetite of banks, but because the interests of the government demand it before the elections. Although it seems that the banks have also found an option to get out of that situation dry. They decided to replace those “losses” by increasing the price of other services.
The appetite of banks is great, especially in the credit market. There is no way they want to reduce the interest on loans, despite the fact that money has become cheaper in the last few years. We are talking about the money leaving the Central Bank.
Three years ago, the price of money coming out of the Central Bank was 10.75 percent, today it is only 6.50 percent. It decreased by 4.25 percentage points.
This is a serious devaluation of money, which implies that the banks should also reduce the interest rates on loans provided by them to citizens and businesses. But the banks, enjoying the patronage and assistance of the government, continue to keep the price of loans high. Not only do they not reduce the loan interest, but they also increase it.
Three years ago, the average interest rate of dram loans with a term of up to 1 year in the banking system was 11.76 percent. At that time, the price of money or refinancing rate was extremely high, it was at the peak of the last years, it was 10.75 percent. And in the conditions of that peak, the loan interest rate was incomparably lower than now.
One year later, in 2024. in January, the price of money was 9.25 percent, and the average interest rate on short-term dram loans increased from 11.76 to 12.76 percent.
They increased the price by 1 percentage point, although the price of money decreased by 1.5 percentage points during that time.
Next: 2025 in January, the price of money coming out of the Central Bank fell sharply, making 7 percent, while interest rates on dram loans with a term of up to 1 year continued to rise, reaching 13 percent.
At the beginning of this year, banks increased the price of such loans again.
Now the price of money coming out of the Central Bank is 6.50 percent, and the average interest rate of short-term dram loans has reached a record 13.41 percent.
Over the course of three years, money became cheaper by 4.25 percentage points, and dram loans with a term of up to 1 year, instead of becoming cheaper, became more expensive by 1.65 percentage points. In the case of this type of loans, the bank margin is already incredibly high. As a result of this, banks get big profits, and these profits are primarily at the expense of citizens, taking into account the fact that short-term dram loans are primarily consumer loans, which citizens are often forced to use to solve their household problems.
Just 3 years ago, in the case of short-term dram loans, the bank margin was only 1 percentage point, now it is almost 7 times larger. The price of these loans is more than double the refinancing rate. This means that when the bank borrows money from the Central Bank at 6.50%, it raises that percentage at least twice and gives it to the citizens.
With such means, money is made at the expense of the citizens, and the authorities follow all this indifferently. Moreover, they do everything so that the banks do not reduce the interest rates on loans. What is needed for that? You just need to subsidize loan interest and keep demand artificially high.
Now they have decided to provide interest-free loans to the villagers on the eve of the elections. Interest-free to the extent that the state budget should cover those interests instead of the peasants. Banks will benefit from this. The victim, naturally, is the state budget. But who pays attention to this? The state’s money has no owner, and the government can afford such extravagances for political purposes. They take the money out of the budget and put it in the banks’ pockets.
According to the latest data, the loans of the banking system approach 21 billion dollars, of which the largest portfolio is short-term dram loans. Such loans, which are primarily of consumer importance, approach 5 billion dollars. They are not only expensive loans, but also, as we see, they are getting more and more expensive. The government is not doing anything to curb the appetite of the banks.
Even the steps of the Central Bank to lower the price of money, which at first glance tend to “force” banks to reduce loan interest rates, are not yielding results. But with the same logic that limited the price of trade mediation for small businesses, they do not intend to limit credit interest. Banks, for obvious reasons, do not tend to limit their own appetite.
And it turned out that as much as possible, they oppress people with expensive loans, they advance the interests of banks. Market pricing and demand have become an excuse to keep the price of loans artificially high.
HAKOB KOCHARYAN
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