Category: News

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1. The application concerns the State’s alleged failure to undertake measures to fulfil its positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention to enforce the applicant’s parental rights and reunite him with his daughter, as well as the alleged lack of effective domestic remedies in that regard.

2. The applicant is the father of a seven-year-old girl, A.A., whose mother is Y.H. The family is ethnically Armenian but resided in the United States until the parents divorced in 2021.

3. On 13 March 2023 the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, granted full physical custody of A.A. to the applicant.

4. On an unspecified date the child was taken to Armenia, where she was allegedly unlawfully retained by Y.H.

5. In October 2024 Y.H. left the child in the care of her mother, M.M., and father, Y.Hov., and travelled to the United States.

6. On 12 October 2024 the applicant travelled to Armenia in an effort to assume custody of the child. However, the child’s maternal grandparents did not permit him to take the child into his care.

7. On 12 February 2025 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Yerevan Court of General Jurisdiction (“the Yerevan Court”), seeking an order requiring M.M. and Y.Hov. to return the child. He also requested a provisional measure ordering the child’s return pending the outcome of the proceedings. On 21 February 2025 the Yerevan Court refused the request for a provisional measure. On the same date, however, it delivered, of its own motion, a separate decision establishing a visiting schedule, allowing the applicant to see his daughter three times a week for three hours on each occasion, without the presence of the grandparents.

8. On 24 February 2025 the Compulsory Enforcement Service (“the CES”) initiated enforcement proceedings in respect of the Yerevan Court’s order establishing the visiting schedule. On 5, 7 and 21 March 2025 the bailiff made telephone calls to M.M. and Y.Hov. in an attempt to arrange visits. However, no visits took place, as M.M. and Y.Hov. requested postponements, proposed that the visits take place in their apartment, or were absent from their apartment. On 21, 23, 26 and 28 March 2025 the bailiff, together with the applicant and a representative of the local child protection authorities, visited the grandparents’ residence at the times specified in the court order, but they were absent.

9. Meanwhile, following an appeal by the applicant, on 31 March 2025 the Civil Court of Appeal delivered a provisional measure ordering Y.Hov. and M.M. to return the child to the applicant pending the outcome of the proceedings. It held that as long as the child was not in the actual care of her mother, she was to be in the care of her father, who enjoyed a preferential right to raise his child vis-à-vis third parties, including the child’s grandparents.

10. On 1 April 2025 the CES initiated new enforcement proceedings and a bailiff, together with the applicant, visited the grandparents’ residence to enforce the order to return the child to the applicant. However, M.M. and the child were not there, and Y.Hov. claimed he did not know their whereabouts. On the same date the bailiff formally decided to initiate search measures and subsequently requested that the police carry out a search.

11. On 4 April 2025 the police informed the CES that a search had been initiated.

12. In April 2025 the applicant submitted several criminal complaints, alleging that the grandparents’ non-compliance with the court order of 31 March 2025 had constituted a criminal offence under Article 507 § 1 of the Criminal Code (failure to execute or obstruction of the execution of a judicial act). The investigator refused to initiate criminal proceedings, concluding that the actions described by the applicant had not constituted a criminal offence.

13. On 14 May 2025 Y.H. returned to Armenia and, on 23 May 2025, moved into her parents’ apartment. The following day she was interviewed by the police.

14. On 27 May 2025 the police sent a letter to the CES, revealing that M.M. and the child had been found and that they were at the grandparents’ apartment.

15. On 9 October 2025 the bailiff decided to terminate the search measures.

• THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT:
  1. ALLEGED VIOLATION of ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION

16. The applicant complained that the State had failed to fulfil its positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention to enforce his parental rights and ensure that he was reunited with his daughter.

17. The Government argued that the application should be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, as the applicant had not appealed against the investigator’s decisions refusing to institute criminal proceedings (see paragraph 12 above). The Court notes, however, that that alleged omission could not have absolved the authorities from their obligations in the matter of enforcement – including, where appropriate, through the imposition of sanctions – since it is they who exercised public authority (see Ignaccolo‑Zenide v. Romania, no. 31679/96, § 111, ECHR 2000-I; Hansen v. Turkey, no. 36141/97, § 107, 23 September 2003; and Tzioumaka v. Greece, no. 31022/20, § 86, 9 April 2024). This objection must therefore be dismissed.

18. The Government further argued that the application should be declared inadmissible as premature, on the grounds that civil proceedings concerning the complaints raised before the Court were still pending. The Court observes, however, that in so far as the applicant’s complaint concerns the alleged failure to enforce binding provisional measures already adopted in respect of his parental rights, it cannot be regarded as premature solely because the proceedings on the merits are still pending (see Fourkiotis v. Greece, no. 74758/11, §§ 16 and 45-47, 16 June 2016).

19. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

20. The relevant general principles concerning the State’s positive obligation to protect the relationship between parents and their children have been set out in a number of cases (see, for example, Malec v. Poland, no. 28623/12, §§ 66-67, 74 and 78, 28 June 2016; E.K. v. Latvia, no. 25942/20, §§ 72-77, 13 April 2023; and Tzioumaka, cited above, §§ 79‑80).

21. In the present case, the CES was initially required to enforce the Yerevan Court’s order of 21 February 2025, which had established the visiting schedule. While several attempts were made to enforce that order, they were all unsuccessful (see paragraph 8 above).

22. Subsequently, on 31 March 2025 the Civil Court of Appeal delivered a provisional measure ordering Y.Hov. and M.M. to return the child to the applicant. The authorities were therefore under a positive obligation to take adequate, swift and effective measures on the basis of that decision to enforce the applicant’s parental rights. Since the child’s whereabouts were unknown (see paragraph 10 above), this required, firstly, that they take all reasonable steps to locate her (see Hromadka and Hromadkova v. Russia, no. 22909/10, §§ 165-69, 11 December 2014).

23. On 1 April 2025 the CES formally initiated search measures for M.M. and requested the police to carry out a search. Accordingly, the police formally initiated a search. However, the Government have not demonstrated that, following the formal initiation of those search measures, any concrete action was taken to locate the child, such as interviews with Y.Hov., enquiries with relatives, neighbours or relevant institutions, or the possible tracing of M.M.’s whereabouts through her mobile phone location data. The Court is especially concerned that in a situation where the child’s whereabouts were unknown – a particularly serious matter – the Government have not been able to provide any evidence whatsoever regarding concrete measures taken beyond the formal initiation of a search.

24. Furthermore, no sanctions were imposed in response to the lack of cooperation on the part of the child’s maternal grandparents, who repeatedly failed to make the child available and did not disclose her whereabouts when the bailiff sought to enforce the court orders. The Court reiterates that it is up to the competent authorities to impose appropriate sanctions – even of their own motion – in the event of a lack of cooperation on the part of the persons with whom a child is living (see Maire v. Portugal, no. 48206/99, § 76, ECHR 2003-VII; Sévère v. Austria, no. 53661/15, § 98, 21 September 2017; and Tzioumaka, cited above, § 86).

25. It is true that by 27 May 2025 – that is, nearly two months after the search had been initiated – the child had been located at the grandparents’ residence. However, the Government have not demonstrated that this was the result of concrete efforts on the part of the authorities, rather than merely the consequence of the mother’s return to Armenia shortly beforehand (see paragraph 13 above).

26. Shortly after the mother’s return to Armenia, the child was in her care. This rendered the Civil Court of Appeal’s order no longer applicable, as it had been directed against the child’s maternal grandparents and the court had specifically noted in its reasoning that the child was to be in the applicant’s care as long as she was not in the actual care of her mother. The Court therefore cannot fault the domestic authorities for not pursuing the enforcement of that order thereafter. The Court cannot accept the applicant’s argument that the domestic authorities have failed to secure his custody rights on the basis of the decision of the Superior Court of California (see paragraph 3 above), because that decision has not yet been recognised in Armenia under Article 346 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

27. However, irrespective of the subsequent change in circumstances, the Court finds it problematic that the authorities did not promptly inform the applicant once his daughter had been located. The Government referred to the bailiff’s decision of 9 October 2025 terminating the search measures (see paragraph 15 above) and a letter dated 10 October 2025 addressed to the applicant as evidence that he had been informed by the authorities that his daughter had been located. However, that decision was issued and the accompanying letter was prepared after the Government had been given notice of the present application and nearly four and a half months after the child had been located. The Government further argued that the applicant’s observations of 16 December 2025, which included documents concerning the child’s whereabouts, indicated that he had been informed of his daughter’s whereabouts at an earlier stage. However, the applicant has shown that those documents were submitted to the Yerevan Court by M.M. on 8 October 2025, thus demonstrating that he had obtained them after a delay of nearly four and a half months. Such a delay in the authorities’ informing the applicant that his daughter had been located could have given rise to feelings of uncertainty and anxiety in the applicant and adversely affected his contact with his daughter. The Court finds no justification for such a delay, especially considering that the passage of time can have irremediable consequences for relations between a parent and a child.

28. In those circumstances, the absence of information about any concrete measures taken to swiftly locate the child with a view to enforcing the applicant’s parental rights, coupled with the authorities’ failure to inform the applicant promptly once she had been found, shows that the national authorities failed to take all the measures that could reasonably have been expected of them to enable the applicant to reunite with his daughter and preserve their relationship. That failure discloses a breach of the State’s positive obligation to protect the relationship between the applicant and his daughter.

29. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. Alleged lack of effective domestic remedies

30. The applicant also complained that he had had no effective domestic remedy at his disposal for his complaint under Article 8 of the Convention. This complaint could fall to be examined under Article 13 of the Convention. However, having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties, and its findings above, the Court considers that it has dealt with the main legal question raised by the case and that there is no need to examine the complaint concerning the alleged lack of effective domestic remedies (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014).

• APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

31. The applicant claimed 12,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage.

32. The Government contested that claim.

33. Deciding on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 4,500 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

34. The applicant did not claim any costs and expenses.

• FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the complaint concerning the alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaint concerning the alleged lack of an effective domestic remedy;
4. Holds
   1.  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, EUR 4,500 (four thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State, at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
   2.  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 1 October 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Hetq.am

In a video interview released on October 14, 2026, marking the 35th anniversary of the Hayastan All-Armenian Fund, Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan used the occasion to tightly weave the Fund’s future into his controversial “Real Armenia” policy framework. This speech, combined with the recent systemic overhauls enacted by the Fund’s leadership, signals a massive geopolitical and ideological shift in how the state handles diaspora-funded initiatives.

The Framework: Territorial Realignment & “Real Armenia”

Pashinyan used the public address to re-state that the ultimate guarantor of Armenia’s future is a finalized peace agreement with Azerbaijan built strictly around the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration, preserving exactly 29,743 square kilometers of sovereign Armenian territory.

• Border Demarcation: He explicitly argued for a clean, pragmatic settlement where no enclaves or exclaves remain on either side of the border. He championed territorial exchanges of identical sizes to secure predictable transport routes.
• Forward-Looking Ideology: He asserted that the nation must define its path “not by what has already occurred, but by what is yet to unfold,” explicitly warning against using historical patterns as an excuse to repeat past geopolitical mistakes.

The Fund’s Evolution: From “Survival” to “State-Building”

When addressing the 35-year legacy of the “Hayastan” Fund, Pashinyan called for a structural pivot away from historical diaspora-led charity and toward legal statecraft.

• The Pivot to Infrastructure: He noted that while the Fund was born out of 1990s emergency survival—recovering from a devastating earthquake, war, and economic collapse—its modern iteration must fund institutional growth. He advocated for long-term internal upgrades (e.g., local water mains, schools, municipal infrastructure) over ideological projects.
• “State vs. Homeland” Concept: Pashinyan critiqued the diaspora’s traditional emotional attachment to a romanticized “Homeland,” arguing instead that contributions must systematically serve the legally defined, physical Republic of Armenia.

The Response from the Board of Trustees

The Board of Trustees anticipated and structurally mirrored Pashinyan’s core messaging during their recent institutional overhauls.

• Approval of the Strategic Shift: Led by Board Chairman and President of Armenia Vahagn Khachaturyan, along with Pashinyan and other key state ministers, the Board officially approved a new three-year strategic development strategy.
• A Move from Reactive to Strategic: Presented by the newly elected Executive Director, Aramayis Avetisyan, the Board’s approved roadmap directly aligns with the administration’s push to move the fund “from a reactive approach towards long-term strategic planning.”
• Focus Areas: The Board formalized a structure based on four pillars: strategic development, organizational efficiency, enhancing financial transparency, and modernizing the Armenia-Diaspora cooperation ecosystem.

Critique of the Fund & Pashinyan’s Diaspora Views

While the administration and the Board frame this transition as a necessary modernization, Pashinyan’s rigid approach toward the Diaspora has drawn sharp criticism from opposition figures, community leaders, and traditional diaspora institutions:

The Trust Deficit & the 2020 War Controversy

The foundational critique of the Fund under the current government stems from the 2020 Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) War, during which the Fund raised over $160 million. The Pashinyan administration transferred a massive portion of these donation funds directly into the state budget. Critics and diaspora donors frequently blast this move as a breach of trust, arguing it severely damaged the Fund’s credibility and institutional transparency.

Erasure of Pan-Armenian Cohesion

By continuously demanding that the Diaspora detach its funding from Nagorno-Karabakh or pan-Armenian nationalist concepts, critics accuse Pashinyan of alienating the exact demographic he relies on for financial capital. Opponents argue that reducing the Diaspora’s role to that of a utility-funding entity strips away the emotional and historical cohesion that drives global Armenian fundraising.

Framing the Diaspora as Anachronistic

Pashinyan’s rhetoric has frequently been critiqued as condescending toward traditional diaspora structures. His “Real Armenia” framework effectively frames traditional diaspora patriotism as an outdated mechanism that courts conflict with neighbors rather than pursuing realistic peace.

Critics contend that instead of building a true bridge, this approach splits the Armenian identity into two separate, opposing camps: the pragmatic residents of the Republic versus the ideological spectators of the Diaspora.

Anchoring the wandering tongue: can Armenia become a living have for Western Armenian?

By Ohan Chekmekchian

Hetq.am

The Armenian language has long survived as a majestic, two-headed cathedral.

Following the cataclysm of the 1915 Genocide, its structural geography split along deep linguistic fault lines. While Eastern Armenian became anchored in the institutional soil of the Soviet and subsequently the independent Republic of Armenia, modern Western Armenian became the wandering tongue of exile, preserved across communities in Beirut, Aleppo, Paris, and Los Angeles.

For decades, the Iron Curtain kept these sister standards physically apart. However, the dawn of Armenian independence in 1991 ruptured these boundaries, initiating an unprecedented linguistic encounter. Over the past three decades, the Republic of Armenia has ceased to be merely a distant, symbolic monument for the Western Armenian diaspora; it has transformed into a dynamic, complex crucible where the survival, integration, and institutionalization of Western Armenian are being actively negotiated.

The Returnee Paradox: Between Romanticism and Social Marginalization

The return of thousands of diasporan repatriates to an independent homeland brought the living cadence of Western Armenian directly into the streets, cafes, and workplaces of Yerevan. This migratory influx—reignited during independence and accelerated by the tragic geopolitical upheavals in Syria and Lebanon—somewhat disrupted the monolithic Eastern Armenian linguistic landscape.

Yet, the homecoming of the language has been defined by a poignant paradox. Repatriates arriving in Armenia are often met with an internal tension between linguistic admiration and social marginalization. On one hand, local society frequently romanticizes Western Armenian, praising its archaic elegance, its distinct phonology, and its rich, classical terminology. On the other hand, the pragmatism of daily survival forces a compromise. Because Eastern Armenian remains the undisputed standard of administration, commerce, and media, many Western Armenian speakers experience subtle exclusion, confusion, or even light ridicule due to differences in orthography, pronunciation, and vocabulary. Consequently, many returnees undergo a linguistic shift, adopting Eastern Armenian in public spheres to ensure seamless social and professional integration. These realities relegate Western Armenian to the private confines of family circles and returnee networks, raising critical questions about whether the homeland is truly acting as a sanctuary or merely a museum for its sister language branch.

The Legislative Push for Pluricentric Recognition

To counter this passive assimilation, an intellectual and political drive has emerged within the republic to grant Western Armenian formal legal status. Under Article 20 of the Constitution of Armenia, the law states simply that “the state language of the Republic of Armenia is Armenian.” While the text does not explicitly specify a linguistic standard, decades of administrative inertia have treated Eastern Armenian as the default official standard. For years, diasporan advocates and local linguists have argued that leaving Western Armenian without explicit legal safeguards accelerates its status as an “endangered language,” a designation formally recognized by UNESCO.

This advocacy reached a milestone when governmental policy frameworks began considering a formal legislative pathway to grant Western Armenian a special, protected status within the country. Here, we’re referring to Armenia’s 2021-2026 Government Action Plan.

This proposed special status aims to explicitly strengthen the language’s position within higher education, general schooling, and public administration. By shifting the national narrative from a monocentric focus to an intentionally pluricentric one, the state acknowledges a profound historical truth: the Republic of Armenia belongs to the entire Armenian nation, and its linguistic policy must reflect the dual heritage of its people.

Domestication of a Living Literature

This institutional push is mirrored by a quiet but resilient cultural renaissance in the domestic publishing sector. Historically, Western Armenian literature was printed almost exclusively in the diaspora—by historic publishing houses in Istanbul, Beirut, or Boston. Today, the terrain of “living” Western Armenian literature is taking root within the republic itself. Prominent local publishers, such as Antares, have actively expanded their catalogs to include books printed directly in Western Armenian, ranging from traditional folklore and children’s literature to contemporary poetry collections like Karo Arslanean’s If…Furthermore, academic institutions within Armenia have engaged in the production of specialized textbooks and contrastive grammar guides designed to bridge the gap between the two standards for English and Eastern Armenian speakers alike. This domestic commercialization of Western Armenian literature is vital. It shifts the language away from being an endangered relic of a lost geography and establishes it as a viable, living medium of contemporary literary production within the sovereign boundaries of the Armenian state.

Infrastructure, Funding, and the Urban Ecology

The theoretical arguments for this renaissance find validation in the insights of contemporary authors and institutional frameworks actively working on the ground. Intellectuals and writers moving between Beirut, Istanbul, and Yerevan emphasize that literature cannot survive on nostalgia alone; it requires an active urban ecology. Prominent voices within the contemporary diaspora argue that publishing in Yerevan grants Western Armenian a psychological legitimacy that fragmented communities abroad can no longer provide. For a writer, seeing a Western Armenian volume displayed in a bookstore on Abovyan Street in Yerevan transforms the language from a “family relic” into a competitive, public artistic medium.

This grassroots literary momentum is reinforced by major transnational bodies like the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, whose Armenian Communities Department has injected significant funding into the republic. Through targeted grants, translation projects, and pedagogical digital tools, these initiatives treat Yerevan as a logical capital for Western Armenian preservation. By bringing diaspora-funded cultural infrastructure directly into Armenia’s academic and tech sectors, these projects create a tangible workspace where local and returnee editors, translators, and digital creators collaborate, proving that the language’s survival hinges on a shared, institutionalized homeland economy.

Erasing the Psychological Barrier: A Homeland Obligation

However, the long-term viability of Western Armenian as a daily spoken language within the Republic faces steep structural hurdles. Realistically, it is unlikely to become the primary daily street language for the broader population of Armenia. The institutional inertia of Eastern Armenian in courts, schools, and the military is deeply entrenched, and history demonstrates that within one to two generations, the children of returnees naturally assimilate into the domestic standard. Crucially, this assimilation is often accelerated by a psychological barrier: the misplaced sense of self-consciousness or social pressure that leads repatriates to hide their native tongue.

There is absolutely no reason for any speaker to feel embarrassed speaking Western Armenian in the capital. The two branches of the Armenian language are not mutually incomprehensible; they share the same deep structural roots, and the core vocabulary remains, for the most part, entirely identical. Because the systemic differences are minor phonetic and grammatical variations rather than fundamental linguistic divides, the Republic of Armenia should naturally be considered a haven for Western Armenian. The homeland has a moral and historical obligation to be a place where the western branch can breathe freely without its speakers feeling alienated.

A Blueprint for Parallel Diaspora Investment

Achieving this “dual-fluency” alternative does not mean the diaspora must abandon its vital local infrastructure; rather, it requires a parallel commitment to funding targeted Western Armenian initiatives inside the republic alongside its existing schools and institutions abroad.

The diaspora can function as a catalyst by funding local digital content creators, podcasters, and animators within Armenia to normalize the language across global digital spaces. Furthermore, the diaspora can leverage its philanthropic and venture capital networks to establish specialized “Western Armenian Immersion Zones” in the republic. This means funding dedicated academic and cultural programming in tech hubs like TUMO, local museums, and universities to ensure the language has a robust institutional presence. By partnering with Armenia’s technology sector to develop localized software, predictive text engines, and AI translation models, the diaspora can help embed Western Armenian into the republic’s digital economy, bridging the gap between historical heritage and future innovation.

Conclusion: Activating the Dual Engines of Yerevan

Ultimately, the role of Western Armenian in the republic since 1991 serves as a barometer for the broader relationship between the homeland and the diaspora. True integration cannot mean the erasure of Western Armenian identity in favor of a homogenized domestic norm. If Western Armenian is allowed to fade into an auxiliary tongue of a bygone diaspora, a massive repository of Armenian literary, philosophical, and historical memory will fade with it.

The republic must aggressively pursue policies that normalize the presence of Western Armenian in public life—encouraging specialized school tracks, elevating public confidence in the language, and expanding state-sponsored publishing grants. Yerevan must evolve into a dual-engine capital that actively sustains both literary branches. Only by fully embracing its pluricentric reality can the Republic of Armenia serve as a genuine, permanent sanctuary for the totality of the Armenian soul.

(Ohan Chekmekchian is a linguist and essayist who completed his studies at Yerevan State University and Beirut’s Haigazian College.)