Georgia after Karabakh: What has changed in the region and what lessons Tbilisi should learn

Feb 2 2024


“The military operation conducted by Azerbaijan in September 2023 concluded the longest-standing conflict in the Caucasus region, centered around Karabakh. At the very least, it marked a significant stage in the resolution of the conflict.

A new reality has taken shape in the region. However, what implications does this hold for Georgia? What lessons should the country, grappling with two unresolved territorial conflicts of its own, take away?

JAMnews presented these inquiries to experts in conflict, international relations, and security. Additionally, we engaged in discussions with them about Turkey’s escalating role in the region and the potential opportunities this presents for Georgia.”



Paata Zakareishvili, conflictologist:

The developments in Karabakh have fundamentally altered the Caucasus region by introducing a new influential player – Turkey.

Turkey, which withdrew from the Caucasus in 1921 as per the Treaty of Kars, made a return exactly one hundred years later, in 2020.

Being a NATO member, and considering Georgia’s aspiration to join NATO, the entry of NATO, represented by Turkey, into the region raises concerns for Russia.

Presently, Turkey stands as our neighbor, a friendly state that recognizes the territorial integrity of Georgia. However, we are not leveraging this Turkish factor in any significant manner.

Russia does not show significant interest in the closer ties between Turkey and Georgia. Conversely, Georgia maintains a neutral stance in its relations with Turkey, which seems peculiar and runs contrary to Georgia’s interests.

As a new player in both the Caucasus and the Black Sea, Turkey should enhance its influence in both directions.


Georgia, situated in the Caucasus and on the Black Sea, holds a unique position for Turkey today. However, we remain silent. Not only do we fail to express interest in fostering friendship with Turkey within the context of security, but, on the contrary, we cultivate an image of a suspicious state that cannot be trusted. Turkey is unlikely to appreciate our recent engagements with Russia and China.


It is evident that Russia is weakening and has lost influence. In this context, much depends on how Georgia sets its priorities.



Zurab Batiashvili, Research Fellow at the “Georgian Strategy and International Relations Research Foundation” (GFSIS):

Azerbaijan has become the first country in the post-Soviet space to restore its territorial integrity. It is noteworthy that this occurred amid the Russian-Ukrainian war. Azerbaijan capitalized on Russia’s vulnerability, unable to engage in military actions on two fronts, and Moscow turned a blind eye to Azerbaijan’s actions.

Apart from the importance of resolving this conflict and restoring Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity on its own merits, it also holds significance for the region as Russia’s influence is evidently waning.


However, this does not imply the complete elimination of Russian influence.

On the other hand, we also observe the strengthening of the Turkish-Azerbaijani coalition in the South Caucasus. This is natural, as in its foreign policy, it operates on the principle of “one nation, two states.” Therefore, it is not surprising that Turkey is entering and solidifying its presence in the region through Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan, being the largest Caucasian state in terms of territory and population, allows Turkey to extend its influence across the entire Caucasus by gaining influence over Azerbaijan.


The example of Karabakh demonstrated that despite Azerbaijan not being a NATO member, it successfully formed a robust coalition with Turkey, Israel, and Pakistan, leveraging it for its own objectives.

Why can’t we pursue something similar, even with the involvement of Great Britain, Poland, and Turkey, for the benefit of Georgia? Since we are not NATO members, we need to contemplate alternative paths that involve Western countries. This is the direction we genuinely need to consider and actively pursue, aligning with how a country concerned about its own security should behave. However, what security are we discussing when the country has lacked both a security concept and a document on threat assessment for years?

Another lesson we should draw from the current geopolitical situation is the necessity for strength, and this strength should manifest through robust state institutions encompassing the military, intelligence, foreign policy, and more. Unfortunately, this is not occurring.



Sergi Kapanadze, Doctor of International Relations:

The developments in Karabakh undeniably alter the situation in the region, as there is now a genuine chance for peace in this conflict-ridden area.

The primary impediment that was obstructing economic progress in the Caucasus region has been resolved.

This implies numerous new opportunities, not only in the context of achieving peaceful conflict resolution but also for establishing new connections and economic contacts.

Now, we can commence efforts on new routes, whether in the East-West direction, which is of interest to us, or the South-North direction, which theoretically could also be of interest to us.

Russia’s role in the region is undergoing changes. One question pertains to the current status quo regarding Russia’s role at this stage, and the second revolves around the potential and prospects for Russia to persist in the region.

As of now, Russia has succeeded in sustaining its involvement in the conflict, although the role of the Russian military on the Azerbaijani-Armenian border is not yet fully defined. Due to the peace agreements, Russia holds leverage to potentially endure in the region, and it is likely to make efforts not to relinquish it.

Certainly, much will hinge on the positions taken by Azerbaijan and Armenia regarding Russia’s role. Recent developments suggest that Armenia is not inclined towards Russia’s involvement in the South Caucasus, which is understandable given the unfolding events. Armenia perceived that Russia did not adequately protect it and failed in its duty within the Collective Security Organization.

Russia’s involvement and assistance thus far have been beneficial for Azerbaijan, but the future role that Russia will play for Azerbaijan remains uncertain. In any case, there is a chance and a prospect, in my opinion, that Russia’s role will be less significant than before.

While some may deduce from the events in Karabakh that conflicts can be resolved through force, I do not believe this is the right lesson for Georgia.

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and primarily Karabakh missed the chance for a peaceful settlement, and the subsequent course of events underscores this lesson.

In my view, both Sukhumi and Moscow should draw the conclusion that it is preferable to resolve the issue peacefully rather than being constantly under the threat of renewed war. This, in my opinion, is the main lesson that needs to be learned and discussed more actively.

Regarding Turkey and its growing role in the Caucasus, after the events in Karabakh, Turkey emerged victorious and strengthened its position along with Azerbaijan. This is an undeniable fact. Turkey has fortified its standing and influence in the South Caucasus.

It is certainly possible to intensify the peace policy with Turkey’s involvement, and even more plausible to deepen Turkey’s role in the matter of conflict resolution. There is undeniably potential for enhancing relations with Turkey. Of course, there are also certain issues that need consideration and cannot be ignored, such as the current relationship between Turkish trading companies and Abkhazia.