Category: 2024

Russia believes that the West is encouraging Armenia’s approachment with NATO and warns Armenian authorities to consider “how safe this is and what it will lead to.”

This reaction follows a statement by NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, Javier Colomina, regarding Armenia’s approach to the bloc. Specifically, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova stated that approaching the North Atlantic Alliance has already resulted in “many countries losing sovereignty and independence.”

Senior research fellow at APRI Armenia, military expert Leonid Nersisyan views this as a direct threat to Armenia. He suggests that Yerevan should refrain from engaging in discussions on this matter as it may not alter the situation and could potentially exacerbate it. Instead, Nersisyan advocates for diversifying foreign policy and preparing for possible future scenarios.

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Javier Colomina announced a “significant shift” in relations with Armenia during an interview with Armenpress agency. According to him, NATO is prepared to progress at the pace determined by Yerevan in its approach to the bloc:

“We are content with the current bilateral relations with Armenia. We are also highly encouraged by Armenia’s decisions in foreign and defense policy, the transition they have opted for. I understand this is a challenging decision and may require considerable time, but we urge our partners to draw nearer to us, and that is precisely what Armenia is doing.”

Colomina also highlighted NATO’s support for Yerevan’s actions, such as the decision to increase troop numbers in the NATO peacekeeping force (KFOR) in Kosovo, which, in his view, signifies a clear “demonstration of political engagement and dedication.”

The Special Representative of the NATO Secretary General further mentioned that a new Individual Partnership Program (ITPP) “with ambitious objectives” is currently under development for Armenia.

Commenting on Colomina’s statements, the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, advised to “open the map and see in which region, between which neighbors” Armenia is located. She declared Armenia’s approach to NATO to be contrary to the country’s national interests:

“We have already witnessed the consequences of proximity to NATO – involvement in conflicts, loss of sovereignty and independence, submission of will to external planning in all aspects, and, most importantly, the inability to pursue one’s own national interests. We must analyze this and understand Armenia’s own national interests, what is beneficial in the short, medium, and long term, and act accordingly, rather than relying on promises.”

She was followed by the special ambassador of the Russian Foreign Ministry for CSTO issues, Viktor Vasilyev, who also argued that Armenia was acting “under pressure from the West.” He stated that “Armenia’s security, including in the military-technical sphere, cannot be ensured without cooperation within the CSTO.”

Vasilyev believes that the crisis in Armenia’s relations with the Russian military bloc CSTO is also the result of “understandable emotions of the leadership and residents of Armenia.” However, he believes that “despite the difficulties, reason must prevail.”

Military expert Leonid Nersisyan also observes a significant substantive shift in NATO-Armenia relations. In this regard, he highlights joint exercises with the US military and visits to Yerevan by high-ranking military personnel.

He believes that Yerevan is genuinely taking steps towards closer ties with NATO. As evidence, he points to the agreement on military-technical cooperation signed with NATO member France:

“In this context, it’s possible to enhance cooperation with NATO to some extent, to progress, without yet making a final decision to leave the CSTO. That moment will come eventually. However, the West now recognizes that Armenia faces challenges related to the CSTO and the severance of ties with Russia.”

According to the expert, it is crucial whether NATO will be prepared to offer Armenia assurances “that mitigate the risks of leaving the CSTO.”

“Such assurances are needed regarding both security and the economy, in relation to both Azerbaijan and Russia. Russia’s response could either be through Azerbaijan, in the form of military escalation, or economic,” he explained.

Regarding the statements from the Russian side, Nersisyan interpreted them as direct threats against Armenia.

He believes the underlying message conveyed is: “If you move towards NATO, Armenia’s existence as a country will be at stake.” Furthermore, as the expert pointed out, Zakharova mentions possible issues but fails to acknowledge potential problems with Russia itself.

“For years, Yerevan solely relied on cooperation with Russia, yet received neither military nor diplomatic support in difficult times. It’s now absurd to suggest that Armenia lacks the right to seek other partners,” he emphasized.

The Armenian authorities assert their commitment to peace, unwavering even in the face of adversity. However, residents of the country interpret the leadership’s conciliatory stance differently. While many condemn the government’s approach, even those who refrain from criticism doubt the feasibility of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s peace initiatives. This skepticism is reinforced within Armenian society by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s statements, perceived as laden with threats and animosity towards Armenians and Armenia.

Local experts echo these sentiments, suggesting that “Azerbaijan harbors no interest in Armenia’s peace agenda,” and that “Aliyev is gearing up for conflict,” with support from Turkey and Russia.

In light of these developments, what lies ahead for Armenia? Political scientist Stepan Grigoryan weighs in with commentary.

• Opinion: “Armenia can develop relations with NATO without exiting CSTO for now”
• “Baku and Moscow will not change their policy towards Yerevan” – Armenian ambassador to EU
• “Moscow needs continuation of Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict”. Opinion from Yerevan

“The Armenian government is earnestly pursuing a peace agreement, demonstrating a willingness to make significant concessions, often without justification.

I, too, advocate for peace and negotiations, but peace must come at a reasonable cost. While the signing of a peace treaty would be welcomed, it should not come at the expense of unilateral concessions.

I see no genuine desire for peace from Azerbaijan, particularly evident in the official statements of Azerbaijani officials and leadership.

Baku continues to impose new preconditions in the negotiation process, which undermines the path to a peace treaty. Recent statements suggest that Armenia must amend its constitution, withdraw complaints against Azerbaijan in international courts and other bodies, further indicating Azerbaijan’s reluctance to pursue genuine peace.”

“Azerbaijan is actively and openly falsifying history and manipulating everyone, to such an extent that it has become evident: following the signing of any peace agreement, regardless of its terms, Aliyev will inevitably assert new claims the next day.

One such instance is illustrated by Ilham Aliyev’s assertion regarding the population demographics in Armenia prior to the onset of the Karabakh conflict in 1988. Aliyev contends that there were significantly more Azerbaijanis residing in Armenia than Armenians in Azerbaijan.

However, a cursory examination of readily available statistics reveals the contrary: there were five times as many Armenians living in Azerbaijan as there were Azerbaijanis in Armenia.”

The expert community continually poses the question to the authorities of Armenia: why does there seem to be no response to Aliyev’s statements?

Aliyev demands the return of Azerbaijanis to Armenia, alleging their expulsion. However, this topic is artificially constructed and unrelated to the peace agenda.

No international structure or document has registered the expulsion of Azerbaijanis from Armenia.

During the Soviet era, Azerbaijanis living in Armenia sold their homes and departed without coercion. In contrast, Armenians in Azerbaijan lacked such freedom. Moreover, Soviet Armenia provided compensation to departing Azerbaijanis, while Armenians leaving Azerbaijan received nothing.

Following the 1988 escalation of the Karabakh issue, Armenians in Azerbaijan faced massacres in Sumgait, Kirovabad, Baku, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijanis sought to address the conflict by expelling Armenians, prompting the formation of self-defense forces. This led to a major war lasting until 1994, resulting in the displacement of both Armenians and Azerbaijanis in and around Artsakh.

Aliyev also demands control over some eight villages. However, there has been no reciprocal assertion of claims over Armenian territories from Yerevan. For instance, the Tavush region, which remained on the Azerbaijani side of the self-defense line during the 1990s, has not been subject to claims from Yerevan.

The Armenian authorities also acknowledge that Azerbaijan does not desire peace, yet they justify their policy by expressing a desire to avoid new aggression from Baku. Within today’s Armenian political elite, there exists an opinion that peace could eventually be attained through concessions.

I fundamentally oppose this approach because giving in only fuels further demands. If concessions are made easily, why wouldn’t Aliyev seek more?

Advocates of concessions within the Armenian political elite seem disconnected from recent history. In the 1990s and 2000s, Turkey and Azerbaijan proposed the surrender of at least one region around Artsakh as a gesture of goodwill, with promises to open borders and foster cooperation. Presently, all of Artsakh and its surrounding seven regions are under their control, devoid of Armenians. Despite this, the borders remain closed, indicating Turkey’s lack of intention to open them.

Moreover, Turkey has never explicitly laid out conditions for Armenia, instead directing attention towards Azerbaijan for resolution. Of the seven districts surrounding the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), we voluntarily surrendered three and a half. Aliyev himself acknowledged this when he admitted that continued war would have inflicted significant losses on the Armenian side.

The interests of Azerbaijan and Russia intertwine in this scenario. Russia, with its overarching aim to revive the USSR in some capacity, seeks to diminish Armenia’s sovereignty and independence. In pursuit of this goal, Russia openly supported Azerbaijan in occupying Artsakh and displacing Armenians from the region. Consequently, Azerbaijan is indebted to Moscow, and Russia demands control over the so-called “Zangezur corridor” from Baku. This demand is communicated by Baku on behalf of the Russian Federation.

The primary objective of this alliance is the dismantlement of Armenian statehood. Russia aims to annex a portion of Armenia into the Russian Federation as a new region. Notably, this does not encompass the entirety of Armenia. The remaining territory, particularly Syunik [the southern border region of Armenia], is intended to be ceded to Azerbaijan.

Strategically, Russia also aims to assert dominance over Azerbaijan. However, due to the presence of Turkey, which acts as a safeguard for Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, Moscow is currently focused on exerting control over Armenia. Given that this aligns with Azerbaijan’s interests as well, Armenia finds itself under dual pressure.

“They argue that as elected representatives, they possess legitimacy and the authority to make concessions, to enact policies they deem necessary, even if they diverge from their initial program. They justify their actions by pointing out that all regional actors are aligned against us.

In response, we must seek support externally, from other partners, other allies. Currently, we receive open support from the United States and Europe, despite lacking strategic relations with them and barring their involvement in the region.

However, when the authorities face criticism for their shortcomings, it’s essential for people to remember that they were the ones who voted them into power. Voting decisions require careful consideration.

The expert community also plays a significant role, offering guidance to the authorities on right and wrong courses of action through personal conversations, speeches, and interviews. While criticism may be harsh at times, it does not negate their legitimacy.

Critiquing former leaders was easier as they lacked legitimacy, having ascended to power through rigged elections. The current situation is more challenging.

Nevertheless, concerning matters of territorial integrity and sovereignty, no government, regardless of its legitimacy, has the right to compromise on these fundamental values.”

“Armenia faces numerous threats, diverse in nature, not only from Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, but also from the evolving global situation, which renders everyone vulnerable.

A war against the world order established after the Second World War is underway. In such turbulent times, the influence of international courts and structures, upon which Armenia could traditionally rely, is diminishing.

The probability of war looms large today, necessitating preparedness. Azerbaijan may exploit the preoccupation of the United States with its domestic affairs, given the Biden administration’s divided attention, as well as similar distractions in Europe due to upcoming European Parliament elections.

Backed by formidable diplomatic support from Turkey and Russia, Azerbaijan is conducting a potent, focused campaign against France, placing our allies in a challenging position.

Furthermore, complications may arise if the Middle East conflict escalates, diverting Iran’s attention from us. Aliyev could seize upon such a situation to target Syunik.

The prospect of an Azerbaijani attack on Armenia may be temporarily deterred by upcoming elections in Azerbaijan and Russia. As Putin and Aliyev coordinate all their actions, I have little insight into Baku’s potential aggression before Putin’s inauguration. However, once this transition is complete, possibly in May or June, no scenario can be discounted.”

“Direct negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan without mediators have never taken place. Moscow communicates its demands to Armenia through Baku. An example of this is the demand for the so-called “Zangezur Corridor” by Azerbaijan, which would be under Russian control.

Russia and Azerbaijan actively work to block Western mediation, as it aligns with their mutual interests, and they are determined to maintain this stance.

Consistency is crucial. Avoiding travel to St. Petersburg and Sochi is essential. Despite this, we announce engagement with Western platforms, and then we go to St. Petersburg [he means the participation in the meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Council in St. Petersburg in late December 2023]. This shift comes after a prolonged period during which Armenian authorities boycotted all meetings within Russian integration structures.

However, the West currently supports us, irrespective of whether we request assistance or not.

Sanctions against Azerbaijan are imminent and deliberate. Expulsion from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) effectively isolates a country from Europe. The European Union intends to terminate its gas contract with Azerbaijan.

Similar actions were taken against Russia, initially stripping the Russian delegation of voting rights in PACE before eventually expelling it altogether. Azerbaijan faced immediate expulsion from PACE. Here, it’s not primarily the Armenian influence driving this process, but rather Europe’s own decision that an authoritarian regime, aligning itself with Russia, must face consequences. Half of the PACE resolution focuses on the ethnic cleansing of Armenians in Artsakh.

Our primary ally is the West, and it’s imperative to further broaden our engagement. Having invited European observers to monitor the border with Azerbaijan, the next step is to welcome military bases, even while remaining in the CSTO and hosting a Russian base on our territory. Our constitution does not forbid the presence of both Russian and Western military bases simultaneously.”

https://jam-news.net/probability-of-armenia-azerbaijan-war-opinion/ 

“The military operation conducted by Azerbaijan in September 2023 concluded the longest-standing conflict in the Caucasus region, centered around Karabakh. At the very least, it marked a significant stage in the resolution of the conflict.

A new reality has taken shape in the region. However, what implications does this hold for Georgia? What lessons should the country, grappling with two unresolved territorial conflicts of its own, take away?

JAMnews presented these inquiries to experts in conflict, international relations, and security. Additionally, we engaged in discussions with them about Turkey’s escalating role in the region and the potential opportunities this presents for Georgia.”

Paata Zakareishvili, conflictologist:

The developments in Karabakh have fundamentally altered the Caucasus region by introducing a new influential player – Turkey.

Turkey, which withdrew from the Caucasus in 1921 as per the Treaty of Kars, made a return exactly one hundred years later, in 2020.

Being a NATO member, and considering Georgia’s aspiration to join NATO, the entry of NATO, represented by Turkey, into the region raises concerns for Russia.

Presently, Turkey stands as our neighbor, a friendly state that recognizes the territorial integrity of Georgia. However, we are not leveraging this Turkish factor in any significant manner.

Russia does not show significant interest in the closer ties between Turkey and Georgia. Conversely, Georgia maintains a neutral stance in its relations with Turkey, which seems peculiar and runs contrary to Georgia’s interests.

As a new player in both the Caucasus and the Black Sea, Turkey should enhance its influence in both directions.

Georgia, situated in the Caucasus and on the Black Sea, holds a unique position for Turkey today. However, we remain silent. Not only do we fail to express interest in fostering friendship with Turkey within the context of security, but, on the contrary, we cultivate an image of a suspicious state that cannot be trusted. Turkey is unlikely to appreciate our recent engagements with Russia and China.

It is evident that Russia is weakening and has lost influence. In this context, much depends on how Georgia sets its priorities.

Zurab Batiashvili, Research Fellow at the “Georgian Strategy and International Relations Research Foundation” (GFSIS):

Azerbaijan has become the first country in the post-Soviet space to restore its territorial integrity. It is noteworthy that this occurred amid the Russian-Ukrainian war. Azerbaijan capitalized on Russia’s vulnerability, unable to engage in military actions on two fronts, and Moscow turned a blind eye to Azerbaijan’s actions.

Apart from the importance of resolving this conflict and restoring Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity on its own merits, it also holds significance for the region as Russia’s influence is evidently waning.

However, this does not imply the complete elimination of Russian influence.

On the other hand, we also observe the strengthening of the Turkish-Azerbaijani coalition in the South Caucasus. This is natural, as in its foreign policy, it operates on the principle of “one nation, two states.” Therefore, it is not surprising that Turkey is entering and solidifying its presence in the region through Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan, being the largest Caucasian state in terms of territory and population, allows Turkey to extend its influence across the entire Caucasus by gaining influence over Azerbaijan.

The example of Karabakh demonstrated that despite Azerbaijan not being a NATO member, it successfully formed a robust coalition with Turkey, Israel, and Pakistan, leveraging it for its own objectives.

Why can’t we pursue something similar, even with the involvement of Great Britain, Poland, and Turkey, for the benefit of Georgia? Since we are not NATO members, we need to contemplate alternative paths that involve Western countries. This is the direction we genuinely need to consider and actively pursue, aligning with how a country concerned about its own security should behave. However, what security are we discussing when the country has lacked both a security concept and a document on threat assessment for years?

Another lesson we should draw from the current geopolitical situation is the necessity for strength, and this strength should manifest through robust state institutions encompassing the military, intelligence, foreign policy, and more. Unfortunately, this is not occurring.

Sergi Kapanadze, Doctor of International Relations:

The developments in Karabakh undeniably alter the situation in the region, as there is now a genuine chance for peace in this conflict-ridden area.

The primary impediment that was obstructing economic progress in the Caucasus region has been resolved.

This implies numerous new opportunities, not only in the context of achieving peaceful conflict resolution but also for establishing new connections and economic contacts.

Now, we can commence efforts on new routes, whether in the East-West direction, which is of interest to us, or the South-North direction, which theoretically could also be of interest to us.

Russia’s role in the region is undergoing changes. One question pertains to the current status quo regarding Russia’s role at this stage, and the second revolves around the potential and prospects for Russia to persist in the region.

As of now, Russia has succeeded in sustaining its involvement in the conflict, although the role of the Russian military on the Azerbaijani-Armenian border is not yet fully defined. Due to the peace agreements, Russia holds leverage to potentially endure in the region, and it is likely to make efforts not to relinquish it.

Certainly, much will hinge on the positions taken by Azerbaijan and Armenia regarding Russia’s role. Recent developments suggest that Armenia is not inclined towards Russia’s involvement in the South Caucasus, which is understandable given the unfolding events. Armenia perceived that Russia did not adequately protect it and failed in its duty within the Collective Security Organization.

Russia’s involvement and assistance thus far have been beneficial for Azerbaijan, but the future role that Russia will play for Azerbaijan remains uncertain. In any case, there is a chance and a prospect, in my opinion, that Russia’s role will be less significant than before.

While some may deduce from the events in Karabakh that conflicts can be resolved through force, I do not believe this is the right lesson for Georgia.

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and primarily Karabakh missed the chance for a peaceful settlement, and the subsequent course of events underscores this lesson.

In my view, both Sukhumi and Moscow should draw the conclusion that it is preferable to resolve the issue peacefully rather than being constantly under the threat of renewed war. This, in my opinion, is the main lesson that needs to be learned and discussed more actively.

Regarding Turkey and its growing role in the Caucasus, after the events in Karabakh, Turkey emerged victorious and strengthened its position along with Azerbaijan. This is an undeniable fact. Turkey has fortified its standing and influence in the South Caucasus.

It is certainly possible to intensify the peace policy with Turkey’s involvement, and even more plausible to deepen Turkey’s role in the matter of conflict resolution. There is undeniably potential for enhancing relations with Turkey. Of course, there are also certain issues that need consideration and cannot be ignored, such as the current relationship between Turkish trading companies and Abkhazia.